courage and the soul in plato-phd glassgow

8/12/2019 Courage and the Soul in Plato-PhD Glassgow

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ourage and the Soul in PlatoelenMargaret Clare Mawby 0002542)

Submittedfor the degree:PhDhilosophy Department,Arts Faculty, Glasgow Universityanuary2006

HelenMawby


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Abstract

In the Introduction I briefly lay out thehistory of the valuetermsthat I will beconsidering n my thesisandconsider hephilosophical relevanceof the developmentofsuchvalues n the 5t century.The infiltration of modern deasof morality into whatwasconsideredo be goodto the Greekshasa great nfluenceon the literatureand philosophyof this period.Platoprioritises thesequiet moral virtues,but alsotries to hangon to someof whathadcomebefore,andthus facesdifficulties with his moral theory. I will showthat couragepresentsPlatowith anacutedifficulty whenattemptingto developaconsistentethicaltheory.

In Chapter 2I look at the Protagoras where the main issuesabout courage that Plato willcontinue to discuss throughout his life are introduced. The questions of the extent towhich the virtues can be taught and the unity of the virtues are introduced early on. Whatfollows is an attempt to explain and justify the Socratic idea that the virtues are co-dependentand that they all in some way boil down to knowledge. In Chapter 3 on theLaches I will show that the discussion focuses more particularly on the virtue of courageand is mostly a more sophisticated attempt to understand courage than the one presentedin the Protagoras. The early dialogues are chiefly concerned with the Socratic idea thatvirtue is knowledge and my discussion in those chapters considers how well this theoryworks when related to courage. The role of fear in a definition of courage is not explicitlyconsidered in these early works but it is clearly a fundamental part of any explanation ofcourage. The position Plato takes on fear in the early dialogues is not altered in anysignificant way until we get to the Laws -and even then not substantially enough - and sothe inherent problems in this approach are continued into the middle period.

In the following threechapters 4-6) 1examine he position taken n the Republic indetail,which I take to be more representative f the Platonicratherthan Socraticposition.Plato spsychologicalmodel - which includesdirect influencefrom the lower soul- is a


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more reasonable interpretation of the internal workings of the agent than the simplermodel in the early dialogues of the only direct motivator being beliefs or knowledge. Thismodel supports the definitions given of the virtues in the Republic and thus Plato s ethicaltheory is presented more clearly than perhaps anywhere else in his corpus. The sameproblems face Plato in explaining courage though, in spite of his meticulous thesis, hestill must explain how fear operates within his definition and I look at this in detail inChapter 6 on the emotions.

The chapter on the Laws considers the idea that some of the apparent differences betweenthe Republic and the Laws are due to Plato s growing realisation that courage will not beassimilated into a unified ethical theory of the type that he wishes to propose. Plato takesthe dramatic step of referring to the acts of mercenary soldiers as courageous and thus theissue of whether courage should always be considered a virtue arises. I consider whatChristopher Bobonich has called the Dependency Thesis as an attempt to understand therelationship between these two apparently different types of courage. At the end of theLaws Plato seemsmore unsure about the position he should take on the unity of thevirtues and how to explain the virtue of courage. As I will show over the next sixchapters, courage presents a challenge that Plato is never quite able to meet, but the waysin which he fails to incorporate it into his ethical position provides illuminatingdiscussion on the troubling quality of courage.


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I would like to thank my supervisor Richard Stalley for his continual support andinsightful commentary and the Arts and Humanities Research Board for the generousfinancial contribution. Many thanks as well to my wonderful husband Jim.


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Translations

Unlessotherwisenoted,the following translationsof Plato s dialogueshave beenusedthroughout

Apology,trans.G.M.A. Grube, Plato: Complete Works,Hackett PublishingCompany,Indiana,1997.Crito, trans.G.M.A. Grube, Plato: CompleteWorks,HackettPublishing Company,Indiana,1997.Euthydemus, trans. Robin Waterfield, Early Socratic Dialogues, Plato, Penguin,Harmondsworth, 1987.Gorgias,trans.Robin Waterfield, Oxford University Press,Oxford, 1994.Laches, trans. lain Lane, Early Socratic Dialogues, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1987.The Laws, trans. Trevor J. Sounders, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1970.Meno, trans. W.K. C. Guthrie, Protagoras and Meno, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1956.Phaedo, trans. G. M. A. Grube, Plato: Complete Works, Hackett Publishing Company,Indiana, 1997.Phaedrus, trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff, Plato: Complete Works,Hackett Publishing Company, Indiana, 1997.Protagoras, trans. Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell, Plato: Complete Works, HackettPublishing Company, Indiana, 1997.Republic, trans. Desmond Lee, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1955.

11havealtered he translationsslightly when necessary.


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Contents

Chapter1: Introduction

Chapter2: Courageand Hedonismin the Protagoras 7

Chapter3: Courage n the Laches 39

Chapter 4: Republic I The Soul 66Chapter5: Republic 2 Virtue 104

Chapter 6: Republic 3 The Emotions 127

Chapter 7: Courage in the Laws 145

Chapter 8: Conclusion 198

Bibliography 204


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Chapter 1: Introduction

In his influential book Merit and Responsibility A. W. H Adkins puts forward the thesisthat the important value terms in Greek times - those such as agathos, arete, kalos, kakosand aischron - were heavily influenced by the needs of the society. When the mostimportant quality in a man was that he could protect his dependents from the threat ofdeath or servitude through warfare the agathoi were those who were able to do this. Thusthe people depicted in Homer who are given the highest honours are the strong andpowerful who are able to protect the weaker who depend on them. Adkins calls thevirtues that were commended in heroes such as Achilles and Agamemnon competitivevirtues. Adkins also says:

Being the most powerful words of commendation used of a man, they [courage,successful leadership etc. imply the possessionby anyone to whom they are appliedof all the qualities most highly valued at any time by Greek society.

In the 5`hcentury the meaning behind such value terms becomes much more muddled,perhaps due to the need for internal civic concord which relies more on justice andtemperance than courage and skill in warfare. We start to seevalue terms occasionallybeing connected with characteristics that were not previously recognised as important.What Adkins calls the quiet virtues - as opposed to the competitive virtues of theHomeric world - start to seep into the works of dramatists such as Euripides, Sophoclesand Aeschylus. For example in the Suppliants by Aeschylus we find him praising justice:

Zeus...watchesover these hings, andholdsthe balance,assigning o the kakoi theirunjustdeeds, o the law abiding, their righteousdeeds.And in the Ajax by Sophocles we find him commending temperance:

A. W. H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, p. 31.2Aeschylus,Suppliants,402, from Adkins own translation n Merit andResponsibility.


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Socrates elieved hat he hadprovideda valuableservice o the menof Athens. What issurprisingaboutSocrates'speechn theApology is that he frequently links thevalueofjustice with arete.He does his both implicitly - by his claimsthat the only thing thatmatters s thathehas behavedustly - andexplicitly:

Do you think I would have survived all theseyears if I were engaged in public affairsand, acting as a good man must, came to the help of justice and considered this themost important thing. 5

By claiming that a good man,an agathos,would come o the help of justice Plato smaking an explicit claim about what kind of person a good man is. To attempt to clarifythe meaning of a term such as agathos at that point in the 5 hcentury was a particularlychallenging exercise, but one which Plato took on:

Plato's chief problem in ethics is the problem which has existed in Greek values fromHomer onwards: namely, that of affixing dikaiosune, and the quiet virtues generally,to the group of values based on arete so firmly as to make future severanceimpossible.6

As well as establishing Plato's position on the importance of the quiet virtues, theApology establishes Socrates as the heroic figure of Plato's work. By having respect forthe old values - such as courage, and the new ones - such as ustice, Socrateshimselfrepresentsthe ethical position Plato will take in most of his works. When Socratesputsthe question he expects from others -'are you not ashamed,Socrates, to have followedthe kind of occupation that has led to your being now in danger of death? 7 - he repliesby comparing his behaviour with that of Achilles:

According to your view, all theheroeswho died at Troy were inferior people,especially he son of Thetis who was socontemptuousof dangercomparedwithdisgrace...he despiseddeathanddangerandwas much more afraid to live a cowardwho did not avengehis friends. Let medie at once, hesaid, when onceI have

' Apology32e3-5.6Adkins p. 259-260.7Apology28b3-4.

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muddled conception of virtue. However, including courage in the transition to a generallymore quiet conception of virtue creates considerable problems for Plato; this is becauseour common conception of courage can be exhibited by people who are certainly not just,moderate and wise. We will see in the following chapters that Plato's attempt to includecourage in a unified theory of virtue in the Protagoras, Laches, Republic and the Lawspresentshim with considerable difficulty. At each stageof his career courage challengesthe consistency of Plato's view; by the time of the Laws, Plato appearsto be aware of thedifficulty courage presents to his thesis and quite radically alters his interpretation of thevirtue - in that it is no longer necessarily a virtue at all.

