ctbto spectrum - december 2002 issue 1 · resume – and that in turn would make non-proliferation...

It is my pleasure to introduce the first issue of CTBTOSpectrum, a new, biannual, public newsletter designed toinform the Preparatory Commission's specialized audiencesand the wider public about the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the objectives and activities of theCTBTO Preparatory Commission.The newsletter's namereflects the wide range of themes with which theCommission deals, spanning topics from technical andscientific verification issues to international cooperation andthe enhancement of global peace and security.

CTBTO Spectrum gives an additional dimension to the public face of theProvisional Technical Secretariat (PTS). It provides more in-depth information onthe organization's activities and focuses on new developments in the build-up of theverification regime.

This first issue gives an overview of the status of the verification regime build-upand, as an overarching theme, it highlights the significant role of the Treaty in nuclearnon-proliferation and disarmament. An interview with Sergei A. Ordzhonikidze,Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, and a special feature article byPeter Marshall, an expert on seismology, focus on this theme. This issue also providesan update on the latest session of the Preparatory Commission, in addition to regularcolumns on verification science, the potential civil and scientific applications of theCTBT verification technologies and a column on the PTS staff, which introduces thePTS mission statement.

I believe that CTBTO Spectrum will advance understanding of the Treaty andprovide new insights in the political, diplomatic and scientific context within whichthe Secretariat's work takes place.

Wolfgang HoffmannExecutive SecretaryPreparatory Commission for the ComprehensiveNuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

CTBTO SpectrumCTBTO SpectrumCTBTO NEWSLETTER ISSUE 1 | DECEMBER 2002

Who we are

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-BanTreaty bans all nuclear weapon testexplosions. The Treaty is a cornerstone ofthe international nuclear non-proliferationregime. It opened for signature in NewYork on 24 September 1996, and today hasachieved strong worldwide support.

The CTBTO Preparatory Commissionis an international organization consisting ofa plenary body composed of all StatesSignatories and the Provisional TechnicalSecretariat. It carries out the necessarypreparations for the effective implementationof the Treaty, and prepares for the firstsession of the Conference of the StatesParties to the Treaty after its entry into force.

Inside this issue

NOTES & QUOTES........................................2COMMISSION UPDATE ..................................4STATUS OF SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION ....5SECRETARIAT SNAPSHOTS ............................6OUTREACH ACTIVITIES ................................7IN THE SPOTLIGHT: Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament,Sergei A. Ordzhonikidze ............................8PERSPECTIVES:CTBT – The Arms Control Holy Grailby Peter D. Marshall, O.B.E. ..................10VERIFICATION HIGHLIGHTS ........................12VERIFICATION SCIENCE ..............................14POTENTIAL CIVIL AND

SCIENTIFIC APPLICATIONS ..........................15PTS PUBLICATIONS ....................................16CALENDAR OF MEETINGS ..........................16

CTBTO SPECTRUM 1 | WWW.CTBTO.ORG PAGE 1

Introduction

United Nations Study onDisarmament and Non-Proliferation Education

The United Nations Study onDisarmament and Non-ProliferationEducation was the subject of a roundtablediscussion attended by educators, students,non-governmental organizations,representatives of the United Nations(UN) system and government officials on9 October 2002 at United NationsHeadquarters. The UN Under-SecretaryGeneral for Disarmament Affairs,Jayantha Dhanapala, gave the openingaddress at the public launch of the study

which was later on submitted to the FirstCommittee of the 57th General Assemblyby the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairsof Mexico, Miguel Marin Bosch. Thestudy was prepared over the past twoyears by a Group of Experts, including tengovernmental experts representing diversegeographical regions of the world, underthe chair of Miguel Marin Bosch. Theprocess of producing the study broughttogether for the first time representativesof international organizations such asUNESCO, OPCW, CTBTO, Universityfor Peace, UNIDIR, non-governmentalorganizations and educational institutions.

According to the Group of Experts,the overall purpose of disarmament andnon-proliferation education and trainingis “to impart knowledge and skills toempower individuals to make theircontribution, as national and worldcitizens, to the achievement of generaland complete disarmament undereffective international control.” Thestudy assessed the existing experience inthe field, examined new aspects of themultilateral disarmament debate,questions of non-proliferation as appliedto weapons of mass destruction andsmall arms, and worked out a series ofpractical recommendations for thepromotion of disarmament and non-proliferation education and training.

Effective and successfuldisarmament education requires an activepartnership between governments,international organizations and civilsociety, as the UN Secretary-Generalnoted in his preface to the study:“Disarmament education seeks to informand empower citizens to work with theirGovernments for positive change. I hopethat Governments, the United Nationsfamily, other international organizations,disarmament-related organizations, non-governmental organizations and others ina position to contribute will do their partto sustain the process of consultation andcooperation started by the Group ofExperts, so that disarmament and non-proliferation education becomes anintegral – and natural – part of theeducation of the next generation.”

CTBTO SPECTRUM 1 | WWW.CTBTO.ORGPAGE 2

Notes & quotes

Ministerial statement

A joint statement by the ForeignMinisters of 18 countries, includingRussia, France and the United Kingdom,was issued on 14 September 2002following a meeting on the margins ofthe United Nations General Assembly.The statement urges States that have notsigned or ratified the ComprehensiveNuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to doso as soon as possible.

The Ministers said at the pressbriefing during which the statement wasissued that the early entry into force ofthe Treaty was central to nucleardisarmament and non-proliferationobjectives. “The prevention of theproliferation of materials, technologiesand knowledge which can be used forweapons of mass destruction is one ofthe most important challenges the worldis facing today. Additional internationaltensions have developed since the CTBTwas negotiated, which make entry intoforce of the Treaty...even more urgenttoday. We affirm that the CTBT has anessential role to play in strengtheningglobal peace and security”.

The Ministers called on all States tocontinue the moratorium on nuclearweapon test explosions and stressed theimportance of maintaining momentum inbuilding the verification regime. Theystated that they will do all they can tomake the Treaty a focus of attention atthe highest political levels.

