crim pro syllabus of sir arno sanidad
DESCRIPTION
ArnoTRANSCRIPT
COLLEGE OF LAW
University of the Philippines
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
First Semester 2012-2013
Arno V. Sanidad
MANDATORY READINGS:
1. Jurisdiction
a. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (as amended);
b. SC Administrative Circular No. 09-94;
c. The 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure;
d. Republic Act No. 8493 (The Speedy Trial Act of 1988);
e. SC Circular No. 38-98 (Implementing Rules to RA 8493);
f. Pres. Dec. No. 1606, as amended (Sandiganbayan Law)
g. RA 8249 (Amendments to Sandiganbayan Law);
h. Rep. Act. No. 6770 (Ombudsman Law);
i. A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.
j S.C Administrative Circular No. 51-96 [Superseding Administrative Order No. 173-94 dated
28 September 1994] Special Courts for kidnapping, Robbery, Dangerous Drugs, Carnapping
and Other Heinous Crimes under R.A. No. 7659.
2. Substantive Rights
a. Const. (1987), art. III;
b. Const. (1987), art. VIII, sec 5 (5);
c. Rule 115, 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure;
d. Republic Act. No. 7438;
e. DOJ-NPS Manual, Part XI, secs. 1, 2;f. Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act, Secs. 60-61;
3. DOJ Inquest and Preliminary Investigation Procedure
a. DOJ Department Order No. 70 [2000 NPS Rule on Appeal];
b. DOJ Circular No. 61 (1993) [New Rules on Inquest];
c. DOJ National Prosecution Service, 2008 Manual for Prosecutors [see Reserved Section);
4. Special Rules and Procedures
a. SC AM No. 00-04-07-SC [Child Witness Rule];
b. SC AM No. 02-1-18-SC [Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law];
c. SC AM No. 02-1-19-SC [Rule on Commitment of Children];
d. SC AM No. 02-2-07-SC [Amendments to Rule 110, sec. 5];
e. SC AM No. 03-1-09-SC [Rule on Guidelines to be Observed by the Trial Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures]
f. Rule on DNA Evidence A.M. No. 06-11-5 -SC October 2, 2007
g. Rule on the Writ of Amparo [A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, 25 September 2007]
h. Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data [A.M. No.08-1-16-SC dated 22 January 2008]
i. S.C., A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.
j. S.C. A.M. No. 11-6-10-SC (Re: Guidelines for Litigation in Quezon City Trial Courts). February 21, 2012 [http:// sc.judiciary.gov.ph/admin matters/AM No 11-6-10-SC.pdf)
k. Judicial Affidavit Rule, A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC (Effective Jan. 1, 2013)
COURSE OUTLINE
PART ONE
INTRODUCTION
I. History Sources of Rules on Criminal Procedure
Amy Rossabi, The Colonial Roots of Criminal Procedure in the Philippines, 11 Columbia
Journal of Asian Law 175
II. Criminal Jurisdiction & Hierarchy of Courts:
A. Oscar M. Herrera, Remedial Law Vol. IV, Criminal Procedure [Rules 110-127), pp 1-56.
a. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (as amended by Executive Order No. 33 and Republic Act No. 7671, Republic Act No. No. 7691, Republic Act No. 7902, Republic Act No. 8246, );
b. SC Administrative Circular No. 09-94;
c. The 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure;
d. Pres. Dec. No. 1606, as amended (Sandiganbayan Law);
e. RA 8249 (Amendments to Sandiganbayan Law);
f. Rep. Act. No. 6770 (Ombudsman Law);
See: summary of jurisdiction in Philippine Legal Research.
B. Criminal Jurisdiction
1.Allegations of complaints as basis
Buaya v. Polo, 169 SCRA 471 (1989)
2.Elements & Requisites of Criminal Jurisdiction
a)Subject matter or offense
Revised Penal Code as amended
Special Penal Laws
Law at time of institution of criminal action not at commission
People v. Lagon, 185 SCRA 442 (1990)
Neither at arraignment
Palana v. People, 534 SCRA 296 (2007)
b)Venue or Territory where committed; Purpose
Sec. 18, B.P. 129
Treas v. People, G.R. No. 195002, January 25, 2012
Uy v. C.A., 276 SCRA 367 (1997)
Campanano, Jr. Vs. Datuin, 536 SCRA 471 (2007)
People v. Taroy, G.R. #192466, Sept. 12, 2011
Change of Venue:
Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (4), 1987 Constitution
People v. Gutierrez, 36 SCRA 172 (1970)
People v. Pilotin, 65 SCRA 635 (1975)
Mondiguing v. Abaci, G.R. No. 4131 3. November 6, 1975, 68 SCRA 14.
People v. Sola, G.R. No. L-56158-64 March 17, 1981**
See: [A.M. No. 10-1-06 RTC : January 12, 2010]
Re: Petition for Change of Trial Venue of
Criminal Case No. Sa-198, People v. Data
Andal Ampatuan, Sr., et Al. For Rebellion
From the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato
City to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City.
c)Person of the Accused
Valdepenas v. People, 16 SCRA 871 (1966)
Miranda v. Tuliao, 486 SCRA 377 +
3.a)Jurisdiction not subject to waiver or agreement
Figueroa v. People, 558 SCRA 63 (2008)
b)Jurisdiction and Double jeopardy
Heirs of Honrales v. Honrales, 629 SCRA 423 (2010)
III. Hierarchy of Courts and the Remedy of Appeal
A. Generally
Rule 122, Secs. 1, 2, 3, 6, 9;
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. V. People, 427 SCRA 456 (2004)
Section 9. Appeal to the Regional Trial Courts.
Rules 123, 124, 125;
Alonso, et al vs. Cebu Country Club, Inc., et al., G.R. No.
188471, April 20, 2010.
B. MTC: (Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal
Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts)
1.Original & Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction:
Sec. 32, (1) & (2), B.P. 129
Sec, 3 & 4, SC Administrative Circular No. 09-94
2.Appeal
Sec. 1, Rule 122
Sec. 39, B.P. 129
Sec. 2 (a) Rule 122
3.How appeal taken
Sec. 3, (a), Rule 122
C. Regional Trail Court:
1.Original & Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction
Sec. 20, B.P. 129 (As amended by R.A. No. 7691)
a. Family Courts
Sec. 3 & 5 (a), R.A. No. 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997)
b.Special Courts
Kidnapping, Robbery, Dangerous Drugs, Carnapping and Other Heinous
Crimes under R.A. No. 7659.
S.C. ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR No. 51-96 [Superseding Administrative Order No. 173-94 dated 28 September 1994]
Environmental Courts
(AO No. 23-2008, Re: Designation of Special Courts to Hear, Try, and Decide Environmental Cases, January 28, 2008)
c.Offenses committed by public officials
Sec. 4 (a) par. 2, Pres. Dec. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A
No. 8249
Lacson v. Executive Secretary, 301 SCRA 298 (1999) +
Magno v. People, 647 SCRA 362 (2011)
2.Appellate jurisdiction
Sec. 1, Rule 122
Sec. 2 (a), Rule 122
3.Appeals from RTC, how appeal taken
a. In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
Sec. 2 (b), Rule 122b. In the exercise of its original jurisdiction
(1)Death Penalty Cases
R.A. 9346
Rule 122, secs 3 (d), 10 (as amended by SC A.M. No. 00-5-03
[October 15, 2004]; Amendments to the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases); cf. RA
9346;
Rule 124, sec. 12, 13 (as amended by SC A.M. No. 00-5-03
[October 15, 2004]; Amendments to the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases)
Rule 125;
(2)Penalty is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
Rule 122, Sec. 3 (c)
Rule 124, Sec 12
Intermediate Appeal
People v. Mateo, 433 SCRA 640 (2004)
People v. Abon, 545 SCRA 606 (2007)
Appeal to Supreme Court not mandatory
People v. Rocha, 531 SCRA 761 (2007)
No automatic appeal
People v. Salome, 500 SCRA 659, Aug. 31, 2006
(3)Other cases
Rule 122, Sec. 2 (c)
To the Court of Appeals
Rule 41, Sec. 2
Rule & Exception:
Tabujara III vs. People, 570 SCRA 229 (2008)
Appeal and certiorari distinguished:
Magestrado vs. People, 527 SCRA 125 (2007)+
c)Appeal by any of several accused
Rule 122, sec.11;
Applied to accused appealing separately
Constantino v. Sandiganbayan, 533 SCRA 205 (2007)
d)Withdrawal of Appeal
Rule 122, sec. 12;
PD 968 (as amended), sec. 4;
e)Effects of death of accused pending appeal
Villegas v. CA, 271 SCRA 148 (1997);
People v. Ayochok, 629 SCRA 324 (2010)
f)Effect of Failure to Appeal a patently wrong judgment
People v. Barro Sr., 338 SCRA 212 (2000);
g) Appeal a judgment of Acquittal:
People v. Asis, 629 SCRA 250 (2010)
Merciales v. C.A., 379 SCRA 345 (2002)**
Mupas v. People, G.R. No. 189365, Oct. 12, 2011
Bangayan v. Go-Bangayan, G.R. No. 172777/172792, Oct. 19, 2011
4.Ombudsman & Sandiganbayan:
Pres. Dec. No. 1605, as amended (Sandiganbayan Law);
RA 8249 (Amendments to Sandiganbayan Law);
Rep. Act. No. 6770 (Ombudsman Law);
a)Ombudsman:
Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 105965-70. March 20, 2001
Appeals from the Ombudsman:
(i)In administrative cases & annulment of judgment
Fabian vs. Desierto, 295 SCRA 470, September 16, 1998
Macalalag vs. Ombudsman, 424 SCRA 741 (2004)
Office of the Ombudsman vs. Court of Appeals,
640 SCRA 544 (2011)
(ii)In criminal cases
Golangco vs. Fung, 504 SCRA 321 (2006)
Perez vs. Office of the Ombudsman,
429 SCRA 357 (2004)
Office of the Ombudsman vs. Heirs of Margarita Ventura, 605 SCRA 1(2009)
b)Sandiganbayan -...in relation to office
(i)Grade 27 and above
Sec. 4(a), (1), (2), (3), (4), & (5) Pres. Dec. No. 1606, as
amended by 7975 and R.A. No. 8249
(ii)Public Officials irrespective of salary grade
Sec. 4(a), 1(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), & (g) Pres. Dec. No, 1606, as
Amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249 Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, 424 SCRA 236 (2004)
Bariaga v. Sandiganbayan, 457 SCRA 301 (2005)
Organo v. Sandiganbayan, 320 SCRA 684 (1994)
Inding v. Sandiganbayan, 434 SCRA 388 (2004)
Lacson v. Executive Secretary, supra
(iii)Appeals from the RTC
Magno v. People, supra
5. Court of Appeals:
a) Rule 41
Ordinary Appeal (Appeal by Writ of Error)
b) Rule 42
Petition for Review
c) Rule 124
Sec. 8 & Rule 125 Sec. 1 Ivler v. Mondesto-San Pedro, 635 SCRA 191 (2010)
6. Supreme Court:
a) Generally
Rule 65
Finality of acquittal doctrine and exception:
People vs. Asis, 629 SCRA 250 (2010)
People v. Velasco, 340 SCRA 207 (2000) **
b) Improvident Plea; Remand & Re-arraignment When Proper:
People v. Molina, G.R Nos. 141129-33, December 14, 2001;
Ong vs. Genio, 609 SCRA 188, Dec. 23 2009
c) Even Split or no majority in Supreme Court
Rule 125, sec. 3;
Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals 71 SCRA 231 (1976)
IV. Remedies after Final Judgment
Habeas Corpus
Rule 102In Re: Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo de Villa
442 SCRA 706 (2004) **
PART TWO
RULE 126 SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Pertinent Documents & Pleadings:
1) Search Warrant;
2) Documents as basis for issuance:
Request for Issuance;
Affidavit/s of complainant or witnesses
Others (Photographs, sketches, etc.)
