Cossacks and the Russian Empire,1598-1725

Thi s book explores the ways in which the Russians governed their empire inSiberia from 1598 to 1725. Ru ssian control over Siberia was ex traordinary,dependent on a handful of men at a vast distance from the centre of imperialpower, with no regular armed force and a cash-starved economy. It raises impor­tant questions conc erning the nature of the Russian autocracy in the early mod­em period, investigating the hitherto neglected relations of a vital part of theempire with the metropolitan centre, and examining how the Ru ssian authoritieswere able to control such a vast and distant fronti er given the limited means attheir disposal. It is argued that, despite this great physical distance, the represen­tation s of the tsar 's rule in the syrnbois, texts and gestures that permeated Siberianinstituti ons were close at hand, thus allowing the prom otion of political stabilityand favourabl e term s of trade. Particular attention is paid to investigating the roleof the Siberian Cossacks, and explaining how the institutions of empire facilitatedtheir position as trader s via the sharing of cultural practices, attitudes and expec­tation s of behaviour across vast distance s among the members of organizations orpersonal networks. Overall, this book is a thorough apprai sal of how the institu­tions of Russian imperial government functioned in seventeenth century Siberia.

Christoph Witzenrath is Assistant Lecturer at Humboldt University, Berlin,Germany. His research interests include medieval, early modem European,Ru ssian and Soviet history.

of the Siberian Cossacks, and explaining how the institutions of empire facilitatedtheir position as trader s via the sharing of cultural practices, attitude s and expec-

Routledge studies in the history of Russia and Eastern Europe

1 Modernizing MuscovyReform and social in sevenreenth-century RussiaEdited Iarmo Kotilaine and Marshall Poe

2 The USA in the Making of the USSRThe Washington conference, 1921-1 and 'uninvited Russia'Paul Dukes

3 Tiny Revolutions in RussiaTwentieth-century Soviet and Russian history in anecdotesBruce Adams

4 The Russian General Staff and Asia, 1800-1917Alex Marshall

5 Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920-1991Soviet policy, and communismBident

6 The History of SiberiaIgor V. Naumov (Edited David N. Collins)

7 Russian Military Intelligence in the War with Japan, 1904-05Secret operations on land and at seaEvgeny ,'PY'UP"lI

8 Cossacks and the Russian Empire, 1598-1725Manipulation, rebellion and expansion into SiberiaChristoph Witzenrath

Cossacks and the RussianEmpire, 1598-1725Manipulation , rebellion andexpansion into Siberia

Christoph Witzenrath

First 2007by Routl edge

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Simultaneousl y published in th e USA and CanadaRoutledge

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known or hereafter invented, photocopyi ng and or in an yi nformati on storage or retri eval system, without in fro mthe publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataA catalogue record for is avail abl e from the Bri tish Library

Library c F "'~H ""000 Cataloging in Publication Data

Cossacks an d the 1598-1725: manipul ati on, rebelli on andexpansi on into Siberi a I Christoph Wi tzenrath.

cm. studi es in of Russi a and Eastern Europe; 8)Includes bibl i ographi cal refer ences and

7 ,",-V"",, ",-.,621-4 (hardback 1 Siberia (Russi aj-2. Power sci encesj-Russi a

(F~~~:;'~~~~l;-r~ll~t~l~~; 3. (Federati on )-Siberi a-G relati 0 ns. 4. Central-local government relarioris-Russia(Federati onj-Siberi a-Histcry-l ttb century. 5. Russi a-Politi cs an dgovernment-Tlth century. 1

2007957' .07-dc222006031616

ISBN 0-203-96290-7 Mastere-book ISBN

ISBN 10: 0-415-4162-4ISBN 13: 978-0-415-41ISBN 10: 0-203-96290-7ISBN 13: ~!~-lh:lJj-~IJ,,~lJ-~

For Friederike, Werner and Elisabeth

Contents

IntroduedonAims and 1Siberia in the seventeenth century 6

and 20Sources 27

1 The Cossack grouprule and the leader 34

Inteeration through institutional . advice andthe Cossacks 49

Inrerrnortiarv ranks 55

The voevoda and the Personenverband 58

IX

XI

Xlll

1

31

2 The economics of Siberian service 62Corflict and negotiation 70

trade and service 78

3 Integration of the trading frontier: the sovereign's affair 85Siberia in the seventeenth century a vast military camp? 86The limited public and Cossack litigation 87The regalian salutation 97The :5 word and cfair 99Conclusion 119

viii Contents

4 Kormlenie and bribery: local influence and administration 122Cultural blindness or 130Conclusion 138

5" Local and central power in the Baikal region 1689-1720 139r t ''l"."vpr around Lake Baikal 141

Sedentarization and rebellion 150alliance on the 152

164Trade and rebellion 167

Conclusion 180

Conclusion

Notes

Index

182

189192228247

Preface

I had become involved in the of this book when Ludmila in afriendly manner, redirected my interest in modern Russian town rebellionsto Siberia. I was struck by their and their sense of purpose, somethingI had but not in Russia. From this first, rather strangeencounter, my own purpose has been to reconcile this with 15C1IC1'11

views on the relations of the tsar and the in Russian history or vice versa.I had to learn two in the process: that military history could not be

evaded and is actually quite and that can make use of anof the all-powerful ruler in ways that seem to defy the very idea of tsarism, Frommilitary history and I have learned that Cossacks can best be describedas a form of group the economic and defensive efficiencyof the temporary primary group, which is among the main reasons for Cossacksuccesses and adaptability to frontier environments.

A combination of military, cultural and trade of SiberianCossack activities the power resources wielded and to which thetsars had to accommodate. Particularly during the first half of the seventeenthcentury, Moscow crucially on the Siberian fur riches to finance its mil­itary reforms, imports and Western However, to cultivate reliability in apolitically volatile environment and open the way to Moscow and the markets ofWestern , the Siberian Cossacks swore an oath to the tsar and never failedin their claims to staunchly defend his interests. Service became the centre oftheir life and imperial culture the medium through which they them­selves and the terms of trade. A if limited, public allowedreassuring thernsel ves of mutu al assistance and forming alliance s. At the heart ofmy analysis is the insight that an institution like the tsar's or affairor the oath has two principal effects: by its claims on time immemorial ordivine it makes actions and reliable, which wasimmensely valuable for trade in a frontier area one-twelfth of theworld's territory. However, those with the necessary power resources could inter-

it in various ways according to their needs, notwithstanding the requisite loy­alty. A petition claimed to defend the interest of the tsar while it explained theneed of the governor in the same terms, and it united the undersignedCossacks behind this purpose. In such a way, the of unity camouflaged

x

conflict, stability and an of events, limitedthough it was locally, temporary, or by social group.

But this was more than it was a efficient device of1111'''0<"ln10' the rapidly in its own on the avail-ability and distribution of power resources, institutional mechanisms allowed the

of the to entertain very different relations with the centre; someof the frontier could even exploit 'older' areas. This book thus proposesa fresh of the Russian The myth of the tsarserved those who wielded some form of power, but they were not exclusivelythose in the imperial centre or and they could be morenumerous than expected

Acknowledgements

Without Robert I would not have written this book. His comments andhints have led to an incomparably more framework and todevelop my of reliably my drafts and with mymistakes all Karin Friedrich and Meuam have provided anamiable, environment in a city that me.Ludmila Thomas's derived from alternate vantage points on both sidesof the former iron have me. Dietmar Wulff had an openeye at a crucial moment, and Dittmar Schorkowitz with a new form ofw l1Ul1:~. Nikolai N. Pokrovskii took time to make me aware of the many scattereddevices of work in the archives. Andrei Zuev admirably andwas for discussions. My thesis would never have been without theimpressions and with, among Konstantin Mitupov and MarinaG. at Ulan-Ude and Irkutsk. Svetlana and her atRGADA have done the best possible. Baberowski has offered to teach atHumboldt his critique and Martina Winkler's congen-ial reply have my presentation. Of her own accord, Cathy Brennanmagnanimously sent inaccessible and books. Maureen Perrie andJanet Hartley made invaluable and requirements. I am grateful for myanonymous reviewer's useful remarks and discussions with Peter Sowden. All ofthose mentioned as well as Christoph Schmidt, Carsten AndreasKappeler, Nancy Kollmann, Valerie Kivelson, Andre Berelowitch, Brian Davies,Annette v. Stieglitz and Carsten Kumke have me in important ways.The with Ludwig Steindorff and Bartlett gave me fresh insights.To some the remarks and critique of Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger, JoachimSchulze, Susanne Rau, and Christian Hochmuth, although concerned with a dif­ferent, related draft, found their way into this book. Anna Zhukovskaia, ArturasVasiliauskas, Martin Aust, Alfons Guido Hausmann, Dmytro Rybakov,Cornelia Soldat, Vera Urban, Christoph Gurnb, Patrick Tidball, Carolin Leutloff,Hannes Grandits, Almut Hofert, Rusterneyer, Stefan Karsch, ValentinaLeonhard and Uffa Jensen have at various times contributed to a favourablewm-kino atmosphere and inspiring debates.

XII

The '-V,l1"!,," London Studentship Award secured my material life dur-the years in and Russia, and the University of London funded trav-

to Siberia.Mark Rebecca Taylor, Martina Danilevskaia

and Ambrosi have company and sheltered me at various times in bothcountries. Kate Wilson has done the same and discussed PolishVainzoff introduced me to and in Moscow and ''''''''T''''rendered at for reproducuon professional.

My students have refreshed me with thcught-provckingMy will soon why I was not another'

book. Without the sensitive of my family, I could never have finished it.Gabriele Karl has up with later tended our children approv-

critically, and ever so wonderfully, from the wholeundertaking, for which the of course, mine.

y syn bo Figure I Map of Tobol'sk at the tum of the eighteenth century, b y syn boiarskii S.U. Remezov.

Figure 2 Map of Irkutsk district by S.U. Rernezov, based on sketches drawn locally sometime beforel701.

• •...

',

~

........-.....JI_~·~~I- J. _-..-,. "".;" "' ''''-.",...... ....'i\,tLi.,I I'a .......~~....~.-t.. :::::- 'II:-'llJ..

.sll f;J 'l~J~~

u :. -r

langered Figure 3 Map of Krasnoiarsk, conveying a sense of the lown' s endangered position among 'volosti nemirnye' (' peaceless ' tribes) and barren, empty opensteppe, from Remezov' s alias .

t~

,:

-.l~ Terribles depicteon closer

Figure 4 Reception of Ermak's Cossack envoys by Ivan the Terrible in the imagination of the Tobol'sk cartographer, Cossack and synboiarskii S.U. Remezov more than a century after the events depicted. Despite the slight exaltation of Ermak (left, above), therepresentation of the Cossack group - especially its formation closed to the outside and same-size of the members -leslifies to theauthor's intimate knowledge of such groups.

Introduction

Aims and objectives

The history of the Russian Empire has recently been extensively reappraised andthe role of imperial expansion has been reconsidered to explain Russia 's histori­cal developm ent since the reign of Ivan IV the Terribl e.' The empire has beenreinvestigated from the multi- ethnic and ceremonial point of view, and from theperspective of international relations and power politic s.? However, the questionhow this large empire functioned internally, how the frontiers, the centre, andother parts interacted in the seventeenth century, and how, under early modemconditions, the huge territorial gains were sustained instituti onally is still largelyneglected .' Writing about international relations, Alfred Rieber has pointed outthat, besides the multicultural society and cultural rnarginali sm, it was particu­larly the frontier conditions specific to the Russian context that have confrontedthe empire 's ruling elite s and the mass of the population over long periods of timewith both a range of possibilitie s and a set of constraints ." In Siberia, these pos­sibilities and constraints were taken to the extreme in that it was made up entirelyof overlapping frontier s of the north and the steppe where the state 's authoritywas limited to a few fortified place s, an enormous challenge and a bounty ofopportunity to the newly arriving, their main reason for conquest being the soon­flourishing international trade with furs and luxury commodities. Siberia there­fore is particularly well suited for studying how the empire 's institutional cultureadapted to social change, since persistent expansion and the specific form s oforganization required by the perilous and porou s trading fronti ers both challengedand highlighted imperial culture as the tsar depended much on their revenues.Moreover, the regions beyond the tax border at Verkhotur 'e in the Urals, whichwill broadly define Siberia in this study, are interesting, since they permit toexamine how the autocratic empire managed to fuse its organizational power andthe forces of individual initiative necessary to establish communications through­out a rapidly expanding territory that remained dangerous and threatened by abreak-down of communications with Mo scow.

The se questions have long been considered too dangerous to touch by histori­ans or they have elicited approaches that are apologetic of empire , explain effec­tiveness in inappropriately modem term s, or underestimate the flexibility of

larly the frontier conditions specific to the Russian context that have confrontedthe empire 's ruling elite s and the mass of the population over long period s of time

2 Introduction

imperial culture. in the century the German academic in theservice of the tsar, G.F. Muller, his opinion that the Siberian frontiertowns executed government after the tasks of defence andthe collection of the fur tax.5 from such one-sided of tsarist power,the question of how the was in and to sustainits rapid as distinct from its own claims of power was not accept­able among nineteenth century Russian scholars. Even for the PTn,ni,..'p' ~

nents, whether before or after the revolution, there was no point questiomngeffectiveness of the tsar's power, and those whocriticized Russia from a regionalpoint of view to Solov'ev' sand Kliuchevskii's of Russia

instead of the state, a uniform mass of was cast in the role ofthe hero that left uniforrn, traces, colourless in whilecolonizing empty spaces.sInsofar as the relations between town and tsar are rep-resentative for imperial was a very influentialtion, on the of the Russian service town authored by Vemadskii,Accordingly, the material and cultural of the town in Westernoccurred naturally and slowly within a self-contained of while theMuscovite state artificially interfered with this the Siberiantowns, maintained, 'the artificiality, .. is even more obvious'.'

accepted the powerful of Russia by enlighten-ment political theorists in on the body of travelogues. travellmzauthors in the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries had readily taken over represen­tations of power and in court ritual by clericsanxious to increase the tsar's standing in the Orthodox world. The travellers had

these in the terms of classical among themAristotle's of tyranny: 'The Tsar, .. alone rules the whole country, .. hetreats [his as the master of the house does his servants"." The rhetoricdevices of Western theories of absolutism employed underPeter I and the consec-utive, cult of ensured that this theme of all-powerful autocracyand subservient throughout the century. In the nine-teenth century,Western and Russian views of Muscovy reinforced each andperceptions of Russia as exotic"contributed to the dominance of the patrirnonialvision in debates about the past. The state historical school gave primacy to thestate and dismissed as inert (S.M. Solov'ev, Boris Chicherinj.w TheSoviet view of the tsar and the economic and political institutions theinterests of the ruling feudal class further contributed to the canonization of thecoercion paradigm. Instead of how such a vast empire as Russia could begoverned at all, Western and exile historians from the revolution until the 1970sreadily succumbed to the myth of unrestrained tsarist power,overly military and administrative centralization, although this versionemphasized political coercion over social and economical forces.11

Until very recently, this emphasis on the central perspective and, well into thenineteenth century, severe in a sensitive field of governance have dis­r n,,"''' ,,,"prJ studies of internal relations within the empire. The main reason for thefailure before Kappeler's recent celebrated study of the multi-ethnic empire to

Introduction 3

produce anything remotely similar was the of the to ques-tions of the nation-state that occurred when modem historiographydeveloped; thus the great Russian historians of the nineteenth century, Solov'ev,Kliuchevskii and Platonov, conducted national history, as did the historians ofother countries. The of the Russian thus beearne Ru ssian history.'?As can be added as another reason for the failureto relations. As will be below, for reasonsthe Cossacks were studied, until, in the late Soviet some historiansembarked on this line of research. These trends contributed to thelack of research in the field of institutional culture of the Russian CJl'flU'C;.

In this sense, the term 'autocrat', as mentioned designedimpress the Orthodox world, still overshadows the aspect of 3 However,not only the term 'Sibirskoe tsarstvo' from 'Moskovskaia Rus" inthe tsar's title shows that Muscovites the realm as , but alsoused this distinction in officials with embezzlement.t- Russiawas also an in the sense of under a unified authority byvirtue of the tax border between Siberia and Muscovy in the Urals. IS

('nnN>rn·ino- the multi-ethnic has demonstrated that it was notexclusivelv by force and a bureaucratic but often by ~h:;'r'1TlO-

power with native elites. Below the level of ethnic custom and lawremained untouched, and ruled their and tribes on their own account,as as Moscow regularly received tributes. Hi This study poses similar ques-

but them to a different of the and a different socialgroup, the Siberian Cossacks. The main question is whether, in the Muscoviteempirevpopulations had access to the tsar and the chancelleries only viahigh-ranking intermediaries, and could therefore influence political decisionsonly this channel if at all. The Siberian Cossacks are a particularly use­ful social group for the purposes of this investigation. Unlike the ethnopoliticalcases and Slezkine studied, they were predominantly though notexclusively Russians, and were never co-opted into the court nobility in thesame way as many native elites.'? At the same time, Siberian Cossacksregularly travelled to Moscow and were received at the chancellery and some­times by the tsar. Analogous to Kappeler's questions, this study asks how the cus­tom and laws of the Siberian Cossacks could be made compatible with theinstitutional culture of the Muscovite Unlike cases, however,the who were mostly of Russian therefore had grown up withthe institutional culture of the empire ingrained within them. Thus, unlike thenative elites, they were not learning about something This is an interest-

point, especially because of the reputation of Cossacks as rebels: thereason they fled to the frontiers, it is widely supposed, is because they wished toescape the restrictions of the Muscovite system. The Cossacks are renowned fortheir 'free spirit' .18 Yet this book shows that these 'rebels' an intimateknowledge of how to manipulate the imperial culture to their own advantage.Also, unlike Kappeler's ethnopolitical cases, ordinary Siberian Cossacks main­tained direct contacts with the court without intermediaries and were relatively

4 Introduction

frequently received in Moscow. The Cossacks in adhered to established pro­cedures to be awarded the opportunity to go to Moscow, where they also traded

but also breached these quite often to the point ofdisobeying and even the tsar's and their official

commander, the voevoda, Cossacks are famed for their love of freedom and a'democratic' process, but historians have failed to put this obser­vation into an analytical framework. Thus, important are not addressed:how could democratic institutions fit into the framework of autocracy, especiallyin where historians more military command structures?How could a 'free' co-exist with service to the tsar, and reconcile itsrations to the of the tsar's voevodas nobles and land-owners from the central areas of Muscovy? This study whathappened when the reach of its most effective coercive means of

had to on a group of of non-nome. underm-ivilecerl

who had grown up with the imperial culture and were able to work institutions totheir own advantage.

In an rebellious attitude of the from Siberia constituteda seriou s problem for the court. In some of the century's major in the c ap-ital, Siberian did take for in 1648, when the tsar had tosacrifice his to the rebels .19 In most cases, theSiberian rebels found it more to within the boundaries of estab-lished institutions and nevertheless to press home their which includedimportant elements of their Cossack customs. This ambivalence of insti-tutional permanence and constitutes one of the important areas of inves-UlS'lU\J'l1 throu ghout this book.

Institutional analysis applied in history has received considerable attentionrecently, especially at the Dresden of the Deutsche Forschungsgemein-schcft, 'Institutionality and History', by the transformations inEastern and elsewhere. While there is a common notion of institutions asper se stable and the Dresden has the ways inwhich institutions become and the mechanisms of their transforma-tion. Institutionality is paradoxically, by both permanence and'-1"UllS'~, since the quest for social stability is basic for its analysis .21

Responding to the need for reliability and social order on which most peoplebuild their institutions are established, although the y, as any means for per-petuating are more likely to break down than to remain stable. Therefore,the main effort in maintaining institutions is to adhere to and to fuel the illusionof institutional stability and permanence. However, since empire is dynamicand quickly in Russia due to the modem Military Revolution andexpansion institutions had to answer to this . In the literature on theRussian empire, however, institutional has so far not been high on thed!!,t;UU,tt.·· As institutions are part of the cultural and social processes that result in'-l1'UllS'~, institutional is part of the rise and fall of empires. To uphold thevital illusion of permanence and stability, institutionality has to accommodate'-1"UllS'~' Siberian like other agents of empire chancelleries, boyars,

Introduction 5

voevodas, and clerics answered to these ambivalences in andother documents, finding ways to harness the institutions to theirspecific needs.

As is well known from the of of thepeasantry that lost their to petition the tsar the century and suc-cumbed to by no means all groups in the Muscovite succeeded

influencing institutions whoever can influence the way inperceive institutions important powers, since others have

on them and therefore to adapt to the established definition. Imvesugates how Siberian Cossacks and on which resources of power

drew to influence the tsar's decisions and the institutional culture of theChapter 2 discu sses the material of this position to what

effect did Siberian Cossacks communicate and with the tsar, and howdid maintain themselves? An implicit concern of these is also thecontribution Siberian Cossacks made that led other agents of to adapt par-tially to their demands. 3 the symbolic forms of communi-cation in the institutions, their and in thecontext of power relations established in the 4explores the ways in which institutions and their structured admin-istration, and the to which it can be called a theextent of accountability and achieved in administration, one of the con­cerns of Chapter 3 whether, and to what communication, negotiationsand the power resources at the disposal of Siberian Cossacks resulted in a public

will loomOne of the problems in Siberian history remains the question of how the

tsar to squeeze at least 10 per cent of the state's budget out of this wild,remote, almost uninhabited and by all standards inaccessible terri-tory, bereft of virtually all infrastructure a few wooden fortresses dottedaround its vast expanses. The dilemma worsens if we consider that even statesmuch better suited to the demands which the modern military revolutionmade on their had to on the structures they already found in soci-

Peter I, was surprised that not even the structures usually expectedin Muscovite towns, such as the office of elder, existed in Siberia.2li toexplain how Muscovy managed its wealthy but unwieldy Siberian territories,Lantzeff and, following him, Dmytryshyn, have relied on the control the central-

bureaucracy exerted over Siberiaf? this clear-cut of con-trol from above collides with the reality of frequent protest againstmisappropriation of funds by the tsar's in Siberia, and in 0 .... " ....""

with the well-established that bureaucracies work just as well as theof public scrutiny to which they are subjected, This was all the more the

case since one of the generally accepted reasons for the relatively even function-of the administration, the considerable level of professionalization of the

nobles who operated it, according to Lantzeff', did not apply in distant Siberia,where governors, as is often stressed, enriched themselves beyond all controls.28

Protest the enrichment of voevodas, therefore, seems to be one of the

6 Introduction

most likely candidates for an of how Muscovy extracted the riches ofthe Siberian furs. Historical studies, have not established a frameworkfor the forms of that fuelled these that stands up to compar-ative one of the aims of this book is to establish the forms oforganizaticn of Siberian Cossacks I) and to the ways bywhich made themselves heard.

This book some of the results of the discussions of Haberrnas'sof the public, which has been re-examined by historians moreinterested in the modem of the public than in pure idealto a small, but very important section of the Muscovite population, the Siberiantown the Siberian public does not fit readily into Habermas'stheoretical While Habermas holds staunchly to his of thebeurgeois public from the public' of the court,which 'did not the population but its own power to the pop-ulation' ,51 these historians have pointed out that the public was rootedin forms of public that can best be understood as partitioned, basedon face-to-face relations and primarily by particular of thepopulation, though open to other groups; these early forms of public

could even be thematically limited, unlike modem mass media, and didnot on the framework of ationed and thematically limited public to Muscovy is an that hasnot yet been Kivelson has established that the provincial gentry of thecentral areas and the nobility had a say in government althoughtheir influence was limited to the interstices of autocracy; but all the lower ranksare still considered excluded from political influence.s-

Since public imperial institutions and local are all intri-interconnected and only make sense in their mutual context, it is sensible

to study and them in their environment as completely as the sourcesallow. A narrow local focus helps to manage the diverse and plentiful sourcessuch an approach involves, and a micro-study is best suited to produce the kindof data needed and references between the elements of institutional cul­ture. The last chapter will make use of a suitable body of sources drawingtogether the threads of the argument by concentrating on one major incident, theSelenga rebellion of 1696 and its on a detailed stud y ofone particular rebellion, 5 applies the developed in the first fourchapters to shed new light on this greatest Siberian Cossack of the century,and on the ways in which centre and periphery negotiated authority.

Siberia in the seventeenth century

The forms of organization and the institutions that structured the complex rela­tionship between Moscow and the Cossacks are related to the turns and twists ofthe history of the conquest of Siberia, showing that Moscow could not assert itspower without compromising. In the early 1580s Ermak and his Cossacksconquered the khanate of Sibir ' in what is now called Western Siberia. After

Introduction 7

their eventual Moscow's armies took over, and the first Russianfortresses were founded during the late 1580s and 1590s on the of theformer khanate. In 1604, Tomsk was founded as an important to theeast on the brink of the open east-west in 1608the Tomsk Cossacks rebelled for the first time. 35 There were further rebellions in1628, in 1633-4 and in 1636-8; in 1642 the town was embroiled in arebellion Tukhachevskii's and in 1648-50 it was byrebellious Cossacks and their elected voevoda, This does not mean that the inter-

were calm. An drawn up by an enemy of the Tomskvoevoda Osip based on of the lost central archives,

claimed as many as nine rebellions up to 1647.3~ Such and concomitantof self-rule were , but locally limited.

Nevertheless, concerned almost all Siberian towns at different times .37

Moreover, the Time of Troubles (1598-1613) meant a serious decline ofMoscow's rule the Urals. such impediments to the tsar's control,

in 1639 Cossack bands had reached the Pacific seaboard. Ru ssian intru­sion into Siberia took two in the north a combination of insmall the White Sea shore and river transport attracted merchantsand from Northern Ru ssian towns. The late six teenth century pred om i-nance of merchants in this area ended in 1601, when voevodas and Cossackssent by the tsar set up the town of on the river Taz as a cen­tre and for the collection of the fur tribute. Other outposts were set up inTurukhansk in 1604 and Khantaisk in 1620 on the banks of the lower Enisei, Inthe south, another network of rivers the Irtysh, Ob, Enisei and nu"",,,"led as far as Iakutsk (founded 1 on the river Lena and the Pacific ocean byvarious waterways. On the between the Ket and a tributary to thefort Makovskyi was founded in 1618, and Eniseisk in 1619 north of the con­fluence of the Enisei and rivers. To the south, movement was far slower,and restricted to some mountainous in the Altai, where Kuznetsk wasestablished in 1618 south of Tomsk, and to Krasnoiarsk (1628), which remainedan important but embattled outpost in the throughout the century. In thepartly wooded lands on the rim of the open Russians encountered pro-tracted nomad which they could not overcome until late Petrinetimes. During the 1640s the Buryats around Lake Baikal were subdued byCossacks from Iakutsk and but the of the local Buryatsmeant that Irku tsk was founded only in 1661.38 During a of internalChinese unrest Cossacks established an independent territory on the Arnur,which, however, was forced to seek Muscovite support when the Manchusfought back to what they considered their dominion. The warlasted until the peace of Nerchinsk in 1689 returned the Amur to China inexchange for the promise of increased trade contacts.

By the early 1650s, Muscovy had, in little over half a century, extendednominal control over the enormous territory between the Urals and the Pacific,albeit not yet all of what today is called Siberia. The conquest thus was rapid,

that tod ay' s Siberia comprises abou t one -twelfth of the earth's

8 Introduction

landmass. that tsarist power also suffered serious thisrapidity raises an important question. While military and the net-work of waterways contributed to this an is as tohow the of capital in Muscovy, which could have thisquick was overcome. After all, Muscovy to out-manoeu-vre 's powerful Muscovy thwarted for a dominion overnorthern Russia and Siberia and a quest for direct trade with China all throughthe Time of by withholding information but not without commandingsignificant local I). This book asks how in a cash-starvedcountry Muscovites to overcome distance in terms of power and econ-omy and how this was politically and institutionally(Chapter 2).

The renewed interest of historians in Siberia following Perestroika and thebreak-uri of the Soviet Union concentrated on the natives. F"'r~"llh'~ challengeto Soviet of a close of Russian and native lowerclasses has the contribution of brute force to the Siberian balanceof power, the natives in particular the first of con-quest. 40 In turn this elicited a new concern with the natives' own rolein the economic of a sub-continent which was the furresources. These studies have also the fact that the seven-teenth century Russian power was restricted to the of rivers withthe of the more populated western Siberian areas immediately sur­rounding Tobol'sk, with settled or semi-nomadic native populations. suf­fered from voevodas' efforts to resettle Russian to feed the Cossacks,()('('l1n"111,O' native or hunting in another voevoda's district,often territorially with each other. However, collectors of the furtax relied on native notions of taxes, which had developed under the Mongols.It was impossible regularly to tax nomadic hunters in the endless forests bareof infrastructure without them by some means. This meant that astrong element of barter had to be added to the vague promise of security madeby the Cossacks. While this was unequal in terms of an ideal JlJalrc<cc,

introducing a strong extra-economic element, the widespread claims thatCossacks deceived native hunters are partly misleading: the assumption thatnatives could not judge the value of offered betrays a of arroganceand of fundamental economic laws. Prices relate to the relativescarcity of in different locations and to the distances wares have to travelto reach markets." Kotoshikhin, the fugitive clerk of the Ambassadorial chan­cellery already knew that the depletion of furs in western Siberia and the needto turn further east had increased .42 The efforts to over­come the enormous distances involved in the fur trade are one of the subjectsconsidered here. Some of the frequent, but locally limited native rebellions inthe and Tundra served to the terms of trade. Fear overthe small and isolated teams of iasak collectors in the endless forests.Cossacks were more than officials they acted as agents of the tsar's enterprisein the fur trade and simultaneously on their own account.

Introduction 9

Outside this new interest in Siberian natives is not matched by anynificant contribution to the study of their foes and the Cossacks as themain agents of the tsar's power in Siberia. them briefly, Lantzeff consid-ered the de of the Cossack as bythe Cossack oath, the of their service and mutual responsibility to thetsar. he did not why, the substantial profits that couldbe made in nobles either did not settle there or turned into Cossacks.vLongworth traces Cossacks in their diverse nationalistmyths. He claims two different of to the

and the a 'child of the open ethnicallywere naturally to Muscovite, unless they allied

still more formidable the Tatars:

Born of disorder and reared in the borderlands between theRussians of the northern forests and the destructive Tatars of the southern;jl<:;jJjJ<:;;j, [they] had the self-reliant man's for ~prl1T'it"

(Philip Longworth)

This romantic,their

of the Cossacks besides nomadscollides with Siberian reality. to how

treedom-Iovmg men like Errnak's Cossacks could become the 'unwitting ten­tacle of the Russian , Longworth suggests that they were unusually sub­missive to their leader from on in the of the Siberian Khanate.s-As Chapter 1 from a Cossack point of view there is nothing particular inthe chronicles Errnak's this which wassoon promulgated throughout Russia, stresses the same mechanisms that func­tioned among the 'free' Cossacks of the western frontier. were fur­ther adapted to Siberian conditions, in particular since the Cossack way of lifeengulfed all the tsar's Siberian servitors. musketeers and even thenominally deti boiarskie were known as 'Cossacks' and used thisterm about themselves.s' also called themselves 'servitors' or even 'serv-

Cossacks', but there was no rule as to the specific context in whichthis occurred all sources are more or less related to and the few sur­viving private letters do not allow any firm distinction of the contexts in whichthese terms were used.

In the instructions issued in Moscow to each voevoda, they wieldedsive powers. Originally field commanders, they had first superseded civil admin­istration by the namestnik late in the sixteenth century in frontier areas, wheremilitary leadership was the Time of Troubles they became morecommon in towns removed from the frontier. In towns, the voevoda wasrequired to decide harmoniously conjointly, without mutual hindrance, andwithout squabbles with his a second voevoda, a secretary or apod'tiachii s pripis'iu, who were usually appointed and instructionstogether." In Siberia, this system, with roots in Byzantine ideas about power-

and in Mongol double-circuit administration." was conducive to

10 Introduction

conflicts among the voevodas and afforded to Cossacks opportunities to interferewith administrarion.f The voevoda commanded the Cossacks and headed thelocal voevoda's office, mainly of undersecretaries han-

the and the sworn officials for tax and stocks. The voevodaheld the supreme court of law on the local level and decided over recruitment ofrank-anIJ-IUe, service allotments of and the to travel.His powers were, to the restricted by divine by therequirement not to offend the local population, by the associates' mutual agree­ment, and by the tsar's although the exact delimitation of the voevoda'sauthority and the issues to be referred to the and the tsar were notdefined .49 some of his kin and servants the voevoda,if anyone at all, in smaller towns, When by the Cossacks, hewas in the minority; thus, rebellions frequently overruled the voevoda's deci­

as Aleksandrov and Pokrovskii have shown. To explain the Cossacks'have relied on Western models of the 'estate-

representative monarchy' and of absolutism.s' which have been criticized fortheir reliance on arguments even where applied to France or England,Concerning Muscovy, evidence of an monarchy' which

absolutism is particularly scant. The so-called orassemblies of the land, Muscovy's main lacked codifiedregulations, were conv oked by the tsar and served to consent to tax bills ratherthan discuss them." Recent studies of Cossack communities west of the Uralshave not produced evidence for the assertion that Cossack identityduring the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries hinged primarily upon the juridi-cal statu s their distinction from other of a ruler. 52 to

there was no common Cossack for their extra deal withthe that Cossack history in a ... told in terms ofdiversity' .53 Though it will not be disputed that Cossacks adapted to their envi-ronment and were quite capable in remuneration and statusneither Boeck's explanation nor the model of the monarchycan adequately why had the necessary resources to do so, and thenature of these resources.

As bureaucracy grew throughout the seventeenth century, Aleksandrov andPokrovskii claim the tsar lost interest in the less controllable, but fully fledgedestates.54 as recent studies on western princely states have shown, even themost 'absolute' monarchs had to rely on their estates to some theimportance of consultation and consent.55 Thus the question needs to beaddressed whether there were other reasons for the loss of political significancethat Cossack forms of suffered in the century.

Russian historians increasingly doubt the interpretation of the Siberian recordsin terms of an estate of the Cossacks. Akishin has unearthed the reformer PeterI' s about the lack of the Mu scovite precurs ors of the town hall in Siberiantowns. Cossack groups lacked permanence and coherence to a that makesit dubious to consider them as estates. Vershinin has consequently re-evaluatedSiberian voevodas' aspirations and hitherto only discussed as an

Introduction II

of increased state power, him to conclude that voevodas were the onlymoving force in Siberia.5~

These studies, do not the of Cossacks and thevoevodas, or ask why Siberian Cossacks were useful to Moscow exceptinexpensive. Studies of the Terek and Don Cossacks notice this yetexpiam it by the Muscovite state's weakness and the low maintenancesufficient for Cossacks. The modem military reforms are usually measuredin terms of increased and the 'mercurial'in terms of loyalty and discipline Don Cossacks were often more effective

Tatar forces and Ottoman forts than Muscovite This isnot the only unnoticed contradiction in current accounts of Cossacks. The asser­tion that Cossack institutions were at the same time and democratic isleft among Cossacks is taken at face value, withoutfurther explanation as to how it worked, how far it was democratic and how this

democracy translated into or at least co-existed with military cost-effectiveness." Thus there is a gap in our about how the Cossackgroup functioned, and how it related to the to the tsar and to the chan-

system.Based on military and of the rim, this study

shows how the Cossacks flexible and inclusive forms of oraaniza-tion I). on the Cossacks in Poland-Lithuania, Kurnkehas shown that a very form of primary group was forthe characteristics of the noticed but not explainedingly in a welter of studies.t? Such a group, which I will call after Kumke'Personenverband' ,~O served the Cossacks as a basis for the articulation of theirneeds." These forms of and the institutional links between theCossacks and Moscow offer a coherent explanation for the of therapid establishment and consolidation of a Russian Siberia.

In a country renowned, even by modem standards, for its casn-starveoweak market relations and paltry infrastructure, private on theirown could not unleash the enormous dynamism of the Russian inSiberia. economic needs and political considerations contributed to set-

up a surprisingly effective state Monopolies bestowed on privatemerchant corporations by European colonial with the sameproblems of local and petty trade their as didMuscovy in Siberia.s? Siberian Cossacks were not simply brigands,as they are often portrayed.v' The Siberian chancellery did its best to motivateCossacks in the way Hanseatic merchants did by offering their sailors a small par-cel of stowage room (' Fiihrung') hauls.M on the oftions, and impelled under Soviet rule to the Cossack lower class in Siberiaas disadvantaged and poor, scholars have overlooked this issue (Chapter 2).

Studies of Siberian government and bureaucracy agree that it was ineffectiveand corrupt.~5 While that thismight be the outcome if modem criteria areapplied, this study re-evaluates the very conditions of effectiveness under whichthe Siberian bureaucracy functioned. Challenging conventional interpretations,

12 Introduction

this book shows that, under modem conditions and in a frontier environment,enormously distant from the centre, the administration did surprisingly well\'-J.1U.}'C\C' 4). To a considerable of still await ~rT'll1tiTHJ

since sources are sparse or do not contain the kind of information.eral cases, close study of the sources shows that is often a misleadinglabel for of officials; moreover, the wasunfamiliar to seventeenth century Russians. These assessments concur with a num-ber ofrecent of modem Russian which concede thatin essential such as the frontier or Muscovitechancelleries were more effective than in extractive "",Irlc <?~

Muscovite chancelleries can best be described as a historical indtversmz from modem terms, coupled a considerable

professionalism and adherence to norms which formulated them-with a that were to be treated to

scaled social value. Where the voice of a boyar more than that of a mem-ber of the gentry, Cossacks and other lower class Muscovites needed mech-anisms them access to and the ability to defend their localintere sts. Yet individuals were often lost in this env ironment chancellery clerksonly considered claims a handsome reward,"? Even so, members ofsome non-noble groups could the defence of their needs in the chancellerysystem due to concerns such as taxation or mil-itary demands.sf The Cossack group therefore was essential to providing the nee-e ssary for Coss ack needs in Moscow or with the voevodas,

Since Cossack groups were not permanent, while demanded aof permanence and a crucial question arises: How could

these groups sustain an institutional order that allowed forabout the terms of service and of valuable commodities? Toanswer this question, the nature of and soliciting has to be addressed.In Muscovy, the public was censored and public criticism often needed forcefulbackmg akin to a rebellion to make itself heard. How could negotiation take placeunder such conditions? In this Siberia differed most from the restof Muscovy. The use of institutions on both sides of the Urals, not leas tsince frontier conditions isolated each town and even more so a Cossack groupin the or the to a greater or lesser from influences outsideits local area. Still, these men were in particular need of contacts to Moscow, thevoevodas, and the chancellery system, for they lived on various kinds of trade orservices delivered to merchants. Since the addressee of litigation was in all casesa Moscow chancellery or the tsar, it was essential that an institution common toboth Siberia and Moscow was invoked. Social actors have commonly used insti­tutions such as monarchy to express contradictory concerns. In doing so, litigantsas well as wire-pullers had to rely on an approved claiming to derivefrom the fonts of monarchy rather than challenging its foundations. Cossacksamong others learned to apply this in a suitable way to convey theirconcerns, To explain this behaviour, this study makes use of recent developmentsin the analysis of institutions. In this book, institutions are seen as institutional

Introduction 13

mechanisms, consisting of of behaviour and symbolic repre-sentations of their aims. Institutions can be as 'symbolic orders' notrrnntvmo that institutions are 'just' emblematic, but that every 'order' bears aninstitutional form, in which its are This can be inany institutionally in gestures and material What usually,even in scientific vocabulary, is called an institution is on closer examination anorganization or a form of in which the visibility of its order is put oncentre stage: a state, family and educational establishments,sometimes also large -scaie pntprr'r; ~p~ ·o~

It is true that cannot exist without institutional mechanisms.However institutional mechanisms can exist without for ",,,,tuu}',,,,

in the the socially elaborated norms and sym-bols of romantic love or forms of On the other hand, tocodify and make even these norms controllable by , an canbe established, as in the century German 'friendship alliances'(Fieeundsdlcji'sb;Umte).Thus an institutional mechanism can be sustained as mereconvenuons, requiring a social base but not a as wasthe case with the Siberian Cossack Personenverbdnde.

Such a notion a resolution of recent controversies about theform of Muscovite government in the seventeenth century. The original meaningof the as 'slave of the tsar' in the salutationcontained in petitions or, to social rank and group, 'orphan of the sov-

was eroded over a time and even used in .71

Kivelson has clarified Muscovites' for the honourable state of servi­tude, which in their eyes was ethically different from that of slaves ~Pr'V1r\P'

the infidels or unjust masters. To oneself into an unfree position could bean action: if the tax base eroded and fled wil-fully, the dignity, and cultural values of those left behind were endan-

. Therefore the and the return of refugeeseventually, but unintendedly, to their own enserfrnent did not demon-

strate a spiteful, mentality, but aimed at fundamentalof survival, order and continuity. On the one hand, the master who was con­

sidered rightful and observed Orthodox custom for example, them incase of bad harvests that were frequent due to climatic conditions at the marginof agricultural feasibility, even though in reality that obligation was naturally notalways and by everyone observed was allowed to do almost to them.On the other hand, there was still a notion of obligations that could mean thatsomeone who acquired these powers without proper justification could be consid­ered a sham. the unsafe conditions in Muscovy, the tsar and chan-cellery system did a remarkably job in the tsar's of pietythat secured the most basic needs and values such as the vast num-bers of captives taken during small-scale nomad raids that trickled through thefrontier defences. Cash-starved Muscovy produced a welter of economic failures,and although the state was part of the process, it was not the only reason for thiscondition; it is thus not surprising that Muscovites perceived the state's role as

14 Introduction

re lie vine. In this sense, in seventeenth century Muse ovite servi-bondage were mostly compared to an often, though not

always and to unsafe state of freedom or 'at will' anotion that carried implications for both the victims and the perpetrators of actsof rebellion that were often difficult to distinguish from criminality.FThe Muscovite nexus between and criminality,however, cannot be observed in Siberia.

The of the salutation only partly on changingof the but also on the actual balance of power, whichGoldfrank and was tilted to the of thethe more arguments are fiscal demands, to serve andimpoverishment by demands of and the crown's sense of its prerogatives

"rrnrrlil1c to this consilium in Russia never bound the ruler which pre-vented coalescence of classes or of estates political

the prohibition of clubs and education until the sec-ond half of the century, and the of mutual distrust via slovo i delo gosu-darevo the denunciation of broadly defined utterances and actionsdirected the tsar rendered individuals incapable of resolute action." Yet,as will be in Siberia at the balance of power was much moreequal. Western has overlooked this, since the main agent of powerin the seemed elusive." flexibilityshould not be misunderstood as absence of structure. More inclined to take seri-ously the evidence of life than narrowly confined or constitutional

Soviet historians have provided but ill-defined which haveuntil now proven difficult to reconcile with historical terms and concepts.Intriguingly, Pokrovskii and Aleksandrov have claimed that the wordand affair i delo unity and resolute action inSiberia, the understanding of this norm for Muscovy west of the Urals.This, in tum, contradicts their own conviction that a unified 'political structure'existed on both sides of the Urals." Thus, a coherent explanation of local resoluteaction in the framework of the institutional culture of is 79

Analysis of the word and affair' (Chapter 3) with the institution-alist toolbox sheds new light on a protracted controversy. In the last two decades,several have been for the study of the particularistic inter-ests and the of litigation in the terms of the affair,which is identified as an ideology. As Perrie concludes, their drawback is theimpossibility of reconciling monarchist illusions of the rebels with their insubor­dination to the monarch's especially when the latter became more openlycondemning of the rebels' actions.w All these to the affairfall short of a problem how could both Cossacks and their""r'wrir,r" appeal to the word and affair to uphold divergent interests,

that they had to make use of the same unified symbolic order in which thearbitrary decision of the tsar was considered binding?

Rehbera, Schimmelpfermig and other recent theorists of institutions agree thatinstitutions often function exactly in this way. Institutions provided a common

Introduction 15

point of reference for interests. The actual of of papalauthority, of French or German monarchy was never beyond dispute.Relative to localities, social groups, time and the distribution of power in

divergent inrerpretarions of an institution were These mterpre-tations were contested and, at the same time, to foster stability and penna­nence in a social reality that is always more prone to institutional IJrE:aK-OClWll,claimed to derive from authoritative sources and to be in anorovecidioms. To stress this function of a forum for interests within what wasconsidered divine or what in modern is a set of rules andsymbolic these authors have coined the term idea' .81

An institution is conte sted since those who are physicall y, intellectually andsociallv capable of it for their actions can apply it as a resource ofnower.s- Institutional identifies different ideas for thelegitimate interpretation of an institution. A idea is a determination ofwhat 'the state', the Roman Catholic Church, 'art' etc., or 'the' affairshould be at a moment. Institutional shows that this selectively

acceptance from among a multitude of which compete andguiding idea is only temporarily successful by set

from and above a of often-incompatible potential orientations.Since the idea is a product of and a of contradicting

it disowns many of the senses and drafts of order. Yet this is thevery reason why its validity is never uncontested and on differentsituations, interests and social groups. The idea of of papalism.t'of or German monarchy was always contested and, at the sametime, from the of needs was claimed as unified,secured from the authentic sources and therefore irrefutable.e' Institutional analy­sis contributes to the study of communication since it allows for theexpression of needs within the limits of a shared institution, for exam-

the word and affair, or service.s'The latter argument is important for the history of the Muscovite empire.

Recent studies on Muscovy's and local politicshaverevealed that the centre often found it hard to influence them, and was forced tomake significant concessions. Even after the final defeat of the Solovkimonastery revolt in 1676 monks in this and other great northern monasteries pur-sued politics of the ecclesiastical authorities. Schismatic monaster-ies and in other and in particular in Karelia were ofteninspired by particularistic Extensive Moscow carters' settlementswere left off the hook of police contrcl.f The chancelleries supported northernpeasants in their with landlord s on their and lands.88

Far from the all-controlling central power, Moscow even had to compro-mise with the southern frontier which were the instruments of itsauthority.t? As late as the early l680s, to southern needs was animportant element to the success of military reforrn since southerners enj oyed theopportunity to their relationship by temporarily putting themselvesout of reach. food supplies, Moscow made far-reaching concessions,

16 Introduction

the implications for sueh essential iss ues as military refoml. 90

For the central Russian Kivelson stresses the lack of invoevoda therefore decrees disapproved by local strongmen and theirri vals often could not be carried out. networks, inclu ding locals andcentral staff, formed parallel structures of Already to con­temporaries, the seventeenth century was known as the 'rebellious century' ,92 acondition the tsar's rule. the only area under Moscow'sunrestricted sway was the western from the burdens of war,which the tsar could discipline the military." In what amounts to anificant shift of focus on a new basis of evidence, the question has therefore beenraised what the centre could contribute to politics, and how far and bywhat means it could control the re~~1011S."

How central control was at all under modem conditions whichdid not most of the means of communication we are used to, in anadverse climate, an countryside and with enormous distances to becovered, is a question has ans wered con ventionallines. Muscovy as a whole, with too great an on the per-haps untypical of Ivan IV, historians have pointed out that autocracy servedas a kind of Procrustean bed, off locally assertive communities militarilyand by them." Local elected officials and the Moscow'srepresentatives in the who frequently asked for detailed orders to

their actions, were taken at face value to prove that local initiative wascurtailed in favour of centralized control. Yet this policy ended in (h~:~rr;lV

plunging the nascent into a period of internal troubles at the tum of thesixteenth century. Andreas has provided a more subtle explanation not-

that the Muscovite political system included different modes of ;nt,>o-rClt;"n

and various kinds of social groups, often without them, cultivating andcn-upunz local elites/" Yet while it is part of the explanation that local noblesbecame part of the this still does not completely explain howMoscow could exert any influence on the number of it gov-erned. Kivelson has pointed out that even the considered themain tool in a conscious effort at uprooting and the nobility andgentry, did not guarantee that state orders were obeyed in the Apart fromcurbing attempts at separation, this instrument did not much improve the state'sauthority over these territories. Resettled gentry developed a new sense of localcommunity and tended to concentrate their lands within one or a few rather cir­cumscribed provinces. Contributing to our understanding of centre-permhervrelations, Kivelson envisions relations between Moscow and the centralprovinces th'rru ro h the prism of noble a parallelpower structure to the official bureaucracy. At the apex of these competing net­works stood the high and middling nobility in the Moscow chancelleries, relatedto local figureheads who could mobilize sufficient support among neighboursand among their own peasants. Clients of particu lar officials at the centre, thesemen from among the provincial gentry provided pressure groups drawn from thelatter and their peasants to defend their more circumscribed local interests.

