d3.2a – blue med fab safety case (part a: regulatory aspects)
TRANSCRIPT
BLUE MED PROJECT PHASE 2: DEFINITION
WP3.1 - Safety
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
Released Issue
Version 2.0
27/03//2012
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION SHEET
BLUE MED D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB SAFETY CASE
DELIVERABLE REFERENCE NUMBER
PROJECT REFERENCE NUMBER
D3.2 - FAB SAFETY CASE
The scope of this document is to demonstrate that the BLUE MED FAB can be implemented in a manner which is acceptably safe. Thisappropriate evidences. The Safety Case complies with the applicable regulatory requirements and is presented in two distinct documents (D3.2a and D3.2b) for easy readability. This document (D3.2a) focuses on the regulatory aspects of the Safety Case
BLUE MED, FAB, SAFETY, CASE, RISK.
Contact Person:
Petros Stratis
Email:
DOCUMENT STATUS AND CLASSIFICATION
STATUS
Working draft Final Draft
CLASSIFICATION
Public Internal Confidential Restricted
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION SHEET
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
DOCUMENT TITLE
BLUE MED FAB SAFETY CASE – Part A: Regulatory aspects
DELIVERABLE REFERENCE NUMBER
PROJECT REFERENCE NUMBER EDITION:
EDITION DATE:
Abstract
The scope of this document is to demonstrate that the BLUE MED FAB can be implemented in a manner which is acceptably safe. This is claimed through a series of arguments, supported by appropriate evidences. The Safety Case complies with the applicable regulatory requirements and is presented in two distinct documents (D3.2a and D3.2b) for easy readability. This document (D3.2a) cuses on the regulatory aspects of the Safety Case.
Keywords
BLUE MED, FAB, SAFETY, CASE, RISK.
Tel:
+357 22 404192
Organisation:
DCAC
Fax:
+ 357 22 404195
Address:
Pindarou 27, Nicosia, Cyprus
DOCUMENT STATUS AND CLASSIFICATION
Proposed Issue Released Issue
Page 2 of 31
Part A: Regulatory aspects
2.0
27/03/2012
The scope of this document is to demonstrate that the BLUE MED FAB can be implemented in a is claimed through a series of arguments, supported by
appropriate evidences. The Safety Case complies with the applicable regulatory requirements and is presented in two distinct documents (D3.2a and D3.2b) for easy readability. This document (D3.2a)
Organisation:
Pindarou 27, Nicosia, Cyprus
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
Page 3 of 31
BLUE MED Project
Partner States
Cyprus
Greece
Italy
Malta
Albania
Egypt
Tunisia
For the list of contributors, please refer to the Appendix 1
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
AUTHORS
BLUE MED Project
Partner States Author WP Reviewers
Petros Stratis Evis Antonopoulos
--- Athina Lala
--- Maria Milena Renis
--- Francis Bezzina
--- Fisnik Tabaku
--- Salama Ramadan
--- Walha Mohamed Amin
1 : WP National Focal Point
CONTRIBUTORS
For the list of contributors, please refer to the Appendix 1
WP Reviewers1
Evis Antonopoulos
Athina Lala
Milena Renis
Francis Bezzina
Fisnik Tabaku
Salama Ramadan
Walha Mohamed Amin
For the list of contributors, please refer to the Appendix 1
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
Review Level
Program Management Office
Review Level Review Body
1st review level
Final review level
Approval Level
Governing Body
Leonidas Leonidou
Gregory Nanidis
Alessio Quaranta
John Gatt
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
REVIEW
Review Level Body Approval
Program Management Office Approval by correspondance
Review Body Body Approval
OPCG N.A.
TPCG N.A.
FCPCG N.A.
ANSP-SB Approval by correspondance
MCG Approval by correspondance
NSAC Approval by correspondance
APPROVAL
Approval Level Body Approval
Governing Body
Leonidas Leonidou
Gregory Nanidis
Alessio Quaranta
Gatt
Approval by correspondance
Page 4 of 31
Approval by correspondance
Approval by correspondance
Approval by correspondance
Approval by correspondance
Approval by correspondance
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
Page 5 of 31
DOCUMENT CHANGE RECORD
The following table records the complete history of
ED. DATE
0.1 01/12/2009 Creation of the document
0.2 16/12/2009 Modification of initial safety argument as proposed by EUROCONTROL
0.3 15/03/2011 Revision, for
0.4 22/3/2011 Revision, safety argument structure changed to fit the type of changes expected
0.5 30/3/2011 Minor revision, fine tuned in view of WP3.1 meeting
0.6 10/6/2011 Minor revision, WP3.1 meeting
0.7 30/7/2011 Extensive reSarajevo
0.8 16/8/2011 Fine tuning
0.9 22/8/2011 Internal WP3.1 release for working level consultation
0.95 20/09/2011 Consolidation of comments received
0.95a 10/10/2011 Split doc in two parts (D3.2a and D3.2b, as per PM request)
0.95b 28/10/2011 PMO Quality revision
0.96 05/01/2012 Updated, following NSAC review
1.0 30/01/2012 Final, for the GB (after NSAC endorsement in Athens 11 Jan 2012)
2.0 27/03/2012 Released Issue
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
DOCUMENT CHANGE RECORD
The following table records the complete history of the successive editions of the document.
REASON FOR CHANGE SECTIONS/PAGES
Creation of the document
Modification of initial safety argument as proposed by EUROCONTROL
Revision, for compliance with the FAB IR
Revision, safety argument structure changed to fit the type of changes expected
Minor revision, fine tuned in view of WP3.1 meeting
Minor revision, WP3.1 meeting
Extensive re-structuring, after FABs ES2 workshop in
Internal WP3.1 release for working level consultation
Consolidation of comments received
Split doc in two parts (D3.2a and D3.2b, as per PM request)
PMO Quality revision
Updated, following NSAC review
Final, for the GB (after NSAC endorsement in Athens 11 Jan
Released Issue
the successive editions of the document.
SECTIONS/PAGES AFFECTED
All
10
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
-
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
1 GENERAL INFO ................................
2 INTRODUCTION ................................
3 REGULATORY REQUIREME
4 SCOPE - OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
5 DEFINITIONS ................................
6 RATIONALE FOR THE FA
7 ASSUMPTIONS ................................
8 SAFETY RELATED ORGAN
9 ACCEPTABILITY OF THE
10 BLUE MED FAB INITIAL SAFETY ARGUMENT
10.1 Safety arguments decomposition
10.1.1 Safety Culture ................................
10.1.2 Safety will be managed ................................
10.1.3 Safety Oversight ................................
11 SUMMARY – REGULATORY COMPLIANC
12 OVERALL SAFETY CASE
ANNEX 1 - PROPOSED BLUE MED SA
ANNEX 2 - INITIAL HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND M
ANNEX 3 - SAFETY PLAN ................................
ANNEX 4 - INVESTIGATION OF ACC
APPENDIX 1 - LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
................................................................................................
................................................................................................
REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................................
OPERATIONAL CONCEPT................................................................
................................................................................................................................
RATIONALE FOR THE FAB IMPLEMENTATION (SAFETY CASE JUSTIFICAT
................................................................................................
SAFETY RELATED ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS ................................
ACCEPTABILITY OF THE FAB SAFETY CASE ................................................................
SAFETY ARGUMENT................................................................
Safety arguments decomposition ................................................................................................
................................................................................................
................................................................................................
................................................................................................
REGULATORY COMPLIANCE MATRIX ................................................................
OVERALL SAFETY CASE CONCLUSIONS ................................................................
PROPOSED BLUE MED SAFETY POLICY ................................................................
IDENTIFICATION AND MITIGATIONS OF PLANNE
................................................................................................
INVESTIGATION OF ACCIDENTS AND SERIOUS INCIDENTS IN BLUE MED
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS ................................................................
Page 6 of 31
................................................................. 7
................................................................ 7
..................................... 8
................................................................ 9
..................................... 9
FETY CASE JUSTIFICATION) ...................10
................................................................10
..........................................................11
..............................................13
..............................................14
.......................................15
.................................................................15
...................................................16
.............................................................19
....................................20
....................................................21
............................................22
ITIGATIONS OF PLANNED CHANGES ........23
..........................................................28
NCIDENTS IN BLUE MED FAB ..........29
.................................................................31
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
Page 7 of 31
1 GENERAL INFO
Document description: BLUE MED Safety Case
Rationale: WP3.1 deliverable (D3.2)
Author: WP3 Leader + WP3.1 national representatives
Distribution :
2 INTRODUCTION
This document supports the claim that the BLUE MED FAB will be implemented in a manner which is acceptably safe. Furthermore, it provides establishment of a functional airspace block, in accordance with the requirements of the FAB IR ((EU) 176/2011). It should be noted that, some of the required information is further detailed in other BLUE MED documents and deliverables to which this document cross
As per the relevant guidance materialthe required information to the Commission (in accordance with the FABcomplete Safety Case (SC). Therefore the Safety Case hereinupdated at regular intervals or as may be required, so as to adequately support the overall claim.