3) Motion to Quash Search Warrant
4) Motion to Suppress
5) Motion for Return of Property Seized
I. Nature, scope and definition
A. Definition & Nature
Const. (1987), art. III, Secs. 2,3;
Rule 126, Secs, 1, 13; +
Exclusionary Rule
Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967);
People v. Valdez, 341 SCRA 25 (2000)**
People not places
Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967);
See: Polo v. David
, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011**
Private searches
Governmental interference
People v. Marti
, 193 SCRA 57 (1991);
Vessel Security officer
People v. Bongcarawan, 384 SCRA 525 (2002)
See: Spousal or privacy of communication exception?
Zulueta v. C.A., 253 SCRA 699 (1996)
B. Constitutional and statutory boundaries; limitation on State action
1. Nature of right protected; waiver of protected right
Villanueva v. Querubin, 48 SCRA 349 (1972);
Guanzon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623 (1990);
Governmental transgression
People v. Marti, supra
2. Scope of protection
Const. (1987), art. III, sec. 3(1) Katz c. U.S., supra
Burgos v. Chief of Staff 133 SCRA 800 (1984) Eb;
People v. Valde, supra
Enhanced Senses and Reasonable expectation of privacy:
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S 27 (2001) Thermal Imaging device
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S 207 (1986) Aerial naked eye observation
Dow Chemicals v. U.S., 476 U.S 227 (1986) Aerial search using device
United States v. Place, 462 U.S 696 (1983) Sniff Dog
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S 293 (1966) Plant
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S 35 (1988) Garbage search
Washington vs. Boland, 115 Wn.2d (1990); 800P.2d 1112
Airport searches:
People v. Canton, G.R No. 148825, December 277, 2002
RA 4200 (Anti-wire Tapping Law):
Gaanan vs. IAC, G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986
RA 9272 (Human Security Act of 2007):
Sec. 7-16
Rule 126, sec. 13;
C. Types
1. With A Search Warrant +
a. Generally
Rule 126, sec 1;
People v. Aruta, 288 SCRA 626 (1998); + ;
Manalili v. CA, 280 SRCA 400 (1997); +
b. Venue of application; jurisdiction of court
Rule 126, sec 2
;
BP 129 (as amended by RA 7691), sec. 21;
Interim Rules (January 11, 1983), par. A3;
Malaloan v. CA, 232 SCRA 249 (1994)**; + + +
Range of enforceability
People v. CA, 291 SCRA 400 (1998);
c.Requisites for issuance
Rule 126, sec. 1; cf. Const. (1987), art. III, sec. 2;
PICOP v. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253 (1999); +
(1) Concept of probable cause in search warrants + People v. Estrada, 296 SCRA 383 (1998); + Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., 438 SCRA (2004);
People v. Aruta, G.R. No. 120915 April 3, 1998;
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, supra
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 613 (1983); + Stonehill v. Diokno, supra
(2)Determining probable cause:
i)Person Authorized: Who determines?
Const. (1987), Art. III, sec. 2
;
Rule 126, sec. 4;
People v. Tuan, G.R. No. 176066. August 11, 2010
Kho v. Makalintal, 306 SCRA 70
Bache v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971) + (see Oscar Herreras digest p. 892)
People v. Mamaril, 420 SCRA 662 (2004)
Tan v. Sy Tiong Gue, 613 SCRA 98 (2010)
ii)Procedure: How is it determined?
Rule 126, sec. 5;
Personal examination by searching questions of complaint of
witness: + + + +
Bache v. Ruiz, supra
Kho vs. Makalintal, supra
PICOP v. Asuncion, supra
People v. Tuan, G.R. No. 176066. August 11, 2010
Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1984);+ Coca- Cola v. Gomez, 571 SCRA 18 (2008)
(3)Description of things to be seized +
Kho v. Makalintal, supra;
Bache vs. Ruiz, supra;
(4)Description of place to be searched + +
People v. Estrada, supra
Roan vs. Gonzales, supra
PICOP v. Asuncion, supra
People v. C.A., supra
d.Things that may be seized +
Rule 126, sec. 3;
Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, supra + California v. Greenwood, supra
Washington vs. Boland, supra
Rules on DNA Evidence A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC October 2, 2007
People v. Umanito, G.R. #172607 Oct. 26, 2007
People v. Umanito, G.R. #172607, April 16, 2009
e.Form and content of warrant; lifetime
Rule 126, sec. 1, 6, 10;
Bache v. Ruiz, supra
Mustang Lumber v. CA, 257 SCRA 430 (1996); (nevermind) +
F.Validity of warrant
People v. Estrada, supra
People v. CA, supra
Others: +
2.Warrantless Search & Seizure:
a. Search incident to lawful arrest
Rule 126, sec. 13; + + +
People v. Molina G.R. No. 133917, February 19, 2001**
People v. Aruta, G.R. No. 120915 April 3, 1998
People v. Valdez, supra
People v. Padilla, 269 SCRA 402 (1997);
People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432 (1999); + People v. Binad Chua, G.R. Nos. 136066-67, February 4, 2003
Office of the Court Administrator v. Barron, 297 SCRA 376 (1998);
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); + Nolasco v. Pano, 147 SCRA 509 (1987);
Cf. Nolasco v. Pano, 139 SCRA 152 (1985);
Posadas v. CA, 188 SCRA 288 (1990) + People vs. Cuizon, 265 SCRA 325
Malacat v. CA, 283 SCRA 159 (1997)**;
Warrantless Search of Computers & Cell Phones:
Computers:
U.S. vs. Hill, 459 F.3d 966 (2006)
U.S. vs. Ziegler, 474 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir., January 30, 2007
Polo v. David, supra
Journal Articles:
Edward T.M. Garland and Donald F. Samuel, Fourth
Amendment and Computers, Georgia Bar
Journal, Vol. 44, Feb. 2009
Cellphones:
U.S. vs. Finley, 477 F.3d 250
State vs. Smith, 124 Ohio St. 3d 163 (2009)
Journal Articles:
Adam M. Gershowitz, The Iphone Meets the Fourth
Amendment, UCLA Law Review, October, 2008.
Bryan Andrew Stillwagon, Bringing an End to Warrantless
Cell Phone Searches, Summer 2008 Georgia Law Review
b.Consented Search People v. Malasigul, 63 Phil. 221 (1936);
Alvarez v. CFI, 64 Phil. 48 (1937);
Schneckcloth v Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)
People vs. Cuizon, 265 SCRA 325
(1)Peaceful submission not consent to search
Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689 (1938);
Written consent:
Roan v. Gonzales, supra
(2)Effect of voluntary surrender
People v. Agbot, 106 SCRA 325 (1981);
(3) Effect of posting bail
Rule 114, sec. 26;
c.Stop and Frisk, Roadblocks & Checkpoints, and Other Less Intrusive Searches
Stop and Frisk:
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S 1 (1968); + Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993)
Florida v. J. L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000)
People v. Binad Chua, supra
Malacat v. CA, supra
Esquillo v. People, 629 SCRA 370 (2010)
Airport searches:
People v. Canton, G.R. No. 148825, Dec. 27, 2002, supra
Roadblocks & Checkpoints:
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); + Michigan Dept. Of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325
Caballes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002; + People v. Lacerna, 278 SCRA 561 (1997)
People v. Solayao, 262 SCRA 255 (1996)
People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401 (1991)
People v. Encinada, G.R. No. 116720. October 2, 1997
Checkpoints:
Valmonte v. De Villa, 178 SCRA (1989); + People vs. Vinecario, 420 SCRA 280 (2004);
Aniag vs. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 424 (1994);
People vs. Escano, 323 SCRA 754 (2000)
People vs. Vinecario, 420 SCRA 280 (2004)
d.Moving vehicles/hot pursuit +
Caroll v. US, 267 132 (1925); + California V. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985)
Papa v. Mago, 22 SCRA 857 (1968); + Caballes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002; + Asuncion v. CA, 302 SCRA 490 (1990); + Roldan v. Arca, 65 SCRA 336 (1975); + People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122 (1990); + People v. Balingan, 241 SCRA 277 (1995); + Obra v. CA, 317 SCRA 594 (1999); +e.Plain View Doctrine Harris v. US, 390 U.S. 234 (1966); + Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 472 (1971);
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987)
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990)
People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597 (1993); + People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668 (1999); + People v. Bolasa, 321 SCRA 459 (1999);
People v. Evaristo, 216 SCRA 431 (1992);
People v. Valdez, 341 SCRA 24 (2000);
People v. Salanguit, 356 SCRA 683 (2001)
f.Private Searches & State Expansion of Private Search
People v. Marti, supra +
People v. Bongcarawan, G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002
State v. Von Bulow, 475 A. 2d 995 +
See: Zulueta v C.A., 253 SCRA 699 (1996)
g.Extraordinary circumstances:
People v. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 (1994);
Bringham City v. Stuart, 126 S. Ct. 1943 (2006)
h.Concepts of: Fruit of the Poisonous Tree; Attenuation; Inevitable Discovery (where did it come from?)
