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Critical Analysis of State and Corporate Networked Surveillance,

Including Dataveillance.

Introduction

The intensification of surveillance in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks has

further justified the argument that we live in a Surveillance Society, one where

strict surveillance is considered as a means of providing security (Lyon,2003).

Surveillance has been further simplified owing to the growing need to use our

Personal Identifiable Information (PII) to access and consume goods and

services which leave digital footprints that are retained, compiled and

manipulated (Green, 1999) for surveillance purposes. State and corporate

organisations are now involved in diverse forms of surveillance. Whilst this

trend has brought several successes in fighting crime and commerce, serious

concerns are expressed regarding its true aims, benefits and limits. Would

surveillance make the world safer or would it be used as a tool for exercising

control and power? This essay critically analyses state and corporate

surveillance and dataveillance.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows; a comprehensive review of the

existing literature on surveillance is first conducted. Afterwards, the issues of

state and corporate surveillance and dataveillance are investigated as

separate entities. Finally, the essay discusses how governments and private

companies cooperate in the perspective of dataveillance.

From Surveillance to Dataveillance – An Overview

Surveillance has transcended from the previous notion of looking after people

to a powerful machinery for exercising control and power over them.1

Traditional surveillance was costly and required excessive human and

material efforts, and these factors served as a check against over-ambitious

intelligence gathering projects. Dataveillance on the other hand takes

1 http://tactical4934.blogspot.co.uk/2009/05/extended-thoughts-on-implications-of.html

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advantage of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) (Clarke,

2003a) and delivers cheaper, largely automated and effective surveillance

technologies (Lyon, 2008). Consequently, dataveillance could become

intrusive and difficult to regulate. Dataveillance thrives on the digital footprints

we leave behind as we perform our daily activities like tele-working, banking,

shopping, communicating; a notion Lyon (2006, pp, 25) referred to as the

“electronic panopticon”. It is therefore not surprising that several surveillance

technologies are derived from the emerging trends in the internet and ICTs.

However, the pervasive use of these sophisticated surveillance technologies

could lead to authoritarianism and intrusions on privacy (Ericson and

Haggerty, 2006). Although the states claims dataveillance is crucial for

successful anti-terrorist efforts, Ogura (2006) believes a key motivation for

dataveillance is to predict unknown people’s future behaviour. Realising this

however requires extensive data mining which may not be legal.

Consequently, a huge part of state surveillance efforts which hitherto

concentrated on foreign intelligence gathering is now done within the

country (Mobbs, 2003). Also, several partnerships between the state security

agencies and private companies are emerging. .

State Surveillance and Dataveillance

Government intelligence agencies are adopting more sophisticated

technologies like web surveillance in order to fight crime effectively. These

include monitoring websites visited, and keeping track of information

exchanged via emails, Skype, instant messaging and social networking sites. 2

The UK government recently announced plans to adopt web surveillance,

claiming they would not intrude on privacy by not reading the contents of

emails. 3 However, the claim that private emails would not be read is quite

debatable. This is specifically because there are hardly any measures that

would indicate that the emails are not being read anyway. Moreover,

2 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-17576745

3 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-17595209

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governments became suspicious of everyone since after 9/11 (Lyon, 2003) so

it is worrisome why they would not go ahead and read the contents of the

mails and other internet communications they access. China and Iran have

been condemned by the West because of similar policies, thus it is also

difficult for the Western Nations to justify their dataveillance. 4 It is quite

undemocratic for the government to pry into all online activities for the sake

of fighting terrorism. Democracy thrives on freedom of speech and right to

privacy; however, such web surveillance would definitely prevent people

from their fundamental human rights because most people will be wary of the

government’s monitoring. Awareness of being watched has psychological

impacts; it reduces productivity, causes depression, anxiety and tension

(Smith et al, 1992). For example, someone who innocently sends a mail to a

colleague on a discussion about current terrorist methods for educational

purposes may be flagged and monitored unnecessarily, not everyone wants

such attention. If government never legalised reading mails sent by post then

it becomes suspicious for them to acquire the authority to monitor emails.

