Cuba, Castro and John F. Kennedy Kr AMU. 19, 1959, I met for the first and only time the man who was to be the major foreign-

policy issue of the tg6o Presidential campaign; who was destined to be a hero in the warped mind of Lee Harvey Oswald, President Ken-nedy's assassin; and who in 1964 is still a major campaign issue.

The man, of course, was Fidel Castro. It is safe to say that no other individual in the world has created such a conflict of opinion in the United States. Many foreign-policy experts strongly support Sen. J. Wil-liam Fulbright's view that Castro is merely "a nuisance but not a grave threat to the United States." The opposing view, which I share, is that Castro is a dangerous threat to our peace and security—and that we cannot tolerate the presence of his communist regime go miles from our shores. The primary evidence which caused me to reach this con-clusion was provided by Castro him-self in the conversation I had with him more than five years ago.

Fr WAS a Sunday afternoon, and there was nothing I wanted less to do than to go down to my Capitol office for a meeting with the new Cuban dictator. But there were spe-cial circumstances which prompted

me to schedule the appointment. Castro had come to power in Cuba

a little more than three months be-fore. He was now in Washington at the invitation of the American So-ciety of Newspaper Editors. Because his visit was unofficial, and because he had been making violent anti-American statements, President Ei-senhower had declined to see him.

Since I had had considerable experience in dealing with Latin American problems and because they thought some special treatment might change Castro's unfriendly at-titude, our ambassador to Cuba, Philip Bonsai, and Secretary of State Christian Herter urged me to meet with him. I agreed, on the condition that the two of us would talk alone, without members of his staff or mine present, and that there should be no photographs taken or other attempts made to exploit our conference for publicity pur-poses. It seemed to me that until he demonstrated some intention of modifying his anti-American stand he should not be accorded the same treatment I would give to other vis-iting foreign officials.

Apart from the beard and the bat-tle-fatigue uniform which are now his trademarks, Castro was one of the most striking foreign officials I .met during my eight years as Vice

283

284 CUBA, C.ISTRO AND JOHN F. KENNEDY

President. As I told President Eisen-

hower later, he seemed to have that indefinable quality which, for good or evil, makes a leader of men.

He had a compelling, intense voice, sparkling black eyes, and he radiated vitality. After 31/2 hours of

discussion I summed up my impres-sions in this way—he looked like a revolutionary, talked like an idealis-tic college professor and reacted like

a communist. He was intelligent, shrewd, at times eloquent. He gave

an appearance of sincerity, but what he said followed a pattern all too

familiar to me. I had had conversa-tions with many communist leaders abroad and in the United States. The answers to questions came back almost parrotlike from them, as they now did from Castro.

Q. Why don't you have free elec-tions?

A: The people of Cuba don't want free elections; they produce bad gov-ernment.

Q. Why don't you give fair trials to those whom you charge oppose the revolution?

A. The people of Cuba don't want them to have fair trials. They want them shot as quickly as possible.

Q. Aren't you afraid the commu-nists in your government will even-tually take it over?

A. I am not afraid of the commu-nists; I can handle them.

I made no headway in attempting to convince him that international communism is more than just an economic and political idea and that its agents are dangerously effective

in their ability to grasp power and

to set up dictatorships. At the conclusion of our confer-

ence I wrote a four-page secret memorandum, and sent copies to President Eisenhower, Secretary Herter and Allen Dulles, head of the Central Intelligence Agency. My conclusion was, "Castro is either in-credibly naive about communism or is under communist discipline."

In the weeks immediately after Castro left Washington, several spir-

ited policy discussions on Cuba took place within the Eisenhower admin-istration. The majority view in the State Department was in sharp dis-agreement with my appraisal of Cas-tro. Most of the career foreign-policy experts argued vigorously that Cas-tro was "liberal" but that, despite some communist associations, he definitely was not a communist. Their view prevailed over mine at the outset, and their recommenda-tions were followed. From that day to this, the lack of a firm and con-sistent policy toward Castro has caused the United States to accept a continuing series of defeats, per-mitting our avowed enemies to be-come entrenched in the Western Hemisphere.

Castro presented a complex prob-lem from the very start. He had come to power with the tacit sup-port and encouragement of the ma-jority of the foreign-policy experts in the State Department, as well as with the enthusiastic approval of powerful elements of the American press. Cuba at that time, after years

F'

286 CUBA, CeISTRO AND

of Batista's misrule, was in need of a revolution. The tragedy was that Castro turned up as its leader. The mistake made by some of our gulli-ble State Department officials and by certain influential columnists and editorial writers was that they failed to recognize the real problem we faced. Our choice was not between Batista and somebody better, but between Batista and somebody far Worse.

It was not long before President Eisenhower began to realize that the original appraisal of Castro was wrong. Within months, bloody purges, illegal confiscations of prop-erty and Moscow-line attacks on the United States completely unmasked Castro and exposed him for what he really is.

By early 196o President Eisen-hower reached the conclusion that Castro was an agent of international communism and a menace to peace in this hemisphere. In a top-secret meeting in his office, at which I was present, he authorized the CIA to organize and train Cuban exiles for the eventual purpose of freeing their homeland from Castro's communist rule.