Introduction 17

Bushkovitch has shown that, even under Peter I, noble networks continued toinfluence politics.?"

Historians of Siberia have tended to networks as of anauthoritarian unfolding throughout the seventeenth century, which

aside more modes of social life. Yet in terms of dom-ination, had more ambivalent effects than is often particularlyin the Siberian frontier. Where trade and rl <:"'0'1'-"'('\" ~

frontier conditions combined to create the Cossack group,the wielded important powers. in distantSiberia was available closer to the local level than in central Muscovydue to the administrative srrucurre." Moscow aimed to overcomemodem conditions of and the potential threat of separation,exacerbated by Siberian distances and bad communications, by therm;ru;rQ-:,YSlenl; yet this move could be made effective only by concedingicant political influence to local power brokers. Thus, the Cossack group oftenbalanced the terms of an unequal implied by toward itsown advantage.

Nancy Kollmann has chosen another approach, demonstrating that, inMuscovy, the defence of honour of of the population bythe tsar and his courts was one of the means by the centre to integratethe In too, this was an important means of one'sacclaim among the not least since honour was a precondition forelected to the more . Although the tsar and his courts in the-ory honour, it depended on the Cossack group, since election docu-ments had to be by Cossacks.lv'

In his influential account of Siberia's administration in the seventeenth cen-tury, Lantzeff overlooked issues. He claimed that Siberia's administra-tion was akin to a business on the part of the Muscovitegovernment. The 'modem' bureaucratic features he noted in the administrationrested on several assumptions that recent researchers have no

perceive the great clans and the non-titled families of royal servi-tors as constant rivals in a for power at court, but rather as interwovenstrands in the fabric of a elite. Contrary to earlier interpretations positingthat Muscovite politics can be understood as the of a declining court aris-tocracy to defend its power the of a provincial gentry,high-ranking clans and the tsar shared a common interest in the effectiveness ofthe government and the well-being of the realm. 103 The whomLantzeff considered the of bureaucracy, accompanied voevodas only

the initial decades of the seventeenth century to some of the moretant destinations in Siberia. 104 the role of who were raised fromthe lower ranks of Muscovite society to become heads of chancelleries, dimin­ished, as nobles noticed the power of the administration. Brown hasquestioned their independence from court factions. In Brown's reading, all chan­cellery from the loftiest boyar to the humblest sought theirniche where they could make a living. They could rely on their own chancellery

18 Introduction

staff to defend their but not on the staff of other chancelleries,Collegiate arrangements had only limited relevance to r''''~tr'i(,til1IO' arbitrary rule,not least since only administratively more towns were held bytwo voevodas.

Customs administration was another field in which the Siberian chancellerytried to introduce as much accountability as The Siberian triedto further this aim by skilfully selected from different socialgroups and by controls. Merchants from towns in Siberia andFI1·rnn"Cl,., Russia staffed the customs houses in the main towns. This was aitable office since Siberian Russians for the honour of allowed toselect customs officials among their own as soon as local communities became sol-vent to guarantee the exact and profitable of thisHowever, voevodas often on the business of the customs officer. Bothwere instructed to and each other's butonly the customs chosen in a different town, hewas from the voevoda's jurisdiction, but without autonomous powers ofcomrnand.ws In some the customs officer provided the seals needed tosafeguard the passage of petitioners to the tsar. They sometimes shared a commoninterest since voevodas allied with the great Moscow merchants and their represen-

to smooth their business and for mutual assistance with safe-guarding and intercession at the Siberian In smaller settlementssworn men were chosen to tax collection. Where local merchants wereabsent but trade was strong, Cossacks could be chosen. The roadsbetween Siberia and Russia to were also recruitedfrom Cossacks and sworn men. At the official border of voevo-das were controlled on and Siberia. Fixed amounts of specifiedwares and moneys were to every position, which voevodas could notexceed in theory; in however, a more flexible attitude prevailed. Even so,to excessive voevodas' wares were sealed and listed at the localcustoms house. Similar controls applied to merchants and who were con-trolled at each customs station, where were to pay the tithe .110

Consequently, Siberian administration cannot be as a 'modembureaucracy', or at least as bureaucratic only in a more restricted sense, asChapter 4 will show in detail. Ultimately, the Siberian chancellery could not relyexclusively on established to extract revenues from Siberia. Lantzeffnoted that the of earlier times marred orderly administration.Nevertheless, he did not reconcile his wider assertion that the evident effective­ness of Siberian administrative 'a toward the bureau­cratic administration of more modem times' .111 It also remains unclear how theSiberian chancellery managed to contribute, according to conservative estimates,on average about 10 per cent of the state's budget; moreover, it was rare con­vertible revenue.l'? As elsewhere in the early modem era, the tsars had to rely onestablished local communities or elites to pursue their aim ofreturns;'!' in the case of Siberia, these were mainly the Cossacks. What, then,were the incentives for loyal service to the tsar?

Introduction 19

Answers to the problem of provided for Siberia on the militarypreponderance of the musket when combined with fortifications and other mili-tary innovations. an in defensive situations, neverthe-less did not much when iasak. In the forests, unwieldy rnu sketswere often less useful than quick and silent bows. Another explanationconcentrates on the waterway system allowing rapid movement across the sub-continent, 14 the rivers still forced Muscovite traders, Cossacks andcouriers to travel across burdensome Natural networksof and teehnical innovations do not how such an enterprisewas . One of the earliest historians of Gerhard Muller, stressedthe role of the state to the success of Muscovite colonization ofwlL'<Cll,", but did not address many of the of such an 1

modem states could find it difficult to govern even a townlike close by the in southwest I~ An oft-repeated

goes 'the is and the tsar is far away'. While the latter presump-tion cannot be distance as a misses the main

Over the Russians have shown often that disre-distance to a difficult to in most environrnents.

This of distance on the institutional environment. Whatcounted was that the focal of the the central thetrading posts and fortresses were by common institutions. On their wayto or from Moscow, Siberian Cossacks did not ask for the 'essence' of institu-

or which social structure deserved the name institution. were inter-ested in institutional mechanisms that could stabilize social relations sooverstretched in Siberian conditions. It was an accomplishment to transform theconungeru into something , which 'Iasted' , even if on closer inspectionthe actual was visible. This of and 1"p~t1""il1i1"'O' regulations,which nevertheless simultaneously empowered individuals and local communi­

is treated by institutional analysis. Institutional attainments can I <:;u.<:; VlO.

or function as a resource for producing something new and improvepotentials of and interaction. In these they always have tobe related to power potentialities, to and overt as well as covert inequal­ity."? As as Cossacks could rely on these institutional structures and stan-dards, even for recently recruited and often impoverished theof a the frontier up to a year in one direc-tion could become calculable. Institutions such as the affair, salary,partial tax-exemptions, material support for travelling to Moscow, elections andthe to advice to the commander or voevoda also amounted to ""1"ivil,"O'p

It rendered Cossack status in Siberia attractive to vagrants, natives, pe asantseven merchants or their relatives.

Since authority in the had collapsed due to the disintegration of the suc-cessors of the Mongol Empire, in the resulting power vacuum, organization wasthe most sought after resource. In its absence, the southern borderlands depopu­lated due to frequent raids from nomad groups, which had an inclination to splitand, despite autochthonous forms of obedience, in a 'search for central

'hidden'

20 Introduction

authority' which could be extended to outside 18 Once such an organiza­tion was established, many merchants from Bukhara established permanent rep-resentatives or themselves in Tobol'sk the first towards directRu sse-Chinese trade. 119 While on institutional mechanisms,these cannot be set up quickly. institutions entailscosts, since on acceptance by a wide array of social organizationsand fields. It is this wide applicability of an institution and theexpected behaviour that makes it attractive and benefits toagents. Consequently, it is also very to institutions the morebroadly are the more agents have to their habits andtheir acquired behaviour

It was therefore a momentous decision of the Moscow to adoptthe title of tsar, in the nomad societies in the form of the 'Whitetsar/khan'. The descent was of particular use to theCossacks, their name from outcasts of the Tatar/Mongol army.Throughout the Siberian adoption of the title by themeant that anyone who the of the Moscow tsar tan-

benefits in interaction and trade with those nomads that sought loosealliance and trade in Muse ovy rather than with its enernie s.121 Asshown in I, Siberian Cossacks this reality. It is these co-ordinat-

services the tsars provided that historians have underestimated. werealso substantial in the of frontier defences and the redemption ofslaves by nomad bands throu ghout the southern frontier.P?

Institutional co-ordination and a chance of obtaining a favourable outcomea stream of petitions flowing 70 per cent of were con-

firmed and by the tsar or the chancellery; reiteration was prohibited onlyif the tsar had a definite decree. 123 Power was from a torrent ofinformation collected, documented and compared in the chancelleries. unlikethe stem and brutal reactions to Cossack and rebellions on the westernside of the town rebellions in Siberia were much more difficult to sup­press. concentration of was too to supply, and of necessitywould have depleted the fur resources, which were paramount in any considera­tion of Siberian politics. In Siberia, investigations and trials, leadership,concessions and trade opportunities to a took the place of centrallyorganize d, naked force in the pacification of Cossack re bellions,

Empire and expansion

Muscovy's is a of a medievalChristian princely state transforming itself into a great power within150 years. It did so by supplementing and backing up increasingly up-to-datetechnologies and forms of organization with medieval and steppe politics and cul­ture, build ing in the process, that was frau ght with setbac ks and sudden, unex-

leaps, a Eurasian empire.

Introduction 21

Since the fourteenth century, Muscovy collected the lands of Rus', which itconsidered its inheritance, although they were mostly under Lithuanianrule, a unitary the of Kazan' 1552 andAstrakhan I it became a multi-ethnic, multicultural, and multi-religious

gathering the lands of the Golden Horde and the commercialarteries of Northern

Muscovy different means of the collection of thelands of Rus"; most of them were variants of those by other princelystates the modern processes of concentration and integration.These methods were to increase the level of taxation craved by thedeveloping fiscal-military state to finance the needs of warfare in an agein which new military up and were constantly

by mercenaries. from co-opnnzism to enhance the state's local presence, establishingtern, to the forced mass relocations used importantprovinces like Kazan' or the soon lost Polotsk,where bonds between local communities were strong after thewars and frequent of sides in the conflicts in which Muscovy engagedits western 127 contrast, in eastern and southern Orthodoxprovinces sporting strong local communities, like forced relocationswere a very limited in which allowed affectedservitors a of manoeuvre even during the Oprichnina. In these areas, asanvwhere in the settled of the the state profited from itsincreasing administrative slowly throughout the sixteenthcentury, centrally appointed and locally elected officials, while localsbenefited from formalized informal more efficientand a of and order. 128

Heavy reliance on the middle and lower service cavalrymen in a bellicosemeant that lost their and were

excluded from participation in the system of local and central admin-istration and its benefits. Often from exploitation and oppression,

wealthy boyars who could afford to manage estates more leniently, whileothers swelled the numbers of those who used criminal means to earn their mea­gre livelihood. The y left behind impoverished cavalrymen on their serviceestates, frequently the ubiquitous bandits.F? Those who to maketheir stay encroached on members of other service clans depend-ent peasants. DO In this way, building an effective and expansive military-fiscalstate in an area at the margin of agricultural viability provided important servicesto local cavalrymen and but overstretched the resources and fed into thestreams of mobility of land and people that eventually brought aboutthe break-down of the Time of Troubles; as R.T. Frost posits, a crisis of the veryprinciple of service in the eastern Slavic world.l!' Nevertheless, the groundworkfor the Russian state had been laid and the local administration of guba elderscontinued to throughout the disruptive civil war; before Polish-

22 Introduction

Moscow the second levy set upMuse ovite structures. 1

Although Orthodox Christianity was the official religion vigorously defendedreal or 'heretics', whether were Old Believers, Protestarus,

Catholics or 'Jews', and at the same time aimed at proselytizing among Animists,Jews and Muslims, power relations on the steppe to some impelledMuscovy to to considerations shared with surroundingempires, such as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Ottoman or the suc-cessors to the 33 It also shared a common strategy with medievalLithuania, the pagan rival that had come to dominate Rus' from thethirteenth century onwards: a confrontation with Western powers theyboth assimilated vast eastern areas that had arrived at a relative power vacuum,to incre ase re venues .134 Muscov y relied on elements that had been common toMiddle Eastern cultures in Antiquity and, to some still united Christianityand Islam, such as the cult and literature of Wisdom that had been enshrined inthe and Polotsk cathedrals, and was revived in the 1550s inthe Moscow Golden Palace murals, in Kremlin and in consecrationsof cathedrals in Vologda and Tobolsk, It had been transferred in advice literaturein both the Persian and the Russian traditions.U> Thus, andclient elites even when were forcibly resettled and their was tern-

porarily vigorously suppressed.Muscovy drained Tatar nobles by andconversicn.l 's six teenth century re seulernents ofMuscovite scribes nr'p~pr'vprt the of merchants and Tatar but notfor servitors of less Orthodox root who often intermarried withTatars. 137

Muscovy followed itsimperial mission of from captivity andbeen for many centuries the main source forowed by sub-Saharan Africa.t-s Unlike Southern whereterritorially states could not lead redemption efforts effectively forwhich monastic orders were best suited.t-? in seventeenth century Muscovy thestate took over from the patriarch, introducing a new hearth-tax after a specialcensus at least 5,OOO-150,(](JO roubles per annum, devoting in the first halfof the century some 5 million roubles to ransoming Orthodox slaves.tw Thus,Muscovy shouldered limited tasks beyond the scope of ordinary mod­ern military-fiscal states, in which expenses for the military and the court wereidentical with overall expenses. Muscovy yielded many fruits from thesepayments: its main integrative ideology, which had helped to the con­quest of Kazan', central to the 'traditional' epithet of the 'pious' tsar, codified asthe only doctrine in the 1649 Ulozhenie , ransoming helped to spread thefame of the Muscovite tsar in Orthodox lands. Redemption business createdclient societies, sueh as the Don Cossac ks acting as interrne diaries, depend ing onthe 'pious' tsar financially, and, in case of captivity, placing their on him.t-'Along with tributes and inducernents paid to nom adic Ieaders, this trade con­nected friends and foes on the frontier, transcending seemingly insur-

Introduction 23

mountable differences. Its outcomes were ambivalent: it tied suc-cessors of the Mongol to Muscovy, to divide con-federations of nomadic tribes but it also drained the Muscovitesettled core of resources never economic

frequently-disintegrating nomadic confederations and withporous the choice was whether resources were off inthe form of manpower or money; those who fled from tax burdens stillcontributed to the by the fecund soils of the wooded

frontier.At least as important as ransom, tribute and client societies was the

military. Confrontation with Western powers and a slow process of adaptation tochanges in and that advanced in ever since the Italiancuv-states embraced it in the fourteenth century, fomented in Russia a militarycapable of strikes and at the same time frontier fortificationsthat a modicum of on an area almost void of natural defences.The Military Revolution in massiveimperceptibly with setbacks from the second half of the sixteenth to theeighteenth century. In Poland-Lithuania, a peculiar adaptation of this process toEastern quick and movements of

had the tovarzysz-system of recruitmentand the new of infantry lines in fulllop with their which formed the backbone of the szlachtaand translate d into political for the noble s.142 Yet the cultural and eco-nomic underpinning of Polish nobiliary might, to the naval powers,did not exist in Mu scovy, where Orthodox noble s still not in Ieftinitiative for new techniques to the state and to costlynaries and advisors. This the character of cultural reception:was uneven throughout the population, a Ru ssia of several resulted .144

Nobles from access to the tsar and the imperial capital that was at the sametime a bustling trade hub, and from their temporary deployment as military com­manders and administrators to the imperial and provincial backwarers.t-!Diversification of their income minimized risk in a that was threatened inmany ways: it was subject to invasion as well as pin-prick raids from almost allsides and suffered from widespread banditry and from its position at the very

of agricultural feasibility, in losses whenever weather condi-tions vacillated even minimally. The tsars obliged service nobles high and lowimpoverished by equal inheritance by distributing conquered, unoccupied andconfiscated territories on the basis of service. nobles, their servicerecords, and were essential in such a system, con­tributing to the growth of central administration. Stakes in different parts of theempire and in more than one economic activity, or at least potential access tothem, increased the security of a Moscow noble, and the source of these richeswas the tsar and expansion.

Absence of natural borders and, in the sixteenth century, mounting insecurityin the meant incessant wars, in which Muscovy was often enough the

24 Introduction

aggressor, as in the first Northern War (1 fought for the inheritance ofthe Teutonic Order. No able to shoulder costs of theOrder's suffered invasion by the Muscovites in search of topopulate their who, after defeat by Polish-Swedish ceded theLivonian to Poland. The conflict first assembled the includingBrandenburg and who met in numerous battles over access to andhegemony in the Baltic Sea area.

the Time of Troubles IS98/1605-13, territories in the Westwere lost to Sweden and Poland-Lithuania. seventeenth century mercantil-ism and state monopolies aimed at Muscovy's weaknesses, but ittook time to form a sufficient economic base.l"? The late-seventeenth centuryRussian supply response to Westem an open economy, andcommercial not least towards Stockholm, some of the under-pinnings of the Petrine military Building up manufacturesfor military supply, of the Russian officer corps fromthe Thirteen-Years War (1 and the artel' as a group of soldierssupplying and for motivated due to their nepenn-ency on and access to booty, distinguished late Muscovite and especially Petrineannie s.148 These internal structures of the fiscal-military state had already over­come the greatest obstacles to reform before Peter acquired his momentous in­depth of the latest such as mathematicalfoundations of shipbuilding and navigation, his roots in Muscovite Orthodox cul-ture, the myth of the new and to the West, as well as a down-to-earth attitude a chord in many of his shared by a significant

of the elite. His creation of a army com-manded by a Russian officer corps and manned by thenavy allowing for the first time to take Reval and and the new conditions of

most importantly the Table of Ranks 1722 that provided a clear frame­work of status and allowed the possibility of promotion merit withoutthreatening the social hierarchy based on birth, was overwhelminglyaccepted by the service elite. These made Peter's capable of over-

FI1'r"np'~ most advanced military machine, the Swedish army.t-?

Terminating the important period of the Northern Wars in Northeastern Europeanhistory, the Great Northern War (1700-21) culminated in Peter I's victories atPoltava 1709 and after a thorough adaptation to the Military Revolutionit la russe,150 and added Estonia, Livonia, with the new capital ofStand parts of Karelia to the empire .151

While military might was important in the tsar's as a power-ful ruler, and in fact sealed as a power under It ISsymptomatic that by far the most momentous and lasting in westward expan-sion during the seventeenth century was won without a Muscovite bulletbut a major war: Khrnel'nyts'kyi's 1648 revolt against Polish magnateswas fuelled by the social of the Commonwealth's unwillingness toestablish a permanent military force perceived as a threat to the Republic. Thesubsequent hesitant towards the agreement of an anti-Polish alliance at

Introduction 25

Pereiaslav in 1654 finally won Muscovy the left bank of the and access tonew outposts such as Kiev. By no means, though, had elite Cossack offi­cers lost their taste for Polish culture and status of a noble citizen in what was per­ceived as the Renaissance ideal of a citizen army,152 or ordinary, youngCossacks orientation at short-term aims rather than stable social structures. WhilePoland had and to some succeeded in Cossacksand some of them into more reliable infantry,' it suffered the draw-back of modem states to introduce armies but unable to paywages the disciplined back with even more skill154 and withouthesitating accepted the crucial help of the Crimean Tatars, Poland's eastern rival,

a slowly mixture of medieval, and modem policies,offended Cossacks by its , authoritarian attitude and constant inroads

their autonomy, but offered service and failed to in particularthe Don Cossacks until the important southern was won bythe time of the of the Crimean Khanate in the centuryand the former rival in the west 55 all Cossack vagaries,Muscovy at least continued to support from a substantial group among theCossack hosts, led in the Left Bank by Ivan Briukhovetsky, in the 1660s and

. In Lithuania, where and resistance initially balancedafter the invasion in 1 its quickly eroded when behaved in amanner far from tsar Alexis' to local con-cermnz the heterodox of the population, while the glut of on themarket drove down their Muscovy was still unable to sustain more thanthree in consecutive years. Lithuania was lost while Muscovyretained the Left and Kiev in the Truce of Andrusovo1667.15~

For Muscovy, it sufficed to divide Cossack groups or nomadic tribes and inte-grate many of them as loose clients displaying financial 57 Moscowhosted an aristocratic diaspora, from Crimeans to who prove usefulas potential claimants to future positions of power in their former realms or inadministrative in the complex It wasimportant, though, that the tsar maintained an fiction of a subject sta-tus of these peoples and groups, even as many did not share this view. Muscoviteimperial culture allowed the of egalitarian local customs and hierarchicalstructures even contradictory valuesl'" locally, socially, andrary valid guiding ideas allowed Moscow to maintain an of control and theleaders of tribes to maintain an of equality, for example, on issuessuch as whether iasak was tribute or trade, or a shert' a peace treaty or a far morebinding oath of 59 For a Cossack or a nomad it was essential to be con­sidered not a deserter or robber but legitimate subject of a ruler orone merely accepted as such by nomad leaders.l~o Moreover, the institutionalmechanism of the word and affair helped to make sure that the locallyand temporarily most powerful group access to the governor, the chan­cellery, and the tsar, as as it claimed to serve the latter. The myth of the benev­olent tsar gave Muscovy an advantage in the power competition over

26 Introduction

systems like the that abhorred strong central power and nomadconfederations or Cossack societies perpetually in search of strong leadership.

Evidently that form of pacification did not mean that all was well, it rathergradually stopped the of nomadic confederations and their subsequentbreak-ups.xreating smaller and smaller units that could ever more be inte-

into the Pacification was reinforced by buildingcostly fortificationlines that put an end to incursions by Tatar armies. At first con-sisted of wooden forts and felled trees, heads directed to the criss-cross-

the frontier and, in the century, the open divided andencircled nomad and provided for further peasant

the militarily enfeebled tribes into andacceptance of Russian law and hierarchies to defend their land or, as in the Razinand Bashkir cases, into the bloodletting of revolt and

expansion, the frontier was not just porous and hard torolled, local institutional relations:building of fortifications, distribution of to and themwith defence led to further with its corollary loss of

to new groups of settlers closer to the next fortifications line who offered todo the job for less. Local established to deal with frontieremergencies were subsequently diverted to supply local army detachments bythen wars.1~2 This powerful process erossed the frontier and

like a slow wave, producing unstable social and institutional boundariesand when combined with at increas-

discipline or payments. Muscovy its frontier andrelations well, opportunities for service for the newlynomads and them in far-away battles, booty, and caouves,instead of them after the initial conquest, when fortification pro-ceeded at the next line, even if that meant inefficient warfare on the western bor-der and a troublesome in or Poland.w' Sharedelements, such as the already mentioned 'Wisdom of God', which highlightedcommitment to harsh and law facilitating trade essential tonomad or Tatar in Ivan IV's service clad in 'God'sWrath' provided a common ideology and ritual in addition to orientationat a new great power, helping to create a conquest movement out of disparatetribal units and facilitating state-building processes.

To estimate the influence of expansion, a contrast of sorts is instructive: in thedemographic revolution of the prosperous and rebellious late-sixteenth centuryNetherlands, the Military Revolution proceeded under the vigorous control ofwealthy and whose aim to contain and discipline theLal1dskl1echt-mercenaries at low costs was achieved following prole-tarianization of a part of the population that had nowhere else to go forbecoming a sailor in gruesome conditions on the ships leaving for the colonies.1M

In Russia, due to expansion in a continuous territory, a cash-starved economy andlow population density, the Military Revolution failed to discipline surplus pop­ulations, produced a well-developed chancellery system and a powerful military

Introduction 27

while gradually the of formal political participation, increas-promulgating monologous law without societal participation and finding it

difficult to internal Iawless spaces.lv? Thus, Russia became a countrythat colonized itself in several senses: it was unable to externalize social costs ofseventeenth century economic and cultural efforts in a continuoustPrrlt(wvl~8 and it extended the middle of confluence of several cultures toits very in the native elites to and inits capital, which was yet unheard of in the of the maritime empires.In Northern too, the middle of inclusive cultural, economic anddiplomatic relations was by competition of colonial over fron-tier areas, native middle men in an position for negotiation,but the nation states drew upon established metropolitan institu-tional culture. I~9 Mu scovy colonized itself by monopolies on

commodities to merchants and while man-to derive the benefits as it established an effective fiscal-military state. Its

flexible imperial culture that was medieval, and Europeanto was difficult to and merchants as offi-cials used it to blunt the purposes of the maritime colonial powers which could

a foothold only if merchants or applied for privi-and to the tsar. no The proce sse s of Asianization and

Europearuzanon are best in the foundation of two coloniesin the medieval or antique sense: St was meant to be the'Europeanized' capital soon by a cosmopolitan elite while Peter'sfirst military success but lost in 1711, was set up in the same crude Perrineway of modem social massive amounts of forced labourand epitomized colonial failure and the continuing inability of the new-ranzieoPerrine elite to make true its ambitions and of a new, 'scientific' way ofcharting and the southern 171

The Petrine revolution from above topped tendencies of modernizingand of abandoning formal political participation Muscovite sensitiv-

proving victorious due to the force of personality of one man who prevailedover his many adversaries. 172 His attempts to introduce efficient local institutionsto stabilize recruitment and taxation, however, failed, mainly because in Russia,unlike in Peter's model consent of the peasants was not essential sincethe service elites reliably crushed their resistance. Peter the ineffi-

of serfdom, but realized that it was the fundamental basis of the Russianservice system. As the twentieth century proves, modem military technologyenables a small, militarized social elite to secure and maintain great power statuson the basis of a backward and undeveloped rural economy; Russia paid theonly in 1917. 173

Sources

Though copious, the nature of Muscovite bureaucratic heldlargely in the Siberian Chancery and in local archives, means that there are

28 Introduction

substantial in these not least in the one-sidedness andformulaic nature of the welter of frequently repetitive official documentation,revealing some of the most valuable information only between the lines. Petitionswritten or ordered by local Cossacks a valuable different perspective,although even these are written in an official, formulaic

To a restricted extent, published document collections remedies to thissituation. There are some letters by Siberian whichare for the way Cossacks articulated themselves in non-official docu-ments, although rather sparse in and to the kind ofsources that historians of Western find; 174 there are no known Cossackdiaries. Cossacks could express themselves in in the manifold ontheir travels but these do not contain the kind of information needed forthis study. by German ambassadors and an officerin the tsar's service add some colour to the dry Some valu­able materials on the church, on annals and on towns have been edited in the1980s-90s.17~

In Cossack and and the elements of theinstitutional culture, I have used a multitude of sources both published andunpublished. Particularly cases that have, to my , not beenused are sometimes found between other papers of the Irkutsk 177

existing descriptions of the files can be or .The recent pub-lications of sources related to towns and the copy-book of the Tobol'sk archbish-

have proven helpful.178In the absence of published materials I have usedRezun's on the Tukhachevskii campaign. Compared to the well-observedand cited detail in the part, the is unassum-

and does not follow established models; the author often expresses bewilder-ment about evidence.F? A 1720s helped to establishthe inclusion of traders and in Cossack service.180 On the yearsafter the Time of Troubles, I have used publications of diplomatic materials andthe materials collected by Mirller.l'" For the material life of Cossacks I havedrawn on the edited by a German officer, on the map of Irkutsk in theRernezov atlas (1701),182 and on aforementioned publications. Most u;:;,.J ;:;';:;~,

and on salary are archival materials.Processes of institutionalization, bribery, and are trace-

able in these publications, in the copybook of the in publishedannals, in archival materials such as and for salary, in petitionsfound in the archives, in a recent synopsis of the Russian Orthodox bible, in thematerials published in Muller's lstoriia, and in the description by a member ofthe Polish sziachta.

This study answers recent, justified criticism of studies of the sovereign'word and affair that concentrate exclusively on rebellions, since they tend toeschew social relations in more peaceful times.184However, in Siberia rebellionswere a frequent The approach chosen in this study re-ernbeds partic­ipants in their social networks and institutional culture to understand the signifi­cance of their actions, not only against the background of assumptions

Introduction 29

about the relative socio-economic of estates, but on that of their every-day and the options available to them in the institutional culture inwhich lived. Institutional to uncover the ofinstitutions in political and social interactions. Institutions would not be viable if

were only efficient on a level of that theremained intact. Their in situations

acceptance or lost it, and we know this world of interaction only to a modeston the level of events considered important by historians such as the

rarze-scaie. spectacular rebellions but need clarification aboutinsignificant aav-to-cav local administration, litigation, and other forms of socialinteraction. In order to understand the impact of a petition, for it is nec­essary to know the of the which reveals morefully only in the petty local documentation of their daily existence. The Siberian

in Moscow, the great taken at "VI,''''-,C'''!,> rrl"t"'ri"l~

could only partially reconstruct events of a rebellion. were not nee-",~,,,,uq interested in the reasons for a and their investigationsat the point when it broke down. Information was more when itreached Moscow, and therefore lost some detail. Less 'relevant' information fromPVf'rv,1>lv chancellery business was left behind in the local where itsometimes survived. The same to many records of business transac-

which in abbreviated form only in the customs and tominor, but very petty law-suits amongCossacks.mirnniae of the and the of to indi-vidual instructions for and who receivedthem from the local voevoda, lists of who evaded their duty by

money to substitutes or appointments, are all found among thedocuments of the local voevoda's office, allowing some into the lives ofthe of rebellions. This information is not available for every persondue to the of the archives and some materials lost by butmost of the Cossacks who took part in the rebellions have left some other traces.Computer-based evaluation of the material allows more effective andre-ccruextualizing of personal data, and the reconstruction of links between par­ticipants that were ostensibly unrelated.

The database contains 1,668 entries on Irkutsk informationabout name; function; careers; kinship and links; of serv-

other observations on their role in former rank; locality; date ofa special label allowing the of personal connections; literacy; and

hyperlinks to relevant notes from sources. It allows the of connectionsbetween Cossacks to terms in one label and makes calculat-

proportions, for instance, of literate men among different localities andyears easier. Where names were garbled, incomplete, or there was more than oneperson of the same name, comparison of entries helped to establish the identityof the person.

The rebellion has been chosen since previous researchers have cov-ered it inadequately, and the archive of the Irkutsk voevoda's office is the most

30 Introduction

extensive and on the Siberian much of thewealth of local detail needed in this study. The only other surviving extensivelocal Siberian that of Iakutsk, is much more monotonous, possiblybecause of the different social and economic structures in the north, and becauseof its distance from the frontier and from trade routes. The 791 filesof the Irkutsk each up to 250 folios for this study con-centrate on the from the end of the l680s to the I 700s. containa welter of sources of a primarily local nature that if at all, only been usedin a statistical way in a narrow social historical the results of which

for a few brief articles are unavailable in most in particular out-side Russia.t'" It may have contributed to the wealth of documentation thatIrkutsk was quickly at this time. On the other hand, archives in thewooden towns often burned, and many files as late as the revo­lution and the confusion of the 1990s. Even the Irkutsk archive suffered muchof the statistical data often available for Russian towns are lost.Regrettably, in 1917 the archive of the Trinity monastery was piled ina salt store on the shore of Lake Baikal and by Archives fromother monasteries of the contain insufficient material on the period. Littlehas survived on Irkutsk and its district at Eniseisk'w and Tobol'sk, where thearchive was inaccessible. For documents denied to me from I haverelied on the of documents. the substantial gapsin the primary sources, there is rich material available which does allow the draw-

of new conclusions about the nature of Muscovite rule in Siberia.

1 The Cossack group

the conquest of Siberia and the of consolidation, con-most of the seventeenth century,Cossacks constituted the absolute

ity of its Russian population. In most towns, albeit with the exclusionof 'Iobol'sk and outshone the even in terms of eco-nomic resources. As the social structure of mainly nobles and

did not exist beyond the Urals, the role of Cossacks in local politics wasparamount. until historians have the internalorganization of Cossacks in Russia as much as in while both romanticand have dominated. Since historians of the state-historicalschool the state as the moving force in the conquest, they deemedSiberian Cossacks mere executors of official orders. to heroicexploits, they saw the whole conquest of Siberia as an 'achievement of Russianweapons' and studied the voevodas and other officials, not the Cossacks.? TheSiberian criticized this interpretation in the nineteenth century; yet,

ascribed the main role in the conquest to the 'free' undertakenby merchants and the administration, they with theiropponents but conceived of officials as Ogloblin's innova-tive study of town rebellions, a spin-off of his chancellery inventory,remained fora time the exception,"

Soviet historians tried to prove that Siberia was won for Russia not exclusivelyby the military and government. Since the Bolsheviks his­torians were most attentive to the ' contribution to colonization. Theycould not overlook the role of Cossacks in but no major studyappeared.' Only in the 1970s, Buganov and Golikova refuted the hypothesis ofthe reactionary character of the seventeenth and century rnusketeers'rebellions, however, their closeness to the 'masses"," During the 1970sand 1980s, local studies credited Cossacks not only with butalso for their involvement in agriculture, trade, and crafts.' Kurilov, Chistiakovaand Kamenetskii turned attention to town rebellions, finding that the social basiswas mostly Cossack.t

Considering this longstanding ideological blindness, it is unsurprising thatexplanations for the extent and nature of their participation in local politics havebeen few and contradictory. A recent overview on Russian history put the state of

32 The Cossack group

research plain: ' a mixture of primitive andruthless authoritarianisrn' .9 as this statement is for the c urrentstate of studies on it no for the tensionbetween these terms. There is a in recent to put theblame for on the and the tsar, whereas the Cossacks areconstrued as and soldiers' .10

Scholars have tried several to the erratic twists and turnsof the relations between Cossacks and problems that areeven more difficult to trace. Shunkov, the existence of electedlocal bodies in the of that in withoutfeudal these were in a 'rudimentary state'. all powerrem ained in the hands of the voevoda, II Even Peter I was astonished as he wasreminded by Siberians that the bodies of local governance in Europeanthe and did not function in Siberia. Although this was due tothe virtual absence of townspeople in most towns, the Cossacks did not establisha similar body.l? an extra the 5"""""dearth of rele vant studie s up to the I several eminent scholars have debatedthe 1695-8 rebellion in Krasnoiarsk. While Ogloblin believed the overthrow ofthe voevoda was caused by his Bakhrushin, still on thevoevoda's powers, the from obedience to rebel-lion by socio-economic 3 Initially, Krasnoiarsk Cossacks and voevodaswere close allies in subduing the natives. Yet when the nomad becameever more powerful in the last decades of the seventeenth century, newnatives to pay iasak became difficult. In this period, Bakhrushin claimed, thevoevodas ceased to interested in their own enrich-ment; the Cossacks rebelled.t- were organizedeven after the moreover, were very successful. 15This observationunderscores Aleksandrov and Pokrovskii's broader point, that throughout the sev­enteenth century, there was a constant form of Cossack Rather thanrona-term socio-economic a close look at the context of these Cossackgroups is necessary.

Pokrovskii and Aleksandrov have aimed to the many scattered factson rebellions and occasionally extensive Cossack rule in a thesis of the'estate-representative monarchy', involving assemblies and locally elected offi-cials.w Cossack groups as estates, is questionable becauseof their instability. had neither codified sets of rules, nor schedules for reg-ular and they defended their and in an unpredictableway. Sometimes they fought voevodas; sometimes they collaborated with them.Furthermore, Cossack circles were explicitly banned in although withlittle effect. Thus, Vershinin straightforwardly concludes that there were noCossack estates. fighting each other, as they occasionally did, could nothave conquered and administered such a vast territory on their own without nobleguidance. up the thread of the state-historical school, Vershinin assertsthat the voevodas were the true, far-sighted praise forhaving conquered and developed Moscow's north Asian possessions,

The Cossack group 33

However doubts remain the ability of noble voevodas to live upto their supposed role as ideal bureaucrats to rules. AlthoughCossack groups were unreliable to a certain still provided an irre-placeable counterweicht to voevodas' Petitions were indeed the only

way in which Cossacks could the voevoda, To their'-IQlU lJ~, it was necessary to adapt the institutional culture of the centre to theirneeds. This adaptation is described in 3. Even this most important of the

Aleksandrov and Pokrovskii ascribed to the Cossacks did not refer to aTPCCI1I ar event, but a of subordination. As mentioned,due to the formal prohibition voevodas claimed that the circles were 'traitorous'in which were deliberated .18 To understand Cossack institutionsand forms of we need to find an for their irrs-c-n l >I,'i t v

and contested nature. the of Siberian Cossacks inthis has to allow for their steadfast involvement in local politics and the

success level of their actions. Instead of Western insti-tutional this book considers the very foundations of institutions, andopens the way to a new of the fluid institutional forms found inSiberia.

The deadlock in the current state of studies on the Siberian Cossacks derivesfrom the problem that the form of the main agent of Siberian local politics isunclear. If there was a strict military as most historians thereshould have been no limits to the power of the voevodas in distant and isolatedSiberian towns and fortresses.'? Vershinin's account that in the lastdecade the approach centred on the military hierarchy has lost much of itsexplanatory value. While on the voevodas' contribution to Siberianadministration, he avoids a description of the organizational structures of theimmediate executors of their orders. After all, a central problem in the relationsof the Cossacks and the voevoda, and in the so-called self-administration of theCossacks remains unexplained. The return of Krasnoiarsk Cossacks to the voevo-das' rule in 1698 has been explained by Moscow's cunning in a popularvoevoda, P.S. Musin-Pushkin.w To describe the Cossacks as the deceived,

however, underestimates their control and powers of judgement. Within anapproach centred on estates, their long-lasting and careful yet eager pursuit ofpermanent self-rule, to expel the voevodas from Siberia for asAleksandrov and Pokrovskii claim, is not consistent with sudden ofyet another voevoda, without noticing that he served as a Trcjan horse.?'

This impasse in studies of the Siberian Cossacks is confirmed by other cases.If they could indeed permanently run the administration without the interferenceof a voevoda, why would they ever the bureaucratic orders that broughtabout the final downfall of the Cossack estates, as Akishin's recent account ofPeter's reforms in Siberia suggests, relying on an approach based on the supplan­tation of the monarchy by bureaucratic rule. Although heprovides material showing that, until close to Peter's death, reforms foundered onthe conditions of service in Siberia, he cannot this observarion.PAbruptly, he abandons the estates approach in his conclusion, the

34 The Cossack group

'medieval' character of the Cossack , which intertwined with author-itarian influence the upper hand within this symbiosis."

A close look at Cossack structures, reveals thatadapte d to their including the variou s borderlands Iived in, andthe bureaucratic framework in which . As the distinct forms ofCossack authority in Siberia and other frontiers suggest, these structureswere also of To invoke 'archaism' does not why author­itarian and collective authority were combined. Nor does it make clear why thelatter finally gave in, or why St could suddenly afford not to listen toCossacks' What is most is an of the way centralgovernment and local or group rule interacted. This is to pro-vide such a model.

Group rule and the leader

To the of Siberian town rebellions in the seventeenth centuryas well as their virtual different havebeen While monarchy' is an interpretation pre-occupied with Western models too little of what happenedin bureaucratization as a force which misses the pointas well. Historians were never slow to that the Siberian chancelleryscrutinized events in Siberia at a very cost. the increase ofadministrative staff the latter half of the seventeenth century was confinedto the central chancelleries .24 The parad ox is that, although historians have inves-

local events , for the abrupt end of town Cossack rebellionsat the end of the century have been on the outside, at the centre. To under­stand Cossack groups from within, it is necessary first to their interactionwith their immediate environment. What is here is an viewof the relations within Cossack groups, of which relations with the voevoda orother leaders were an important part. Co-operation and independent action, sub­mission and rebellion are not considered as mere unruliness or as OP1::JO~ied

of political culture,25 but as coherently the needs of a socialformation, the Personenverband. The Cossack Personenverband was a specificform of primary group that was formed by unrelated members. Primary groupssearch for ways to reduce their members' anxietie sunder threat-

conditions. They are suited to this endeavour due to the face-to-face rela­tions maintained within the group, and therefore well adapted to frontierconditions. Unlike most primary groups, however, the Personenverband was nota kinship group, since members formed it of their own volition. Thus, there wasan inclusive up to the oath delivered to eac h other in the Coss ack circle;prospective members could not be force d to take the oath or agree to a set of rulesgoverning group behaviour. The group was formed to provide mutual protectionand enable economic pursuits in the as well as to carry out raids and cam-

This was all the more important since Cossacks acted in an environmentthat mostly did not provide natural and where the influence of the state

The Cossack group 35

was limited to frontier to leave aside major rebellions.Therefore.the union was determined by common aims, and not by considerationsof social status. men of any social, ethnic or reugrous backgroundcould become members of a Cossack group, since within the Personenverband,

all members were valued exclusively to their abilities and their useful-ness for common An exclusive followed when theCossacks had taken the all members were by ofdeath to observe the and in particular adhere to the aim. Union wastpn,"'''',T'ClT'''' the and many later Cossack groups dissolved after a hunt-

or season, anew for the next season. Leaders wereelected only after the Cossacks had a common aim. Their authority alsoderived from their ability to fulfil the com-mon group aim. were members of the group rather than exaltedcommanders or nobles. The which could a leader if hedid not pursue group aims, tightly controlled him. Thus, there were nodual sources of authority within the Cossack because authorityderived from the and was by thePersonenverband. This term was first applied by Kumke to the Cossack groupsof the Lithuanian frontier and the Lithuanian and Polish influ-ence.?? Yet its value is not restricted to this and can fruit-fully be extended to other of the Eurasian thisf" n"nll'T will address and developments in the relations of leader andPersonenverband in the partially dissimilar Siberian

The obvious difference between such a group and an estate was the lack ofpermanence of the Personenverband. In this it can be addressed as a setof institutional mechanisms that existed without a stable The indi-vidual group was discontinued, without or but toestablish and maintain its organizational structure Cossacks relied on institutionalmechanisms. existed within the Cossack group, but also without it.Institutional mechanisms consist first of or widely termsand gestures, and forms of social and ofbehaviour linked to these symbolic forms. institutional mechanisms donot depend on an organization. As far as the original Personenverband is con-cerned, as it occurred first in the Muscovite and Lithuanian frontier, suchmechanisms included deliberation of common aims, the of per-sonal over social value, the election of the leader, and the close surveillance ofthe leader and his deposition if he did not the Personenverband's aims .28

As will be shown, the assumption that the Cossacks decided primarily accordingto a set of established professional rules is not confirmed by archival material,although I do not deny that there existed certain customs the ways inwhich a fortress was set up or a campaign was conducted.t?

The Lithuanian and southern Russian Cossacks lived and developed in anenvironment which in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries could not bebrought completely under the control of either of the neighbouring states. Thegradual decay of the Mongol Empire had left an abandoned area, the 'wild field'

36 The Cossack group

the the forrner Turkic allie s of the Mongols,who no the of the Mongol Khan and were thereforecalled qazaq or 'free men', banded in groups to make a bycaule-? and by assaults on the settlements in the area. weresold as slaves on the markets of the former Greek and by then Ottoman,cities of the Black Sea shore. Devastation by these raids left whole voidof population and settlement. These of the fifteenth tosixteenth centuries meant that the open steppe, where these nomad groups oper-

was too insecure for while even in the woodedpeasants had to be Levels of violence among nomads aswell as among Cossacks in the same environment should not be

by modem standards. Frontiers in elicit fiercer behaviour, buteven in the 'civilized' modem levels of crime and violent behaviourwere much than has been Life on thereduced to the few cities and their immediate neighbourhoodinhabitants, hunting and were the only ways to make afrom the sparse the ecumene as to the nomadecumene, which it confronted and with derived from the soil, sincefull was as nomad interference

After the mid-sixteenth century the where new settlers couldfind tax-exempt plots, also attracted from adjacent states, and the Slavicelement among Cossacks. It was equally attractive that Cossackgroups remained ethnically and religiously open to virtually anybody, at least upto the 1630s. Some of the qazaq groups had already vowed toMuscovy or Lithuania, who employed them to defend bordernomad incursions. These groups became the first to with Slavic peo-

Although little is known about the structure of the qazaq groups, the pictureis clearer when it comes to the mixture of East Slavic and Tatar institu-tions. Contrary to the myth of Cossacks as free men, too proud to engage inculture, as Ivan ill had observed in 1 it was the young men('molodtsy') riding off to the to get rich. 54 Those who returned with orwithout a fortune sought to settle down close to fortified settlements ontheir own plot of land. 55 When heading for the they a means oftransportation even more familiar to the East Slavs, the boat. Like the qazaqgroups they lived by the game, fish and furs which they sold toLithuanian and Muscovite merchants. There could be additional income from thebooty of campaigns directed, by the end of the sixteenth century, thecoastal cities and Turkish trade on the Black Sea. Although the rivers andtheir banks posed some obstacle to mounted nomads protecting theCossacks to a the open remained a dangerous place where theycould easily fall victim to the nomads who were superior horsemen.

To cope with fear in the insecure open environment, where few naturallyfortified places suitable for defence were available, and to make sure they attainedtheir Cossacks developed a unique form of organization, the temporary pri-

The Cossack group 37

mary Cossack group or Personenverband. Its main principle was theutility of the individual to the purpose. The Cossacks' main aims wereformed by the conditions of survival in the defensive was neededto counter Tatar attacks. On the other hand, its economic thatthe season yielded surplus to feed them in winter and to payofflicences or bribes to the starosta or voevoda of the frontier town lived in. Theusual size of a between about 10 and 60 men, on this

the number of men needed to hunt or fish, to preserve the hunt fortransportation, to defend the group or, to the aim the group had set, toconduct a The law of returns, the of communi-cation the restricted human capability to maintain face-to-face relations and sustain an de corps, limited its

One of the greatest was the of the group while it oper-ated in the The Cossacks strove to this by a range of measures.Before for the open they held an to determine their

decide potentially divisive questions such as the rules for the preyor booty, and tasks to individual members. Once these aims and the com­position of the group were each member was obliged to uphold them, andchanges could only be made by common consent. After they had arrived at a deci-

the group temporarily closed itself to outside influences for as as it tookto realize its plan. as as it was it was open to ofany social, and ethnic background nobles, andOrthodox, Roman Catholics and, up to the I Jews-? a member would noteven be allowed to Ieave once consensus was reached. This absolute and stubbomadherence to its aims made the Personenverband so effective in terms of econ­omy and self-defence: each member subordinated himself to the aims anddecisions. In some the Personenverband can be understood as a 'primary

: communities in which 'face-to-face' relations rule social behaviour andthe distribution of roles and functions among their members. The individuality ofmembers is of since all aims are subordinated to the well-

of the community. to the primary group is:

... a certain fusion of indi vidualities in a common whole, so that one's veryself ... is the common life and purpose of the group.... this wholeness ...involves the sort of sympathy and mutual identification for which 'we' is thenatural e x:pre ssion,

Due to this fusion, formal social exaltation in the outside society and ethnic orconfessional boundaries played no role in the Personenverband. Allmembers were equal and had their functions to their utility tothe purpose; only personal capabilities could contribute to a rwrcc",,'c

standing in the This merger can be explained by the behaviour of smallmilitary units in extreme situations, which has been studied in particular by mil­itary It has been shown that depends on the of dan­ger on the battlefield. Search for group-immanent solutions to minimize fear was

38 The Cossack group

decisive for group identity and solidarity. The aim of these groups consisted inresisung disintegration and by a firm common stand.

for someone a 'buddy' than an abstractThis in fear led to an isolation that made Cossack

groups immune to outside influences. What could be the relevance of a farawayand its power mechanisms to a small isolated group in the boundless

in face of a be it nomads, a Cossack group, or anatural obstacle?