On a different note, there is an important difficulty when trying to analyse the views ofPlato. His choice to use the dialogue form, in which he never appears,means that in theearly dialogues at least, his own ideas are never explicit. Due to this difficulty there hasbeen much discussion of whether the dialogues can be considered to reflect the views ofthe historical Socratesor those of Plato. There are two main schools of thoughtconcerning his issue- the Unitarian view and he developmental.The Unitariantradition, supportedby Shorey,Friedlanderandto someextentKahn, subscribeso theview thatall Plato's dialogueswerewritten from a singleunchangingpoint of view. Incontrast,developmentalists,suchasGuthrieandVlastos,believethat Platostarted romtheposition of thehistorical Socratesand graduallydevelopedhis own views, whichgrew and changed hroughouthis life.

Themost commondevelopmentalistposition is thatwhich supports he ideathat the`early' dialoguesareSocraticandthe `middle' and `late' dialoguesarePlatonic. ThusGuthriesaidtheearly dialoguesare wherePlato `is imaginatively recalling, in form andsubstanceheconversationsof his masterwithout as yet addingto themanydistinctivedoctrineof his own 0.1 reject the Unitarianview and someversionsof thedevelopmentalview of the Socraticor Platoniccontentof thedialogues.The main10Guthrie,A History of GreekPhilosophy,Vol. IV, p.345.

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Chapter 2: Courage and Hedonism in the Protazoras

Contents1.Introduction (p. 8)2. Courage(p.9)3. Hedonism (p. 15)

i. The Protagoras and the Gorgiasii. Gosling andTayloriii. Rudebuschiv. An alternative interpretation

4. The CommensurableScale (p.25)i. Canwe havecommensurability suchthat we can udge all options opento uson the amount of pleasurecontained?ii. Is commensurability necessaryor Socrates denial of akrasia?

5. Courage(p.31)6. The Development from the Protagoras and the Laches to the Republic (p. 35)7. Conclusion (p. 38)

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1. Introduction

The Protagoras is the first of the early dialogues o put couragecentrestage . In thisdialogue Socratesargues or the thesis hat virtue is in some way reducible toknowledge.It is in this dialogue that theproblems associatedwith applying such atheory to couragestart to take shape.We will see hat Plato hasgreat difficulty inexplaining courage n the light of the position he takeson hedonism in theProtagoras, the role of which in this dialogue is to bolster his anti-akractic,intellectualist stance.Given that the thesis hat virtue is knowledge is subsequentlybuilt on hedonism it is clear from the outset hat courage s going to beproblematic.We may beable to accept hat being a goodperson

s the bestkind of life, but thatdoesn t mean we can also accept hat it will be the most pleasurable,or that it shouldbe. Wouldn t a man who took pleasure n the slaughter of battle bea monster ratherthan an example of virtuous behaviour?Ultimately, Socrates support of hedonismcreatesmore problems for a coherentdefinition of courage han it solves. I will alsoargue n this chapter hat the Protagoras, like theLaches,provides Plato with a forumto examinethe ideasof his teacherandother ideasof the time before he took the stepof writing a more assertivedialogue like the Republic.

11will arguethis in this and the following chapter.


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2. Courage

The dialogue beginswith the question whether virtue canbetaught. Protagorasbelieves hat it canbeanddefends his position in his great speech2. he point of thisis that eventhough there are no recognised eachersof virtue, the Athenians makeevery effort to teachvirtue to the young.The education hey receive (especially themusical elements) s designed or this purposeand so arethe laws of the city. Butinsteadof replying directly to theseclaims Socrates aises he question of the unity ofvirtue. The discussionof unity is perhaps ntended o illuminate the questionof theteachability of virtue and in the endplaceboth Socratesand Protagoras n difficultphilosophical positions.Their contrastedpositions in the final pages that Socratesthinks virtue is knowledge but cannotbetaughtandProtagoras hinks virtue is notknowledge but canbe taught - confirms that something s awry in the discussion- ortheir initial statementsconcerningteachability.

After the introductory discussionandProtagoras irst speech he conversation urns tothe question of the unity of the virtues.Protagorashasspoken n his speechaboutthevirtues as if they were `collectively onething 3. In responseo this Socratesasks:

Is virtue a single thing, with justice andtemperanceand piety its parts,or arethethings I have ust listed all names or a single entity?4

To this questionProtagoras espondsby claiming that `virtue is a single entity, andthethings you areasking aboutare its parts 5.Socrateswants to know whether Protagorasthinks the individual virtues are `heterogeneousn the way that eyes,earsand noseareparts of a face,or arethey homogeneousike the partsof a lump of gold? 6 Protagorasresponds hat they are like the parts of a face,whereasSocrates aim in the Protagorasis to try andarguethat they havea strongerconnection,perhaps hat they are moreakin to parts of a lump of gold - all reducibleto knowledge. Protagoras ejectsboth2Protagoras 320d1-328d3.3Prot. 329c5.4Prot. 329d1-3.sProt. 329d4-5.6Hobbs, Angela, Plato and the Hero, p. 113.


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the stronger and the weaker versions of the unity of the virtues. The stronger thesis isthat the virtues alI amount to the same thing; that `bravery', `wisdom', `temperance',`justice', and `piety' are all words that refer to the same thing. The weaker thesis isthat the virtues are necessary and sufficient conditions of each other, in that people arebrave if and only if they are wise, temperate, just and pious. As Terry Pennerexplained, the former thesis is called the stronger because it entails but is not entailedby the latter - the weaker thesis7. Protagoras makes it clear that he rejects both thesesof the unity of the virtues when he claims that the virtues are not even necessarilyfound together: `many are courageous but unjust, and many again are just but notwise'8.

To challenge he claims madeby Protagorashat the virtues aredistinct and separableSocratesgives threearguments.Eachof the arguments s intended o show that two ofthe virtues that Protagorasbelievescanbe found separatelyare in fact intrinsicallylinked. The first argument9 s designed o showthat ustice and piety arethe samekind of thing, but it is not successful.Protagorassaysconcerningthe virtues that `theyare not like each other in power or function or in anyother way . Protagorasbelievesthat the virtues can be found separately, herefore hat we cannot assume hat if aperson s ust then they will bepious.Socrateshen askshim:

Isn't piety the sort of thing that is ust, and isn't justice the sort of thing that ispious?Or is it the sort of thing that is not pious?Is piety the sort of thing to benotjust, and therefore unjust, and ustice impious?1

Socrates s asking Protagoras o saywhetherhe thinks that piety is either ust orunjust, but this is not an appropriatequestiongiven what Protagorashassaid.Protagoras s clearly committed to the ideathat it is not the casethatpiety is ust,whereasSocrateshasaskedhim whetherpiety is ust or unjust. Socrates s guilty of aswitching the scopeof the negation such hat Protagorasmust respondby either7Penner,T., 'The Unity of Virtue', Plato 2: Ethics, Politics, Religion and the Soul.8Prot. 329e5-6.9Prot. 331a7-332a3.10Prot. 330a6-7.

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agreeing hat piety is ust or not. Protagoras ightly doesnot agree o respond oSocrates'conclusionsand it is clear that ashe hasn't agreedwith these nitial pointsthere is no point in Socrates' aking the argument urther. Socratesappears o maskthe failure of this argument with insinceremagnanimity when he says hat he hasirritated Protagorasand that they shouldmoveon for that reason.

The secondargument12s designed o showthe connectionbetween emperanceandwisdom. Socrateshasmore successwith this attempteventhought he perhapsshouldnot havehad.After establishing the ideathat each hing canonly haveone opposite,Socratesgoes on to arguethat folly is the oppositeof both temperanceand wisdom,andtherefore temperanceand wisdom mustbe the same hing. Protagorascould haveargued hat folly is not the oppositeof temperanceeventhough it may be the oppositeof wisdom, but instead he grudgingly agreeswith the conclusion eventhough he is nothappyabout it.

The third argument13 etsout to establisha connectionbetween ustice and wisdombut Socratesand Protagorasareat loggerheads rom the start.Protagorasclaims thatonecanshow good udgement whilst acting unjustly -a particularly un-Socraticclaim- but that this is only the case f the end result is good.Protagoras s then committedto the ideathat we only show good udgement when we do something if the endresultis good14.This idearules out the possibility that someonecould act unjustly andcleverly and accordingto all possible nformation but be foiled at the last momentbyan act of god that no one could possibly have foretold. In this situation it seemssomewhatunfair to saythat they did not show good udgement if without the act ofgod everything would haveturned out asthey intendedand to their advantage.Protagoras s thus committed to the claim that thosewho may besaidto think wiselywhile behavingunjustly must actually bring about somegood consequences.What is

Prot. 331a8-bl. This is the first argumentSocratesgives to challengeProtagoras' claim that thevirtues aredistinct.12Prot. 332a3-333b3.1' Prot. 333d3-c4.14Prot. 333d8-12.

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not clear is who the consequences houldbe good for. Onewould guess hatProtagorashinks of them asbeing advantageouso the agent,but Socrates'questionof whetherthese`goods hings constitutewhat is advantageouso people? 5 muddiesthe watersand enablesProtagoras o get out of the argumentby going on to adigressionabout the relativity of good.We might think that a distinction needs o bemadebetweenmoral and non-moral goodor betweenwhat is good for the agentandwhat is good for the community. It is possible hat Protagorashas he latter in mind,but of courseSocratesneeds o avoid sucha distinction.