Six months later, on October 21,

196o, just four years ago, it was the Castro issue which forced me to make the most difficult and, as it turned out, the most costly decision of my political career.

Castro in the 596o Campaign

I WAS in my suite in the Waldorf-Astoria in New York, preparing for

JOHN F. KENNEDY

the fourth and last of my television debates with John F. Kennedy. The subject was to be foreign policy, an area in which most observers con-sidered me to have the advantage because of my wider experience in that field. But the headlines in the afternoon papers forced me to make a critical decision which put me at a serious disadvantage in discussing the major foreign-policy issue of the 1960 campaign.

The issue was then, as it is in 1964. what should be American policy toward Castro's communist gov-ernment in Cuba. For several weeks Kennedy had been criticizing our administration's policy without making specific recommendations as to how it should be changed. A few days earlier, in a speech before the American Legion Convention in Miami Beach, I had gained the initiative on the issue by calling for a quarantine of the Castro regime and setting forth a specific program to accomplish that objective. And now, just before we were to debate this issue face-to-face on television before 70 million voters, Kennedy counter-attacked. Eight-column headlines in the afternoon papers read: KENNEDY ADVOCATES US. INTERVENTION IN CUBA; CALLS FOR AID TO REBEL FORCES IN

CUBA.

In his statement he declared, "We Must attempt to strengthen the non-Batista, democratic, anti-Castro forces in exile and in Cuba itself who offer eventual hope of over-

rthrowing Castro. Thus far, these fighters for freedom have had vir-

2M

T

HE

RE

AD

ER

'S D

IGE

ST

N

ovember

tually n

o su

pport fro

m o

ur g

ove

rn-

ment."

As I fin

ished re

adin

g th

e sto

ry, I re

alize

d th

e d

ifficulty o

f the d

ecisio

n

I had to

make. F

or m

onth

s I h

ad

know

n th

at w

e h

ad b

een d

oin

g e

x-actly w

hat K

ennedy se

em

ed to

be

advo

catin

g—

supportin

g a

nd tra

in-

ing C

uban e

xiles so

that th

ey co

uld

fre

e C

uba fro

m co

mm

unist co

ntro

l. B

ut th

is was a

top-se

cret C

IA p

roj-

ect. I w

as o

ne o

f only th

ree

hers o

f7A

cipl

---7- csizet—ii7s cal - line' w

ho

wha a- as n b

riefe

d

tI r i had n

e int „ and the i str ongest

ron y

and most persistent advocate for sa-

tin ti

a p

ro-

gra

m.

—1W

); the q

uestio

n w

as, d

id John

Kennedy kn

ow

of th

e e

xistence

of

the p

roje

ct? P

resid

ent E

isenhow

er

had in

structe

d A

llen D

ulle

s, head o

f th

e C

IA, to

brie

f the D

em

ocra

tic

candid

ate

on a

ll opera

tions, in

clud-

ing to

p-se

cret o

pera

tions. I kn

ew

th

at K

ennedy h

ad a

lready re

ceive

d

two b

riefin

gs fro

m D

ulle

s. I imm

e-

dia

tely h

ad a

mem

ber o

f my sta

ff ca

ll the W

hite

House

on th

e se

cur-

ity line

to a

sk if the

se b

riefin

gs co

v-ere

d C

uba. A

mem

ber o

f the W

hite

H

ouse staff indicated they had. (Sev-

era

l month

s afte

r the e

lectio

n, A

llen

Dulle

s was to

state

that h

is brie

fing

of K

ennedy h

ad in

cluded C

uba b

ut

not th

e tra

inin

g p

rogra

m fo

r Cuban

exile

s.) At th

e tim

e o

f the d

ebate

, how

eve

r, and a

fter ch

eckin

g w

ith

the W

hitc H

ouse

, I had

to p

roce

ed

on th

e a

ssum

ptio

n th

at K

ennedy

had b

een b

riefe

d o

n th

e se

cret p

ro-

gra

m.

I was faced w

ith a heads-he-wins,

tails-I-lo

se p

ropositio

n. If in

the T

V

debate I were to reveal the existence

of th

e tra

inin

g p

rogra

m a

nd p

oin

t out that I had been one of its strong-est a

dvo

cate

s, I would

Bull th

e ru

g

out fro

m u

nder K

ennedy's p

ositio

n.

But if I d

id so

, the p

roje

ct would

be

doom

ed, a

nd a

lso th

e live

s of b

rave

m

en, b

oth

insid

e a

nd o

uts

ide o

f C

uba, w

ho w

ere

rece

iving tra

inin

g

and assistance.

Decisive C

onsideration: Security

I H

AD

only o

ne ch

oice

: to p

rote

ct the security of the program

, I had to oppose

Kennedy o

n h

is positio

n o

f advo

catin

g th

at th

e U

nite

d S

tate

s openly a

id a

nti-C

astro

force

s insid

e

and outside Cuba.