One way in which the group ensured unity would be was by resolutecrackdowns on dissenters. It is the inability to that best highlightsthe difference between the Cossack 'constitution' and modern democracy,

environment, unity was and even violent of lil1<~pr'iil1O'

doubts about the validity of the consensus could be a suitable way of ~caUllJ."'1lJl15

a state of harmony deemed necessary. In this no frontier matches southernRus': to the late century, no American Ind ian roamed theas a mounted nor was there an ages old nomad that could boastof Western like a cat a half-dead mouse. At the time the

was fought over, Indian nomads much less of a than theMongols, Tatars or to technically less advanced Muscovy, let aloneLithuania to the mid-seventeenth century. For the insecurity in thepopulation, in the east a certain of violence was frequently a necessary ele-ment in the process of deliberation. This 'constitution' proved so that thePersonenverband punished members who offended its some-times even by death. Although the open was free of normal struc­tures of rule of any power, it was hardly anarchic. It was rather therule of the group everybody was subordinated to that was permanent, for onlygroups could survive in with other groups, and with the Tatars. Asmilitary the primary group has the level ofcombat of all military units.

The rule of the group was further enhanced by the election of the leader. Farfrom its power to the the Cossack group a personalitywho by his very capabilities could embody the aims. This could mean apromise of rich prey or booty, or the fame of a successful Cossack leader. Ratherthan ruling the group, the leader had a more representational function he servedto allow identification. the the group identified with its aims. TheZaporozhian according to the French Guillaume Ie Vasseur deBeauplan and others, tended to believe it was only the group that mattered andhad merit, while all leaders were equally In Siberia, the sophisti-

ronz-iasunz and successful Tomsk rebellion of 1648-51, complainingabout the malfeasance of the voevoda Osip Shcherbatyi chose at the outset inApril for some time as its controversial figurehead the banned chamberlain of themetropolitan, Podrez-Pleshcheev. Podrez openly denied God and ownedan illegal tavern. A pimp, he had been reproached for his lifestyle and arrested forso serious an offence as instigation to murder only months before the rebellionstarted. However, to the Cossacks, he symbolized resistance to the voevoda.

The Cossack group 39

Moreover, in view of the serious him, assignmenttion of syll with the allowance of 20 roublesof in 1647, leaves little room for doubts that he albeitlimited benefaction from his uncle, L.S. who was made head of the

on 15 1647. Pleshcheev's career did not last as anenraged crowd him in Moscow on 3 June 1648.42 The Cossacks were

to Podrez-Pleshcheev in his voevoda butonly as as he was useful to them. could be a vital resource in the"11""0'0'1'" for power and a share in Siberian since Cossack groups were vul-nerable their to and from Moscow or T"h"]'",,

In of their first to Moscow, they chose the successfulCossack trader and syn boiarskii Fedor of the bribes he hadexacted from natives. Rather than to an bad charac-ter, one move Pushchin made underlines that to the the idealleader was even more to the Personenverband conditions of equality andcompliance than the ordinary members. He went as far as to sue his own uncle inthe Cossack the since his uncle away from the anddoes not pull with the troop' and demanded 'he must be punished by the troop' .44

The role of Siberian Cossack leaders in rebellions as described potentially dis­torted by their was usually that of someone who induced theCossacks to undertake unlawful actions. Yet in subtler a great deal issaid about the much more intricate nature of these relations. During the saidTomsk rebellion former second voevoda Bunakov, who had been elected subse­quently by the Cossacks as their voevoda, and the secretary Patrikeev were calledby the voevoda Inthis emphasis on on gratification and yielding to the Cossacks'

the nature of the between Cossacks in the Personenverbandand their leader is enunciated.

Siberian events reveal that the authorities the primary Cossack groupto exert absolute group rule. investigation into the Transbaikalian rebellionof I the former leader of the Anton triedto conceal his active role in the movement by maintaining that he had been forcedby the Cossacks to lead the campaign to Irkutsk 'against my own wishes' .4~ Evenif this was a fraud, Berezovskii nevertheless tried to rationalize his actions by ref­erence to an or well-known institution; his argumentwould have been bizarre.s? An eminent personality was not allowed to withholdhis capabilities due to the commitment of Cossacks to their group, whichdemanded that they did in their power to achieve the commonThus, in Cossacks' eyes leadership, once the leader was meantcommitting an act of treason to the In 1628, the elected ataman IvanKol'tsov tried to stop his Krasnoiarsk who were starved after theirsalary was not delivered in time, from robbing a caravan. But in doing so, heexceeded his authority, and he was in the Cossack circle and killed by hisown men.49 To the approval of the group and thereby achieve authority theleader had to comply with the aims and ideals to an even higher

40 The Cossack group

"rrli,,«,,\] members. It was only by the aims that leaders ofegalitarian groups could enhance their authority they had no coercive means sui

at their disposal. Thus, Cossack groups cannot be characterizedwith the usual of the of rule and

to their rather than function, leaders were notelected before the group had on its aims. Similarly, if on a partly differentlevel of 295 Cossacks from western Siberia headed for a campaignto build the fortress of Iakutsk on the river Lena in 1634. elected theirimmediate group leaders the desiatniks and leaders of units of10 and 50 only after a process of with the voevodas over

and the conditions of service had ended. The motley band ofCossacks, mostly recruited, had to set up their group structure from

as none of the ranks of 'Iobol'sk Cossacks were to set outfor Iakutsk, several thousand miles away in wild and inhospitable northeasternSiberia. Immediately after showed inconfronting the and in formulating and their aims. Whenchallenged by the made it clear that their first aim was the sur-vival of the group in its current form. In the course of when several ofthe rebellious Cossacks were and to the voevodas' office, their'comrades' among the crowd outside 'volunteered to support them and didnot allow them to be beaten with . Their actions incited the crowd to

more fervently a very frequent form of action." Cossack groups werefrequently described by the name of the who be ofalmost any rank, including ordinary adding' ... with comrades'. Ratherthan subordinates to the this term evinces the communal men­tality, in Siberia from the time of as well as on the southeastern

rim. 52 In other cases, the term 'with comrades' was exchangedfor 'with Cossacks' for example, when the Berezov voevoda in 1626 dined withataman Ivan Cossacks.>' The inverse relation to the leader setsCossacks apart from the of Novgorod with their political and economic

claims to a relarion.vThis of leadership defines the difference between the resident peas-

ant or posad mir and the temporary, mobile, aim-oriented CossackPersnnenverhand. forms of organization that are often inaccurately equated .55

The mir's elected village elder was accountable for the taxes collected by the mir.He even had to pay any incurred losses himself. This derived from the subjuga­tion of the mir to the prince caused by the Mongol invasion.w As peasantsand town-dwellers increasingly fled to the rim, they did not simply copythis mir or fall back upon its more primitive forrns.t? The village communitycould provide essential security and a of independence in its inter­nal affairs, but above all the fugitives fled from the oppression that was organizedin the form of the mir and its accountability to the land owner. 58

Volia illustrates the distinction between Cossack institutions and the mir: therunaway a new life of 'freedom', which meant a nomadic, boundless free­dom, or 'freedom plus .59 The Cossacks bound each other only at campaign

The Cossack group 41

times to 'consensus'. This character of bonds was later,in partly removed. constant reprimands

holding circles and unruly behaviour show that some of this volia was alwaysjJl<:.~C;lJlC. Furthermore, rebellions were not a return to mil' but to those ofthe Cossack Personenverband: rather than the measure ofeligibility was a mixture of qualities and the in the outsideworld insofar as it was useful to the group, which could well mean that the out­sider was . This Cossack feature was at odds with attitudes,where 'not our man' was a in the tightly knit and interde­pendent community.s? contrast, Siberian Cossacks never excluded Cossacksfrom other towns from the circles just on account of their mere whichwas all the more at odds with mil' since towns could be in harsh compe­tition. Since the Personenverband was oriented toward could even calla 'our man' and him as their leader or for the sake of otherenterprises, if were by his politics.s' Thus, it is doubtful whetherCossacks can be addressed as a estate. Because the families of the firstsettlers were all but to estate, non-Cossack recruits couldon their kin as advocates. The attempts of the government to limit the number ofservitors and actually former or townspeople were doomedwherever were needed for service.s?

The way in which voevoda B.S. Dvorianinov of Verkhourr'e was success­fully reveals much about the relation of the Personenverband andthe mil'. The voevoda, who had covered the misdeeds of his andpatron , fell prey to an intrigue from a quarter he did not In June 1648,the M. Kabakov, under torture, addressed the voevoda with thewords have, and Dvorianinov failed to correct him. Still,this affair was dormant until in October he was by the s prip-is'iu LT. Nedoveskov, accompanied by the undersecretaries and a groupof Cos sacks. By K abakov's invocation, the litigants claimed, sornewhatbelatedly, that Dvorianinov had dishonoured the tsar. The next day, a delegationconsisting of and the elder of the felt entitledto put the voevoda under arrest and disallow Dvorianinov all communicationswhile the mil' came to a head (pridumaett with Ignat'ii [Nedoveskov] and Fedor[Driagin, chief cu sterns officer].

As so m any other Siberian rebellions, this mil' consiste d of members ofvirtually every settled social group in Verkhourr'e and first made sure to formu­late and litigation in the form of a petition. Only after constituting them­selves as a Personenverband by this did they formally declare the'deposition', it inextricably with litigation they could not allowthemselves to be judged by Dvorianinov any more, since' [we] do not want to fallin .M This formal deposition of the voevoda was also uncharacteristic ofthe peasant mil'.

The states of affairs of the mil' were typical of this institution's insta-bility, yet viability in Siberian towns, where the frontier, frequent service in far-offplaces and the involvement of many Cossacks in distant trade demanded a high

42 The Cossack group

of flexibility of institutions. The memory of the mir was available to allRussians who had made their way to the steppe or to while the term couldbe useful in with Moscow, as we will see later. Siberian Cossacks,elected leaders were not accountable to the or the tsar in the same wayas a elder. could distinguish themselves by successful orthe amount of furs collected or by new iasak under the tsar'shand'. be asked for an were unlikely to paythe difference in tax yield on the sole evidence that fewer furs had been collectedthan the year before. This marks the divide between the frontier and central Russia,between taxes about which a could be made and those that could not:any incurred losses in the recorded iasak treasure entrusted to Cossacks

their to Moscow was deducted from theirOn the other hand, even if rebels elected leaders to an official position, it was

possible for a syn boiarskii or a to his service record byaccepting the election without the of punished by the tsar.

from the direct the Personenverband could provide, the Cossackrn-rmarv group an environment in which both ends themiddle was a feasible alternative to blind obedience. Afonasii Beiton's careerremained his dubious with the Transbaikalian Cossacksin 1696. The former Cossack Fedor Cherkasov had denounced his master, theIrkutsk head of musketeers and Moscow list dvorianin Afonasii Belton, for con-

with the rebellious Cossacks from the other side of Lake Baikal.In his own Cherkasov had left the Ukrainian towns forSiberia after his father's death, where he served from 1685-6 as a Cossack in

Dauria on the Arnur and on the River just across Lake Baikal.in Irkutsk, he said, he was fooled into indentured labour in 1691-2,

a dvorovoi rabotnoi after he was made drunk by whowanted Cherkasov to work for him as a tailor and by deception married theCossack in that same to his servant. Cherkasov maintained he did not dareclaim his in the following years, but after the conversationbetween Beiton and the he believed he could count on the voevoda'ssupport. Indeed, he made serious accusations Beiton, toCherkasov, the Transbaikalians approached Beiton when they came twice to lay

to Irkutsk in Mayor July 1696. They came with clear offering tomake Beiton their in Irkutsk once he had swayed theIrkutsk Cossacks to the side of the Transbaikalians: You Afonasii will be sedokwith us in Irkutsk and rule the local Cossacks and ... all people.w

Quite unceremoniously, according to Cherkasov, the 30 Cossacks 'as one'ordered Beiton to make sure the cannons on the palisades of the j ",,""Ull y strength­ened fortress would not be loaded so they could not be fired at theTransbaikalians, In case this proved impossible, they had other plans theyneeded Beiton's knowledge of the Arnur area since, newly recruited as they were,and without any orientation in the they still intended to leave the Selengaand promised to come and help get him out of Irkutsk. The Cossacks took it for

that he would join them; as they said, 'we will go to the Arnur with you

The Cossack group 43

.. and you will serve with us as you served earlier in Albazin'. The socially equalposition of the leader vis-a-vis the Cossacks is also in the rites of sub-mission and mutual he upon election: 'Afonasii, hpc,r;l1O'

their told them "I am to serve with you [if] only you neither tumme over nor abandon me and I will live and die with you" .Il?

Thus, rebels the upper class elected and forced oneof their known to be their with reason that hewould comply, only that the situation was in their favour.

As Siberian Cossacks could an outside Cossack leader to enter servicewith their group, could also tum his own wishes a voevoda assignedby the tsar into their own elected rebel leader. In the Krasnoiarsk rebellion of theI as in many other cases, the Cossacks their leaders and elected

frequently; this has been as of theCossacks' control over their leaders.ss the very of andelections shows that it was no modem inclusive or estate rule theexclusive group ruled here.f/)

In a symbolic way, the Krasnoiarsk rebellion shows the narrow boundariesconstraining even a popular leader who was sent and legitimated byauthorities. The son of a Polishnobleman, who was as in the voevoda's office and roseto the rank of musketeers head, was sent in 1698 by the Eniseisk voevoda tomvesugate the deposition of the third voevoda in a row. During his investigations,Lisovskii found out just how uncomfortable it could feel if one was popular withthe Cossacks. Since the Krasnoiarians in Eniseisk at this stage did notconfirm the claims of their about the voevoda's the

voevoda restored voevoda Durnovo to his post. This was more than theKrasnoiarsk Cossacks could and, after consultations in thedecide d to send him back whence he came. Found in his re sidence,Durnovo was taken to the bank of the only his caftan. While theracket was continuing and Cossacks tried to decide what to do next,Lisovskii took Fedor Chanchikov's and Daniil Startsov's Personenverbdndeaside and with them. Afterwards he approached Dumovo, who couldnot overhear these deliberations, to comfort him and told that the Krasnoiarianswould not attempt to kill him, a fact Lisovskii claimed to know 'genuinely'.

among the Cossacks there were shouts that Lisovskii was sent bythe great , whereas Durnovo 'came by himself ... and they obey StepanLisovskii, and whatever Stepan Lisovskii they will do'. At this point,Lisovskii attempted to escape on a boat half-loaded with stones moored at theriverbank, in which Durnovo, his and Krasnoiarians loyal to him had beenput, but Chanchikov and others him by the pulled him out of theboat', shouting that 'they were not to allow him to leave Krasnoiarsk forhe must be their [Ieader po as before, instead of the voevoda.... [Lisovskii asked:]whether they wanted to lead him to town tied up?'

He may have wondered whether making him their voevoda was really afavour, the next day, there were rumours in town that it had been wrong not

44 The Cossack group

to kill DUl11ovo.7 1There was always the that a voevoda might succumb togroup rule, but he might equally well be embraced by it.

The assertion of group rule may be for a relatively town.Krasnoiarsk was an advanced outpost in the Cossacks dependedextraordinarily on crafts and therefore the primary Cossack group was anpVf'1"v,1"v 1",<,"\1"1";1"1"11"1" for most, if not all of them. Similar conditions inthe Transbaikalian towns and fortresses in the valley to the

in the south. For fur hunters pulled in groups ofbetween two and nine whose uninterrupted presence in thegrounds lasted between two and five weeks the season from September toOctober. hunted sable and and in the the marmot. Of the 273declarations of furs worth 15 rou bles made in the customs office at Irkutskfrom 1692 to 1700, Cossacks made 57 declarations worth 3 roubles. TheCossack bands declared the richest haul. It is therefore no that furhunters often Cossacks or vice versa their basic orga­nizational forms were by no means different on the group level, for formalnanerwork. oaths and of five to

also maintained fisheries."? In the hunting and other kindscraft were even more connected than in the forests. For there

of time to hunt while groups of sentries (stan i tsy, otezznyekarauty or, in Poland-Lithuania, rode the steppe tosounds of hooves transmitted by the ground to find hostile nomad bands before

could assault town or hamlet. This was an salient feature insurrounded by and nomadic tribes." Double income,

together with a or at least incre ased of inc orne, to amade for the attractiveness of the Cossacks in Poland-Lithuania.f ThePersonenverbdnde were only military associations" the economicyield counted which was unattainable without the security provided by the closeobservance of the purpose by all members.

Cossacks also banded to trade, and the Personenverband provided aform of the attainable levels of trade

rmvi l'E'>re~~ exempting them up to a set, if over the course of the seventeenth cen­tury variable, amount, and often carried numbers of furs and other merchan­dise. In 1699, a superior Mongolian force assaulted two desiatki of IrkutskCossacks from their one-year service in the outpost of Tunkinsk,which was off access through the mountains to Irkutsk. At least three of therank-and-file Cossacks lost their merchandise, clothes and furs, to the robbers."When in 1698 the caravan of merchant Spiridon Liangusov left Nerchinsk forChina, 100 Cossack accompanied it; the Siberian which hadjust tax rules, was anything but pleased as it learned that all of them hadbeen tax-exempted. Such numbers of guards were no exception." The syn

boiarskii Grigorii Lonshakov carried his own furs worth 275 roubles when he andhis Cossacks brought the fur-treasure to Moscow. These official tripswere used for private trade." Groups of Cossack traders each otherrepeated a pauern well-known from early medieval merchants; it is one of the dis-

The Cossack group 45

tinctive elements of Siberian Cossackdom as to their else­where in Eastern since in Lithuania river trade was reserved to town mer-

while the only commodity Don Cossacks traded wasAfter I the emergence of caravan trade with China at

by Russians the Personenverband with an opportunity to prove its util-ity unavailable to Cossacks a result of a differentiation of theof trade and diplomacy due to irreconcilable on betweenthe tsar and the Manchu Cossacks took part in trade involvingexchange with Chinese merchants at in the eastern Siberianfrontier area in the 1670s and 1680s. Cossac ks of the frontier fortresse s of1-\roazrn, Nerchinsk and Chinese merchandise themediation of and For in western overlandtrade with Central Asia had been reserved to Bukharan who enjoyed

tax Although Cossacks profited from this trade, which served to sup-ply frontier it also meant that their own opportunities for trade wererestricted to internal traffic. Until the establishment of direct links withexternal trade was limited to missions to the their official part tra-ditionally intertwined with trade. 82 who from the first attempts to reachChina in the century had carried out ambassadorial duties of their ownaccord, had this form of trade.

This combination of official and functions, in the context ofthe had already in the final years of the Time of Troublesreached a state in which Moscow had reason to fear sedition in its Siberian pos­sessions yet precariously held .83 These conditions promoted a redefinition of rela­tions between the tsar and the Siberian Cossacks. The first Russian mission toChina in 1617 about half a century earlier than the first officially authorizedwas initiated locally, as Moscow sources noted by 'Siberiannp,-,nl,p'.84 The Petlin mission was sent by voevoda Ivan Sernenovich Kurakin,who so far had the benefits of a rapid and career in 1597, heattended the of the German ambassador, in 1601 he was

in 1606 voevoda in Tula. Kurakin is a controversial , deeplyinvolved in politics during the interregnum. As a member of the boyar duma, hefought on the side of the pretender and the Polish prince Wladyslaw 'against theRussians', or rather for a restricted monarchy on the Polish model, and petitioned

Sigismund for a land grant in 1611;85 later he benefited from an amnesty.The boyars who proposed Wladyslaw's election as tsar were from the circlearound the Rornanovs, it unlikely that he was banned under Mikhail forhis role in the Time of Troubles.w The prevailing opinion is that his assignmentto Tobol'sk was 'honourable' banishment.s' a term without proper explanation.Yet this makes clear neither why he stayed in Moscow, nor why he was made aboyar in 1614, after Mikhail's accession to the throne.88 Demidova and Baron,however, noted Kurakin's intimate knowledge of English trade interests in theEast and his valuable services to the new dynasty. He probably first metMerrick, the Muscovy company's Moscow representative, in 1606, when thecompany secured the renewal of its privilege from tsar Vasilii Shuiskii, whom

46 The Cossack group

Kurakin had to the throne. If he did not learn about ambitionsfor a in Northern Russia on this he certainly learned morein 1614, when he with Merrick in talks peace negouauonswith undertaken simultaneously with Merrick's bid for toeX1JIO:re the Ob' as a to China.s? It is unlikely that he wassubsequently sent to Tobol'sk by accident. From January 1616 to 1620 he was

there as but thereafter his career faltered. If he was in troubleand eager to resume his career, and therefore remained in Moscow, why thenshould he such ample for the disfavour he finally suffered? Even thenext voevoda and the newly installed of 'Iobol'sk, Kiprian, were con­fronted with tensions from the tsar's disapproval of the of Kurakinand his colleagues,

The events are for the way the Personenverband could findit useful to subordinate itself to a Ieader and influential noble even to thepoint of the of the tsar in Moscow. While author-ity in Moscow declined due to the effects of the Time ofTroubles.Kurakin led the Siberian Cossacks very back to hiscontacts during the Time of Troubles, he knew about the powers of westernnavies and trade . He reacted quickly when a Russian merchant fromthe White Sea coast in Tobol'sk that and Dutch merchanthad tried to reach the river Ob' by way of the sea. To secure Russian influence aswell as the of Tobcl'sk on Siberian trade, Kurakin the searoute to Siberia. This route, from the river Pechora by way of the sea tothe Iamal peninsula, which was traversed via a burdensome reached thetrade hub of without even the government outpost inTobol'sk, effectively taxes. Under the of competition,Tobol'sk who attended to this closed the searoute.92This was the first in the process of channelling Siberian trade exclu-sively to selected border At this point, Kurakin had reasons toa reward, for he had successfully sought the profit of the as instruc-tions demanded .93 Siberian Cossacks profited from this decision and from send-

missions to China. Rather than the Bukharan intermediary trade, thispromised rich profits to those entitled to undertake and lead these missions.Kurakin had already promoted relations and trade in Tobol'sk andthe southern of the Siberian self-assured as wellas by a wave of popular acclaim, Kurakin sent Tara ataman VasiliiTiumenets and desiatnik Ivan Petrov to the Oirat Altyn-Khan in 1618 with aninstruction making them his own envoys: ' ... prince Kurakin and colleaguesand not the gave orders [for] the mission '94

The apparent wilfulness on the part of the voevoda these lines wasaddressed by Moscow already before the Cossacks returned to Tobol'sk. On 31December 1616, the boyar duma decided without mentioning the tsar thatfurther missions to the Mongols or to China should not be sent; the resolution wassent to Tobol'sk the next day.95 Several years later, the decree had to be repeatedand by the boyar, Tobol'sk voevoda and reformer Iurii

The Cossack group 47

Ianshevich but even he earned but joyous support by thismeasure."

With this Moscow stirred up unforeseen which profoundlyinfluenced relations between Moscow and the Siberian Cossacks. Even half acentury at the time of the in Moscow andremembered the election of tsar Mikhail Confronted with awhether a tsar or not, just three years after his who was not further-

their the Cossacks favoured a at least in their local lead-Mirroring the close relations between traders and a merchant

in Verkhotur 'e:

We the decree from not from Moscow. We would be better offif our Ivan Semenovich Kurakin was Moscow is far

Much more serious than this incident was the rebellion faced in July 1617 by thevoevoda of who had been to his position shortly after thedecree was issued. The very of this rebellion was uncommon for laterSiberian town rebellions: it was not directed any particular measure of thevoevoda, but Moscow's rule in The local Cossacks of this border

and customs barrier on the way to which had risen in importanceafter the measures introduced by Kurakin did not, even in the thenew voevoda, Fedor Pleshcheev, The voevoda had no interest inpainting the Cossacks in dark colours, and his the features of thePersrmenverhand. while their open disloyalty. Pleshcheev claimed thathe asked the Cossacks:

Why do you swear an oath by ... what is your plot withC.W.] Fedor Durov? And Fedor Durov and his plotters shouted ... swear­words at me and pulled my beard: 'We Tobol'sk but not Moscowdecrees; it would be if our ... Kurakin was with us andMoscow is far away'. I ... answered: 'We have but one inMoscow, not in Tobol'sk'. Thus [they] wanted to kill me.99

In 1615, as the Time of Troubles was Kurakin was to a troubledrealm. Many men formally in the service of the tsar had just returned from Moscowand the north of Russia, where they had become accustomed to Cossack ways, liv-

virtually beyond the influence of the tsar or his boyars. According to a contem­porary Cossacks controlled even the streets of Moscow at the very time oftsar Mikhail's election in 1613: 'No boyar dare confront or meet the Cossacks inthe streets, and [the boyars] make way for them and even bow their heads' .

In the devastated city, Personenverband behaviour spread:

Cossacks walk ... in groups, even where it is impossible to move in thebazaar twenty or thirty men, all armed, wilful, and ... never ... less than[ten to] fifteen men. lOo

48 The Cossack group

To establish his among these men, Kurakin had to make concessionshe distributed land and to the Cossacks without collecting ::ll"lnrnn·ri::lIIP

taxes and delayed dispatch of the land to MosCOW. IOI As already men-he became a popular leader by missions with and

astonishing aims. As Moscow and tsar Mikhail seemed neither willing nor able tohelp the Cossacks to attain their they oriented quickly towards leaders tal-

with their ideal of direct and to acclaim thevoevodas of Tobol'sk as and tsars of the Siberian realm occurred fre-quently as the Time of Troubles came to an end in Muscovy.P?

any means of direct control, the capacity to sendto quell a rebellion thus from its Mongol predecessor'v-

Moscow had means to ensure Siberian Cossacks remained within its ofinfluence. The of Cossack envoys from missions to the Mongolsand to China reflect a recurrent obstacle to any form of formal independencethe solidarity of in the former Mongol When Cossacks in Siberiafirst reached out for the could not dominate the and othersuccessors of their who confronted them with the oflegitimacy. Though the instruction Kurakin had to ataman VasiliiTiumenets and desiatnik Ivan Petrov stated explicitly that they were to delivertheir message in the name of quickly their mindwhen confronted with the

The ... on that were sent ... as envoys ofthe [Moscow] and not by the voevodas, were merry and allowedthem to travel ... without fear. 104

Similar situations occurred at the Saians and the Altyn-Khan. In Cossacks weretreated favourably as they claimed to travel on tsar Mikhail's 'and not thevoevodas' . An explanation for this behaviour at a time of weakness of the Muscovitestate is afforded by the of the tsar by the contenders in the forthe of the Mongol The Altyn-khan and the Enisei weredescendants of and would neither Russian Cossacks norany qazaq who explicitly disrespected the principles of legirimacy.vt

Though records on the Petlin mission do not refer to the event, the assignedleader of the mission, voevoda of Eniseisk Trubchaninov, neverafter the envoys had left Tobol'sk, and the Cossack and eventualleader of the mission, Ivan Petlin of Tomsk, wrote the to Moscow.ws Hewas always mentioned with his comrade Andrei Madov during his mission; fur­

two Cossacks accompanied him.v? The mission had been taken overby Petlin and Madov. They had as the tsar's envoys, which brought a com­plaint from the East Mongol Altyn Khan, who was helping them to reach Chinain 1619 in a letter to Moscow. He demanded that the Russian tsar send 'your ownenvoys ... and not the Siberian people'.

In the same month, a letter from tsar Mikhail to the Altyn Khan warned theMongols to distinguish between the tsar's emissaries and those sent by 'Siberian

The Cossack group 49

1~p,'ml,p'.108 This agreement between the Altyn Khan and the 'WhiteKhan', as the Mongol leader called tsar Mikhail several times in his letter, and aconfirmation of the duma decision of 1616 in the instruction to the newvoevoda of Tobol'sk in 1620 stalled all missions to China for decades. It evencurtailed the well-established relations with the East Mongol Oirats. Setin the formative years of Siberian Cossack institutions, this provided alesson there was no way the tsar, who made the best to thePersonenverband in any steppe environment even a of Muscovy'sdrastic and Nevertheless, the dualof interference in Siberia and Cossack it was time for a writ-ten confirmation of Cossack customs, them into Muscovite imperialculture.

Integration through institutional adaptation: advice and theCossacks

In June 1684, the Irkutsk voevoda Leonr'ii Kislianskii instructed the syn boiarskiiIakov Turchaninov and the icon-painter Vasilii Korotov to search for and exploitores and 'blue mineral colours' in the Vitim valley on the eastern side of LakeBaikal. Turchaninov sailed about 400 kilometres north until he reached the smalltown of of the district of Irkutsk. he demanded that thelocal workers and the necessary equipment. What seemed to bea routine doomed the whole Iakov Turchaninov indignantlydescribed the deliberations in his to the voevoda, The prikazchik IvanMaksimovich Perfil'ev was a renowned Irkutsk syn boiarskii with an even moreillustrious future to corne.F? His father had led the second expedition to found11 rcUC~J'-, and on an earlier occasion had shown his torestrain his Cossacks on a successful mission to pacify the Buryats, who wererebelling after the tribulations caused by three Cossack iasak collect-

groups sent to the from different towns. This leader didnot behave like the all-powerful military commander in someaccounts of Siberian Cossacks. As a reaction to Turchaninov's request, IvanPerfil'ev assembled Barguzinsk Cossacks in the office, reported onthe demand his fellow syn boiarskii had made and asked the Cossacks openly foradvice: '... shall we [them] mounts and hands and a and eq uip­rneru?' 110

It was necessary for him to ask and have his authority reconfirmed, althoughthe tsar through his the voevoda, had already it to him. Thiswas a common situation: in many cases, Siberian Cossacks elected their com­manders. However, this source differs significantly from others on this subject.It was not the result of a Cossack insurrection, but a decision in a normal situa­tion, which was not particularly and thus reveals what is usually neg­lected the all-too common details of decision-making in mutual agreementwith an leader who could marshal powers beyond thePersonenverband's immediate of authority. Thus, when Ivan Perfilev

50 The Cossack group

asked the Cossacks for he was summarily acclaimed: you thegreat laid ['authority' is not mentioned explicitly]; whatever youwish, so you will dO'.111

Most in this statement is the absence of any confirmation by theCossacks of Perfil'ev's ultimate, unrestricted command over themacknowledsed that the tsar's decree was a source of legitimacy independentthe Personenverband. The sentence is an accurate representationtion of power within the Personenverband. Perfil'ev'sactions and intention while their own, established a fact that fromtheir point of view needed no verbal the absence of any commitmenton the of the Cossacks to fulfil Kislianskii's demands. Perfil'ev knew verywell how much he needed their support, and thus stressed in his answer the unityof his own and the Cossacks' interests:

And he Ivan told the men: '[If we] them equipmentand hands] ... will exploit the [thus] it will be Kislianskii'sand the Irkutsk Cossacks' merit but not mine and not yours, Barguzinskservina men.t'?

lJll'~Jt::~,l, he downplayed any sense of obligation to hisfellow deti boiarskie in no of a common estate bound him tothem, no local sentiment stopped him on his course the order of thevoevoda, this did not affect his future among theminterim duties as a voevoda in Eniseisk and Irkutsk. Even considerations of rankhad no effect on his decision Kislianskii was a stol 'nik. 113 toa modem Perfil'ev did not any orders. He contented himself withsuggesting a course of action to the Cossacks:

Are there any volunteers among you who want to travel... towards thesource of the Vitim river ... to find the mineral ores and I will youmounts [etc.] and you submit a petition to the great at theprikazchik's office ... 114

Perfil'ev thus stressed a consciousness for procedural elements of law. In hisaction is as from the Cossack

Personenverband. In a move characteristic of a leader, he then proposed an alter­native and explained it as a powerful fusion of the principles of thePersonenverband and the legitimation as a prikazchik conferred on him by thetsar. As as he was the unquestioned leader of the andcould propose a compelling aim and course of action, he had the actual power toenforce his own and the Cossack's implied will:

As you search for these mineral ores it will be my merit and yours but if thereare no volunteers among you I will beat them and force them to bring a peti­tion and travel to the Vitim River.!"

The Cossack group 51

Stressing: merit Perfil'ev took up the Cossacks' service I~ Perfil'evthe situation accurately, for his was fully endorsed by the Cossacks. Thedismayed and how his own brother the'Barguzinsk servitors ... with comrades' handed in a petition and received allIakov had for the Personenverband thus kinship con-cerns. It would have been impossible for to act the Cossacks'intere st and his even if he had been so inclined. Iakov receivedonly mounts; he could report to Irkutsk that without equipmenthe was unable to the frozen . In the he he watchedhis brother and his men ride to the Vitim River on 12 came Is with all nece ssaryequipment and stay there for two not even allowing Iakov Turchaninov toobserve their 17

This formalized way of had a In 1648partisans of the first voevoda of who had been by

tried to justify one of the voevoda's measures by the Cossacks' deci-sion. The clash was about the mode of building the new fortifications, andSh,ohpr'h"tvi'~ partisans tried to demonstrate that the Cossacks hadpayments to that end, somewhat out of with the tradition of work dues owedby them: to the advice of all servitors ... [and] on their ... orders' .118

The formula that the of the rebels employed in one of the cennrrv's

town rebellions echoed the official of Errnak's In1620, as the dust of the Time of Trou bles had just settled, and Siberian Cossackswere roused to confrontation or the new and father oftsar Mikhail Romanov, Filaret, sent the first archbishop to Tobol'sk, Kiprian, topacify them .119 The latter tried to enhance his public by arevised version of accounts he had collected from survivors of Errnak's 1582 con­quest of the Western Siberian Khanate of Sibir ' .120 The text of the whichincluded the names of 36 fallen was read from the pulpit in Tobol'sk'scathedral of St Sophia as part of the commemoration of martyrs onSunday of Orthodexy.F' These and other forms of commemorations served toreinforce a social sense of identity; they the commemorated inthe group and were bound to forms acknowledged by con vention. 122 Whereasprivate commemoration was initiated by donations, usually by nobles and thegentry to secure memorial services after their death or that of their kin, the syn­odikon of Orthodoxy served to dissociate the church dogmatically fromand to affirm ecclesiastical and secular hierarchy. Dating from the synod of 843,it contained the decisions of the seven ecumenical councils and a list of the namesof those who had succumbed to anathema; on the other hand, all orthodox deadwere publicly promised remembrance. in the sinodik ofOrthodoxy was decreed by the ecclesiastical and secular power. It was extendedwhen new anathemas, good orthodox, and the fallen were included, who wereregarded worthy of remembrance by name in this honorific document and in theritual of Orthodoxy; an addendum was made for the fallen at Kazan' in 1552. Thechin pravoslaviia started to grow during the latter part of the sixteenth century,when the lists of the sinodiki became differentiated according to In

52 The Cossack group

I of Tobol'sk solicited that the tsar, the and theecclesiastical council Ermak and his Cossacks as martyrs. Thiswas proclaimed in Moscow, relevance for all of Muscovy.'?"

the Cossacks strove for although their aims fell short ofdemanding acceptance as as Cossacks in Poland did, who wanted the

in I a different institutional environment,The sinodik kazakam (in the chin the

elective character of the Personenverband and its valour, in Christianterms in the annalistic notes added to the The text adamantly under-lines that God and not the tsar elected Ermak's Cossacks to and overcomethe Muslim of Sibir '. this reflects later whenboznieu riornrrehr-hi iu" was added on the 127 ' ... with God's aid and due

to their valour Ermak and his retinue ... 'The church thus aimed at in the Cossacks, whom it still had to accom-

modate in 1621, as another citation which set God's election in oppo-sition to the tsar's orders:

and his unanimous retinue] ... whom God has elected and who weresent neither by men, nor by the instruction of the tsar's voevodas toconsecrate the and triumph over the Muslim tsar Kuchiurn .... 128

The term 'to elect also appears in a context that highlights Ermak 'sand the Cossac ks' free and strong will 129 and the great valour of thePersonenverband.vv An important reason why they were elected was also theCossacks' consent:

God elected them from among the common and armed the atamanErrnak Timofeev syn 131 Povol'skii and the unanimous and outstandinglyvaliant retinue with warlike ness and initiative. 132

Publicly the church thus of the participation of Cossacks in vital deci­sions. The text evokes the Personenverband when Ermak is depicted seekingadvice from his Cossacks and the question arises whether the Tatars, whom theCossacks had only recently fought to conquer the khanate of Sibir ' should nowbe the onslaught of the who threatened both:

the impious Koracha, the advisor of the [Siberian] tsars, sent his envoysto Errnak and the comrades [to ask for] men to defend themselves theKazakh horde. to the decision of all comrades (po prigovoruvseg 0 tovarstvai, believing the [env oys'] impious and unbelie ving vows, hesent ataman Ivan Kol'tso with forty comrades to Koracha ... 133

Bad advice is equalled here to impiety, threatening exclusion from the orthodoxcosmos and community, which combined with muchenichestvo;martyrdom, wasa common topos among Siberian Cossac ks.134 Official decrees issued in Moscow,

The Cossack group 53

expressed in the formula 'the advised (prikazali) and theresolved'.135 Unfamiliar, is the subject advice at

the court, the and not lowly Cossacks were the and gavetheir advice to the tsar, not to an ataman. Even on an official level,command of the Cossacks was not .aurocraric or military and hier-archicat, but routinely involved the of Cossacks.

This was not the only instance in which the model of the tsar and his wise advi-sors was to other of As Soldat has shown, Iosif ofVolokolamsk directly referred to of the tsar and the duma tolegitimate his monastic rule. In his rule, a council of 12 monks advised theabbot. 13li The sinodik also became the source for versions of the Siberian annals

the seventeenth century Siberia .137 In theLikhachevskaia edition, this theme of advice is In this passage, far fromcriticizing decisicns aided by there is a clear allusion to the theme of thebad and the which was so prominent in Muscovite publications

with the problem of the tsar's powers. While Muscovites used this themeof the bad advisors to the faithful tsar to rebellions particularmeasures of the tsar or his chancelleries and the theme of advice in theLikhachevskaia redaction calls into question particular decisions by Cossacks orvoevodas, The decision to help the Tatars is thus:

At that time, they did not advice and the words: 'Do notbelieve every but find out whether it is sent by God or the devil'.behaved cunningly and deviously and handed the atarnan and the Cossacksover to the impious

The terms and 'hand over to the impious are allusions toIosifs controversial Recent scholars have established that theauthor, rather than opportunistic with to the tsar's power, aimed atestablishing and a body of 'holy .the function of which isbest understood in the way he included his own texts, to them as 'holyscriptures', toO. 139 Slovo 7 and 16, dealing with the dutie s of the subjeers towardsthe the possibility of a bad tsar, and the duty of the tsar to eradicate'heresies' do not contradict each other as has been claimed .140 Slovo 7 has beenmisinterpreted as a kind of orthodox theory of resistance yet in the title Iosifclearly states that it was about the way subjects should treat authoritySince ordinary men and the tsar are both replicas of God, Iosif says, they shouldtreat the tsar with the same reverence as other human and thus performthe bOW. 141 since not all tsars are .Tosif concludes:

... it is proper to bow before them and to serve with the body, but not spiri-tually as the Lord says: the tsar what is the tsar's, and God what isGod's [this] is not detrimental to your soul. Rather you will learn to fearGod: for the tsar is God's servant, to men for and for pun­ishment.

54 The Cossack group

For Iosif and the sixteenth century in the tsar was by God'swill to fulfil salvific history: if he contravened the commonly standards,it was up to everyone to decide whether to an order or not. In both cases, thedecision did not affect the most important of human salva-tion, which was for a considerable of the seventeenth century still moreimportant than the order and tribulations of this world. At the sameGod the tsar even if he behaved like Satan a tormentor or hangman(muchitel') could be a necessary device to punish the

Yet if the tsar, who rules men, wants to rule beyond himself with abom­inable tribulations and even and rage, and falseness, prideand fury, more evil than all others such a tsar is not God's servant, but adevil, not a tsar, but a tormentor. Due to his deceit Our Lord Jesus Christcalled such a tsar not tsar, but fox: he said, tell that fox.

The fox is an allusion to Luke I where the Pharisees warn Jesus that Herodwants to kill him. Jesus defiantly calls Herod a fox, although he was a legitimateruler, on with his wondrous which had attracted Herod's scorn inthe first Luke then follows up with Christ's lament, which hints at salva-tion at the end of time. In this context, acts to define the characteristicof a tsar, obedience to whom was not to salvation:

The said: 'The ruler since his ways are ... youshall not serve such a tsar or on behalf of his Godlessness andcunning, whether he torments or threatens with death: 142

Although this is not contained in the Orthodox Bible, it clearly statesits intentions. These allusions were well-known to Muscovites the Enlightenerwas a popular book, and many of its were widely used in latermoreover, Kiprian, then the metropolitan of Novgorod, sent it in 1635 toTobol'sk.t-" Muscovites were not commonly literate, however,popularization of the Sinodik Ermakovym and the frequency of the term'torment' in court cases on misbehaviour of officials and show thatunderstanding of these allusions was not restricted to a small elite, but part of aculture shared by wider segments of the population.

The 'Sinodik Ermakovym kazakarn' and later editions thus parallel the atamanwith his advisors and comrades, the to the tsar and his boyars perform-

parallel functions to which the same words apply. Parallels are familiar inMuscovite theories of legitimation: the tsar himself was paralleled to God, not asa human but inasmuch as his powers were concerned. The parallel was per­ceived in the same way as an icon as the replica of the archetype, a holy orderas it was perceived in the Bible and the teachings of the Early Fathers. Thus, awhole area of decision-making was sanctified and integrated unchanged intosalvific history. Cossacks' decisions were officially sanctioned, but they remainedsubject to deliberation and could be reversed and the proponents held responsible

The Cossack group 55

if their decisions were construed as evil 'bad advice' if it was possibleto get hold of them.

Muscovy thus had found a very versatile method of institutional adaptation,which was particularly to the frontier environment and to a vastwith social formations. Institutional is a contentious issuedue to the many interests routinely involved. Institutions only their value tothe that others them. Their value to individuals loyal to these insti-tutions on the to which can that will meet withpredictable reactions in other or in different social this isimportant even over the course of since trade across Siberia usu-ally took months. In this , institutional can be problematic since allindividuals that have once to a particular institutional environment andstarted to build their futures on these institutions' reliability would have toaccommodate to institutions. Ambitious reform usually engender

costs in individual and information, and therefore founder ona lack of popular or popular Muscovy likened an institu-tion that was adapted to the social environment of the frontier territories toanother institution known in the central areas west of the Urals. institu­tional both at the frontier and in the Muscovite heartland was effectivelyDV-nasseu, while in the frontier area the bonus of direct, legitimateaccess to the court and chancelleries without their cherished customs.

lntennediary ranks

The of of deti boiarskie147 and their attitu destowards the Personenverband reveals them as intermediaries between the chan-

and voevodas on one side and the Cossack group on the other. 148 Insteadernphasizing the line of their fabled ancestors, like the gentry in the cen-

tral of'Russia.ts? they proudly remembered the well-recorded deeds of theirancestors during the conquest of Siberia, and stressed recent service in Siberia. I soSuccessful and into unknown of Siberia not onlyindicated loyalty and service to the tsar, but also a leader's popularityamong the Cossacks. Or so the Siberian chancellery thought: it was constantlysearching for reliable information on the current state of affairs, but remained farfrom the arena of action, it hard to estimate the current popularity of anyCossack leader. Such information could be vital when news reached Moscow thatone of the Siberian towns had deposed its voevoda, a swift officialdismissal and calling for an investigation by an outsider with sufficient authority.In such a situation, relief for the battered and hated current voevoda could not bedelayed until a new nobleman from Moscow had made the burdensome journey.As has been shown above in the case of Krasnoiarsk voevoda Dumovo andpis'mennyi Lisovskii, reputation among angry Cossacks could literally bea matter of life and death. Neither the razriad voevodas, nor the chancellery couldpossibly seek security by subordinating the deti boiarskie completely to theirinfluence. Afonasii Belton, the Irkutsk Cossack golova already portrayed, used

56 The Cossack group

his popularity with the Transbaikalian Cossacks to stay in control of thesive situation as the Cossacks Irkutsk in 1696. toCherkasov's aforementioned denunciation, he frequently conferred with theTransbaikalians at but he eventually did not implement any conspiratorial

In I he as second an unusual arrangement tore-establish in Udinsk his son who had been ousted by the rebels in 1696.Nevertheless, in the following years Andrei Beiton took the safe option and sup-

the even to the point of an by thevoevoda of Irkutsk.P' He was one of the 'courtiers of the Moscow list' in .:llU't::J ra,

who, much like the Siberian deti never equal with theircentral Russian homonyms,not to mention the to serve in MosCOW.1 52In the

and under the condition of Personenverband men such as Beitoncould curb rebellious in the ever more important towns, whichbecame rich after 1703.153 Their engagement in trade Iakov Beiton was tobecome the leader of a caravan to China and popularity among Cossacks suitedAfonasii's sons well and frequently held the office of in Udinskand well into the second decade of the Theenterprising Iakov Beiton was sent in the aftermath of the rebellion as temporaryvoevoda to where his reputation apparently was less resounding,Krasnoiarsk Cossacks were still too distrustful and, satisfied with their 'elected'voevoda obstructed relief. Iakov Beiton could not even check thetown's accounts, but was at least neither nor ousted he formally heldthe until a new voevoda, P.S. Musin-Pushkin, popular for his successfulcarnpargns, arrived, 155

The of deti boiarskie between the voevoda and the Cossacks was fur-ther by several factors. to this rank was restricted to thevoevoda of the which several towns.15~ to the quarrelsbetween different towns and their the voevodas' interest inprofit, subordinate voevodas' insistence on which was frequently similar tothat of the voevoda's, and divisive differences in opinion were part ofrelations between voevodas, An and popular syn boiarskii whocouldbe sent in case of conflict was therefore an asset for the razriad voevoda, Anothermajor concern for the chancellery was apprehension about what might happen tothe interests while the Cossacks and their frequently elec-tive leaders ruled the town exclusively, let alone the of a of rebel-lion to other towns. The Siberian chancellery as well as the voevodas of Tobol'skand the towns in many cases tried to calm the excited crowd of Cossacksby temporarily a loyal syn boiarskii in place of a voevoda.P? In othercases, the Cossacks, their faithfulness by a man with arecord of loyal service such as Perfil'ev in Irkutsk in 1696-7, deliberately chosethe elected leader.15s The Ivan Perfil' ev was, as already mentioned, a lead-

figure in Irkutsk. His solid reputation was reflected in his two-storey house inthe hamlet named after him and by unusual assignments to the post of thevoevoda of a razriad town, in 1688.159 In 1697 as 'elected judge' ofIrkutsk a title used during town rebellions he sent another syn boiarskii,

The Cossack group 57

Andrei Moskvitinov, who successfully the exploits of pre-rebellionprikazcnita and those of the rebels' elected For an appeal to Cossacksmore qualities were voevodas have otherin mind than the Cossacks were unlikely to every relativeof a voevoda sent to them, or a just because of theirrank or patronage

The Siberian the it in ratherterms. When in 1660 it was left to Tobol'sk voevoda LA. Khilkov to

decide who to send to Nerchinsk in heavily contestedDauria, the ordered to choose a who hasattended to the affairs voevoda or C.W.] and who isexperienced in Siberian service' .1~2

Khilkov sent L.B. Tolbuzin, who had served as a in western Siberia.A level of and Cossacks not voevodas character-ized the Amur area. In 1686, Tolbuzin's son led the highly motivated AlbazinCossacks, who held out the of the Mandzhurian

When Tobol'sk dvorianinrr' Fedor Tutolrnin, sent by the voevoda ofTobol'sk to voevoda Bashkovskii's tenure, arrived in Krasnoiarsk in1695 in the of the he met with Bashkovskii's fierce resistance.The Tutolmin out and his days inthe hamlets in conviviality, banquetsfor the elected thus his bonds with local Cossacks to pre-pare for the final clash.I~5

The Siberian governor M.F. was challenged in 1715 over his practicesin deti which the jiskal A. Filshin deemed exaggerated.'-"UoU' "1 explained that allowances were since volunteers were needed forthis rank and its extended the in 1718, u ".15".l1l1

repeated: 'many were for their and others ... from lowerare and reasonable men to send for iasak-collection and other sov-

D"'D;A-n'~ affairs' .IM the closeness of the deti boiarskie and other inter­rnediary ranks to the Cossacks could prove problematic for the chancelleryor the voevoda, Siberian deti boiarskie were considered eligible forthe post of a voevoda on a permanent basis, not least since most lived lives nottoo different from that of the Cossacks. Loyalty proved difficult to impose: in1640 the voevoda of Tornskreduced several local deti boiarski e to foot Cossacksto punish them for insubordination and gambling; he was forced to promote ordi­nary Cossacks as replacemerus.ts?