“Effective and successfuldisarmament educationrequires an active partnershipbetween governments,international organizationsand civil society.”

“The prevention of the proliferation ofmaterials, technologies and knowledgewhich can be used for weapons of massdestruction is one of the most importantchallenges the world is facing today.”

concerning the CTBT which “underlinesthe urgency of the entry into force of theCTBT in the context of the progress inimplementing the international system tomonitor nuclear weapon tests under theTreaty.” The resolution was passed by118 votes in favour.

During the General Debate, theimportance of the conferences tofacilitate the entry into force of theTreaty (Vienna 1999, New York 2001)was underlined and concerned Stateswere called upon to sign and ratify assoon as possible. Several Statesemphasized the importance ofmaintaining a moratorium on nucleartesting. Some States also noted that“such a moratorium cannot replace thelegally binding commitment representedby signing and ratification of theTreaty.” A number of States noted that inrespect to the development of the CTBTverification regime encouragingprogress has been achieved. Ninety-seven States are on board and animpressive international system hasbeen established to deter and detectexplosive nuclear tests.

“This Treaty is a crucialelement in the non-proliferationregime. The longer we delay itsentry into force, the greater therisk that nuclear testing willresume – and that in turn wouldmake non-proliferation muchharder to sustain.”


United Nations GeneralAssembly FirstCommittee report

The First Committee of the 57th UnitedNations General Assembly, which coversdisarmament and international securityissues, has approved a resolution on theCTBT tabled by Australia, Mexico, NewZealand and 52 other countries, by arecorded vote of 125 in favour to oneagainst (United States). Four statesabstained (Colombia, India, Mauritius,and Syria). The resolution stresses that auniversal and effectively verifiableComprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treatyis a fundamental instrument in the fieldof disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. It urges all States to remainseized of the matter at the “highestpolitical level” and to sign and ratify theTreaty without delay or conditions.

An omnibus resolution by the NewAgenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt,Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, SouthAfrica and Sweden), entitled ‘Towards anuclear-weapon-free world: the need fora new agenda’, contains a paragraph

THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN NEW YORK

United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan,Conference on Facilitating the Entry intoForce of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-BanTreaty, New York, 11 November 2001


The plenary debate

The main focus of the plenary debatewas on budgetary issues. Member Statescongratulated Niger and Botswana ontheir ratification of the ComprehensiveNuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. SeveralMember States expressed theirappreciation for the signing of therelationship agreement between theCommission and the Agency for theProhibition of Nuclear Weapons in LatinAmerica and the Caribbean (OPANAL).Further negotiations on possiblecooperation agreements with otherNuclear Weapon Free Zoneorganizations were encouraged.

Conclusions

The Commission approved the budgetfor 2003 amounting to US$ 88 581 700.As an indication of the maturity of theorganization, the Member Statesdecided, on a trial basis, to reduce theannual number of Commission sessionsto two in 2003. Ambassador JavierPaulinich of Peru was elected as thenext chairman of the Commission forthe first half of 2003. Support wasexpressed for the convening of anotherConference on Facilitating the Entryinto Force of the ComprehensiveNuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 2003 and forthe continuing build-up of the globalverification system.

Report on theNovember 2002session

The Preparatory Commission for theComprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban TreatyOrganization (CTBTO) held itsNineteenth Session on 11–15 November2002 in Vienna under the chairmanshipof Ambassador Liviu Aurelian Bota ofRomania. Seventy-five Member Statesand one observer attended the session.

The report of the ExecutiveSecretary

Mr. Wolfgang Hoffmann, ExecutiveSecretary of the CTBTO PreparatoryCommission, reported in detail on theprogress achieved in the implementationof all Major Programmes of thePreparatory Commission. He pointedout that as of 8 November 2002, 63States Signatories had paid theirassessed contributions in full and 18States Signatories had made partialpayments, which resulted in a collectionrate of 88,7% of the 2002 assessment ofUS$ 83 091 100.

In international cooperation, Mr.Hoffmann mentioned inter alia thevoluntary contribution by theNetherlands for the year 2003 and theholding of a training course by Japan incooperation with the ProvisionalTechnical Secretariat. These voluntarycontributions by Member States arewelcomed as positive signals for thecontinuing support of ProvisionalTechnical Secretariat programmes andactivities.

Commission update

Profile of theChairperson of thePreparatory Commission

Ambassador Liviu Aurelian Bota,Permanent Representative of Romaniato the International Organizations inVienna, has served as Chairman of thePreparatory Commission for the secondhalf of 2002.

Mr. Bota joined the diplomaticservice in 1961 and spent several yearsas a member of the Permanent Missionof Romania to the United Nations inNew York.

He also held several high-rankingpositions in the United Nations system,including Director of the UnitedNations Institute for DisarmamentResearch (UNIDIR) in Geneva, SeniorAdvisor to the Undersecretary-Generalfor Human Rights in Geneva and Headof the United Nations Mission ofObservers to Tajikistan (UNMOT) andGeorgia (UNOMIG).

In 2001 he served as Chairman ofthe Permanent Council of theOrganization for Security andCooperation in Europe.

Treaty signatures and ratifications

CANADA

MEXICOCUBA

JAMAICA

BELIZE

DOMINICANREPUBLICHAITI

PUERTORICO

GUATEMALA

COSTA RICA

NICARAGUA

HONDURASEL SALVADOR

PANAMA

COLOMBIA

VENEZUELA

TRINIDAD

and TOBAGO

GUYANA

SURINAME

FRENCHGUIA

NA

ECUADOR

BRAZILPERU

BOLIVIA

PARAGUAY

ARGENTINA

URUGUAY

CHILE

Falkland/Malvinas Islands

FIJI

Greenland

ICELAND

NORWAY

SWEDEN FINLAND

DENMARKUNITED

KINGDOMIRELAND

FRANCE

BELGIUM

NETHERLANDS

LUXEMBOURG

GERMANY

LATVIALITHUANIA

RUSSIA

POLANDBELARUS

UKRAINE

SPAINPORTUGAL

CZECHREP.