The d

ecisio

n w

as rig

ht fro

m th

e

sta

ndpoin

t of th

e c

ountry

. It was

wro

ng p

olitic

ally

. When th

e te

le-

vision d

ebate

was co

nclu

ded, K

en-

nedy e

merg

ed a

s the m

an w

ho w

as

advocatin

g a

"get-to

ugh p

olic

y"

tow

ard

Castro

. I was th

e m

an w

ho

was "soft" on C

astro—the exact op-

posite

of th

e tru

th.

Any num

ber of factors could have m

ade th

e d

iffere

nce

in w

hat w

as to

be the closest P

residential election in histo

ry, where

a sh

ift of less th

an

one-h

alf a

vote

a p

recin

ct w

ould

have

changed th

e re

sult. M

ost o

b-

serve

rs agre

e th

at o

ur p

ositio

ns o

n

the C

uban issu

e co

uld

well h

ave

been th

e d

ecisive

facto

r. But I h

ave

never had any regrets about this de-cisio

n, o

r any d

oubt th

at it w

as th

e

only one I could make under the cir-

cumstances.

1964 C

UB

A, C

.4S7'R

O A

ND

On

Ap

ril 19, o

fn, th

ree m

onth

s afte

r Pre

sident K

ennedy's in

augu-

ratio

n, I fle

w to

Wash

ingto

n fro

m

my h

om

e s

tate

of C

alifo

rnia

, to

which I had returned to practice law

after 14 years in governm

ent service. I w

as sch

edule

d to

make

a fiire

ign-

policy speech in Chicago the follow

-in

g w

eek, a

nd I h

ad w

ritten A

llen

Dulle

s to a

sk that h

e b

rief m

e o

n

som

e o

f the la

test d

eve

lopm

ents.

Pre

sident K

ennedy re

adily g

ave

his

appro

val; I h

ad a

n a

ppoin

tment to

m

eet w

ith D

ulle

s at six o

'clock o

n

the a

ftern

oon o

f the 1

9th

. T

he a

ppoin

tment w

as to

he in

my

Wash

ingto

n h

om

e. I a

rrived th

ere

fro

m th

e a

irport sh

ortly b

efo

re six,

to find a message from

the CIA

that D

ulle

s would

be d

ela

yed {or at least

an h

our. It w

as a

fter 7:30 before the

doorb

ell ra

ng, a

nd I w

ent to

gre

et

him

.

Th

e Bay o

f Pig

s I itA

n k

now

n a

nd w

ork

ed w

ith

Alle

n D

ulle

s since

the su

mm

er o

f 1947 w

hen he was one of the advisers

to th

e H

erte

r Com

mitte

e, o

f which

I w

as a

mem

ber. T

he m

inute

I saw

him

I realize

d th

at h

e w

as u

nder

great emotional stress. I asked him

if he w

ould

like a

drin

k. Com

ple

tely

out of character for the smooth, cool

pro

fessio

nal I h

ad se

en h

andle

so

many d

ifficult s

ituatio

ns th

rough

the ye

ars, h

e a

nsw

ere

d, "I ce

rtain

ly w

ould

. I really n

eed o

ne. T

his is th

e

wors

t day o

f my life

r I a

sked, "W

hat's

wro

ng?"

He

replie

d, "E

very

thin

g is

lost. T

he

Cuban in

vasio

n is a

tota

l failu

re."

101IN F

. KE

NN

ED

Y

2&)

Isnow

n, o

f course

, that th

e

invasion was in progress, but it nev-

er crossed my m

ind that it would he

allo

wed to

fail.

Dulle

s n

ow

filled m

e in

on the

deta

ils. Afte

r the e

lectio

n, b

efo

re

Pre

sident K

ennedy to

ok o

ffice in

Ja

nuary, D

ulle

s had b

riefe

d h

im

com

ple

tely o

n th

em

aitft p

rogra

m.

The P

resid

ent-e

lect h

ail in

dica

ted

that h

e fe

lt the p

rogra

m sh

ould

go

forw

ard

, and sa

id h

e w

ould

follo

w

thro

ugh o

n it a

fter h

is inaugura

tion.

But, as had happened in the E

isen bow

er a

dm

inistra

tion, a

sharp

dif-

fere

nce o

f opin

ion a

bout (;a

stro

developed am

ong Presiik nt K

enne-dy's advisers. O

ne wool, of activists

urg

ed h

im to

go liirw

alcl w

ith th

e

inva

sion p

lan. H

is libera

l advise

rs fro

m th

e S

tate

Departm

ent a

nd o

n

his p

erso

nal sta

ff took th

e lin

e th

at

if Am

erica

n su

pport o

f the in

vasio

n

becam

e k

now

n, w

orld

opin

ion

would react unfavorably. T

his group advis

ed th

at th

e U

nite

d S

tale

s

should

eith

er try to

get a

long w

ith

Castro

or fin

d so

me o

ther m

eth

od

for d

ealin

g w

ith h

im.

Pre

sident K

ennedy fin

ally o

ver-

rule

d h

is soft-lin

e a

dvise

rs and d

e-

cided to

go fo

rward

with

thiu

slan.