Nevertheless, in case of confrontation many sided with the local voevoda toprofit from his powers of to to Moscow, to the lucrativeof prikazchiki in the smaller forts or to buy up for the Cossacks' supply.I~8

Others felt left out, and supported the Cossacks in rebellion, if not outrightinstigating them. In May 1695, after down on voevoda Bashkovskii,Cossacks at Krasnoiarsk forced some deti boiarskie to become their 'elected

. Not that they personally found fault with this idea, but they were oftencautious to wait until they could prove forced, and until a confidant

58 The Cossack group

square, he met syn boiarskiiforced to come, and Konon Samsonovsquare' .

After Zlobin to draft a the Cossacks decided to elect leadersto the voevoda until the decree reached town, to hold courtbetween themselves and to elect selectmen. To constitute their new administra­tion, 'the whole town' assembled on the square and elected ';I1,iO'",e Errnolaev,L,1\JUlJ.I, sotniks and Muruev and Rostovets,and the desiatnik Tirnofei Potylitsyn; the latter was the of a

and influential Cossack family. The Cossacks confirmed their election by"WI" >11"11110' an oath and the ritual of the cross them to back U 1115"'''11

Errnolaev 'with comrades' and 'never to hand them over whatever' .1~9The force of the were the deti boiarskie Samsonov,

Triton and Matvei Iarlykov and the atarnan-brothers Tiurnentsov.Iarly kov exerted his influence to save the life of one of the hated of thevoevoda in the voevoda's office.l"v The of the elective sud'ias was

the power with the Cossacks. This flaee"'II,

and frequent of sud'ias were common in rebellions.!" they are sympto-matic of the of deti boiarskie in the Personenverband. The sud'ias werecollectively called 'G. Ermolaev with comrades' thus marking his authority assimilar to a but also his position as one among equals, Cossackcustom, too. The authority of leaders prevailed in this rebellion, at leastover the authority of the administration, which suffered much from toforce them to witness the voevoda's misdemeanours.

The Siberian tried to restrict access to the rank of deti boiarskie

yet it did not intend to raise the barriers between the Cossacks and their leadersto a that render direct communication impossible. In chan-cellery all of these men were called 'servitors' or, withoutdistinction, Cossacks.F? Deti for the sake of local influence, had to relyon the and comply with its rulings. Due to their intermediarystatus and their interests in some collaborated with voevodas antagoniz-

the Personenverband, while others derived special prominence from employ-their and kinship ties in Moscow and the razriad towns.

reported first hand that the Cossacks did not want to punish them. Thus, atamanMikhail Zlobin's son Ivan brought news to his father, of the small fortIasaulovsk, from the rebels him to ride back to town 'without

would send to fetch him. On KrasnoiarskErmolaev, who told that he had also been

comrades, who crowded in the

The voevoda and the Personenverband

Voevodas arrived in Siberia as the principal of the tsar. As far asthe Cossacks were they still had to prove their potential benefit to thePersonenverband, or at least to a powerful fraction of the town's Cossacks. Theymostly appeared with little fame of their own and thus depended on the uncertainauthority they derived from sent by the tsar. their authority and

The Cossack group 59

status and it into a frontier context which was to a considerable extentbeyond the influence of the Muscovite they brought their retinue offamily members and household servants, which could consist of as many as 30or, in the case of even 60 to 70 by plentifulsupplies.F" In their town, usually faced much more numerousCossack groups. Local was to run the official and the

business of the voevoda, To overcome initial alienation andlack of acceptance upon the arrival of a new instructions stipulated call-

the Cossacks to the the voevoda's office, literally thehouse', read aloud the instruction they had received in

Moscow, and listen to their To establish his one of thea new voevoda had was to them redress he could his

predecessor's dealings and fine him and return takenillicitly to the claimants. should not be underestimated asan avenue of redress for the it could only in some cases help Moscowto recover losses due to that had been by Cossacks and voevoda;the voevoda simply leave before the new one arrived.!" Cossackscould this evasion by and him in time, employingobvious The voevoda could their superiority only if hewon over substantial numbers or very influential members of thePersonenverband. The latter could pose a problem, as elected leaders of the lowerrank would fall from favour due to the Personenverband's orientation towards its

if leaders acted these aims. wealthywho until the last quarter of the seventeenth century were sent to Tobol'sk, andsometimes to towns, could violate the plunder theCossacks and the iasak and still rely on ties. If challenged, asin the case of who faced an ambitious secondvoevoda not scared by the first voevoda's influence in Moscow, he could still buyout the defy and make the most of it.177 with theexception of Tobol'sk and to a much lesser the frontier towns of

Eniseisk and the majority of the voevodas were not high-rankingboyars but petty nobles.t"

The Cossacks' numerical superiority was not so significant a factor in theremote territories of the northeast. Nomads of the posed no threat inla~.uc""" which was too far removed from the relatively small O'M,i~lrll1~

checked local Yakut tribes. In the inhospitable northeast, all supplies had to becarried over hundreds of miles from Eniseisk and Irkutsk, while those willing tosettle remained in the south. Cossacks could hardly live by trading nor could theysupplement the provisions sent from other towns by the crops of their own plot,and were attracted mainly by the wealth in furs to the end of the cen­tury. and scurvy were frequent and devastating, repeatedly decimatingCossack numbers. Deti boiarskie in Iakutsk district were in a slightly differentposition than elsewhere in Siberia. Deti boiarskie, Cossacks and the voevodasprofited from the difficulties of control over this remote territory Moscow

they could make better money than elsewhere in Siberia, and were

60 The Cossack group

less threatened by and punishment. In the far-flung ofIakutsk, most Cossacks in distant forts and winter-huts, where influencingthe voevoda's decisions was irnpossible.!"? Smaller due to adverse con­ditions and distance from the frontier also meant that voevoda Golenishchev­Kutuzov and his entourage were probably not the only to win the upper hand overCossacks. in 1666 he faced a petition by all the IakutskCossacks who were about to relieve their comrades in the scattered winter-hutsof the only 36 men. The was handed in at a review at the onlytime of year when at least a of the Cossacks were assembled in Iakutsk, thevoevoda was forced to 180

The assembled Cossacks accused not only the deti but also 'no-names', who were sent as although had no name and no meritfrom the of view: the Cossacks accused them of bad lead-

boiarskii Fedor Pushchin, one of the banned leaders of the rebellionof Tomsk in 1648 and hardly a no-name in the sense of unknown, was nev­ertheless without fortune in his new . He did not command much authorityamong Cossacks in although he retained his rank amongother failures, he was accused of 50 Cossacks when them to theAmur his orders. He had been unable to find natives on the riverto them, and ran out of After up a winter-hut, hereported, his Cossacks had left him to go to the Amur then a major Cossack aim

but most of them had died of and at the hands of Chinese troops. TheCossacks were as had to that the voevoda favours tomen whom they did not as while their direct the desiat-niks and were not considered. The latter were the most active pro­ponents of these aceusations.181 to Cossacks' ailegarions, syn boiarskiiPavel claimed that the Cossacks the illicit distilling of liquorand of beer by those Cossacks who were as alldeti boiarskie and no-names were accused of similar activities 'because he wastheir brother-Cossack'. The accused Cossacks could say little more than their foesto defend themselves these claims.182 Although Cossacks and detiboiarskie were equally at fault in Iakutsk,183 it was the dissociation of leadership,position and profit that so the Cossacks and their immediate leaders; thisextreme situation was facilitated by the conditions in Iakutsk,

While the Cossacks could be checked by the rnak-common cause with the iasak people. This could happen in Irkutsk and other

places as well Barguzinsk Cossack Khariton Evdokimov accused syn boiarskiiGerasim Turchaninov of inciting the Tungus to beat up his Cossacksin a winter-hut. Cossacks were not alone in the busi-ness ofcollecting the iasak. Besides the iasakpeople, who at times endured atroc­ities, the prikazchiks themselves were under peril. Evdokimov raised hisafter Turchaninov accused him of inducing his Cossacks to rebel against theprikazchik of in 1687-8. Prikazchik Moisei Viazmin did not agree todivide the fur treasure among them 'according to Cossack custom'('po Evdokimov's Cossacks hung him with his in the smoke of the

The Cossack group 61

winter-hut until he Khariton's Cossacks could not get awaywith their insubordination, they were fined in Irkutsk. 184 The balance of

power between the voevoda and the Cossack Personenverband therefore mat­since it defined who could profit from the iasak collections.

For the nobles who made up the bulk of the motives for apply-for a in the smaller and middle towns included to their

service and the pursuit of wealth, which were not welladvised to seek in poorer towns like or Narym.l'" Most Siberian townswere on distant frontiers where a voevoda's initiative wasCampaigns were the environment of the Personenverband. con-fronted a voevoda with a mixture of opportunities and obstacles. Iurii'Lukhachevskii, a Tobol'sk syn voevoda of Tara and,Mangazeia and descendant of an clan of Smolensk nobles bannedto felt this even after successfully his Cossacks in1641 the Enisei Althou gh they had richbooty, the Cossacks suddenly abandoned him. From their point of view, the aimof the was and the of the voevoda and Moscow were ofno concern to them. They wanted as soon as possible to sell their 'silken kaftans',alluding to booty and trade a new fortress Tukhachevskii wantedto build on a frontier which were used to as 'their' iasak area couldonly unwelcome It had been Tukhachevskii's strategy thatenraged them to pacify the but never to allow the Cossacks defeatingand them completely. His Cossacks did not spare him their urgentadvice. They were not interested in a settlement between Moscow and thenomadic like the nomads, Cossacks took a vested interest in thewindow open rather than the of Moscow's influence .18i) Having

booty, left him had to find in Kuznetsk.Significantly, the Cossacks of different towns involved in this campaign hadformed a Personenverband by to stand fast to their own aimsbefore Tomsk.l'" Frontier conditions made the Personenverband indis­pensable to Moscow and the voevodas, had to to the impenetra­ble and in principle unsubjugated Personenverband that offered the basis forestablishing a political space in which Cossacks could the terms andconditions of their actions.

2 The economics of Siberian service

the first half of the seventeenth century government forces andhunters ever into the populated mountains,swamps, and open of Northern Asia. The government increas-

felt the main dilemma of fur-tax politics: how could Moscow maintain asuitable its share of furs in a soand wild it was essentially uncontrollable?The frontier, which mer-chants and fur had to travel for thousands of miles whilewithin reach of nomad exacerbated this One of the instrumentsavailable to guarantee the necessary was translated as remu-neration, reward or salary. It was paid upon of a petition handed in by theCossack individually or collectively by a desiatka at the voevoda office. EachCossack was entitled to an allowance (oklad). Payment of 'e wasdelayed if Cossacks did not appear to claim it. The voevoda decided when theamount was paid and on what conditions. He could also decide to pay an advancefor up to three years if he considered the Cossack reliable and his mission neces­sary.Additionalmoneys were paid when Cossacks travelled to Moscow: the dailyallowance in Moscow, and a lump sum paid on departure,

Russian in Siberia, from Errnak's conquest of theSiberian khanate in 1581-2 to the establishment of Okhotsk on the Pacificseaboard in 1648, was intrinsically linked to zhalovan'e. Historians haveexplained this by geopolitical factors. The convenient river system allowedthe of enormous distances throughout the whole continent by boat. Fromthe mid-fifteenth century onwards, an demand for luxury espe­cially costly furs, such as sable and marten, was created by the prosperity andpomp of Renaissance Europe. Muscovy's ability to provide them was unrivalleduntil the latter half of the seventeenthcentury.' The Westernprovision of the mus­kets Muscovy needed for its wars and for the Cossacks in Siberia withsuperior weapons, were among the favourable conditions that made the fur tradefeasible. In Asia, turmoil following the downfall of the last successors of theMongol Empire secured an auspicious environment for Russian expansion. Theconquest of the khanate of Kazan' in 1552 opened the way to Northern Asia.Political instability in Eurasia included civil war among the khanates,which resulted in off lesser nomad confederations into Romanov or

The economics Siberian service 63

"Manchu War wrecked the Turkic khanates of Khiva and Bukhara,and combined with dynastic in China to disrupt commerce and life in theoasis on the trade routes from China.?

Yet one factor has been dealt with rather superficially,if at all: how did a cash­<:h·,~nT'lPrl economy manage to make such efficient use of all these opporurnitieseven if it was desirable and physically to reach Tobol'sk within threemonths by boat, or Irkutsk within nine it was still necessary to financesuch an . Zhalovan'e as a convenient solution to these linkednrr,hl'>m<: of and administration, since it allowed to convey informa-tion about the current state of affairs as well as between centre and

The connected to 'e show that it did not primarily serve asan instrument for unruly Cossacks": 'e was to anegotiable. From on, Moscow stressed reliability in the of salariesfor Siberian Cossacks. The tsar and the Siberian were in no positionto these salaries Muscovy's efforts in wartime cru­cially on the Siberian treasure. Furs were a principal commodity ofexchange, providing the means for from abroad which Russia

such as lead, sulphur, tin, etc. A pro-cession of bundles of 40 sable each caused astonish-ment at the court of the German emperor Rudolf II in 1595. This ofSiberian furs, a contribution to the war the Ottoman Turks, was valued at400 ,000 roubles. Between 1585 and 1680, the total number of sables and othervaluable skins obtained in Siberia amounted to tens of thousands per year, reach-

a of over 100,000in the I 640s.Their value in Moscow which was con-siderably less than the they fetched on the markets constituted atleast 10 per cent of the state's easy convertibility further increased theirimportance. The resources of the made the Russian the unrivalledsupplier of furs to and Asian markets until the century. Evenafter Canada arrived as a competitor, it could not match the Siberian sable, sup-

beaver as its most commodity.sThe sable, with its dark colour and luxurious texture, commanded the

followed by the black fox and the marten. A hunting or trading tripresulting in the of a few pelts could make a Russian prosperous for life

however in case of failure, it could also throw him into the claws of indenturedlabour." Enormous distances made seekers of wealth look for secure forms oftravelling and financing their adventures.

Competition for furs was stiff as in the Californian gold-rush in the nine-teenth century, hunters and merchants streamed into set up small bases inthe austere on the Gulf of Taz near the Arctic where they initiallyoperated independent of the government, their supply routes during the Time ofTroubles beyond Moscow's reach. Initially, merchants and hunters even called onthe native Sarnoyeds to defeat Muscovite troops arriving in 1601 with orders tofound the town of Mangazeia and take control of the Further south,closer to the , frontier conditions placed Moscow in a more advantageous

64 The economics Siberian service

position from the start. In these areas, which also provided the best routes fortrade and the only arable land available beyond the of the nomadKalrnyks and the eastern the claims of members of the partly expelled,

co-opteo western Siberian Tatar and the defensive tacticsof on the frontier made military and fortificationsindispensable: In frontier conditions, it was hard to grow the basis ofRussian fare and an attraction to everyone near the Control of sup-

was thus a for a of power, many conflicts. Yetthe Siberia offered to accumulate wealth, Moscow could not

confine itself to the narrower it took to its southern frontiersthere, a policy of lean management meant that fortresses had to stock their

emergency reserves from the soldiers' own service Furs had to beextracted from an immense country, and, since were scarce, small and

vulnerable groups had to collect and them to there-the Siberian was to pay the .The best forces avail-

able for such a business were those otherwise most likely to rob transportsCossacks the of in small groups due totheir Personenverband structure. To much earlier than in other

of with the of the capital, Moscow went to greatto a reliable and system.

r\uca'Jy in the sixteenth century, Muscovite governments had been consciousthat the availability of food was indispensable to ensure the frictionless function-

of Distributions as infrequent and intermittent fromthe tsar's household to individuals. By the early seventeenth century, however,

distribution had acquired a more and predictable character. Muchof the central bureaucracy in Moscow was maintained on a basis from thetsar's own and the members of the lower service '-la~~c",

received payments intended for food purchase. A limited number of supply wag-ons, filled with from the tsar's demesne lands, followed on cam-

where men with cash allowances could buy food. During thetsar's also distributed food in the capital, as in the 1601-3famine. Finally, the government frequently fixed on certain delimitedmarkets. These efforts remained small in scope, sporadic, and decentralized wellinto the seventeenth century. The bureaucracy and the musketeers were still lim­ited in size the 1600s, the army in Russia to mid­century was substantially self-supporting, and urban populations had declinedfrom their pre-I600 size. II Even when after mid-century army reform under tsarAleksei to create a dependent population, the Russian governmentdid not the need to additional Only when thesize of its army had doubled and the numbers of new formation troops had vastlyincreased did supply become an important element of the military reforms.F

More relevantly, these conditions remained confined to central Russia: south­ern musketeers did not receive the payments Moscow owed them on paper,although the south was obliged to pay the related tax, musketeers' Nationalsupply did not function in the south throughout the century, unsurprisingly

The economics Siberian service 65

modem conditions. isolated fortress towns in the south organizedtheir own localized system of emergency food supply.Local distributed

only if the could no access the fields from whichserved. As late as 1 the military governor of Boboriko in the extreme south-west demanded outside with the next would die ofstarvation. Small towns, distant from any trade that inthernsel ves amounts. The of the and forestlandwas onerous, and the time of most of the new farmers was limited bytheir military duties. Plots of land were often small, and labour was scarce. Badharvest years were and farms outside fortress walls were vulnera-ble to hostile attack. Furthermore, collected as service dues boththeir clients and contributors were locals and the same individuals,13

Overall, therefore, Moscow had the system of new fortresses centralMuscovy built and maintained on the The situation of Siberian fortresstowns access to routes and fur was very different.Tomsk may serve as a point of since it was located in a similar envi-ronment, far to the southeast from the main area of peasant settlement in westernSiberia around Tobol'sk. As in much of Russia's south, it was anexposed frontier town, it difficult to its own in sufficientquantities. Trade did not in and market sometimessoared around 12 to 15 roubles per from soon after the foundarionof Tomsk in 1604, the govemrnent, in a significant shift from its policies on itsown defensive belt south of Moscow, was to provide over enormousdistances to Tomsk as well as to most Siberian towns. More often than not,Cossacks received their remuneration. Tomsk was vital for the fur trade asan outpost and equipping to the river Yakutia andeastern Siberia.

Northern Russian towns collected for Siberia, since they also profitedfrom the fur trade with Siberia. the years of food in the Time ofTroubles, when Cossacks left their families to make a living in war-riddenEuropean L... u~~"a, Cossacks the Muscovite countryside contractswith the mir of northern towns and on and money zhalovan'e'; IIj

despite the term used in the documents, this was close to the alimentation prac­tised between cornmunities and officials.

After the Time of Troubles, when supplies slowly resumed former levels,Cossacks sought to secure an alternative source of income. As their numbersgrew, and pressures on the supply-side of delivery augmented, the Cossackshid their new hamlets and lands from Moscow's vigilant eyes. As early as 1620,the Siberian concerned about the drain on resources, promotedreform of the delivery system, as the decree proclaimed, it was: 'aheavy burden on northern [European Russian] towns and villages and many aredeserted, the inhabitants have fled'. 17

The tsar's father, Filaret, made his boyar Iu .Ta. Suleshev voevoda ofTobol'sk with a warrant to sort out Siberian supplies. He classified Siberian townsas either or non-agrarian; Cossacks to the latter received full

66 The economics Siberian service

salaries.whereas the former had to reductions. Some towns, such assuffered from this On the other hand, the Cossacks benefited,sinceSuleshev their land-holding This balanced did not spareSuleshev from to overthrow him," but overall his measures were

his endeavour an outstanding of modem adminis-trative reform. Suleshev achieved economies and was suitably rewarded.Institutional at this scale is not an modem common but rathersomething achieved only where certain conditions were even in Central

a law's implementation in many ways on the compliance andquite autonomous motivation of the which could be very different fromthe intentions of the A land survey conducted Suleshev'stenure was the basis for reform in which came earlier than in other partsof Russia. In southern sueh an endeavour too expensrvetherefore, in this similar reforms were never undertaken.f Vershinin hascited Suleshev's reform as proof of the role he to voevodas inSiberian at least as as the Personenverband provided an

successful institutional on the careful institu-tionalizing of more reliable boundaries to comprehensible procedures,as did Suleshev and 1), also on conditionsof economic If Cossacks had an incentive to use, or abuse these insti-tutions, had a firm foothold the Urals. These conditions werepartly or entirely absent in two other attempts at reform in Siberia: so, those ofTobol'sk voevoda F.I. Godunov, who lacked when he attempted to intro­duce the less institutionalized instead of the well-established of theCossacks, and at the same time to reduce salary The attempts ofO. Shcherbatyi in the 1640s in Tomsk will be discussed below. The Cossacksdeposed both although considerable protectionwithin their networks of , the tsar did not afford the sameoverriding level of as to Suleshev. the enormous distances fromthe centre, Siberia as an important source of revenue was treated much more likethe central ofRussia, with to Cossack it can be comparedto Moscow rather than to any other frontier apart from Astrakhan, seen as anexception due to the Persian trade.23

In actual payments recorded in local cashbooks, N.I. Nikitin con-cludes that from Suleshev's reforms to the economic crisis of the late 1660swhen Siberian fur output dropped actual supply and deliverance of zhalovan'ein western Siberia was more or less equal to entitlement for all but a few; thelatter, for various reasons, usually did not apply for it.24 Based on estimates ofconsumption valid in Siberia in the century, Nikitin admits thatzhalovan'e alone was sufficient to feed an unmarried Cossack. Overall, however,he and other Soviet historians maintain that provisions were insufficient, since anordinary foot Cossack's salary could not feed a family." Yet the estimated mini­mal consumption of Siberians he is based on accounts by travellers likethe student S.F. Krasheninnikov,He received two years' money salary in 1739 onKamchatka for working for a scientific expedition, which was, as he said,

The economics Siberian service 67

just to buy only, since one man needs twenty-fivepud a . Given the brevity of this statement, it is doubtful whether the samenorm applied to seventeenth century Cossacks in the same town for years,who usually cultivated a and cattle.2ii Another for this'norm' are the western Siberian Cossacks in F.A. Golovin's armyembarking in 1687 to defend the Amur Chinese who received two

of flour a month. hardly had to theirdepending on what was Nikitin paid to anunmarried Cossack of chetverts per annum, while a marriedCossack would receive 0 1/2 in the 'agricultural' towns, and marriedCossacks in towns too far north for such as Berezov andreceived eleven chetverts. Okladnikov mentions an 'official norm' of 2.5-3chetverts for the rather of 1710-95 on whieh Nikitin relies, with achetvert' 8 1/2 rather than 4 1/2

A calculation of the nutritional value however though very andhardly an accurate reflection of the 'real' value yields results.Given the nutritional value of as four calories per gram, with 87per cent of the either carbohydrate or follows rates of morethan 3.48 kcal per 36.6 per 4 or 4 1/2 puds per chetvert' and anassumed average of 10 chetverts per family yields more than 5,094 kcal or1,463.8 annually for one family.s' that a family with two chil-dren between nine and 12 needs 9,600 cal daily 3,504 kcal annually.>'even cattle could be fed on this diet. Now this overstates the nutritionalvalue of as some loss occurred during severe win-ter conditions and hard work increased and in this kind of com-putation can be far from reality. Still, even in the agricultural towns theofficial ration was substantial, and hardly corroborates claims that a familycould not feed itself on it.

Many of the qualifications Okladnikov made with to this 'norm' needto be borne in mind: applicable to it was rather elastic.lasak andpromyshlenniks needed much less than this, and even the themselvesproved flexible to provide more for the market once fiscal pressure madethis a favourable option there were other means to live by. A German officer inRussian service his astonishment and dismay about the Russians onarrival in Tobol'sk in 1667, at the very end of the of relati ve wealth. Hecompared them either with mercenaries in the German principalities or withEuropean Russian Cossacks:

The Russians in [Tobol'sk] deal with ... fat and tasty fish in super-abundance. trade in different kinds of and other foodstuffs ...everyone to be a merchant. There are diverse handicrafts ... but noone wants to be a peasant, thus the rich land lies idle. Most of these peopleserve the tsar as Cossac ks ... each of them his travel-salary;that is why they do not want to work, but rely on thebargain here, especially the wonderful fish. 32

68 The economics Siberian service

the unknown German officer vented his his grasp of iasak-collection was all but as he did not leave Tobol'sk and underes-timated nomad threats to he was as to the role fish played inthe diet. Much fish was to be found in the Ob", Irtysh, Arnur, the lakes ofthe western and in Lake Chan. Less fish lived in the Nerchinsk areaand in the Lena.P In fish was so plentiful that still in the 1730s evenon meat ate more fish than meat, although most Cossacks rearedcaule.v'

Cossacks needed cash 'e to buy equipment and such assaddles or muskets. a married Cossack with children could

at least of it on food. 'e did not cover all theexpenses of a family, and there were rather incidents of complaintsby married Cossacks. Yet the measure of and the that theSiberian not only felt an obligation to feed the Cossack and his wife,but a whole family" appears to be informed by notions. UIUI<c<c'J,

comparisons with modem closest in statusto the suggest a different evaluation. Mercenaries in the Thirty YearsWar were as much victims as guilty in the destruction caused. Ordinarysoldiers were swindled over pay, food, and medicine both by officersand by civilians who profited from food and money meant forthe of were confined to the camp market and the sutler, andwere not allowed to access towns and markets at will. By contrast, SiberianCossacks were town residents and could travel on duty to other marketthey rebelled successfully when barred from the market place, as in 1648 inTomsk.'? Even in the best of unmarried mercenaries in the Germanfound it hard to feed themselves on their since weapons, equipment andadditional foodstuffs had to be at could not eventhink of supporting their wives and children unless they earned extra.The wretched and soldiers' concubines and prostitutes stumbled

muddy roads behind the host, heavy their waythrough the country. Only at the very end of the seventeenth century did German

devote their attention to this problem. before this, SiberianCossacks had different, although related worries: their wives, though eligible forincrease d zhalovan'e for married were often left behind in town with-out any Cossacks' distant , since the men carried what-ever they could, a deal elsewhere.v For this reason, and since lifein two places was more even the increased salary for marriedCossacks sometimes could not save their families from The Siberianc nanceiiery, conceme d abou t this problem as as 1639, though not inclinedto condone a second extra salary for married Cossacks when on expeditions,decreed that one-third of the salary had to be held back for wives. However, thisdecree was conducive to fraud voevodas often tried to profit from the paymentof salaries, holding back one-third of the salaries of all married orunmarried, and appropriating the rest for thernsel ves. Cossacks complained abou tthe practice in petitions, and the decree was abolishe d in 1647 after a thorou gh

The economics Siberian service 69

mvesugauon ordered by the tsar further proof of the and flexi-bility of the Siberian chancellery

As usual in an women were acutely needed. Whethercoaxed by Cossacks to join or sent by the manyCossacks' wives and concubines from Russia, but to even num-bers were taken by force from the natives or sold by them. Native rn arrrace

pauerns allowed 'wife-friends', and a wife with a vis-these family links enhanced cohesion among populations thinly

across vast territories that knew no of authority or responsibility for pun-those who offended the established rules of conduct. Bride

the Arabic term " for a taken militarywere among the native customs that contributed to the Cossack

habits. Social of economic andextended service led to and exploitation of these cus-toms, and to conflicts with ecclesiastical authorities. mestiza-tion, the church soon to of women, or mortgagingwives when Cossacks to business and considerations oftion, if not mutually divorce thus made public.w Cossack women activelydefended their honour in court, in cases them fully in local

and its conflicts.41

Siberian Cossacks had another profitable source of incorne. German merce­naries in the seventeenth century could not hope for a substantial share of ransom,since were only allowed to demand ransom of of their own rank.Consequently, the greater part of ransom was swallowed up by thelowly mercenaries mostly could not pay any ransom at all, and even if by chancethey had to offer, their were only allowed to take as much asthe amount of their own monthly In the ~tr'"O'O'lp

between the chancellery and the Cossacks over ransoming and theirTlr'1~()l1IPr'~ could not be won by either although enslavement meantlosses to Moscow's revenues it infringed upon the number of iasak payers, asCossacks did not refrain from natives. Cossackssaw as their inalienable a point of view only strengthenedby the fact that in Siberia, as along the frontier, enslavementwas seen as a traditional practice even before the Russians appeared. On severaloccasions, the Siberian tried to stem the tide, inter alia by forbiddingthe trade in captives and the enslavement of non-baptized natives. At least, thismeasure legally separated the of the iasak-paying natives from legitimatetransactions with Cossacks' private economies. The natives lived their traditionaland shamanic ways, and would The success of these U<c,.I<C'<C~,

however, was lirnited.O In 1678-9 the Cossack Ivashko then prikazchikof fort Tunkinsk, launched a successful campaign, returning with two malenatives and two women ('devki'). Despite reports received from Irkutsk, it wasonly after six years that the voevoda prince Shcherbatyi finally succeeded in lay-

his hands on when he was sent to beyond the reach of thelocal Irkutsk Personenverband, and interrogated him over what happened to the

70 The economics Siberian service

natives. The Irkutsk Samoilov had in 1679-80 whenthey were living in the house of Irkutsk Cossack Petr Studenitsyn 'and com­rades'; Studenitsyn was in Mongolian trade .44 Only the fate of another

known by his new Christian name of Timoshka, was known in detail.According to petition the next Irkutsk Ivan Vlasov hadhanded young Timoshka to and this time the transaction was recorded.N(Itwithstanding rar,el!'p ,,'~ remonstrarions that he had just hired Tirnoshka outfor ten he could not state the or the date until whichhe had let him. found that had Tirnoshka for 30 rou-bles to Irkutsk Kozemka and claimed he did not evenknow where he lived by the time of his Studenitsyn's career like-wise suffered no as he went to Tunkinsk as eodovaishchik

recervmg a 'e in advance and as elected sworn man thefur treasury to Golovin's army at Nerchinsk in 1688 .4~ For years, thePersonenverband had provided sufficient cover for these asthe local on local to a than thevoevoda who was to be within two to four years, did not dare inter-fere with it.

Seeking cover in the Personenverband worked quite well, particularly in thefirst after the of a when the hold of the voevoda admin-istration was still remote and themselves as not too farremoved from the Personenverbandr' Relatives could be inclined to pay ransom,thus and for ransom made for a convenient source ofincome which Cossacks openly as an inalienable to

it from While the government attempted to limit thesepractices throughout the seventeenth century, it was the effects of over-huntingand the decline of iasak that Mosc ow's in the eighteenthcentury, when were owned openly.s?

Conflict and negotiation

The controversy caused by cases of fraud on deliverance of zhalovan'e tends toobscure the fact that in Siberia, Cossacks were in a position to prevent such

Already in the 1620s, when the supply problems of the Time ofTroubles were still not overcome, which affected for theCossacks since they made up for most of a town's expenses, voevodas had to seekloans from local merchants and 'all people'.~ Cossacks were in many cases indirect control of the supply of money, and salt. They were the only oneswho could the from the Russian Northor Tobol'sk, even if a syn boiarskii was in While trade in

was the capabilities of the Personenverbandprovided the defensivestrength necessary to protect transports, since more numerous troops could not besupplied. This position could prove strong enough to force the Siberian chan­cellery and the voevoda to make concessions on their plans for reforms, In 1637,after a commission had surveyed Tomsk Cossack land, new regulations on zhalo-

The economics Siberian service 71

van'e were introduced in the conscious of theburden supplies placed on the of the RussianNorth and the costs of stipulated that Cossacks who cultivated evensmall of land should not receive 'e from the next year onwards.

would either 'serve from their land' or receive a lower amount. Theresultant rebellion focused on the arrival of the thevan'e from Tobol'sk, The stol'nik Ivan Romodanovskii, tried tocircumvent an situation, if superficially, to l<C15auty.

Zhalovan'e was paid out in full only for the year and, to cus-tom, at the on the river quay. Romodanov skii ordered the Cossacks tocarry their allowance of for the year not, as usual, totheir but to the The at the quayand disturbed by the rapid introduction of the new law, andrefused to Romodanovskii made clear would receive theirvan'e as soon as had earned it, but no in advance. As they explainedin a the Cossacks feared they would not receive their 'e or

have to pay bribes in future; indeed such a them of theirbest opportunity to influence the levels and conditions of salary sinceceased to be a public event open to the pressures of the Personenverband.were also quick to point out that Romodanovskii had ordered the tocarry a number of sacks to his house and to those of severalother persons under suspicion of collaboration with the voevoda, an allegation themir of the corroborated in their own petition. A different is caston the in the petition of the which hints at earlier battlesover the of Voevoda had delayed the issue formore than five they claimed, until the sudden appearance of ice on the'quick and stony' river Tom crushed the and the wholesank. After this catastrophe there should have been severe dearth, but the nextvoevodas, Ivan Romodanovskii and his to 'offendand violate and insult' them even more. in 1635 the newcomers not onlydelayed the it to retain the best for themselves while deal-

out only 'wet and rotten' yet still there seemed to be reserves, since thevoevodas also bought up the Cossacks' allowances wholesale, as the latter admit­ted frankly in their petition.v'

The less than desperate approach to the issue is in theirattitude towards tangible concessions the voevoda made to their cause. After theannouncement of the new law and the determination of the voevoda not to payout zhalovan'e in advance, the Cossacks threatened to seize the yet neverdid. In particular, Ivan Matveev, the desiatnik who brought the fromTobol'sk to Tomsk, 'said many rude words to the voevoda and barked at him', asRomodanovskii put it. The voevoda reacted by imprisoning seven of theleaders, all of them piatidesiatniks; with the help of some of the deti boiarskie.However, he had not taken into account the resolution of ordinary Cossacks: 150men 'went into prison forcefully and imprisoned themselves' to join their leaders;they did not allow their names to be listed and followed their leaders to the

72 The economics Siberian service

the from theirof rebellious spirit could not

assembled circles andsovereign's and someone else's

voevoda's office when the latter were summoned, a common tactic.55

Rornodanovskii that the Cossacks reproached him: 'Whatever the hostso it will be: we will neither carry the nor serve from

[our] fields without 'e' .When another attempt at

Personenverband had failed, and in town thebe the voevoda re~lort£d:

gave advice and crimes concernmgaffairs' .

Romodanovskii tried to divide his foes by a calculated partial retreat. Heoffered to hand out the 'e for the next year (1 awayto those who were entitled to receive it Therebels, however, did not care about the offer: had all convened in the refec-tory of the church of the for deliberauorr'.w

Considering that the Cossack petition claimed an earlier voevoda had with-held the on the until and sudden ice on the river Tom sank

such endurance hardly confirms that felt the consequences of theirrefusal heavily. Nor did the poor make a romantic sacrifice in the interest of their'mir'; a term which was neither mentioned at this nor at almost any other stageof the rebellion.t? The Cossacks still had reserves at their disposal, andin particular knew had untapped resources for their political ThePersonenverband's firm hold on the distribution of zhalovan'e explains why,among the abuses uncovered by there were few occasions inwhich Cossacks were outmanoeuvred with to the payment of their

Tempting as it may be to compare this rebellion to the and bread riots inEngland described by Thompson and his followers as of a moral economy,serious differences remain. on an eroded body of statutoryand customary law, to dearth by the reintroduction of markettions, and did not abstain from merchants' on the rivers and sell-

them 'at their in the market The rebels in Tomsk, however,a similar opportunity did not attempt to take the salary by

force. They sent a delegation with their petition to Moscow, to persuade theSiberian chancellery not to reform. As petitioners sent on a distant journey, theyfelt entitled to seize their 'e directly from the for a year inadvance.w The Personenverband was fully to disobey the voevodawho was entitled to withhold a safe-conduct yet would rather negotiate throughits with the chancellery in distant Moscow than simply seize theon the of claimed

The rebellion's outcome was close to a full vindication of this strategy. Withthe participation of one of the later leaders of the rebellion, Andrei Guba, a com­plete overview of Cossack land had only just been filed as a preparation forreform, yet under the threat of rebellion the Siberian chancellery decided the landshould be . At least for the time the new law on service fromthe land was not to be applied.s'

The economics Siberian service 73

The Cossacks used the same strategy of the trade bottleneck formedby the frontier town in other events, too. In 1645-6 Tomsk Cossacks demanded

'as a for not to leave for as Bakhrushin believedan advance of two years on their allowances for a the

who were when voevoda 0.1. ordered 200Cossacks to be elected from their ranks. declared that Krasnoiar Cossackswere of: '... skirmishes with the ... due to their limit-less fi2

The delay caused by these tactics forKrasnoiarsk, for Bakhrushin this was but thevoevoda and the voevoda of the the former as theinterests of the This is to view the events in isolation. In 1648, thesame when voevoda that the system of pay-

zhalovan'e once a year was detrimental, so he paid only half the oklad onceat a time.M When he sent another 200 Cossacks on the urgent demand of theKrasnoiarsk voevoda Durnovo, he the rebellion discussedabove.fis

The Krasnoiarians meanwhile remained a poor lot. Rivalry between Eniseiskand Krasnoiarsk started with the foundation of the latter by Eniseisk voevodaAndrei who built the fortress 'by his own volition, not tothe decree', as Eniseisk Cossacks believed. While Eniseisk Cossackswere burdened with supplies from Makovsk Cossacks in bothfortresses soon became rivals over the Buryat since Krasnoiarsk wasblocked to the south by the and by mountains and rapids to the east. Whena Krasnoiar after iasak and in Buryat in Ihad to return from the via local Cossacks obliged their voevodato confiscate Krasnoiar I since had in and obedient ter-ritories. Eniseisk handled supply, too, and the voevoda had already refused toadvance I e for this althou gh the Krasnoiarians had besiegedEniseisk.w At the tum of the 1680s and 1690s, by most of the trade andsurrounded by , this southern outpost was insufficiently supplied.Krasnoiarsk reliably received zhalovan'e only in years of service journeys, Evenvoevoda Musin-Pushkin complained that already 30 Cossacks had fled and morewould follow if compensation were not paid out, since they were all indebted andcould not pay their creditors. as Krasnoiarsk Cossacks knew well:

In other Siberian towns, the servitors are your sovereign's... salary in advance for a whole year, while all of us ... receive ... salary[only] for the years, but in advance they do not us [anything].We have also received no salary for several years. (164 7)fi7

Krasnoiarians could not offer the same amount of iasak other towns collected,since the yielded much less valuable furs than the forests. The main prob-lem in the early 1690s was not the low level of but rather thefact that, over several years, a sum of delayed payments had accumulated,

74 The economics Siberian service

so reliability of was no in 1692-3 it amounted to 11,404roubles for the last six years. In addition to their isolation, Krasnoiarians had clearmaterial motives to doubt their loyalty. These could onlyhave been confirmed, and were directe d towards the voevodas and mvesugatorswhen a reward by the tsar for a successful was withheld inI a and famine contributed to the combustible situation inKrasnoiarsk on the brink of the which lasted until I

Manipulation of was one of the major devices by whichPersonenverbdnde of different towns it was not theCossack Personenverband that shed on a plot in Tobol'sk involvingweights and a of to Cossack detach-ments; Tobol'sk was the for to the north, south and east,

from Russia. The affair was uncovered bythe litigation of Savva Kliapikov, who had been byvoev oda P.I. Pronskii to silence him. Although he had served for 30 years in

he had been excluded from the company of those from the for-In his detailed bill of complaint, Kliapikov claimed that the

Cossacks had supported him the voevoda's false advisors. However,Kliapikov could not assemble sufficient support among Cossacks for a localmvesugauon, Only the of from areleased the Kliapikov succeeded to be to Moscow,while a preliminary investigation uncovered evidence of widespread fraud.s? Aswill be in 5, Irkutsk Cossacks behaved similarly. A of morepopulous administrative centres, from Tobol'sk over Eniseisk to Irkutsk com-manded and increased their fortunes at its expense, as the military situ-ation allowed. included the poorly endowed Tornsk, which, however,marshalled a and was an important point of and Iakutsk,where the dispersal of Cossacks meant that the voevodas could withhold part ofthe supplies. Supplies were more generous in the north and other unsuit-able for agriculture, as in Surgut or where conditionsdemanded this. the rich fur yields in these or functions essen-tial for trade also gave the tsar opportunities to display his b,..(,.p~"p

Some historians consider zhalovan'e as merely a tool in Moscow's hands totrick the Cossacks into dependency 'from the very of the conquest',which allowed the metropolis to the internal life of the Cossack

However, such a model of absolute control is belied by events such as theAchinsk campaign and its preliminaries, which also shows the extent to whichSiberian Cossac ks ex ploited the state. In 1639-41, Moscow attempted to open upthe land-route between the southern outposts of'Tomsk and Krasnoiarsk by estab­lishing fort Achinsk on the Chulym River. Cossacks showed how little inclinedthey could be to follow government despite appropriate zhalo-van if orders contravened their interests. The leader of this campaign,Iakov Tukhachevskii, led a host drafted from several western Siberian townswhich was planned to comprise 1,000 a number it never reached. Theywere all to meet in Tara, where the zhalovan'e for one year had already arrived in

The economics Siberian service 75

the and summer of 1639. The first delay occurred when Cossacks fromTobol'sk claimed their salaries for the year yet deliveries had alreadygone to Iakutsk, and there was left in Tobol'sk to them. 'I h,p" '",,1,_

tioned that their horses were weak and not fit to endure asupplies had not yet while their equipment and winter clothes were insuf­ficient.F At the same time, Cossacks who had slackly andasserted that had become down near Naryrn, nevertheless made theirway to Tomsk. immediately had travelledand " and in rove from one homestead to the next' and'finally die'. It is that the Cossacks who wrote this served and lived inTornsk."

While Tukhachevskii used the hold-up for fromTiumen", which were meant to those from met asimilar fate while the wrong way. Tukhachevskii was quick topoint out that this snag that some Cossacks 'do not want to serve you, sov-

. He asserted that Tobol'sk sotnik Ivan Ru kin, a descend ant of a sprawlingfamily of wealthy Cossacks in Naryrn and who was influentialamong Cossacks in Tobol'sk, initiated acts of . On a recent service jour-ney to Moscow, he had learned of the details of Tukhachevskii's plan. Back inw,,-,,,,,, "", he claimed there was no official decree this He there-fore sent his Cossacks back to Tobol'sk with the had escorted toTara. In Tornsk, Cossacks petitioned for compensation a particular example ofsoft sell on their a truly apocalyptic situation. On their way to

they claimed, 'Many of us lost their while others were lamed, andmany of us arrived on foot'. But since:

we do not want to desert your service ... we indebted us amongourselves in the circle and bought [foodstuffs and horses] at a '-''''5'''''... and on our way to Tomsk we ... rode through the Baraba [wooded

and... two horses for one our last clothes. Manyof us reached the town of Tornsk with difficulty on foot... and cold,naked, barefoot and without and the salary sent from Tobol'sk ...drowned in the river while others did not reach us ... and froze ... and whilewe were in Tomsk ... we starved ... 74

However much hyperbole was involved, Moscow did not think twice aboutordering Tomsk to dole out zhalovan'e. Since the wereempty, the Cossacks asserted, Tomsk voevoda Klubkov-Mosal'skii ordered thecollection of four quarters per from all the in Tornsk. Onlythen did the Cossacks sluggishly prepare for campaign, but they still waited toreceive their cash allowance. Despite all efforts to fit them out for campaign, theCossacks claimed 'We borrowed from each other ... and set out for thesovereisns service ... in great want ... " then petitioned and waited again, thistime for the arrival of the delayed cash and salary for the year,sent from Tobol'sk." All claims of the Cossacks notwithstanding, the Tornsk

76 The economics Siberian service

voevortas. who in those years had to appease a rebellious attitude in their owntown and were therefore hardly towardsTukhachevskii, while allclaims as to contributions collected among the population, that granarieshad issued 456 quarters of rye; Tukhachevskii confirmed this version and

In their wrote that do not want to serve you,although the arrears have been sent from Tobol'sk: rye, groats, oatmeal andsalt. .. and ham, butter and cheese ... but that their drowned in theriver Ob', as wrote in their petition ... that is all untrue.

Only one boatload got wet since their inafter the thaw' .7~

Tukhachevskii ordered Rukin, Tomsk syn boiarskii Vasilii Prokofev and 60Cossacks to to the Enisei . Even after this,Rukin and when Tukhachevskii tried to him, Tobol'sklitva and mounted Cossacks interfered.

When the army left Tomsk on 20 June 1641, half a year later than planned,and, due to 210 Cossacks short of the 870, there wasdisagreerneru about strategy the Cossacks wished to strike hard, and in fact tookas many and booty as could. in no more than a monththey amidst the to exhaust their and money remuneration,as claimed. Once had seized a trail of dromedaries and other live-stock in a successful assault, the animals as shields to the Enisei

from retribution, they claimed they could no sustain campaignservice. During the one of'Tukhachevskii's most ardent piatidesi-atnik I. Misailov, to sell weapons for roubles towhile Tukhachevskii of the same feat. As the voevoda found out, manyof his men planned to flee to the Kalmyks in the southwest, to seize theopportunity for trade. The Cossacks were infuriated when they learned theyshould return their whom considered their rightful remuneration forthe campaign. Tukhachevskii planned to defeat the nomads, yet to treat themrespectfully to placate potential opposition to a new fort amidst their lands.Returning successfully from the campaign, on a crossroads near Kuznetsk, thevast majority of Cossacks in the circle could find no reason to departand build a fort; after a row only 12 men, half of them his own militaryfollowed Tukhachevskii.?"

Syn boiarskii Ivan Rukin and his entourage of Tobol'sk /itva and mountedCossacks to have their own Achinsk and the desir­able status of the area. Yet the majority of Cossacks could hardly care less asmentioned, they might sympathize with the former, but they were much moreconcerned with their short-term and negotiated for salary as best theycould. Returning to Tornsk the Cossacks received a caravan of Ob' Osriaks toexchange Iivestock and captiyes for furs. On 13August and 9 October 1641 4,418roubles cash salary and 2,506 sacks of rye flour and 2,5911/2 chef'; 906 chet' of

The economics Siberian service 77

oat; 450 chet' groats and and chet' oat were delivered fromTobol'sk, Tukhachevskii's rebellious Cossacks petitioned Tomskvoevodas to issue for their 'military affairs'. In Tomsk,

of starvation since rye was four roubles forone chet', started, and the voevodas gave in as before.received their for two years in advance, as the Tomsk voevodas ypy\(wtp(j

nevertheless to a return to Tukhachevskii, claimed thatwere unable to serve under his ' .. . we will notTukhachevskii and we will not serve this service' .78

Tomsk voevodas means they allowed the Cossacks toelect their own leaders to head for fort which then had been establishedby Tukhachevskii's few men. In his unusually detailed and reliable on theAchinsk based on archival sources en of his account of the his-tory of Rezun claims this was unusual."? years beforePokrovskii's book on the it does not to the carnpaign.s-nor the forms of or the way in which Cossacks their

As election was a common, institutionalized practice.As the Cossacks were little inclined to relieve Tukhachevskii in his

claimed not to be able to leave for Achinsk as as there was nosnverercns decree a voevoda since 'it is not [our] custom', theydeclared, to elect their own voevoda, had reason to hesitate, asTukhachevskii inundated Moscow and Tomsk with petitions demanding severepunishment for the 'traitors' who had deserted him. The rebels, sufferedno harm, for they bluntly declared they would not allow any of them to be impris­oned but only all a fairly improbable outcome. ThePersonenverband formed of these oddly assorted Cossacks from several townsdefied the of and a stol'nik voevoda Klubkov-Mosal'skii at that, the tsar's own institutional It was only aftera decree from Moscow arrived, and as many as 57 Cossacks had taken to their

that the rest of Tukhachevskii's army, reinforced by new men, well pre­for trade by the 'e had and under the officially con­

firmed leadership of the second Tomsk voevoda 1.Kobylskii, set out to relieve thefounder of Achinsk.s'

Thus, Personenverband concerns, even zhalovan'e could not guaran-tee the smooth execution of Moscow's wishes. This sheds light on the decisivepowers of the Personenverband Cossacks could not live without their remu­neration, and depended on disbursement in advance in order to make theiractions viable. Negotiations about a sensitive issue such as the of loansfor years in advance were yet contenders insisted on the legitimacy oftheir actions.