According to Donahue, Whittemore and Heerman (2007) and Clarke (2003b),

dataveillance could make security agencies concentrate their efforts and

resources on minor offences rather than serious ones, which would ultimately

lead to inefficiency in fighting crime. Also, data mining could be complicated

and costly in terms of infrastructure, human effort and time (Seifert, 2004)

despite the usage of sophisticated technology especially if errors are to be

minimised. Therefore, Schneier (2010) emphasises on the need to balance

between normal human intelligence (which could be more accurate and

reliable) and heavy reliance on dataveillance. 5 This was demonstrated by

the inability to identify the perpetrators behind the murder of senior Hamas

commander, Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, in January 2010 at Dubai despite the

use of sophisticated surveillance technology.

4 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8474011.stm

5 http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/10/the_mahmoud_al-.html

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Most cyber criminals, hacktivists (for example Anonymous), and terrorists

employ Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) including proxies,(Shelley,

2003) The Onion Router (TOR), anonymizers and encryption to evade

detection. 6 It is difficult to determine how effective dataveillance would be

at identifying them. The state could rather concentrate efforts at overcoming

these challenges than spying on all internet users. With governments

monitoring online activities, it is expected that the use of PETs would not only

increase but that more sophisticated, clandestine methods would emerge

(Clarke, 2003a). Innocent people would want to hide their online activities

while criminals would want to be more subtle. 7 Similarly, how far would the

government go if faced with online hacktivists and opposition due to

dataveillance? 8 Would it employ cyber espionage measures like Trojans and

spyware (as in Syria and other countries)9 because of their inability to access

anonymised and encrypted communications? Maybe even legalise such

approaches? It may not be too pessimistic to anticipate such measures

because surveillance strategies designed for specific reasons often change

unexpectedly from their initial purpose (Lyon, 2006) (Seifert, 2004).

Identity theft costs the UK £1.7 billion annually,10 while over 3.6 million

households in the US have been victims.11 Identity theft could impair the

accuracy of state dataveillance and lead to injustice (Dummer, 2006).

Cybercriminals could employ Identity theft to avoid detection and/or

blackmail their opponents especially with foreknowledge of government’s

dataveillance. For example, monitoring emails may not identify the true

originators (Moss, 2003). However it may not be very easy for a falsely

accused victim of identity theft to exonerate himself. (Dummer, 2006, pp 274-

6 http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/apr/02/how-to-hide-emails-government-snooping

7 http://www.johntfloyd.com/blog/2012/03/28/our-surveillance-state/

8 There are a couple of open source projects designed to assist internet freedom for people in internet

controlled countries like the psiphon project. http://psiphon.ca/?page_id=178 9 http://articles.cnn.com/2012-02-17/tech/tech_web_computer-virus-syria_1_opposition-activists-computer-

viruses-syrian-town?_s=PM:TECH 10

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4672622.stm 11

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2006/BJS06039.htm

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275). Furthermore, data abstraction systems are also susceptible to attacks

and errors (Mobbs, 2003) (Seifert, 2004) .This includes networked CCTVs; 12 they

are susceptible to cyber attacks through which video feeds may be altered,

stolen or modified in real-time (Li and Yi, 2010). Thus, over dependence on

dataveillance without alternative verification methods could result to

misinterpretation of peoples’ profiles (false positives) and ultimately wrong

decision making. Unfortunately, individuals rarely know what their profiles are,

hence they lack the opportunity to correct it until when a case arises (Cate,

2010).

The uncertainty of how the state would use data in the future is worrying,

owing to several reasons a major one being functional/data creep; the

likelihood of using technologies/data in ways they were not initially intended

to be used (Seifert, 2004). An example is the evolvement in the usage of data

derived from the London Oyster cards; originally used in improving

transportation. The Metropolitan Police has requested for information from this

database on several occasions (Lyon, 2008). Suffice to say in the future,

governments may use data acquired from dataveillance in ways that we

may not imagine today. Furthermore, the deployment of Radio Frequency

Identification (RFID), microchips and nano-technology has positive

implications including effective monitoring of paedophiles and child

offenders rather than keeping them in the prisons (Cohen, 2010, pp 138 – 141).