Nardone v. U.S. 308 U.S. 338
Wong Sun v. U.S. 371 U.S. 471
Nix vs. Williams, 467 U.S. 431
II.Procedure for service of warrant; post-service procedure
A. Service of warrant
1. Time of search
Rule 126, sec. 9;
2. Two-witness rule
Rule 126, sec. 8;
People v. Gesmundo, 219 SCRA 743 (1993);
3. Breaking of door or window to effect search
Rule 126, sec. 7;
People vs. Huang Zhen Hua, 439 SCRA 350 (2004)
B. Post-service procedure
People v. Gesmundo, supra
1. Issuance of Receipt
Rule 126, sec. 11;
People v. Lacbanes, 270 SCRA 193 (1997);
2. Delivery of property and inventory; return and proceedings on the return;
Rule 126, sec. 12;
People v. Gesmundo, supra
III.Remedies against unreasonable search and seizure
1. Exclusionary Rule : Motion to quash search
Warrant or suppress evidence:
Art. III, Sec. 3 (2)
Rule 126, sec. 14;
RA 8493, sec. 2 (d) (cf. Rule 118, sec. 2[d]; )
Stonehill v. Diokno, supra
Bache v. Ruiz, supra
Rakes v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978);
PICOP v. Asuncion, supra
2. Waiver of Jurisdiction & Non Waiver of Admissibility:
People vs. Lapitaje, 397 SCRA 674 (2003);
Esquillo vs. People, G.R. No. 182010, August 25, 2010 (dissent of Bersamin)
3. Return of property illegally seized:
Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 892 (1920);
Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 170 (1948);
Collector v. Villaluz, 71 SCRA 356 (1976);
Mata v. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388 (1984);
4. Criminal liability and Civil Damages:
Rev. Pen. Code, Arts. 128, 129, 130, 206;
MHP Garments v. CA, 236 SCRA 227 (1994);
Remedy against warrantless searches:
Galvante v. Casimiro, G.R. No. 162808, April 22, 2008
PART THREE
RULE 113- ARREST
Pertinent Pleadings & Documents:
1) Warrant of Arrest
2) Petition for Habeas Corpus
3) Motion to Quash Warrant of Arrest
4) Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause
I. Nature and Definition
A. Definition
Rule 113, Secs. 1, 2:
Sanchez v. Demetriou, 227 SCRA 627 (1993);
People v. Sequio, 264 SCRA 79 (1996);
Defensor- Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 663 (1993);
Cf. Diplomatic and parliamentary immunities from arrest
Const. (1987), art. VI, sec. 11;
Rev. Pen. Code, art. 145;
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Arts. 31-37;
Visiting Forces Agreement, Art. V;
B. Types
1. With a warrant
a. When and how warrant issued
Const. (1987), art. III, sec. 2;
Rule 112, sec. 6;
May dismiss instead of issue warrant
Ong vs. Genio, 609 SCRA 188, Dec. 23, 2009
b. Requisites for issuance
Const. (1987), art. III, sec. 2:
Rule 112, Sec.6 (a);
Rule 112, Sec. 8;
1) By a Regional Trial Court;
People v. Grey, 625 SCRA 523 (2010)
Allado v. Diokno, 232 SCRA 192 (1994);
Placer v. Villanueva, 126 SCRA 463 (1983);
People v. Inting, 187 SCRA 788 (1990);
Cojuangco v. Sandiganbayan, 300 SCRA 367 (1998);
Soliven v. Makasiar,
Lim v. Felix, 194 SCRA 292 (1991);
Pangandaman v. Casar, 159 SCRA 599 (1988);
People v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 475 (1999);
Roberts v. C.A. 254 SCRA 307
Webb vs. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652
Ho vs. People, 280 SCRA 285 (1997)
Okabe vs. Gutierrez, 429 SCRA 685 (2004)
AAA vs. Carbonell, 524 SCRA 496 (2007)
DOJ- National Prosecution Service Manual for Prosecutors,
Part VI, sec. 1;
2) Inferior Courts
Rule 112, Sec. 6 (b)
Examine complainant and witnesses:
Tabujara III vs. People, 570 SCRA 229 (2008)
Not mandatory to issue warrant:
Gutierrez v. Hernandez, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1628, June 8, 2007,
c. How effected or served
Rule 113, secs. 2, 3, 4, 6, 7;
People v. Lumayok, 139 SCRA 1 (1985);
People v. Albior, 163 SCRA 332 (1988);
d. Assistance; breaking into and out of building or enclosure
Rule 113, secs. 10, 11, 12;
People vs. Huang Zhen Hua, G.R. No. 139301, September 29, 2004
2.Warranties (In flagrante Delicto & Hot Pursuit)
a. When justified:
(1) Old Rule :
Rule 113, sec. 5, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1985);
(2) New Rule :
Rule 113, sec. 5
Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311 (1990)
Umil v. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251 (1991)
Go vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 138 (1992)
Larranaga v. C.A., 287 SCRA 581 (1998);
People v. Tudtud, 412 SCRA 142 (2003);
People v. Molina, G.R. No. 133917, February 19, 2001**
People v. Chua, 396 SCRA 657 (2003);
People v. Mendez, G.R. No. 147671, November 21, 2002;
People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668 (1999)
N.B. J. Panganiban, Concurring
Cadua v. CA, 312 SCRA 703 (1999);
People v. Montilla, 285 SCRA 703 (1998);
People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986);
People v. Jayson, 282 SCRA 166 (1997);
Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968);
Padilla v. C.A. 269 SCRA 402 (1997)
People v. Racho, 626 SCRA 633 (2010)
b. Method of arrest by officer
Rule 113, sec. 8;
People v. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455 (1999)
R.A. 7438 [Guidelines, procedures and duties of officers arresting, detaining, inviting or investigating at the time of arrest or at custodial interrogation];
c. Method of arrest by private person
Rule 113, sec. 9;
d. Post-arrest procedure
Rule 112, sec. 7;
e. Exceptions construed strictly
People v. Valdez, 304 SCRA 140 (1999);
People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1985);
f. Special Rule for Juveniles in Conflict with Law
Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with Law (RJCL), secs. 6, 7;
Rep. Act. No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006; JJWA),
secs. 21, 22;
3. John Doe warrants:
People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169;
Pangandaman v. Casar, 159 SCRA 599 (1988);
DOJ Circular No. 50, October 29, 1990;
4.DNA Warrants:
[DNA warrants: A panacea for old, cold rape cases? Georgetown Law Journal, Apr 2002 by
Valdivieso, Veronica
See: http:// www.denverda.org/DNA/John _Doe_DNA_Warrants.htm]