Rezun believes that Ivan Rukin and his supporters, who put up a more ferventopposition to Moscow's and Tukhachevskii's plans, feared the establishment of asovereisns fortress headed by a voevoda, which from Rezun's point of view isidentical with the 'all-powerful ... state' .82 To a certain they considered'the state' a competitor; however, it seems unlikely that they perceived it as

78 The economics Siberian service

'all-powerful', since had proven that the state was not even capable ofcontrolling efficiently what was on in the frontier. Therefore, they ratherfeared the of another Personenverband in trade and a voevoda withpersonal needs at Achinsk that would exclude them from of thehinterland of Toms k and Tobol'sk. Similar moti vations can be found on a numberof other occasions. Thus, in December 1672 Samoil Aleksandrov syn Lisovskii,prikazchik of that on three occasions five Cossacks fromSelenginsk had used a decree to turn away more than 30 local fromBarguzinsk, inciting them to pay iasak in In 1661,Irkutsk was founded on behalf of a petition by a Buryat theEniseisk voevoda for from the of the Krasnoiarsk

In 1646, the Eniseisk voevoda FF Uvarov's pro-in accordance with a of 'the whole town' to and

shortcomings in the administration of that Eniseisk should no beof the Tomsk the relations of Kuznetsk and Tomsk developed

Credit, trade and service

Cossacks considered their and entitlements worthy of andCossack service desirable. For the Siberian authorities, recruitment was not asthorny an issue as, for in the German actually, problems relatedto recruitment were different. The Siberian could not eventhink of the of re bellions, and could not exert a control tightenousn as to exterior discipline; desertion could be a problem in somerpc,irn,~ where there were new, more attractive conditions. even the set­tlers in Albazin, which came closest to a 'free Cossack republic', chose to collectand pay the iasak thus allowing the interpretation that they were loyal; hencethe Siberian was quick to deliver whatever supplies were needed.wRather than though they were not unknown, the Siberian chancellerywas forced to tackle the problem of unsanctioned enrolment. After investigationsheaded by Moscow or Tobol'sk envoys, those unlawfully by the voevo­das were ousted.87 Siberian Cossacks paid enorm ous bribes j ust for the jJJ1V "" 10"

of enrolment an investigation in in 1720 revealed that commonbribes amounted to up to seven roubles and a of Chinese cloth,although some paid even more. Meanwhile, warlords in the German wereforced to pay increasingly amounts of Handgeld, a one-off payment onenrolment. Handgeld often amounted to more than a mercenary could earn in awhole year and nevertheless or rather for that reason the and townsfaced frequent defections, sometimes already on the recruiting square(Musterplatzi. Whereas German could only fill the ranks of their armieswith criminals and vagrants, thus inevitably harming their efforts to increase dis­cipline, in western Siberia the chancellery increasingly relocated those enrolledunlawfully from among the banned, the vagrant and even the tax-paying peopleto their former quarters. The aim was to increase the number of descendants of

The economics Siberian service 79

Cossacks among the Even in the east itself, a candidate needed somequalifications to be for service. out of 185 Cossacks inter-1"""",t",rl at in 1720 were vagrants before enrolment dur-

1700-19 mostly sons of and or from allover Siberia and the north of Ru ssia, while just 71 Cossack sons and three 'inhab-itants' were the latter two groups all from thevagrants showed a to remain in the same forreturn Just 12 had lived in for four years or ~l1",'n<:;l,

half of the latter for one year or while 36 had made a in Selenginskfor 10 to 27 years before enrolment. Two enrolled Cossacks had formerly beenbanned for unknown reasons a rather low came from the

or were descendants of one of them even a merchant.89

A certain of steadiness and the ability to adapt to the new environment,as well a minimal accumulation of wealth were for enrolment as a,-v~~a1~rc, at least in the first two decades of the century, whenSelenginsk was a rich caravan town on the border. The attractivenessof Cossack service can be discerned from the fact that, out of the 218 aforemen-tioned Cossacks in only 32 claimed they had not bribed the voevodaor the to be many of the others as much as seven rou-

while another 15 are not known to have paid bribes. While in the second halfof the sevenreenth century military serv ice in the German lost itseven to the lower classes ,90 in Siberia at the turn of the seventeenth century,Cossack service still looked for Although there was a

labour most of the vagrants or rather had to wait fordecades to until they were considered reliable and had acquired some local

At least in the 1690s, were considered so reliable in eastern Siberiathat Cossacks could frequently take out a loan on this security. In Irkutsk,between January and 1694 26 foot and mounted Cossac ks borrowed sumsbetween one and five roubles, which were to be paid directly by the voevoda'soffice 'in advance for the next year (l from my first instalment' or on thespot 'in advance for next of these futures were the prikazchik of theEniseisk Ushakov, mounted Cossack piatidesiatnik Erofei Iakovlev synMogilev, the mounted Cossack desiatnik and holder of the venal office of thescribe in the town square Andrei Kakhovskii, the Cossack Ivan syn

Khrnelev, and the pod'iachii Ekim Samoilov, all of Irkutsk. These transactionsshow that economic relations were intense enough to social relations. Theneed to identify debtors by the developing financial relations in aquickly town with a turnover in population led to the routinerec ording of full names. In Irkutsk, all ordinary Cossacks and lower ranks

a loan were recorded with their father's name, which was not common prac­tice in other documents. On the contrary, the town square scribe and thehlghel'-rall1kll1gpod'iachii who drew up the deeds were recorded with their titlesand whereabouts, but without their father's name. Significantly, the same wastrue for two Cossacks their transaction in fort Bel'skii.?'

80 The economics Siberian service

The economic success achieved by means of such loans could be considerable.In 1691, unknown perpetrators stole soap and tobacco from the ofIrkutsk Cossack Andrei Osharov, Osharov, unable to pay the losthis soap and tannery to the owner syn boiarskii Sidor who

In the same year Osharov, not to stand by forreclaimed an as yet minor debt from a fellow and in the next

year came up with an even more ambitious plan to recover the soap works andtannery this time he wanted to buy it out at the considerable of 230 rou-bles. Unable to pay he the Siberian for a In1 the Siberian liability for Osharov's debt to theamount of four roubles per annum taken from Osharov's service entitlement.?"The rec ords are silent on whether this was the full annual amount of payment due,but the arrangement was attractive for Shestakov to agree tothe deal. For several years, all went well for Osharov's and Shestakov's deal,while Osharov rose to become a de siatnik of mounted until in 1696, theyear of the Cossack rebellion around Lake Baikal, the embattled voevodaSavelov tried to his most important While Osharov was awayfrom Irkutsk, Shestakov seized the opportunity to enrich himself. He claimed thatpayments had not been the factory, and finally had Osharov'put in ... and ... for two weeks'. Osharov and his wife com-plained were forced to pay a horse worth five roubles fifty, clothes for him-self and his wife, and silk to Sidor. In 1696, for Irkutsk thepayment of to all Cossacks was still half a decade away, althoughbouring Nerchinsk already fully relished the rewards of the caravantrade with China.9~ Yet Savelov had many of ~11~'tPrfl1crp

Shestakov was his equal in this art, and an investigation was already impendingboth. Whatever the reason for the quarrel, Shestakov could not in

his for too In early 1697, Irkutsk Cossacks overthrew voevodaSavelov, and Shestakov was killed by rebellious Nerchinsk Cossacks withthe relatives of a he had killed in a quarrel while leading a caravanreturning from China.?' The Siberian though still of thistrain of events, fully endorsed Osharov's complaints, ordered the return of hisvaluables and obliged the Irkutsk treasury to pay the full liability each

Only months after this lawsuit, Osharov managed to take part in escortingthe iasak treasury to Moscow, him with an opportunity to buy merchan­dise in the capital. When he re-applied for remuneration in advance for1699-1700 after returning in early 1699, the loss of one-fifth of the treasury dur-

the journey was considered, yet in the end he was exc ulpate d and recei ved hisIn 1699-1700, Andrei Osharov was busy in Irkutsk, most likely workms

at his factory; avoiding distraction, he one-year service in the frontierfortress of Tunkinsk during 1700-01 with rank-and-file Cossack Poliakcv.tw'Therebellion of the Transbaikalians and the subsequent fall of the voevoda hadchanged the balance of power in favour of Osharov, Though a Cossack of low sta­tus, he primarily through the engagement of the chancellery and its stead­fast commitment for financial securities.

The economics Siberian service 81

Flourishing international trade induced such a commitment. As merchants hadto fear Cossacks and had yet to rely on them on distant it comesas no that, after the crisis of following the 1670s, there wasfirst a consolidation in the essential border post on the caravan routeto China. 1 all were made, and no furtheroccurre d for those allowances not applied for in indi vidual years. A decade

the same level of was reac hed in and in 1703, cara-vans finally their route to the shorter trail.l'"

In many ways, the Siberian to bind Cossacks' interest inor overland trade to its own business of the fur tax.

Cossacks often received of their which was either delayed or was paidin advance on arrival at the Siberian with the fur treasuryor with reports the voevoda sent to Moscow. In Moscow, daily allowances werepaid at a rate of three to four when between two and six rou-bles this was paid also to servants of the bishop, sworn men, and iasak

whose was related to the affairs' .102 the sev-enteenth century, a variable total of up to 50 roubles in merchandise was free oftax, and so was zhalovan'e. Taken this could amount to a considerablesum: in 1697, Nerchinsk syn boiarskii Lonshakov was sent toMoscow to convey the treasury back to Nerchinsk destined aszhatovan'e for Cossacks and iasak He had for thisappropriately, mainly Chinese cloth and other items worth 275roubles. of the whole amount he paid taxes only for worth 145roubles, since 50 roubles were tax-free anyway, and merchandise worth another80 rouble s was counted as 'e for 1694-6 and even in advance for theyears 1697 and 1698. He was the leader of a caravan to China in 1689-91, one ofanum ber of ric h merc hants among the Coss acks, Some of these were kin of mer­chant families, attracted by the opportunities for trade that Cossacks , inparticular service abroad; diplomatic were otherwise inacces-sible to merchants, who therefore worked closely with their Cossack rel-atives. In Irkutsk and Nerchinsk such families included the S"\I\I;ltP'''\I~

Istopnikovs, Shtinnikovs and some merchants, nowever nrp,/prTPrl

to become Cossacks themselves, such as the Burdukovskiis, or the Selengmskpiatidesiatnik Dmitrii Tarakanovskii, recorded as a merchant in the 1680s and

1690s in and Udinsk, these families didnot make up the vast majority of Cossacks the caravans. One hundredCossacks escorted the 1698 caravan, the loophole created by new, compli­cated decrees aiming to limit the number of tax-exempt Cossacks to four, andtheir tax to a mere 20 roubles; not the Siberian chancelleryreacted furiously. Even so, between 20 and 50 Cossacks constituted a normalescort. 103

Although the lion's share in trade regularly belonged to the merchants, detiboiarskie and wealthy rank-and-file it would be artificial to separatean 'upper class' from the poor mass of the Cossacks.P' According to precedents,lesser Cossacks took their tum in the caravan's escort and in other distant

82 The economics Siberian service

services. lOS Out of 127 Cossacks and deti boiarskie who escorted six caravansbetween Nerchinsk and during 1690-1701, only 24 declared less than 20roubles of dutiable merchandise on return. In the amiddle field can be determined, with Cossacks back morethan their cash 'e for two years of serv ice . Fifty -two Cossacks importedmerchandise worth three to 14 times their entitlement of seven roubles 100roubles), and another 24 carried wares up to 200 roubles. The wealthy Cossackmerchants can be divided into several groups as well, with II in between200 and 300 and another twelve back 330 to 630 roubles. It hasto be admitted that there was a considerable gap to those Cossacks and detiboiarskie the incomes from the caravan trade these fourhm", 0'\1 t back 1,442 roubles 60 2,464 roubles and Iroubles, accounting for half of the merchandise worth 23,813 roublesCossacks and deti boiarskie imported from China in these years. Nevertheless,it is hard to see how the could be divided into the leadershiphand and Cossacks on the other. As Leont'eva out, itmisses the point that Cossacks in the escort received their merchandiseexclusively as a form of payment for services to the merchants, since these serv-ices could form a considerable of the business.Iw in many waysmuch of the population of districts involved in trade took part in the

of caravans. In I Nerchinsk Cossack E. Gusevskii drove 25 horsesacross the border with the caravan of Iakov Beiton, to carry 185 pud nankeenback from he received Chinese silver worth 555 or three lan for onepud load. Profitable contracts like this were very widespread. In Nerchinsk,where etc. were in supply, locals never sold livestock on themarket. The border was close, caravan escort was restricted to members of theborder and Cossacks of each town were allowed to escort only to thenext station on the way. food to members of a caravan wasmore profitable than in the market the of Russian-Chinese caravan trade through the town, the number of ofNerchinsk rank-and-file Cossacks as deti boiarskie increased significantly.Members of the Cossack families of the Liangusovs, Molodois, K~17,~11()',~_

Peshkovs, Khludnevs, Lugovskiis, Firsovs, and others, started during the1670-80s as ordinary Cossacks. They advanced in the 1690s and early years ofthe century to the ranks of syn and dvorianof the Nerchinsk and Moscow list. shared a professionalism andgood fortune in trade, leading some of them to the conclusion that theirprofession from Cossack or servitor to private merchant served their interests

the lost records on individual careers are usu-ally incomplete, the high of profit in caravan trade allowed careers likeNerchinsk Cossack V. Khludnev, who moved to when the caravanschanged their route, and returned from Beijing in 1717 with Chinese merchan­dise worth 875 roubles. In 1726, he had already changed his profession tomerchant, and sent his prikazchik to Moscow with Chinese wares worth 10,845roubles.vs

The economics Siberian service 83

Nevertheless, many risks were associated with caravan and many ordi-nary Cossacks who travelled for the first time found that they could not master allof them, as scores of lawsuits show. with hands or damaged

due to or frequent unforeseeable events on thelacked the material their wealthier comrades Since msn-rmer-

est short-term loans of well over 100 roubles were not rare, found them-selves frequently pilloried, and redeemed themselves at a rate of five roublesannually:

Cossacks, gunners and other servitors of Iesserselves out from debt, shall be handed over to theindentured labour.P?

who cannot buy them­after one month for

It is little that at the a second caravan of creditorsusually awaited those eager to get hold of their merchandise. Even forwealthy like the Ushakovs and Nikitins, trade was connected to awhole system of loans.t'v For Cossacks it was a great relief to face theconsiderable risks with the of interest-free zhalovan'e in advance. The

advantage such an arrangement offered to the Cossacks can be "nr'lr''''~Prt

rates of interest in Muscovy: 20 per cent as 5 per cent in theNetherlands a level matched by an equally problem to make debtors payfor their debts.111 The Siberian chancellery took care of the needs of Cossacksescortingcaravans; in a decree the use of additional 'e issuedin 1698-9 it was stipulated that, to ease those who were sent on dis-tant should receive more cash and less merchandise.112

Even ordinary Cossacks were very much up to the relative on differentas shows the resistance by the Tobol'sk Cossacks to their new

voevodas' plans to hold back zhalevan'e on the occasion of the campaign to setup fort Iakutsk in 1638. In the course of their finally successful theyobserved:

As compared to Tobol'sk, in ... Eniseisk is three times moreexpensive. If they receive their salary [only] at the river Lena, they will notfind anything for their and what they find they will have to buy at

13

This was indeed the situation early in the century.Although caravan trade was the quickest way to get rich, for the new and poor

men there were more effective means available involving less of a Thecaravan trade infused other, less spectacular trades and crafts with new life, manyof them held by Cossacks, Grain forestallers travelling the countryside to buy out

on the voevoda's request were largely deti boiarskie and some upwardlymobile rank-and-file Cossacks.Yet on account of direct sales in the market place,for example in Nerchinsk in the years 1699-1700, 1701, 1703 and 1714, all other(' "tP<r')r'if' ~ of sellers were outnumbered more than ten times by 151 ordinary

84 The economics Siberian service

and their relatives. Their presencewas overwhelming in number of sales and a volume of 2,115.75 whileall other taken accounted for just 394.5 chetverts. 114 A lowerproportion of Cossacks in with 33 per cent of all cattlesold in Irkutsk market 1694-7 and 12 per cent in Nerchinsk in threeods 1697-1701 to Cossacks of predominantly lower ranks.While forestallers accounted for most of the trade in traders in the mar-ket were usually rank-and-file Cossacks. Since the 1 annuallysmall caravans travelled from Irkutsk or to Mongolia topurchase livestock; the nomads also drove their cattle to the walls of Nerchinskand on the brink of the open At least four Cossack butchers

in Nerchinsk and two in Irkutsk." Other commodities includedminerals, metals and mica for window-

jointed church wind ows made of this material Survive .11eIn allconsiderable numbers of Cossacks were Jobs were

~PT·\liri,.,O' caravans, contractual of animals,building or at harvest time, all of whieh were, due to a still lim­ited workforce in eastern Siberia, well-paid up to the amount of a Cossack'sannual allowance.

Church architecture reflected how intricately interwoven Cossack tradeand localism were in Irkutsk district. Slovtsov considered a certain style of churcharchitecture with tent-formed bell-tower roofs sloped at the ends instead of onioncupolas as 'Cossack taste', a way of building known in the Russiannorth which in the last years of the seventeenth century was forbidden bybut continued in Siberia."? Monasteries and churches occupied a vital indaily life. The of the parish church often served as a room forthe Cossack community and were elected and paid by the 18 Afterthe Udinsk raid of a voevoda's in Il'rnsk, the desiatnik; rebel leaderand elected of Udinsk Moisei Borisov, donated a part of his booty toIl'insk parish church to pacify the inhabitants of II' insk."? Consideringthe important role monasteries and churches played in life, it is not sur-

to find on the outside of the church as part of the 'Cossack' style.The 1684 inventory of Irkutsk mentions under the porch of the Saviour church 'six

in a circle and two habitations'. There was also a

new bell-tower with a tent roof made of near the church, and under thepassage it with the church there were four more shops and achurch storehouse.F''

In Irkutsk and its district, many churches kept to this style .121

3 Integration of the trading frontierThe sovereign's affair

the sixteenth and seventeenth Muscovy'sincreased more than 30 times to become an that included very differentsocial groups, customs, and climates. Although distances were already

west of the the fact that Siberia dwarfed all other annexed territoriesexacerbated the of governance. the modem ,gover-nance was restricted by many factors in countries such as France or Germany,therefore the question of how Siberia was into the realm and whatinstitutions made its government is even more salient. Additionally, inSiberia the only officially sanctioned armed forces were the various Cossackbands, while the rest of the population bore weapons as well. For economic rea­sons, the tsar could not send an army to Siberian towns. Yet there wereeconomic motives that the Siberian towns to remain under the suzeraintyof the tsar. Since the main markets for fur and a considerable part of the supplyof foodstuffs, weapons and others were located in the west, they alwayssome sort of agreement with Moscow. Because any accord was apt to be renego­tiated, institutions enabling Cossac ks to communicate with the chancellery andthe tsar had to be flexible. they also had to confirm the expectationprevalent in autocratic Muscovy that only God's laws bound the tsar.

Hardly any institution in central Muscovy combined the of faith-ful service with the needs of independent-minded traders in isolated outposts. Yetinstitutions are not as pre-determined as it may seem the actual meaning ofsymbolical forms depends on the distribution of power in The exercise ofpower in seventeenth century Siberia was different from central Muscovy.Therefore the vital institution service and providing for the security ofthe tsar, the word and affair, in Siberia obtained variant aswell. Thus, for example, the rebels justified the of Irkutsk in 1696as well as several confiscations of voevodas' merchandise by thevoevoda with a affair, and called for his deposition. Due to thestaunch support the Irkutsk Cossacks afforded the voevoda, and substantial forti­fications, they could not achieve their aim; however, other Siberian Cossackrebels quite frequently enforced deposition. This chapter focuses on the sever-

word and affair, a institution which proved particularly useful for theSiberian Cossack bands in their relations with the Muscovite centre, as a case

86 the trrmtior : the sovereism's

study which suggests an for the processes of adaptation Muscoviteinstitutions underwent in Siberia. The institutionalist approach chosen in thisstudy stresses that such remained Muscovite insti-tutions; in all Muscovites could apply them. Power relationsdetermined what these and other institutions facilitating communication tnrougn­out Siberia and Muscovy meant to Siberian Cossacks.The first two haveestablished three main factors these relations: the Personenverband,its to and and the fur trade. This willexplore the of these factors with other sources of power and the institu-tional environment Muscovy provided to Siberia. Before with thefeatures of the word and affair it will, consider certain

of the Siberian environment necessary for an of theular way this institution in the very different of Siberia.

Siberia in the seventeenth century - a vast military camp?

Since historians from G.F. Muller on have stressed the achievements of statepower already during the and conquest of Siberia, the state's exclusiveinitiative in absolutism has never been called into question.' For crit-ics of tsarist rule, the added to the tsar's crown by the of Siberiawas an eyesore, did not of the as such. Thenineteenth century Siberian highlighted the exploitation and suppres-sion of Siberia as a Russian colony, but did not grasp modem conditions.Slovtsov explained frequent nomad assaults by the chancellery's negligence,acquisitiveness and distrustful attitude, and by the of voevodas

c-a'r-r-icrvric of defenders.? Soviet historians attacked tsarisrn, but hardlyquestioned the tsars' powers of From the 1940s the old sta-tist paradigm was rescued from a different the estate-representativemonarchy's demise came about by the intervention of the state.Nevertheless, this conception no ascribed all developments in Muscovy tocentralization. 'bureaucracy' was no morethan a class occupied in administration, receiving

Accounts of early modem governance stress problems in enforcing laws anddecrees throughout Western Yet the latest Western historiography onSiberian administration has done little to these problems and their spe­cific dynamics in context. According to Dmytryshyn, bureaucracies became mod­em during the seventeenth century; the tsar's power was unbridledby institutional arrangements, or by any other impediment. He explains bureau­cratic efficiency by Russian superiority, without to anearly modem context.> Most witty on how voevodas were forced to devise spe­cial tasks to Cossack boredom below critical level such as sentry duties inthe (!) this remains the only flimsy hint at Cossack rebellions in theaccount, aiming more at distraction. Given the obvious contradictions betweenboredom and the 'perennial lack of manpower', one wonders how bureaucraticefficiency could be achieved."

the "'"'111'" " the sovereien s 87

All of Siberia is as one 'military , but the reader is leftwondering what 'military' means here. Cossacks no voevodas

controlled their mobility and neither in trade nor,miraculously, in '7 Huuenbach's more balanced points out thevibrant and life in the yet while a sense of Siberianrebelliousness. he fails to explain how 'central authority quickly snuffed out theseSiberian 8

In Muscovy's aims in Siberia were not devi-from Lantzeff's main that the Siberian was a

business run on behalf of the tsar. Lantzeff failed to explain how thetsar's orders came to life in an isolated and distant environment. Acknowledginga certain level of 'democratic' habits among the he failed to relate themto the administrative suucture.? Similarly, he noted the chancellery'sdemands to ask Cossacks for advice on essential issues. The sole causes forCos sac k 'd is turbances' were voe vodas' mac hinations and maitre atment,Although mentioning the removal of voevodas by the heCossacks who detained them without for orders .10 This apparent lack ofreflection on the relations between the administration and social relations inSiberia is a feature of both the Russian and Western 1

The Soviet scholar Bakhrushin took a hard look at these issues.Wr'itil1O' in a his extreme ideas about the of mecha-nisms of control were not conducive to balanced judgement about the rituals andinstitutions of the voevoda:

The ceremony of and the contents of was once and for alllaid down in the instructions ... After two years, when a new voevoda arrived,he would tell with the same pathos of his that he had mistreatedhis and robbed them. Out of mercy, the new said, the puthim in his he already knew that after another two yearsthe following voevoda would his very words ... Since [the govern-ment] was unable to the it instead and tried to distanceitself in the eyes of the population in a naive manner from its own

This chapter raises the question whether Bakhrushin was indeedthe ways in which Cossacks could subvert the strict his-rarr-hv

power in Siberia.

The limited public sphere, patronage, and Cossack litigation

The main outside source of power available to Siberian Cossacks was patronage.The peculiar form of subordination of Siberian towns and forts offered SiberianCossacks opportunities to establish and make use of regionally available supportfrom nobles. Although the highest level of authority was unified inthe Siberian chancellery in Moscow there was a still greater choice of authoritiesto which could be addressed than the Moscow chancellery system

88 the trrmtior : the sovereism's

offered to in the Russian To up the reac-tion to nomad assaults, first Tiumen' had been an elevated status over theother towns and a status soon to be transferred to Tobol'sk, which thenheaded the first Yet in all but military affairs, Tobol'sk was only of minorimportance. 'Iobol'sk it has been were more first amongequals than superior officials, and authority over other towns exclusivelyby the orders received from Moscow. The Military OfficetRasrtad) in Moscow while the Tobcl'sk voevoda did not

the to by his own the least of them in his rarriad.Instructions issued to new voevodas in Moscow stressed that they had to reportissues of to and those of toTobol'sk, Tobol'sk functioned as a centre for the collection of information, sinceMoscow was too far away to deal with this task on its own. The only thevoevoda of Tobol'sk had was to a recalcitrant voevoda to MoSCOW.1 4

A voevoda who the of the head of the Siberian chancelleryhave to face scrutiny by a member of a hostile faction the

procedures of relief. Recent studies of Muscovy the earlier view thatnoble clans mere kinship ties of individuals locked inmutual enmity and eagerness to the tsar. noble clans as inter-woven strands in the fabric of a elite committed to a certain to theflnl1r'i~hil1O' of the whole realm and the effectiveness of Thus theoutcome of litigation, even if for the time the voevoda inhibited it, wasunpredictable, but there was always the of a favourable settlement.

By the provisions to the of towns and the ofv(",'vnr1,,~ Moscow to the concentration of power in Siberia in thehands of one person, and to stabilize its power in the frontier beyond theUrals. Ii) these terms also created a certain of fluidity in admin-istrative relations. In many cases, the formally lesser voevoda did not hissubordination to the town. He be motivated by the importance ofhonour to a Muscovite noble, who at least until the abolition of mestnichestvo in1682 could find it hard to orders from a person of lower or equalsince that would affect his own and his kin's standing within the nobility.'?IO'l1,nr'1l1O' razriad-uswus became a common tactic employed by voevodas in theirsquabbles with each other and among different kinship groups and clienteles, butit was useful to their foes among their local subordinates as well. to ambi­guity in administrative relations, towns and their voevodas sometimes attemptedto establish an independent district that made their town less dependent onanother district during court procedures. Squabbles between Cossacks fromtowns in different for example, Eniseisk in Tornsk (established1608) and Mangazeia in Tobol'sk razriad over furs, which often caused themistreatment of the native population, led to the foundation of the third razriad,of Iakutsk, in 1638. 18 On occasion the voev odas of the razriad town c ornmis­sioned special investigations into abuses of the voevoda's power.'? whichCossacks could embrace, or prove unpopular. Quarrels among voevodas offeredample opportunities for Cossacks in the nominally subordinate towns to out-

the "'"'111'" " the sovereien s 89

manoeu vre their voevoda and make use of the condition that voevodas were eagerto serve the tsar at least as as patronage issues and their own interests didnot interfere.

When in 1686 Krasnoiarsk deti boiarskie and Cossac kscould make use of the diverse and mutually bickering

networks among Siberian voevodas, Krasnoiarsk was then partrazriad, and stol'nik and voevoda 1. Shishkov made sure to

while his in Eniseisk was Konstantin O. Still,when deti boiarskie Trifon Eremeev and Mikhail Bernadskii handed in a petitionin Shishkov reacted ruthlessly and, on their return, put them under

Threatening with the knout, he forced them to a declaration that theirpetition was a lie. Shishkov treated syn boiarskii Fedor anothertioner in in a similar way. was not on17 March I he declared a affair on the market square. Shishkovsent a messenger to him to the voevoda's office, and when Aikanovobjected, he sent Cossacks. Aikanov told Cossacks he would be 'beaten to death'and arrived at the voevoda's office with a crowd of Cossacks as the voevodaclaimed, Fedor had made them drunk and instructed his friends and 'bread-eaters'to beat the drums and the bells. one of a family of Cossacks anddeti Aikanov was likely to mobilize his and kin, but as sub-O:><CYIU<Clll events show, there was more on in town. Shishkovfrom a point of safety amidst the crowd, Aikanov declared he could not makepublic his affair and demanded to travel to Eniseisk to

Shishkov demanded that he be told the contents of the accusation andthre atene d to make use of torture, to no avail. The Cossacks in the crowddemonstrated a clear sense of due while Aikanov, whichBakhrushin did not notice. orally that 'Fedor cannot be tortured,for he has declared a affair you, stol'nik and voevoda '-1'15"" 11

Shishkov, He must be sent under to Eniseisk'.Shishkov claimed that he did not lose his or try to beat Aikanov, but

Aikanov's threatened the voevoda so that several of his supporters,Cossacks recruited among the had to be rescued from the mob." Hereferred to the norm of i zagovor that forms a part of the provisions perti­nent to the affair. However, the Cossacks maintained that they merelydelivered a petition, in this case orally, another related norm allowing their behav­iour. The decisive question was who could prove their case and, to this end, thepower of the Personenverband loomed Apparently, in a sense to bedefined below, this event had a limited public character.

If Shishkov was then, the Cossacks still made use of the rivalrybetween Shishkov and his new superior in Eniseisk. They described in their peti­tion a different course of events. According to them, Shishkov refused theirdemands and wanted to write to the Siberian chancellery by himself, claimingthat he was 'not under the authority (rarriads of Stepan Afanas'evich Sobakinand [IJ will not obey him and [IJ, [amJ in any case more honourable thanthe stol'nik and voevoda',23

90 the trrmtior : the sovereism's

Muscovite administrative law literally, the Cossacks asserted they hadmet Shishkov head-on, that 'Krasnoiarsk is part of Eniseisk and

did not 'want to the decree of the great :24 The incidentshows that there was no chain of command in an absolute sense.authority was liable to to ideas derived fromambiguous and at times elements of various official laws,instructions, and local custom. ideas are formed from these contested andcontradictory contents and of an institution. answer to and are

by socially conditioned needs which temporarily prevail in alocality and social group; therefore, a idea can become to theexclusion of others in a a social group, and a particular l1I'l'in,1.""'

The Cossacks' aim was to access to the of information and cornmu-nication.and quite inventive in its pursuit. The next day, when TrifonErerneev declared another affair, felt strong to circum-vent Shishkov's to disallow and send a to Eniseisk,Shishkov's attempt to discredit the when he heard abou ttheir tricks sat on a pillow stuffed with the while by boat

by invoking a affair got him nowhere. The SiberianPersonenverband often applied the affair as a device to over-come the voevoda's to block in an administrative lawsuit, break-

down barriers between the distant Siberian lands and Moscow.2~

The question whether Muscovy was a bureaucratic has often been. For the central chancelleries in Moscow, Brown has a more differ-

entiated answer in his analysis, Muscovy was unequal to modem bureaucraticpolitical with their political popular participation in pub­lic affairs, and an increased accountability of executive branch leaders and theirsubordinatesF' Yet the system could claim the characteristics S.N.Eisenstadt formulated for 'historical bureaucratic societies', i.e. staff specializa­tion, staff professionalizauon, and capacity. To an aston­

, chancellery staff maintained a culture of accountability.P' Likemost of the heads of chancelleries in Moscow, the voevodas were nobles albeitin the lesser towns and forts often middle- or low-ranking but were not part ofthis system to the same as chancellery staff. Shishkov therefore was in theforefront of a conflict between a administrative-rnindedness and the oldnrivile ses of the nobles, claiming the of mestnichestvo over admin-istrative hierarchy, although the former was abolished in 1682.29 Surprisingly, atleast from the point of view of most interpretations of Siberian administration, hiswas a doomed cause. His foes' however, lay in that they did and did notact out the same conflict. While their tenet was greater accountability demand-

their due salaries and one of their means of achieving them was formaladherence to the principle of administrative hierarchy, their social environmentdoes not fit the corporate description Brown for the chancelleries. InMuscovy, he found that scaled social value rather than a strict formal hierarchyshaped the social relations among the staff of the central chancelleries. It alsoguided the interpretation of terminology and statute application. In Siberia, the

the "'"'111'" " the sovereien s 91

rank of the voevoda and his to disallow a leave from service embodied anapparently strict the non- or Personenverband tzi-lied around the traditional means of a affair which togetherprovided the social Siberian Cossacks to break the monopolyon law suits a voevoda otherwise have As it was intothe texture of Muscovite institutions, the looseness of the traditional Cossackgroup, its ability to regroup and to exercise control over othersocial groups as soon as it momentum, was usually sufficient to thwart theambitions of a recalcitrant although he was nominally more elevated inthe hierarchy,

The seventeenth century Siberian public was predominantly bound to personalinteraction. Social still stemmed mostly from direct communicationamong those who were at an event.30 Therefore the KrasnoiarskCossacks to meet when the voevoda was essential it afforded ~prl1rit"

to the and constituted the public character of the event. muchcare was afforded to the uses of the written official documentation of thistion, the meant that the public commandedence of situations in which the sender or of the communication are

a process with many implications in a far-flung The rela-tion of written documentation and direct interaction in constituting a public

became and needed definition. Thus there was mount-tension when the petition was brought to Eniseisk in the pillow the cunning

of each side reached levels.Communication among those who are means more than just vocal

of information: in gestures,mimic, dres sand syrnbolical arrangements in space perform vital functions.Moreover, interaction tends to undifferentiated inclusion, so that anyoneinvolved in it cannot communicate: anyone can cut in at any time, but hisand actions can also suffer from the intervention of others. Therefore communi­cation in a public on the permanent convergence of a centre ofattention. The mentioned symbolical-theatrical elements and ceremonies relatingto the affair could form a communicative context from anamorphous mass of The Krasnoiarsk Cossacks displayed a keen con­sciousness of these structuring elements of the public the symbolicalcentre was the affair attention from anyone involved. Thelitigant and his supporters observed the rules attached to the sovereign'affair the litigant had to be brought to an impartial judge, if not directly toMoscow, and the contents of the affair could not be disclosed.

The point of assembly in front of the voevoda's office directed attention to thesovereicns affair. Siberian Cossacks acted in this way on numerous occasionsin Tomsk in 1648 they brought the litigant who had invoked a affairwithout any suitable action taken on the part of the voevoda, directly from prisonto the voevoda's office, where a crowd of several hundred Cossacks hadassembled and decided to depose and arrest the voevoda.v Owing to thePersonenverband's institutionalized custom of advice and deposing their

92 the trrmtior : the sovereism's

l;:;aU;:;j~, the to convoke military reviews was not only contested betweenvoevoda and but were often converted into Cossack assemblies.'Thus, before the actual contents of a and it, whichwere public activities in spaces, such as Cossack circlesor church attention was focused by public acts of accusation. Theserelativelv open, inclusive public acts in which frequently outsiders peasants,Uu.c",,~, and took were followed by an exclusive , afterthe Personenverband constituted by collectively the petition. Thus,actions of the Personenverband fitted the modern partitioned public-? thatpertained to certain groups in but was nevertheless open toinclude at least at times. There could be by different groups ofthe town population, but the Cossack was the decisive document,defended by a sworn and influential community. the Personenverband wasboth constituted in public and, with other institutional con­tributed to the permanence of the decisions reached at in public.

Close observation of what was to be made public and what was not testifies tothe nature of this public event its limitations were defined by the sovereign'saffair, the contents of which were not to be communicated to the voevoda whotherefore could not them. the actively set thewhile the public character of this was limited to questions of dueprocess, the following deliberation in the Cossack circles that excluded thevoevoda to define the contents of the affair in order to win asmany aspo~;sit)le.

In some cases, Cossacks decided not to confront voevodas ofextremely exalted rank. Such was the case in a town inhabited bymany wealthy townspeople; yet even in this town situated on the very artery ofSiberian the Cossacks proved the decisive force. With the Bashkirs closeby, the town was in constant and well fortified.f While, in 1645, theCossacks remained inactive in the first of two cases interconnected by patronage,townspeople confronted the voevoda, boyar M.F. a member of tsaritsaEvdokiia Lukianovna's clan. The incident was initiated by the town's second incommand, pod'iachii s pripis'iu M. Likhachev, who met Streshnev head-on,accusing him of various abuses in front of other officials at the voevoda's office.When he made no headway, he went to the market place to make them publiclyknown. the Siberian sent F.M. Postnikov toVerkhotur'e in December. Arriving in February, he found out about Streshnev'sbribe-taking on the very first day of inspection. Since the voevoda knew about arange of petitions by a priest 'and all the land', by mere hants, trappers,shipbuilders, and iasak tributaries, which had reached the Siberian chancellery,he decided to sack Postnikov on the that 'he was not sent according to thetsar's decree' and ordered his servants to beat him.'?

Backing by a local group was essential in the vicious politicking betweenStreshnev and Postnikov. The pod'iachii s pripis'iu claimed that he had managedto escape the deadly only due to the threatening crowd in frontof the voevoda's court. The next day, his family carried him through town, to

the "'"'111'" " the sovereien s 93

make Streshnev's publicly known. There was never an attempt tomvesugate, let alone to punish the apparent indiscretions of the two pod'iachii snrini<"i" In their to the public, for sup-

The medium of such a sudden turn could only be the Personenverband,

which was of a leader completely unknown to the locals.Despite such administrative Verkhourr 'e Cossacks decided

otherwise on this occasion. In town, Streshnev's servants tried toL V"C1U,l'CVV, yet were as Postnikov claimed: 'the mir has seen andheard our in this affair and the dishonour and how I was tormented andcovered with blood'.

Yet this mir should not be confused with a involvedwith It was a public in the marketbut remained without consequences the immediate emergency inclinedto as it was by him; it neither included more than afew nor did it take feasible for Cossacks conclusionsfrom such that this voevoda could no be . In markedbreach with usual formulations, there was no mention of Cossacks in Postnikov's

or of other social groups, for that matter.40 The voevoda may have as aprecaution made sure of the as Pokrovskii and Aleks androvbelieve; otherwise, the shown by the Cossacks may have been dueto Streshnev's exalted rank. In any case, this was not an opportunity Verkhourr'eCossacks would seize to the voevoda, nor did they risein rebellion. Verkhourr'e was but a provincial and itsCossacks understood well not only their potential role as local power butalso their position in an internal border town to from Moscowor Tobol'sk .41 Far from both blind obeisance and complete insubordination, aswell as from the estates structures Aleksandrov and Pokrovskii try to prove, theVerkhourr'e Cossacks were adept in between different sources ofauthority.

While the Cossacks also remained neutral in subsequent developments duringStreshnev's in events make it clear to what mestnichestvocould destabilize even his exalted position. Verkhotur'e witnessed a startling con­frontation between two members of top-level boyar clans, which reveals muchabout Muscovy's power structures at the time. In 1646, in a move not onlythe remarkable of internal accountability in the chancelleries but also the)",,,,,,,..,, ,y", of boyar clans, the head of the Siberian chancellery, N.I. Odoev skiidecided to Streshnev's rule in the border town, through whicheveryone had to pass on their way to Siberia.s? The new Tobol'sk voevoda, boyarII. Salty kov, a relative of tsar Aleksei's mother Marfa, headed the inperson. In Muscovy's clandestine oligarchy, relying on politics undercover of the tsar's virtual omnipotence," the family clans of the tsar's mother andof the tsaritsa were the two most important power groups. Saltykov had orders to

send Streshnev and his sons to Turinsk; a measure prescribed by law during gen­eral investigation, involving all the town and dependent on the support of litigat-

parties .44 On arriving at Verkhourr'e in April 1646 during his journey to

94 the trrmtior : the sovereism's

Saltykov started to Streshnev's customs misdemeanours andin particular the latter's seizure of the customs documentation in the summer of1645. This seizure had served Streshnev as a convenient means to customscontrol of his which he sent to Moscow in October. While Saltvkov'sinvestigation supported the view in the he could not nrr,rp"rl

to Streshnev out of town. Streshnev started to get in the way of investiaa­tion and, to lead the gross insult towards its climax, declared decrees

After both had insulted each Salty kov set out to continue histrip to he had decided to initiate a dishonour suit. Desperate,Streshnev at last remembered local and while riverboats werestill in the bell rang in town and bonfires were lit to rumours.Streshnev incited the inhabitants to a Saltykov of fireto Verkhourr'e. His 'advisers' had 'barked' at Saltykov him aand not trustworthy man', while the voevoda himself had called Saltykov 'little

, and, to invoke a affair, called him 'traitor',of its On the one hand, these forms of symbolic communica-

tion and ritual interaction underline treated by Habermas as 'representativepublic acts' .4~ On the other hand, studies about honour have shown that there wereforms and functions that are neither nor , but necessar­ily relied on a public opinion. The focal point of public orientationwas the of a person or group, measured at common values of modesty andriglueousness.s" In the case of the two nobles at Verkhourre, these values had adifferent than in other cases primarily Cossacks, investigatedin 4. The Verkhourr'e quarrel aimed primarily at influencing public opin-ion in the town. Streshnev's show of was primarily intended to silenceopposition. The unwillingness to the petitions, however, shows that theCossacks were not particularly and well aware of the thetwo alternative offers of up to them.

Verkhotur'e was not primarily a frontier town, nor was its predominant func­tion the collection of iasak. Still, the turning point was reached after this outra­geous behaviour, and Saltykov knew well about the unwillingness of theVerkhourr'e Cossacks to defend the voevoda, It is therefore not thatVerkhotur'e Cossacks did not interfere when Saltykov sent pismennyi golova -an officer capable of records A.T. Sekerin with a detachment ofCossacks to continue the into Streshnev's affairs. This time, thedefiant voevoda was sent under guard to Moscow. As could be , his clandid not fail to defend him; Streshnev even managed to have his client, B.S.Dvorianinov, appointed the new voevoda of Verkhourr'e. This helped Streshnev

the when Dvorianinov from the outset blocked attempts atscrutinizing his patron's rule.

Although even a Saltykov could not thwart attempts to get by with impunitythrough in Moscow, the end of the rule of Streshnev's successor showsthat the Personenverbandcould. Dvorianinov, like OJ. Shcherbatyi in Tomsk, or,more successfully, Suleshev in Tobol'sk, was one of the Siberian voevodas whotried to increase the tsar's profits while at the same time pushing hard to increase

the "'"'111'" " the sovereien s 95

their own income. his own position, he the Cossacks byhis attempt to block their trade with the iasak people before they had collected thetribute. This double-bill of enhance d control ambitious, andCossacks incited their comrades in the district in letters:

Boris [Dvorianinov] seeks the profityou of of which once you wereshirts and without orders you rode out to thedise.

and he willyou acquired silken

with merchan-

In these there is little indication of the concerns of the Cossackas Aleksandrov and Pokrovskii claim, while the of all

Cossacks was tackled .48

Also of the politics of the Personenverband is the way Dvorianinovchallenged, The voevoda fell prey to an from a quarter he did not

the M. Kabakov, who was tortured, in his painaddressed the voevoda with the words have mercy', andDvorianinov failed to correct him. Still, this affair lay dormant until in October1648 a affair was filed by the s U. Nedoveskovaccompanied by the and a group of Cossacks. By acceptingKabakov's the claimed, somewhat belatedly, thatDvorianinov had dishonoured the tsar. The next day, a ofCossacks, townspeople and felt entitled to put the voevoda under arrestand disallow Dvorianinov all communications 'while the mir deliberates with

[Nedoveskov] and Fedor' the customs head. As so manyother Siberian rebellions, this mir consisted of virtually every imaginable settledsocial group in but was dominated by the it first madesure to formulate and litigation in the form of a petition. It was only afterconstituting themselves as a Personenverband by this act that they formallydeclared the deposition, it inextricably with the affair;

could no allow themselves to be by Dvorianinov, since '[we]do not want to fall into ' .49 This was imaginative formulation of a guid-

idea in handling the word and affair, which, obtained under tor-ture, was often not considered effective.

The states of affairs of the mir were typical of this institution's insta-bility yet viability in Siberian towns, where the frontier and frequent service infar-off places as well as the involvement of many Cossacks in distant tradedemanded a high of institutional flexibility. Once thePersonenverband depicted this unpopular voevoda of Verkhotur'e as the tsar'srepresentative, who lost his power when falling into , or when such a fallwas perceived. Dvorianinov never won back authority in Verkhotur'e: when inFebruary 1649 he was relieved by R.R. Vsevolozhskii, the town's populationinterfered with the first attempt to punish some of the making sure to beatup Dvorianinov's supporters. In the meantime, an element of due process hadbeen observed by using the customs head's official seal as replacement

96 the trrmtior : the sovereism's

for the voevoda's which Dvorianinov still allowing the rebels' del­egations to leave town. To underline their claim that there were two divergentnormative involved, Cossack custom and the estate-representative

on the one hand, and on the other hand with its top-down power Aleksandrov and Pokrovskii make reference to the term'eli ,'rrh,,' at least in this case and in that of voeveda Eldezin of Tiumen' .51

It is hard to see in these cases, that there was a diarchy in town, sincethe voevoda was bereft of any real power, while Cossacks relied on arguments ofdue process to establish their claim to the voevoda, Cossacks lwp,fPrTpr!

defined authority in town, and did not tolerate ambiguous situations wherepower and the law were which be indicated by 'diarchy", as onthe occasion of entrance, who ordered that Dvorianinov was to act asa of Nedoveskov in the voevoda's office, him immediately.Another was formulated and by 48 18 32members of the postal service and 23 to substantiate their claim thatcould not the voevoda until Dvorianinov was officially relieved.

The in tum, was impelled to take their stance and couldnot do so without recourse to due process to implement its decision. It took timeto discern that Dvorianinov was liable only for not the 'sover-

word' to the and not for the When its res-olution was to be after a threat uttered by the Dvorianinov haddied in Verkhourr'e under unclear circumstances. The chancellery did not indictthe of the voevoda as such, but questioned whether an investi-

in his behaviour had indeed been necessary, implicitly that dif-ferent ideas rather than one official, unquestionable of thesnverercns word and affair were at issue. During this interval, rebels impeded thepunishment of whom the indicted for enticement torebellion. It was only in June 1649 that 26 of Dvorianinov's opponents were pun­ished with the knout on orders issued by the new Tobol'sk voevoda.t? Relativelyclose to the centre of power and Muscovy, Verkhourr 'e was far from

the of rebellion. At the same time, trade relations nonethelesscreated conditions rife with institutional mechanisms'< like the decrees'or the use of the word and affair to get rid of an unpopular adminis-trator. Verkhourre also however, the dependency of all Siberian localinstitutions on , a consideration which has not been dueeither by Aleksandrov and Pokrovskii or in historical writing onSiberia.

These factors make it possible to explain why Shishkov, like so many otherSiberian voevodas, could not escape in Krasnoiarsk. In the typicalchancellery Brown such an outcome was unlikely. solidar-ity bound superiors and subordinates who partook in bribes and whilecovering for one another. Nevertheless, the chancellery system was dependent onthe periphery, at least on the Siberian, since the Personenverbdnde were the onlygroups who could offer sufficient control of the fur-providing frontier. In thissense, it was not an exclusively formal hierarchy and patronage that decided over

the "'"'111'" " the sovereien s 97

"r'''''l",·'tl1r,iti,''~ to ensure obedience to commands, but rather scaled social value, abroader concept that can take into account the power of the Personenverband.