The present document is structured in a manner that can be easily reviewed by stakeholders concerned with regulatory compliance, such as the NSAs, the European Commission and other external stakeholders that may be relevant (e.g. EASA). It will present the initial safety argument on how safety in the FAB will be achieved and maintained and will answer, in a clear and crequirements of the FAB IR. It will include, inter alia, a high level safety assessment of the foreseen ATM/ANS related changes, presented as a series of hazards with associated mitigations.
It should be noted that the ownership of thit covers more than just ANSP operations. In this respect, the BLUE MED States, through the arrangements described herein, the State Level Agreement (SLA), the NSA Agreement and the FAB SMS roadmap (D3.3) will have the responsibility to maintain and update it so as to remain valid. In doing so, due regard must be given to the States’ Safety Plans required by ICAO, to which the actionscontained in this Safety Case will need to contribute, especially inof safety.
1 European Commission Guidance Material for the establishment and modification of Functional Airspace Blocks (FAB) Ver.1.0, da03/12/2010 ( Adopted)
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
BLUE MED Safety Case
WP3.1 deliverable (D3.2)
WP3 Leader + WP3.1 national representatives
This document supports the claim that the BLUE MED FAB will be implemented in a manner which is acceptably safe. Furthermore, it provides the safety related information required before the
airspace block, in accordance with the requirements of the FAB IR ((EU) 176/2011). It should be noted that, some of the required information is further detailed in other BLUE MED documents and deliverables to which this document cross-references.
the relevant guidance material1, prior to starting FAB operations and at the time of submission of the required information to the Commission (in accordance with the FAB-IR), there cannot yet be a complete Safety Case (SC). Therefore the Safety Case herein will be retained as a living document, updated at regular intervals or as may be required, so as to adequately support the overall claim.
The present document is structured in a manner that can be easily reviewed by stakeholders concerned compliance, such as the NSAs, the European Commission and other external
stakeholders that may be relevant (e.g. EASA). It will present the initial safety argument on how safety in the FAB will be achieved and maintained and will answer, in a clear and concise manner, to the requirements of the FAB IR. It will include, inter alia, a high level safety assessment of the foreseen ATM/ANS related changes, presented as a series of hazards with associated mitigations.
It should be noted that the ownership of the BLUE MED Safety Case belongs to the Member States, as it covers more than just ANSP operations. In this respect, the BLUE MED States, through the arrangements described herein, the State Level Agreement (SLA), the NSA Agreement and the FAB
3.3) will have the responsibility to maintain and update it so as to remain valid. In doing so, due regard must be given to the States’ Safety Plans required by ICAO, to which the actionscontained in this Safety Case will need to contribute, especially in the establishment of acceptable levels
European Commission Guidance Material for the establishment and modification of Functional Airspace Blocks (FAB) Ver.1.0, da
This document supports the claim that the BLUE MED FAB will be implemented in a manner which is the safety related information required before the
airspace block, in accordance with the requirements of the FAB IR ((EU) 176/2011). It should be noted that, some of the required information is further detailed in other BLUE
, prior to starting FAB operations and at the time of submission of IR), there cannot yet be a
will be retained as a living document, updated at regular intervals or as may be required, so as to adequately support the overall claim.
The present document is structured in a manner that can be easily reviewed by stakeholders concerned compliance, such as the NSAs, the European Commission and other external
stakeholders that may be relevant (e.g. EASA). It will present the initial safety argument on how safety oncise manner, to the
requirements of the FAB IR. It will include, inter alia, a high level safety assessment of the foreseen ATM/ANS related changes, presented as a series of hazards with associated mitigations.
e BLUE MED Safety Case belongs to the Member States, as it covers more than just ANSP operations. In this respect, the BLUE MED States, through the arrangements described herein, the State Level Agreement (SLA), the NSA Agreement and the FAB
3.3) will have the responsibility to maintain and update it so as to remain valid. In doing so, due regard must be given to the States’ Safety Plans required by ICAO, to which the actions
the establishment of acceptable levels
European Commission Guidance Material for the establishment and modification of Functional Airspace Blocks (FAB) Ver.1.0, dated
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
3 REGULATORY REQUIREME
• (EU) 176/2011: “Information to be provided before the establishment and modification of a
functional airspace block”
• (EC) No 1070/2009 “Amending Regulations (EC) No 549/2004, (EC)
551/2004 and (EC) No 552/2004 in order to improve the performance and sustainability of the
European aviation system
• (EU) 1034/2011: “on safety oversight in air traffic management and air navigation services and
amending Regulation (EU) No 691/2010”
• (EU) No 1035/2011: “laying down common requirements for the provision of air navigation
services and amending Regulations (EC) No 482/2008 and (EU) No 691/2010”.
4 SCOPE - OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
The geographical area under scope is the airspac
upper information regions (UIR) entrusted to the Member States by the ICAO Regional Air Navigation
Agreements, as identified hereunder:
• Athinai FIR;
• Hellas UIR;
• Nicosia FIR/UIR;
• Milan FIR/UIR;
• Rome FIR/ UIR;
• Brindisi FIR/UIR; and
• Malta FIR/UIR.
Those parts of the above listed FIR/UIR that do not form part of the FAB are listed
BLUE MED State Level Agreement.
The proposed BLUE MED operational concept is as described in the
Concept of Operations D1.1a Version 1.3, dated 10 Feb. 2010
D1.1b Version 1.0, dated Jan. 2011
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
Information to be provided before the establishment and modification of a
functional airspace block”
Amending Regulations (EC) No 549/2004, (EC) No 550/2004, (EC) No
551/2004 and (EC) No 552/2004 in order to improve the performance and sustainability of the
European aviation system”
(EU) 1034/2011: “on safety oversight in air traffic management and air navigation services and
EU) No 691/2010”
(EU) No 1035/2011: “laying down common requirements for the provision of air navigation
services and amending Regulations (EC) No 482/2008 and (EU) No 691/2010”.
OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
The geographical area under scope is the airspace of the flight information regions (FIR) as well as
upper information regions (UIR) entrusted to the Member States by the ICAO Regional Air Navigation
Agreements, as identified hereunder:
Athinai FIR;
Hellas UIR;
Nicosia FIR/UIR;
Milan FIR/UIR;
FIR/ UIR;
Brindisi FIR/UIR; and
Malta FIR/UIR.
Those parts of the above listed FIR/UIR that do not form part of the FAB are listed
State Level Agreement.
The proposed BLUE MED operational concept is as described in the deliverables titled “
Concept of Operations D1.1a Version 1.3, dated 10 Feb. 2010” and “Detailed Concept of Operations
D1.1b Version 1.0, dated Jan. 2011”.
Page 8 of 31
Information to be provided before the establishment and modification of a
No 550/2004, (EC) No
551/2004 and (EC) No 552/2004 in order to improve the performance and sustainability of the
(EU) 1034/2011: “on safety oversight in air traffic management and air navigation services and
(EU) No 1035/2011: “laying down common requirements for the provision of air navigation
services and amending Regulations (EC) No 482/2008 and (EU) No 691/2010”.
e of the flight information regions (FIR) as well as
upper information regions (UIR) entrusted to the Member States by the ICAO Regional Air Navigation
Those parts of the above listed FIR/UIR that do not form part of the FAB are listed in Annex 1of the
deliverables titled “BLUE MED
Detailed Concept of Operations
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
Page 9 of 31
5 DEFINITIONS
“Aerospace Performance Factor using multiple localized safety measures, e.g. reported incidents, causal factors, or other operational factors or constraints etc., weighted by subject moperations. The weighting may be
“Analytic Hierarchy Processing complex decisions, based on mathematicsgroup decision making.
“Air Traffic Management – ATM”(air traffic services, airspace management andand efficient movement of aircraft during all phases of operations.
“Change” means the application of any activity or system element that has not previously been part of the design envelope, normal operating environment or procedures of the organisation.
“Failure Case” means the demonstration (by arguments) that an ATM system will be acceptably safe, taking into account of the possibility of failures.
“Functional System” means a combination of systems, procedures and human resources organised to perform a function within the context of the ATM.
.
“Success Case” means the demonstration (by arguments) that an ATM system has sufficient functionality and performance for it to be acceptably safe in the absence of failure.
“Safety Case”: A comprehensive document containing the safety arguments, supporting evidence and implementation plan, demonstrating that a proposed change to an ATM system can be put intacceptably safe.
For any other terms used in this report, the definitions of (EC) 1070/2009 and (EC) 1315/2007 apply.
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
“Aerospace Performance Factor – APF” an approach to the measurement of safety performance using multiple localized safety measures, e.g. reported incidents, causal factors, or other operational factors or constraints etc., weighted by subject matter expert judgment, and normalized against system
may be achieved by the use of analytical hierarchy processing (AHP).
“Analytic Hierarchy Processing – AHP” is a structured technique for organizing and analyzing mathematics and subjective judgement, with particular application in
ATM” means the aggregation of the airborne and ground(air traffic services, airspace management and air traffic flow management) required to ensure the safe and efficient movement of aircraft during all phases of operations.
means the application of any activity or system element that has not previously been part of operating environment or procedures of the organisation.
means the demonstration (by arguments) that an ATM system will be acceptably safe, taking into account of the possibility of failures.
means a combination of systems, procedures and human resources organised to perform a function within the context of the ATM.
means the demonstration (by arguments) that an ATM system has sufficient performance for it to be acceptably safe in the absence of failure.