ITALY

SLOVENIA

CROATIA

SLOVAKIA

HUNGARY

YUGOSLAVIA

BULGARIA

ROMANIA

REP. OFMOLDOVA

ALBANIA

GREECE TURKEY

CYPRUS

MOROCCO

WesternSahara

ALGERIALIBYAN

ARAB JAMAHIRIYA

TUNISIA

MAURITANIA

SENEGALGAMBIA

GUINEA-BISSAUGUINEA

SIERRA LEONE

LIBERIA

MALI

BURKINAFASO

CÔTED’ IVOIRE

GHAN

AT

OGO

BENI

N

NIGERIA

NIGERCHAD

EGYPT

SUDAN

ERITREA

ETHIOPIACENTRALAFRICANREPUBLICCAMEROON

EQUATORIALGUINEA

GABONCONGO

DEMOCRATICREPUBLIC OFTHE CONGO

RWANDABURUNDI

UGANDAKENYA

SOMALIA

ANGOLA

NAMIBIA

ZAMBIA

UNITED REPUBLICOF

TANZANIA

MALAWI

ZIMBABWE

BOTSWANA

MOZAMBIQUE MADAGASCAR

SWAZILAND

LESOTHOSOUTHAFRICA

MAURITIUS

Reunion

GEORGIA

ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN

SYRIANARAB REP.

LEBANON

JORDAN

IRAQIRAN (ISLAMICREPUBLIC OF)

SAUDI

ARABIAQATAR

OMAN

YEMEN

INDIA

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN

TURKMENISTAN

UZBEKISTANKYRGYZSTAN

TAJIKISTAN

KAZAKHSTAN

SRI

LANKA

NEPAL BHUTAN

BANGLADESH

MYANMARLAO PEOPLE’S

DEM. REP.

THAILAND

CAMBODIA

VIET NAM

MALAYSIA

BRUNEI

DARUSSALAM

PHILIPPINES

INDONESIA

SOLOMON

ISLANDS

FIJI

VANUATU

New Caledonia

AUSTRALIA

NEW

ZEALAND

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

MONGOLIA

DEMOCRATICPEOPLE’S REPUBLIC

OF KOREA

REPUBLICOF

KOREA

JAPANCHINA

ANDORRA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

GalapagosIslands

North I.

South I.

Newfoundland

South Georgia

CanaryIslands

Svalbard

NOVOSIBIRSKIYEOSTROVA

Hawaiian Islands

MELANESI A

ZEMLYA FRANTSA I OSI FA

Nov

a

y aZe

m l y a

SEVERNAYA ZEMLYA

Norwegian Sea

North Sea

Black Sea

Red

Sea

Gulf of

Guinea

Hudson Bay

Gulf ofMexico

Sea of

Okhotsk

Sea of

Japan

East

China Sea

Yellow

Sea

Bay of

BengalSouth

China

Sea

Celebes

Sea

Coral Sea

Tasman Sea

Baffin Bay

ARCTIC OCEANARCTIC OCEAN

Barents SeaKara Sea

Laptev Sea

East

Siberian

Sea

Beaufort

Sea

Gulf of

Alaska

PACIFIC

OCEAN

NORTH

ATLANTIC

OCEAN

SOUTHATLANTICOCEAN

INDIANOCEAN

PACIFIC

OCEAN

ARCTIC OCEAN

Phi

li

pp

in

eSe

a

AUSTRIASWITZERLAND

ISRAEL

Bouvet I.S.Sandwich Is.

St. Helena

Rocas

Fernando de

Ascension I.

St.Paul Rocks

Açores

Madeira

Faerøern

Shetland Is.

Rockall

COMOROS

Farquhar Is.

SEYCHELLES

Aldabra Is.

C. d’Ambre

Socotra

QueenCharlotteIslands

BAHAMAS

Great Australian Bight

KIRIBATI

Phoenix Is.

Tokelau

Wallis &Futuna

SAMOA

TONGA

NIUE

COOK ISLANDS

Îs Marquises

French Polynesia

Tahiti

Îs.de la Société

Îs.Tuamotu

Îs.GambierÎs.Tubuai

Pitcairn

Sala y Gómez

Easter I.

South-Eastern

Pacific Plateau

KiritimatiGilbert Is.

South WestPacific Basin

Caroline Is.

MARSHALL ISLANDS

PA

LAU

I.San Ambrosia

I.San Felix

Is.Juan Fernandez

Martin VazI. da Trindad

Tristan da Cunha

Gough I.

Tasmania

ANTIGUA

and BARBUDA

DOMINICA

SAINT LUCIA

BARBADOS

SAINT VINCENT

and the GRENADINES

GRENADA

NAURU

TUVALUCocos Is.

Christmas I.

Îs. Crozet

ChagosArchipelago

MALDIVES

ST. KITTS

and NEVIS

KUWAIT

PAPUANEW

GUINEA

SAO TOMÉPRINCIPE

CAPEVERDE

SINGAPORE

ESTONIA

UNITEDARAB

EMIRATES

BAHRAIN

MONACOTHE FORMER

YUGOSLAV REP.OF MACEDONIA

BOSNIAAND

HERZEGOVINA

DJIBOUTI

LIECHENSTEIN

HOLYSEE

SANMARINO

MALTA

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

BALTICSEA

CASPIANSEA

ARAL SEA

MOZ

AMBI

QUE

CHAN

NEL

EASTINDIES

MICRONESIA(FEDERATED STATES OF)

DENMARK STRAIT


166165

149138

151 155 160

9789

18

26

51

69

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Ratifications

Signatures

414141414141

31 3130

26

13

02

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 20020

5

10

15

20

25

30

4044

35

41

Ratifications

Signatures

193 Total States Total Annex 2 States

44 STATES LISTED IN

ANNEX 2 TO THE TREATY

RATIFYING STATES

97

31

NON-SIGNATORY STATES

27

3

SIGNATORY STATES

166

41

TOTAL STATES 193STATUS AS OF 28 OCTOBER 2002


Mission Statement

The mission of the ProvisionalTechnical Secretariat (PTS) is tosupport the efforts of the PreparatoryCommission for the ComprehensiveNuclear-Test-Ban TreatyOrganization – an independent,international, intergovernmentalorganization – in carrying out thenecessary preparations for theeffective implementation of theComprehensive Nuclear-Test-BanTreaty and in preparing for the firstConference of States Parties to theTreaty. The Treaty bans the carryingout of any nuclear weapon testexplosion or any other nuclearexplosion.