As in central power throughout the modern world had to onthe interests of local power The Siberian Cossack Personenverbdnde

alliances with central since this increased their radius of action,their for trade and their vis-a-vis the voevoda or otherPersonenverbdnde. Such could not occur by decree of thetsar. Central control upon the and ability of the Cossacksand other Siberian inhabitants to utilize central institutions for their own ends.One of the was of a sizable part of theCossack population. At least in some cases, as in Irkutsk, Cossacks attainedlevels of otherwise only found in the capital, of 10 per cent or more, farin access of other of the frontier and rank-and-filewhich may be in by their occupation in accornpa-

the fur treasure and caravans.r"

The regalian salutation

The of the salutation illuminates important of thenature of authority in Muscovy. Contained in any document used in theMuscovite and in particular in the and reports used forcommunication between the populace and the ruler, it has inspired vivid discus­sion as well as among both observers and historians.Contemporary travellers from Western were appalled by the ofMuscovites their forehead' in front of the tsar, as the literal translationof the 'biti chelom' runs. By calling themselves the 'kholcp' of the tsar,Russians abased themselves and abdicated any had, since this termwas usually translated as 'slave' .5~

The older understood the formal address in petitions as anexpression of the unconditional submission of the tsar's subjects to his powers,following the of oriental powers as or 'patrimonial'.The juxtaposition of 'oriental' and 'Christian' or rulership was aninvention of the enlightenment, when it was used to warn of tendencies in Frenchgovernment as 'absolutist'. While writers such as Bodin andMontesquieu had little actual into the of Asian governments,mobilizing racist sentiments in the early colonial capitals was a rewarding way ofinfluencing the public. 'To knock one's forehead' was a direct calque from thekou tou customary in Chinese administration, which Muscovy encountered viaMongol intermediaries and, in its form, hardly oriental aespot­ism. At the time of the lending of this term, during the Mongol suzerainty in thethirteenth century, after centuries of prosperity and openness of Chinese civiliza­tion, the age of seclusion during the Ming and Manchu dynasties por­trayed by Jesuit missionaries as despotism was still far away. Already under theHan, however, a civil service had developed which allowed for administrativedecentralization.t? These observations remind that at a point of time and in a

98 the trrmtior : the sovereism's

particular and actual are at best loosely related. Bitichelom was the appropriate address by a slave to his master inMuscovy, but it was also used in equal and even in inverse . In thisway the Irkutsk syl1 boiarskii Ivan Arsen'ev addressed his brother who heldthe same rank. Petr wrote a short notice on the back of the to a rank-and­file which commences: 'Brother Petr Ermolin, greetings tzdravstvuiv

Petr Arsen'ev chelom b'et".58Il'insk rebel Ivan used this term in a letter to his fellows: 'To our

Gospoaa [Gdsam] the Udinsk and desiatniki and all rank-and-fileCossacks, Cossack Ivashko ... chelom b'et ... '59

1""\llW.)lJ15Jl historians have such recent studies on theregalian salutation have to older views. Marshall Poe deems apeculiar patrimonial of its social in many respects con vincing,but observes in the seventeenth century. The institution of

which flourished in Muscovy until the late seventeenth century, used theterm to denote a slave.w In this context, Iurii Krizhanich remarked: 'Tobe tsar is to serve but to be of the tsar of one's own this ishonourable and is actually a kind of freedom' .fil In Muscovy, where honourserved as social cement for it a difference in status between an

and the of the tsar.fi2 To be the tsar's kholop was not onlyhonourable, it also a notion of freedom and thatbound both tsar and The former Cossack Fedor Ivanov syn Cherkasovin 1696 gave a vivid of the methods Afonasii Beiton used toenslave him:

... he invited me home since I am a tailor and made me drunk. He indentedme, your kholop, that I, your kholop, marry, live and work in Afonasii's

with wife and children and I, your kholop, the document under theinfluence of alcohol. Afonasii married me my will to his bought[Russian] servant ... who was also drowsy, a slave (poraboshchena v kholop-stvo ponevoli) in his house in eternal M

There is a contrast in this text between the Cherkasov who ascribed to himself thehonourable title of the tsar's 'kholcp tvoi"; and his description of his wife as'involuntarily enslaved into ; Cherkasov indicated thatkholopstvo was not equal to abject slavery, but only kholcpstvo ponevoli.Voluntary kholcpstvo could go along with self-esteem.f

Muscovites viewed the as the source of justice who decided in thelast instance by virtue of his anoinrmenr.w yet moderated bySiberians, to such ideas, often added a to their peti­tions, as the coda of the Tornsk petition of 15 June 1649 to tsar Aleksei made clearbetween the lines:

Compassionate ... ! Confer on us, the Lord's Anointed,your absent kholopi and orphans, your just compassion, look at us, and order

the "'"'111'" " the sovereien s 99

that we ...will be saved from expulsion and oppressionand do not let yourself believe his false reports ... since they want tous shed our innocent blood and lay your distant fron-tier waste !j7

At firstthe

this statement seems to confirm nurtured by the use ofaffair west of the Urals. The next will

c hallenge this view and look for an of the dissimilar uses of this insti-tution.

The sovereign's word and affair

The word and affair is a well-known punitive norm for infringementsof the of the person of the tsar, to financial, political, and evenmagical misdemeanours. The relevant articles in the contain stipula-tions treason and plots mainly intended to defend the tsarand his officials' body, honour, and The sole from the rule thatdisrespectful or behaviour towards these persons must be punishedseverely is made in case it is proven conclusively that 'a small number' ofCl"""lT'n,Clr);prl an official in order to submit a him or other officials

improper behaviour, not an or insolent anitude.v?In recentyears, the word and affair has seen numerous re-evaluations thatit at the very core of their to Muscovite As I willargue in this while historians have reasonably seen denunciations underthese articles as proof of Muscovite popular monarchism, its institutional and rit­ual structured channels of appeal and public interaction that open up new

into the ways in which Muscovite institutional culture was harnessed toSiberian conditions of trade, and the limited public 70

Most historians have relied on collection that assembledalmost exclusively cases of the word from the central areas .71 In hismuch-cited essay, Keenan has called the word and deed' one of thecharacteristic elements of Muscovite political culture. Although, to",.<:;<:;11,(111, in these the state prosecuted only trifles, it was done with

rra rr-cr-m c rrto- earnestness and brutality', in precarious times aiming to 'protect notand of the tsar but the myth of his and all-

. In periods of political stability cases introduced with 'words' or'deeds of the receded."? The denunciations in Novombergskii's collec­tion stress the tendency of the absolutist state to subdue society by dividing it.Individual actors without much local support, many among them,informed the authorities about their fellows, to a fleeting alleviation of thebrutal conditions they lived in. Since the word and affair was a normthat safeguarded the tsar and his family, it stipulated that litigants were to bebrought to Moscow thus they could by-pass the loathed adrninisrrarion."

The less well-known Siberian cases are different, where the invocation of theword, more often the affair, served to depose the

100 the . the sovereign's

voevoda, Pokrovskii Keenan's theranee of the word and affair by it as a mechanism for feed-back from the since the voevoda administration was anddiverted revenues from the fur trade to the voevodas' own He observesthat Siberians used this direct line to Moscow or otherwise to their in

towns or in Tobol'sk to voevodas and take over theadministration rebellions. He otherwise adheres to conventional conceptsof the Russian population's 'utopian' or 'naive' belief in the tsar, whichwas bound to be yet constituted an abundant resource which eventhe tsarist took until I 917 to exhaust.I"

While with Pokrovskii's Perrie has altered theemphasis put on the of Muscovites to include other such asnegouauons ('1"1111";110' on the Moscow paid to Cossacks. She Il1C1orp IO-

rated these observations into a model characteristic of the she studied indetail, the southern where Cossacks offered their military services andexpertise for a rather meagre ration what acquiredc ampargns and as fishers and She c ontras ted thesesouthern Cossacks with the town rebellions 'in the name of the tsar' whichPokrovskii had described: Petrie's Cossacks were with pretenders.An important contribution to the of the word and affairis her observation that the traditional of relationships between theCossacks and the government described by Khodarkovsky involving petitions,

negouauons, threats, shows of and conce ssions fitted thispattern of well." On the other hand, the tsar and Moscow dependedon the Cossacks for their costly military assistance as well. On a more 1',"11"1<11

level of analysis, the rhetoric of the tsar's paternalistic benevolence towards theCossacks, and of the Cossac ks' humble for pardon and rewards pro­vided an appropriate ideological framework for their relationship, in which the'monarchist populism' of the authorities to the 'popular monar-chism' of the and helped to reinforce it.7~

The word and affair facilitated appeal local court andvoevoda decisions by some of its implications. The high level of attentionafforded to any case in this category had its in the wave of dur-

the Time of Trouble s, who rallie d substantial m ass support, in partie ular fromthe Cossacks of the Don and Southern Russian by to be thelegitimate tsar or disappeared tsarevich, Their aim was not rebellion feu-dalism, but rather the notion typical of early modern Europe of a 'worldturned upside-down' in which not the system itself but only the relativeposition of individuals within it. Since in six teenth and seventeenth centuryMuscovy all decisions at least nominally had to be made by the tsar, only theclaim to be the tsar gave a person sufficient power to challengeauthoriues." As central authority was reconstituted, it responded to this challengeby closely each and every utterance of improper words tothe tsar or popular imitations of the majesty, even if this appeared futile. If aknown robber invoked the words 'I know a word' or an equivalent in

'ading fronti er: the sovereig nS 101

this was to launch an and immediately himaway from local influence into the capital. The at grassroots level wasMoscow's answer to the of a vast frontier area threatened by nomad incur-

where any attempt at building a more secure border meant that all had tobe armed and every hand was needed for defence. The lack of natural defencesmeant that an effort at frontier defences about an increasein vulnerable, insecure communities needed to man who suffered frominadequacy of supply as well as cultivable land, since open fields could hardly bedefended. the seventeenth century effort at fortifying the southern bor-

this me ant that anomie situations often just the fortific ationsof the day, while unrest was in the area behind the Anycould a boundless area and besides and gentry, it was peas-ants and from the rebels' who, in theoften overthrew them. This made unpopular at the endof the Time of Troubles and explains the attention to futile denuncia-ticns."

Even in Moscow to punish about the tsar, orjust the omission of of the tsar's title in a document. theSiberian did not care to any of the of this categoryto Moscow."? Yet if there was as little military threat to Moscow from its small,scattered and distant bases in Siberia as there was a military threat toSiberian towns from the centre, Moscow still depended on their loyalty. It neededSiberia's resources to wage war in the west and relied on them the crucialseventeenth century. The chancellery as well as Siberian Cossacks reflected thisdifference in conditions in the adopted towards the delo.Where financial outweighed the attempt to 'tum the world upside-down',attention focused on machinations with the funds which Moscow made availableto Cossacks and voevodas,

Moreover, conditions facilitating the transformation of this institution into aviable mechanism for litigation and appeal included the ample field of meaningsauac hed to 'del0'; it has also led historians to translate it as 'deed'; I am translat­

it here as 'affair' to highlight the main meaning or nexus Siberian Cossackshad in mind when they invoked the delo': Besides its implication oftreason and related phenomena, the delo denoted an obligation to

in the same vein as delo.An instructive side of the combination of the term delo 'craft' aswell as 'livelihood' is provided by delo barkhatnoe, ikonnoe, pushech-noe, etc. What is usually interpreted as affair' thus can betranslated as for the as in 'Simon is always occupied with theSO',ef,E'l>Jl1'S affairs of icon-painting' .so

The most common meaning of gosudarevo delo in Siberia during this periodwas a service assignment or mission to chancery staff or the voevoda,Tikhornirov and Man'kov tried analytically to differentiate the 'affairs of state'and, on the other hand, the denunciation for treason or politic al crime s in the 1649tltoznenie code of law. However, Pokrovskii has shown that there was no basis

102 the . the sovereign's

in the text for such a distinction. He concluded that this and, to themodem mind, confusion in the law reflected the 'contradictory early stage of thefounding of an important juridical connected to the processesof social awareness and to the very pungent realities of politicaland class 81

PP1'rp'nti,/p as this it does not explain the way in which theseprocesses functioned. It is also questionable whether this condi-

tion much later on. In the seventeenth century, the that thisinstitution was in the stages of its and somewhat iscreated by its transformation. The Cossacks found this institution well suited totheir needs in since it covered such a broad and even contradictoryarray of of law, and the custom and institutions of their ownservice to the tsar. All these partly rules and stipulations could be usedas ideas to need s among localities, socialgroups and time in a vast and , to the institution. In thisway, norms derived from Cossack custom, such as the deposition could

tacit their continu al use in service relationsf' and thustransform the institution. The 1649 provided many of the norms onwhich the rebels' based their such as accessto the tsar, or the norm i zagovor, rebellions and massassemblies.s' these in Siberia at Ieast it was that the'tsar's dignity' could be saved by publicly ousting his thevoevoda,

This was facilitated by the fact that Cossacks could claim to rely on the 'truefonts' of the affair. claimed to be vigilant for the sovereisn'sprofit84 and to abide by the norm limiting the prohibition of assemblies if thefollowing established that the defendants an official notas part of an insurrectionary plot, but to submit a petition85 thereby making itdifficult for their to claim that were traitors. This state of affairswas not conditioned by an early stage of this institution's development, but ratherby the needs of In the Muscovite , there were so many diverainsneeds and conditions of life, so that an institution such as the sever-

word and affair had to undergo according to the place and socialgroup in which it was used. After all, establishing an institution is very costly ineconomic and social terms many and build their future on it.8lj

<;;nprifir expectations such as privileged treatment of these cases, overriding thehierarchy, and direct access to the tsar contributed to its esteem among the popu­lation. However, a certain amount of confusion in this juridical term where theindividual case was described should not deter us from that itcould be useful in an empire. To be indistinguishable at first from litigantswith radically different needs and opinions was useful in an empire that put a pre­mium on outward conformity. As this chapter will show, this uniformity inappearance did not prevent Siberian Cossacks from successfully pursuing theirneeds. Rather than a proof for the Cossacks' naivety, they made good use of theopportunities afforded by the tsar's populism.

'ading fronti er: the sovereig nS 103

The Muscovite system took into account positions of power,rather than permanently certain groups and theirstatus over other concerns. In an extended frontier area, such as Muscovy's south,this constituted an enormous this commu-nities were raised from status to only to lose their statuswhen the border fortificationsmoved. In this area, the affair not only

but also communities. Similar to Siberian theseservitors made a common stand to their and denounced him tothe as it was in was therefore only one economic andsocial among others that provided communities with sufficient bar-

power. In Muscovy's south, the isolated frontier condition of a force thatwas for nomad assaults a ofautonomy and in the case of the southern border whichwere unconnected to trade, inconclusiveevidence suggests there were fewer suc­cessful to voevodas than in Siberia.s? in the Left Bank latein the seventeenthcentury, well-connected Cossack officers used the 'sovereign'sword and affair' Cossacks and peasants in the process of enserf­ment when frontier conditions ceased to provide significant income.w

In clear contrast to the in the Left 'free' ordinary Don orZaporozhian Cossacks were not immune to the system.This be puz-

since many of them fled from conditions in the Left Bank andelsewhere, yet ideas locally to the social conditions.In these areas, the Cossack group often used their former leaders as bargaining

in with Moscow, since social status was irrelevant. Theyenjoyed this power as as the Cossack Personenverband wasimmune to considerations of and the related boost to recogm-tion of social status of the aims of the which suchknowledge could in more complex armies, When a rebel leader noseemed capable of the aims of the and became aliability, they often denounced him as a traitor and him for a generousreward. Subsequently his former followers were redeemed service.s?

In Siberia, Muscovite policies encountered a frontier in several ways that alsomeant differentconditions and and therefore a tendency to the con-tents, or ideas of the affair in petitions. Less fortified than thesouthern rim of Muscovy,90 the southern Siberian frontier dur-

the seventeenth century became punctuated by a loose series of isolated forts,separated by hundreds of miles from each other.The most southem outposts, suchas Kuznetsk or Krasnoiarsk, found themselves encircled by nomadic peoples. Yetanother kind of frontier the whole of the conquered and thiswas not exclusively due to the feeble of the tsar's forts and towns dotted overthousands of miles throughout the Northern Asian territories. While most of theTatars collaborated with the new power, the further the Russians went to the fur­rich north and northeast, the less adapted were the semi-nomadic peoples ofSiberia, the Tungus, Samoyeds and Koryaks to notions of suzerainty and taxesderived from the Mongol Empire. They were as little inclined to consider an oath

104 the . the sovereign's

of as more than a loose peace or trade agreementas were the nomads of the south. While it was easy to send punitive forcesthe more those with a nomadic or semi-nomadic life-styIe frequentlyevaded as well as to enforce levies. Tribute on thenatives by decree therefore locally took the form of which took intoaccount the power of the Russians and their of as wellas their better access to markets. the government barred access formerchants to the iasak before the iasak was taken.?' since controlrelied on the loyalty of the Cossack Personenverband as well as the voevodas.their collaboration was hard to avoid. In 1658, the Siberian chancelleryished the new voevoda of Iakutsk to make sure he did notas the reminded him, had led Moscow as a to establish thetown. In the l630s Cossacks from the southern town of Eniseisk had forced theYakuts into submission and the iasak. of thesituation had the tsar of the best furs by with their ownmerchandise before the iasak. The voevoda of Eniseisk, 'befriendingthem' the Cossacks' Thus, two frontiers combinedto make the Russian forts and towns look like isolated in an area whereclaims of on the of the tsar and even the Cossacks went far beyondthe actual ability to enforce them. not just the natives resisted closerconrroi; in to deal with the the Cossacks could not be controlledtightly. The of the towns and forts themselves pursued their own inter-ests, and whether with the voevoda or him, repeatedlyescaped Moscow's sway.

In this extended area of weak state control, Moscow nevertheless pursuedsome of its most profitable economic activities the fur trade and the Chinesecaravan trade. A of this trade was conducted as government thegovernment therefore was keenly interested in loyalty throughout theSiberian frontiers. Muscovite in Siberia are therefore best understood bymvesugaung the ways the chancellery and the voevodas handled the issue of loy­alty.To be considered loyal was crucial in an area where all boundaries were in astate of flux, where private and state were not and personal aswell as group conflicts were therefore fought as pitched information battles forthe most loyal profile, best in the form of the word or affair.

On the loyalty was primarily owed to the whileloyalty to the tsar often had to be artificially manufactured post factum. In 1657,a group of Cossacks with their piatidesiatnik Ivan Pavlov was chasedinto the forests between Ilirnsk and the Amur after syn boiarskii Kurbat Ivanovhad proclaimed a affair them: 'On behalf of the sovereign'saffair I ordered the Cossacks to meet and sent them out to chase ... I wrote imme­diately to syn boiarskii Fedor Pushchin and the Amur and Iakutsk toIlirnsk sotnik Iakov Antsyforov and the and merchants and trappers, sothat we, after could pursue the traitors all together

In the battle two Cossacks were wounded, while the pursuing capturedthe 'traitorous' Personenverband, comprising about three times as many men.

'ading fronti er: the sovereig nS lOS

Kurbat maintained that only after all booty had been listed, thePersonenverband was its due: 'distributed among themselves, for

need motivation to chase such traitorsAccording to his report, Kurbat Ivanov was not involved in the decision-

Tn~, k i nc- process to the split in the Cossack group and the cam-of Pavlov's men. Kurbat claimed he knew about the 'traitors' from a letter

Pushchin had sent to him, that had stolen Pushchin's and his men'sequipment and when their group, and had merchants oftheir on their way to the Arnur." It is characteristic for this that itomits all details about the process to the split ofPushchin's men. These internal processes of the Personenverband remainedopaque for the outside world; at least as as there was no counterallegarionand no since claimants of the true of the sov-prplO'r'1'~ affair asserted that relied on the true sources, which could not bediscussed.f In the frontier area, the outcome of competition between and withinCossack groups was affected little by outside thus the affair'served as a uttered by those who felt could make use of theRussian authorities and wanted to make it clear to the Personenverbandthat to take for action. As an institutionalmechanism, the affair facilitated of the

Whereas in this case Pushchin found someone else to declare a 'sovereisn'saffair', restore leadership and to Moscow and the voevoda, as already men-tioned, this was not always so easy. Ten years in a similar yet unfortunatecourse of events, he faced of 50 men. Pushchin's dexterousdefence the typical behaviour of the Personenverband lead-

unsuccessful, while the Amur was a ne arby and tempting aim. Whether ornot he indeed risked all and waited until left him or rather prudently yieldedto their in Pushchin could some of them to return toIakutsk to earn the merits of the collected iasak. to a survivor, therem aining Cossac ks died of starvation or were kille d by the Chinese .95

There were sufficient reasons to doubt Pushchin's claims.rebellion of Tomsk in I Cossacks led by Pushchin backed a sovereign'affair the voevoda, Pushchin was punished and banned to Iakutsk.wDuring the rebellion, the faced multiple courueraccusarions of sov-

affairs by their mutual foes. The considerable Pushchinamassed in this rebellion c an be from the attempts to break the inforrna­tion embargo the rebels had imposed on their captives, Tomsk voevoda OsipShcherbatyi and his partisans, continuing during the whole period from April1648 to August 1649.97

With to transforming the affair, Siberia profited from itsfrontier status. Even in the European north of Russia, voevodas ruled with thehelp of outside troops. They collected taxes in the vicinity of the northwesternborder, and at times even the local levy of service men was assembled in thismanner.f Coercion used to convene the sluzhilye liudi in Moscow was codifiedin the 1631-2 statute to Beloozero, threatening to send guards from Moscow in

106 the . the sovereign's

case of and to make the local dvorians of the Moscow list pay for thepersecuti on twice In the more central rural areas of Muscovy, it is true, thelack of even the most basic staff reduced the voevoda to little more than one ofthe local whose connections at court and in the chancelleries as wellas local were indicative of their local In .:llU~J ra , however,n>tIIr'()11>tcrp followed rather different channels. Moscow was indeed far away, asword would have it, and it received the news after it was current: threemonths later and When a Cossack Personenverband returned from 'dis-tant service' to its base in a Siberian town the voevoda had often for hisfirst tenure was two years. Cossacks could not the voevoda'scollaboration, yet the was even more unreasonable. As alreadymentioned, a Cossack Personenverband from could antici-

a for had done if only suffi-cient fur tribute.

In this institutional context and that territories in a newly con-and not yet land were hard to let alone ue.re uu ,

between different towns and forts over territories was intense.Whenever a clash one party claimed it had been assaulted when ,w.(·pr,,_

new under the exalted hand', as did the TomskCossacks in 1639. Their Eniseisk Cossacks in the new fort of Iakutsk,returned the that Tornsk Cossacks and their non-iasaknative allies had actually attacked their own established antion tantamount to a affair. 103 In the l690s, when most potential iasak­payers had been divided among the towns and forts, usurpations still occurred. In1697 Ivan Korytov gave a of vicious localpoliticking with government decrees and petitions. He complained that theprikazchik of the small fort of the desiatnik Emelian Panikadilshchik,one of the leaders of the Transbaikalian rebels in 1696, had made inroads into the

sovereign's iasak Buryats'. In that year, Korytov had refused tofollow the for which he was punished. I04 Panikadilshc hikov claimed thatinstructions to him in Irkutsk subordinated the Buryats to Kabansk. In hisown favour, Korytov cited a petition sent to Irkutsk before his arrival bySetengmsk Cossacks of all ranks, that Buryats were orderedto deliver the iasak to In Siberia, no force could be sent in torecalcitrant local Cossacks to since that meant the num ber of con-tenders for the fur tribute and of mouths to be fed with importedno patron at court was powerful enough to stop a successful Cossack group thathad managed to its competitors in the Siberian forests.

In such cases, the affair remained almost the only way to contestthe spoils and of influence. This was a reality Iakutsk Cossack SamsonArtem'e v and his comrades had to accept in 1657, after they lost their interpreterin an accident at the between the rivers Vatan and Nantara. As they wereleft without anyone who could information from the natives, ordersor collect the iasak, they soon lost their best amanat as well. This amanat lost notime, calling on the iasak-paying Tungus Khudynets to destroy the equipment of

'ading fronti er: the sovereig nS 107

Artem'ev's men stored in a Artern'ev sent to Cossack Kondrat'eiMoiseev in the middle winter-hut on Nantar river 'on behalf of this sovereign'saffair', but Moiseev to shelter Khudynets winter until the iasakwas paid. In his report, the furious unable to any furs at Iakutsk,accused his rival Moiseev of the service by not appro-

care .105 Artem'ev did not on the loss in profit by the hid-den amanat, since he knew his had collected a amount of tribute.His strategy is still reminiscent of the ritual of the affair.

stre ssing financial matters, he nevertheless tried to create the impre ssionthat Moiseev was a traitor.

In modem historians need to be careful withthe of irreversible modernization processes from archaic compact rit-ual to rationally differentiated codified law.lO~ On a closer look, communicativeforms in a medieval age as well as entered into a 'premature"modem era, which in modem to rliffpr'iil1O'

degrees and at different times. Already in the era, codification servedto institutionalize basic forms by on canonical texts. evenin much later centuries ritual codes of communication used for regulation turnedout successes, while rational codified law stood on a

because it lacked the basis and mentalities.In this sense, there was indeed a field of but it ran rather diagonallybetween the two of uncombinable ritual and codified law, across the wholecultural system as a functionally differentiated alternative. This is obvious wherepolitical tenets were pragmatically pursued, while rituals and law were elabo-

for the order of the Golden where rituals were rationallyinstrurnentalized, as during summits and royal or where in codified, butprecarious arrangements was used as a ritualized medium of communica-tion. I07 In this sense, ritual arrangements such as the word, oralWJl 11 11 i"" invocation of the word or affair, or the withholding of thecontents of the affair were not 'traditional', they couldcombine both strands.

Whether we are to consider the affair as modem or ratheras traditional, it is reasonable to look at processes of institutionalization or insti-tutional from a that allows for their possible rationality. Byestablishing the sinodik for Kiprian founded anidealistic objectification, an explicitly formulated reflection that set up, justifiedand legitimated retrospectively the institutional stock. lOS Overcoming the prob­lem of publicizing such objectifications in a still largely illiterate environment,Ermak and his Cossacks' feats and deaths were commemorated and read out reg­ularly in Tobol'sk's St Sophia cathedral. It left no doubt as to the ofthe tsar the relations with the Cossacks:

Ermak sent the iasak with an atarnan and Cossacks to the ... Ivan(IV) [reporting] that by his fortune they conquered the tsarstvoof Sibir ' and God for everything.

108 the . the sovereign's

In this formula the affair does not yet appear as a term, how­ever, the ritual and God-bestowed qualities of the support and theapparently staunch loyalty of the Cossacks to the tsar are evident in manyin the sinodik. This ritual display and the tribute delivered made them forthe mercy:

arrival in Moscow, the ... received them and ordered thatthe was read. The bestowed cash and clothes on theCossacks, sent great reward and his merciful word to Ermak andthe Ccssacks.P?

Even if the tsar did not approve of the earlier feats of a Cossack group, as he didin Errnak's case, he would never fail to redeem and bestow his on the sue-cessful. IIO The voev odas' instructions stipulated that Cossac ks withiasak from 'new lands', which had not previously paid could on ahand some re ward. III While in this case written took centre stage, in the

illiterate frontier environment of the fur tribute ritual aspects ofsovereisn's affair remained important.

Town rebellions and the sovereign's ljfair

While these highlight how the affair structured conflicts inoutlying areas service and collection of the where it

a useful means to make the contenders acceptable back to the tsar's serv­ice, it was also applicable to urban power In these cases, it was moreimportant to express differing points of view without questioning the authority ofthe tsar. If the voevoda demanded too much from the Cossack community, evenif he acted to the tsar's interest as did voevoda Shcherbatyi of Tornskin 1648 on Cossack salaries they quite often united tooverthrow or disobey him. In a contradiction of sorts, however, they also formu-lated their claims as a affair. Historians either have thisproblem, or have seen in such cases a naive belief in the tsar', whichsquarely contradicted the underlying forces of bureaucratization and the increas-

power of the voevoda and therefore could only be frustrated. 112 Moon andField, nineteenth century have raised the question of whetherCossacks and really believed in their own zeal for the affair,or only feigned it. However, despite their inclination to explain the con-tradiction in terms of the dissirn ulative, cunning and m anipulative nature of peas­ant behaviour, Moon concludes that the evidence is contradictory andinconclusive.l!' Perrie has noted that in the last analysis such questions are per­haps unanswerable. I 14 contradictions are necessary parts of any institu­tional mechanism. Institutions are interpreted by guiding ideas that themselvescontain contradictory elements to unite partisans with different but claimto contradict other guiding ideas, held by their opponents, which they disown. Aninstitution is contested since those who are physically, intellectually and socially

'ading fronti er: the sovereig 11 S 109

capable of it for their actions can use it as a resource of power. I I

Institutional identifies different ideas for themate of an institution. idea is only temporarilyset above a of often-incompatible potential orientations. Since the

idea is a product of and a of it disownsmany of the senses and drafts of order. Yet this is the very reason whyits validity is never uncontested and on different situations, needsand social I~

Contested and ideas allowed for a limited of politicson the local while the related institutional mechanism of the sovereign'saffair provided a focal point for ritual, attention On12 April 1648, a banished noble and well-knowntroublemaker, while in affair the voevoda,

Shcherbatyi of which was then made public with the help ofnlr,ttP'r~ by mouth-to-mouth well-oiled machin-

a rebellion by Cossacks from all ranks the daysbefore. A crowd, no less than 300 or one-third of Tornskans toShcherbatyi, assembled in front of the voevoda's office and demanded the condi­tional release of Pleshcheev to have him questioned on the details of his accusa-tion. The who knew that his among the Cossacks hadlost reminded the of'Pleshcheev's misdemeanours to himimprisoned, however finally yielded to the demands of the crowd. Thus thevoevoda was confronted by Pleshcheev publicly, who the invocation. Ina characteristic combination of these ritual elements with written, institutional­ized forms of communication, the rebels asked whom he accused and the CossackChechuev documented his refusal to disclose this detail;'!" Thus the invocation ofthe affair focused the of a mass The result ofthis confrontation was the official deposition of the voevoda by the ,-v~~u.'-'''':''

who declared could no live under jurisdiction and servethe faithfully.

While from the onset there was little doubt that Pleshcheev-Podrez's sover-affair was void, an information battle ensued about the proper interpreta­

tion of the events vis-a-vis Moscow. The voevoda, under arrest in his court,managed at times to the information blockade imposed by the rebels. Inhis version of events, he had been violated by the and subsumed the rebel­lion under the heading of 'riotous assembly and plot (skcp i , one of thespecial cases of the affair. l l s The rebels, comprising most of theCossacks and inhabitants of the town, compiled lists of theyclaimed the voevoda had , and sent them to Moscow, with theirown version of the events on 12 April, which were as a fully rit-ual of petition addressed to the They claimed they had only acted inthe best interest of the reductions in salary and the retributions forcedupon them by Shcherbatyi made them incapable of performing equallinga affair. These conflicting guiding ideas under the common institu­tional cover of the affair had lasting consequences: for over a year the

110 the . the sovereign's

rebels controlled the town; another three years were to pass before a few of themwere comparatively lightly punished.l'?

Tomsk Cossacks employed the idea that their service was at the heartof the affairs even in the case of their ', As mentionedCossacks maintained their to own whose relatives thenthem out. Although supplies to the Cossacks were not necessanlytsar's will, any excessive harshness in the iasak

of - as could neither hunt tur-bearmzpay the tribute with their herds. The rebels made sure to strike the note, fortheir idea who Tomsk Cossacks of thisincome:

In 164511646 we, your retaliated... Kalm yktraitors. We defeated them with the aid of your S01Ier,el9:n'S fortune. Prince

took all our booty and ... by force. He our tosend them to Rus' .120

Instead of on their traditional which they felt was contested by thetsar's and the voevoda's relied on another thetism of natives or their into tried even harder toprove that the voevoda had violated the tsar's affairs by away their

they their as amanat, official captives who lived intown to tradition to ensure their relatives paid the iasak.121

that their wives and children were in Tomsk and notrli ~'npr~prl [throughout the empire], visited them and obeyed the tsar. 122

When the voevoda took away the the argument runs, the Kalrnyks with-drew from and instead of hostilities. The virtue in this isnot naivety, but purposefully somewhat twisted as Pokrovskii has to admit

but not in the . This served to confuse and occupythe chancellery in the serv ice of the the Cossac ks rnixe d their iasyr'with the amanat as though it was the same. Siberian in short, haddeveloped a very peculiar attitude towards Moscow instead of raiding the tsar'streasury on the they hijacked it symbolically normsand decrees to put a suitable guiding idea which interpreted the sever-

affair in line with their perceived needs. Since their elected voevoda wasformally second voevoda, they maintained that they were the sovereign'saffair even after to Shcherbatyi,

The rebels sent a series of petitions to the tsar and enforced an informationembargo around the voevoda's court, the prison and on the roads and rivers con­-ncr-r i n c- Tomsk to the outside world. Nonetheless, contradicting reports writtenby the voevoda and his imprisoned supporters slipped through the lines. On 30July 1648, the regular new secretary arrived in Tomsk to relieve his by thendece ased 123 A fierce and frank battle of word s ensued, with the

'ading fronti er: the sovereig 11 S III

rebels to win over secretary Kliucharev, who had left Moscow beforeany of the above documents reached it. While Osip had briefedKliucharev in their main argument was the affair,Shcherbatyi's transgressions and the 'destruction and suffered at hishands. Since the first of the rebellion, when the just first voevodahad entered the office and seized the official the second, elected voevod aBunakov and secretary not without from the set upoffice in town, on a Cossack's homestead, to avoid implication by the deposedvoevoda's affairs. Il'ia Bunakov therefore tried to Kliucharev to joinhim in the new instead of to convene both voevodas in theold, 'raided' office, which was in the eyes of the rebels not secure from

unlawful afflictions. Thus, Bunakov later had a hard timeinterrogation in why he held office in the 'traitorous home-

stead' , the rebels did demonstrate a keen awareness of secre t accessto a public space. Bunakov to Kliucharev that to theirtion these Il'ia alone sits at your affairs. With Osip hecannot sit by any means' .124

That very hour, Kliucharev a delegation 'of about 60 arrivedand Bunakov's 'with great noise' that they would notallow anyone to become messenger or bailiff, thus Kliucharev andShcherbatyi from a decree or court decision. the rebels betrayedan acute sense for the limits of hierarchic implementation of monologic law,which Pokrovskii overlooks in his account. He equally misses thatmade their appearance in the public limited to service issues in front of thevoevoda's adept use of the opportunities it offered. That samee venmc another rebel delegation asked for the tsar's which Kliucharev

to he also received a petition by one of the firstsupporters accusing Bunakov of a affair. On I August,

with 'many of all ranks',repeating the arguments and potential messengers orboiarskii V also hinted to the assumptions of

once the first voevoda and secretary could not enact their court deci-their popularity would be minimal, 'and therefore there will be many

killings among the Cossacks and great confusion (smuta) in Tomsk' .125

The secretary understood well that this reference to the Time of Troublespointed at the very heart of the affair, and that he was in the middleof a for the locally valid guiding idea. In his public he lumpedtogether several events, to show that attempts from below to restore securitynever helped:

So it happened when Moscow was destroyed, when the Lithuanians andPoles conquered Muscovy and there was no at that time inMuscovy. Their brethren the Cossacks were at Moscow with the boyar,voevoda and prince Drnitrii Trubetskoi and with prince D.M. Pozharskii, andthat is what, .. [they] did: They killed each other traitorously.Fs

112 the . the sovereign's

From secretary Kliucharev's point of not even the second militia had anyinfluence on the history of Mu scovy, let alone the liberation of Moscow. His ideasabout the affair, far removed from the realities of the Siberian fron-

a radical solution to relations between Moscow and theCossacks. In Muscovy west of the in this or in per-

the as the culprit, it would have been a mainstreamon which even often 127 Kliucharev

e xpounded one of the ideas for influence into disown orientations to set one vision of pacificarion:

Yet when God cleansed Muscovy and ... there was a tsar[as] ... your father Mikhail Fedorovich ...Cossack cu stoms were ind icted .128

That was a bit much for Tomsk Cossacks a after the Troubles, espe­cially since the rebels themselves had referred to the smuta in their first petitionin April 1648 the voevoda of trou bles in town.F? AlthoughKliucharev's of the rebels' proud answer might be biased, it is neverthelessenureiv in accord with their further stance:

told me, your You are free in this, tsar andAleksei Mikhailovich of all Russia, but you will never order

that all of them be Prince will not lead them. Do

It is quite clear that the rebels did not nourish naive as Pokrovskii assumes,or a 'monarchist illusion', when they carried on petitioning the 'true' tsar.knew very well the fundamental body that supported their stance: it was not themir they cited, but 'all of us'. The solidarity of the Personenverband resoundedin these words; a self-reliant conviction that even the tsar was, in the last analy-

no stronger than any Siberian Cossack in a Persol1el1verbal1dpursuing its aimeven Moscow had to take into account its solidarity. The strong, centralizing,

active and state Pokrovskii and Aleksandrov depict, and to which the'estates' of the Cossacks supposedly succumbed under Peter I,131 could nota foothold in Siberia. Prince Osip Shcherbatyi nurtured other, naive,

in his attempt to Tornskans with torture and the gallows, which,his best efforts, he could only realize in a different time and in a less

autonomous place: he helped to scores of rebels in the Middle Volgaduring the Razin rebellion. In Siberia, nothing quite comparable happened,

numerous rebellions .132Tornskans, however much they referred to the 'true tsar', never forgot the very

real of guiding ideas: their delegation repeated these words in jail inOctober 1649, when petitioners for the last time tried to explain their position to

the tsar.m Nevertheless, Kliucharev's made a lasting impression: some ofthe deti boiarskie and wealthy Cossacks decided to switch sides at this point, and,though they were punished by their former allies, became supporters of

'ading fronti er: the sovereig nS 113

Shcherbatyi. For the time the rebels precluded any contact and collabora­tion between the first voevoda and the secretary, who were confined to theircourts.

The rebels had no illusions about their situation, as their further course ofactions showed. On 8 1649, 16 months after was arrested,new voevodas arrived from Moscow. For the this was a clearBogdan Andreevich Kokovinskii was the brother-in-law of Il'Ia Bunakov'sbrother Andrei and Il'ia's and supplies; Mikhail PetrovichVolynskii was old who had alienated some of Shcherbatyi's

This was hardly a was one of the strongest forcesin Muscovy. Pokrovskii offers no for proper analysis of these connec-tions. he tends to downplay links of thePersonenverband. while those the voevoda or his are presentedas of bureaucratization and centralization implemented fromabove. Bunakov was a of the and GavrilovichPushkin and to MI. the brother-in-law of formerTomsk secretary Boris to save him 'from the of hell' which hiscolleague Shcherbatyi for him.135 Shcherbatyi and his protectorTrubetskoi.who headed the Siberian had little influence on who wasto become voevoda, as this decided the Military Still, the rebels aswell as Bunakov had to for their and view of events, in Tomsk aswell as in Moscow, different contexts for respective guidingideas.

ideas can be detected during the voevodas' relief.Unsurprisingly, Shrl'Pr'I":ltvi r'I"nm'tNj that from the outset the new voevodas didnot agree unconditionally with his interpretation that the Cossack rule was 'trai-torous'. Their stance was aided by two orders one the instruc-tion issued to the new voevodas, which, to normalstipulated that the old should both account for the town. Shcherbatyipresented another decree: It was pronounced in Moscow on 4 March 1649,

informed about the new conditions in Tornsk and therefore thefirst voevoda of accounting for his rule. angry and extended quarrels withShcherbatyi, his successors Kokovinskii and Volynskii adhered to the instructionthey had received. They in conviviality with the rebels' representatives,Shcherbatyi was the voevodas had had him posted 'in a house with-out circumvallation on the meadows' and he feared retaliation by the Cossacks;after ten days he gave in.13~

In Tomsk, rebels could now rely on due process to press for their interests.t-?Already on 12 the rebels demanded the exclusion of secretaryKliucharevfrom the impending investigation, due to his partiality. Shcherbatyi's partisans,Petr Sabanskii and comrades, according to the rules, had been sent to Tobol'skduring the investigation. The rebels did not feel insecure at all none of theirpetitions was so carelessly as this one, by only 23 persons, including twodeti boiarskie, among them the notorious Fedor Pushchin, four piatidesiatniki,ten desiatniki who also for their men, and seven rank-and-file Cossacks.

114 the . the sovereign's

Once no effort seemed necessary, these men formed the very core of the rebels.had the situation Kokovinskii and Volynskii relieved

Kliucharev from without even for and wrote toMoscow that could not start the for the decree demandedKliuc harev 's under all documents to be sent to theKliucharev and sent a petition in to be relieved fromhis duties. Trubetskoi was impelled to was dealt onemore blow.

The now took an unwelcome tum for but satisfiedthe majority of the As in many other cases after Siberian 39

the odinachnaia , the written decision not to hand over each as wellas the line by by almost all Cossacks and otherinhabitants of the town, made sure any had a hard time. WhileKokovinskii and Volynskii gave reason to complain about theirular methods, and did not find much evidence directed the

seemingly softening stance of the Tomskans the Siberiancnanceuery to send in new who were to act of thevoevodas, and who arrived in Tomsk on 20 March 1650. At the same time,Trubetskoi ordered Fedor Pushchin and ten more advisors of Il'ia Bunakov toMoscow to be confronted face to face with hadalso used his position as first voevoda to several on behalf ofthe rebellion to be arrested en route back to Tomsk at Tobol'sk and other towns,although the tsar had received measures that were sanctioned afterwards byTru betskoi .140 The road and the towns marking the stations were dangerou sfor since the local Personenverband in their town of could notalways help them their with their far-flung networks of clients and

did not cease to send to Moscow, with solemnaffirmations that they heeded the affair. When the direction of themvesugauon turned them, with the second successors of Shcherbatyi andBunakov in office in Tomsk, they still to this line. In Tomsk, mvesugatorshad a hard time to find anyone not involved in the rebellion, since until March1652 Tomskans maintained they had their statements to Kokovinskii andVolynskii and did not wish to contradict them. the rebels stood their dayby what could be said a particular f000 of partitione d public by me ansof to norms and ideas related to the affair. It was byno means evident that these norms could only be interpreted in the way thatpleased the Personenverband. However, by highlighting the appropriate normsaccording to its the Personenverband for a time set the

after all, exists in action it on the resources an agent is able tomobilize in a situation by his knowledge and position in 141

The institution of the affair served to structure, focus and empowerpublic resistance to a course of investigation that might destabilize thePersonenverband's position when it was, as any public communication, endan­

by the tendency of participants in public not to listen to each other, espe-cially in a situation of heightened tension and impending of defeat. This

'ading fronti er: the sovereig nS 115

is an of the affair Aleksandrov and Pokrovskii overlook due totheir concept of , they are more interested in the reactions ofsome deti boiarskie to the Kliucharev to prove that the upper crust finallyleft the 'radicals to their own devices'. Only when the illegally ques­tioned who were declared of Osip, the balance of powerchanged, With the facts this yielded, and with the statements of some detiboiarskie who had remained a more detailed of the rebellionemerged. Moscow to draw conclusions and considere d therebels.

With earlier under arrest en route, the third group of petitionersstill arrived in Moscow. the detained that theiractions were undertaken on behalf of thepetitions rather than the asbelieve. to the detained, thesetravened the interest. Their seeminglysteadfast stance was rewarded. In the summer of I the sent aninstruction to Tomsk punishment for those among Bunakov's advisorswhom the chancellery and the tsar considered the worst offenders. Out of the

two-thirds of the who had the rebels' seven dele-gates were arrested in Moscow, seven rebels sent to and Tobol'skmvesugauon, and II who in town. were to be beaten with the knout,which signified a painful but comparably light chastisement'< in 1648or the aborted Tomsk plot planned by a small minority in 1634, which neverstarted but yielded 12 executions by demonstrated that the laws pro-

'rebellion and were still taken AlthoughShcherbatyi was determined to prove that quite a number of Tomsk rebels hadbeen guilty of treason even before 1648 the were of no use andeven after a rebellion had engulfed the trading frontier.