: A comprehensive document containing the safety arguments, supporting evidence and implementation plan, demonstrating that a proposed change to an ATM system can be put int
For any other terms used in this report, the definitions of (EC) 1070/2009 and (EC) 1315/2007 apply.
an approach to the measurement of safety performance using multiple localized safety measures, e.g. reported incidents, causal factors, or other operational
atter expert judgment, and normalized against system ical hierarchy processing (AHP).
is a structured technique for organizing and analyzing and subjective judgement, with particular application in
means the aggregation of the airborne and ground-based functions air traffic flow management) required to ensure the safe
means the application of any activity or system element that has not previously been part of operating environment or procedures of the organisation.
means the demonstration (by arguments) that an ATM system will be acceptably safe,
means a combination of systems, procedures and human resources
means the demonstration (by arguments) that an ATM system has sufficient
: A comprehensive document containing the safety arguments, supporting evidence and implementation plan, demonstrating that a proposed change to an ATM system can be put into service
For any other terms used in this report, the definitions of (EC) 1070/2009 and (EC) 1315/2007 apply.
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
6 RATIONALE FOR THE FAJUSTIFICATION)
The BLUE MED FAB is a response to regulatory requirements asuniform level of air navigation services in the central and east Mediterranean basin.
7 ASSUMPTIONS
• The Safety Case applies to the four EU States of BLUE MED (Cyprus, Greece Italy and
Malta), in which the SES
NSAs responsible for safety oversight and duly certified ANSPs which provide service within
the FAB in accordance with the SES regulations.
• All the planned operational/technical changes will
safety cases/assessments.
• The BLUE MED FAB will be initially developed, deployed and operated according to the
proposed BLUE MED operational concept (described in the deliverables titled “
Concept of Operations
Operations D1.1b Version 1.0, dated Jan. 2011
close cooperation between
harmonised processes for safety management.
• The deliverables of other Work Packages (particularly WP1, WP2 and WP6) are
sources of information with respect to the identification of
FAB.
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
RATIONALE FOR THE FAB IMPLEMENTATION (SA
The BLUE MED FAB is a response to regulatory requirements as well as an operational vision for a uniform level of air navigation services in the central and east Mediterranean basin.
The Safety Case applies to the four EU States of BLUE MED (Cyprus, Greece Italy and
in which the SES regulations are complied with. The four States have established
NSAs responsible for safety oversight and duly certified ANSPs which provide service within
the FAB in accordance with the SES regulations.
All the planned operational/technical changes will be implemented and supported by local
safety cases/assessments.
The BLUE MED FAB will be initially developed, deployed and operated according to the
proposed BLUE MED operational concept (described in the deliverables titled “
Concept of Operations D1.1a Version 1.3, dated 10 Feb. 2010” and “
Operations D1.1b Version 1.0, dated Jan. 2011”). The operational concept foresees the
close cooperation between ANSPs for the coordinated implementation of changes, including
esses for safety management.
The deliverables of other Work Packages (particularly WP1, WP2 and WP6) are
of information with respect to the identification of the foreseen ATM
Page 10 of 31
B IMPLEMENTATION (SAFETY CASE
well as an operational vision for a uniform level of air navigation services in the central and east Mediterranean basin.
The Safety Case applies to the four EU States of BLUE MED (Cyprus, Greece Italy and
regulations are complied with. The four States have established
NSAs responsible for safety oversight and duly certified ANSPs which provide service within
be implemented and supported by local
The BLUE MED FAB will be initially developed, deployed and operated according to the
proposed BLUE MED operational concept (described in the deliverables titled “BLUE MED
” and “Detailed Concept of
. The operational concept foresees the
ANSPs for the coordinated implementation of changes, including
The deliverables of other Work Packages (particularly WP1, WP2 and WP6) are appropriate
the foreseen ATM changes in the
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
Page 11 of 31
8 SAFETY RELATED ORGAN
The primary organizational arrangements foreseen to comply with the safety related requirements of
the FAB IR are,
• the BLUE MED NSA Committee
• the BLUE MED ANSP Safety Coordination Group
The NSA Committee will have the overall responsibilit
oversight requirements of the BLUE MED Safety Case
assigned to it. This Committee will answer directly to the BLUE MED Governing Board, which is the
highest level of Governance in the FAB. Further details on the workings of this Committee are included
in the BLUE MED NSA Agreement, as well as the FAB State Level Agreement.
The BLUE MED ANSP Safety Coordination Group
review, manage and monitor the
requirements of the FAB IR). Membership to the Group will primarily be from the BLUE MED ANSP
SMS units e.g. BLUE MED ANSPs’ Safety manage
to the ANSP and Safety Committees of BLUE MED. The group will also make use of operations and
engineering expertise from the ANSPs whenever deemed required for the FAB safety activities. ANSPs
shall endeavor to keep the membership consistent (at least in the initial period) to ensure harmonisation
and cohesion. Further details on the workings of this group are included in
Further to the above, and in accordance with Article 20,
BLUE MED Sate Level Agreement, the BLUE MED Governing Board can “set up Committees…and
working groups…to assist it in specific matters and approve the proposals of the Committees and
working groups”. In this respect, one additional organizational arrangement could be the setting up of a
BLUE MED State Safety Sub-
regulatory/oversight and ANSP’s organisations (including Military ANSPs, if deemed necess
would have the overall responsibility for maintaining the BLUE MED Safety Case.
sub-committee could be supporting
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
SAFETY RELATED ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
The primary organizational arrangements foreseen to comply with the safety related requirements of
BLUE MED NSA Committee.
BLUE MED ANSP Safety Coordination Group,
The NSA Committee will have the overall responsibility for overseeing the implementation of
oversight requirements of the BLUE MED Safety Case, and the direct responsibility over the task
. This Committee will answer directly to the BLUE MED Governing Board, which is the
el of Governance in the FAB. Further details on the workings of this Committee are included
in the BLUE MED NSA Agreement, as well as the FAB State Level Agreement.
Safety Coordination Group will have ToRs and responsibilities and will
review, manage and monitor the BLUE MED FAB SMS Roadmap (which covers the ANSP related
requirements of the FAB IR). Membership to the Group will primarily be from the BLUE MED ANSP
SMS units e.g. BLUE MED ANSPs’ Safety managers or their appointed representatives and will report
to the ANSP and Safety Committees of BLUE MED. The group will also make use of operations and
engineering expertise from the ANSPs whenever deemed required for the FAB safety activities. ANSPs
eavor to keep the membership consistent (at least in the initial period) to ensure harmonisation
. Further details on the workings of this group are included in D3.3 - FAB SMS Roadmap
Further to the above, and in accordance with Article 20, “Competencies of the Governing Board” of the
BLUE MED Sate Level Agreement, the BLUE MED Governing Board can “set up Committees…and
working groups…to assist it in specific matters and approve the proposals of the Committees and
pect, one additional organizational arrangement could be the setting up of a
-Committee which could include representatives from the State’s
regulatory/oversight and ANSP’s organisations (including Military ANSPs, if deemed necess
have the overall responsibility for maintaining the BLUE MED Safety Case.
supporting the NSAC on specific issues of safety.
ARRANGEMENTS
The primary organizational arrangements foreseen to comply with the safety related requirements of
the implementation of the safety
, and the direct responsibility over the tasks
. This Committee will answer directly to the BLUE MED Governing Board, which is the
el of Governance in the FAB. Further details on the workings of this Committee are included
and responsibilities and will
(which covers the ANSP related
requirements of the FAB IR). Membership to the Group will primarily be from the BLUE MED ANSP
rs or their appointed representatives and will report
to the ANSP and Safety Committees of BLUE MED. The group will also make use of operations and
engineering expertise from the ANSPs whenever deemed required for the FAB safety activities. ANSPs
eavor to keep the membership consistent (at least in the initial period) to ensure harmonisation
FAB SMS Roadmap.
“Competencies of the Governing Board” of the
BLUE MED Sate Level Agreement, the BLUE MED Governing Board can “set up Committees…and
working groups…to assist it in specific matters and approve the proposals of the Committees and
pect, one additional organizational arrangement could be the setting up of a
representatives from the State’s
regulatory/oversight and ANSP’s organisations (including Military ANSPs, if deemed necessary) and
have the overall responsibility for maintaining the BLUE MED Safety Case. Furthermore, this
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
The organizational chart
Figure 1: BLUE MED FAB Safety organisational arrangements (with respect to safety)
BLUE MED States Safety sub
(Comprises representatives of both the
NSA and ANSP Committees
reporting lines to be defined by the
Governing Body)
BLUE MED NSA
Committee
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
The organizational chart below summarizes these arrangements
BLUE MED FAB Safety organisational arrangements (with respect to safety)
BLUE MED FAB
Governing Board
BLUE MED States Safety sub‐committee
Comprises representatives of both the
NSA and ANSP Committees. ToRs and
reporting lines to be defined by the
)
BLUE MED NSA BLUE MED ANSP
Committee
BLUE MED ANSP
Safety Coordination
Group
BLUE MED Civil
Coordination
Page 12 of 31
summarizes these arrangements:
BLUE MED FAB Safety organisational arrangements (with respect to safety)
BLUE MED ANSP
Safety Coordination
BLUE MED Civil ‐
Military
Coordination Group
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
Page 13 of 31
9 ACCEPTABILITY OF THE
A Safety Case is deemed acceptable when it meets a number of prean overall safety claim (i.e. in this case, that the BLUE MED FAB will be moment of delivering the Safety Case, the following cav
• The BLUE MED FAB is not yet established.