Socrates'choice of arguments n responseo Protagoras'belief that the virtues arenotunified is interesting. Protagoras' specific claim is that 'many arecourageousbutunjust, and many againare ust but not wise' 16.Socrateshasattempted o respond othe claim that many are ust but not wise with his third argument,but hasnotaddressedhe ideathat people canbecourageousbut unjust. As I haveargued nChapter 1,couragepresentsa particularly acuteproblem for Plato because,morethanany of the other cardinal virtues, it doesnot easily fit into the conception of beingwholly good.This may be why Plato doesnot include courage n thesearguments;hemight recognise hat couragepresentsa difficulty for the unity of the virtues andthushave Protagorasmore explicitly single out couragesothat Socrateshasno choicebutto confront this problem. After an interlude andthe discussionabout poetry Protagorasmakeshis position clear:

What I am sayingto you, Socrates, s that all theseare parts of virtue, andthatwhile four of them are reasonablycloseto eachother, courage s completelydifferent from all the rest.The proof that what I am saying is true is that you willfind many peoplewho areextremely unjust, impious, intemperate,and ignorant,and yet exceptionally courageous'?

Socratesresponds o this bold claim with the following argument:(i. ) `courageousmen areconfident'. 18

15Prot. 333d8-el.16Prot. 329e5-6.17Prot. 349d4-8.18Prot. 349e2.

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3. Hedonism

After Protagoras speechexplaining why herejects he argumentset out to prove thatwisdom is couragePlato suddenly ntroducesa new theme.SocratesasksProtagoraswhether `somepeople live well and others ive badly?26 To this questionProtagorasreplies in the affirmative. However whenasked f he is willing to connectpleasureandthe good in such a way that `to live pleasantly s good,andunpleasantly,bad Z7,hedeclines.The hedonistic view which is apparently ntroducedat this point hasperhapsbeen he most discussedof the themes n this dialogue,and the most challenging partof the dialogue to explain. Plato appearso bearguing for an ideathat is inconsistentwith the restof his work, which raises he questionto what extent hegenuinelysupported he argumentspresented n this dialogue. I will arguethat the version ofhedonism hat Socratesargues or in theProtagoras doespresentuswith a seriousinterpretative problem as long as we wish to believe that the (early) dialoguesaregenuine accountsof either Socrates or Plato s views. The views expressedn theProtagoras do conflict with thoseexpressedn the Gorgias and other `early works. Iwill show that two attempts o interpret these wo works consistently- Gosling andTaylor, and Rudebusch- ultimately fail. I do not think it is likely that the answer othis inconsistency s that either Socratesor Plato simply changedhis mind. Althoughthat is a possible explanation, it is not the most likely as it would meanthat eitherSocratesor Plato were committed to a theory for a short spaceof time that thedialogues hat camebefore andafter were implicitly critical of. Sucha changeof heartwould alsohaveto have involved extensiverevision of the early Platonic position. Ifit is then the case hat Plato is advocatinga theory that not only doesnot appear n theother dialoguesbut also is actually explicitly arguedagainst n other works then otherkinds of explanationsmust be sought.If Plato could not consistently believe in all thetheories that Socratesargues or in the early dialogues(without regularly, and ratherdrastically, changinghis mind), then thesedialogueswere most probably notfunctioning asrecords of Socrates actualbeliefs. If this is the case hen in what otherway could they have been functioning?

26Prot. 351b1-2.27Prot. 351c1.

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i. The Protagorasandthe GorgiasThe main problem with the hedonism n the Protagoras is that Socrates'position inotherdialoguesdoesnot seem o supportsuch a view. This is particularly the case nthe Gorgias, and so interpreting these wo dialogues n sucha way that they arenotopenly contradictory has beenrather a challenge.As Rudebuschsays n his bookSocrates,Pleasure,and Valuea straightforward `readingcausesan interpretivedilemma for thosewho seek o ascribea coherentethical theory to Socrates hatunderlieshis argumentation n both dialogues'28. In the Gorgias Socratesarguesexplicitly againstCallicles that pleasureandgoodnessaretwo different things. Nearthe beginning of the discussionSocratesandCallicles say:

[Socrates]:All right, let's have it on recordthat Callicles of Acharnaeclaims that`pleasant'and `good' are identical... [Callicles]: And what shall we say aboutSocratesof Alopece? Doesheor does he not agreewith Callicles? [Socrates]:Hedoesnot. 9

Whereas here is much support for the view that Socrates s advocating somekind ofidentification of `pleasure' and `goodness' n the Protagoras. For example:

What's this, Protagoras?Surely you don't follow the common opinion that somepleasuresarebadand somepains good?I mean o say, in so far asthey arepleasant,are they not also good, leaving asideany consequencehat they mayentail?And in the sameway pains, in so far asthey arepainful, are bad.30

ii. Gosling andTaylorGosling andTaylor3' offer an explanationof the apparent nconsistencybetween heGorgias andthe Protagoras by drawing a distinction between wo types of hedonism- onethey think is argued against n the Gorgias, the other supported n theProtagoras. Their position is that in the Gorgias SocratesarguesagainstCallicles'version of hedonismthat states hat any pleasure s the good, whether that bethepleasureof immediategratification or the pleasureof long-desiredand worked forZ Rudebusch,George, Socrates,Pleasure, and Value, p.19.29Gorgias 495d5-el.30Prot. 351c3-8.

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ambitions. In the Protagoras they think that Socratess arguing for an enlightenedhedonism hat is only committed to the ideathat goodnesscanbe found in long-termpleasure.Gosling andTaylor work through the arguments n the Gorgias and showthat the hedonismof the Protagoras is not a target,and that what Socrates s doing inhis discussionwith Callicles is demonstrating hat the good is not the satisfactionofall and anydesires hat come along32.Thus they concludethat:

It appears hat the alleged inconsistencybetween he Protagorasand the Gorgias isillusory. What is maintained in the former is not what is attacked n the latter, noris Socrates'position on pleasure n the former inconsistentwith the stancewhichheadopts n the latter33

The argumentprovided by Gosling andTaylor allows us to interpret these wodialogues n a way that doesnot causeconflict. By arguing that Socrates'argumentsagainstCallicles show only that onemustdistinguish goodness rom immediatepleasantnesshe hedonism in the Protagoras that allows for the Socratic rechneofmeasurements left untouched.

The account given by Gosling and Taylor does therefore avoid certain difficulties,however it encounters a different one by drawing a distinction between long-term andshort-term pleasures. Rudebusch argues that the distinction that Gosling and Taylordraw between long-term and short-term pleasures creates the loss of thecommensurability that is so important for the identification of virtue with knowledgeand the unity of the virtues - and there is much evidence for such ideas beinggenuinely Socratic. The reason why the commensurability is so important is explainedwell by Terence Irwin. Irwin describes Socrates' position in the Protagoras asepistemological hedonism; we need to be able to assess which options will provide themost overall pleasure in order to pursue what is pleasurable (or good)34. He arguesthat hedonism in the Protagoras is essential for Socrates if he is to defend the truth of

31Gosling Taylor,TheGreeksonPleasure.32For more detail of this point seeGosling Taylor, The Greekson Pleasure.33Gosling Taylor, The Greeks on Pleasure, p.76-77.34Irwin, T., Plato's Moral Theory, chapter IV.

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the unity of the virtues (UV) andthe ideathat knowledge is sufficient for virtue(KSV). He says hat:

If the many were not hedonists, heir initial objection to KSV would not be refuted.For they suggestedhat some of man s desires- for food, sex, revenge,and soon -might move him apart from his beliefs aboutthe ood; and only HP showed hatthey could not recognise such incontinent desires5

His claim is that without a general and inclusive hedonism,which provides acommensurablescale on which to compareour options, knowledge could not bethedetermining factor of virtue. Knowledge after all needsa subjectarea o work on, andwith the acceptanceof the ideathat what contains he most pleasure s the good, itwould just need o assesswhich optionscontain the most pleasure.And the fact thatvalue is to beunderstood n termsof pleasuremakes he connectionbetweenknowledgeand action so acceptable,as:

Then if the pleasant s the good,no onewho either knows or believesthat there isanotherpossiblecourseof action,betterthan the one he is following, will evercontinue on his presentcoursewhenhemight choose he better.36

And if knowledge is sufficient for virtue then it is sufficient for all virtue andthevirtues then becomeone; they are all essentiallyknowledge of what the right thing todo is. As Irwin says:

Socratesdefendshedonismonly by showing that the many implicitly accept t intheir choices.But to defendthe truth of KSV andUV, hedonismmust be true, andnot only the many s belief.37

Irwin s argument hat Socratesrelies on this belief in hedonismin order to argueforother thesesseemsplausible. Therefore if the point of including hedonism is to givesupport for theseother more important theses, his role that hedonism is playing mustnot beunderminedby an attempt to interpret the Protagoras and Gorgias consistently.

35ibid, p.106. HP stands or the Hedonism Principle.36Prot. 358b10-c4.