However, it can only be imagined how such technology would be employed

in the future. 13 State dataveillance can also be useful for ensuring several

social welfare programs. For example the data profiling program of the

Australian Department of Social Security was used to identify families with

children who were eligible for additional assistance through the Family

Allowance Supplement. (Lyon and Zureik, 1996). Thus, state dataveillance is 12

there are about 4.2 million CCTV cameras used in the UK; one for every 14 people http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6479395.stm 13

There are already suggestions to use RFIDs to identify wounded/dead soldiers instead of dogtags, to prevent cases of missing children through chip implants and even as means of identifying citizen rather contemporary methods like national ID cards. (http://beginningandend.com/u-s-military-developing-rfid-microchip-implants-for-soldiers/)( http://engine.lib.uwaterloo.ca/ojs-2.2/index.php/pptvt/article/viewFile/548/195)

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not bad per se, yet, there is the need to clearly outline its limits so as to

prevent unimaginable circumstances in the future.

Corporate Surveillance and Dataveillance

Unlike the government, corporate surveillance/dataveillance is majorly borne

out of the desire to maximise profits. Hence, many big corporations are

currently involved in surveillance and dataveillance, aimed at gathering as

much information as possible on their customers. A research by Ponemon

(2010), claims that the average user appreciates (several are unaware while

some are indifferent) use of his information, not minding the implications as

long as his online experience is improved. For example if a consumer

purchased a book from eBay, a list of similar books and related items would

be automatically generated. This saves time for people interested in making

more related purchases. Similar suggestions could be flashed as adverts even

after navigating to other sites. Essentially, this is facilitated by the sharing of

marketing interests/ profiles (via cookies) between various sites/companies.

This may also be a good means of aiding discovery of similar goods and

services offered by other vendors. Using customers’ data to improve services

could be understandable nevertheless, most data is either exchanged or

traded with other companies, like credit/financial companies (Lyon, 2010), for

additional information that could be useful in assessing the customers’ credit

worthiness. Most of this is done without users’ knowledge. 14Customers’ data is

traded to data profiling warehouses (and other companies) which categorise

it into groupings in terms of race, age, gender, wealth and so on(Zimmer,

2007) . However, Fienberg (2006) claims that such data could be inaccurate,

as well as the profiles created from them. This is because people could be

actually different from whom they appear to be online; identities cannot be

comprehensively or perfectly formed through dataveillance.15 However,

corporations use these groupings to discriminate between their customers; this

14

This is against the EU Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC). 15

http://tactical4934.blogspot.co.uk/2009/05/extended-thoughts-on-implications-of.html

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trend is being exacerbated and institutionalized (Surveillance Studies Network,

2006). Furthermore, such data is used for targeted advertising, which could be

considered a tool for controlling web users as it exploits the awareness of

user’s online activities through powerful predictive algorithms to seduce them

into making purchases even when they do not have such plans. 16 This is the

business model upon which companies like Google (Craig and Ludolff, 2011)

make so much profit.17

Data mechanising is a booming trade now, many businesses are involved in

this. Data is accumulated from various sources and sold for as little as $65 per

thousand names.18 Casino houses are known to purchase such information for

use in face recognition software to target barred or unworthy customers.19

Health records purchased by pharmaceutical companies and retailers are

also used to target those with such ailments using spam mails or on their

browsers with adverts.20 Numerous applications for mobile devices (ipads,

smart phones) and social networks add additional features. However they

demand for various levels of access to our devices including access to call

records, messages and inboxes.21 We know little of how our devices are

accessed afterwards or how the extracted data is used. Data merchandising

thus flourishes to the detriment of our privacy (Donahue, Whittemore and

Heerman, 2006, pp2). Similarly, cookies are installed on browsers without the

knowledge of users. This is a huge privacy intrusion (Ashworth and Free, 2006,

pp 108) because cookies are like bugging devices; they can record all online

activities including usernames, browsing preferences, and habits.22 Hence

they facilitate features like targeted advertising. Corporate sharing of

16

http://www.neolane.com/usa/resources/industry-news/articles/study-shows-internet-advertising-influences-electronics-purchases 17

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-11545463 18

http://epic.org/privacy/profiling/ 19

http://www.onlinecasinoking.com/casino-facial-recognition.html 20

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-13190004 21

http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9225219/18_firms_sued_for_using_privacy_invading_mobile_apps 22

Storing cookies on the user’s machine without his/her consent contravenes the EU e-Privacy Directive(Article 5(3) of Directive 2002/58/EC )

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customer information without their consent is a serious breach of privacy

(Conti, 2009).