The PTS works to establish aglobal verification regime to monitorcompliance with the ComprehensiveNuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. It builds,tests, and provisionally operates theInternational Monitoring System, theInternational Data Centre and therelated global communicationsinfrastructure, and prepares for on-site inspections. It provides timelydata, assessments and other productsand services to Signatory States ofthe Treaty. The PTS also conductstraining programmes and undertakesother outreach work in support of theTreaty.

The international, multiculturalstaff of the PTS demonstrate thehighest standards of professionalexpertise, efficiency and integrity.

Secretariat snapshots

THE DIRECTORS OF THE FIVE PTS DIVISIONS HAVE EITHER DIPLOMATIC OR SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUNDS.TOP ROW, LEFT TO RIGHT: PIERCE S. CORDEN (United States) , Director, Division of Administrat ion;ZIPING GU (China), Director, Legal and External Relations DivisionBOTTOM ROW, LEFT TO RIGHT: GERARDO SUAREZ REYNOSO (Mexico), Director, International Monitoring System;RASHAD KEBEASY (Egypt) , Director, International Data Centre;VLADIMIR KRIOUTCHENKOV (Russian Federation), Director, On-Site Inspection Division

AS OF 4 OCTOBER 2002, 268 STAFF MEMBER FROM 67 COUNTRIES STRIVE TO FULFIL THE PTS MISSION.THIS MULTINATIONAL STAFF COMPOSITION REFLECTS THE GLOBAL CHARACTER OF THE ORGANIZATION.


Outreach activities

External relations

External relations outreach aims toensure the entry into force of theComprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty(CTBT) through signature andratification by all Annex 2 States and toestablish the global verification regimein cooperation with InternationalMonitoring System (IMS) host States. Italso works to encourage universaladherence to the Treaty and to enhanceparticipation in the Commission's work.

The PTS furthers Treaty supportthrough bilateral and multilateralinitiatives. It organizes missions in orderto stress the political and security valueof the Treaty and to provide informationon technical implementation aspects.Joint missions between the Legal andExternal Relations Division and the

International Monitoring SystemDivision have proven an efficient tool toachieve these goals, as they combinetechnical and political aspects of theactivities of the Commission. So far jointmissions have taken place to Cameroon(August 2002) and Libya (October 2002).

International cooperation

International cooperation workshops andtraining programmes also play animportant outreach role. Over 350participants from more than 130 Stateshave so far taken part in internationalcooperation workshops in venues aroundthe globe. The most recent one, in Kenyain June 2002, brought together 20 Statesfrom East and Southern Africa. 25Caribbean States are expected toparticipate in an internationalcooperation workshop that will takeplace in Jamaica in December 2002.

The Commission also organizesexperts discussions, information visitsfor senior officials from developingStates, equipment donation to assist inthe establishment of National DataCentres (NDCs) and special trainingprogrammes for experts from developingStates.

Training

In order to build and operate theverification system efficiently, training isessential. All three verification Divisionsoffer training courses and programmes.The IMS arranges technical trainingprogrammes for IMS station operators andstaff from NDCs. In November 2002, atwo-week training course has taken placefor technical staff of NDCs from 12Member States on the use of softwarepackages to utilize International DataCentre data and products. The On-SiteInspection Division holds training coursesfor potential inspectors and workshops toaddress technical matters related to on-siteinspections.

The PTS is currently consulting withMember States on ways to enhance itstraining programmes. At the same time, itis taking steps to establish a centralizedregistry of training information.

IMS facility agreementsand arrangements

In view of the numerous internationalagreements it concludes, the PreparatoryCommission recently acceded to the 1986Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatiesbetween States and International

The PTS conducts a variety of activitiesfocusing on enhancing the Treatyunderstanding of decision-makers andthe general public, generating politicalsupport, encouraging internationalcooperation and building nationaltechnical capacities through training.

continued on page 8

RELIMINARY SITE SURVEY OF A RADIONUCLIDE STATION IN EDEACAMEROON), AUGUST 2002.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WORKSHOP FOR STATESFROM EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA, NAIROBI (KENYA),18–20 JUNE 2002.

NATIONAL DATA CENTRE TRAINING COURSE FOR TECHNICAL STAFF,VIENNA (AUSTRIA), 18–29 NOVEMBER 2002

A: In the nuclear context, I place theCTBT in the logical, and I hopehistorical, chain that leads fromuncontrolled nuclear proliferation tomultilaterally agreed and verifiedelimination of all nuclear weapons. Theconclusion of the CTBT in theConference on Disarmament marked thecompletion of an important step in thisprocess that essentially started with thenegotiation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in one of theConference on Disarmament’spredecessor bodies.

More broadly, I see the CTBT,together with the Biological WeaponsConvention and the Chemical WeaponsConvention, as a link in the fence thatwill ultimately keep out all weapons ofmass destruction. The job of theConference on Disarmament is tocontinue building this fence.

Q: In the Final Declaration of theConference on Facilitating the Entry intoForce of the CTBT adopted in New Yorkon 13 November 2001, 109 ratifying andsignatory States affirmed “…that theconduct of nuclear-weapon testexplosions or any other nuclearexplosion constitutes a serious threat toglobal efforts towards nucleardisarmament and non-proliferation.”