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However, the implausibility of Gosling andTaylor s interpretation is not simply that itwould negate he value of the hedonism or Socrates,but that there is textual evidencethat he did not support sucha position. To draw anydistinction between differenttypesof pleasures,whether it is between ong-term and short-term pleasures,or highor low pleasures, mplies that not all pleasurescanbequantified on the samecommensurablescale.And asSocratessays n theProtagoras:

For if someonewere to say: `But Socrates,he immediate pleasure s very muchdifferent from the pleasantandthe painful at a later time, I would reply, `They arenot different in any other way than by pleasureandpain, for there is no other waythat they could differ. Weighing is a good analogy; you put the pleasures ogetherand the pains together,both the near andthe remote, on the balancescale, andthensaywhich of the two is more. For if you weigh pleasant hings againstpleasant, hegreater and the more must alwaysbetaken. 8

This statementmakes t clear that Socratess not advocatingan enlightenedversion ofhedonism hat prioritises long-term pleasuresover short-term ones,but that the factthat somepleasuresare in the future should mean hat they often carry lessweightthan they should in the decision-making process. t is clear then that Gosling andTaylor s distinction betweendifferent kinds of pleasuresmistakenly interprets thethesisarguedfor, and invalidates the relevanceof hedonism in the Protagoras.

iii. RudebuschRudebusch s heory is subtly, but importantly, different from Gosling andTaylor. Histheory also relies on a distinction between ypesof pleasures,hat of real andapparent pleasures.He also believes hat his distinction reconcilesthe Protagoras andthe Gorgias becauseSocrates s only attackingapparent pleasures n the Gorgias,whereashe is advocating a scale of real pleasures n the Protagoras. This distinctiondoesnot facethe same problems asthe Gosling andTaylor distinction as it isplausible that Socrates s discussingwhat is genuinely pleasurable n the Protagoras,andthat his attack on Polus and Callicles position in the Gorgias is on mistakingwhat is only apparentlypleasurable or what is genuinely pleasurable.Socrates

37Irwin, T., Plato s Moral Theory, p. 108.38Prof. 356a6-b6.

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All right, let s have it on recordthat Callicles of Acharnaeclaims that `pleasantand `good are identical, but that knowledgeand couragearedifferent from eachotherand from goodness42

Socrates,on the other hand,claims not to bea supporter of sucha view. It is clearatthis point that Callicles position is not that the good andapparent pleasurearethesame,but that the good is the sameas genuinepleasure.When SocratesparaphrasesCallicles position it is the identification of goodnesswith actual pleasure hat hemeans,andthe argumentthat follows shows hat Socrates s arguing against hisposition and not one that assimilatesgoodnesso apparentpleasure.The argumentfalls into two parts.In the first part SocratesgainsCallicles acquiescenceo the ideathat as good and evil fortune are opposed o oneanother hey aretherefore mutuallyexclusive. He provides examples suchasif you hadophthalmia in both eyes,youreyescannot at the same ime be healthy- in other words, what is good for the eyesand what is badare mutually exclusive. He concludes his part with the statement hat:

Wheneverwe find a person osing andkeepingthings at the same ime, then,we llknow that we re not facedwith the goodandthe bad.Do you agreewith me aboutthis?a3

This is a statement to which Callicles agrees. In the second part of the argumentSocrates begins by saying that thirst and hunger are painful and the satisfaction ofsuch desire is pleasurable. So Callicles has admitted that by drinking and satisfyingyour thirst you are both in pain (because you are thirsty) and enjoying the pleasure ofdrinking by satisfying your thirst. Socrates then reminds Callicles that he earlieragreed to the claim that what is good and evil cannot be experienced at the same time,and therefore concludes that pleasure is not the same as the good, and pain is not thesame as the bad. I am not concerned with the possible flaws in this argument butsimply that Socrates attack is not levelled at apparent pleasure. The argumentcertainly could be used to show that apparent pleasures and pains are not the same asgood and evil respectively, but it can - and appears to be - levelled at genuinepleasures. Rudebusch s argument is that Socrates arguments in the Gorgias are notattacking the genuine pleasures that are used so effectively in the Protagoras, but as42Gorgias495d5-8.41Gorgias 496c1-4.

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this argument with Callicles does arget the identification of pleasurewith the goodregardlessof the distinction betweengenuineand apparentpleasureshis argumentdoesnot hold water.

The strugglewith the Protagoras andthe Gorgias is not simply a matterof finding areadingof them both so that they do not contradict one another,but a matterof findinga readingof the early dialoguesthat includesboth the Protagoras and the Gorgias.Otherwise the ongoing efforts to align the argumentsof the Protagoras with thoseofthe Gorgias would be only an academicexercise,and would not necessarily ell usanything interestingabout the early work of Plato. Rudebusch s nteresting readingofthe Protagoras accepts hat Socrateswasactually arguing for a version of hedonism.What all casesof hedonism have in common is describedvery well by J.C.B. Goslingin his book, `Pleasureand Desire: the case or hedonismreviewed . He says hat whatis common to all casesof hedonism s that:

Pleasure s set up asthe criterion and/ormotive of (good) action, principles or wayof life. There are many other ethical views which make out, for instance, hat thelife of virtue must at leastbepleasant,or contain somepleasures,which, howeveradmirableor interesting they may be in themselves, ail to qualify ashedonisticbecausehey explicitly, and not just by unacknowledged mplication, introducesomeother criterion than pleasure or deciding between he good or the bad life oraction 44

For Socrates heory to be a version of hedonism t must becommitted to the ideathatwhat is good can only be defined as suchby consideringthe amount of pleasure tproducesor contains.There canbeno other criterion included in the evaluation thatdetermines he ethical value of an action, principle or way of life.

The difficulty in attributing a consistenthedonism o the Socratesof the earlydialoguescanbe seen n the Crito. There Socratessays:

44Gosling, J.C.B., Pleasureand Desire: the case or hedonismreviewed, pp.25-26.

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Sinceour argument leads o this, the only valid consideration,as we were sayingjust now, is whether we shouldbeacting ustly in giving money and gratitudetothosewho will leadme out of here,and ourselveshelping with the escape,orwhether in truth we shall act unjustly in doing all this 45

Socratess sayingthat the only relevant question s whether running away would bethe right thing to do. The things that Crito wisheshim to consider- his family, friendsandhimself- hedoesnot believe should betaken into account.Strictly speaking hiswould beconsistent with hedonism but only if Socratesbelieved that it is alwayspleasanteror lesspainful to do what is ust than to behaveunjustly and in particularthat in his casebeing put to deathwas pleasanteror lesspainful than running away.On the faceof it theseclaims look obviously false and Socratesdoesnothing tosuggest hat heaccepts hem. So if the Socratesof the early dialogues is supposedobea hedonistwe haveto accept hat in the Crito he is concealinghis true views.However, the lack of support for a hedonistic Socrates n the Crito coupled with apossiblemisunderstandingof the argumentsof the Crito will not suffice to showthattheProtagoras is at odds with this dialogue. Eventhough the hedonistic theory is notexplicit in the Crito it doesnot mean hat Socrateswas not at this point an advocateofsucha theory. Also, Socratesmay havebelievedthat a life in exile without thecompany of his friends away from the city he loved- andthe knowledge that hedidnot live by his beliefs - would have been he morepainful option. The reason hat theCrito contradictsthe Protagoras is the primacy of goodness n the above statement.He says hat `the only questionwhich remains o beconsidered s, whether we shall dorightly , if that is the only questionwhich should beconsidered hen even if the rightoption is the most pleasurableSocratescannotbea supporterof hedonism hereasheintroduces`someother criterion than pleasure or deciding 46what he should do, thatof rightness tself.

iv. An alternative interpretationIf there is no successfulargumentthat canexplain the hedonismof the Protagoras insucha way that produces consistencywith the Gorgias and the other early dialogues

45Crilo 48c7-d3.46See ootnote 16.

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thena different kind of explanationmustbe sought.Socrates s arguing for a theory hedoesnot support elsewhere,and in the Gorgias openly criticises. Oncewe accept hisfact the kinds of explanations we must turn to in order to understand he Protagorasbecomeclearer.There are two routesopento usat this point. The first may betheroute of the `adhominem argument.This theory claims that Socrates s concernedonly with the personhe is arguing with, andtherefore tailors his arguments o suit thesituation.This implies that the positions Socrates akes n the early dialoguesare notnecessarilyhis own (they could beof course n situationswhere it is the argument hathis interlocutor needs o hear).The second s the one I havealreadyproposedabove-that the most plausible explanation of the Protagoras problem is that it doesnotrepresentSocrates own view, but that it allows Plato to challengeand considercertain theories.The problems encountered n the Protagoras were obviouslyconsiderableenoughfor Plato to reject hedonismasa basis for action, and it is theseproblemsthat I will consider in the sectionon courage.The reason think the secondtheory is preferable s that the `adhominem idea is an implausible interpretation ofthe arguments n some of the early dialoguesgiven the amount of crosstextualsupport from other writers47. t cannot,of course,apply to a middle period dialoguesuchasthe Republic - for the Republic seems o be far too genuinely arguedfor anddiscussed o simply bean ad hominem argument or the good of Glaucon andAdeimantus.The second heory calls on evidence n the Republic which showshowthe ideasandproblems of the early dialogues directly impact of the ideasof themiddle period.

47Notably Aristotle and Xenophon.