• There is no unique BLUE MED NSA
• There is no common FAB SMS implemented accepted by the concerned NSAs (albeit one is planned, with a clear rimplementation)
• Consequently, there are no formal, commonly defined acceptability criteria for the FAB Safety Case, other than those mandated by the FAB Implementing Rule.
In view of the above, the criterion for acceptability of the BLUE MED SC
• SCr1: The FAB Reporting
The safety arguments elaborated in the following pages satisfy this criterion.
2 COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 176/2011
establishment and modification of a functional airspace block
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
ACCEPTABILITY OF THE FAB SAFETY CASE
A Safety Case is deemed acceptable when it meets a number of pre-set criteria, which, in turn support (i.e. in this case, that the BLUE MED FAB will be acceptably
moment of delivering the Safety Case, the following caveats hold true:
The BLUE MED FAB is not yet established.
There is no unique BLUE MED NSA or BLUE MED ANSP.
There is no common FAB SMS implemented by the concerned ANSPs accepted by the concerned NSAs (albeit one is planned, with a clear r
Consequently, there are no formal, commonly defined acceptability criteria for the FAB Safety Case, other than those mandated by the FAB Implementing Rule.
In view of the above, the criterion for acceptability of the BLUE MED SC is:
Reporting IR2 regulatory requirements are complied with
The safety arguments elaborated in the following pages satisfy this criterion.
COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 176/2011 of 24 February 2011 on the information to be provided before the
establishment and modification of a functional airspace block
set criteria, which, in turn support acceptably safe). At the
by the concerned ANSPs and subsequently accepted by the concerned NSAs (albeit one is planned, with a clear roadmap for
Consequently, there are no formal, commonly defined acceptability criteria for the FAB Safety
regulatory requirements are complied with
on the information to be provided before the
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
10 BLUE MED FAB INITIAL
The figure below shows the initial safety argument the basic arguments for safety in BLUE MED.
Figure 2:
The top level claim (Arg0) is decomposed into three principal Structured Notation (GSN)3 convention. The essence of this approach towards making a case is that an argument can only be considered to be true if each of the sub
3 GSN was originally developed by the University of York in the safety argument (requirements, claims, evidence and context) and (perhaps more significantly) the relationships that exist beelements (i.e. how individual requirements arcontext (environment) that is defined for the argument).EUROCONTROL in its Safety Assessment Methodolog
ACCEPTABILITY CRITERIA
Cr1 : The (EU) 176/2011 safety
regulatory requirements are
complied with
JUSTIFICATION 01:
FAB creation is both an
operational and a regulatory
requirement (SES I and SES II)
Arg. 1:
Safety Culture will be
developed
Str1.1
Provide direct and backing
evidence by means of
FAB Safety Policy, safety
culture surveys and after
care improvements that a
positive safety culture is
created, cultivated,
monitored and improved
in all the FAB
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
BLUE MED FAB INITIAL SAFETY ARGUMENT
The figure below shows the initial safety argument for the FAB, which presents, in graphical form the basic arguments for safety in BLUE MED.
Figure 2: BLUE MED Initial safety argument
) is decomposed into three principal Safety Arguments, using the Goal convention. The essence of this approach towards making a case is that an
argument can only be considered to be true if each of the sub-arguments is shown to be true.
GSN was originally developed by the University of York in the late 90s, as a graphical representation of the individual elements of any safety argument (requirements, claims, evidence and context) and (perhaps more significantly) the relationships that exist beelements (i.e. how individual requirements are supported by specific claims, how claims are supported by evidence and the assumed context (environment) that is defined for the argument). In ATM industry, the GSN has been further developed and adopted by EUROCONTROL in its Safety Assessment Methodology and Safety Case Development Manual.
OVERALL CLAIM (Arg 0):The FAB will be implemented
in a manner which is
acceptably safe
Arg. 2:
Safety will be managed
St00:
Demonstrate that safety is achieved
by success in three main pillars:
Safety Culture, Safety Management
and safety oversight, providing direct
and backing evidence that safety is
addressed as required
Str2.1
Provide direct and backing
evidence that accidents and
incidents will be duly
investigated, safety
performance monitored,
safety targets set and that
the risks associated with
operational changes will be
managed in all the FAB
Safety Culture will be
developed
Provide direct and backing
evidence by means of A
safety
culture surveys and after
care improvements that a
afety culture is
monitored and improved
Page 14 of 31
for the FAB, which presents, in graphical form
Safety Arguments, using the Goal convention. The essence of this approach towards making a case is that an
arguments is shown to be true.
late 90s, as a graphical representation of the individual elements of any safety argument (requirements, claims, evidence and context) and (perhaps more significantly) the relationships that exist between these
e supported by specific claims, how claims are supported by evidence and the assumed In ATM industry, the GSN has been further developed and adopted by
Arg. 3:
Safety oversight on ATM/
ANS will be provided in a
coordinated manner
Str3.1
Provide direct and backing
evidence that safety
oversight will be provided
to the FAB, in a
harmonised manner,
through the enhanced
cooperation of the BLUE
MED NSAs
CONTEXT:
‐ Current operations are
acceptably safe
‐ SES I / II requirements
‐ BM Concept of operations
ASSUMPTIONS:
The BLUE MED FAB will be established, at the
latest, by the 4th
of December 2012.
All the planned operational/technical changes
will be implemented and supported by local
safety cases/assessments.
Additional assumptions as per Section 7
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
Page 15 of 31
10.1 Safety arguments decompositio
The three principal arguments and any subevidences supporting the arguments will be collected in time, enhancing the validity of the SC.
10.1.1 Safety Culture
Arg1 asserts that BLUE MED FAB will operate exists and which will be continuously environment and it will convey the values, commitments and the way forward the FAB. According to the FAB SMS Roadmap, this is planned for establishment), when it will be the FAB Safety Policy has already been prepared and it is included in
The FAB safety culture will be monitored and further developedEUROCONTROL has already developed the process for such a survey for ANSPs, althoughtime of writing), it is intended mainly for application at naalready undertaken this survey, nevertheless, a FAB wide survey will need some modification to the original to take into account and address the safety requirements at State level (e.g. well as regional and national differences. When a suitable survey has been designed, preferably at pan-european or FAB level, then BLUE MED will or further improvements in its environment. Until such time the safety culturachieved by individual ANSPs measurements and after care improvement plans.
Further to the above, due consideration will be given to developments with regards to the just culture arrangements foreseen in the SES II ATM performance scdevelopments during RP1 and will adjust its National Performance Plans (or FAB Performance Plans, if deemed necessary) to include such actions that will ensure that just culture exists and is implemented in the FAB.
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
Safety arguments decomposition
and any sub-arguments thereof support the overall safety claim. The evidences supporting the arguments will be collected in time, enhancing the validity of the SC.
asserts that BLUE MED FAB will operate in an environment where an underlying safety culture exists and which will be continuously developed. A FAB Safety Policy, will set the framework of this environment and it will convey the values, commitments and the way forward
FAB. According to the FAB SMS Roadmap, this is planned for 2012 (or in ), when it will be endorsed at BLUE MED Governing Board level. A provisional text for
the FAB Safety Policy has already been prepared and it is included in Annex 1.
safety culture will be monitored and further developed by means of sEUROCONTROL has already developed the process for such a survey for ANSPs, although
, it is intended mainly for application at national level. Some BLUE MED ANSPs have already undertaken this survey, nevertheless, a FAB wide survey will need some modification to the original to take into account and address the safety requirements at State level (e.g.
and national differences. When a suitable survey has been designed, preferably at european or FAB level, then BLUE MED will perform it and use its outcome to make corrections
or further improvements in its environment. Until such time the safety culture in BLUE MED by individual ANSPs measurements and after care improvement plans.
Further to the above, due consideration will be given to developments with regards to the just culture arrangements foreseen in the SES II ATM performance scheme. BLUE MED FAB will monitor developments during RP1 and will adjust its National Performance Plans (or FAB Performance Plans, if deemed necessary) to include such actions that will ensure that just culture exists and is
support the overall safety claim. The evidences supporting the arguments will be collected in time, enhancing the validity of the SC.
in an environment where an underlying safety culture . A FAB Safety Policy, will set the framework of this
for ensuring safety in 2012 (or in Year 1 of FAB
endorsed at BLUE MED Governing Board level. A provisional text for
by means of specific surveys. EUROCONTROL has already developed the process for such a survey for ANSPs, although (at the
tional level. Some BLUE MED ANSPs have already undertaken this survey, nevertheless, a FAB wide survey will need some modification to the original to take into account and address the safety requirements at State level (e.g. oversight) as
and national differences. When a suitable survey has been designed, preferably at it and use its outcome to make corrections
in BLUE MED will be by individual ANSPs measurements and after care improvement plans.