"It took g

reat c

oura

ge," D

ulle

s

told

me, "fo

r the P

resid

ent to

ove

r. ru

le so

me o

f his a

dvise

rs and o

rder

the in

vasio

n to

pro

ceed." R

ut in

the

end th

e so

ft-liners w

on i h

eir p

oin

t and, b

y last-m

inute

co

mpro

miscs,

doom

ed th

e o

pera

tion to

failu

re. I •

More concerned w

ith an adverse re-actio

n fro

m "w

orld

opin

ion" th

an

with

the th

reat o

f com

munism

in

290

TH

E R

EA

DE

KS

DIG

ES

T

Novem

ber 1964

CH

11.4, C..IST

RO

.4ND

JOH

N F

. KE

NN

ED

Y

.1.9t th

e W

este

rn H

em

isphere

, they p

er-

suaded th

e P

resid

ent to

curta

il the

orig

inal co

nce

pt o

f the o

pera

tion.

Tw

o o

f the th

ree F

ree C

uban a

ir strike

s desig

ned to

knock o

ut C

as-

tro's air force were canceled, depriv-

ing th

e in

vasio

n o

f air su

pport.*T

he

resu

lt was a

disa

ster b

oth

for th

e

Cuban F

reedom F

ighters and for the U

nited States. W

e got the blame for

inte

rvenin

g; w

e w

ere

denie

d th

e

credit w

e w

ould

have

rece

ived fo

r w

innin

g; a

nd C

astro

was m

ore

firm-

ly entre

nch

ed th

an e

ver.

President K

ennedy's Reaction

TH

E N

EX

T D

AY

, April 2

0, w

hen I

retu

rned to

my h

om

e a

fter a

vis

it CO

th

e C

apito

l, I found a

note

by th

e

tele

phone, le

ft by m

y 15-ye

ar-o

ld

daughte

r, Patricia

. It read: "P

resi-

dent Kennedy has tried to reach you

several times in the last hour. P

lease ca

ll the W

hite

House

opera

tor."

I pla

ced th

e ca

ll, and th

e o

pera

tor

put th

e P

resid

ent o

n im

media

tely.

His vo

ice w

as te

nse

but frie

ndly a

s he sa

id, "D

ick, could

you d

rop b

y to

see m

e? A

ny tim

e w

ill be a

ll right.

I have

appoin

tments w

ith D

ick Rus-

sell and with m

embers of the C

uban R

evo

lutio

nary C

ouncil, b

ut o

ther-

wise

my ca

lendar is fre

e th

is afte

r-noon." I to

ld h

im th

at I w

ould

be a

t his o

ffice a

t four o

'clock a

nd w

ould

be a

vaila

ble

to se

e h

im a

t any tim

e

his schedule permitted.

I was escorted into the P

resident's priva

te o

ffice a

few

min

ute

s afte

r I

• Sec "D

ecisio

n fo

r Disa

ster: A

t Last—

The

Tru

th A

bout th

e B

ay o

f Pig

s," The R

eader's

Dig

est, S

epte

mber '64

.

arrive

d a

t the W

hite

House

. I hadn't

been in that historic oval room since

I had sa

id g

ood-b

y to P

resid

ent E

i-senhow

er there on January 19, three

month

s befo

re. T

he P

resid

ent w

as

sta

ndin

g a

t his

desk ta

lkin

g w

ith

Vice

Pre

sident Jo

hnso

n. "L

yndon is

going down to see if he can't get the

Mexica

ns to

support u

s on th

is Cu-

ban b

usin

ess. I h

ave

just to

ld h

im

to te

ll the M

exica

ns th

ey o

we u

s a

vote

. Don't yo

u th

ink w

e sh

ould

be

tough w

ith th

em

?"

I replie

d, "W

ell, th

e M

exica

ns o

f-ten take the soft line w

here the com-

munists a

re co

nce

rned, b

eca

use

of

the C

irdenas in

fluence, b

ut th

ey

need us as much

or m

ore

than w

e

need them today, and this is one tim

e w

hen I th

ink w

e sh

ould

insist th

at

they sta

nd w

ith u

s." Shortly th

ere

-afte

r, Johnso

n le

ft the ro

om

, and

the President sat dow

n in his famous

rockin

g ch

air. H

e p

roce

eded to

give

his reactions to the events of the past few

days. "I h

ave

just co

me fro

m a

meetin

g

with

the m

em

bers

of th

e C

uban

Revolu

tionary

Council," h

e s

aid

. "S

eve

ral o

f those

who w

ere

there

had lost their sons, brothers or other clo

se re

lative

s or frie

nds in

this a

c-tion. T

alking to them and seeing the

tragic expressions on their faces was

the w

orst e

xperie

nce

of m

y life.

"Last n

ight," h

e co

ntin

ued, "th

ey

were

really m

ad a

t us. B

ut to

day

they h

ave

calm

ed d

ow

n a

lot a

nd,

belie

ve it o

r not, th

ey a

re re

ady to

go o

ut a

nd fig

ht a

gain

, if we w

ill give

them

the w

ord

and th

e su

p-

port."

Kennedy d

id n

ot try to

hid

e h

is frustration, disappointm

ent and fury ove

r the fa

ilure

of th

e o

pera

tion.

Pacin

g a

round th

e ris

lin a

nd u

sing

his d

ow

n-to

-earth

Irish, ra

ther th

an

his H

arva

rd vo

cabula

ry, he to

ld m

e

how disappointed he had been in the

advice he had received.