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4. The Commensurable Scale

It may seem hat the hedonism Socratesproposes n the Protagoras relies on a scaleofcommensurablevalues, in other words, that every action canbe reduced o the amountof pleasure t contains andthat thesepleasurescanbequantified and compared.Thisreliance on a commensurablescale means hat the pleasure nvolved is essentially hesamestuff that exists to a greater or lesserdegree n certain activities. Thecommensurability of values is usedby Socrateso showthat akrasia is not possible-aclaim that has beenchallengedby Michael Stocker- and that when we behave n away that is commonly describedas weaknessof will we are simply in ignoranceofwhat we actually value asbest48.What I will consider n this section arethe followingissues: . Whether we can havecommensurability suchthat we can udge all optionsopento uson the amount of pleasurecontained; i. Whether incommensurability isnecessaryor Socrates'denial of akrasia.

i. Canwe havecommensurability such hat we can ud eg ll options opento us on theamountof pleasurecontained?Much has beenwritten on the claims made n the Protagoras concerning thecommensurablescale of pleasure.Canevery option available to us beassessed ndcomparedby how much pleasureeachcontains?Zeckhauserand Schaefer, n theirarticle `Public policy and normative economictheory' use he following gruesomeexample: `[a] man would not agree o havehis armsand legscut off in exchange orany numberof desserts' 9.This claim is surely true, and a difficult case or a supporterof commensurability.According to the commensurability claim it would be the casethat we could work out how much pleasure here is in each of the dessertson offer,andhow much displeasure here is in having one's legsand arms cut off, andthencould in principle find an amount of dessertshat matched or exceeded n pleasure heamountof displeasure elt at the alternative. One may bepreventedfrom enjoying allthe dessertsby prematuredeathor someother reason,but that doesnot interfere with

48Stocker,Michael, Plural and Conflicting Values.49Zeckhauser Schaefer,`Public policy and normative economic theory', p.52.

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The distinction between he cognitive andthe affective turns on how the relevantobject is taken up. It might be, soto speak,seenor appreciated hrough reason,even if this is a thoroughly evaluativereason.Or it might be felt 5

He says hat the fact that we can value things in different ways explains how akrasiacanbe possible. If the way that we value different options can fragment we canseehow a situation could arise in which we think oneoption is the bestcourseof actionbut are more attracted o the alternative andthereforewe do not act on our judgmentof what is best51.

Soare pleasures he kinds of things that canalwaysbecomparedwith one anotherquantitatively? There are sucha variety of different pleasures o be found, the claimthat all pleasuresare essentiallythe same,ust causedby different objects, isintuitively unappealing.David Wiggins says:

It seems hat in the sphereof the practical we may know for certain that thereexistabsolutelyundecidable questions e.g. caseswherethe situation is so appalling orthe choicesare so gruesome hat nothing could count asthe reasonablepracticalanswer. 2

Unlike the case above where the choice is easy between having one s arms and legschopped off and having many desserts, Wiggins is claiming that there are cases wherethere is no right thing to do. Philippa Foot warns against concluding that there areundecidable cases because of the fact that the choices are ghastly and she is right to doso53.How would we rationally make a decision between two such different things aslosing our sight, and a never being with a loved one again? There do appear to becases where it is not possible, even in principle, to make a decision based on pleasuresand pains. We may indeed be able to actually make a choice if forced, but that doesnot mean that our decision is based on any rational criterion. If all options can beassessed n terms of pleasures and pains, as Socrates contends in the Protagoras, this

soStocker,Michael,Plural andConflicting Values, .216.51I will discussbelow Stocker s reasons or saying that this fragmentation can also occur with acommensurablescaleof values.52Wiggins, David, `Truth, Invention and The Meaning of Life , p. 371.53Foot, Philippa, Moral Dilemmas.

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is a relevant case,and one that Socrates,or a supporterof this theory, doesnot haveareasonableanswer o54

However, we must guardagainstassuming hat commensurability andcomparabilityarethe same hing. I will discuss he difference between hese wo ideas n the nextsection andconsiderwhether commensurability is indeednecessary or Socratesorwhetherhecanget away with using the lessdisagreeableconceptof comparability.

ii. Is commensurability necessaryor Socrates denial of akrasiaSocrates s relying implicitly on two ideas n the Protagoras; that the value of allactions canbe reduced o the amountof pleasure hey contain, andthat all typesofpleasureare commensurable.Much hasbeenmadeof the claim that commensurabilityis necessaryor Socrates argument,andthe argumenthasbeenattackedbecauseofthe difficulty of sucha claim. However, could Socratesargumentwork with the lesscontroversial claim that pleasuresarecomparable atherthan commensurable?

These wo terms- commensurability andcomparability - denotesimilar ideas.Comparability is the claim that we can compare pleasuresand rank them according tohow much we value them, in other words the ideathat we can make senseof the claimthat one pleasure s better than anotherpleasure.Commensurability is a strongerclaimthanthis, as it is the ideathat not only can we compare pleasures,but that they areessentially he samestuff but found in greateror lesseramounts.Therefore onecouldcoherently claim that pleasuresare incommensurablebut comparable.Somepeople,such asJosephRaz hold that drawing this distinction is not a meaningful one55.As T.K. Seungand Daniel Bonevacexplain in their article `Plural Values and IndeterminateRankings :saA hedonist could recognise someundecidable cases,such as(a) if we knew that the pleasuresandpains involved in eachof the available coursesof action to be absolutely equal, or (b) if we could nottell which action would produce more pleasure or pain. A hedonist cannot recognisecaseswhich areundecidablebecause he pleasuresand pains are incommensurable n some way, which is what I amarguing for here.

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For Raz,the ideaof incommensurability entails the ideaof incomparability. Whentwo things are incommensurable there is no common measure or their respective56values),he holds, they cannotbe meaningfully compared.

The ideasupportedby Razthat if valuesare not commensurable hen we are unable ocompare and rank them seemscontrary to experience.Putting aside he argument hatpleasuresare incommensurable, f we considertwo possibleoptions suchastheethical choiceand the pleasurableoption, it seemshat we areable to choosebetweenthem. In this sense hen we can rank them in sucha way that allows us to choosebetween hem.As Griffin explains:

Someudgments of the form A is preferable o B do not rest upon otherjudgments about the quantity of somethingfound in A and the quantity of it foundin B. When, in employing the principle of utility, onetalks about A's yieldinggreater satisfactionthan B, this shouldbe understoodas sayingthat having A is thesatisfaction of a greaterdesirethanhaving B would be. One wants A more than B.But one's desiresare not rankedby quantitiesof satisfaction57.

We may beable to recognise hat A is preferable o B without it being the case hat Acontains more of somespecific quality than B. Kant may believe that `there is nocommonmeasure or the value (dignity) of human beingsand that (price) of materialthings'58,but he also ranks the dignity of human beingsashigher. He is not beinginconsistent here, ust simply recognising he fact that even if two things areincommensurable hat doesn't mean hat we are unableto compare and rank them.

To return to the aboveheading, here is evidence n the Protagoras that Socratesdidindeedsupporta form of commensurability of pleasures,and that he did require astrongersenseof similarity than comparability. The analogieshe useswhen he istrying to persuadehis interlocutor that salvation lies in this art of measurementsuggesta quantitative commensurability that could not bereplaced with the ability torank one's options. Socratessays:ssRaz, Joseph,TheMorality of Freedom.56Seung,T.K., & Bonevac, D., `Plural Values and Indeterminate Rankings', p.800.37Griffin, James, Are there incommensurablevalues?, pp.48-9.58See20

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Weighing is a good analogy; you put the pleasures together and the pains together,both the near and the remote, on the balance scale, and then say which of the two ismore 59

And:

If thenour well-being dependedon this, doing and choosing large measures,avoiding andnot doing the small ones,what would we see as our salvation in life?Would it be the art of measurement r the power of appearance?0

Socratesalso refers to knowing the greaternumber,andhis art of measurementasascience.The languageused gives usclear indications of the quantitative natureofSocrates skill of measurement.The complexity of such a skill suggests hat the theorythat pleasuresare comparableratherthan incommensurablewould not be sufficient,andalso supportsSocrates useof commensurability.Comparability may be enough osupportus making a decision between wo options, but when we haveto take intoaccountall the possible pleasuresandpainsof eachoption facing us, comparabilitywill not give us the necessary larity to makesuch complex choices.

The fact that Socrates s advocatinga commensurablescale ratherthan a comparativeonemakes he hedonismof the Protagoras problematic. If Plato is indeedusinghedonism o support the unity of the virtues andthe thesis that knowledge is sufficientfor virtue then the foundation is weak. As well asthese nherentproblems withhedonism,Socrates commitment to suchan idea intensifies the difficulty of includingcourage n his general heory.

59Prot. 356b2-5.60Prot. 356d1-5.