1. The John Doe Arrest Warrant. PDF
2. The John Doe Complaint With Genetic Profile. PDF
3. The John Doe Arrest Warrant With Alles. PDF
4. The John Doe Amended Complaint After Cold Hit. PDF
5. The brief in support of John Doe Warrants. PDF
6. Wisconsin v. Davis, Wisconsin C.A. District 1,3/8/05 davis. PDF.]
5. Invitations
Babst, et al. v. NIB, 132 SCRA 316 (1984);
People v. Sequio, 264 SCRA 79 (1996);
People v. Del Rosario, 305 SCRA 740 (1999)
R.A. No. 7438
II.Custodial Investigation
A. Source, Definition, Scope and Procedure
1. Definition
People v. Pasudag, G.R. No. 128822, May 4, 2001;
People v. Zuela, 323 SCRA 589 (2000);
People v. Abe Valdez, G.R. No. 129296, September 25, 2000, 341 SCRA 25;
People v. Rodriguez, 341 SCRA 645 (2000);
People v. Del Rosario, 305 SCRA 740 (1999);
Cf. Babst v. NIB, 132 SCRA 31 (1984)
People v. Muleta, 309 SCRA 148 (1999);
People v. Tan, 286 SCRA 207 (1998);
2. Duty of police during custodial investigation, procedure
Const. (1987), art. III, sec. 12;
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
People v. Obrero, 332 SCRA 190 (2000);
People v. Duero, 104 SCRA 379 (1981);
Republic Act No. 7438, sec. 2 (b), (c), (d);
Cf. People v. Ordono, 334 SCRA 673 (2000);
B. Rights Involved and consequences of violation
1. Rights involved
Const. (1987), art. III, sec. 12 (1), (2);
Republic Act. No. 7438, sec. 2(a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f);
People v. Obrero, 332 SCRA 190 (2000);
People v. Mojello, G.R. No. 145566, March 9, 2004 **
2. Consequences of violation
Const. (1987), art. III, sec. 12 (3)
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971);
New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984);
People v. Duero, 104 SCRA 379 (1981);
People v. Figueroa, 335 SCRA 299 (2000);
Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 429 (1971);
Republic Act. No. 7438, sec. 4:
C. Specific requirements in case law:
1. Waiver of right to counsel
People v. Caguioa, 141 SCRA 289 (1980);
People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465 (1985);
People v. Continente, 339 SCRA 1 (2000);
Cf. People v. Bacor, 306 SCRA 522 (1999)
People v. Quidato Jr., 297 SCRA 1 (1998);
2. Counsel of choice during custodial investigation
People v. Obrero, 332 SCRA 190 (2000);
People v. Labtan, 320 SCRA 140 (1999);
People v. Samulde, 336 SCRA 632 (2000);
People v. Gallardo, 323 SCRA 218 (2000);
3. Compliance with requirement to inform person detained of rights
People v. Canoy, 328 SCRA 385 (2000);
People v. Sapal, 328 SCRA 417 (2000);
People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 517 (1986);
People v. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289 (1986)
People v. Continente, 339 SCRA 1 (2000);
4. Police line-up
Gamboa v. Cruz, June 27, 1988;
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967);
People v. Pavillare, 329 SCRA 684 (2000);
5. Proof of voluntariness of confession; burden on prosecution
People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986);
People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986);
6. Exceptional cases of uncounseled confessions not held to be excluded
People v. Andan, 269 SCRA 95 (1997);
People v. Domantay, 307 SCRA 1 (1999);
But cf. People v. Morada, 307 SCRA 362 (1999);
III.Rights and Remedies
A. Rights of persons under arrest
Const. (1987), art. III, sec. 12;
Rule 113, sec. 14;
RA No. 7438, sec. 2;
People v. Ramos, 186 SCRA 184 (1990);
People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465 (1985);
People v. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289 (1986);
People v. Decierdo, 149 SCRA 496 (1987);
Cf. v.v. Mendoza, The Right to Counsel in Custodial Interrogations, 61 PHIL. L. J. 409 (1986);
B. Remedies
1. Motion to Quash Warrant
Miranda vs. Tuliao, 486 SCRA 377 (2006)
Cf.- Talag vs. Reyes, 430 SCRA 428 (2004)
De Joya vs. Marquez, 481 SCRA 376 (2006)
2. Motion to quash information; Preliminary investigation/ Reinvestigation
Rule 117, secs. 1, 3;
Luna v. Plaza, 26 SCRA 310 (1968);
Alimpoos v. CA, 106 SCRA 159 (1981);
3. Bail
Const. (1987), art. III, sec. 14;
RJCL, sec. 15, 16, 17;
JJWA, secs. 34, 35, 36 cf. sec. 4(p);
Rule 114, sec. 26;
Panada v. Veneracion, 269 SCRA 371 (1997);
4. (a) Habeas Corpus
Rule 102
Sec. of National Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, Oct. 7, 2008
Ilagan v. Enrile, 139 SCRA 349 ( 1985);
Velasco v. CA, 245 SCRA 677 (1995)
Moncupa v. Enrile, 141 SCRA 233 (1986);
(b) Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC) &
Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16 SC)
V.V. Mendoza, A Note On The Writ of Amparo, PLJ 82 No.4 (2008)
State participation, indispensable:
Navla v. Pardico, G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012**
Rubrico vs. Macapagal- Arroyo, 613 SCRA 233 (2010)
Yano vs. Sanchez, 612 SCRA 347 (2010)
Razon, Jr. Vs. Tagitis, 612 SCRA 685 (2010)
(c) Effects of plea on objections to legality of arrest
People v. Alojado, 305 SCRA 236 (1999);
People v. Rondero, 320 SCRA 383 (1999);
See cited case in Esquillo vs. People, J. Bersamin Dissenting Aug. 25, 2010
People vs. Racho, 626 SCRA 633 (2010)
Cf. also Non-curability of illegal nature of arrest
Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311 (1990)
Umil v. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251 (1991);
Bagcal v. Villaraza, 120 SCRA 525 (1983);
5. Criminal liability for unlawful arrest
Rev. Pen. Code, Arts. 124-126;
6. Suppression of evidence obtained
Const. (1987), art. III, secs. 3(2), 12(3), 12 (4);
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975);
Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859 (1948);
Cf. Rule 126, sec. 14;
RULE 114- BAIL
Pertinent pleadings:
1) Motion to set bail/ Petition for bail
2) Motion to reduce bail
I. Nature and Definition
A. Definition; persons covered or required to post bail
-Rule 114, secs. 1,3:
Feliciano v. Pasciolan, 2 SCRA 888 (1961) (EB)
Villaseor v. Abao, G.R. No. L-23599, September 29, 1967 (EB)
Defensor-Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 663 (1993);
Miranda v. Tuliao, 486 SCRA 377 (2006)
Cortes v. Catral, 279 SCRA 1 (1997);
People v. Manallo, 400 SCRA 129 (2003);
People v. Nitcha, 240 SCRA 283 (1995)
B. Nature
1. Matter of right
Const. (1987), art. III, sec. 13;
Rule 114, sec.4;
JJWA, secs. 34-37;
RJCL, sec. 15-16;
People v. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 (1991);
Cf. Arraignment not pre-requisite to bail
Lavides v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129670, Feburary 1, 2000;
Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, 396 SCRA 443 (2003);
2. Discretionary
Const. (1987), art. III, sec. 13;
Rule 114, secs. 5,6,7,8,24;
RJCL, sec. 17;
Teehankee v. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756 (1946);
People v. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522 (1988);
Ocampo v. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55 (1946);
Siazon v. Judge, 4 SCRA 184 (1971);
Mamolo v. Narisima, 252 SCRA 613 (1995);
Cf. Duties of Judge
Cortes v. Catral, 279 SCRA 1 (1997);
People v. Tuppal, 395 SCRA 72 (2003);
See also Interim bail
Enrile v. Perez, G.R. No. 147785 (resolution of the Supreme Court En banc dated May 5, 2001);
II.Types and conditions of bail
A. Corporate surety
Rule 114, secs. 1, 2, 10, 13, 21, 22;
B. Cash deposit
Rule 114, secs. 1, 2, 14, 21;
C. Property
Rule 1, 2, 11, 12, 13, 21, 22;
D. Recognizance
Rule 114, secs. 1, 2,15,16;
RJCL, secs. 6(i), 15;
JJWA, secs. 4 (p), 35;
III. Amount of bail; when not required
A. Guidelines
Rule 114, sec.9;
Dela Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1 (1971);
Villaseor v. Abao, 21 SCRA 321 (1967);
B. When not required or reduced
Rule 114, secs. 16, 20;
Rep. Act. No. 6036;
IV. Forfeiture and cancellation of bail; remedies for violation of bail conditions
Rule 114, Sec. 21, 22, 23; Bail
V. Bail filed with other courts:
Rule 114, Sec. 17
Re: Anynomous Letter-complaint against Hon. Tamang, 617 SCRA 428 (2010)
VI. Bail on Appeal:
Leviste vs C.A., G.R. No. 189122. March 17, 2010
PART FOUR
RULES 110,111,127
PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL
AND CIVIL ASPECTS OF OFFENSE,
WITH APPLICATION
FOR PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
Pertinent Forms:
1) Complaint
2) Information
3) Authority to Appear as Private Prosecutor
Pertinent Pleadings:
1) Motion for Suspension of Criminal Action
2) Reservation of Civil Action
3) Entry of Appearance as Private Prosecutor
I. Nature of liability arising from criminal act
A. Criminal
Revised Penal Code
Special Penal Laws
B. Civil
Revised Penal Code, arts. 100-113;
Civil Code, arts. 29-32-33, 34, 2176;
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 322 SCRA 160 (2000)
II. Institution of actions arising from crime
A. Criminal aspect
1. Generally
Rule 110, sec.1;
RJCL, sec. 11;
Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 253 SCRA 773 (1996)
2. Venue and Jurisdiction
BP 129 (as amended), secs. 20, 32;
Rule 110, sec. 15:
RJCL, sec.14;
a) MTC : (Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts)
Sec. 32(2), B.P.129 (As amended by Sec. 2, R.A. No. 7691)
Sec. 3 & 4, S.C. ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 9-94
b) RTC
CASES:
People v. Lagon, 185 SCRA 442 (1990)
Malaloan v. CA, 232 SCRA 249 (1994)
3. The complaint/ information; test of sufficiency
Art. III, Sec. 14 (1) & (2), 1987 Constitution
Rule 110, Sec. 6
People v. Pardilla, 92 SCRA 591 (1979) **
Malto v. People, 553 SCRA 643, September 21, 2007
Lazarte, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 581 SCRA 431 (2009) **
Allege elements of the offense & effect of failure
People v. Valdez, 663 SCRA 272 (Jan. 2012)
a. MTC :
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts)
Sec. 11 & 12, 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure
b. RTC:
Rule 110, secs. 2, 3, 4:
DOJ-NPS Manual, Part III, sec.8;
4. Person prosecuting criminal action; intervention of offended party
Rule 110, secs. 5 (as amended by SC AM No. 02-2-07-SC, April 10, 2002),