"I was a

ssure

d b

y e

very

one I

checke

d w

ith—

all th

e m

ilitary e

x- perts a

nd th

e C

IA—

that th

e p

lan

would

succeed." O

ver a

nd o

ver

again

, he re

itera

ted th

e fa

ct that

these assurances had been given to him

. He d

id n

ot m

entio

n th

e fa

tal

advice

—give

n h

im b

y som

e o

f his

libera

l Sta

te D

epartm

ent a

nd W

hite

H

ouse

advise

rs—to

cance

l the tw

o

air strike

s—and, in

effe

ct, destro

y th

e p

lan.

. F

inally h

e p

ut th

e ke

y questio

n

to m

c, blu

ntly a

nd d

irlctly: "What

would

you d

o n

ow

in C

uba?"

"I would

find a

pro

per le

gal co

ver

and I w

ould

go in

," I answ

ere

d. I

suggested three possible legal justi-fications for taking such action: 1. A

new

definition of aggression, based on th

e p

rem

ise th

at S

ovie

t-blo

c

equip

ment w

as u

sed b

y the C

astro

forces, and that w

e had an obligation to see that the F

reedom F

orces were

at le

ast e

qually su

pplie

d.

2. S

end A

merican forces in under our treaty

right b

eca

use

of th

e ixite

ntia

l thre

at

to G

uanuhia

mo. 3

. Send A

merica

n

force

s in to

pro

tect th

e live

s and

rights of the several thousand Am

er-ica

n citize

ns still livin

g in

Cuba. I

em

phasize

d th

at I fe

lt we m

ust d

o

whatever w

as necessary to rid Cuba

of C

astro

and co

mm

unism

.

Kennedy h

eard

me o

ut w

ithout

com

ment, a

nd th

en re

plie

d, "B

oth

W

alte

r Lip

pm

ann (w

ho h

ad re

cent-

ly h

ad a

n in

terv

iew

with

Khru

-sh

chev) a

nd C

hip

Bohle

n (w

ho h

ad

been o

ur a

mbassa

dor to

Mosco

w)

have

reporte

d th

at K

hru

shch

ey is in

a ve

ry cocky m

ood a

t this tim

e. If

their appraisal is correct, he may be-

lieve this is the time to m

ove against us a

nd h

e m

ight se

ize u

pon a

ny a

c-tion on our part in C

uba as an excuse fo

r doin

g so

. This m

eans th

at th

ere

is a

good ch

ance

that, if w

e m

ove

on C

uba, K

iyosh

i:hue w

ill move

on

Berlin

. I just d

on't th

ink w

e ca

n ta

ke

the risk, in

the e

vent th

eir a

ppra

isal

is corre

ct." O

ur c

onvers

atio

n th

en tu

rned

brie

fly to

Laos, w

here

Am

eric

an

support o

f a n

eutra

list re

gim

e

seemed to be leading to an eventual

com

munist ta

keove

r. I to

ld P

resid

ent K

ennedy I

thought th

at in

both

Laos a

nd C

uba

the im

porta

nt th

ing w

as to

take

som

e a

ffirmative

actio

n, in

cludin

g,

if nece

ssary, a

t least a

com

mitm

ent

of A

merica

n a

ir pow

er.

He s

aid

, "I just d

on't th

ink w

e

ought to

get in

volve

d in

Laos, p

ar-

ticula

rly where

we m

ight fin

d o

ur-

selve

s fightin

g m

illions o

f Chin

ese

tro

ops in

the ju

ngle

s." I pis n

ext re

-m

ark u

nderlin

ed h

ow

the fa

ilure

to

com

e to

grip

s with

com

munism

in

one part of the world has w

eakened our p

ositio

n in

eve

ry oilie

r part o

f th

e w

orld

. "In a

ny e

vent." h

e said,

"I don't se

e h

ow

we L

an m

ake

any

move

in L

aos, w

hich

is sow

mile

s aw

ay, if w

e d

on't m

ake

a m

ove

in

2Q2 CUBA, CASTRO AND JOHN F. KENNEDY

Cuba, which is only go miles away."

I replied, "This, of course, is a de-

cision which only you can make, in

the light of your information as to

what our strength is and your intelli-

gence reports on enemy strength

and intentions. I want to tell you

that I will publicly support you to

the hilt if you make such a decision

in regard to either Laos or Cuba,

and I will urge all other Republicans

to do likewise. I realize that some

political observers say you might risk

political defeat in 1964 if either the

Cuban or Far East crises involves an

American armed forces commit-

ment. I want you to know that I am

one who will never make that a po-

litical issue if such action becomes

necessary." His reply, in the light of what

happened three years later, was

prophetic, although I do not think

he intended it that way. "The way

things are going and with all the

problems we have, if I do the right

kind of a job, I don't know whether

I am going to be here four years

from now." I was not sure at the time what he

meant by this. I assumed that Presi-

dent Kennedy foresaw that he might

now have to take risky military ac-

tion. And with the Bay of Pigs fail-

ure fresh in his mind, he realized

that another such defeat could be

disastrous for him politically in tg64.