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5. Courage

OnceSocrateshas developed he relationship betweenpleasureand the good,andtheidea hat peoplealways go for what they believe to be best,he continues:

Then if the pleasant s the good,no one who knows or believesthere is somethingelsebetter than what he is doing, somethingpossible,will go on doing what hehadbeen doing when hecould be doing what is better.To give in to oneself is nothingother than ignorance,and to control oneself is nothing other than wisdom. 1

And hegoes on to say:

[Socrates]: Now, no onegoes willingly towards the bador what he believesto bebad; neither is it in humannature,so it seems,o want to go toward what onebelievesto be bad insteadof to the good.And when he is forced to choosebetweenone of two badthings, no onewill choose he greater f he is able to choose helesser.They agreedwith all of that too.[Socrates]: `Well, then, is theresomethingyou call dreador fear?... saythatwhetheryou call it fear or dread, t is anexpectation of something bad... If what Ihavesaid up to now is true, thenwould anyonebewilling to go toward what hedreads,when hecan go toward what he doesnot?Or is this impossible from whatwe haveagreed?For it was agreed hat what one fearsoneholds to be bad;no onegoes willingly toward thosethingswhich he holds to be bad,or chooses hosethingswillingly . 62

Socratess claiming that becausewe go towardswhat we believe to bethe bestoption,the courageousdo not go towards what is frightening to them becauseone would onlyfear the worse option. Once Protagorashasagreedwith the hedonistic position asdescribedby Socrateshe appears o think that hehasno choice but to acquiesce n thecontinuing discussion.However this is a controversial stepfor Socrates o make.Plato s claim that `what one fearsoneholds to be bad;no onegoes willingly towardthose hings which heholds to be bad,or chooses hose hings willingly is surely anoversimplification of the matter.The ideathat no-oneeverdoesanything thatfrightens them is troubling; why should it bethe case hat the someonecannot gotowards somethingthey feel fear about, ust as long asthey believe it to contain thegreateroverall pleasure?One might think that this is what the courageous ypically do.61Prot. 358c1-c5.

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It may betrue that people fear what they consider o be bad,but you may feel fearabouta particular action becauseof one element nvolved(such asthe possibility ofdeath)but not think that the action overall is bad. Socratesappears o be forgettingabouthis theory of maximising pleasureat this point and endsup oversimplifying theargument.The Socratic belief that we always choose o do what we believe to bethebest hing for us could haveallowed for the feeling elementof fear towards what weactually do63,as long as we think that it is the best hing overall, and provided thatSocratesdistinguishes he feeling of fear from the udgement that motivates us.Socrates previous argumentallows him to claim that:

But all people,both the courageousandthe cowardly, go toward that about whichthey areconfident; both the cowardly andthe courageousgo toward the same64thing

And,

[Protagoras]: But, Socrates,what the cowardly go toward is completely oppositetowhat the courageousgo toward. For example,the courageousarewilling to go towar, but the cowardly arenot. [Socrates]: s going to war honourableor is itdisgraceful? [Protagoras]:Honourable [Socrates]: Then, if it is honourable,wehaveagreedbefore, it is also good, for we agreed hat all honourableactions weregood65

This idea is not inconsistentwith the braveman also having feelings of fearof whatinspiresconfidence in him. Fortunately Socrates definition of courage n theProtagoras doesnot need o dependon the ideathat the courageousdo not feel fearfulof what they do. He could have saidthat the courageousgo towards what gives themmost confidencebut that they can also feel fear of it. Perhapshe believed that byaccepting he ideathat courage may involve acting in spite of feelings of fear hewould haveto allow for akrasia,but this is not the case.By oversimplifying theargument at this point it loses he logical connectionwith the previous points in thedialogue andbecomesmuch moreopento criticisms suchasthe one above.

62Prot. 358d1-e8.63As long as the feeling element of fear is different from the udgement that something is bad.64Prot. 359e1-3.65Prot. 359e4-10.

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The claim that the courageousoption is alsothe more pleasurable s a ratherproblematic one.There is something odd aboutclaiming that the courageousoptionwould also bethe pleasantest.We commonly considercourageousactionsto bethekind of actionsthat aredifficult or painful - pleasure s a term rarely applied tocourageousdeeds.Whether we believe that courageousdeedsaredone in spite of fear,or becauseof fearof what ought to be fearedasPlato does, he courageousdeed s anact done for a reason.Courageousactsare not donethoughtlessly or becausesomeonefelt like it, and if an act is done in thesemannerswe would not considerthem to becourageous.This also counts for someonemotivated by pleasure. f a woman runs intoa burning building and savesa child we would think of her as courageous,however ifsomeone ushed nto a burning building simply for the thrill we would not regardthemasbrave. It looks asthough a courageousact must serve somepoint beyondtheimmediatepleasureof the act.

Socrates positive thesisaboutcourage s thus:

Cowardice is ignoranceof what is and is not to be feared...courage s the oppositeof cowardice.. .Sothen, wisdom about what is and is not to be feared s theoppositeof this ignorance...Sothe wisdom about what is and is not to be feared scourageand is the opposite of ignorance66

As we cansee rom this definition, Socratesargues hat courage s knowledge of whatshould really be fearedand cowardice is ignoranceof this. Presumably hen, thecourageousperson s also the personwho knows what will bring most pleasure,whichis the oppositeof what should truly be feared.The braveperson is thus motivated todo the courageousact by the desireto move away from what is most fearful and movetowards what brings most pleasure.The ideathat the courageousperson s motivatedby moving away from what is most fearful is incorporated n Plato s definition ofcouragebeyondthe Protagoras, and I will discuss t in later chapters.The ideathat wemove towards what brings pleasurewhenwe act courageously s unique to theProtagoras, and the main problem with the definition offered in this dialogue.

66Prot. 360c12-d9.

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Sohow could Plato ustify the claim that by choosingto act courageouslyyou makethe correct choice for his hedonisticcalculus?He could meanone of two things: eitherthat the actual act of bravery brings pleasure or that the rewardsof being a bravepersonbring more pleasure han any other option. If the former is to standa chanceasthe correct interpretation then Plato must mean o include cerebralpleasures even ifhe cannotdraw a distinction betweencerebraland physical pleasures hat elevates heimportanceof one or the other without damaginghis thesis. So assuming hat Plato isnot claiming that going into battle for example s physically pleasurable he could beclaiming that there are cerebralpleasuresassociatedwith it that outweigh thepleasuresof running away. But what could thesecerebral pleasuresbe withoutrecourse o the ideathat pleasurecomes rom doing the morally right thing? Thetheory that whether one is courageousor not dependson whether one gets pleasuresfrom the act of battle is clearly unacceptable.

PerhapsPlato meantthe latter - that the rewardsof being a brave personbring morepleasure han any other option. This interpretationalso leads o insuperabledifficulties. The thesiscould only be plausible if the person were to survive thecourageousact otherwise they would not accrue he long-term benefits. If that werethe case hen either we must return to the above problematic interpretation that onegets pleasure rom the act of battle or denythat anyonewho dies is courageous.Neither of theseoptions are appealing.

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Then it seems hat our first business s to supervise he production of stories,andchooseonly thosewe think suitable,and reject the rest. We shall persuademothersand nurses o tell our chosenstories o their children, andby meansof them tomould their minds and characterswhich are more important than their bodies. 9

By the time of Republic Book III Plato is explicit that education,asProtagorasmaintained,doeshavean impact on virtue. However, he is also to someextent inagreementwith what Socratesargues n the Protagoras, ashe doescontinue to stressthe importanceof knowledge for virtue. So it looks asthough Plato hasfound somecompromisebetween he two contradictory and inconsistentviews espousedbyProtagorasand Socrates n the Protagoras, by selectinga piece from each heory thatarenot inconsistentwith one another.So,by putting the theoriesof these wo greatthinkers againstone another n this imaginary conversationPlato was able to seewhich part of eachof their views he should pick up and carry forward.

A further point of interest in the Protagoras regardinghow theseearly dialoguesshould be read is the treatmentof courage n this dialogue.As stated above,Protagorasclaimed that regarding the virtues, `four of them resembleeachother fairlyclosely, but courage s very different from all the rest 70.When reading the Protagorasit is natural to agree with Protagoraswhen he claims that eachof the virtues aredifferent from the others, but that they areconnected, ike the parts of a face. WhenProtagorasclaims that courage seems o be a specialcasehe is keying into a commonassumption hat the other virtues, such as ustice andtemperance,are necessarilyrequiredof a good personbut that courage s possibly something beyondthat71,or thatsomeonecould be courageouswithout having the other virtues. Socratesarguesagainst he separationof courage rom the other virtues by trying to prove in argumentthat the virtues can be shown to be the same.However, Plato seemsmore convincedby the Protagoreanview in the Republic. When he discusseshe virtues in that laterwork courage s the only virtue not said to primarily reside in the rational part of thetripartite soul. All the other virtues aresaidto primarily rely on the reasoningpart of

69Rep. 377b9-c4.70Prot. 349d3-4.7 By which I meanthat in somecases t is commonly thought to be supererogatoryto be courageousbut that this is not always the case.

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the soul andthat this part needs o be developed n order to havethesevirtues.Genuinecourage72 oesalso rely on having a developedreasonof course but the factthat it also relies on the development- ratherthan suppression of anotherpart of thesoul is interesting.Only Courage s explainedby the inclusion of the thumos thespirited part.This division betweencourageandthe other virtues again showsthat theearly dialogueswere not just about the views of Socrates but were exercisesused odiscover his own more workable view.

72Courageof the Philosopher Kings.

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7. Cnndusinn

The Protagoras ends n a paradoxical position. At the beginning of the discussionSocratesclaimed that he didn t think that virtue could be taught, but hasgone on toargue hat virtue is knowledge. Protagoras,on the other hand,expressed he view thatvirtue could be taught, but rejectedthe ideathat it is somesort of knowledge. Theimplication of the dialogue ending on such a note is that neither Socrates norProtagoras viewpoint is wholly acceptable. t perhapsalso implies that a satisfactoryaccountof virtue and whether it canbe taught will draw on both positions and makeamore consistentwhole. The fact that the end of the dialogue suggestswe needa newaccount of virtue and its teachability appliesto courage n particular sincethat virtuehasproved the most difficult to fit in with Socrates view. The temporary commitmentto hedonism doesn t help Socratesproducea workable theory - in fact it createsmoreproblems. I will show in the following chaptershow Plato attempts o deal with theseproblems.