16;
JJWA, sec. 32, 33;
People v. Berialies, 76 SCRA 42 (1977)
Republic v. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191 (1988)
People v. Ocapan, 150 SCRA 607 (1987)
People v. Ilarde, 125 SCRA 607 (1987)
People v. Madali, 349 SCRA 104 (2001)
Cf. Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462 (1987)
Roberts v CA, 254 SCRA 307 (1996)
Cf also. Non-retroactivity of removal of complaint requirement in Rape
People v. Galigao, G.R. Nos. 140961-63, January 14, 2003
5.Form and content
1) Procedural
a. Name of accused and offended party
Rule 110, secs. 7, 12;
People v. Guevarra, 179 SCRA 740 (1989)
b. Designation of offense
Rule 110, sec. 8
DOJ-NPS Manual, Part III, sec. 40;
People v. Pardilla, supra **
People v. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542 (1978)
People v. Buayaban, 400 SCRA 48 (2003)
People v. Delim, G.R. No. 142773, January 28, 2003**
People v. Fernandez, 414 SCRA 84 (2003)
People v. Masapol, 417 SCRA 371 (2003)
Estafa includes falsification as means?:
Patula v. People, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012
Consequence of failure to allege
People v. Valdez, 663 SCRA 272 (Jan. 2012) supra
c. Formal amendment
People v. Degamo, 402 SCRA 133 (2003);
Villaflor v. Viver, 349 SCRA 194 (2001);
(2)Substantive
a. Single offense
Rule 110, sec. 13;
People v. Fernandez, 183 SCRA 511 (1990);
People v. Lopez, 312 SCRA 684 (1999);
b. Cause of accusation
Rule 110, sec. 9:
People v. Chan Toco, 12 Phil. 262 (1908);
Balitaan v. CFI- Batangas, 115 SCRA 729 (1982);
Matilde v. Jabson, 68 SCRA 456 (1975);
People v. Gallo, G.R. No. 124736, resolution dated September 29,
1999;
Vasquez v. CA, 314 SCRA SCRA 460 (1999);
People v. Llanto, G.R. No. 146458, January 20, 2003;
Evidentiary Facts & Ultimate Facts
Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, supra;
c. Date, place and time of commission
Rule 110, secs. 10, 11;
People v. Lizada, G.R. Nos. 143468-71, January 24, 2003;
People v. Ladrillo, 320 SCRA 61 (1999);
People v. Losano, G.R. No. 127122, July 20, 1999;
U.S. v. Javier Dichao, 27 Phil. 421 (1914);
People v. Molero, 144 SCRA 397 (1986);
People v. Lualhati, 171 SCRA 277 (1989);
Rocaberte v. People, 193 SCRA 152 (1991);
Cf. Need not be alleged
People v. Perez, 417 SCRA 449 (2003);
6. Suspension of criminal action by reason of prejudicial question
Rule 111, secs. 6, 7;
DOJ - NPS Manual, Part III, secs. 23-24;
People v. Consing Jr., 395 SCRA 366 (2003);
Magestrado v. People, 527 SCRA 125 (2007)
Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman, 539 SCRA 415 (2007)**
B. Civil Aspect
1. Generally
Rule 111, sec. 1;
RJCL, sec. 12;
People vs. Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239, G.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994**
2. Suspension of separate civil action
Rule 111, sec. 2;
Acquittal and Civil liability:
Manantan v. CA, 350 SCRA 387 (2001)
Cf. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question
Rule 111, secs. 6,7;
Dreamwork Construction, Inc., Vs. Janiola, 591 SCRA 466 (2009)
3. Independent civil actions
Rule 111, sec. 3;
4. Effect of death on civil actions
Rule 111, sec.4;
5. Effect of judgment in civil action on criminal action
Rule 111, sec. 5;
III. Remedies available
A. Amendment/substitution of information
Rule 110, sec. 14;
DOJ-NPS Manual, Part III, sec. 4;
Teehankee v. Madayag, 140 SCRA 425 (1985)**;
Draculan v. Donato, 140 SCRA 425 (1985);
Almeda v. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38 (1975);
People v. CA, 121 SCRA 733 (1983);
People v. Tubongbanua, 500 SCRA 727 (2006)
And right to preliminary investigation;
Matalan v.Sandiganbayan, 455 SCRA 736 (2005)
B. Motion to Quash
Rule 117; Cf. Rule 119, sec. 19;
Cruz v. CA, 194 SCRA 145 (1991);
C. Bill of Particulars
Rule 116, sec. 9;
See: Bill of Particulars in Criminal Cases by Ambrosio R. Blanco, 202
SCRA 739
D. Provisional Remedies
Rule 127, secs. 1, 2:
Rule 57, 58, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure;
PART V
RULE 112 PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
AND INQUEST
Pertinent Pleadings/Legal Documents:
1) Complaint-Affidavit
2) Counter- Affidavit
3) Resolution
4) Motion for Preliminary Investigation
5) Motion for Reinvestigation
ASSIGNMENT: DRAFT A COMPLAINT AFFIDAVIT AND COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT
RESOLUTION
INFORMATION
I. Definition; when required
A. Nature, Purpose, Scope and Probable Cause
Sales v. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 293 (2001)
Baytan v. COMELEC, 396 SCRA 703 (2003);
Paderanga v. Drilon, 196 SCRA 86(1991);
Go vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 138 (1992)
Probable cause in preliminary investigations:
Allado v. Diokno, 232 SCRA 192 (1994)
DOJ-NPS Manual, Part III (Preliminary Investigation), Part II
(Inquest);
B. Definition : when required
Rule 112, sec. 1;
DOJ - NPS Manual, Part III, secs. 1, 2, 3, 7;
RJCL, secs. 13,8:
Doromal V. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354 (1989);
Go vs. Court of Appeals, supra
Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652 (1995);
C. Persons authorized to conduct
Rule 112, sec. 2;
DOJ- NPS Manual, sec. 6;
RA 6770, secs. 11 (4) (a), 15;
Velasco v. Casaclang, 294 SCRA 396 (1998);
Balgos v. Sandiganbayan, 176 SCRA 287 (1989);
Alonzo vs. Concepcion, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1879. January 17, 2005
II. Procedure in cases where preliminary investigation required
A. In cases cognizable by RTC
Conducted by prosecutor
Rule 122, secs. 3, 4, 6, 8;
RJCL, sec. 13;
Rodil v. Garcia, 104 SCRA 362 (1981);
Objective of P.I. & duty of public prosecutor:
Allado v. Diokno, 232 SCRA 192 (1994);
B. In cases cognizable by MTC
Conducted by prosecutor
Rule 112, secs. 1 [par.2], 3, 4, 6, 8;
RJCL, sec. 13;
C. In cases cognizable by Sandiganbayan
1. Conducted by prosecutor
Rule 112, secs. 3, 4, 5, 8;
2. Conducted by Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor
RA 6770;
Administrative Order No. 07, Rule II, secs. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7;
See: Ombudsman & DOJ MOA, April 19, 2012
III. Procedure in cases not requiring a preliminary investigation
A. MTC cases or those covered by summary procedure
Rule 112, sec. 9;
B. When person lawfully arrested without warrant
Rule 112, sec. 7;
DOJ Department Order No. 61 (September 21, 1993) [ New Rules on Inquest];
Rev. Pen. Code, art. 125;
RJCL, sec. 8;
Leviste vs. Alameda, 626 SCRA 575 (2010)
IV. Remedies from Preliminary Investigation
A. Appeal
DOJ Department Order No. 70 (July 3, 2000) [2000 NPS Rule on Appeal]; cf. DOJ-NPS
Manual,
Part IV (Petition for Review);
Dimatullac v. Villon, 297 SCRA 679 (1998);
Ty v. NBI, 638 SCRA 671 (2010)
B. Reinvestigation/ Preliminary Investigation
Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462 (1987);
Roberts v. CA, 254 SCRA 307 (1996);
Dungog v. CA, 159 SCRA 145 (1988);
Velasquez v. Undersecretary of Justice, 182 SCRA 388 (1990);
People v. Beriales, 70 SCRA 361 (1976);
Doromal v. Sandiganbayan, supra
Leviste vs. Almeda, supra
Cf. Effects of absence of or irregularity in preliminary investigation
Go vs. Courts of Appeals, 206 SCRA 138 (1992)
Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 253 SCRA 773 (1996);
C. Reconsideration
Sales v. Sandiganbayan, supra
D. Injunction and writs of retraint in proper cases
Primicias v. Pangasinan, 93 SCRA 462 (1979);
Guingona Jr. v. City Fiscal, 137 SCRA 597 (1985);
Paderanga v. Drilon, supra;
People vs. Grey, 625 SCRA 523 (2010)
Brocka v. Enrile, 192 SCRA 183 (1990)
E. Petition for certiorari
Rule 65
Ty v. NBI, supra
F. Bail, effect of Posting
Rule 114, sec. 26;
DOJ-NPS Manual, Part V, secs. 1-13:
Go v CA, 206 SCRA 138 (1992);
Larranaga v. CA, 287 SCRA 581 (1998);
Scatter shot warrant is void.
Authoritative in COMPUTER SEARCHES. The only case that used the 2-pronged test in Katz.
Disposition: no reasonable expectation of privacy in government computer. The computer is of public ownership; it can only be used for public purposes.
Cited a case: employees laptop was searched. The laptop belongs in his private capacity. The search violates his right of privacy.
IMPORTANT: distinction of public vs. private character of computer.
e.g. a policeman (working sideline as private security guard in motel) discovering marijuana in a motel room. Admissible or not? May the policeman dissociate himself from being a policeman so that he is not an agent of the State? (Check US jurisprudence)
Forwarding companies: guidelines sent by govt to conduct searches.
TEST: Look if agent is acting in private capacity or for government? Look at INTEREST to discover: interest of government, not for private interest.
WRONG DECISION. The rule of evidence allows the admissibility of the documents here. Wife is exempted, can do a search. Look at Rule 130!
The privilege of communication is separate from unreasonable search and seizure.
Mendoza anchors argument on privacy of communication, not search.
Dept. of Tourism: has photos of all hotels/motels
ZONA (?) / saturation drives.
Rule 126, Sec. 1 vs. Sec. 13.
Why SC wrong? SC said to prove zoning. But SolGen already admitted there was.
2-pronged test:
1. Subjective expectation of privacy
2. Objective expectation
SC attached right to privacy to defect of technology (e.g. possibility of a party line).
Agree or disagree? How about Imbestigador?
THE LAW ONLY CONSIDERS VOICE. IT DOES NOT COVER PHOTOS OR VIDEOS.
In expose films, they dont present the voice.
May a search warrant be issued for purposes merely of an administrative investigation?
Construed strictly against State and liberally in favor of individual.
There is no presumption of regularity in attempting to justify it.
Defines PROBABLE CAUSE for purposes of the search.
In US cases of search, decisions/conclusions are FACT-BASED. This case is fact-based.
Know the enumeration of exceptions in this case. What is not present: automobile search.
Here, there is TIME sufficient to determine probable cause for purposes of warrant issuance.