In your view, what effect will theentry into force of the CTBT have onglobal non-proliferation efforts and thedisarmament process?

Q: The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT) was negotiated at theConference on Disarmament in Genevabetween 1993 and 1996.

Where do you as the Secretary-General of this Conference place theCTBT in the overall historic context of theConference on Disarmament?

Sergei A. Ordzhonikidze


“The entry into force of the CTBTwould provide an immediate boostto both non-proliferation efforts andthe whole disarmament process.”

Organizations or between InternationalOrganizations. The Commission has alarge number of bilateral agreements andarrangements with States hostinginternational monitoring facilities for theCTBT.

International Monitoring System(IMS) facility agreements andarrangements are foreseen in the Treatyand are based on models adopted by theCommission to regulate theestablishment and provisional operationand maintenance of the facilities. Todate, the Executive Secretary has signed22 such agreements and arrangements onbehalf of the organization, of which 15have entered into effect and two areapplied provisionally.

Negotiating IMS facilityagreements can take time. Early on itwas realized that the Commission'sprogramme of work could not wait forthem to be finalized. The practice thusevolved for host States to authorize thenecessary work by means of interimexchanges of letters, pending conclusionof the formal facility agreement. Thishas been a successful approach and legalarrangements in the form of IMS facilityagreements, or exchanges of letters, nowgovern the Commission's activities at309 of the 337 monitoring facilities in 76of the 90 host States.

continued from page 7

Mr. Ordzhonikidze,a Russian nationaland career diplomat,was appointedDirector-General ofthe United NationsOffice at Geneva inMarch 2002. Healso serves as theSecretary-General

of the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. Ordzhonikidze joined theSoviet diplomatic service in 1969 andhas held several positions at thePermanent Mission of his country to theUnited Nations in New York, includingDeputy Permanent Representative. InMoscow he served as Deputy Chief ofthe International Legal Department ofthe Foreign Ministry and Director ofInternational Organizations of theForeign Ministry. In 1999, Mr.Ordzhonikidze was appointed DeputyMinister of Foreign Affairs.

In the spotlight

What could be done in youropinion to further signature andratification of the Treaty, in particular ofthese 13 outstanding Annex 2 Stateswhose signature is still needed for theCTBT to enter into force?

A: To be frank, I think the mainobstacle to entry into force of the CTBTis the lack so far of political commitmentto the concept of the nuclear-test-ban byone of the nuclear weapon States.Without leadership from all five of thepermanent members of the SecurityCouncil, we are unlikely to see the 13outstanding Annex 2 States join anytimesoon. So it is essentially a question ofbuilding political support for the test banwithin the nuclear weapon States. I thinkit is important that other, smallercountries, who rely for their security onthe guarantees contained in the NPT,make it clear how important it is to them– in pure national security terms – thatthe CTBT enters into force. Thismessage needs to be delivered throughall available channels: bilateral, regionaland multilateral.

In the meantime, it is vital thatthose countries which have ratified thisinternational legal instrument, workenergetically with the ComprehensiveNulcear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization toensure that when the Treaty does enterinto force, everything will be ready andwill operate effectively. It will be all themore difficult to get the necessarypolitical support where it counts, ifinterest and support is dissipatingelsewhere.

of the Treaty can be detected in a timelyand effective manner.

What political significance does theverification regime have in constrainingthe proliferation of nuclear weapons?

A: The verification regime is the teethof the Treaty, and the politicalsignificance is that the teeth are sharpand strong enough to bite anyone whoconducts a nuclear text explosion. Forcountries which do not have nuclear

weapons, there is a strong disincentive todeveloping them – essentially, there is nochance that tested and reliable weaponscould be developed undetected. For thecountries which do have nuclearweapons, there are serious constraints todeveloping and expanding their arsenals.This in turn both reduces the pressure onthem to keep up with their nuclear rivals,and represents an effective tool toprevent any non-nuclear State fromdeveloping a nuclear capability.

Q: 44 States listed in its Annex 2 mustratify the CTBT before it can enter intoforce. These 44 States formallyparticipated in the work of the 1996Conference on Disarmament andpossessed nuclear reactors at that time.So far 31 Annex 2 States have ratifiedthe Treaty.

A: The entry into force of the CTBTwould provide an immediate boost toboth non-proliferation efforts and thewhole disarmament process. Mostimmediately, there would be a solidguarantee against the resumption oftesting, backed up by confidence thatany illegal testing would be detected.This would deliver many governmentsthe assurance they need that the NPTregime is protected, and that theirdecision not to pursue nuclear weaponsis justified.

Secondly, entry into force wouldrestore confidence in multilateralsecurity arrangements in general, andwould boost efforts to negotiate furtherinstruments for nuclear disarmament,such as a treaty banning fissile materialproduction. I think there would also bevery positive effects in other areas, suchas biological weapons, where generalscepticism and lack of political interestis detracting from the development ofpotentially important multilateralbarriers to proliferation.

Q: The world witnessed over 2000nuclear test explosions before the CTBTopened for signature on 24 September1996. CTBT's global verification regimeis the result of many years ofnegotiations led by an internationalGroup of Scientific Experts at theConference on Disarmament to ensurethat non-compliance with the provisions


“The verification regime is the teeth ofthe Treaty, and the political significanceis that the teeth are sharp and strongenough to bite anyone who conducts anuclear test explosion.”


With the signing ofthe ComprehensiveNuclear-Test-BanTreaty (CTBT) on24 September 1996the most significantstep towards nuclearnon-proliferationsince the signing of

the Nulcear Non-Proliferation Treaty wastaken. The CTBTO PreparatoryCommission which, together with itsProvisional Technical Secretariat (PTS), isto establish all the facilities specified inthe Treaty to enable States Signatories toverify compliance with the provisions ofthe Treaty, started work shortly afterwards.The CTBT contained an unprecedentedtechnical verification package, includingthe establishment of a total of 321seismological, hydroacoustic, infrasoundand radionuclide monitoring stations in 90countries – the International MonitoringSystem (IMS). In addition to theestablishment of the IMS, the PreparatoryCommission had to create an International

Data Centre (IDC) and to define theprocess required to conduct an on-siteinspection (OSI).