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Chapter 3: Courage in the Laches

Contents1.Nicias and Laches on military training (p.40)2. Laches first definition of courage (p. 46)3. Laches second definition of courage (p. 48)4. How the Laches should be read (p. 52)5. Nicias definition of courage (p. 55)6. Further support for part 4 (p. 61)7. Conclusion (p.63)

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1. Nicias and Laches on military training

The Laches is an early dialogue that discussessome of the main `Socratic' issues, such aswhether virtue is knowledge and consequently whether it can be taught, with reference tothe specific case of courage. It begins with Lysimachus and Melesias looking for adviceon how to best bring up their sons `in order to make first-rate men of them . They haveasked Nicias and Laches, two famous Athenian generals, to join them in the hope thatthey might be able to tell them whether military training will help in this aim. Lachesencourages Lysimachus and Melesias to bring Socrates into the discussion, ashe believeshim to have some experience in these matters. In his usual fashion, Socrates asks Lachesand Nicias to give their opinion on military training first, as he is `younger than thesegentlemen and rather inexperienced in the field'2.

Nicias speaks first, and says that he believes that this kind of training gives men manyadvantages, among them that it will make them `fit and healthy'3, `trained in the use ofmilitary equipment'4, and it will encourage an interest in military technique. He makesone particularly interesting additional point concerning training which is that `thepossessionof this same knowledge will make any individual a great deal braver and moredaring in battle than he would otherwise be'5. Why would Nicias make such a claim?Presumably the point is that military laymen dropped into a war zone may not be asinclined to act courageously becausethey do not have experience of such situations. Theknowledge the trained soldier possessesmay at times enable him to perform courageousacts that the layman would not even consider.

It is then Laches' turn to state his position on the matter of military training. Contrary toNicias, he claims that military training does not increase bravery in the individual. He

Laches 179b3.2Laches 181d2-3.3Laches 181e4.4Laches 182a5.5Laches 182c4-6.

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gives various points in supportof this view. The first is that if it did increasebravery henthe Spartans,he most militarily respectedof the Greeks,would practise t. lain Laneclaims n the footnotesof his translationof theLaches hat the first of these s simplywrong, `TheSpartanArmy, known andfearedas he finest in Greece,wastheproductofa ruthless egimeof training which began or all male citizens at the ageof seven 6.Thisview has beencriticised as t has beenclaimedthat it doesnot appreciatehe natureof thekind of training beingdiscussed.f thenatureof the exercisewasto demonstratehebeautyof military technique henLaches claim that the Spartanshavenot practised twould not necessarilyseemso ridiculous. In this casehewould beclaiming that theSpartans re so well versed n military matters hat if this kind of training benefitedsoldiers n anyway, they would bepracticingit. However, Laches point is only correct ftheyreally wereonly discussinga particularkind of military training, and onewhich theSpartans id not practise. f the discussions meant o be a more generalonewhich is toincludethe benefitsof all kinds of military training, thenLacheshasmissed he point ofthe conversation.

Secondly,Lachesclaims that the instructors hemselvesarenot notedfor their bravery,and so a connectionbetween his military training andbraverycannotbeestablished:

I ve comeacrossquite a numberof these nstructorswhen they ve been acedwith thereal thing, andI know the stuff they re madeof. We can see ight awayhow the landlies: not one manwho has done his military training hasever made a name orhimself on active service... And yet in every other subject the men with highreputations come from the ranks of those who have gone through the appropriatetraining. 7

This claim is basedon Laches personalexperienceof the menthat practise his skill. Itseemso be an early exampleof the adage thosewho can,do, thosewho can t, teach .As a military manhimself, it is interesting hatLacheshasnot seensomeonebe brave nbattlewho is well known for using such methods.However,this point is perhapsmore

6 lain Lane, Early Socratic Dialogues, p.87.7Laches 183c1-7.

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instructiveaboutLaches approacho the argument.He is thinking aboutthe issue heyarediscussingn a muchmorepracticalsense:have seenanyonewho usessuchmethodsshowbravery in war? This point alsosuggestshatwhat Laches s thinking of is a specialkind of artisticmilitary training designedo beput on showfor its aestheticvalue,ratherthana more generalmilitary training. This readingwould supporthis point above hat the8Spartansdo not train their soldiers in this way.

Laches third reason or thinking that this kind of military training doesnot makesoldiersbraver s thathe thinks it only succeedsn making cowards ake foolish risks, andthebrave he focusof attentionandcriticism. This claim is of more interestand is worthquoting in full:

And it would be true to say, I think, that if someone who was a coward wereto imagine that he knew all about it, he would become over-confident andthen make it all the more obvious what his true colours were. If, on the otherhand, he were a brave man, people would watch his every move, and if hemade even the slightest mistake, he would have to put up with a great deal ofabuse.People have a grudge against men who profess to know such things, sounless a man is strikingly braver than the rest, there s no way he can avoidbecoming a laughing stock if he claims this kind of knowledge. 9

Therearemany ambiguous ranslations n this paragraphhat createa difficulty ininterpretation.Firstly, the word `thrasus s here being translatedas`over-confident .Does his translationadequatelyexhibit what Platowasoriginally trying to say?Giventhis translation assumeLachesmeans hat the cowardwould over-estimatehis ability,which is actuallynot as effective ashethinks. Sowhy would he thenmakehis `truecolours , or elsewhereranslated`truenature , moreobvious? canonly imaginethat thisstatementmight be describinga situation where he coward would put himself into aaIt is interesting to note that Laches arguments against military training do follow a logical structure. Hefirst argues that military training is not necessary for courage, as the Spartans are well-known for beingcourageous and they don t do it. He then argues that it is not sufficient for courage as those who do practiseit are not brave. This pattern is then inverted later when Socrates points out that the first two definitionsLaches gives for courage are merely sufficient (standing one s ground) and then merely necessary(endurance) but that the does not give one that is both necessary and sufficient, which is what Socrates issearching for.9LachesI84b4-c4.

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dangerous situation, for example into battle, because he considers himself to be lessthreatened by it than he previously thought becauseof his new found skill in fighting.However, becausehe is by nature a coward, he runs away at the last minute, revealing histrue colours. However, this reading seems o create a problem when we look at it inrelation to the brave man. The passage appearsto be saying that the brave man would puthimself in situations of danger where his ability could be assessed.And if he has claimedto have superior skills in fighting the criticism will be harsh if he fails to live up to theseclaims. The claim that a man can only avoid this if he is `strikingly braver however doesnot seemto make sense.Why would a braver man be less likely to make a technicalmistake in fighting? I think that this examination shows that the above translation is notsufficient to explain what Plato was saying in the Laches.

Hobbs offers an alternative reading of this passage.She says that deilos and andreios,above translated as coward and brave man, could also be translated as good or bad atfighting. In this case Laches could be referring to a situation where `the poor fighter islured by his overreaching confidence into situations which he is in fact ill-equipped tohandle, thus exposing his woeful lack of prowess 10.Under this interpretation, withandreios being translated as a man good at fighting, 184b7-cl would again refer to thejealous scrutiny of observers wanting to find a flaw. 184c1-4 would now more coherentlyrefer to the àndreios , or man skilled at fighting, who is so skilled that mistakes neveroccurred, and therefore he cannot be mocked by those who are ealous of him. Thisalternative reading does avoid the problem of how to understand Laches claim thatùnless a man is strikingly braver than the rest, there s no way he can avoid becoming alaughing stock if he claims this kind of knowledge , but also requires an implausibletranslation of àndreios and `deilos . What this passageperhaps suggests is that Lachesdoes not have a firm grip on the notion of courage and on the difference between courageand some kind of skill in battle.

10Hobbs, A., Plato and the Hero, p.82.

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This final point by Laches does have further implications. Nicias supports the view thatknowledge of this area makes you braver, probably because he is supposed to be familiarwith the Socratic tenet that virtue is knowledge and is the tool by which Plato will allowSocratesto challenge such a view. Laches, on the other hand, thinks that knowledge offighting will not make you braver, which for the Greeks necessarily had only positiveconnotations, but it makes you rasher. Laches rejects knowledge as a component of whatmakes one braver, and we see later that he does not believe it to be a virtue that isdependent on intellectual qualities. Socrates later uses this distinction between courageand rashness o support the idea that it is knowledge (the kind of moral knowledgeSocratesrequires) that is what distinguishes the two - it being a part of courage but not ofrashness.