Further to the above, due consideration will be given to developments with regards to the just culture heme. BLUE MED FAB will monitor these
developments during RP1 and will adjust its National Performance Plans (or FAB Performance Plans, if deemed necessary) to include such actions that will ensure that just culture exists and is
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
10.1.2 Safety will be managed
Arg2 asserts that BLUE MED FAB will operate in an environment where both in a proactive and a reactive manner. In this respect, investigated (both at State and ANSP level)set and the risks associated with operational changes will be managed.
Arg2.1 asserts that accidents and incidents will be duly investigatedcan be sub-divided into two domains: the State domain, where accidents and serious incidents are normally investigated, and the ANSP domain, where less serto prevent any degradation from the high safety standards ANSPs like to retain.
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
Safety will be managed
asserts that BLUE MED FAB will operate in an environment where safety will be managed, both in a proactive and a reactive manner. In this respect, accidents and incidents will be duly investigated (both at State and ANSP level), FAB-wide safety performance monitored, safety targets set and the risks associated with operational changes will be managed.
Figure 3: BLUE MED Safety Arg. 2
asserts that accidents and incidents will be duly investigated. This very important safety activity divided into two domains: the State domain, where accidents and serious incidents are
normally investigated, and the ANSP domain, where less serious incidents are also to prevent any degradation from the high safety standards ANSPs like to retain.
Page 16 of 31
safety will be managed, accidents and incidents will be duly
wide safety performance monitored, safety targets
. This very important safety activity divided into two domains: the State domain, where accidents and serious incidents are
also investigated so as
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
Page 17 of 31
With regards to the State domain, the accident and serious incident investigation and the associated safety data collection, analysis and996/2010. The independent Accident Investigation Boardsoperate in an enhanced cooperation model, in accordance with Agreement (included in Annex 4 of this report for readability purposes).
With regards to incident investigation in the ANSP domain, the following actions have been planned in the BM FAB SMS roadmap:
In Year 1 of FAB establishment
• A common investigation process will
guidelines on ATM Occurrence Investigation.
• Harmonisation of national occurrence reporting and investigation processes shall begin,
agreeing, as a minimum, on the output
• Implementation of the Risk Analysis Tool (RAT) in the national occurrence investigation
processes.
• Agreement on a common
investigation results in a commonly accessible repository
EUROCONTROL TOKAI -
• Sharing within the FAB their (national) lesson dissemination material (e.g. safety bulletins)
Year 2 of FAB establishment
• Harmonisation of national SM
continue, aiming (in so far as practicable
Arg2.2 asserts that the FAB Safety Performance will be monitored and managed.this is, as per the regulatory requirement, functional airspace block. BLUE MED D3.3 in its entirety provides a roadmap with specific actions designed to achieve this goal. Particul
• A FAB-wide safety monitoring process shall be agreed (inputs and outputs as a minimum).
Adoption of common tools will be
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
With regards to the State domain, the accident and serious incident investigation and the associated is and exchange, will be conducted in accordance with Regulation (EU) Accident Investigation Boards of the BLUE MED States concerned, will
operate in an enhanced cooperation model, in accordance with Article 26 (included in Annex 4 of this report for readability purposes).
With regards to incident investigation in the ANSP domain, the following actions have been planned in
In Year 1 of FAB establishment:
common investigation process will be set-up and it will be based on the EUROCONTROL
guidelines on ATM Occurrence Investigation.
Harmonisation of national occurrence reporting and investigation processes shall begin,
on the output of the processes.
the Risk Analysis Tool (RAT) in the national occurrence investigation
common method of archiving FAB relevant safety occurrences and
investigation results in a commonly accessible repository (e.g. through the use of
- Tool Kit for ATM Occurrence Investigation)
Sharing within the FAB their (national) lesson dissemination material (e.g. safety bulletins)
Year 2 of FAB establishment (2013):
Harmonisation of national SMS process for occurrence reporting and investigation will
in so far as practicable) towards a unique occurrence reporting form.
asserts that the FAB Safety Performance will be monitored and managed.this is, as per the regulatory requirement, to avoid any degradation in safety performance within the
. BLUE MED D3.3 in its entirety provides a roadmap with specific actions achieve this goal. Particularly for safety performance, the following are foreseen:
wide safety monitoring process shall be agreed (inputs and outputs as a minimum).
Adoption of common tools will be recommended (e.g. APF);
With regards to the State domain, the accident and serious incident investigation and the associated in accordance with Regulation (EU)
of the BLUE MED States concerned, will of the State Level
With regards to incident investigation in the ANSP domain, the following actions have been planned in
be based on the EUROCONTROL
Harmonisation of national occurrence reporting and investigation processes shall begin,
the Risk Analysis Tool (RAT) in the national occurrence investigation
FAB relevant safety occurrences and
through the use of ECCAIRS or
Sharing within the FAB their (national) lesson dissemination material (e.g. safety bulletins)
S process for occurrence reporting and investigation will
reporting form.
asserts that the FAB Safety Performance will be monitored and managed. The intention of degradation in safety performance within the
. BLUE MED D3.3 in its entirety provides a roadmap with specific actions arly for safety performance, the following are foreseen:
wide safety monitoring process shall be agreed (inputs and outputs as a minimum).
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
• SES II compliant leading indicators
safety management) and appropriate targets
pan-European ones which are expected
• The effectiveness of safety management sha
methodology developed by EASA.
• FAB wide safety maturity will be assessed
European level by EASA.
Arg2.3 asserts that FAB safety targets will be set.arrangements for clearly identifying and allocating thethe setting of safety targets, the following are foreseen:
In Year 1 of FAB establishment
• A bi-annual FAB Safety Pro
(starting from the end of 2012), detailing specific FAB
associated with measurable safety targets
• The BLUE MED ANSPs shall relate and align the
individual designated ANSP Safety Plans to
performance targets.
In Year 2 of FAB establishment
• The top 5 safety concerns/risks in
expert judgment and, subsequently, complemented by data.
• SES II compliant FAB-wide
identified as well as the ones defined in future SES regul
• Safety targets for the FAB shall be proposed
Governance for formal adoption
be set by the EC in the framework of the Performance IR.
• Additional tools e.g. ASMT Automatic Safety Monitoring Tool for Safety Performance
Monitoring may be considered for adoption, initially at ANSP level and then at FAB level.
4 A safety target for the ANSP safety maturity has already been set through the endorsement of D3.3
MED Governing Body (At least Level 3 by end of 2014 for all ANSPs and Level 4 for all AN
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
SES II compliant leading indicators for RP1 will be de facto adopted (e.g. effectiveness of
and appropriate targets will be set. These will be further updated
which are expected to be set by the EC for RP2 (2014-
The effectiveness of safety management shall be measured, on an annual basis, by a
developed by EASA. .
FAB wide safety maturity will be assessed using the method agreed and developed at pan
asserts that FAB safety targets will be set. According to D3.3, wclearly identifying and allocating the responsibilities and interfaces with relation to
the setting of safety targets, the following are foreseen:
In Year 1 of FAB establishment (2012):
FAB Safety Programme will be produced at the last quarter of every second year
(starting from the end of 2012), detailing specific FAB-wide safety activities (e.g. surveys)
with measurable safety targets.
ANSPs shall relate and align the BLUE MED FAB Safety Programme
ANSP Safety Plans to ensure consistency with
of FAB establishment (2013):
The top 5 safety concerns/risks in BLUE MED FAB shall be established, based initially on
expert judgment and, subsequently, complemented by data.
wide lagging indicators shall be established, based on the key risk areas
as well as the ones defined in future SES regulations.
Safety targets for the FAB shall be proposed by NSAC to the BLUE MED high level
for formal adoption4. These will be aligned with future pan-European ones that might
be set by the EC in the framework of the Performance IR.
s e.g. ASMT Automatic Safety Monitoring Tool for Safety Performance
be considered for adoption, initially at ANSP level and then at FAB level.
A safety target for the ANSP safety maturity has already been set through the endorsement of D3.3 – FAB SMS Roadmap by the BLUE
At least Level 3 by end of 2014 for all ANSPs and Level 4 for all ANSPs by end of 2019
Page 18 of 31
(e.g. effectiveness of
further updated with the
-2016).
ll be measured, on an annual basis, by a
method agreed and developed at pan-
D3.3, with regards to the responsibilities and interfaces with relation to
will be produced at the last quarter of every second year
wide safety activities (e.g. surveys)
Safety Programme with
ensure consistency with individual safety
FAB shall be established, based initially on
indicators shall be established, based on the key risk areas
BLUE MED high level
European ones that might
s e.g. ASMT Automatic Safety Monitoring Tool for Safety Performance
be considered for adoption, initially at ANSP level and then at FAB level.