The build-up of theverification regime

The task of establishing the IMS andIDC systems, as well as the OSIprocedures, is a major engineering andlogistical challenge. Where no stationscurrently exist, a specific procedure,which can be very time consuming, mustbe followed. Agreements have to benegotiated with host States to allow PTSstaff to enter that State's territory to carryout work. Once this has been done, sitesurveys are conducted to ensure that theproposed location is adequate for thepurpose of Treaty monitoring. The nextstage is to acquire the equipment –which for each of the technologies is ofthe highest specification – and arrangefor its installation. A satellitecommunication link, part of the GlobalCommunication Infrastructure (GCI), isset up to get the data to the IDC inVienna. The IDC uses this data toprepare a bulletin of events detected andlocated for distribution within two daysto all States who wish to receive it.These bulletins can be tailor-made to aState Signatory's individual monitoringrequirements.

The status of the IMSnetwork

At the present time onlypart of the IMS isoperational. The speed atwhich stations areinstalled is determined bya number of factors,including budgetaryconstraints and theavailability of specialisedequipment. What is

already clear is that the performance ofthe final IMS network for Treatymonitoring will significantly exceedthe necessarily conservative estimatesof the experts in Geneva whoestablished the original specifications.

Other potential uses of theCTBT verificationtechnologies

Once the IMS and the IDC are complete,the State Signatories will have access toa unique database. Much of this datacould be of very significant value for avariety of scientific studies which wouldbenefit mankind as well as provideassurance that the provisions of theCTBT are being adhered to. Earthquakehazard and risk assessment, monitoringof global warming, atmospheric andmeteorological studies, early warning ofthe potential dangers of volcaniceruption and studies of pollutant andbiological species are just a few of thestudies which would benefit from timelyaccess to the IMS data. The IMS is toearth scientists what the Hubbletelescope is to astronomers or the latestatom-smasher to nuclear scientists.

CTBT – The Arms Control Holy Grailby Peter D. Marshall, O.B.E.

“The IMS is to earth scientistswhat the Hubble telescope is toastronomers or the latest atom-smasher to nuclear scientists.”

Perspectives

OVERVIEW OF THIRTEEN IMS STATIONS LOCATED IN ANTARCTICA


The CTBT, arms controland nuclear non-proliferation

The CTBT can make a number ofsignificant contributions to armscontrol but perhaps the mostimportant is the establishment,upon entry into force, of averifiable regime in which nuclearexplosion tests are prohibited,thus arresting the development ofnew nuclear weapons. Growinginternational concern about thethreats posed by the proliferationof weapons of mass destructionrecognizes the CTBT as a majorstep forward in reducing suchthreats.

When the CTBT, often described asthe Holy Grail of arms control, wassigned, President Clinton described theevent as “the longest-sought, hardest-fought prize in arms control.” Given thatthe first attempt to impose restraints onnuclear testing and thus control nuclearweapon development were made over 50

years ago, this is perhaps a veryreasonable statement. With averifiable CTBT in force thenuclear non-proliferationobjectives of much of theinternational community will besignificantly strengthened. AllStates Parties are provided with areduced threat to their nationalsecurity thus making the world asafer place for humankind.

The excellent work of the PreparatoryCommission and its PTS will, with the entryinto force of the Treaty, put anunprecedented brake on horizontal andvertical nuclear proliferation. However,there is still much work, both technical anddiplomatic, to be done before the search forthe arms control Holy Grail is over.

Biographical note

After several years working on groundshock from underground explosions,Peter Marshall became a foundermember of the United Kingdom ForensicSeismology Research Group at AWEBlacknest and conducted research on thetechnical problems of test-banmonitoring. During more than 40 yearsof research up to his retirement in June2002, he published over 100 scientificpapers related to test-ban seismology.Peter Marshall acted as technicaladviser to successive UK Delegations ontest-ban treaty issues since 1975 andserved as Chairman of the Expert Groupduring the 1994-1996 CTBT negotiationsin Geneva. He is now enjoying a busyretirement.

“With a verifiable CTBT in forcethe nuclear non-proliferationobjectives of much of theinternational community will besignificantly strengthened. AllStates Parties are provided with areduced threat to their nationalsecurity thus making the world asafer place for humankind.”

GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF THE 337 IMS MONITORING FACILITIES LOCATED IN 90 COUNTRIES

meeting all of the technical specificationsestablished by the Commission, ensuringthat data are tamper-proof andauthenticated, and that data are sent in anuninterrupted stream to the InternationalData Centre in Vienna over an officialGlobal Communications Infrastructure(GCI) link.

Following certification, the PTSbegins to pay the station operation andmaintenance costs, usually through acontract with the local technicalinstitution that has assisted with theestablishment of the station.

IMS station status

The global network of stations whichconstitutes the International MonitoringSystem is unprecedented in the history ofengineering. Stretching from the Arcticto Antarctica and from the Atlantic to thePacific Ocean, it covers the entire earth.In 1997 work began on the 321

monitoring stations in 90countries that make up the“listening posts” of theIMS (see Figure 1).Located in some cases inthe most remote areas ofthe world, the stations useseismic, hydroacoustic,infrasound andradionuclide monitoringtechnologies.

To date, site surveysfor stations have beencompleted at 87 % of the sites. 137stations (43%) are installed andsubstantially meet the Commission'sspecifications. PTS staff and numerouscontractors around the world haveworked in difficult environments toprepare the sites, construct the necessaryinfrastructure, purchase the equipmentand install and test it.