All the while, for two years the of the voevoda, syn boiarskii PetrSabanskii with his 21 comrades had in Moscow, to further their aims.Although were never complained about the the end-less in the chancellery, and about the detrimental effect that the con-tinuing power of 'Cossack circles' in Tomsk had had on their andtheir servants who no dared to show in the streets. In this as inmany Tornsk conditions were a of the Siberian chancelleryproving the inconclusiveness of interpretations, or guiding ideas, of the sever-

affair, rather than to the capability of the tsar or the chancellery to definean outcome that was obligatory to all participants, as Pokrovskii maintains. Bothquarrelling sides had to pay to create at least theimpression of a victory, the chancellery claimed in its instruction:

... the Cossacks were beaten for having plotted with II' ia [Bunakov ], for notwilling to accept ... Shcherbatyi's jurisdiction, deposing him, locking

him into his court ... and communication ... They beat and robbedtheir brethren, deti boiarskie Petr Sabanskii and comrades and put them in

116 the . the sovereign's

without the decree ... and elected Il'ia as their only[voevoda] and acted treasonously with him, holding Cossack circles and

This however did not amount to an immovable as opposedto the 'mirskaia to which, as Pokrovskii claims, the rebels adhered 145 itwas Trubetskoi's and of the events, and it may beassumed that tsar Aleksei shared this idea. of a commonguiding idea of the nobles and the tsar, even some of the former saw the affair ina different not in the same way that the Tornsk Cossacksdid, while all, knew very well that they had noleverase to stages of the Moscow rebellionin 1648, when the seemed .Aleksei even went as far as toreceive the Tomsk rebels' and assure them of his benevolence and help.Even when the were held on remand in Moscow after handinga to the tsar on 20 October 1649 the public processionon Dmitriev day, a motion ruled by the never aboutthe difference between the institutional mechanism and the idea theypropagated. In their letter directed to Tomsk Cossacks put it thus:

You, our masters, shall stand all as one, so that you will not be tried.And do not hand us in, brothers atamans molodtsy! We stand in for the lawl4~

for the entire town; even if the orders to us, we will die main-taining the law and waiting for the mercy. Therefore we beat ourforeheads many times to you, our masters: live in Christ! 147

As a necessary for their on thepower the Personenverband provided by not admitting anything to investigationthat could be used them. Yet even in this unobserved moment, didnot imagine themselves as bearers of an ideology, of a truth that existed beyondthe ramifications of the institutional of the It wasnot 'the town's justice' as as Pokrov skii claims, 148 but law thatthey felt they were upholding, bravely and honourably, for their whole town.l-?Although they understood that they ran the risk of up on the gallows, theyalso knew that their main opportunity lay in the attempt to influence the balanceof power, which, however little inclined to their side, nevertheless would deter­mine the outcome of the law suit. their attempts to maintainthat all their actions aimed consistently to increase the profit of the andtheir for the mercy were rational. did not vie or at leastnot mainly for miraculous and were clearly reflected in the out-come. None of them was put to death, although Shcherbatyi by the same institu­tional mechanism of the affair threatened to hang all of them. Eventhe leading rebels did not fare too badly. All the rebels returned to Tomsk, thoughsome of them subsequently were sent to Iakutsk, Altogether 65 people, thebanned rebels and their families, were sent to Iakutsk, retaining their ranks. On

'ading fronti er: the sovereig nS 117

their way to had ample opportunity to discuss as syn

boiarskii Petr Lavrov, one of was checked by rebelpiatidesiatnik Matvei Nenashev under orders to accompany the group. had

re ason to do so after all, rebellion and punishment had both proven thatMoscow's most extreme measures and ambitious were not applicable toSiberia. I50

The word and affair offered a means of andfocusing debates in public that were thematically limited toissues of service. In the it provided a means of Cossacks that

to the The affair provided a channel ofto authorities and allowed different members of a network of

n>lIIr'()11 >lCrp to communicate on controversial issues while the ofapprehended as traitors. As a set of related norms, and related

pauerns of behaviour, this institutional mechanism provided resources of poweractors could make use of in the pitched semi-public battles for information andcontrol that were characteristic of seventeenth century Siberia. 151

The sovereign's pr(jit and the sovereign's tjfair

To open a channel for and to be able to engage in negotiations petition­ers had to travel to Moscow, or at least to a more elevated voevoda or the bishopof Tobol'sk.' Siberian voevodas, however, the to ban ;()I'Ir'T\.~,,~

deemed unnece ssary, or else in case of emergency. This was in the intere stof the tsar's treasure, since it excess trade of furs by Cossacks. Yet toa Russian of the seventeenth century, the notion also meant aform of security, mainly due to the peculiar influences of the southern frontier.While Muscovy west of the Urals from the 1630s became ofdefending its southern borders all-encompassing nomad invasions, fenc-

off small groups was far more difficult. For such small groups, the for-tifications of the border (the were hardly impregnable. They cameintending to a few whom could either sell as slaves or lib-erate for ransom. Muscovite politics had different ways of dealing withthis issue while attempts to dominate the nomad s never lasted long,much was done by tribute to the Crime an khan and other nom ad suzerains.Yet whenever Moscow failed to live up to , nomad groups who livedon this tribute as part of the traditional politics felt that they were notbound by earlier 53 Their solution to their economic slow-down wasraiding, and they often did so of the khan in nomad societies,elected khans were not as authoritative as a monarch. Ransomand tribute therefore amounted to an enormous financial burden for Muscovy.Thus the tsar had powerful and convincing arguments for his dominant role inspending at least five million roubles in the first half of the seventeenth centuryon ransom for captives to the Crimean khan alone. These were not trifle s, as esti­mations of the number of new towns illustrate, which eq ualled state onransom payments I ,200 in the first half of the seventeenth century. 154 Siberian

118 the . the sovereign's

Cossacks were to for captivity,155although the ransom taxwas not levied in Siberia. In comparison with other states, Muscovywas in a far worse situation. In the whole recent compilations ofsources on amount to about 60,000 overall in the first half of the seven-teenth S~ as to an estimated 150,000 in Muscovy alonethat , or 10,000 in western Siberia in the first two decades of the eighteenthcentury. IS? The ransom tax was the first to be levied by and it contributedto the of the state sector in ways unknown to Western where ran-som continued to be handled by interlocutors and monastic orders.P''

Even ordinary were aware of this, as shows the case of the wife of aUkrainian in Korochi. She was denounced for condemn-

the tsar who did not ransom her son, a in the Crimea: ' ... as I do notsee my son before me, so the tsar shall not see .IS9 To no littlethis why was one of the tsar's most valued attributes in popular andelite and in loyal The inasmuch asit referred to financial affairs and the voevoda's in allowing travel-

therefore had different overtones for those who ran the risk of cap-ture or at least for every Russian or Orthodox that not of exploitation byan state but of a claim to its revenues.Alienating funds on the of the voevoda therefore was accused by theCossacks not only on but also because knew thatthese funds were not available for the 'pious' ends of This was espe-cially as that recovered funds from voevodas'

mostly ended in the state coffers rather than with those from whom they hadbeen taken.l~o

Another conspicuous influence of the southern frontier on Russia and, conse­quently, on is a problem with the system of obviousalready in the history of Errnak's conquest of the Khanate of Sibir'. The tsar hadfirst exploitation of western Siberia and the to set up fortified gar-risons and to for criminal lawsuits to the werethus in in a similar position to Western merchant corporations,

by their monarchs these which amounted to a state in the state. Yetin Russia, undercapitalization and low urbanization meant that merchants couldnot fill this role. In no small this was caused by the significant drain oncapital and workforce due to nomad raids, which in Siberia had still more severeeffects and lasted well into the century than west of theUrals.Is? As private merchants could not or would not Cossacks duringthe conquest, or provide sufficient funds for sustained presence, Errnak'sCossacks to deal with the tsar, Ivan IV's grant to the Stroaanovs,While Ermak's Cossacks did not prevail, state-funded established astable presence in Siberia.lv'

About the same time, Moscow faced the desire of the northern mar-itime powers to establish their power over northern Russia and to find a new routeto Siberian furs and to China. IM To secure Siberia for Russia, Moscow was readyto place an enormou s burden on the northern towns west of the Urals. In the 1630s,

'ading fronti er: the sovereig nS 119

paid the 'Siberian supply': in 1 it paid no less than 2,204 roubles 30allyn every year in to Tobol'sk was even morePayments continued until 1 when an edict decreed that Viatka was relieved of

obligation, since 'there [was] in Siberia' by then.1M

amorphous political pressures from the south and highly organ-technically influences in the north, in the formative of

Siberian Cossack institutions at the end of the sixteenth and in theteenth century after the Time of Moscow was to nr'rIVlrjp

and palpable assistance. The Cossacks were traditionally oriented towardsMoscow's but also lacked access to sufficient funding andmade a clear choice for the tsar. and trad-

were linked to the tsar's interests and vice versa. For the samereason, taxes as well as the tsar's at trade with certain lux-urious most of them traded across the border or throughout the frontier,may have a measure of than elsewhere, yet in Siberiathe exact level was still to dispute. In particular, Cossacks from

understood as zeal in the name of the affairon the part of the voevoda, a task entrusted to him in his instruction, could be putforward as a idea of the acclaim of theCossacks under certain circumstances. the of and state

also meant that voevodas could exploit their position unduly. Asexplained in the next meant that the voevoda was enti-tled to a amount of If the voevoda demanded too muchfrom the Cossack community, even if he acted to the tsar's asdid voevodas Shcherbatyi of Dvorianinov of and otherseconomizing on Cossacks' salaries they united to overthrow or dis-

him. Thus, in Siberia state and were blurred to a consider-able treatment of Cossacks in travelling meant that state andprivate were further intertwined.1~8 At the same time, for Cossacks thesame provisions facilitated travelling once the the voevoda, had beenwon over or overcome.

Conclusion

The latest time for a relative in literacy in an area as far east asIrkutsk was the 1690s, when trade across the newly established border markedlyincreased. Institutionalization answered to the need for negotiation and informa-tion Yet, it was not so much the symbolic uses of a form of address andits but the opportunities to exert control over these uses or to struc-ture them that defined the political system.I~9 In Siberia, there was little chanceof obtaining obedience directly the power of the centre was largely virtual. Itsmaterial depended on the motivation and means of overcoming distanceand transport problems, which in tum could only be realized by trade. Thus, tradeand finances, rather than military power, constituted the main means of rulingthese vast territories.

120 the . the soveriegn S

Siberian Cossacks of the seventeenth century provide an of howMuscovite on the power of the group could be adapted to the needs ofa dynamic community of merchants. While this meant that individual Cossacksremained within the sway of group power, it did not indicate that these groupsbecame particularly or petrified. With different, often , groupsin town, in a limited way Cossacks could choose between different while

had to with one of the groups, usually only for a limitedof time. As in confrontations in Italian adherents of the defeated groupwere often forced to leave the town. The affair and thePersonenverband did create social pressures to conform. Neutralbvstanders could find it difficult to resist. Once a affair was launchedby a group, an to came into existence: 'Why do yourefuse to the with us; are you not well towards the sever-

170At the same time, decrees sanctioned a duty to in obli-everyone who knew about a affair to make it known to the

authorities.!" if the majority did not 'haul with the mir ' to ~Uf'jJVJl

a affair, and if the voevoda was not interested in it, it could be hardto inform Moscow. Early modem conditions were not conducive to the close con­trol of local actors by the distant centre, and that was no less true in Siberia. InThe affair thus differentiated between those actionthe and his tertium 11011 datur, This was important for therebels to make sure which had to on polls among the resi-dents 173 did not find statements out of line with either the rebels or the equallytainted of the voevoda,These precautions helped locally to establish adominant idea.

On the other hand, Cossacks could make sure they were not excluded from thePersonenverband and its power, the choice between different options tothem. On 6 1680, Eniseisk Cossack Karp Errnolin lodged a complaintwith Ivan syn boiarskii and in the fort Irkutsk. He protested

his comrade, Pronka Sirotinin, who cursed the of the trans-and claimed he 'knows a affair all Cossacks'. The very

same day, Eniseisk Cossack Sirotinin was questioned. Perfil'ev inquired into thenature of the affair and who was its perpetrator. Sirotinin

however in part talked his way out claiming he was drunk. He asserted that on aservice the year before one of his Trenko Tikhonov, had seizedand sold three sacks of the supplies at fort Udinsk on the otherside of Lake Baikal. Sirotinin claimed he had reported this incident to the otherCossacks, the hired Cossacks and the 'who were sent with him'. Headde d he had made a slip of tongue and, apart from this incident, he knew noother affair about anybody else .174

Unusual as this incident might seem in the light of Siberian accountsof the declaration of a affair preoccupied with the impeachment ofvoevodas and other officials it is revealing in many . ThePersonenverband's complicity with Tikhonov had been stronger than any obliga­tion to the tsar until Sirotinin accused all Cossacks of a affair. It was

'ading fronti er: the sovereig nS 121

not uncommon to sell official privately, but it was much less "rr'Pl~tprl

not to share the with comrades. Sirotinin the limitations ofthis Personenverband which no lived up to either of its to servethe or to share the by a mere five words. Thus, the sov-PrP10'r'1'~ affair increased Cossacks' options to ensure they received their share intrade as well as collective .17~ While peasants in centralRussia in the twentieth century still used methods reminiscent of the gosu-darevo slovo i delo to silence a minority of reform-minded local inthe seventeenth century Siberian Cossac ks were this institution tomake sure trade flows were not disrupted by authorities dominated either bynoble or by the Personenverband.

4 Kormlenie and briberyLocal influence and administration

In the last years of the seventeenth century, a scandal rocked exten­sive were conducted into the financial machinations and fraud sur-

in the east. The voevodas in particular were under scrutiny, yet amongthose who had the law, some survived with impunity,in particular M.P. and S.T. Dumovo of Krasnoiarsk. The head of theSiberian chancellery since June 1 A.A. Vinius, who regularly correspondedwith Peter I, covered up for them, in touch with them and was their 'patron'.'Neither nor Durnovo were descendants of boyar families; but those werethe of favouritism in Peter's when the tsar was to estab-lish a to traditional boyar Yet Krasnoiarsk Cossacksopposed Dumovo because he tried to cover up for his He had littletime to any misdeeds himself but he had a hard time, since he was con­fronted by Krasnoiarsk who became so alienated that they travelledforty versts to prohibit the official duma secretary Polianskii, fromentering the town and district. In Moscow, Polianskii was accused of thevoevodas and was ousted as a side effect of the revolt.' This indicates that themvesugauon was indeed and could only be thwarted by a voevoda likeGagarin who, as a client of the tsar's favourite, Menshikov, was high on the socialladder of The question raised by these observations is how they canbe reconciled with the obvious fact that bribery in Siberia was commonplace andwidespread.

In 1701, shortly after these events, Vinius fell out of favour and tried to pay10,000 roubles to Peter's friend and favourite Menshikov, to save at least the mostcherished among his many posts him access to Siberian wealth.Menshikov was new to the business and reported the affair to tsar Peter. AsPavlenko notes, had Vinius 'a more modest bribe', Menshikov might haveaccepted and helped him. Though Russia was hardly a positive amongcontemporary realms, it is that the son of a Dutchman misjudgedMenshikov so In the European overseas colonies bribery was common,which at the local level interfered with central orders." It is likely that Menshikov,despite his later habits, was indeed indignant at Vinius's behaviour, since thenorms of his time did not exclude bribes in but excessive bribes. Butcould only Menshikov have the real norm of their time, while Vinius,

Kormlenie and rsrt rrrr v. "J ,.".~"~~ and administration 123

as an embodiment, of Russia's or Siberia's and corruptUle'Cll""l, behaved illegally?

To understand the issues of it is necessary to examine the chan-system in some detail. With the of the chancelleries the late

sixteenth and seventeenth the need to govern the conduct of adminis­trators among thernsel ves and between them and their clients also grew. This needgenerated administrative law, which encompasses standards the per­formance and behaviour of administrators. It was institutionalized first in the1550 code of law and the system was further in the judi-cial charter and edict non-codified Muscovite court casedocuments. It was also influenced by external sources, such as andLithuanian law.fi The most codification of Muscovite administra-tive law was the 1649 which also an conscious-ness for this need it was a response to rebellions and, to the 1497Sudebnik, the text of the code had increased tenfold. Administrative misconductC!f'f'nrrlir,a to seventeenth century Russian law could cover illicit materialtheft, the display of favouritism and towards orlitigants, sheer inattentiveness, indifference or towards aswell as untoward consumption and of wealth.' Yet Russians were dis-

to view these not as fixed values, but as of that were con-demnable only when such became too venal and corrosive oforganizational efficiency. This was in seventeenth century terms denot-

what today would be called likhoimstvo meant more thanwas allowed or while not condemning bribe-taking.

It is received wisdom in Siberian studies that was rife in this distantterritory, with petty nobles bribes to be appointed to the post of voevodasdown to a whole of and which has been diagnosedby some researchers in without supplying much evidence nor any defi-nition.? Such superficial were never followed up with an in-depth studyof the conditions of bribery; scholars have also been reluctant to consider thequestion of whether modern terms are applicable to this period. In Muscovitestudies, this question has been addressed only Vziatka, meaning literally'that which has been taken', had a multitude of meanings, such as adebt or diverting zhalovan'e. One of Peter's well-known decrees bribe-

in 1714 used this word in a way close to modern usage. In 1698-9 secre­tary of state Polianskii, who had been sent to Eniseisk to irregularitiesand the rebellions of the years, drew on the term to sum up a petitionsubmitted by members of the gostinnaia sotnia. Yet these early usages did notbecome current: a judicial dictionary of the late century did not evenbother to define the term Instead, it referred the reader to likhoimstvo;though synonymous to for Russian readers by the nineteenth century, thelatter term was derived from two roots, lishnii and imat'; the former denoting'superfluous, excessive, or unnecessary', while the latter is an archaic formmeaning 'to take' .10 Literally, thus, the term by the eighteenth centurydid not refer to the of the state's interest, as according to his

124 Kormlenie and irttuence and administration

decrees would have it, or to the of the fine line between the duty owedto the state and private as the modem age sees the matter. Rather it wasa reference to a limit defined either by custom or arbitrarily by the tsar. Thus thispetition, as by Polianskii, did not make use of the term butgreat on the circumstance that Savelov had extracted unusuallybribes by force.

Savelov tried to defend himself by out that he nevertook ' bribes 'by force' ne and did not inflict dam-ages on the traders. Implicitly he maintained, a was not by itselfa crime. To buttress his claims he statements made by two traders inJune 1697, which that on their way back from TransbaikalianCossacks had forced the merchants to the Savelov.11

Contradictory statements by other members of the same caravan, thatSavelov had demanded more than 660 roubles to let them pass, had beenhanded to Polianskii in Eniseisk in July 1697. in its conclusion, theSiberian found Savelov guilty of not taxes, but not of

bribes.l?One of the most outspoken defenders of this viewpoint was the historian and

voevoda of VN. who was later administrator of the minesin the Urals. In his exhortations to his son on the virtues of a and anobleman, he gave a lesson in how to make use of another term close towhat in modem usage would be 'bribe'. Recounting his confrontations over thisquestion, he gave a self-confident account of his answers, fairinsights into the habits of a and voevoda, Tatishchev referred to biblicalsources, 'Delaiushchemu ne po no po ('Now to him thatworketh is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt', Romans 4:4), in reply-

to a by Nikita Demidov in 1722. He went even further when corneredby tsar Peter: as as the first looked at the affair, and decided by the let­ter of law, he did not transgress, while likhoimstvo would be illegal only if the

decided and took money for it. Tatishchev's main argument is nota formal one; he claims to be much more concerned with political questions, suchas the welfare of a merchant who might lose a substantial amount of money whilehe was waiting for a decision. A judge, Tatishchev knew, was paid to sit in courtduring the first half of the day, while the second half was unpaid. if hewas to refrain from from hunting and he was to be remu­nerated for this extra effort. Since there were many cases that had to wait due toadministrative overload and their position in the court's it was only fairto receive payment for renouncing his leisure time. According to Tatishchev, evensuch an ardent corruption as Peter could not this necessity,though he specified that such could only be to the honest judge.As Tatishchev the term vziatka a proper interpretation: 'NeitherGod nor your majesty can censure what is as a quittance [of the debt]mzdu vziatuiui."> The therefore, is literally 'that what is owed to thejudge'. He implied that only excess demands supported by physical or othermeans of power were deemed illicit.

Kormlenie and rsrt rrrr v. "J ,.".~,,~~ and administration 125

A of Tatishchev's views with those of a rather more distinguishedthinker is instructive when Muscovy to Western where thegreat debate was not so much about but about venality. Momesquieuhimself had office and claimed:

Cette venalite est bonne dans les Etats monarchique parce qu'elle faitcomme un metier de famille, ce qu'on ne voudroit pas pour lavertu; qu'elle destine chacun a son et rend les ordres de l'Etat plus

If offices were not sold publicly, in a they would be distributed andsold by courtiers under the counter: la maniere de s'avancer par lesrichesses et entretient l'mdusrrie, chose dont cette de gouverne-ment a besom'.

In this was an of absolutism par la venalite desoffices', as Mousnier characterizes conditions in the sixteenth and seven-teenth centurie s.14 In western the state and the monarchies livedwith similar administrative constraints, but they the of a muchmore trade capitalism. In both cases princely states found it difficultfor their ambitions as well as their defensive needs to raise sufficient loanssecurities, which institutionally could not guarantee. With the ofthe Netherlands and the state was not yet able to guarantee a loan

the of the and states frequently resorted toforce to make creditors more amenable. The tradition in canon and secular law ofthe which was well-fortified intrusion on the part of the state,however, allowed the employment of medieval structures in financial administra-tion to raise loans the of perquisites.

In Muscovy, there was a significant lack of capital, to no small due tothe financial drain of the open fronrier." Since harve sts ruine d by bad weatherand other causes of economic deterioration such as nomadic intrusions were morefrequent than in the West, or even in the more inhabited of Poland,revenue from a particular province was less secure and stable. Much ofMuse ovy' s military success depende d upon the efficient stoc kpiling of supplie S.I~

To finance the income of a high noble, one was not adequate for anadministrator, it paid much better to be sent to different and obtain rev­enue to the and other available means of power,including personal capabilities.

The forms of service remuneration subsumed as alimentation (kormlenie) dif­fer from 'e in that they were collected and paid locally, and not throughthe central chancelleries. Appointment to the post of a voevoda, on the otherhand, was considered as zhalovan too, in this traditional and basic sense mean-

a boon, a favour.!? In principle, there was the alimentation 'on and'on departing' the district, the alimentation on holidays and the daily, weekly andmonthly alimentation. The term korm was not reserved to voevodas, but couldalso apply to dignitaries on the frontier, who served the tsar or

126 Kormlenie and irttuence and administration

for a short The rules alimentation of thevoevodas, their kin who accompanied them and the staff of the voevodas' office,have often been blamed for the administrative inefficiencies and economic back­wardness from which Russia suffered in the modern 8 this is notevident by itself it is obvious that any local collection of taxes was difficult tocontrol in a with communications and inclement cli-matic conditions. To control them was whilecontrolling them locally, by elected or reduced centralcontrol to and rendered impossible. Therefore the voevodawas sent out with the unequivocal aim of himself, the returnsof which he had to estimate himself as the instructions to localconditions. Yet he could also be called to account if, due to his localtaxes which resulted however infrequently in confiscations. SinceSiberian returns were far more important to the central treasury to theirconvertibility in Siberian voevodas were controlled more

than was the case elsewhere. The internal customs border established atVerkhotur'e was never the influence of certain but it wasinstructed to check and compare voevodas' wares and cash on and leav-

wlL'Cl1a, to find out about their activities. Cossacks benefitedfrom this impediment on the trade activities of voevodas by theirexcess wares to Cossac k tax-free allowance s.19

At the point between voevodas, kormlenie could accompany sat-isfactorv or contact between an administrator and and thepopulation but in a country which was so vast and little developed, which livedunder such a strain of bad weather conditions and insecurity as Muscovy, this wasbetter than no contact at all. Rulers had to content themselves with much smaller

in their ambitions than in France. Under these conditions, venal-ity could not be employed as a security to the same as in and itwas reasonable to leave it to voevodas and staff to this rev-enue. Tatishc hev that in the seventeenth century, chancellery staffreceived a bribe for appointment as a town voevoda.w From the tsar's point ofview, it was reasonable to limit this but impossible to stamp it OUt.2 1Thesame was true for bribery and kormlenie, which can in this be addressedas the nearest suitable institutional mechanism available to the tsar for financingat least his administrative, and to some military, In France cor-

concerns over venality sometimes aimed at the crown's power,seeking to obtain the of disposal of offices by and sale ofoffices in their own hands.22 Venality and kormlenie in Muscovy, while thetsar additional, if not readily convertible, sources of thesevery interests of noble clans and chancellery corporations, althou gh theydid not enjoy the same kind of institutional guarantees granted to them in France.

Kormlenie did not the same judicial privileges fortifying its usufructu-ary the intrusion of the princely state, as did secular officials in France inthe tradition of beneficium. While in France tax collectors were sometimessimply chased awayp in Siberia the judicial of the tsar allowed the

Kormlenie and rsrt rrrr v. "J ,,".~"~~ and administration 127

Personenverband to await while suitable measures.Entitlements of the holders of the office of voevoda were much less fixed andmore on community approval, than in Western which meantthat the community had even more influence on the office holder than inthe

The conventional of the voevodas of Siberia is slightly mis-leading.xince any evaluation of the of this influence on the relativepower of the voevoda and the local community. Out of his confiscated belongingsto the value of I roubles, voevoda Frants bekov of Iakutsk was2,000 roubles after This was three times the averageallowance to a voevoda for and in he was not allowedto return more than he had taken in.'2~ Yet this kind of accountability was only oneof the Muscovite chancelleries. In I voevoda M.M.Arsen'ev of Iakutsk the Siberian his DeIOm,-

more than 11,000 roubles, which he had sent to Nerchinsk in 1696. AtUU1U~,L,", local Cossacks their voevoda confiscated the whole car­avan of 15 horses, and finally divided the booty among them. Thevoevoda did not attempt to hide the fact that he in trade while he wasvoevoda in Iakutsk, He used the very same rebellious Cossacks used innegotiating the terms of trade with the Siberian in order to be ableto serve faithfully, he needed the tsar's and He thatwhen he was appointed to this distant post, he borrowed from AlekseiFilat'ev in Moscow and in Iaroslavl from Semen Luzin and theirprikazchiks in Tobol'sk and Eniseisk to be able to travel. After his arrival inIakutskhe received a letter from the him to send the money,or, preferably, furs bought for this money for trade with China to Filar'ev'sprikaz:chiikAleksei Lobanov at Nerchinsk, Arsen'ev stressed that his debt was duefor repayment and that he stood to among other his hereditary vil-

rendering him incapable of He claimed that to meet the target hehad to sell 'my attire, and my wife's and children's, and all my table silver'. Thecnanceuery decree this application for an allowance, thus underlmmg

its function as an insurance for the tsar's and ordered the newvoevoda of Irkutsk, Nikolev, not without suspicion, to exactlywhether the list of Mikhail Arsen'ev's loans coincided with documented loans theprikazchiks veet« to produce 'whenever next they touch Irkutsk'. The chancelleryhad noticed that revenues from Siberian towns were falling, and put theblame on the voevodas, In Mikhail Arserr'ev's case, in one year of his tenurealone, the amount of iasak had fallen from about 39 bundles of 40 sables each tojust 19 bundles, while there was ample evidence of sables in private trade withChina.t? Whatever the outcome of this investigation, like others, it did not destroythe family reputation and cormections.P' The chancellery weighed up the relativeimportance of the principles of accountability and provisioning for its servitorseven in an obvious case of illegal transactions, and voevodas knew they couldrely on officials turning a blind eye to a certain amount of illegal trade on theirpart.

128 Kormlenie and irttuence and administration

Furthering their interests, voevodas by no means inevitably fell out with thePersonenverband. As with other cases in Russia, satisfied inhabitantssometimes sent to Moscow to ask for another for their"rnitoetiv-oi' voevoda, 'Merciful' was the word used in contrast to 'likhii'; in otherwords these voevodas to the limits of the Cossacks' endurance,and their qualities as leaders of the In 1686-7Tiurnen' musketeers and Cossacks asked in a not to their

I. a local syn that he caused them no insultsand excessive demands. Although their petition contradicted another apporru-rnent, the it. 3Il 'Merciful' never meant that the voevoda livedon thin air or on his or credit alone. he was 'fed' by the popula-tion, on traditional habits of kormlenie. it was officially abrogatedse veral time S in the late sixteenth and the seventeenth of neces-

this habit lived on.!' As as the or other officialswere as 'merciful', could on this voluntary, generalized

of favours .52 Thus, arrived Cossacks at Tara gave theirvoevoda 'from all the sotnia ten of salt from their salt allowances'v-the bloody war of conquest the Buryats prikazchik Pokhabov receivedBuryat slaves on a basis from his Cossacks for his manifold'successful' His fall occurred after the Buryatsfled to join the on the of the iasak to obtainexemption from the iasak the voevoda bribes were common in such asituation everyone in the district could be satisfied. As as the voevoda didnot try to take more than the Cossacks conceded, they could make a profit from

up some of the better furs not as tribute to the tsar.55 The ratiobehind these forms of was archaic: a voevoda who

by the whole community as to individual bribesat favours from the group was obliged to them, by custom, orby the of the inalienable Still, there was the of thechancellery, which paid for their livelihood and might reduce the salary; the lim­its were defined by the inevitable fluctuations in annual yields the chancellerycould hardly assess from the distance.

Even voevodas deposed by their Cossacks had seen better times when the lat­ter had voluntarily offered When Aleksei Bashkovskii arrived inKrasnoiarsk district, he was offered a sable worth 20 altyn by his later foe AlekseiIarlykov; he received 63 sables while travelling to Krasnoiarsk. Intown, he met with the local Bukharian and Russian merchants and trap­pers offering another 175 sables. On arrival in the same Krasnoiarsk, SemenDurnovo was offered a horse worth ten roubles, before he fell out with the popu­lation for supporting his the Bashkovskiis.'? Similar conditionsensued on holidays and name-days of the tsar's family, or when voevodas wereinvited for dinner in the homesteads of clerks, piatidesiatniks or rank-and-fileCossacks; often, the voevoda and his wife were with furs during din-ner. These were not the exalted voevodas often in literature; theyreturned the favours, especially to their own partisans once the Personenverband

Kormlenie and rsrt rrrr v. "J ,.".~"~~ and administration 129

had split. The rebels therefore called the voevoda's 'convivial scandal­m()l1§~enll1g informers and brawlers (prikormlennye ushniki i gorlany)', r'",t,~rrlT1<r

to the methods used to interfere with the Personenverband's andits with the Conviviality served as a reliable means tosmooth relations as well as to influence the Personenverband at Italso worked the other way round: Dvorianin Fedor Tutolmin, who was appointedby Tobol'sk voevodas to the rebellion the two Bashkovskiis inKrasnoiarsk, on 18 1696 arrived in where Bashkovskii didnot agree to hand over the symbols of office and refused to account for his term.Dismayed, Tutolmin called to starve out the while he lived in the ham-lets distilled alcohol and banquets for theelected sud'ias. In he received official orders to AlekseiBas hkovskii's tenure. the he observed local cus-toms, while Krasnoiarians offered him pre-errrouve

Despite attempts by historians to distinguish between offers andcorruption, boundaries were blurred. A voevoda who had fallen into withthe local Personenverband could find it difficult to prove whether he received

on terms of or simply forced to pay tribute. In1695, Krasnoiarsk Cossacks tried to comer Aleksei they"rnw""rr,prl the Semen Nadein that he write aclaiming Bashkovskii the furs Moscow had sent as a reward for theirvictory over the nomadic Tubinians, Yet Nadein the text that

had voluntarily offered the furs in honour of the voevoda, as , andBashkovskii returned this favour by 'drinks, while some took money' .40

In I Cossacks the voevoda of Tiurnen', on offleecing, after only a few months in office. This was even more suspicious as theirpetition ianored one of his actions which incensed them most: had triedto stamp out illegal distillation, a backbone of the town's economy."

However, there are many of the use of outright and blackmailon the part of voevodas the favourite means was a short, yetextendable stay in the town's were common as well,an evil which was not restricted to Siberia.s? Until he was relieved or deposed, thevoevoda enjoyed the of an unrestricted despot. However, it was notadvisable to make use of these powers too extensively. After the relief of thevoevoda of 1. Nikolev, in 1707 he was not the first voevoda in thistown his family narne-' the Gordei sent a petition to theSiberian chancellery. The conflict with the voevoda unfolded during a trial overthe quarrels between Gordei and A. Plotnikov. Gordei was dissatisfied with thecourt that 'made him suffer from for a time' and accused thevoevoda,Nikolev ranted: 'Who dares to orders to me? No one even ifyou carry on litigation for five .44 In a typical case of a word',he continued:

Who orders to me? I am myself tsar in the same way as in Moscow tsarPetr Alekseevich: I do whatever I want. Nobody orders to me ... even

130 Kormlenie and irttuence and administration

in Moscow I would be tsar ... in Moscowsions! Nobody will my decisions!'

do not agree with my deci-

This amounted to verbal abuse of the tsar and the of to thetsar's throne. His haunted Nikolev: Although Gordei wasimprisoned clad in fetters and 'starved twelve weeks', as he thelerns for Nikolev started when he was relieved. He freed Gordei and sent him tothe steam bath where his the town and a syn boiarskii attendedhim. Obviously Nikolev the of the sincenobody else voiced Gordei's committee inthe bathhouse him not to sue the voevoda and offered 500 roubles. Gordeiuncompromisingly adhered to due process, motivated by his duty todenounce a word. Even when Nikolev put him in he stilldeclined. In his petition, the main incrimination from the wordwas for Gordei's own and It couldprove hard for a voevoda to evade in Siberian service. Siberianvoevodas' kin in Moscow warned them to a low and reminded themof cases in which the tsar had punished voevodas when their made alle-

them. Although instructions restricted their in tradi-tional, sacral terms, these constraints could be as asas in Nikolev's case, was nevertheless always close at hand thePersonenverband's support could temporarily make a man feel and behave like a

Cultural blindness or reasonable flexibility?

While social hierarchy in the administration provided a fairlynot was decided by its consrraints.s? a strict social hier-

as in the law was irreconcilable with modem administrative law.In 1649, members of the duma ranks the committee formulating the Ulozheniewas chosen from among them were immunity from the pro-visions of the administrative misdemeanour.w Brown hasnoted that by our lights there is a contradiction: while members of thegoverning apparatus filled their purses very well through tacit extortion, at thesame time essential in national withreasonable competency.

Nevertheless, we should not fall into the trap of a cultural blind-ness towards condoning bribery and The difficulty of reconcilingthe of bribes with the service ethos of the Muscovite civil administra­tion is due to the failure to grasp that a noble might have to pay a bribe to acquirea position, but his successful retention of that position, and opportunities forprofit, depended upon his loyal performance of service. At the same time, hecould accept bribes in the form that society condoned, or else by outright robbery,if local power relations were favourable. Where no local self-administrationexisted, only force remained to acquire local surpluses.v

Kormlenie and rsrt rrrr v. "J ,.".~"~~ and administration 131

JJ"'~}'l"'" the ambivalent of the of induce-ments, officials were sued for bribery in many In fact, as therebellions show, Muscovites had the same with these contradictions aswe but had to assess them in a very different context and environment.

the very that had as as June 1648 successfully demandedthe heads of several of Muscovy's most influential its ownelected with the 1649 which, as men-

contained stipulations partially the duma ranks fromthe afflictions of administrative law.52 Notably, the 1649 stands out forits understandable among collections of law, and itwas the last and compilation of law, as to the mono-

law in the There is no doubt that thesesudden were and most likely, those who made them alsoTII'"fCl'ivl'rt them as In an situation, Muscovites could notbe to act in an uncontradictory way.

We may not succeed in Muscovite consciousness withoutcontextualizing these of view. It is necessary toadjust the framework of interpretation so that we are able to account for a quitedifferent environment. In this it is essential to differentiate not justbetween social groups, but also their different needs and which were not

unified throughout a social group, or in time and space. In otherwords, a Cossack sent to Moscow, Eniseisk or Tobol'sk to the interestsof his comrades was on one level interested in their cause. On anotherlevel, he could find it difficult to resist interests and opportunities thatoffered themselves in the different of Moscow, or, for that matter, on theroad between his home town and the capital. Communities in the Russian northattempted to institutionalize this fundamental clash of interest in one and thesame person by prohibiting all private on journeys undertaken onbehalf of the community and financed by it, a condition to which the petitionershad to swear an oath; moreover, they constantly letters with their com­munities.f At the same Siberian Cossack groups already found it hard, ifnot impossible, to formulate such rules. After all, men absent for a yearor two simply could not be asked to abstain from all private business, particularlywhen the of the road and the rivers and inflicted by nature andwidespread brigandage were taken into account. werelikely to carry the fur or bring back the salary. Thus, standingup for the of their comrades, and enduring all the risks of the road includ-

that of arrested in Moscow or by one of the fellow voevodas of theirinfluential foe back at home, Cossacks found themselves elevated to a position.It bestowed on them the most valuable reward available in Muscovy closeto the tsar ('they saw the bright in an audience) and gave themtemporal sway over substantial material means." In this they suddenlyresembled the much hated chancellery staff that allegedly interfered with thetsar's ways of justice and consequently often emulated the chancellery staff.According to a decree by secretary Vasilii Altemira at the Siberian

132 Kormlenie and irttuence and administration

chancellery on 16 March I often mis used their power and pu tsome of the money aside for their own benefit, while claiming they were forcedto bribe the staff the staff deniedany such had only money 'for their nourish-

according to the Cossacks' election' which the messengers carried. Thedecree demanded an to be held, and ordered the voevoda to ask theCossacks whether deemed two den per rouble worth of anable fee 'to further about this issue'. Accordingvoevoda Nikolev, the Cossacks to the evidence concerningthe role of in this is the only known decree defining fees dur-

Peter's moreover, it was as dialogicallaw, not a one-sided command.

Time and distance were particularly prone towas Fedor Pushchin experienced irritatingwhich dominated to the time and space he when hereturned from Moscow. With the of he headed, Pushchinreturned only on 6 April, over one and a half months after the chancellery'sdecrees arrived in Tomsk. His pace was slow, and the delegation was in an opti­mistic mood. On their way the river Ob' called on the Ostiaks to cometo Tomsk since carried the decree of favour. Even inCossacks were first inclined to believe that essential news was arri virrc

were further persuaded by the stories the 'moskovshchiny'; as themembers of the were tellingly called in had to The tsarhad received them, and they carried the decrees that instituted proceedings

the first voevoda had even received a guarantee thatShcherbatyi was to be put before court, and could cite the tsar's promise that hisvisitors from the faraway Siberian frontier' were not to fall into dis-grace for their measures the voevoda.ts

In they met with a completely different assessment of thedecrees they carried. Already on 30 July 1648 the new clerk Kliucharev, who hadtaken the side of voevoda had arrived in Tomsk, doubts as towhether it could be that their rebellion would be as InFebruary, the of which Pushchin's delegation carried, had reachedTomsk, The tsar had ordered an investigation of Shcherbatyi's misdemeanours,but at the same time commanded the Cossacks to obey him until the new voevo­das arrived. Another problem was that the Tornskans had already questioned theauthenticity of the very decree that Pushchin brought. Yet for Pushchin and hiscomrades, at least until they met with the pessimistic mood in Tornsk, the realityof their with the tsar was far stronger than written in a decreethey may not even have read en route. carried the tsar's salary paid out inadvance, an extra allowance in cloth to pay for the journey, and they had evenbeen able to loot boyars' courts in co-operation with like-minded Moscow rebels,actions tsar Aleksei avoided condemning. In September, however, after a pauseof several months, the tsar had appointed Trubetskoi, a member of the clientele ofhis former tutor, BN. Morozov, to head the Siberian chancellery Returned

Kormlenie and rsrt rrrr v. "J ,.".~"~~ and administration 133

to the he had held before the Moscow though notto deny the Tomsk rebels' demands, included this awkward stipulation in

the decree .liO Sorne of the members in Tomsk reiterated the claim thatthe decree had been before it was written down. Pushchin, no

seemed so convinced. When cornered publicly by syn boiarskii IuriiTupal'skii at the he refrained from the question as to whetherthe decree was

In the encountered a very harsh climate for any attempt to"n'''lr"i~p their positively. If the decrees they carried were authentic, thismeant that were unable to fulfil a task which seemed straighrforwardfrom a Tomsk If, on the other hand, the decrees were it meantthat the had obviously only made deals in the rebellious capitaland obtained 'stolen . In of the had to listen to

were not worth the trust of the Personenverband.Others to make it better there were for another

Prince the verbal clashes one of these on11 April, the words of In Bunakov's gomitsa, more than30 met Ilia's 'advisors', the and Fedor Pushchin and theCossack M. Kurkin, who him to Moscow. Bunakovchided Kurkin: 'Why did you fail to the order of execution for Oska[Shcherbatyi]?' Liapa, one of the advisors, shouted: 'Now [we], Ostashka Liapaand comrades, travel to Moscow and will not go to the courts. But FedkaPushchin and Mishka Kurkin their time at the courts, and that iswhy did not obtain the order to Oska'.

Bunakov scolded the 'Why did you visit the boyars' courts atMoscow and our common business you travelled to Moscow tobehave like bandits and traitorsl'v' There was much ambiguity and even doubtwhether they had actually some favours or not. Thus, howeverinadvertently, faced similar accusations to those they themselves hadcomplained about in Moscow.

Different environments shaped appraisals differently, and since Muscovites,and especially Siberian lived in so extremely different environments,this had a tremendous impact on their views. Specifically, to environ-ments fostered and these ultimately translated into changingguiding ideas, which were not stable among the members of onegroup, or in an individual, in time and In the encounter of Pushchin andKurkin, who returned empty-handed to Tomsk, with their partisans, differences intime, space, opportunity and information even made an action ofhated boyars look dangerously similar to illicit bribe-taking.

The notion that accountability had to be enforced, so obvious in town rebel­lions, can be treated as one of the principles which combined in a guiding idea. Itis quite explicit as a demand in the many collective petitions of the 1620s-l640s,as well as in the rebellions of the 1640s. li3 Most of the tsar and his boyars' activ­ities to hold officials accountable were directed towards those ranking below

134 Kormlenie and irttuence and administration

them. The most effective measures, such as the stipulations of the 1/I,J7hpnTP.

were directed corruption and the arbitrary decisions of relatively lowlystate secretariesand what does seem is that even

had an if limited, in the accountability of otherthe encounter between I.I. Saltykov and M.F. Streshnev at Verkhourr'e

two members of clans on the one hand for the toresources for and, on the other hand, for accountability.While for thetwo the interest was defined by and the affairs oftheir kin, one of the means that could prove decisive was to enhance accountabil­ity. In such a way, Saltykov could enlist the support of the local Cossacks as wellas the of the tsar, who was interested in increased accountability and con-comitant revenues to further political which wereparamount for any state .fiS

In fact, the tsar's viewpoint is a from which to understand why dif-ferent ideas could not be yet were ultimately as partof the same institutional mechanism. While the tsars benefited from accountabil-ity, taxation more the means to taxation in a fullyaccountable manner simply did not exist. The problems of taxes in cli-matically and economically adverse and vast environments meant that the centrecould not live off the meagre revenues from one but had to diversify tomeet its targets. from this an even more vexatious issue arises: why didthe rebellious Muscovites of the seventeenth century not do away with such aVOl:aClOUS, seemingly inadequate centre? While the second idea exte­rior competition for power seems at first only applicable to the tsar orregent and his or her immediate entourage, we have to take into account a com­mon threat, which was by Muscovites throughout the century andmarked a difference to the common case. It about an equallypressing need as the immediate material situarion and the quest for accountabil­ity of the system. Seventeenth century Muscovites lived, albeit tow ar-v i'n o- UIt;15j;:;;:;;~, with the of capture, to be sold on southern slave mar-kets.M After Africans south of the Eastern Slavs were the secondpool of potential victims of Any state or dominion erected on the EastEuropean and Northern Asian, plains, perhaps for nomad confederations,could not but address this threat and misery; otherwise its subjects were simplycarried The was in part the result of the institutionalization ofthis need. It stipulated annual levies for the of atthe rate of 0.2 roubles from peasant or posad homesteads, service landholdingsand hereditary estates. such as Cossacks, musketeers,artilleryrnen, gunners, and who were most Susceptib1e to cap-tivity, were taxed at half the rate. These moneys were to be collected annually inthe Affairs chancellery based on new census books:

So that no one will be omitted from that cash levy because such ransomingis a common act of mercy. The pious tsar and all Orthodox Christians willreceive great recompense from God, as the righteous Enoch said: 'Do not

Kormlenie and rsrt rrrr v. "J ,.".~"~~ and administration 135

spare and silver on your '-', "'cU~.,, but redeem him, and you will receivea hundred-fold from God' .ij9

In the to ransom/to redeem are two aspectsof the same word, commonly used in a slightly different context for 'the Lord,your redeemer', among in the Books of Enoch. This citation, isnot found in the Russian Orthodox Bible ;70 it is therefore all the more significantfor the put on the tsar's for The stipu-lated rates for ransom, in a to rank and the circumstancesof 71 After the Time of many publications supported and prop-

this idea of the tsar as the pious of the and, con-O:><:;'IU<:;uu.y, the redeemer of 73

The dire need from the defencelessness of the in thelan.guage of Russian Orthodoxy, also made the system indispensable.Without it, there could be no successful extraction of the means to accommodatethe not to of the attempt to constructdefences on the open southern frontier under Boris Godunovand relaunched in the I 630s. It was in particular the defence of the southern fron­tier that Muscovite officials adequately." If military tasks wereaccomplished ineffectually, the military and administrative establishment becamesusceptible to forceful restructunng,">

To underpin the of pious concern for the Orthodox flock, the tsars alsopaid their on and punished among thelocal popularion." Such pious concern was advisable valuable troops.In the seventeenth century, Muscovy's were still oriented at sub-sistence rather than at the market: in critical moments Moscow could not divertsupplies on the markets in sufficient amounts. It thus faced the choice either toleave its valuable troops at the mercy of the forces of inadequate markets and tothe vicissitudes of while on or, to a unacceptable inWestern encourage and sustain efforts at developing an in-kind supplysystem in the south, where were scarce."

This did not mean that supply was always sufficient. Court onencroachments and atrocities of troops on their way to Siberia often hint that the

felt they were themselves victimized and cheated, and merely took theirdue in the areas which profited most from the fur trade. The picture is ambigu­ous, with voevodas additional dues from inhabitants of the theypassed through, while the chancellery took measures to control the material ben-efit of the voevodas when they left Moscow, their were measured,documented, and to a set table of allowed to curb smuggling.They were also controlled at the Siberian border, at Verkhotur'e. Cossacks andmusketeers were and sometimes executed, although usually only in casesnot covered by the Personenverband. The older historiography believed it wasevidence of the futility of complaints that government did not always pay recom­pense to victims." On the other hand, the seizure of voevodas' on thepart of the tsar encouraged those eager to show their trustworthiness, besides

136 Kormlenie and irttuence and administration

filling the treasure for such purposes as the of slaves. In the samevein, demanding actual recompense of the victims in every case, although thiswas what the demanded, actually meant a serious over-assess-ment of modem administrative There was no means of veri-

the potentially inflated claims of or town as even elaboratelists of individual claims were usually not checked evidence .81 In this

their of the and merciful' tsar was firmly rooted in thecare the tsar's were ordered to and the supervrsms chancelleries

Percenuvelv, NI iemojewski inclu ded his of the army in 1606 in aconsideration of the income and of the tsar's court. In order to provethe character of the tsar's Fletcher concentrated on the tremen-dous amount of income from all and the many means available to thetsar to incre ase them. pu t the inc orne at150,000-200,000 i.e. about ten times lower than Fletcher and, unlikehim, considered paid salaries made for themost important of the service relationship as far as Siberian Cossacks wereconcerned, and for the greatest of in town, as mentioned.Serv ice remuneration constitu ted a part of expenses.83 The relia-bility of limited as were, was the stock-in-trade of the relation-

between the tsar and his military and Where this wasnot the case and, modem conditions, it was quite frequently sothose at the of the deal felt entitled to rebel84 or to pay-ments in a grey zone.

It is instructive to consider the conte xt in which these institutions developed.After the decline of the Mongol and its successors, the Muscovite

formerly entrusted with the Golden Horde's tax, were increas-capaoie of these means partly for their own ends. used

them to attract uprooted Tatar warriors in numbers, which were alsoremunerated with to what is often as mainly ameasure of lofty nobles of their identity and power inthe context of warfare the obligation to serve the tsar personally inMoscow was an expedient way to pacify nomad nobles who otherwise oftenengaged in raiding and in the slave trade. Prohibiting arbitrary requisitions in thiscontext was a means of for the tsar, since it set Muscovy apart from theunreliable warriors for the meagre agricultural surplus.Moscow could fall back on this nomadic factor to establish authority. Yet all thetsar demanded was prompt payment of taxes something learned from theMongols. linking the levying of the tax to Christian notions movedMuscovy closer to concern for the population's lot servedMoscow well even in the more central where a semi-nomadic life-stylereappeared in the of banditry, which was often committed in alliance withlocal strongmen; the guba elders were set up to fight bandits taking advantage ofdistrict borders to avoid prosecurion.t? Therefore centralization and bureau­cratization, though by no means a remedy to exploitation in served com­moners in a basic, existential way.

Kormlenie and rsrt rrrr v. "J ,.".~"~~ and administration 137

the wrath about the opportunistic behaviour of chan-staff, among the gentry who lost their peasants during raids,

there was at least an equal interest in officials in whatever way seemedfeasible. In could not simply be as even if attimes such a notion was among Russians. Others wouldtake their , and rather than about the slavish nature of theRussians, this was as an effort to overcome threats likebanditry or tax-evas1on,0 0

Since Muscovy was cash-starved, and could only fortify the frontier byconstant of resources, the centre hardly commanded the means tocompensate administrative In a similar vein as the Cossacks who were

albeit in a different sense than the nobles and allowed to participatein trade at a reduced tax rate, members of the duma ranks weretion from many strictures of administrative law. became usufructuaries oftheir own service sure if not that always workedC!f'f'nrrlir,a to the rule, but that actually went where were ordered, and atleast a job. There is little evidence available to us that mostchancelleries were inadequately on a constant basis.s? Similarly,tions of power in a frontier such as the participated in theusus and were thus from the stipulations of certaindecree s. In 1685-6 two Irkutsk Cossacks were sent to collect the iasak and thetithe. A decree of the tsar dated 1681-2 stipulated that such were notensnne to receive their In the way of an the documentnoted, the two Cossacks nevertheless received their salary since they 'are sentinvoluntarily to the decree as to serve' .90 It didnot take Perrine rationalization from above to make Muse ovy's liudiaware of the potential for calculated from administrative law. As thenext chapter shows, ordinary Cossacks detested such behaviour. At times, theyrebelled it; at other they relied on the very same personsto overcome and administrative misdemeanours. This exemplifies atypical problem in Siberia and Russia as a whole: the gapbetween potential revenues and the risks and hardships of collecting them acrossvast distances in a very thinly populated country could only be overcome if agreat part of revenues was systematically allocated to a tiny, motivated minority.'Involuntarily', they went to serve and become wealthy.