Data held by corporate companies are vulnerable to data loss either by

misplacement/theft, or by cyber attacks. Data lost in the Time Warner

incidents23,US DoD health contractor TriWest 24 and the multiple attacks

against Google25,26 encroach on privacy and could be used to commit

several crimes(Congi,2009). This raises an important question regarding the

safety of data in the hands of these private and commercial corporations.

The emergence of cloud computing could further the pervasiveness of

corporate dataveillance. Data which was ordinarily held within organisational

confines now resides in the cloud hence the Cloud Security Alliance (2011)

asserts that data security is a concern. One possibility is the ability of Cloud

Service Providers (CSPs) to access client data, for example health records

held in Google could be accessed and used for targeted advertising without

client awareness. For example, in the Google Cloud, a single account may

be used to access multiple Google cloud services (for example Youtube,

Google maps, Google+, Google docs). Corporate surveillance and

dataveillance is pervasive and needs to be regulated possibly through

government legislations. (Ashworth and Free, 2006). A direct consequence of

dataveillance is the emergence of private data warehouses that accumulate

large public databases including health records, buying habits, credit and

financial information from different sources. Andrejevic (2007) asserts that

such companies also offer background checking services at different rates

and they are increasingly patronised by employers’ and fiancés/fiancées.

There is also a proliferation of all sorts of surveillance software that are

commercially available for example email tracking devices and phone

calls/messages recorders. However, such technologies are re-tooled and

used as anti-dotes; most spyware have corresponding spyware detectors.

23

http://money.cnn.com/2005/05/02/news/fortune500/security_timewarner/?cnn=yes 24

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/29/us-data-breach-texas-idUSTRE78S5JG20110929 25

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-11920651 26

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-13623378

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While the spyware become more evasive, the spyware detectors also get

better (or try to) at detecting them. Consequently, Andrejevic (2007) argues

that there is a “self-proliferating spiral of monitoring technologies and cloaking

ones”. More worrying is the fact that the availability of these services and

software fosters suspicion in the society. (Surveillance Studies Network, 2006)

The Convergence of State and Corporate Dataveillance

The convergence of state and corporate surveillance structures for the

purpose of dataveillance holds the greatest threat on privacy and other

concerns. (Chander, 2011) This notion is supported by Haggerty and Ericson

(2000) who referred to it as the “surveillant assemblage”; the multiplicity and

heterogeneity of several systems that are harnessed for the purpose of

surveillance consequently producing a more comprehensive, effective and

broader surveillance machinery. State intelligence is limited in the collection

of certain kinds of data including financial and insurance records, airline data

and health records (Ericsson and Haggerty, 1999). Accordingly, governments

either purchase such data from private firms, or contracts the business of data

warehousing and data mining to private companies. The government

benefits not only in data accumulation, but also in circumventing the need to

secure court warrants to access these data (Cohen, 2010, pp 47 – 48) (Wood,

2009) since these private firms are not subject to the same legal constraints as

the government.27 An example of this kind of relationship is the one between

the US Intelligence agencies and Google. 28 Recent legal efforts by a privacy

watchdog Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) to halt this relationship

were unsuccessful. 29 Similarly, private data profiling firms like Acxiom have

had dealings with the US Government intelligence agencies (Whitaker, 1999,

pp 130 -132). However, such data could have been acquired through illegal

27 A major private company involved during the Bush Administration was ChoicePoint ,Inc. It was the defacto

datawarehousing and datamining company for the US government. In 2009, ChoicePoint was fined US$275,000 by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission for a data breach in 2008 that exposed personal information of 13,750 people. http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/ 28

http://rawstory.com/news/2008/CIA_creates_miniGoogle_0331.html 29

http://www.prisonplanet.com/department-of-justice-wants-court-to-keep-googlensa-partnership-secret.html

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means, sometimes even from other government departmental databases.