This discussion is used to introduce the main themes of this dialogue. Laches and Niciasshow what their later position will be through what they say about the matter of militarytraining - Nicias in favour and Laches against. Nicias supports the view that some kind offighting skill will increase bravery. This may be because he is attracted to the Socraticview that virtue is knowledge but has not appreciated the difference between the kind ofknowledge Socrates has in mind and the kind conveyed by the sophists and teachers offighting skill. Laches early conversation with Socrates shows that he is not a particularlyphilosophically-minded man, and that he is not familiar with the Socratic position, andwe can seeearly on that he will probably not be very sympathetic to it. Apart fromestablishing the characters of the two men this discussion also shows the reader that thereis a problem that needs to be addressed.The contrast in the positions of Nicias andLaches demonstrates that the issue at hand is the role of knowledge in virtue. Nicias isestablished as the representative of the Socratic view that virtue is knowledge and Lachesas the opponent to this view. Plato is then free to use Socrates as a more neutral figure inorder to examine the cogency of the two positions. This part of the dialogue also bringsup the question of what kind of knowledge is relevant for virtue, for Laches has ruled outthe idea that it is any type of knowledge when he said that those with some form ofmilitary knowledge are not necessarily courageous people. Socrates then redirects the

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conversationawayfrom the caseof military training andonto the far more interestingquestionof what courage tself is.

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2. Laches' first definition of courageLaches'first attempt at a definition of àndreios' s:

If a man is prepared to stand in the ranks, face up to the enemy and not run away, youcan be sure that he's brave. ' 1

This definition incorporates all the complexity Laches sees n the word and uses what heprobably considers to be its paradigmatic context, that of war. As we can seefrom above,àndreios' can be used to represent courage and can also be used to connote manliness inthis and previous periods. Laches may have intended to convey something of thesedifferent translations, combining the ideas of courage and manliness. How can we expectLaches to make a clear statement about what is essential to courage when the vocabularyopen to him was used to distinguish a more general idea? Socrates wanted Laches to saywhat the defining quality of all the casesof courage was - the element by virtue of whichthey were casesof courage. The term àndreios' may appear to us to be a confused termwith various meanings, but Laches was working with one word with a deep and complexhistory. This fact makes it all the more understandable when he does not initiallyunderstand what Socrates is looking for when he is asked what courage is. Even thoughSocratesmust also have been able to appreciate the breadth of the word Laches wastrying to contain in one sentence, this was clearly not the kind of answer he wanted fromhim.

It is interesting to note, as Charles Kahn did, that

Platonever usesAristotle's word for definition (horismos);andthe term he doesoccasionallyemploy for this notion, horos,preserveshe flavour of its literal meaning,boundarymark. What we call defining is for Plato marking the boundaries .12

Laches 190e2-4.12Kahn, C., Plato and theSocratic dialogue,p.171.

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Evidently in theLachesSocrateswanted o limit theboundariesof àndreia to caseswhere his specific element was exhibited, and not includeall caseshat might havebeenthought to demonstratehat a personwas manly or courageous.Platowanted t to defineaspecific quality, not be a term that denotesa family resemblance.

Plato also wished to extend the boundaries of àndreia to cover all kinds of people. Hetries to explain this to Laches when he explains what he wants from him:

I wanted to find out not just what it is to be brave as an infantryman, but alsoas a cavalry man, and as any kind of member of the forces; and not just whatit is to be brave during a war, but to be brave in the face of danger at sea; andI wanted to find out what it is to be brave in the face of an illness, in the faceof poverty, and in public life; and what s more not just what it is to be bravein resisting pain or fear, but also putting up stem opposition to temptation andindulgence - because I m assuming, Laches, that there are people who arebrave in all these situations. 13

Laches responds by saying `Very much so, Socrates 14.It is perhaps surprising thatLaches does not challenge what must have been to him a radical change of interpretation.Not only did he have to see àndreios as not only military, but also not as the province ofmen alone.

1 Laches 191c9-e3.14Laches 191e4.

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3. Laches second definition of courageLaches seconddefinition is:

I takeit, in that case, o be a certain enduranceof the soul, if I haveto mentiontheelementessentiallypresent n all cases.5

It is at this point that Socratesakes or granteda fact about couragewhich is oneof themajor sourcesof disagreementabout t:

Now, this is how it appears to me: by no means every kind of endurance, I think, canappear to you to be bravery. I make that surmise because I m almost certain, Laches,that you think of bravery as one of the finer things. 16

This statement raises the question of why Socrates dismisses the possibility of thecourageous fool so readily; the idea of the person who intends to do good and facesterrifying danger in the attempt, but unfortunately is seriously misguided and ends updoing harm. Hobbs explains that: `there are serious linguistic barriers preventing such anapproach being readily available to Greek thinkers. No matter how conceived, the veryterm andreia connotes an ideal of male character and behaviour which cannot be value-neutral 17. Here Hobbs is saying that the term `andreia could not be used to describe afoolish person because it had only positive associations, and would not have been usedabout someone who failed or acted foolishly. This is an important issue for Plato sdefinition of courage, and one that I will discuss further in the conclusion below.

Lachesagreeswith this alteration of his definition to wise endurance.SocrateshenprovidesLacheswith various exampleswherehe believes he more foolish man is themorecourageous. achesagreeshat theseexamplescausea problem for his theoryofcourageaswise endurance,but doeshe have o? Oneof the casesSocratesgives for thefool beingmorecourageousn his endurancehan the wise man is asfollows:15Laches 192b9-1 1.16Laches 192c2-5.17Hobbs,A., Plato and the Hero, p.89.

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courageous. Interestingly the same examples are used in the Protagoras in a discussionconcerning courage. It is generally agreed that in these two discussions Plato is referringto the same cases o illustrate completely opposite points. In the Protagoras theconversation goes:

[Socrates]Do you know who divesconfidently into wells? [Protagoras]Of course,divers. [Socrates] s this becausehey know what they aredoing, or for someotherreason?Protagoras]Becausehey know what they aredoing.21

And in theLaches:

Anyonewilling to go down into a well, and o dive, and showendurancen this or insomesimilar activity, will be braver hanthe experts,although not an experthimself.22

In the Laches he is assuming that those who do such things as dive down wells withoutknowledge are braver than those who do it with knowledge. In contrast, in the Protagoraspeople who do such things without the relevant knowledge Protagoras classifies as `mad .Socrates appearsto be relying on his interlocutors having different intuitions about suchcases n these two dialogues. Vlastos, as well as others, has argued that the fact that Platoused the same examples in order to illustrate a contradictory point cannot be accidental:

Platocould hardly have ntroduced he same hreeexamplesn the Lachesunlessheweredeliberatelycontrasting heposition hegivesSocratesherewith the one allowedhim in the Protagoras. submit that the simplestexplanationof this fact is an advancein moral insight in Plato s own understandingof the true intent of the Socraticconceptionof courageas wisdom: whenPlatohascometo write the Lacheshe hasseenclearly what henot yet seenwhenhewrote theProtagoras - that thewisdomthataccountsor the braveman s couragehaseverythingto do with moral insight, andnothing to do with technicalskill.23

I agreewith Vlastosthat therehas beenan advancen moral insight betweenwriting theProtagorasandthenwriting theLaches. n theProtagoras Plato tries to developa simple21Prot. 350a1-5.22Laches 193c4-6.23Vlastos,G., Socratic Studies,p.117.

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relationshipbetweenknowledgeand virtue; in that dialogue he claims that knowledgewithout qualification will make onebraver.In the Lacheswe advancebeyondthedifficulties of theProtagoras and t becomes learthat not all kinds of knowledgecounttowardscourage.For instance heknowledgeof the generalwho knowshe is in a farsuperiorposition to his adversaryon thebattlefield will not mean hat he is the braver nfact thecontrary s probably true.This change rom theProtagorasto theLachesregardingsuch casescoupledwith his desire o still include knowledge n a definition ofcourageshows hat Plato is now explicitly distinguishing betweendifferent kinds ofknowledgeandhasdecidedwhat kind of knowledge s important for his theory.He isnow making it clearthat it cannotbeanykind of knowledge utilizing the distinctiondescribedaboveby Hobbsasthe discussioncontinues.

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4. How the Laches should be read

This part of the dialogue s particularly instructiveabout he issueof whethertheUnitarianor Developmentalist radition24 an provide a coherentpicture of the earlydialogues. n the discussionabovePlato introducesa further example o the onegivenat193a2-9. And as we have also seen above in the Laches Plato says:

And as many as would be willing to endure in diving down into wells without beingskilled or to endure in any other similar situation you say are braver than those whoare skilled in these things. 25

Platois relying on the intuition that anyonewould believethat the person who dived intothewell without experienceor training would bebraverthan thosewho went in with suchexpertise n orderto convinceLaches hat his definition of courageaswise endurancesnot satisfactory.However in theProtagorasSocratesuses he sameexample but in thatcasewishesusto havethe contrary intuition - that thosewho dive into wells withknowledge are courageous those without knowledge are fools26.The Unitarianinterpretation claims that Plato wrote the dialogues from a single point of view and so wecan therefore have an understanding of the Platonic view of the dialogues as a whole.However given the inconsistency above this theory clearly has some particularlydifficult textual contradictions to explain if it is to be a credible interpretation. This mayalso present difficulties to the proponent of some versions of the Developmentalistposition as it is common for supporters of this theory to claim that we can find a coherentSocratic view in the early dialogues. Thus to some extent both of these popular theorieswill struggle to incorporate such a discrepancy between two early dialogues.

24SeeChapter1: Introduction for a discussionof thedifferencebetween he Unitarian andDevelopmentalistposition

courage and the soul in plato-phd glassgow

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