Thirty-four IMS stations have so farundergone the formal process ofcertification. A certified station meets allthe requirements necessary to become arecognized part of the IMS. This includes

Verification highlights


The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-BanTreaty (CTBT) includes a definition ofa global verification regime to monitorcompliance with the Treaty.Establishing this regime, which must becapable of detecting nuclear explosionsunderground, in water and in theatmosphere, is the main activity of thePreparatory Commission for theCTBTO. The verification regime mustbe operational at the Treaty’s entry intoforce. The regime consists of anInternational Monitoring System (IMS)supported by an International DataCentre (IDC), consultation andclarification, on-site inspections (OSI)and confidence-building measures.

CONSTRUCTION OF WIND-NOISE-REDUCING PIPE ARRAYS AT INFRASOUNDSTATION IS07 WARRAMUNGA (AUSTRALIA)

FIGURE 1. OVERVIEW OF IMS STATION STATUS AS OF 4 OCTOBER 2002

The major components of an OSIare an agreed Operational Manual, well-trained inspectors and approvedequipment. On the request of anyMember State and after approval by theExecutive Council, an on-site inspectionteam of a maximum of 40 people mustbe on the territory of the Inspected StateParty within six days and at theinspection site 36 hours thereafter. Anon-site inspection may last up to 130days and cover an inspection area of upto 1000 km2.

The Preparatory Commission hasgiven high priority to the elaboration ofthe draft OSI Operational Manual. Aninitial draft rolling text of the Manualwas completed in 2001 and theproduction of the draft Manual, whichmust be approved by the Conference ofthe States Parties at its initial session, iscurrently a major task of theCommission. Various training activities,workshops, equipment testing, tabletopand field experiments have taken place.To further elucidate the inspectionprocedures and technical and logisticalaspects of an OSI, field experimentswere held in Kazakhstan (1999) and inSlovakia (2001).

Between 17 September and 15October 2002, an extensive fieldexperiment took place in Kazakhstan totest the initial phase of an OSI. Twenty-seven surrogate inspectors with OSIequipment were flown into the countryin order to find ‘evidence’ of ahypothetical nuclear event in an areacovering 400 km2. The experiment willprovide valuable data and insights forfuture OSIs.

users from 57 different Member States.Around 60,000 events such asearthquakes, mining blasts or volcaniceruptions, etc. worldwide have beendetected and reported with minimaldelay to Member States in the form ofReviewed Event Bulletins, the primaryproducts derived from IMS data. Byreviewing processed IMS radionuclidedata, the IDC has detected and reportedon nearly 200 CTBT-relevantradionuclides, or airborne radioactiveparticles. IMS data and IDC productscontinue to be successfully distributedto an ever increasing list of MemberStates.

IDC and GCI activities

Data collected by the InternationalMonitoring System is transmitted innear-real time via the satellite-basedGlobal Communications Infrastructureto the International Data Centre inVienna for processing and analysis.

The GCI is the first globalsatellite communications network basedon Very Small Aperture Terminal(VSAT) technology. IMS facilities andMember States in all but near-polarareas of the world can exchange datavia their local VSAT earth stationsthrough one of the five geosynchronoussatellites. The satellites route thetransmissions to VSAT hub stations onthe ground, and the data is then sent tothe IDC by terrestrial communicationslinks. As of October 2002, the GCIinstallation programme had completed125 VSAT installations out of theplanned total of 234.

Between February 2000, whenMember States approved theexperimental distribution of data andproducts, until October 2002, overone million such items have beendistributed to over 400 authorized


On-Site Inspectionactivities and fieldexperiments

On-site inspections are the finalverification measure that can only becarried out once the Treaty has enteredinto force. An OSI clarifies whether anuclear explosion has taken place inviolation of the Treaty and gathers anyfacts which might assist in identifyingany possible violator.

ANALYST AT THE INTERNATIONAL DATA CENTRE IN VIENNA

VISUAL OBSERVATIONS DURING THE ON-SITE INSPECTIONFIELD EXPERIMENT IN KAZAKHSTAN,17 SEPTEMBER–15 OCTOBER 2002


The noble gasexperiment – phase III

The IMS is currently carrying out the finalstage of a three-phase experiment to testnoble gas equipment. The experiment aimsto develop appropriate instrumentation fordeployment at radionuclide stations tomeasure radioactive xenon content in theatmosphere. To meet the IMS requirementsfor xenon measurements, existing

measurement devices need to be adaptedand completely new technologiesdeveloped.

In phase I, xenon measurementsystems were developed by fourinstitutions located in France, Russia,Sweden and the USA that cooperate with

the Provisional Technical Secretariat forthis purpose. During phase II of theexperiment all four noble gas systemswere located at a single laboratory to testtheir performance synchronously and toexamine the correlation of the results. Inthe current phase III of the experiment,noble gas systems are being delivered toselected sites in four different globalregions – Brazil (Rio de Janeiro), Norway(Spitsbergen), French Polynesia (Tahiti),and Southern China (Guangzhou). PhaseIII aims to assess how the systems operateunder various climatic conditions. Thesystems must demonstrate their capabilityto operate automatically and reliably in thefield. In addition, the achievement ofsecure and accurate data transmissionfrom the noble gas systems to the IDC inVienna is of particular importance forphase III.

Verification science

The network of the InternationalMonitoring System (IMS) with itsassociated communicationsinfrastructure and the InternationalData Centre (IDC) was designed by aGroup of Scientific Experts at theConference on Disarmament in Genevato be fully capable of monitoringcompliance with the Treaty. Newresearch and improved communicationstechnology continuously strengthens andrefines the detection capabilities of theIMS. This column introduces some ofthe latest developments in the field ofverification science.

SAMPLE OF SPECTRUM SENT VIA THE GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE TO THE INTERNATIONAL DATA CENTRE

NOBLE GAS SYSTEM DEPLOYED AT RADIONUCLIDE STATIONS RN27 IN PAPEETE (TAHITI)


Potential civil and scientific applications

The International Monitoring System usesseismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound andradionuclide monitoring technologiescapable of detecting evidence of nuclearexplosions in underground, in water andin the atmosphere in order to monitorcompliance with the ComprehensiveNuclear-Test-Ban. These verificationtechnologies, together with the data,technologies and products of theInternational Data Centre, have potentialcivil and scientific applications which canprovide significant benefits to States andthe international scientific community.

aftershocks following large earthquakes,and to provide estimates of the size andfrequency of further aftershocks.