Nevertheless, he said firmly, "You

can be sure the political conse-

quences will have no effect on the

decision I make in this crisis."

By that time we had talked for 0-

most an hour. He took me out the

side door to one of the White House

cars which he had ordered to be sent

for me, and which was waiting in

the driveway on the South Lawn. As

we walked to the car, he threw out

another strangely prophetic remark:

"I hope you take the time CO write a

book. It's really a good idea, even if

it sells only a few copies. There's

something about being an author

which really builds the reputation

of a political figure. Look what The

Conscience of a Conservative has

done for Barry Goldwater!"

We shook hands, and he turned

and walked back up the path to his

office. As he walked away, his head

bowed, his hands jammed character-

istically into his pockets, he seemed

literally to be carrying the weight of

the world on his shoulders.. As I

watched his weary, stooped figure,

usually so erect and buoyant, disap-

pear into the terrible loneliness of

the White House office, I had an

overwhelming sense of how de-

pressed and discouraged he must

have felt. I realize that political fig-

ures are not supposed to experience

ordinary emotions—particularly

where their political opponents are

concerned. But I can truthfiilly say

that, in this darkest hour of his polit-

ical career, my heart went out to my

friend, Jack Kennedy, the man who.

had come to Congress the same year

I did, 14 years before. •

The Lesson of the Bay of Pigs

THEODORE Roostrues daughter,

Alice Longworth, once told me,

CUBA, CASTRO AND JOHN F. KENNEDY 295

"Father never believed in the old saying„Don't cry over spilled milk.' He always said, 'Of coarse you cry over spilled milk—you cry and you stamp up and down to make sure you don't spill it again!'"

Because Cuba is a classic example of how not to conduct foreign policy is dealing with the communists, it is essential that we see where we went wrong in the past in order to determine what policy we should adopt in the future.

There are two major lessons to be learned from the Bay of Pigs:

First, when a decision has been made to commit American prestige, we must he prepared to commit an adequate amount of American power. As former Secretary of State James Byrnes, whose Sand birthday celebration I attended shortly after the Bay of Pigs crisis, said, —We Americans must not begin anything we aren't prepared to finish."

Second, American foreign policy must always be dictated by the se-curity interests of the United States, and not by some vague concept of "world public opinion." The United States should always have a concern for the opinions of our friends in other nations. But, as the strongest nation in the world, it is our respon-sibility to lead, not to follow, the forces charged with the defense of freedom.

In the Kremlin, Khrushchev must have watched with interest Amer-ica's inept and fainthearted efforts to free Cuba. He drew his own con-clusions from the spectacle, and her.

now had good reason to doubt our resolve to stand up for our own in-terests. As he later said to Robert Frost, "The Americans are too lib-eral to fight."

The Cuban Missile Crisis

A sxw months afterward, on June 4, iser, Khrushchcv had an oppor-tunity to size up the new President and his advisers, at Vienna. What-ever his impression may have been, it is clear from the entire chain of events that our failure at the Bay of Pigs led directly to the Soviet decision to move into the Western Hemisphere in force, with both men and missiles.

The history of this infamous and secret action by Khrushchev has been recorded elsewhere,* but it is perhaps instructive to note that'once again the powerful State Depart-ment clique and the "liberal" mem-bers of the White House staff chose to ignore warnings, chiefly by the CIA and by Sen. Kenneth Keating, who repeatedly stated that Soviet forces of men and missiles were be-ing landed in Cuba.

By October 16, 42, there was no longer any doubt. The CIA laid on the President's desk photographs of Soviet missiles in place in Cuba. The photos had been taken by the CIA's U-2 planes, and the evidence could not be brushed aside.

On .October 22, tg6a, President Kennedy made his dramatic an-nouncement that the Soviet Union

•See "While America Slept." 'The Reader's Digem. March '63.

CUBA, CASTRO AND JOHN F. KENNEDY 297

had secretly moved medium-range

ballistic missiles and jet bombers into Cuba. He ordered a blockade,

and demanded the removal of exist-ing missiles, with on-site inspection to make certain that the job was

done. This was the finest hour of his

Presidency. People, not only in this country but throughout the free

world, applauded this li)rceful com-

mitment of American strength to the defense of freedom and the cause

of peace. By finally calling Khru-shchev's bluff, President Kennedy

assured his own place in history as the man who made nuclear black-mail an obsolete form of diplomacy.

But, again, the tragic history of American indecisiveness repeated it-

self. The persistent clique of ad-visers who had stayed Kennedy's hand at the Bay of Pigs began at once to nibble away at the new

strong policy. They insisted that the whole dispute be turned over to the United Nations for negotiation and settlement. By convincing the Presi-dent that he should back away from the strong course of action he had initially outlined, they enabled the United States to pull defeat out of the jaws of victory. These were the

results of following their incredibly bad advice:

• There was no insistence on on-site inspection. "Offensive" missiles were apparently removed, but "de-fensive" missiles were allowed to

remain. • Not only were the Cuban exiles

prohibited from engaging in further

harassing actions against Castro, but the United States became committed to a no-invasion policy.