CRUX OF THIS CASE: Why not a valid warrantless search? Aling Rosa WAS NOT SUSPICIOUS-LOOKING. Did not give rise to reason to conduct a search.
What is the standard here? There is no intention by Aling Rosa to relinquish the right. Merely respected police officers.
Stop and frisk IS NOT ACTUALLY AN EXCEPTION. It is not a warrantless search. No probable cause is required, only SUSPICION, BASED ON EXPERIENCE OF POLICE OFFICER. It is in the context of crime prevention.
If there is probable cause, it can already justify a warrantless search.
Should "Terry" doctrine apply in this case? No. Context/purpose: for the safety of the officer. (Panganiban 'misread' the case) Officer did not insert his hands into the pocket.
"Terry" doctrine: officer does an investigation arising from suspicion (short of probable cause). The stop is a seizure, but it is only to the extent of the investigation. Pat down is only to the extent to see if there are any weapons. Stop and frisk is related to SAFETY.
Wrong application in this case: weapon cannot be contained in the wallet. No threat to the life of the officer. Doesn't justify the opening of wallet.
SC doctrine: suspicion resulting into warrantless search.
General rule: any court with territorial jurisdiction may issue the warrant. (because there may be no case filed yet)
Exceptions:
Where place of commission of crime is not known: any court with territorial jurisdiction of the place indicated in the warrant.
Even if place of commission of crime is known: any place within the judicial region where crime was committed, for compelling reasons.
Exception to exception: where criminal action has already been filed, only in the court where such action is pending.
Range of enforceability
Nature of a search warrant: writ of discovery. It is only a PROCESS. Hence, it is not yet necessary that FULL JURISDICTION be had over the criminal offense. A search warrant proceeding is not a criminal case.
Generally issued by a court in its ancillary jurisdiction, and not pursuant to its original jurisdiction.
READ THIS CASE: it already outlines everthing in the last portion.
2 remedies:
1. Motion to quash warrant: goes into the validity of issuance of search warrant (e.g. lack of probable cause, no personal examination) -- DEFECTS IN THE ISSUANCE. WHEN TO FILE? Wait for it to be issued, and served. WHERE TO FILE? ONLY THE COURT WHERE THE SW WAS ISSUED. Exception: where the principal criminal action is filed/pending. Exception to exception: compelling reason to file MTQ in issuing court.
2. Motion to suppress evidence / object to the admissibility of evidence: does not address defects in the issuance. Motion for evidence not to be presented during trial.
Objection to admissibility of evidence is distinguished from objection to jurisdiction of person. After arraignment, accused only waives objecting to jurisdiction over person. He does not waive objecting to admissibility of evidence.
"These are alternative, not cumulative, remedies." Prof: nonsense. File MTQ + suppression.
Anywhere in the Philippines.
Requisites:
Probable cause
Connected with ONE specific offense
Rule: need not specify specific section of law, but specify the specific punishable acts
Personal determination by judge
Personal examination by judge
By searching questions
Facts personally known by witnesses
In writing and under oath
Sworn statements and affidavits of witnesses attached to the record
Particular description of place to be searched
Particular description of thing to be seized
Applicant forgot to attach a no license certification from an agency of the PNP, which could have been easily obtained.
Probable cause is such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in conection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
BEST EVIDENCE RULE OF PROBABLE CAUSE
Only the judge, and no other, may issue warrants.
Exception: warrant of arrest in deportation proceedings
Perjury is the disincentive for witnesses to lie.
Affidavits are insufficient. Judge must take depositions in writing.
Examination must be probing and exhaustive, not routinary and pro forma. It must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit, but judge must make his own inquiry about the intent and justification of the application.
Failure to comply with requirements of examination constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
TEST OF PARTICULARITY OF THINGS TO BE SEIZED:
Description is as specific as circumstances will ordinarily allow;
Description expresses a conclusion of fact, not of law;
Description is limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.
Problem: absence of meeting of minds between personal knowledge of searching officer and what judge had in mind in the description of the place. Typographical errors of address. etc.
What is the form when the person is the one to be searched?
Ownership is unessential. It is sufficient that warrant is directed against person with possession/control of the thing.
Subject of the offense
Fruits of the offense
Means of the offense: used or intended to be used
Search warrant is severable.
Must be on the person of the person arrested:
Dangerous weapons
Connected with commission of offense: (a) means, (b) proof
When to search? Either during commission or after.
Arrest must precede the search. Otherwise: both arrest and search are void, if the arrest is based on fruits of the search.
Factors:
Person
Time
Place
Subject
Interior of vehicle: probable cause is required.
the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government
In Eiseman we enunciated four specific factors to consider in determining whether a governmental
expansion of a private search is so significant as to invoke the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. Applied to this case, these include the following:
1. The police officer's experience and expertise.
2. The question of whether in light of his expertise, the officer had formed an opinion with a reasonable degree of certainty concerning the identity of the substance previously searched by private parties before expanding the search.
3. The extent of the intrusion required to perform the expansion.
4. The question of whether such intrusion impinged upon any further expectation of privacy that remained after the exposure of the contents by private persons.
Scatter shot warrant is void.
Authoritative in COMPUTER SEARCHES. The only case that used the 2-pronged test in Katz.
Disposition: no reasonable expectation of privacy in government computer. The computer is of public ownership; it can only be used for public purposes.
Cited a case: employees laptop was searched. The laptop belongs in his private capacity. The search violates his right of privacy.
IMPORTANT: distinction of public vs. private character of computer.
e.g. a policeman (working sideline as private security guard in motel) discovering marijuana in a motel room. Admissible or not? May the policeman dissociate himself from being a policeman so that he is not an agent of the State? (Check US jurisprudence)
Forwarding companies: guidelines sent by govt to conduct searches.
TEST: Look if agent is acting in private capacity or for government? Look at INTEREST to discover: interest of government, not for private interest.
WRONG DECISION. The rule of evidence allows the admissibility of the documents here. Wife is exempted, can do a search. Look at Rule 130!
The privilege of communication is separate from unreasonable search and seizure.
Mendoza anchors argument on privacy of communication, not search.
Dept. of Tourism: has photos of all hotels/motels
ZONA (?) / saturation drives.
Rule 126, Sec. 1 vs. Sec. 13.
Why SC wrong? SC said to prove zoning. But SolGen already admitted there was.
2-pronged test:
1. Subjective expectation of privacy
2. Objective expectation
SC attached right to privacy to defect of technology (e.g. possibility of a party line).
Agree or disagree? How about Imbestigador?
THE LAW ONLY CONSIDERS VOICE. IT DOES NOT COVER PHOTOS OR VIDEOS.
In expose films, they dont present the voice.
May a search warrant be issued for purposes merely of an administrative investigation?
Construed strictly against State and liberally in favor of individual.
There is no presumption of regularity in attempting to justify it.
Defines PROBABLE CAUSE for purposes of the search.
In US cases of search, decisions/conclusions are FACT-BASED. This case is fact-based.
Know the enumeration of exceptions in this case. What is not present: automobile search.
Here, there is TIME sufficient to determine probable cause for purposes of warrant issuance.
CRUX OF THIS CASE: Why not a valid warrantless search? Aling Rosa WAS NOT SUSPICIOUS-LOOKING. Did not give rise to reason to conduct a search.
What is the standard here? There is no intention by Aling Rosa to relinquish the right. Merely respected police officers.
Stop and frisk IS NOT ACTUALLY AN EXCEPTION. It is not a warrantless search. No probable cause is required, only SUSPICION, BASED ON EXPERIENCE OF POLICE OFFICER. It is in the context of crime prevention.
If there is probable cause, it can already justify a warrantless search.
Should "Terry" doctrine apply in this case? No. Context/purpose: for the safety of the officer. (Panganiban 'misread' the case) Officer did not insert his hands into the pocket.
"Terry" doctrine: officer does an investigation arising from suspicion (short of probable cause). The stop is a seizure, but it is only to the extent of the investigation. Pat down is only to the extent to see if there are any weapons. Stop and frisk is related to SAFETY.
Wrong application in this case: weapon cannot be contained in the wallet. No threat to the life of the officer. Doesn't justify the opening of wallet.
SC doctrine: suspicion resulting into warrantless search.
General rule: any court with territorial jurisdiction may issue the warrant. (because there may be no case filed yet)
Exceptions:
Where place of commission of crime is not known: any court with territorial jurisdiction of the place indicated in the warrant.
Even if place of commission of crime is known: any place within the judicial region where crime was committed, for compelling reasons.
Exception to exception: where criminal action has already been filed, only in the court where such action is pending.
Range of enforceability
Nature of a search warrant: writ of discovery. It is only a PROCESS. Hence, it is not yet necessary that FULL JURISDICTION be had over the criminal offense. A search warrant proceeding is not a criminal case.
Generally issued by a court in its ancillary jurisdiction, and not pursuant to its original jurisdiction.
READ THIS CASE: it already outlines everthing in the last portion.
2 remedies:
1. Motion to quash warrant: goes into the validity of issuance of search warrant (e.g. lack of probable cause, no personal examination) -- DEFECTS IN THE ISSUANCE. WHEN TO FILE? Wait for it to be issued, and served. WHERE TO FILE? ONLY THE COURT WHERE THE SW WAS ISSUED. Exception: where the principal criminal action is filed/pending. Exception to exception: compelling reason to file MTQ in issuing court.
2. Motion to suppress evidence / object to the admissibility of evidence: does not address defects in the issuance. Motion for evidence not to be presented during trial.
Objection to admissibility of evidence is distinguished from objection to jurisdiction of person. After arraignment, accused only waives objecting to jurisdiction over person. He does not waive objecting to admissibility of evidence.
"These are alternative, not cumulative, remedies." Prof: nonsense. File MTQ + suppression.
Anywhere in the Philippines.