For example, the IDC hasestimated the locations and magnitudesof several aftershocks that followed themain shock of the very destructiveearthquake that took place near Izmit,Turkey, in August 1999. More recently,the IDC prepared special event analysesfor 19 earthquakes that occurred over asix day period in January 2002 aroundGoma in the Democratic Republic of theCongo. These earthquakes wereprobably related to the volcanic activityobserved during the same time period.

Studies of the earthquake processand studies of the structure and propertiesof the interior of the earth are the twoprincipal fields of seismological research,and IMS seismic data may also contributesignificantly to this field. High qualityseismic data is required to study thedistribution of stresses active at theearthquake source and the geometry andorientation of the causal fault. In addition,much of what is known about thestructure and properties of the interior ofthe earth has come from studies ofseismic waves passing through the earth.The IMS seismic stations providethousands of seismic waves signals perday that have traversed all parts of thesolid earth. This vast source of data canbe used by scientists to improve ourunderstanding of the earth’s interior.

Vienna seminar

A seminar on the potential civil andscientific applications of the four IMSverification technologies, sponsored bythe Permanent Missions of Australia,Japan, the Netherlands and the UnitedKingdom, took place at the ViennaInternational Centre on 15 October 2002.The seminar focused on thetechnologies’ potential to assist nationalauthorities and researchers in diversescientific and civil fields, and was afollow-up to the senior experts’discussion on civil and scientificapplications of the CTBT verificationtechnologies held in London, 9-10 May2002. Fifteen senior experts andscientists from thirteen Statesrepresenting all six geographical regionsof the Treaty had participated in theLondon discussion.

Peter Marshall, a United Kingdomseismology expert and chairman of theLondon seminar, presented an overviewof potential IMS technology applicationsin the fields of earthquake monitoring,tsunami prediction, monitoring ofunderwater volcanoes and oceanprocesses, and meteorology relevant to

continued on page 15

How IMS seismic datacan support earthquakeresearch

Access to IMS seismic data is one of theprincipal civil benefits available toMember States. The data, from aglobally distributed network of modernseismic stations, could be used toimprove the accuracy and timeliness ofreports on potentially damaging seismicevents, especially in countries lacking anational seismic network.

IDC bulletins can provide reportsof the location and magnitude of largeearthquakes rapidly and could also beused to support emergency response andrelief efforts. IDC products can also beused to compute statistics on the

EARTHQUAKE AFTERSHOCK MONITORING MAP,IZMIT (TURKEY), AUGUST 1999

EARTHQUAKE AFTERSHOCK MONITORING MAP,GOMA (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO), JANUARY 2002

PRESENTATION BY PETER MARSHALL AT THE VIENNA SEMINAR,VIENNA INTERNATIONAL CENTRE, 15 OCTOBER 2002

P U B L I S H E D B Y:

Public InformationPreparatory Commission for theComprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)

Vienna International Centre, P.O. Box 12001400 Vienna, Austria

T +43 1 26030 6200F +43 1 26030 5823E [email protected] www.ctbto.org

© 2002 CTBTO Preparatory CommissionCTBTO SPECTRUM – ISSN: 1680-533X

DI S C L A I M E R:The boundaries and presentation of material on maps donot imply the expression of any opinion on the part of theProvisional Technical Secretariat of the PreparatoryCommission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-BanTreaty Organization concerning the legal status of anycountry, territory, city or area or its authorities, orconcerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

Printed in Austria, December 2002

Calendar of Meetings 2003

Preparatory Commission:20th Session 24 – 27 June 200321st Session 10 – 14 November 2003

Working Group A:23rd Session 10 – 13 June 200324th Session 29 September – 3 Oct. 2003

Working Group B:20th Session 17 Feb. – 7 March 200321st Session 26 May – 6 June 200322nd Session 1 – 12 September 2003

Advisory Group:20th Session 22 – 25 April 200321st Session 27 – 30 May 200322nd Session 22 – 26 September 2003

climate change and nuclear accidents, aswell as the potential use of findingsderiving from geological mappingconducted during an on-site inspection.

Mr. Marshall stressed the fact thatall potential civil and scientificapplications of International MontoringSystem technologies depend on dataavailability. The International DataCentre processes IMS raw data andmakes it available to States in the formof Event Bulletins. It is up to the Statesto make the data available for civil andscientific applications. Mr. Marshallunderlined also the importance of

synergies with other technologies in thediscussed fields, which have not yetbeen exploited.

Ambassador Liviu Aurelian Bota ofRomania, Chairman of the PreparatoryCommission, presented the concludingremarks. He encouraged further expertdiscussions, increased exchange ofinformation and technical knowledgebetween States Signatories and increasedState participation to upgrade nationaltechnological capacities.

PAGE 16 CTBTO SPECTRUM 1 | WWW.CTBTO.ORG

2001 ANNUAL REPORTof the Preparatory Commission for theComprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

AVA I L A B L E I N A R A B I C , C H I N E S E , E N G L I S H , F R E N C H , R U S S I A N A N D S PA N I S H .

BASIC FACTS: SIX BOOKLET SERIES

Booklet 1: The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) at a Glance

Booklet 2: The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty Organization

Booklet 3: The Global Verification Regime and the International Monitoring System

Booklet 4: The Global Communications Infrastructure and the International Data Centre

Booklet 5: On-Site Inspections

Booklet 6: Membership Benefits

Publications of the Provisional Technical SecretariatThe following publications are currently available in hard copy or can be downloadedelectronically from our web site at www.ctbto.org:

AVA I L A B L E I N EN G L I S H, FR E N C H A N D SPA N I S H.

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