• This weak-kneed foreign policy

encouraged the enemy to bolder and bolder action. Shiploads of Soviet arms have continued to pour into

Cuba —until today, except for the

United States and Canada, the is-land is the strongest military power in the Western Hemisphere.

• Khrushchev's gamble in put-ting missiles into Cuba was merely another application of the time-test-ed communist doctrine —"Two steps forward, one step backward." The operation turned out to be a net gain for the Kremlin.

ON NOVEMBER 20, 1063, I flew to Dallas to attend a meeting with one of the clients of the New York law firm with which I am associated.

At an informal news conference, which I held on November 21, the questions were concerned chiefly with the visit of President Kennedy, who was scheduled to arrive in Dal-las the following day. One of the questioners pointed out that consid-erable opposition had developed to some of the President's programs and that there might be some dem-onstrations against him and Vice President Johnson, who would be in the party. I urged, in a statement to the press which I later repeated on television, that the President and Vice President be shown the respect

to which their offices entitled them. I stated, "Disagreement with his views is no excuse for discourtesy to

298 T

HE

RE

AD

ER

'S D

IGE

ST

N

ovember

1964 C

UB

A, C

AS

TR

O A

ND

/OH

N F

. KE

NN

ED

Y

299

kr

the office of President of th

e Un

ited

States."

Castro and L

ee Harvey O

swald

TH

E F

OL

LO

WIN

G m

orn i ng, Novem

-h

er 22, I board

ed a p

lane to N

ew

York

. We arrived

on sch

edu

le at tz:A

after an u

neven

tful fligh

t. I hailed a cab and asked the driver to ta

ke m

e to m

y o

ffice. We w

ere w

aiting for a ligh

t to chan

ge wh

en

a m

an

ran

over fro

m th

e street corner and called out, "D

o you have a radio in your cab?" T

he cab driver an

swered

, "N

o. Wh

y?" T

he m

an

replied, "The P

resident has just been sh

ot in D

allas."

This is the w

ay I learned the new

s of P

residen

t Ken

ned

y's assassina-

tion. I ask

ed th

e cab d

river to take

me to m

y apartment rather than to

my office. A

nd

then

, for the n

ext h

our, I sat b

ack in

the cab

won

der-

ing w

hat h

ad h

app

ened

. W

hen

we arrived

at the ap

art-m

ent, the doorman told m

e that the n

ews h

ad ju

st been

flashed

on tele-

vision: th

e Presid

ent h

ad d

ied.

I called J. Edgar H

oover, in Wash-

ington

, and

asked

him

wh

at infor-

mation

he h

ad. I-k

told m

e that a

Lee H

arvey Osw

ald, k

now

n to th

e F

BI as a m

ember of the pro-C

astro F

air Play for C

uba Com

mittee, w

as the alleged assassin.

Osw

ald, w

ithou

t qu

estion, w

as a d

emen

ted ch

aracter wh

o, accord-

ing to th

e reports, h

ad also tried

to k

ill Gen

. Ed

win

A. W

alk

er an

d

had

threate

ned

to m

ak

e a

n

atte

mp

t on

my

life

as w

ell.

Wh

at b

rou

gh

t him

to th

is con

-

dition is still unknown. B

ut certain-ly on

e of the m

ajor factors wh

ich

warp

ed h

is min

d an

d d

rove him

to th

is terrible d

eed w

as his con

tact w

ith com

mu

nism

generally, an

d

with

Castro's fan

atical bran

d of

comm

unism in particular.

Fidel C

astro, therefore, proved to b

e the m

ost mom

entou

s figure in

John F

. Kennedy's life. It w

as Castro

wh

o provid

ed th

e major foreign

-policy issue in K

ennedy's campaign

for the P

residen

cy; it was C

astro w

ho brought him to the low

est point of h

is career, at the B

ay of Pigs; it

was C

astro who supplied the oppor-

tunity for Kennedy's greatest act of

leadersh

ip as P

residen

t, du

ring th

e b

lockad

e; and

, finally, C

astro was

an indirect cause of the tragic snuff-in

g out of Joh

n K

enn

edy's life at a

time w

hen, by reason of experience, ad

ded

to his k

een in

telligence, h

is great vision

and

vitality, he w

as com

ing into the most productive pe-

riod of his leadership of the nation.

Wh

ere Are W

e Now

? T

HIS tw

isted and tragic chain of events brings us to t964. C

uba, along w

ith Vietnam

, is the major foreign-

policy issue of the 1964 Presidential

campaign, as it w

as in 196o. Why is

Cu

ba su

ch a k

ey issue? P

recisely because it sym

bolizes our entire ap-p

roach to th

e men

ace of comm

u-

nism, our entire approach to foreign

policy. T

he an

swer to th

e qu

estion of

what w

e must do about C

uba can be determ

ined only after we have found

an answer to the m

uch broader, all-

inclu

sive qu

estion: I low

does th

e U

nited

States p

ropose to d

eal with

com

mu

nist aggression

throu

ghou

t th

e world

? Th

is is the actu

al fin,

cign-policy issue we face today.