Requisites:
Probable cause
Connected with ONE specific offense
Rule: need not specify specific section of law, but specify the specific punishable acts
Personal determination by judge
Personal examination by judge
By searching questions
Facts personally known by witnesses
In writing and under oath
Sworn statements and affidavits of witnesses attached to the record
Particular description of place to be searched
Particular description of thing to be seized
Applicant forgot to attach a no license certification from an agency of the PNP, which could have been easily obtained.
Probable cause is such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in conection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
BEST EVIDENCE RULE OF PROBABLE CAUSE
Only the judge, and no other, may issue warrants.
Exception: warrant of arrest in deportation proceedings
Perjury is the disincentive for witnesses to lie.
Affidavits are insufficient. Judge must take depositions in writing.
Examination must be probing and exhaustive, not routinary and pro forma. It must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit, but judge must make his own inquiry about the intent and justification of the application.
Failure to comply with requirements of examination constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
TEST OF PARTICULARITY OF THINGS TO BE SEIZED:
Description is as specific as circumstances will ordinarily allow;
Description expresses a conclusion of fact, not of law;
Description is limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.
Problem: absence of meeting of minds between personal knowledge of searching officer and what judge had in mind in the description of the place. Typographical errors of address. etc.
What is the form when the person is the one to be searched?
Ownership is unessential. It is sufficient that warrant is directed against person with possession/control of the thing.
Subject of the offense
Fruits of the offense
Means of the offense: used or intended to be used
Search warrant is severable.
Must be on the person of the person arrested:
Dangerous weapons
Connected with commission of offense: (a) means, (b) proof
When to search? Either during commission or after.
Arrest must precede the search. Otherwise: both arrest and search are void, if the arrest is based on fruits of the search.
Factors:
Person
Time
Place
Subject
Interior of vehicle: probable cause is required.
the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government
In Eiseman we enunciated four specific factors to consider in determining whether a governmental
expansion of a private search is so significant as to invoke the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. Applied to this case, these include the following:
1. The police officer's experience and expertise.
2. The question of whether in light of his expertise, the officer had formed an opinion with a reasonable degree of certainty concerning the identity of the substance previously searched by private parties before expanding the search.
3. The extent of the intrusion required to perform the expansion.
4. The question of whether such intrusion impinged upon any further expectation of privacy that remained after the exposure of the contents by private persons.
Scatter shot warrant is void.
Authoritative in COMPUTER SEARCHES. The only case that used the 2-pronged test in Katz.
Disposition: no reasonable expectation of privacy in government computer. The computer is of public ownership; it can only be used for public purposes.
Cited a case: employees laptop was searched. The laptop belongs in his private capacity. The search violates his right of privacy.
IMPORTANT: distinction of public vs. private character of computer.
e.g. a policeman (working sideline as private security guard in motel) discovering marijuana in a motel room. Admissible or not? May the policeman dissociate himself from being a policeman so that he is not an agent of the State? (Check US jurisprudence)
Forwarding companies: guidelines sent by govt to conduct searches.
TEST: Look if agent is acting in private capacity or for government? Look at INTEREST to discover: interest of government, not for private interest.
WRONG DECISION. The rule of evidence allows the admissibility of the documents here. Wife is exempted, can do a search. Look at Rule 130!
The privilege of communication is separate from unreasonable search and seizure.
Mendoza anchors argument on privacy of communication, not search.
Dept. of Tourism: has photos of all hotels/motels
ZONA (?) / saturation drives.
Rule 126, Sec. 1 vs. Sec. 13.
Why SC wrong? SC said to prove zoning. But SolGen already admitted there was.
2-pronged test:
1. Subjective expectation of privacy
2. Objective expectation
SC attached right to privacy to defect of technology (e.g. possibility of a party line).
Agree or disagree? How about Imbestigador?
THE LAW ONLY CONSIDERS VOICE. IT DOES NOT COVER PHOTOS OR VIDEOS.
In expose films, they dont present the voice.
May a search warrant be issued for purposes merely of an administrative investigation?
Construed strictly against State and liberally in favor of individual.
There is no presumption of regularity in attempting to justify it.
Defines PROBABLE CAUSE for purposes of the search.
In US cases of search, decisions/conclusions are FACT-BASED. This case is fact-based.
Know the enumeration of exceptions in this case. What is not present: automobile search.
Here, there is TIME sufficient to determine probable cause for purposes of warrant issuance.
CRUX OF THIS CASE: Why not a valid warrantless search? Aling Rosa WAS NOT SUSPICIOUS-LOOKING. Did not give rise to reason to conduct a search.
What is the standard here? There is no intention by Aling Rosa to relinquish the right. Merely respected police officers.
Stop and frisk IS NOT ACTUALLY AN EXCEPTION. It is not a warrantless search. No probable cause is required, only SUSPICION, BASED ON EXPERIENCE OF POLICE OFFICER. It is in the context of crime prevention.
If there is probable cause, it can already justify a warrantless search.
Should "Terry" doctrine apply in this case? No. Context/purpose: for the safety of the officer. (Panganiban 'misread' the case) Officer did not insert his hands into the pocket.
"Terry" doctrine: officer does an investigation arising from suspicion (short of probable cause). The stop is a seizure, but it is only to the extent of the investigation. Pat down is only to the extent to see if there are any weapons. Stop and frisk is related to SAFETY.
Wrong application in this case: weapon cannot be contained in the wallet. No threat to the life of the officer. Doesn't justify the opening of wallet.
SC doctrine: suspicion resulting into warrantless search.
General rule: any court with territorial jurisdiction may issue the warrant. (because there may be no case filed yet)
Exceptions:
Where place of commission of crime is not known: any court with territorial jurisdiction of the place indicated in the warrant.
Even if place of commission of crime is known: any place within the judicial region where crime was committed, for compelling reasons.
Exception to exception: where criminal action has already been filed, only in the court where such action is pending.
Range of enforceability
Nature of a search warrant: writ of discovery. It is only a PROCESS. Hence, it is not yet necessary that FULL JURISDICTION be had over the criminal offense. A search warrant proceeding is not a criminal case.
Generally issued by a court in its ancillary jurisdiction, and not pursuant to its original jurisdiction.
READ THIS CASE: it already outlines everthing in the last portion.
2 remedies:
1. Motion to quash warrant: goes into the validity of issuance of search warrant (e.g. lack of probable cause, no personal examination) -- DEFECTS IN THE ISSUANCE. WHEN TO FILE? Wait for it to be issued, and served. WHERE TO FILE? ONLY THE COURT WHERE THE SW WAS ISSUED. Exception: where the principal criminal action is filed/pending. Exception to exception: compelling reason to file MTQ in issuing court.
2. Motion to suppress evidence / object to the admissibility of evidence: does not address defects in the issuance. Motion for evidence not to be presented during trial.
Objection to admissibility of evidence is distinguished from objection to jurisdiction of person. After arraignment, accused only waives objecting to jurisdiction over person. He does not waive objecting to admissibility of evidence.
"These are alternative, not cumulative, remedies." Prof: nonsense. File MTQ + suppression.
Anywhere in the Philippines.
Requisites:
Probable cause
Connected with ONE specific offense
Rule: need not specify specific section of law, but specify the specific punishable acts
Personal determination by judge
Personal examination by judge
By searching questions
Facts personally known by witnesses
In writing and under oath
Sworn statements and affidavits of witnesses attached to the record
Particular description of place to be searched
Particular description of thing to be seized
Applicant forgot to attach a no license certification from an agency of the PNP, which could have been easily obtained.
Probable cause is such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in conection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
BEST EVIDENCE RULE OF PROBABLE CAUSE
Only the judge, and no other, may issue warrants.
Exception: warrant of arrest in deportation proceedings
Perjury is the disincentive for witnesses to lie.
Affidavits are insufficient. Judge must take depositions in writing.
Examination must be probing and exhaustive, not routinary and pro forma. It must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit, but judge must make his own inquiry about the intent and justification of the application.
Failure to comply with requirements of examination constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
TEST OF PARTICULARITY OF THINGS TO BE SEIZED:
Description is as specific as circumstances will ordinarily allow;
Description expresses a conclusion of fact, not of law;
Description is limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.
Problem: absence of meeting of minds between personal knowledge of searching officer and what judge had in mind in the description of the place. Typographical errors of address. etc.
What is the form when the person is the one to be searched?
Ownership is unessential. It is sufficient that warrant is directed against person with possession/control of the thing.
Subject of the offense
Fruits of the offense
Means of the offense: used or intended to be used
Search warrant is severable.
Must be on the person of the person arrested:
Dangerous weapons
Connected with commission of offense: (a) means, (b) proof
When to search? Either during commission or after.
Arrest must precede the search. Otherwise: both arrest and search are void, if the arrest is based on fruits of the search.
Factors:
Person
Time
Place
Subject
Interior of vehicle: probable cause is required.
the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government
In Eiseman we enunciated four specific factors to consider in determining whether a governmental
expansion of a private search is so significant as to invoke the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. Applied to this case, these include the following:
1. The police officer's experience and expertise.
2. The question of whether in light of his expertise, the officer had formed an opinion with a reasonable degree of certainty concerning the identity of the substance previously searched by private parties before expanding the search.
3. The extent of the intrusion required to perform the expansion.
4. The question of whether such intrusion impinged upon any further expectation of privacy that remained after the exposure of the contents by private persons.
Scatter shot warrant is void.
Authoritative in COMPUTER SEARCHES. The only case that used the 2-pronged test in Katz.
Disposition: no reasonable expectation of privacy in government computer. The computer is of public ownership; it can only be used for public purposes.
Cited a case: employees laptop was searched. The laptop belongs in his private capacity. The search violates his right of privacy.
IMPORTANT: distinction of public vs. private character of computer.
e.g. a policeman (working sideline as private security guard in motel) discovering marijuana in a motel room. Admissible or not? May the policeman dissociate himself from being a policeman so that he is not an agent of the State? (Check US jurisprudence)
Forwarding companies: guidelines sent by govt to conduct searches.
TEST: Look if agent is acting in private capacity or for government? Look at INTEREST to discover: interest of government, not for private interest.