FAB SMS Roadmap by the BLUE
SPs by end of 2019 )
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
Page 19 of 31
• BLUE MED FAB safety performance will be further analysed, enhanced and aggregated, based
on input from all BLUE MED
indicators (based on the possible
Aerospace Performance Factor)
Arg2.4 asserts that operational changes will be safety assessed.ANSPs already perform the safety assessment of each change to the ATM Functional System as per the procedures accepted by the respective NSAs. Roadmap) contains an action plan on how the safety assessment processes of BLUE MED ANSPs will be harmonised. Finally, in Annex changes is included, containing a list of identified hazards and associated mitigations.
Arg2.5 asserts that FAB-wideFAB Safety Case (Part B: Beyond regulatory requirements)associated with the common implementation if implemented in the framework of the FAB. This is because the risks assessed by each BLUE MED ANSP individually can be more effectively mitigFAB framework and which act as additional safety barrier to hazards.demonstration of this sub-argument
10.1.3 Safety Oversight
The Blue Med NSAs have already in place a SES regulation compliant oversight system. In addition to this, Arg 3 asserts that manner by the NSA Committee, in the framework foreseen in the State Leaccordance with the BLUE MED
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
safety performance will be further analysed, enhanced and aggregated, based
BLUE MED designated ANSPs through a combination of leading and lagging
possible adoption of AHP - Analytical Hierarchy Process and APF
Aerospace Performance Factor)
asserts that operational changes will be safety assessed. As a result of certification process, ANSPs already perform the safety assessment of each change to the ATM Functional System as
accepted by the respective NSAs. Furthermore, BLUE MED D3.3) contains an action plan on how the safety assessment processes of BLUE MED ANSPs
will be harmonised. Finally, in Annex 2 of this SC an initial high level risk assessment of plan, containing a list of identified hazards and associated mitigations.
wide changes will be introduced with reduced risks. FAB Safety Case (Part B: Beyond regulatory requirements) demonstrates
common implementation of changes to the ATM functional systemif implemented in the framework of the FAB. This is because the risks assessed by each BLUE MED ANSP individually can be more effectively mitigated through the synergies that are possible in the FAB framework and which act as additional safety barrier to hazards. See D3.2 for an elaborate
argument.
The Blue Med NSAs have already in place a SES regulation compliant oversight system. In asserts that the safety of BLUE MED FAB will be overseen in a coordinated
manner by the NSA Committee, in the framework foreseen in the State Level FAB Agreement and in NSA Agreement.
safety performance will be further analysed, enhanced and aggregated, based
ANSPs through a combination of leading and lagging
Analytical Hierarchy Process and APF –
As a result of certification process, ANSPs already perform the safety assessment of each change to the ATM Functional System as
BLUE MED D3.3 (FAB SMS ) contains an action plan on how the safety assessment processes of BLUE MED ANSPs
assessment of planned , containing a list of identified hazards and associated mitigations.
D3.2b – BLUE MED demonstrates that the risks
of changes to the ATM functional systems will be lower if implemented in the framework of the FAB. This is because the risks assessed by each BLUE MED
ated through the synergies that are possible in the See D3.2 for an elaborate
The Blue Med NSAs have already in place a SES regulation compliant oversight system. In will be overseen in a coordinated
vel FAB Agreement and in
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
11 SUMMARY – REGULATORY COMPLIANC
The table below presents, at a glancesafety related reporting requirements of (EU) 176references to other BLUE MED documents and the safety arguments from the previous pages.
Ref (EU) 176/2011 requirement
(Annex, Part 2)
With regard to the functional airspace block safety case,
R1 (a) The common safety policy or plans to establish a common safety policy
R2 (b) A description of the arrangements with accident and incidentplans on how to address safety data collection, analysis and exchange;
R3 (c) A description of the system in place or planned to avoiddegradation in safety performance within the functional airspace block;
R4 (d) A description of the arrangements clearly identifying and allocating theand interfaces with relation to the setting of safety targets, safety oversight and the accompanying enforcement measures in regard to the provision of air navigation services within the functional airspace block;
R5 (e) Documentation and/or statements that the safety assessment including hazardidentification, risk assessment and mitigation has been conducted beforeoperational changes resulting from the establishment or modification of the functional airspace block;
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
REGULATORY COMPLIANCE MATRIX
at a glance, a summary as to how the BLUE MED FAB conforms to the requirements of (EU) 176/2011. It should be noted that the table contains cross
references to other BLUE MED documents and the safety arguments from the previous pages.
(EU) 176/2011 requirement
(Annex, Part 2)
Safety
Argument
Backing
evidence
functional airspace block safety case, the following information is hereby
The common safety policy or plans to establish a common safety policy
Arg. 1 D3.3 – FAB SMS Roadmap, 7.1
(b) A description of the arrangements dealing with accident and incident investigation and plans on how to address safety data collection,
Arg. 2.1 FAB State Level FAB Agreement Article26 D3.3 – FAB SMS Roadmap 7.4, 7.8, 8.7
(c) A description of the safety management system in place or planned to avoid degradation in safety performance within the
Arg. 2.2 D3.3 – FAB SMS
Roadmap 7.6, 7.7,
8.2, 8.7
(d) A description of the arrangements clearly allocating the responsibilities
and interfaces with relation to the setting of safety oversight and the
accompanying enforcement measures in regard provision of air navigation services within
the functional airspace block;
Arg. 2.3
Arg. 3
D3.3 – FAB SMS Roadmap 7.7, 8.2 NSA Agreement
(e) Documentation and/or statements that the safety assessment including hazard identification, risk assessment and mitigation has been conducted before introducing
resulting from the modification of the functional
Arg. 2.4 D3.2 (this document), Part B and Annex 2
Page 20 of 31
to how the BLUE MED FAB conforms to the . It should be noted that the table contains cross
references to other BLUE MED documents and the safety arguments from the previous pages.
Backing
evidence
COMMENT
the following information is hereby provided:
FAB SMS Roadmap, 7.1
COMPLIANT
FAB State Level FAB Agreement
+ FAB SMS
Roadmap 7.4, 7.8,
COMPLIANT
FAB SMS
Roadmap 7.6, 7.7,
COMPLIANT
FAB SMS Roadmap 7.7, 8.2
NSA Agreement
COMPLIANT
D3.2 (this document), Part B and Annex 2
COMPLIANT
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
Page 21 of 31
12 OVERALL SAFETY CASE
The arguments elaborated in the previous sections can be summarised as
• The Safety Regulatory requirements in relation to the FABs will be met,
• The safety in the FAB will be cultivated, developed, effectively managed and overseen,
• FAB relevant ATM/ANS changes will be further assessed prior to actual implementation,
case by case basis, in accordance with a defined and documented process.
Hence, the FAB can be implemented in a manner which is acceptably safe.
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
OVERALL SAFETY CASE CONCLUSIONS
The arguments elaborated in the previous sections can be summarised as follows:
The Safety Regulatory requirements in relation to the FABs will be met,
The safety in the FAB will be cultivated, developed, effectively managed and overseen,
FAB relevant ATM/ANS changes will be further assessed prior to actual implementation,
case by case basis, in accordance with a defined and documented process.
Hence, the FAB can be implemented in a manner which is acceptably safe.
The safety in the FAB will be cultivated, developed, effectively managed and overseen,
FAB relevant ATM/ANS changes will be further assessed prior to actual implementation, on a
case by case basis, in accordance with a defined and documented process.
Hence, the FAB can be implemented in a manner which is acceptably safe.
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
ANNEX 1 -
States commitment to Safety
In order for the BLUE MED FAB to contribute effectively to the overall Pan
the States of Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Malta will:
• jointly designated ANSPs to operate the FAB with the goal to increase Safety levels,
• give the responsibility to their NSAs
efficient oversight of the FAB, thus ensuring continuous improvements of safety;
• define responsibilities and accountabilities with their relevant Accident Investigation Boards as
well as the required safety data flows; and
• take initiatives to promote and continuously improve a common safety culture.
NSAs engagement for Safety
In order to ensure enhanced regulation and oversight of the BLUE MED FAB, the NSAs of Cyprus,
Greece, Italy and Malta will:
• make appropriate arrangements and commit the necessary resources to ensure the effective
safety oversight of the designated ANSPs ; and
• develop the necessary interfaces with the designated ANSPs.
ANSPs active contribution to Safety achievement
In order to ensure the required uniform safety standards within the FAB, ANSPs of BLUE MED will:
• commit on give safety the highest priority in delivering their services
• engage in the integration of their safety management system to ultimately design build and
maintain the FAB SMS;
• identify, co-ordinate, deploy and monitor
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
PROPOSED BLUE MED SAFETY POLICY
FAB to contribute effectively to the overall Pan-European Air traffic Safety,
the States of Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Malta will:
jointly designated ANSPs to operate the FAB with the goal to increase Safety levels,
give the responsibility to their NSAs to develop their own arrangements so as to ensure
efficient oversight of the FAB, thus ensuring continuous improvements of safety;
define responsibilities and accountabilities with their relevant Accident Investigation Boards as
ty data flows; and
take initiatives to promote and continuously improve a common safety culture.
regulation and oversight of the BLUE MED FAB, the NSAs of Cyprus,
ppropriate arrangements and commit the necessary resources to ensure the effective
safety oversight of the designated ANSPs ; and
develop the necessary interfaces with the designated ANSPs.