Th

ere is strong su

pp

ort in th

e State D

epartment and in the adm

in-istration

for Stn

ator Fu

lbrigh

t's view

that Castro is not a danger but

just a nuisance, and that we should

he more flexible and m

ore concilia-tory in

our p

olicies toward

the S

o-viet U

nion

and

other com

mu

nist

countries. T

hose w

ho u

rge a more flexib

le resp

onse to com

mu

nism

lathit ou

t that there arc difficulties in the com

-m

unist bloc. There is a split betw

een C

omm

un

ist Ch

ina an

d th

e Soviet

Union. T

here is the trouhlt.that the S

oviet U

nio

n is h

avin

g w

ith its

satellites in Eastern E

urope, whose

people are overwhelm

ingly against their com

munist governm

ent. And

there is th

e fact that com

mu

nism

, econom

ically, has not been working

in Soviet Europe or in C

omm

unist C

hina or in Cuba or in the satellite

countries. P

uttin

g these d

evelopm

ents to-

gether, th

ose wh

o formu

late our

foreign p

olicy say that th

e world

situation has changed in our favor. N

oting th

e test-kin

treaty, the sale

of wh

eat to the S

oviet Un

ion an

d a

less belligeren

t attitud

e by K

hru

-shchev, they argue that the cold w

ar is thaw

ing and that a new period of

accomm

odation

with

the com

mu

-nists is in order.

My o

wn

evalu

atio

n lea

ds to

a

totally different conclusion. This is

no time to be com

placent about our position in the w

orld. The last four

years have seen the greatest series of loreign

policy failu

res of any com

-parable period in our history. In E

u-rop

e, the G

rand

Allian

ce is in a

!.11:imbles, w

ith several of our allies refu

sing to

sup

port th

e Un

ited

States in

our p

olicy toward

Latin

A

merica and A

sia. In Germ

any, the B

erlin Wall stands as a grim

monu-

men

t to Am

erican w

eakn

ess and

in

decision

in th

e face of a flagrant

comm

unist challenge. In Asia, V

iet-n

am is on

ly the m

ost recent an

d

most shocking of a series of foreign-

policy d

isasters that h

as redu

ced

Am

erican prestige to an all-time low

in

that p

art of the w

orld. L

aos is practically gone. C

ambodia is going.

Bu

rma an

d In

don

esia are on th

e brink.

In countries scattered around the w

orld, acts of m

obs d

escend

ing on

A

merican

emb

assies, stonin

g our

represen

tatives and

tearing d

own

the flag have becom

e comm

onplace. W

e ha

ve b

een h

um

iliated

, frus-

trated, ou

tguessed

and

outm

aneu

-vered

at every turn

. In th

e face of th

is record, h

ow can

anyon

e in a

respon

sible p

olicy-mak

ing p

osition

say that the cold war is thaw

ing? T

he cold

war isn

't thaw

ing; it is

bu

rnin

g with

a dead

ly heat. C

om-

munism

isn't changing; it isn't sleep-ing; it isn't relaxing; it is, as alw

ays, p

lotting, sch

emin

g, work

ing, figh

t-ing.

Soviet w

eapon

s are available to

any group anywhere that is seeking

to b

low

up

the so

cial o

rder a

nd

j00 CUBA, CASTRO AND 1011N F. KENNEDY

create the chaos in which commu-nism thrives. Thousands of young people from non-communist coun-tries are today being trained in the arts of subversion—from the staging of riots to guerrilla tactics. In the bloodletting in Southeast Asia, Cy-prus, the Congo, Yemen, British Guiana and in other areas, commu-nists are directly or indirectly in-volved.

While the danger of destruction by total war has gone down, the dan-ger of defeat without total war has gone up. Those who urge that we seek an "accommodation" with the communists fail to realize that when the communist leaders talk softly they are increasing their subversive and revolutionary activities. This is the situation with which the United States is presently confronted. It is a situation which calls for realistic thinking about communist strategy and tactics, and for a new policy to meet the threat that faces us.

We must understand that the com-munist threat is worldwide, and if communism takes over in one coun-try the tremors are felt clear around the world. We need, therefore, a worldwide approach. I completely reject the idea that there are so-called peripheral areas, collateral areas—like Cuba and Vietnam—that arc not important.

For world communist leaders the battle for Cuba is not about Cuba. It is about Latin America. And the

eventual target is the United States. Cuba, for example, is at our very doorstep. All the world looks on and sees that we do nothing to help our neighbors who are enslaved by a communist dictator. Is it any won-der that they are doubtful that we mean to resist communism in other parts of the world?

At this critical period, we must make up our minds that there can-not be one further retreat any place in the free world. We must have the military strength, the economic pro-grams and the political-action pro-grams to resist any further retreat. Rather than a policy of flexibility, of softening, of conciliation, we must have a strong and determined pol-icy. We must let those in the target nations know that the non-commu-nist world has had enough of this continued encroachment, and that we are now going to stand firm.

As I reflect on all that has hap-pened in recent years, one thing stands out clearly: the troubles our nation has experienced have come when we have failed to stand firm against the communist dictators. We have too often backed down—and backed away. It is time for us to put an end to this disgraceful, self-defeat-ing behavior. It is time CO stand firm —and then move forward—in Cuba, in Vietnam and in any other area where freedom is denied or threat. ened by the forces of world com-munism.

L_