This trend not only depreciates privacy but also encourages corruption

because unscrupulous government officials might sell this data to the private

firms. 30 It also weakens democracy, erodes privacy and inhibits certain kinds

of free speech including political dissent (Cockfield, 2003). Another

controversial relationship is the suspected association between Facebook

and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency DARPA. Several linkages

have been made between certain powerful US individuals and Facebook.

(Cohen, 2010, pp 53 – 55).

Conclusion

Surveillance has intensified since the 9/11 attacks (Lyon, 2003) and this has

caused the adoption of several dataveillance methods. Apart from being

more efficient, dataveillance is cheaper than traditional surveillance methods

(Clarke, 2003a). Thus, it is intrusive and harder to regulate (Lyon, 2008). This

could be a reason for its excessive use by state intelligence agencies even

though they claim that it is crucial for successful crime fighting and counter

terrorist efforts. Ericson and Haggerty (2006), however, argue that the

continual use of pervasive dataveillance could impinge on privacy and

impose authoritarian rule. This notion is supported by Ogura (2006). He claims

that the massive databases crucial for dataveillance cannot be completely

collected by legal means so the state would use illegal methods in their crave

for more data. The recent intention by the UK government to monitor all

online communication raises suspicions despite their claim to respect privacy.

31 Nation states like China and Iran have been widely condemned for web

surveillance, hence it is quite troubling that western states have started

adopting similar measures claiming it is for counter terrorist efforts. 32

Dataveillance could distract security agencies from serious crimes while they

focus on crimes that are easily detectable online (Donahue, Whittemore and

30

Whitaker (1999) described in her book the data transactions between Acxiom and the US Postal

Service, how they exchanged information illegally. 31

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-17595209 32

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8474011.stm

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Heerman, 2007)(Clarke,2003b), consequently impairing social justice. Hence,

the state could rather concentrate efforts at overcoming the use of PETs by

cybercriminals, hacktivists and cyber terrorists to evade detection 33 instead of

monitoring all internet users. Similarly, the problem of identity theft could

potentially impair state dataveillance because it introduces serious

inaccuracies in data mining (Dummer, 2006). It poses a great risk as it could

be used as a weapon against political opposition, for blackmail and other

crimes. Dummer (2006) asserts that there are hardly laid down procedures for

falsely accused victims of identity theft to exonerate themselves from

suspected cybercrimes.

Corporate dataveillance is becoming as intrusive as state dataveillance,

though it is majorly borne out of the desire to maximise profit, it holds grave

implications. The profiles created from the accumulated data is not

necessarily accurate (Fienberg , 2006) owing to the inconclusiveness of online

identities vis-a-vis physical identities 34 however these profiles are used to

discriminate between individuals ; preferential treatment is given to perceived

wealthy people. Furthermore, Craig and Ludolff, (2011) flaw the use of highly

aggressive and pervasive targeted advertising methods by companies like

Google to virtually control people to purchase in ways not planned while

eroding their privacies. But not only big corporations are involved in

dataveillance, owing to the emergence of data merchandising as a lucrative

business, data profiling companies now adopt several means of harvesting

private information which they trade to other companies or the

government(Whitaker, 1999, pp 130 -132). It is the affiliation between such

private companies and the government that raises the greatest concerns; it

aids the government in circumventing the need to secure certain data

without requesting for warrants (Cohen, 2010, pp 47 – 48) (Wood, 2009). This

amounts to severe infringement on the right to privacy. Efforts by EPIC and

other similar Human Rights bodies to question these suspicious relationships

33

http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/apr/02/how-to-hide-emails-government-snooping 34

http://tactical4934.blogspot.co.uk/2009/05/extended-thoughts-on-implications-of.html

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(for example between Google and the NSA, Facebook and CIA) have been

unsuccessful.35 The impact of these associations on dataveillance in the future

is unimaginable.

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