ANSPs active contribution to Safety achievement
ure the required uniform safety standards within the FAB, ANSPs of BLUE MED will:
commit on give safety the highest priority in delivering their services
engage in the integration of their safety management system to ultimately design build and
ordinate, deploy and monitor common safety improvements
Page 22 of 31
FETY POLICY
European Air traffic Safety,
jointly designated ANSPs to operate the FAB with the goal to increase Safety levels,
to develop their own arrangements so as to ensure
efficient oversight of the FAB, thus ensuring continuous improvements of safety;
define responsibilities and accountabilities with their relevant Accident Investigation Boards as
take initiatives to promote and continuously improve a common safety culture.
regulation and oversight of the BLUE MED FAB, the NSAs of Cyprus,
ppropriate arrangements and commit the necessary resources to ensure the effective
ure the required uniform safety standards within the FAB, ANSPs of BLUE MED will:
engage in the integration of their safety management system to ultimately design build and
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
Page 23 of 31
ANNEX 2 - INITIAL HAZARD IDENT
OF PLANNED CHANGES
The establishment of a FAB does not, by definition, mandate the implementation of any changes to the day-to-day operations of the ANSPs. establishment there are no “big bang” changes foreseenassociated with any immediate safety issueschanges are foreseen and it is deemed useful, even at this early stage, to provide an initial risk assessment of these changes.
Classical risk assessment is a function of the likelihood of ATM hazards and the severity of their effect. At the time of the SC submission, the details of the and technical elements that is associated with the planned changes are not yet available, hence the analysis that follows is restricted to hazard identificawill be revisited and a more complete assessment will be performed where and when each change is actually implemented. This will be particularly relevant in the case that the foreseen changes will be implemented at the external FAB boundaries with nonmay be needed.
The table on the next page summarises the results of the assessment performed in the framework of WP3.1, and is based on the vast safety and ATM/ANS expertise
HAZ ID
ATM Domain
Change description
1 AIRSPACE Implementation of a new ATS route network proposal
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
INITIAL HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND MITIGA
OF PLANNED CHANGES
establishment of a FAB does not, by definition, mandate the implementation of any day operations of the ANSPs. In fact, on Day 1 of the BLUE MED FAB
establishment there are no “big bang” changes foreseen, hence its establishment is not associated with any immediate safety issues. Nevertheless, after establishment, operational
foreseen and it is deemed useful, even at this early stage, to provide an initial risk assessment of these changes.
risk assessment is a function of the likelihood of ATM hazards and the severity of their ffect. At the time of the SC submission, the details of the complex interaction of human, procedure
that is associated with the planned changes are not yet available, hence the analysis that follows is restricted to hazard identification and high level mitigations. This analysis will be revisited and a more complete assessment will be performed where and when each change
This will be particularly relevant in the case that the foreseen changes will ed at the external FAB boundaries with non-EU States, when additional mitigations
The table on the next page summarises the results of the assessment performed in the framework of WP3.1, and is based on the vast safety and ATM/ANS expertise of the group participants
Change description WHAT COULD GO WRONG
HAZARD(S)
Implementation of a new ATS route network proposal
Incorrect or inadequate airspace design, increasing airspace complexity ATCO error Pilot error Inadvertent penetration of P,R and D areas
ATC workload increase A/c deviation from planned/correct route Loss of nominal separation Uncontrolled/ unauthorised interaction between civil-military operations
IFICATION AND MITIGATIONS
establishment of a FAB does not, by definition, mandate the implementation of any specific In fact, on Day 1 of the BLUE MED FAB
, hence its establishment is not establishment, operational
foreseen and it is deemed useful, even at this early stage, to provide an initial risk
risk assessment is a function of the likelihood of ATM hazards and the severity of their complex interaction of human, procedure
that is associated with the planned changes are not yet available, hence the tion and high level mitigations. This analysis
will be revisited and a more complete assessment will be performed where and when each change This will be particularly relevant in the case that the foreseen changes will
EU States, when additional mitigations
The table on the next page summarises the results of the assessment performed in the framework of the group participants.
HAZARD(S) MITIGATIONS
ATC workload
A/c deviation from planned/correct
Loss of nominal
interaction between
Ensure good airspace design (usage of airspace design best practices, standards and tools) Revision of LoAs and civil-mil. coord. Training / awareness Correct + timely publication of new route(s) Implement automatic / software monitoring aids
Initial implementation during low traffic periods
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
HAZ ID
ATM Domain
Change description
2
AIRSPACE
Extension of upper limit of controlled airspace to FL660
3 AIRSPACE Harmonisation of route lateral separation minima (5 NM under consideration)
4 AIRSPACE Harmonisation of longitudinal separation minima at transfer of control
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
Change description WHAT COULD GO WRONG
HAZARD(S)
Extension of upper limit of controlled airspace to FL660
Inadequate SUR coverage/accuracy Inappropriate / inadequate vertical/lateral separation standards Inadequate COMMS No MET info ATCO error w.r.t a/c performance
Pilot error (e.g. inadvertent entry into controlled airspace by MIL a/c)
Loss of separation Loss off communication with a/c Uncontrolled/ unauthorised interaction between civil-military operations
Harmonisation of en-route lateral separation minima (5 NM under
ATC error
Pilot error
Loss of nominal lateral separation
Harmonisation of
separation minima at transfer of control
ATC error Pilot error
Loss of nominal longitudinal separation (at FIR boundaries)
Page 24 of 31
HAZARD(S) MITIGATIONS
Loss of separation
Loss off communication with
interaction between
Periodic check Flight tests for calibration of equipment (for both COM and SUR)
Ensure enhanced civil/military coordination
Training,
Correct/timely publication of new airspace parameters
Ensure provision of MET info Training w.r.t to new procedures and a/c performance
Loss of nominal lateral separation
Training to acquire new skills STCA parameters adjustment Focused competency checks
Loss of nominal
separation (at FIR
Focused competency checks ATCO awareness / training Updating of LoAs / written procedures
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
Page 25 of 31
HAZ ID
ATM Domain
Change description
5 AIRSPACE Partial implementation offree route operations (limited in geographical and/or time scope)
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
Change description WHAT COULD GO WRONG
HAZARD(S)
implementation of free route operations (limited in geographical and/or
ATCO not fully aware of the details of the filed flight plan and/or route not specified Credible incorrect route Airspace constraints not updated Working methods no longer applicable due to change in traffic flows and patterns No proper procedures to interface with MIL traffic and MIL areas potential conflicts at the interface between Free route airspace and non Free Route Airspace Aircraft entering in the geographical Free route airspace outside the activation time Aircraft still in free route airspace while activation stops
Pilot error FDP unable to cope ATC error (coordination issues, sector configuration and management, workload)
A/c deviation from expected route ATC workloadincrease
Loss of separation
HAZARD(S) MITIGATIONS
A/c deviation from expected route
ATC workload
Loss of separation
Implement automatic / software monitoring aids RTS for the airspace concerned Training Focused competency checks, Appropriate / timely notifications /publications Flow management / capacity review Test of FDP (in case big number of deviations causes a crash) Safety Nets adjustments (STCA & APW)
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
HAZ ID
ATM Domain
Change description
6 AIRSPACE Division FL between upper and lower airspace FL195 in all the FAB (change for GR, CY, TU, AL and EG)
7
ATC
Implementation of automatic coordination (OLDI) between ACC Units, including the extension in OLDI messages currently used
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
Change description WHAT COULD GO WRONG
HAZARD(S)
Division FL between upper and lower airspace FL195 in all the FAB (change for GR, CY, TU, AL and
ATC error Consider if a change in airspace classification would induce any errors Errors in flight plan
Inadvertent entry into upper/lower airspace Lack of flight data in the correct sector
Implementation of
coordination (OLDI) between ACC Units, including the extension in OLDI messages currently
Corrupted coordination between FDPs OLDI message set incompatibility Incorrect/inefficient implementation of OLDI in HMI
Loss of automatic coordination function Partial loss of automatic coordination function
Credible but undetected error in automatic coordination
Page 26 of 31
HAZARD(S) MITIGATIONS
Inadvertent entry into upper/lower
Lack of flight data in the correct sector
Review of ATS route network for possible misalignment
Appropriate / timely notifications /publications Manual re-routing of flight plan at CWP – controller working position
Loss of automatic
Partial loss of
Credible but undetected error in
Manual coordination procedures (used as backup) Ensure that people are trained for them Appropriate alarms/software aids in the HMI to indicate if something is wrong and that manual coordination has been effected Development in accordance to an appropriate SWAL level Focused competency checks / training (for monitoring the correctness of the system) Training on degraded modes of operation
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
Page 27 of 31
HAZ ID
ATM Domain
Change description
8 SUR Standardization of Radar Data transmission format (ASTERIX interface)
9 SUR Improvement of existing surveillance coverage at FIR Boundaries
10 HUM Harmonisation of ATCO competence through common training
11 SMS Implementation of FAB SMS
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
Change description WHAT COULD GO WRONG
HAZARD(S)
Standardization of Radar Data transmission format (ASTERIX interface)
Corruption to radar data
Inaccurate information Loss of Radar Data
Improvement of existing surveillance coverage at FIR
Incompatibility of new radar with RDP
Corruption of Radar Data (loss of integrity)
Harmonisation of ATCO competence through common
Inadequate / improper training programme
ATC errors
Implementation of Ineffective SMS procedures defined
Ineffective SMS procedures defined
HAZARD(S) MITIGATIONS
radar
Loss of Radar Data
Development in accordance to an appropriate SWAL level Dual (independent) RDP systems and resilient technical maintenance procedures Focused competency checks / training (for monitoring the correctness of the system) Training on degraded modes of operation
Corruption of Radar Data (loss of
Ensure proper integration of additional radar heads by pre-testing in off-line mode
Design training in accordance with best practices
Ineffective SMS procedures defined
Ensure that best practices are used
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
The actions below are designed to provide safety assurance for the implementation phase of the FAB:
Ref Action
1 Revisit the BLUE MED Safety Case and re
assess its validity. Update as necessary
2 Implement the FAB SMS roadmap actions,
as detailed in D3.3
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
ANNEX 3 - SAFETY PLAN
The actions below are designed to provide safety assurance for the implementation phase of the FAB:
Responsible party(ies)
Revisit the BLUE MED Safety Case and re-
assess its validity. Update as necessary
BLUE MED Safety
Committee
Implement the FAB SMS roadmap actions, BLUE MED ANSP Safety
Coordination Board
Page 28 of 31
The actions below are designed to provide safety assurance for the implementation phase of the FAB:
Deadline
6 months after
the signing of
the State Level
FAB Agreement
Safety Details to be
found in D3.3
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
Page 29 of 31
ANNEX 4 - INVESTIGATION OF ACC
INCIDENTS IN BLUE ME
• In the event of an accident or a serious incident according to the meaning of the Chicago Convention occurring in the airspace over the territory of a Member State or under its responsibility in accordance with ICAO rules (hereinafter referred to as “the Member State of occurrence”) and controlled by an air navigation service provider other than the proviwhose principal place of operations is/are located on the territory of the Member State of occurrence (hereinafter referred to as “the effective air navigation service provider”), the Member State of the effective air navigation service provider shadelay to the competent authorities of the Member State of occurrence by the most suitable means. The notification shall have the same content as a notification of Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention.