WRONG DECISION. The rule of evidence allows the admissibility of the documents here. Wife is exempted, can do a search. Look at Rule 130!
The privilege of communication is separate from unreasonable search and seizure.
Mendoza anchors argument on privacy of communication, not search.
Dept. of Tourism: has photos of all hotels/motels
ZONA (?) / saturation drives.
Rule 126, Sec. 1 vs. Sec. 13.
Why SC wrong? SC said to prove zoning. But SolGen already admitted there was.
2-pronged test:
1. Subjective expectation of privacy
2. Objective expectation
SC attached right to privacy to defect of technology (e.g. possibility of a party line).
Agree or disagree? How about Imbestigador?
THE LAW ONLY CONSIDERS VOICE. IT DOES NOT COVER PHOTOS OR VIDEOS.
In expose films, they dont present the voice.
May a search warrant be issued for purposes merely of an administrative investigation?
Construed strictly against State and liberally in favor of individual.
There is no presumption of regularity in attempting to justify it.
Defines PROBABLE CAUSE for purposes of the search.
In US cases of search, decisions/conclusions are FACT-BASED. This case is fact-based.
Know the enumeration of exceptions in this case. What is not present: automobile search.
Here, there is TIME sufficient to determine probable cause for purposes of warrant issuance.
CRUX OF THIS CASE: Why not a valid warrantless search? Aling Rosa WAS NOT SUSPICIOUS-LOOKING. Did not give rise to reason to conduct a search.
What is the standard here? There is no intention by Aling Rosa to relinquish the right. Merely respected police officers.
Stop and frisk IS NOT ACTUALLY AN EXCEPTION. It is not a warrantless search. No probable cause is required, only SUSPICION, BASED ON EXPERIENCE OF POLICE OFFICER. It is in the context of crime prevention.
If there is probable cause, it can already justify a warrantless search.
Should "Terry" doctrine apply in this case? No. Context/purpose: for the safety of the officer. (Panganiban 'misread' the case) Officer did not insert his hands into the pocket.
"Terry" doctrine: officer does an investigation arising from suspicion (short of probable cause). The stop is a seizure, but it is only to the extent of the investigation. Pat down is only to the extent to see if there are any weapons. Stop and frisk is related to SAFETY.
Wrong application in this case: weapon cannot be contained in the wallet. No threat to the life of the officer. Doesn't justify the opening of wallet.
SC doctrine: suspicion resulting into warrantless search.
General rule: any court with territorial jurisdiction may issue the warrant. (because there may be no case filed yet)
Exceptions:
Where place of commission of crime is not known: any court with territorial jurisdiction of the place indicated in the warrant.
Even if place of commission of crime is known: any place within the judicial region where crime was committed, for compelling reasons.
Exception to exception: where criminal action has already been filed, only in the court where such action is pending.
Range of enforceability
Nature of a search warrant: writ of discovery. It is only a PROCESS. Hence, it is not yet necessary that FULL JURISDICTION be had over the criminal offense. A search warrant proceeding is not a criminal case.
Generally issued by a court in its ancillary jurisdiction, and not pursuant to its original jurisdiction.
READ THIS CASE: it already outlines everthing in the last portion.
2 remedies:
1. Motion to quash warrant: goes into the validity of issuance of search warrant (e.g. lack of probable cause, no personal examination) -- DEFECTS IN THE ISSUANCE. WHEN TO FILE? Wait for it to be issued, and served. WHERE TO FILE? ONLY THE COURT WHERE THE SW WAS ISSUED. Exception: where the principal criminal action is filed/pending. Exception to exception: compelling reason to file MTQ in issuing court.
2. Motion to suppress evidence / object to the admissibility of evidence: does not address defects in the issuance. Motion for evidence not to be presented during trial.
Objection to admissibility of evidence is distinguished from objection to jurisdiction of person. After arraignment, accused only waives objecting to jurisdiction over person. He does not waive objecting to admissibility of evidence.
"These are alternative, not cumulative, remedies." Prof: nonsense. File MTQ + suppression.
Anywhere in the Philippines.
Requisites:
Probable cause
Connected with ONE specific offense
Rule: need not specify specific section of law, but specify the specific punishable acts
Personal determination by judge
Personal examination by judge
By searching questions
Facts personally known by witnesses
In writing and under oath
Sworn statements and affidavits of witnesses attached to the record
Particular description of place to be searched
Particular description of thing to be seized
Applicant forgot to attach a no license certification from an agency of the PNP, which could have been easily obtained.
Probable cause is such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in conection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
BEST EVIDENCE RULE OF PROBABLE CAUSE
Only the judge, and no other, may issue warrants.
Exception: warrant of arrest in deportation proceedings
Perjury is the disincentive for witnesses to lie.
Affidavits are insufficient. Judge must take depositions in writing.
Examination must be probing and exhaustive, not routinary and pro forma. It must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit, but judge must make his own inquiry about the intent and justification of the application.
Failure to comply with requirements of examination constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
TEST OF PARTICULARITY OF THINGS TO BE SEIZED:
Description is as specific as circumstances will ordinarily allow;
Description expresses a conclusion of fact, not of law;
Description is limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.
Problem: absence of meeting of minds between personal knowledge of searching officer and what judge had in mind in the description of the place. Typographical errors of address. etc.
What is the form when the person is the one to be searched?
Ownership is unessential. It is sufficient that warrant is directed against person with possession/control of the thing.
Subject of the offense
Fruits of the offense
Means of the offense: used or intended to be used
Search warrant is severable.
Must be on the person of the person arrested:
Dangerous weapons
Connected with commission of offense: (a) means, (b) proof
When to search? Either during commission or after.
Arrest must precede the search. Otherwise: both arrest and search are void, if the arrest is based on fruits of the search.
Factors:
Person
Time
Place
Subject
Interior of vehicle: probable cause is required.
the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government
In Eiseman we enunciated four specific factors to consider in determining whether a governmental
expansion of a private search is so significant as to invoke the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. Applied to this case, these include the following:
1. The police officer's experience and expertise.
2. The question of whether in light of his expertise, the officer had formed an opinion with a reasonable degree of certainty concerning the identity of the substance previously searched by private parties before expanding the search.
3. The extent of the intrusion required to perform the expansion.
4. The question of whether such intrusion impinged upon any further expectation of privacy that remained after the exposure of the contents by private persons.
Scatter shot warrant is void.
Authoritative in COMPUTER SEARCHES. The only case that used the 2-pronged test in Katz.
Disposition: no reasonable expectation of privacy in government computer. The computer is of public ownership; it can only be used for public purposes.
Cited a case: employees laptop was searched. The laptop belongs in his private capacity. The search violates his right of privacy.
IMPORTANT: distinction of public vs. private character of computer.
e.g. a policeman (working sideline as private security guard in motel) discovering marijuana in a motel room. Admissible or not? May the policeman dissociate himself from being a policeman so that he is not an agent of the State? (Check US jurisprudence)
Forwarding companies: guidelines sent by govt to conduct searches.
TEST: Look if agent is acting in private capacity or for government? Look at INTEREST to discover: interest of government, not for private interest.
WRONG DECISION. The rule of evidence allows the admissibility of the documents here. Wife is exempted, can do a search. Look at Rule 130!
The privilege of communication is separate from unreasonable search and seizure.
Mendoza anchors argument on privacy of communication, not search.
Dept. of Tourism: has photos of all hotels/motels
ZONA (?) / saturation drives.
Rule 126, Sec. 1 vs. Sec. 13.
Why SC wrong? SC said to prove zoning. But SolGen already admitted there was.
2-pronged test:
1. Subjective expectation of privacy
2. Objective expectation
SC attached right to privacy to defect of technology (e.g. possibility of a party line).
Agree or disagree? How about Imbestigador?
THE LAW ONLY CONSIDERS VOICE. IT DOES NOT COVER PHOTOS OR VIDEOS.
In expose films, they dont present the voice.
May a search warrant be issued for purposes merely of an administrative investigation?
Construed strictly against State and liberally in favor of individual.
There is no presumption of regularity in attempting to justify it.
Defines PROBABLE CAUSE for purposes of the search.
In US cases of search, decisions/conclusions are FACT-BASED. This case is fact-based.
Know the enumeration of exceptions in this case. What is not present: automobile search.
Here, there is TIME sufficient to determine probable cause for purposes of warrant issuance.
CRUX OF THIS CASE: Why not a valid warrantless search? Aling Rosa WAS NOT SUSPICIOUS-LOOKING. Did not give rise to reason to conduct a search.
What is the standard here? There is no intention by Aling Rosa to relinquish the right. Merely respected police officers.
Stop and frisk IS NOT ACTUALLY AN EXCEPTION. It is not a warrantless search. No probable cause is required, only SUSPICION, BASED ON EXPERIENCE OF POLICE OFFICER. It is in the context of crime prevention.
If there is probable cause, it can already justify a warrantless search.
Should "Terry" doctrine apply in this case? No. Context/purpose: for the safety of the officer. (Panganiban 'misread' the case) Officer did not insert his hands into the pocket.
"Terry" doctrine: officer does an investigation arising from suspicion (short of probable cause). The stop is a seizure, but it is only to the extent of the investigation. Pat down is only to the extent to see if there are any weapons. Stop and frisk is related to SAFETY.
Wrong application in this case: weapon cannot be contained in the wallet. No threat to the life of the officer. Doesn't justify the opening of wallet.
SC doctrine: suspicion resulting into warrantless search.
General rule: any court with territorial jurisdiction may issue the warrant. (because there may be no case filed yet)
Exceptions:
Where place of commission of crime is not known: any court with territorial jurisdiction of the place indicated in the warrant.
Even if place of commission of crime is known: any place within the judicial region where crime was committed, for compelling reasons.
Exception to exception: where criminal action has already been filed, only in the court where such action is pending.
Range of enforceability
Nature of a search warrant: writ of discovery. It is only a PROCESS. Hence, it is not yet necessary that FULL JURISDICTION be had over the crimin