• At its request, the Memberaccording to Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention shall be provided with, and have access to, the necessary materials by all relevant air navigation service providers and competent authorities of the Member States in order to enable an investigation of the accident or the serious incident to be conducted. The Member State of the effective air navigation service provider shall therefore grant, in accordance with its national laws and regulations, conducting the investigation access to the premises, facilities and materials of the effective air navigation service providers and of its own competent authorities. The information provided shall be used only for the purpose for which it was githe consent of the Member State which provided the information.
• The Member State of the effective air navigation service provider shall have the opportunity to appoint an accredited representative to take part in t
• Any Member State which at the request of the State conducting the investigation provided information or access to its competent authorities or an air navigation service provider shall be entitled to appoint an accredited representative tprovisions of ICAO Annex 13 and relevant EU Legislation and related national law. The competent authorities of the State conducting the investigation shall provide the final investigation report in its nationwith any safety recommendations arising out of the investigation, to the competent authorities of the Member State of the effective air navigation service provider as well as, upon request, to the other Member States and to the BLUE MED Governing Board.
• The arrangements above shall supersede the provisions governing investigation of accidents and serious incidents in any existing bilateral agreements between any two Member States related to the provision of air traffic services.
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
INVESTIGATION OF ACCIDENTS AND SERIOUS
INCIDENTS IN BLUE MED FAB (SLA ART.26)
In the event of an accident or a serious incident according to the meaning of the Chicago occurring in the airspace over the territory of a Member State or under its
responsibility in accordance with ICAO rules (hereinafter referred to as “the Member State of occurrence”) and controlled by an air navigation service provider other than the proviwhose principal place of operations is/are located on the territory of the Member State of occurrence (hereinafter referred to as “the effective air navigation service provider”), the Member State of the effective air navigation service provider shall notify such event without delay to the competent authorities of the Member State of occurrence by the most suitable means. The notification shall have the same content as a notification of Annex 13 of the
At its request, the Member State of occurrence or the State conducting the investigation according to Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention shall be provided with, and have access to, the necessary materials by all relevant air navigation service providers and competent
the Member States in order to enable an investigation of the accident or the serious incident to be conducted. The Member State of the effective air navigation service provider shall therefore grant, in accordance with its national laws and regulations, conducting the investigation access to the premises, facilities and materials of the effective air navigation service providers and of its own competent authorities. The information provided shall be used only for the purpose for which it was given and shall not be made public without the consent of the Member State which provided the information.
The Member State of the effective air navigation service provider shall have the opportunity to appoint an accredited representative to take part in the investigation.
Any Member State which at the request of the State conducting the investigation provided information or access to its competent authorities or an air navigation service provider shall be entitled to appoint an accredited representative to participate in the investigation, as per the provisions of ICAO Annex 13 and relevant EU Legislation and related national law. The competent authorities of the State conducting the investigation shall provide the final investigation report in its national language of that state and an English translation, together with any safety recommendations arising out of the investigation, to the competent authorities of the Member State of the effective air navigation service provider as well as, upon request, to the other Member States and to the BLUE MED Governing Board.
The arrangements above shall supersede the provisions governing investigation of accidents and serious incidents in any existing bilateral agreements between any two Member States
e provision of air traffic services.
IDENTS AND SERIOUS
(SLA ART.26)
In the event of an accident or a serious incident according to the meaning of the Chicago occurring in the airspace over the territory of a Member State or under its
responsibility in accordance with ICAO rules (hereinafter referred to as “the Member State of occurrence”) and controlled by an air navigation service provider other than the provider(s) whose principal place of operations is/are located on the territory of the Member State of occurrence (hereinafter referred to as “the effective air navigation service provider”), the
ll notify such event without delay to the competent authorities of the Member State of occurrence by the most suitable means. The notification shall have the same content as a notification of Annex 13 of the
State of occurrence or the State conducting the investigation according to Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention shall be provided with, and have access to, the necessary materials by all relevant air navigation service providers and competent
the Member States in order to enable an investigation of the accident or the serious incident to be conducted. The Member State of the effective air navigation service provider shall therefore grant, in accordance with its national laws and regulations, the State conducting the investigation access to the premises, facilities and materials of the effective air navigation service providers and of its own competent authorities. The information provided
ven and shall not be made public without
The Member State of the effective air navigation service provider shall have the opportunity to
Any Member State which at the request of the State conducting the investigation provided information or access to its competent authorities or an air navigation service provider shall be
o participate in the investigation, as per the provisions of ICAO Annex 13 and relevant EU Legislation and related national law. The competent authorities of the State conducting the investigation shall provide the final
al language of that state and an English translation, together with any safety recommendations arising out of the investigation, to the competent authorities of the Member State of the effective air navigation service provider as well as, upon request, to
The arrangements above shall supersede the provisions governing investigation of accidents and serious incidents in any existing bilateral agreements between any two Member States
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
• All Member States shall have in place appropriate incident reporting mechanisms in conformity with international and European regulations.
• The Member States shall ensure that pertaining BLUE MED safetyreported, collected, protected, exchanged and disseminated.
• The sole objective of occurrence reporting is the prevention of accidents and incidents and not the attribution of blame or liability.
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
All Member States shall have in place appropriate incident reporting mechanisms in conformity with international and European regulations.
The Member States shall ensure that pertaining BLUE MED safety-related informreported, collected, protected, exchanged and disseminated.
The sole objective of occurrence reporting is the prevention of accidents and incidents and not the attribution of blame or liability.
Page 30 of 31
All Member States shall have in place appropriate incident reporting mechanisms in conformity
related information is duly
The sole objective of occurrence reporting is the prevention of accidents and incidents and not
D3.2a – BLUE MED FAB Safety Case
Page 31 of 31
APPENDIX 1 - LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
NAME
Fisnik Tabaku
Petros Stratis
Evis Antonopoulos
Salama Ramadan
Hassan Kamel
Amr Mohamed Amin
Athina Lala
Katerina Nezi
Maria Milena Renis
Barbara Cardinali
Claudio Cannavicci
Pierluigi D’Aloia
Francis Bezzina
Walha Mohamed Amin
Tony Licu
Gilles Le Galo
BLUE MED WP3.1 – Safety
BLUE MED FAB Safety Case (Part A: Regulatory aspects)
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
ORGANISATION STATE
CAA ALBANIA
DCAC CYPRUS
DCAC CYPRUS
NANSC EGYPT
NANSC EGYPT
NANSC EGYPT
HCAA GREECE
HCAA GREECE
ENAV ITALY
ENAV ITALY
ENAV ITALY
ENAV ITALY
MATS MALTA
OACA TUNISIA
EXPERT SUPPORT
EUROCONTROL
EUROCONTROL
STATE
ALBANIA
CYPRUS
CYPRUS
EGYPT
EGYPT
EGYPT
GREECE
GREECE
ITALY
ITALY
ITALY
ITALY
MALTA
TUNISIA
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