Thus, in the guiding idea the supply of officials, or a widearray of needs overlapped. Consequently, a voevoda could be a pardoneven if the local population opposed him, while the rebels were still treated withsome consideration. As already mentioned, a voevoda had different options hecould rely on or become a popular leader of the Personenverband. Yetmost of the voevodas in Tobol'sk and Verkhourr'e, and to an alreadylesser extent in the more important regional centres such as Tornsk and Eniseisk

were of modest social background, pomeshchiks or members of impoverishedlines of great noble families." They had an incentive to serve faithfully, seekingto be rewarded with a land and salary allowance by the tsar. Osip

138 Kormlenie and irttuence and administration

Shcherbatyi was one of these and he was As his 1654tion describes vividly, he never to receive what was due to him. Oldenmities between his family and a clerk blocked rewards and pay-ments, and fire and played their in him. While heacuveiv and the profit of the treasury, he also fur-thered his welfare. Tornsk Cossacks were by hisnominally among others the localKalmyk market and Cossack and other labour. adhered to theguiding idea of accountability and in the frontier area, coupled with a

deal of self-interest in terms of the tsar's profit and Aidea is never since it expresses partly needs in a field of

conflicting and mutually which only at ain a location and social For their and

imprisoned partisans stressed their merits and the profit made for the tsar,>IN'(n','lil1O'lv interpreting the affair. the latter of his tenure,however, he was unable to follow his success for the Tomskrebels. From the point of both were valid,and Shcherbatyi, having received a meagre 17 roubles and 450 quarters of landallowance for over 20 years, was awarded an additional 38 roubles and 250 quar-ters.93 While, in no one if the and poor among thetsar's servitors filled their there was a limit to such assertiveness. Thislimit depended on the relative power of the involved and was contestedby all available means.

Conclusion

Restraining the arbitrariness of them and thediverse military from captivity, and curbing banditrywere discernible basic needs throughout the zone of irnerpenetrationand agriculture. Concomitant principles wereas well as red the of and and the

of the pious tsar the redeemer. None of these principles, mutually exclu­sive in part, though also overlapping, could finally win the upper hand, and theynever appeared in an undiluted form. Yet, in a of time, space andsocial entity the to the processes of institutionalization, whichwas common to all of Muscovy, yielded temporarily obligatory results. Guidingideas formed from partly contradictory principles cannot be attributed solely toone social group in fact they often served to facilitate communication betweenmembers of a clientele.

5 Local and central power in theBaikal region 1689-1720

The 1696-8 Transbaikalian rebellion has been virtually except forKu driavtse v's study to describe it as a war.' Aleksandrov andPokrovskii's book published in 1991 has provided a more detailed account of thisrebellion, n,rn'!r'cnJlinO' the of the western Transbaikalian Cossacks as one

organized and purposeful in modern atnothing less than the final expulsion of the voevodas from Siberia.While elicited by a situation common to it intended to establish theself-administration of the voisko?

This rebellion was indeed one of the most in Russiathe seventeenth century; although its termination cannot be nailed down, therebels wielded considerable power at least until an official waslaunched after two years and three months. its length, it is doubtfulwhether the aim of self-administration was as as Aleksandrov andPokrovskii suggest, especially with to claims that, at the end of the cen­tury, the rebels intended to drive the voevodas out of Siberia. On the threshold ofthe Petrine and already confronted with a new age evolving at the cen­tre, though yet more tentatively throughout the the rebels still drew heav-ily on the habits and of thought of the seventeenth century frontier. Thisrebellion is worth in detail because of the Cossacks' contradictoryreactions to these developments and their attempts to redefine the rules of thegame. A detailed investigation of its various stages and ensures that theinstitutions so far described in isolation are explored in their habitual environ­ment. For it is in interaction that institutions offer most into the changesin Siberian administration and social relations at the turn of the seventeenth andeighteenth centuries.

Soviet as well as Western historians have that conflict in the 1690saround Lake Baikal and not only there was bound to evolve the riftbetween the impoverished Cossacks and the Cossack elite.3 Ord inary Cossacksare depicted as a undifferentiated and unruly mass claiming theirThe united Transbaikalian Cossack with the exception of somegible, but purportedly universally hated prikazchiks, marched to Irkutsk, todemand payment of their salaries and to oust the voevoda, In Irkutsk, theirdemands were met with suspicion, yet this attitude is said not to be representative

140 Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720

of the opinion of the Thus around Lake Baikal, there was aunited front the voevoda, with some minor tac-tical traceable to the split between poor Cossacks and their morewealthy comrades and immediate The affluent Irkutsk upper crust,enriching themselves illegally at the expense of ordinary unequivo-cally this This view of the events in turn is related to the

tendency of Soviet on Siberia to overestimate social cleav-ages and to underestimate the of between the centre andthe and of local initiative as well as the effects of social dislocation inan frontier area. Although it cannot be denied that some of the moreestablished Cossacks and deti boiarskie suffered the one shouldbe cautious about based on their experiences.

Furthermore, the is advanced that these social 'nr'()hlprr,~

the Cossacks ofUdinsk and to a necessary struggleof their in this case for Cossack Ill-defined con-

uncritically transferred from Western discourses such as this cloud our viewof Siberian conditions at the turn of the seventeenth and centuriesrather than them to comparative investigation.s

The rebellion in the Transbaikalian fortresses and towns Udinsk,Il'insk and which to and started witha treaty by the Cossacks of the towns and fortresses on the in

1696. They a caravan with Irku tsk voevod a Afonasii Savelov'sbound for China at Posol'skii Mys'. the treaty, which stipulated

joint obligations and peaceful relations between the therewas conflict between Udinsk and Cossacks about the status of thesmall fortress of Ilinsk. While most Ilinsk Cossacks sympathized with the

Turchaninov, Udinsk Cossacks him forcibly withsyn boiarskii Ivan Novikov, Cossacks the andappointed syn boiarskii Kazan'. Savelov, who already feared for histion, quickly confirmed him. Yet after this agreement, conflict betweenSelenginsk and Udinsk on the of Anton Savelov,voevoda of Nerchinsk, which were stored in Il'rnsk. Irkutsk voevoda AfonasiiSavelov also attempted to appease the Udinsk Cossacks by equipmentfor distilling alcohol in the villages surrounding Il'rnsk. He thus let down his for­mer crony Turchaninov, who was the distillers and offUdinsk supplies. this endeavour came to nothing, as the distillerswere warned in advance and the Udinsk Cossacks were more interested in con­trolling the distillers themselves.

Meanwhile, the Personenverbdnde of Udinsk and pursued theircommon aims, as they tried to explain to the tsar in a common petition interceptedby Irkutsk Cossacks. When the voevoda the demand for a substantialadvance on their salary, 2CX) Cossacks embarked with the aim of forcinghim to payout the full credit. They hoped that the Cossacks of Irkutsk, across LakeBaikal, would join them in pursuit of what they conceived as a affair.Despite the considerable of the Irkutsk Cossacks about the voevoda,

Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720 141

~11,."l~",·tprl him the claims considered baseless. The ofIrkutsk thus came to The angry Cossacks plundered several smallsettlements by deti boiarskie. settled with the abbot ofthe monastery of the Ascension. On their way back from Irkutsk in late summerI and after a second futile the Udinsk led by MoiseiBorisov. beat and robbed a Cossack trader from Irkutsk. This event marked the

point in the and the last common of andUdinsk Cossacks. tension soon led to violence when Udinsk Cossacksrobbed and injured Kazan' and his family.

After from Borisov Andrei Beiton as Inthis of elected he ruled the town and, with effec-tiveness, the area, for another year. In 1697 he was accusedof a affair, relieved by yet another elected Ivan Novikov,and found guilty of peculation.

In April 1697, Irkutsk Cossacks had overthrown voevoda Savelov who hadattempted to seize the opportunity for a second in office when the reliev-

voevoda had died on his way from Moscow. The town was ruledby the elected sud'ia and Irkutsk .lyn boiarskii Ivan Perfil'ev. After receivingthe news of Borisov's Perfil'ev ordered an in June1698 before of the Siberian's decree, whieh als0

demanded an but called for restraint. Perfil'ev had sometant witnesses on the before voevoda Nikolev relieved himin October.

The enquiry acquitted the rebels for several so-called whowere found guilty of embezzlement. Meanwhile, the rebel Personenverbdndecontinued to wield considerable influence. In 170I, Nikolev succeeded in catch-

a number of Borisov's who had been accused by their neighbours,Cossacks at Il'msk, At about the same time, Andrei Beiton, the officially assignedprikazchi): of Udinsk after Novikov, who nevertheless supported the former rebelPersnnenverhand. was accused of bias by an Irkutsk merchant and a localCossack. While Afonasii Savelov suffered from harassment the mvesuga-tion and financial losses by the resolution of the trial, most of the rebelswere never punished.

Two faces of power around Lake Baikal

The lower was a rough and strategically important frontier closeto the major trade route from Moscow to the way viaNerchinsk and the rivers of northern Manchuria, rather than the shorter routethrough the valley and the Mongol which was considered toodangerous. This thoroughfare more or less by-passed the frontier fortresses in theI 690s, but the problem with the Manchurian route via Nerchinsk, the bustlingemporium for the caravan trade with China, was that Nerchinsk Cossacks

the privilege of accompanying caravans abroad thus theCossacks lost profits."This route was changed in 1703.8

142 Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720

Seven great official caravans left from Nerchinsk for between 1689and 1697, but none in 1690or 1694.The staff of a caravan as many as four hun-dred with hundreds of carts and animals, and cattle for food leftNerchinsk over several It included of the wealthy Moscowmerchantarninor and a Cossack convoy. Most of the staff washired in Moscow, where the merchants received their for travel toChina. The staff was nevertheless fluid in Merchants often hiredadditional local workers to assist in and other activi-

and often left some at Nerchinsk or on the riverinside to be up on the return While at wageswere those who made it all the way to found it profitable, becausea certain amount of trade was in particular toCossacks of the convoy, and were .9

Caravans carried Siberian furs, but increasingly,depIeted stoeks in traders als0 furs in J::. uropearrsmall amounts of Russian and Western manufactured backtea, Nankeen and, most valuable, Chinese silk and garments.w While IrkutskCossacks could not participate to the same in this trade, they were still ina favourable to profit from caravan trade. sold agricultural productsto the caravans, which grew in the fertile valleys around Irkutsk,which were safe from nomad intrusions.I I Grain was also and sold atNerchinsk, where attempts to introduce agriculture had met with less success.Since the cession of Dauria to China the mythical lost ofthe Siberian Cossacks on the Amur in the 1689 of Nerchinsk, the townof Irkutsk had been elevated to an economically favourable position.

Irkutsk and Nerchinsk thus profited from the peace treaty of Nerchinsk con­cluded by Golovin with the new Manchu dynasty. Unfettered Russianexpansion in the southeast during the period of internal war in China was curbedby this of the military valour and historic of the Chinese

, but trade between the two could develop on a heretoforeunknown Ievel, an outcome Moscow Caravan trade in the 1690s to1720s differed substantially from the small-scale frontier trade of the I680s,which had continued despite serious warfare on the Amur and the rem-iniscent of the informal small-scale Cossack trade the Terek in theNorth Caucasus.!' At Irkutsk, as in the other towns of Siberia such asTobol'sk or at the end of the seventeenth century, houses in most caseswere two-storeyed or contained a basement dwellingpartially above ground level(podklets," Throughout the eighteenth century, on a frontier much closer toMoscow, in the North Caucasus, small-scale frontier trade continued to prevail.In the main town of Kizliar, a two-storeyed-house remained an exception,reserved to the first ataman of the Terek-Kizliar host, the Kabardian nobleEl'rnurza-Bekovich Cherkasskii, his importance." Irkutsk started todevelop already in the late 1680s, and was rebuilt in 1693 with three of stoutfortifications; the outer fortified settlement for artisans, and other civil­ians, In 1699 the town harboured I ,(](JO inhabitants.Il)

Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720 143

Clashes between the Transbaikal towns and prosperous Irkutskwere but were never restricted to mere conflicts between mem-bers of two classes or strata, however defined. In 1685, rank-and-file Cossacks 'with comrades' complained about the of Kaban'sk andIl'insk to the voevoda at Irkutsk, had not received any help when

were unawares by cold weather on their trip back to Irkutsk.had sailed four doshchaniks with official to Udinsk in the

summer of 1684, and set out to return in the autumn. When got stuck in sud-den ice on the lower reaches of the four they went withtheir sails and anchor to ask Emelian Panikadilshchik and IvanNovikov in Il'insk and Kaban'sk for a butreceived none. This was hardly a if the statement of the Cossacksfrom Irkutsk can be trusted, since were not even decent in thehomesteads of the and the hamlet, and had to live in outlying winter cab­ins and bath huts. Further harassment was ahead, as 'unknown thieves' stoleCossack Timofei Serebrianikov's linen, from one of the Asusual, the Cossacks did not hesitate to make use of their to conduct minorcustoms-exempt trade. Yet this could not them from local envy whenPanikadilshchikov off their demands to the theft.Meanwhile, incurred even greater expenses, for had to hire a withtheir own money to cross Lake Baikal when the weather turned more amiable.Back in Irkutsk, they demanded an investigation to be conducted about thebehaviour of the 17

As no on any subsequent investigation has survived, this petition maycontain twisted facts or but what remains of this story isthe brisk enmity of some rank-and-file Irkutsk without any record ofunusual wealth, sent to deliver supplies to Transbaikal towns, for two nrilrnvr-hil:«

The two continued to be leaders in their own Panikadilshchikovwas a humble who was to be one of the focal of the campaign

Irkutsk and voevoda Savelov in 1 he was among the so-called radi-cals the rebellion. He was also one of the first Cossacks at In1672, when he was first mentioned, another act of bitter competition betweenfortresses was recorded. At his instigation, instead of find-

new iasak payers, 'persuaded' Buryats to deliver iasak at and notat the more northerly, defenceless Cossacks were not allowed tolive there year-round, to the introduction of agriculture in its rich huntinggrounds. IS In complete contrast to the conventional of the rebels as poorrecent recruits, he was then already the owner of a kabala worth 50 roubles, whilehis business required him to repay his own debts.'? Already in 1683, he was aprikazchik; who usually had to bribe the voevoda for an he appearsan unlikely candidate for the leadership of impoverished radicals. As will be dis­cussed below, the other enemy of the suppliers from Irkutsk, the syn boiarskiiIvan Novikov, was twice elected prikazchik by the rebels. Once in Il'insk as can­didate of the 'radicals', as Aleksandrov calls them on the grounds that they fol­lowed a more extreme tactic, while adhering to the same aim of 'democracy', and

144 Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720

for the second time at Udinsk in 1697, where he was aamong the upper stratum of Cossacks supposedly dismantling the rebellion,

Novikov's case is a of the political structures of the BaikalHe was on voevoda Savelov's payroll, excess in I

which he had to pay back after Savelov was relieved." In I while rebellionwas in he was in a smallfortress not far from the mouth of the In Ition of with administrative misdemeanours him, by a KabanskCossackvhe stated that he was made in 1695 with the help of ,-"!l5V!"

Turchaninov, the of Il'insk who, in turn was, from thethe most of the rebels' wrath.'2'2 As owner of a mill at

Novikov was also one of the wealthier deti boiarskie on the Selenga,Perhaps one of the reasons why he was so successful in Cossack support

the rebellion was his generous offer to their without feesin his mill. After the rebellion had ce ased, he could not, win compensa-tion from Irkutsk or Moscow for the credit he had offered.t! After therebellion, he faced other in part cases which had beendormant during the years of rebellion. At the onset of the rebellion, he becameinvolved in the Turchaninov's encouragement of the

distillation of alcohol, which had been by the voevoda Savelov,Novikov was accused of the same as Turchaninov by the Cossacks IvanChiuzhakin and Ivan both from in their petitionand submitted at Irkutsk in 1696. While a minor was andlTlt'''rr"o-Clt'''r1 the same did not happen to Novikov, as he was among those warnedin it is not clear in this source who tipped them off.'24 As will be shownbelow, sympathies in the voevoda's office allow for the possibility that a partisanof the rebels warned Novikov, Novikov and Panikadilshchikov were not the mainleaders of the revolt in 1696, but they played very important roles. Yet they werehardly part of a radical movement to drive the voevodas out of Siberia and estab­lish a premeditated Cossack 'republic' , a 'Don' not any authority abovethem. acted to the demands of the moment, to mobi­lize support which could be found, at least in times of rebellion, only seeChapter I when subordinating themselves to aims acceptable to thePersnnenverhand. which they embodied even more than their or bysecuring or material advantages.

In the Transbaikal, a number of issues brushed over by earlier accounts of theTransbaikalian rebellion had older tensions between the domi­nance of Irkutsk and the Transbaikal. Situated on opposite banks of the southerntip of Lake Baikal were Udinsk and on the major tributary from thesouthern Mongol and Irkutsk on the only outlet to the north and west; thelatter was much more in a position to profit from supplies towed on the rUll'.aJa

from Eniseisk or, increasingly, grown around Irkutsk itself. Irkutsk was foundedin 1661 as a fort. In 1665, was establishe d by local initiative as amiddle-sized fort, to be as a town (gorod) already in 1683.Irkutsk, however, in 1684 had developed into a centre with its own voevoda,

Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720 145

a full range of administrative buildings, baths, a merchants' hall, cot-tages for the Cossac ks and other inhabitants, a house and a church. In 1686,Irkutsk was elevated to the status of a town and which was situated400 kilometres further to the southeast and very close to the open steppe, wasmade of the Irkutsk There was an inner bailey in Irkutsk and a citadel,fortified like the inner bailey, but a number of buildings.Bev rmd this was a third fortified in contrast to theother two. It contained craft and houses for the com-rnercial, Cossack and artisan In 1697, all of the 269 peas-ants of Irkutsk prisud Iived in the main town or in the and hamlets aroundit. also grew the for Nerchinsk and Iakutsk, Milescu noted Irkutsk'sfavourable location in 1675: ' ... Irkutsk is located on the left bank of theriver on a plain site. The fortress is well-built... and the area is verysuitable for :2~

Selengmsk and the Transbaikal as a whole, were in a doubly disad-vantaged position, in particu lar beeause , after the treaty of Nerchinsk withNerchinsk Cossacks the Chinese trade the state monopolyexploited by Moscow merchants. At the end of the century, Iakutsk on the riverLena in the northeast boasted the bulk of Siberian fur resources.Nerchinsk, which was not subordinate d to the Irku tsk was prosperousenouzn to buy to supply its in 1690 it was of pay-

Cossack salaries without arrears-? The western Transbaikal, as opposed toNerchinsk and Dauria, was just a poor thesoutherly climate, for a time nothing much was grown for somevegetables in in the close vicinity of the fortress. There were anytownspeople in either, a condition even in the first decadesof the century. The reason was Mongol which theSelenginsk area was particularly hard to defend.'28 A special envoy of the MongolTsetsen-Khan stated the difficult position of already a year after itsfoundation, when he arrived at Moscow to mark claims to the site and theEven in the 1690s, was not safe from Mongol raids. The Transbaikalwas dependent on Irkutsk, but had little to offer, as iasak was of marginal

Udinsk winter-hut was erected first in 1666'29 and rem ained a minor outpos tuntil it was re-built on Golovin's orders on a rock above the A strategicpoint the valley half surrounded by mountains, it was withoutany peasants, posad, or iasak people until the very last years of the century. Whilelocal revenue bottomed out at 4 roubles 20 (neokladnye) expen­diture amounted already to more than 30 roubles annually. Six winter-huts, smallfortified wooden structures as the only private buildings, were located outside thewalls since there was no space within. Since the caravans took the route of theri ver Uda in the 1690s, it was a station of marginal importance and little local pro-duce to offer for horses and cattle. When the Nerchinsk treaty wasmost of the Khorinsk iasak-paying Buryats under Nerchinsk administration livedon the Uda, Khilka and which lay close to Udinsk, This inclined

146 Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720

Golovin to most of them to Udinsk and grant the settlement status of aminor administrative centre in 1690. Vasil'ev has claimed that the town ofSelenginsk and forts Kabansk and II' insk were subordinated to the new Udinsk

Minert denies this, that until 1775, Udinsk was officially a satellite,it should be added, of Irkutsk. While neither marshals the more infor-mal and rather unstable hierarchies will be described in this Golovin sub-ordinated the to the Irkutsk Udinsk was therefore an idealcandidate for a Personenverband in isolation and independently, inwhat can be identified as very close to the Cossack fashion.

Selenginsk, on the other hand, had been an contender for trade withMongoua and China. It the of the and drew on theexperiences of the oldest Russian settlement south of Lake Baikal. In contrast toUUll1~.", Selenginsk also held claims to fertile soils immediately south of the lake.The valley has some fertile but even at the end of thetwentieth century the dry climate the southern shore of the Baikal 2,400to 2,700 hours of sunshine annually yields low hence predorninanceof in 1668 syn boiarskii Ivan M. inwestern Siberia, on his journey to that:

[Selenginsk] is the best fortress in since the climate is warm, andpromises rich even Chinese cucumbers grow in the Amarket could be established since China is very close. There are manynomads around who want to establish trade in cattle and... Chinese products, but ... there are few Russians ... Eniseisk syn

boiarskii Ivan the merchant Gavrilo Rornanov and rortv-tnreeSelenginsk Cossacks rode ... to China through Mongolia [in 1675].52

Milescu met them in the same year at but their business had beenunprofitable, to war'. 33 he echoed Perfil'ev 's observationson In I Perfil'ev had been sent with the Bukharan merchantAblin as a messenger to Aleksei Mikhailovich's letter to theChinese emperor, which reflected the new approach Moscow had adopted. ratherthan to establish diplomatic relations, which were hampered by mutualsensitivities, the tsar asked only for trade relations. Perfil'ev, who also played a

role the 1696 rebellion, was received favourably and his missionmet with success. It was no accident that the syn boiarskii, who was anenced merchant and thriving Cossack leader, settled in Irkutsk.>'

Cossack salaries at and elsewhere depended on trade. Already in themid-1680s Chinese luxury wares surrendered to customs in place of the tollaopeared as elements in salary payments. The benefited from conflictbetween Russia and China in 1687-8, at the peak of the war on the Arnur, cus­toms tithes collected from Chinese at and Udinsk totalled 1,361roubles, indicating at least ten times that amount in value was on hand on the localmarkets.s After the peace treaty was owing to continuing insecurity on theMongol Nerchinsk drained this source of income and thrived on it in

Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720 147

1687-8 Nerchinsk customs tolls amounted to just I ,461 roubles, in 1689 1,148roubles, but from 1694 to 1697 they had already risen to roubles, and from1698 to 1702 as as 105,908 roubles. After 1703, when a nomadconfederation the Manchu Chinese was the waytnrougn the was cleared and caravans to the shorterroute the valley and the steppe; consequently toll rev-enue at Nerchinsk to virtually In made upfor a sizable part of this but and the western Transbaikal were leftwithout any additional source of income between 1689 and 1703.

As far as defence and military was the Transbaikal gar-which were an important role conflict with China in

securing supply lines from were further afterthe treaty of Nerchinsk, Yet this endeavour but straightforwardWestern Siberian proud of their service record and accustomed to voic-

their did not comply with their futuremade without their consent. Golovin first attempted to Cossacks sent fromwestern Siberia for eternal service in but since elections hadbeen in their home documenting and that they hadto serve for a defined number of years, too many of them fled. to onecontemporary calculation, out of 740 Cossacks whose was changedto eternal service at 296 men were married and owned a house in

'Siberian towns', while 218 left their behind.'? AlthoughLeont'eva stresses Golovin's use of economic stimuli to induce Cossacks to stayat Udinsk, the actu al polic ies applied were more mixed. At first, the Siberian

for the 'volunteers' 'from various ranks who arrived by theirown initiative, or swapped with musketeers mounted or on foot'.

Golovin this view in a dated 28 January 1691:

r\JlJVlJ.l'. the servitors enlisted at Tobol'sk, Tiurnen",Tomsk, and Naryrn, thosewho voluntarily stay may do so. Many of them will stay, since some have setup houses and rnarried i.. them a small aid from the treasury to buildhouses.v

The chancellery, answering to these pressures, cut the Udinsk c-ar-r-i crvn by half:

Cossacks who were elected from all ranks , .. and who were left in Udinskshall be divided in two halves, .. Leave the first half of 376 men at Udinskfor defence, and release the other half to go to the Siberian towns, whencethey were elected.59

Whereas in central Russia, elections were an institution of collective responsibil­ity townspeople elected customs officers, thereby pledging to pay incurredarrearsw during the expansion into Siberia, they also acquired the function ofbacking Personenverbdnde who confronted the demands of the chancellery andthe tsar.

148 Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720

Initially, Golovin's policy successful: in 1691 Udinsk first sentgodovalshchiks to where they served for a year, while inturn to dispatch its own to Udinsk." Golovin left ISO mu sketeers and 50mounted Cossacks in re-built Udinsk, were called mus­rl;:;l;:;;:;j~, as had been levied from volunteer Cossack sons and young

After Golovin's the ISOCossalck:s,20 more than before the war, of which two units of 50 were mounted,and one served on fool. Two or three desiatki were sent each year to Barguzinskand Kaban'sk, In 1694, 32 male kin of Cossacks and three retired Cossacks livedin Selengmsk.

In I another reinforcement was sent, but this time there was no opportunityto win service booty or land, and there were no volunteers. sentunder among the 125 Cossacks from Tiurnen' , Berezovand there were actually many outlaws and vagrants. On their way to the

sufficient raide d towns and fortresses as theycould. One hundred of them were sent to in a wherestaged nothing comparable to the rebellion the mid-1690s.five remained in Udinsk, in quite pitiful conditions, and with little ofimproving their conditions.s" Another 340 recruits from western Siberia were sentto Udinsk in 1694; of 325 arrived." Rather than a consolidated upperof rich Cossacks and deti boiarski e on the one hand, and poor, but united rank-and­file Cossacks on the other, as Siberian Cossacks are often described, the picture thuspresented on the is a mosaic of men with differentbackgrounds.The effects of war, imperial expansion and arbitrary rule had severelysocially dislocated some of them the 'newly recruited'. in theiropposition and envy towards Irkutsk, virtually all Cossacks on the wereunited, although with of intensity,

It is thus not to find an ordinary mounted Irkutsk Cossackembroiled in a dishonour suit a former Udinsk rebel leader. On 9 F"I'lr'I1>lr'v

1700, L. Korchazhenskii accused the Udinsk piatidesiainik of mounted CossacksIvan Ivanov syn Oshurkov, a staunch ally of elected pn:kazetlikBc,risov,for the he had suffered in the bazaar. Korchazhenskii claimed that thereason was a loan of 33 roubles he was meant to pay back, but Oshurkov alsoreferred to the wider differences between Irkutsk and Udinsk: 'He called me[Korchazhenskii] a traitor ... and said: "I am to cut your hands off for yourtraitorous letter and torture you!" withou t your although Ihave not perpetrated anything'.

Although Oshurkov repeated his allegations to the voevoda, Korchazhenskiibrushed it away by reference to his recent election to iasak collector:

if there had been any treasonable affair I ... would not have beenassigned and elected to your... affairs and now ... I am chosen

according to your ... decree and according to the election of IrkutskCossacks for your... sable iasak collection ;.. in theIrkutsk office. Thus Ivan denounces me falsely and dishonours me.4 lj

Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720 149

Honour had direct on social on appointments to profitableservice and the support of the Personenverband elevated an ordinaryCossack well over an unaware Udinsk Although it wasregistered and by the local its point of reference and itsbasis was not in the official organs, but rather in the limited pu blic of theCoss acks .48 The of the conflict be tween Korchazhenskii andOshurkov, which occurred the final enquiry into the Selenga rebellion,will be in this

Competition and envy between Cossacks of different towns in the Irkutskwas exacerbated by the fact that Irkutsk Cossacks and those in the

valley of the were the main of to caravans and theNerchinsk administration. Not only wealthy deti boiarskie and rich Cossacks sup-plied but many Cossack of smallholders also sold their spare in themarket or to If the Cossacks asked for their there wasno profit in it for their comrades on the side of the lake. Since the prisudfell under the Irkutsk voevoda's was not but taxescollected. when marc hed to Irkutsk to claim their thedisgruntled Transbaikalian veterans of the battles for the Amur stated that not justthe voevoda who had not been in Siberia in 1689 but Irkutsk inhabitants in

were traitors. In the Nerchinsk treaty of that year, 'left three townsin Chinese hands' .50 Such were the resentments of uprooted, socially dislocatedmen without , conflicts that were at the root of events analysed in this

enjoyed reliability in the supply of salary due to its home-supplies, the fared much worse. Although was sent on a reg-

ular quantities did not always live up to in mostcases this did not cau se social disorder. Thus in 1681, Cossacks wereshort of 449.5 quarters of rye and 444.5 quarters of barley. The following year,

received their full allowance, but no for earlier losses. Arrearswere lower before the rebellion in 1693 Irkutsk sent 400 quarters of rye toSelenginsk and I .25 to while the settlements on the lowerSelenga contribute d another 165 quarters of rye. Yet this did not me an thatSelenginsk was short of rye and oats, as has been claimed; the reason why 328quarters of rye were not paid out was that some Cossacks did not petition to11 f\.UC~J", or had been sent on distant service. Udinsk, the frontier town with aresident was relatively well supplied with arrears of only 14 quarters ofrye and 40 quarters of oats. In 1696, this relation looked worse, as Selengmsk,Il'insk and Kaban'sk asserted they had received only 233 quarters, while Udinskwas of all but 60 quarters of

Hasty conclusions as to the motives of the rebels drawn from these isolatedfacts nevertheless conceal more than they can illurninare.v For the year 1689-90we are in the fortunate of full records of the calculations and nesotia-tions between Cossacks and the Irkutsk voevoda administration con-Cell1ITIlI c ash reimbursement: 167 men were entitled to receive 910 rou bles, InAugust 1690, when Cossac ks petitione d at Irkuts k for their salary for

150 Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720

the following year, the amount of revenue, iasak and customs tollscame to a meagre 266 roubles. Although the Cossacks could refer to ansive chain of when had received the full allowance in theall at Irkutsk was that this Selenginskwas redirected to meet Cossacks' demands, who received another 192 roubles ontop of the 60 roubles An entry under the year 1692-3 alsoattests to the of on the of Irkutsk Voznesenskiimonastery to cover arrears in 1691 which were paid back one year later by thevoevoda's office .54

Sedentarization and rebellion

Thus payments of on military and the revenues agarrison yielded. The was in the first half of the I butthe Transbaikalian Cossacks did not wait to be fed. Like others in theirsituation, to increase the area under cultivation. thePl1,onl1lr'>lcrpr! by the Siberian had made a effort toand sow the Ku darinsk an area close to the of Lake Baikal, just northof the which was by mountains. This area was warmsummer, fertile and suitable for In their seulements, SelenginskCossacks became although reached thelevel of subsistence only in 1700, a condition that could not be maintained in1705 and 1710. Only the small forts Il'insk and Kabansk yielded sur-

in the I 690s. 5fi

While more Cossacks moved to the outlying hamlets, tensions between theBuryats and the Cossacks increased. As in most cases, when fertile landswere up to these were not lands as peasantsthink, for the Itantsynsk Buryats claimed them as their ancestral . Somehistorians have stressed between the rebels and the Buryats,

up a vision of harmony between the nomads and rank-and-file Cossacks thatcould only be disturbed by lofty like the syn boiarskii Ull1',"-'111

Turchaninov. as mentioned Turchaninov had started as an ordinaryCossack.and his relations to the Transbaikalian Cossacks were much more com­plex than such accounts allow. The petition of the Itantsynsk Buryats leaves nodoubt about the true reasons of their collective manifestation, into Il'inskon the day of Turchaninov's arrest. This action was not a of sympathy for the

but a protest against the links between the rebels and the formerprikazchik. Thus the Buryats wrote in August 1696, five months after theseincidents:

In recent years in [our] ... grounds along the the SelengmskCossacks ... [have settled]. [They] have caused great oppre ssion: they takeexcess fees for and surfeit fines for murder. The prikazchik GrishkaTurchaninov and comrades put [us] in fetters in the forts and small settle­ments and torture [us] without investigation. They do not release

Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720 151

[us] to find [our]and forcefulness has ,1"'~tr'()'v",rl

since the Mongols

prikaznye of Their oppressionand [we] cannot graze in the distant

stressed the connection of Turchaninov and Cossacks inthe final sentences of the petition that demanded redress for their snevances,reaching back to the I 690s:

our COIJH-Ca1ies.""prikamye ... The

[Sovereign] ... order the investigation of these offences and the oppressionthat we have suffered from the andprikazchiks of Irkutsk must not

Turchaninov was a willing ally in the for the KudarinskSelenginsk Cossacks could in 1691-2 the Siberian chancellery

answerinz the Buryats' first petition:

In future Grishka Turchaninov and comrades neither as orikazchik

nor to the iasak collection or any other position... [outsideIrkutsk]. He maynot be released or sent anvwhere.f

This was never enacted by voevoda ua15aJIJ1.

For several years, up to I this cooperation between Turchaninov and theSelenginsk Cossacks thrived. Turchaninov's credit in the eyes of the Cossacksdepended, on their position vis-a-vis the Itantsynsk Buryats, By themiddle of the Cossacks on the Kudarinsk facedincreasing problems. The Buryats decided that only howeverate in the held any of their to the pastures,Itantsynsk Buryats remained under Nerchinsk jurisdiction in 1690 when Golovinassigned the Buryats of the area to Udinsk, becausethere was little opportunity to collect iasak among the Itantsynsk Buryats.fiO

relied on the Nerchinsk who from allowing the set-tlers into their territory, shelter to the Buryats while the settlers.The Cossacks indignation at this collusion and referred to a decreeallowing them to settle in the Kuda since they could not theof the nomads to use their ancestral pastures:

We complain ... about the iasak-paying Buryats of Nerchinsk prisud. Theygraze their ... herds in the Kudarinsk We Cossacks have set up ourhouses [there] to grow for your salary to[your] decree and to the allotment of these in our We havefenced in our plots with good which the Buryats destroy arbitrarilyand mischievously and then let their copious herds graze on the fields.

The Buryats, they claimed, stole from their farms and beat them on the fields'within an inch of our lives'.

152 Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720

could hunt.fi l

In

):.In,wp,,pr the and Cossacks of the Nerchinsk prisud

at Itantsynsk do not these our ... petitions and our indictments, andhave not addressed our destruction. evade court procedure, investiga­tion and even public announcements ... in cases these JJU1Y"C~

because of their greediness,

added that the Nerchinsk Cossacks destroyed them with their "impertinenttreachery", there were not even animals the laSQK-paye:rs

I further Buryat complaints, the Siberianchancellery announced a to be paid by any future voevoda who did notcomply with the rule that were to remain under Nerchinskadministration.fi2 in 1696-7, in their aid for their bad

Selenginsk, Kabansk and Ilinsk Cossacks of all ranks and backgroundsexplained away losses caused by this conflict, the lower Selenga hadsuffered a 'bad harvest' .fi>

The conflict and the Cossacks and theirprikaz:chi'kmarked a turning point in the of the rebellionCossacks were alienated from Irkutsk and also valuedTurchaninov less than before. now, had other concerns and pressing

and found allies to pursue their new aims. In this situation, and forsome, the way was free to get even. Udinsk Cossacks were ready to cc-operatewith since were eager to get hold of Turchaninov.The new con­stellation in the Transbaikal meant trouble for the two men who representedpower in Irkutsk prisud. Cossacks in the hamlets of theKudarinsk were among those who took the lead in rebellion: among 25Cossacks who the aforementioned petition the Buryats and theprikazchik of Itantsynsk winter-hut, there were at least ten active rebels andtioners voevoda Savelov and Turchaninov. Four of the thedesiatnik Anton the piatidesiatnik Dmitrii Tarakanovskii and detiboiarskie Petr Arsen'ev and Kazan' were the leaders of the rebels in

Thus, one of the reasons for the rebellion was a classic example offrontier settlers disturbed in their recently established, fragile relationship

to agriculture. In many cases, throughout the slow-moving history of sedentariza­tion, whether it was Crimean or Kazan' Tatars or they relief inraids on other settlements or merchants from hardships induced by unstableclimate or destruction of their harvest by nomads.s"

A shaky alliance on the Selenga

Preparations for rebellion started with the first letter calling on the Cossacks in allforts on the and those living in the hamlets to come to Il'insk in late1695. One of the three was Ivan Novikov, the above-mentionedprikazchik; who lived in a hamlet.w It befits the area of the estuary of riverSelenga, with its established mercantile interests, that another signatory who als0

Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720 153

lived in Kudarinsk Vasilii Anofriev syn was a mer-chant. The fifth paid for his salt works at was 50 pud in 1694,to 280 in 1704. Already in 1695 he had lent 200 pud of salt to the voevoda.Apparently he had made a fortune when he contracted to buy and trans­

for Golovin's army at Nerchinsk in 1687, out of 3,000

:sellenglrlSk Cossacks voevoda Savelov's his cara-van to China at Posol'skii Mys , the estuary of the in retaliation. InH",lhrI1Clr" I a was sent from to the voevoda to demandthe full in advance for the year I that including of the fol-

year. Senka Krasnoiar and Petr Arseu'ev returned with half-empty hands,or so Cossacks on the deemed, for received only the for theremainder of the year I which had not yet been paid fully.fi8

At issue were of remuneration and theCossacks in to Savelov was not at allto them a loan of one and a half in advance, and as events will

most of Irkutsk Cossacks firmly acceded to this notion. For Cossacks onthe southern side of the lake, the years had shown that Savelov wasunreliable; claimed that the former voevoda, had paid out their full

for one year in but now demanded even more than that. Afterall, some Gavril retired in I had receivedthree worth of salary in advance in 1667.fi9 Althou gh this was, even on thedisadvantaged Selenga, not an isolated incident over the years, recentdevelopments had indicated an different situation as the collectediasak fell even below the Siberian allowed SelenginskCossacks to distribute the iasak treasury in place of salary.w

When their attempt at their failed for the mostSelenginsk Cossacks put a premeditated plan into action. Petr Arsen'ev andSelenginsk piatidesiatniks Anton Berezovskii and Leont'ei Chiuzhakin and twodesiatniks sent a letter to Udinsk calling for the conclusion of a treaty 'for aundertaking (dlia .11 The treaty (dogovor) was not a call to abolishtsarist rule, but for rebellion in a more restricted sense. On a broad base oftures from both towns, it was derived from the oath Cossacks when theycontracted for service.T This remarkable document proves the exact opposite ofwhat some historians have read into the rebellion there is no of anattempt to chase the voevodas out of Siberia, but typical notions of thePersonenverband are reiterated and confirmed. The Udinsk document startedwith a long list of names of deti piatidesiamiks, desiatniks and rank-and-file in which all of them, for the syn boiarskii Ivan Novikovand ataman Kornei Stroikov were listed as 'old and newly enlisted Cossacks', notregarding rank, which was indicated further down the list. In a Muscovite andSiberian which placed a emphasis on rank, this is evidence of theperceived homogeneity of the Personenverband, while rank was not entirely for­feited by the treaty. All of them 'beat their forehead to the detiboiarskie ... and rank-and-file', pledging that:

154 Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720

we have to stand as one peacefully, to observe counselamong us, to serve the ... by the to obey eachother in and to the ... at Moscow about all ourneeds. enmity amongst us must be avoided."

Institutionalization of the Personenverband was in this document by ref­erence to advice as described in the memoria of Errnak's Cossacks (cf, ,-au",c'",

I), as well as to joint i4 In of the overt attempt to limit"r.,,,,,r'tl1r,iti,"~ for it reserved important roles for the tsar and the",,-,,,,1,,71',,,,,, liudi, the officially as well as elected from thevoevoda downwards. Considered far more than these men were inter-nal which the treaty to ban by for amutual to report every Cossack who tried to sow distrust betweenUUU1~,r" Selenginsk.Ilinsk and Kaban'sk to the 'leaders liudi)'. TheSelenga treaty differed from a Cossack's oath delivered while forservice in that it codified terms and for the 'leaders', who were to bereported to the if dared to cause any levy unnecessarytaxes or cause destruction. To institutionalize these aims, the form of the SiberianCossack oath to the tsar was not chosen accidentally, since it was, by way ofErmak's Cossacks and the memoria of Ermak and derived from theoaths sworn to each other by members of the southern steppe CossackPersonenverband. Formulas such as: 'Not to open illegal to pimp, to gam-ble, to steal and to beat others up', were and fitted conditions on theSiberian frontier. In place of the disciplinary the tsar was formallyassigned this power. who also noted the of these oaths,believed that the oath that was administered by the centre created an de

among the Cossacks rather than it as an of forms ofsocial Yet institutionalization opened up opportunities to bothsides the tsar, the and the Cossacks remained within a commoninstitutional culture, but they could take of the provisions made inthese documents only to the actual distribution of power. Attempts atenforcing these provisions can be found in particular with to loans onsalary, when individual Cossacks fled from although the connectionbetween service and salary is not explicit in the oaths:

In the year 1698-9 [two were sent to Irkutsk to transport thesupplies [for Udinsk], On their way back to Udinsk they fled with thedoshchanik, I [prikazchik Andrei Beiton] ... received orders to recover the.. salary from their guarantors. the were recruited

beyond the control of the Udinsk servitors of all ranks so that there are noguarantors and no documentarion."

In an age when bureaucratic and social relations were overstretched in Siberia, anoverarchins institutional culture, which allowed for the interpretation of institu­tions aceording to guiding ideas, was tantamount to the lowest common denom-

Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720 155

inator between Moscow and the Pacific Ocean." Thus the treaty fol-lowed the provisions of the 1649 and claimed to adhere to thesnverercns service (the 'dobroe while on the to jointlyovercome the pitfalls of 78 At the same time, it couldon Cossack institutions in the body of Muscovite procedures,

While the rebels to their actions in semi-official written doc-uments like the treaty, did not hesitate to make use of the power of thePersonenverband their actions. in thePersonenverband its own and rituals of power: Cossacksfor carried staffs. Although Ivan Alernasov denied his panin these when he described the call, there is still some truth in hisaccount:

When [IJ , .. started dinner in [myJ winter hut in Udinsk with theUdinsk musketeer Danilko and comrades [IJ do not remember who

were under the window, a staff. [Fyk], thecalled, .. Alernasov and comrades to the council on the riverbank. [IJ

asked Danilko: 'What kind of council do you hold and to what end?'answered: 'Go honourably to the council, Ivan, otherwise you go insultedl'"?

As of honour were crucial for status and thechances to be on service Thus, the Cossacks left no doubtwhere power lay. this claim by the on the staffsthey carried as ritual of the power of the Cossack group they were called'karshi'; as a hostile indignantly The term refers to theworld of river na vigation, a tree with extensive roots washed from the

beneath the surface of a river.s' Karshi were attributed to the'rebellious burlatuki'; the unmarried men who owned no house and worked ashired day labourers on the doshchaniksF Ivan Alernasov, avoided theterm 'karsha' in his statement, for his later attempts to cover his role inthe he had followed the call more than once:

[IJ , .. went with him to the riverbank, where there were over thirty Udinskrnus keteers, the piatidesiatn ik B orisov, Petrushka Kainov, [IJ do notremember the others. The old and well-to-do Cossacks and [IJ started to per­suade Borisov and comrades to reconsider their plans for rebellion. [TheCossacksJ thre atene d and beat [usJ with sticks ... The y killed the oldCossack Il'ia Ivanov on that occasion, for he tried to talk them out of theirvillainou s plans , .. 83

When Ivan Alernasov made this statement in 1699, he overstated his actual fearfor his life as well as his attempts to curb the rebels' zeal. The old and theranking Cossacks were also more exposed to government reprisals; some ofthem, such as Alernasov, could rely on their rank-and-file comrades' support.Nevertheless, the decisions of the Cossack circle were absolute and

156 Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720

whoever dared question them once were , or held to a minoritytion, was punished In the sources related to the rebellion, whenever ac ollecti ve of the rebels appe ars, a number of names are mentioned, neverjust one. as the best-known leaders and heads of the respectivePersonenverband. Alernasov's declared inability to tell who and how manyCossacks and desiatki were part for the few who were, for differ-ent reasons, turned in to saved his own life and ensured that hecould further be as a leader in Udinsk, Even after I when thePersonenverband could no show itself it lost little of its formerpower for some time to come. Alemasov's stylization in the midst ofhis busy, and anonymous artel'shchiks underlines how thor-

the Personenverband moulded life in Udinsk, Rather than awaythe deti boiarskie and and even the wealthier ones thePersonenverband to control and onerous on them, as thecase of syn boiarskii Ivan Novikov's mill shows. of remarksreferring to N ovikov's even a relatively highly placed man like PetrAleksandrov syn who, outlawed for his Old Believersympathies, was also a client of nobles at court, did not stay awayfrom the rebel Personenverband for he attempted to use it in his owninterests. Spiteful towards the voevoda who had stolen his worth 400roubles, the four books he Arsen'ev led the rebels atSelenginsk during the early stages of the uprising. He was embraced by theCossacks as an of vital information and In aletter written at Irkutsk in I his brother Ivan mentioned the favourablechanges indicated by the voevoda of Samoil FedorovichNikolev: 'Seek security from ... our former patron (milostivets) and neverby all means to knock your forehead to him'.

The Arsen'ev family were also clients of the boyar Fedor MikhailovichRtishc hev, who Mu scovy to Ukrainian scholars in 1649.85His clientele isan unusually fully-described network. It is noteworthy that it includedmore than just which was an essential but not exclusive feature.8~ WhileArsen'ev's membership of the clientele may be explained by his towardsOld Belief, which was promoted by Rtishchev, the network extended not only toranks above his position, but also to Cossacks below him. Arserr'ev'sexhortations to P. Errnolin not to join the Udinsk rebel Personenverband at a latestage addressed the client with a familiar 'Brother Petr Ermolin, zdravstvui, PetrArsen'ev chelom b' et", Friendship is otherwise largely missing from the Russianrec ord of at Ieast in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.In part this may be attributed to the lack of written sources such as let­ters or diaries; however, the power of the Personenverband in Siberia affords anadditional explanation, since a voice in the circle and information about decisionsand moods in neighbouring towns was crucial in the gamble for power and influ­ence. The Personenverband was officially albeit in a diluted form

all attempts at prohibiting 'circles and rebellions' aimed at actual rebellions, andwere never successful. It is therefore less surprising to find friendship as a

Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720 157

resource of in distant Siberia at such an point, since letters wereless likely to be immediately burnt. Kinship networks around Lake Baikal, too,can more often be than proven, since even in obvious casesrelevant information, such as is often for in thecases of the Kazanovs in Irkutsk and Il'rnsk, the Evseevs in Irkutsk,Selenginsk, Nerchinsk and Tiumen' or the Leont'ev's inUdinsk and Ilimsk, Still, the 1720 into has pro-duced evidence of the influence of the Personenverband andof kinship

The two Petr the syn who lived in hishamlet in the Kudarinsk , and Novikov, who shared the lives of his Udinskmen, he also owned a small for thedifference between the two towns, lived off trade while also startingto cultivate the near the lake. Yet since was situated far to thesouth, on the very brink of the open Udinsk and its

settlements. Since the trade route had taken an turn,Selenginsk Cossack merchants also set up in Il'rnsk. At the same timeUdinsk, on its but isolated hilltop within of the open Mongol

had to on from far away. It is for thedivided attitudes in the Transbaikal voevodas and their representativesthat Cossacks aimed at trade relations between voevodas, Interceptingthe voevoda's men and his merchandise at Posol'skii Mys, the estuary of theSelenga.in March 1696 was a well-planned raid, which took plenty of orga­nizational talent and information in advance. It is possible that syn boiarskii IvanArsen'ev at Irkutsk informed his brother Petr about the caravan, although there isno surviving proof; Petr was involved in decision at Selenginskat this time. 88 Since the coup had to be planned, there remains some doubtwhether a syn who was not an intimate follower of Afonasii Savelov,should have known in time.

There were other potential sources of information available to the SelenginskCossacks at Irkutsk. The clerk of the voevoda's office, Timofei doesnot fit the pattern of a poor Cossack in rebellion the upper crust on bothsides of the Baikal either, but his trial is fraught with sympathies forboth sides in the conflict. In 1693-4 he won back his slave Akulina, a Mongolianwoman. His brother-in-law Sofron Kashaev at the had refused to returnher after the year Pezhemskii had to allow her to work at his mother-in­law's hornestead.s?

Rebels for suspected often beat clerks, but Pezhemskii, nPT'h",,,~

through his connections to the felt very differentabout them. On4 May 1696, two months after the raid on Afonasii Savelov's car­avan, he was apprehended as a traitor and banned to Iakutsk, Two Cossacks tes­tified him. Evsei Evseev of Nerchinsk, who had several times declaredfurs at Irkutsk, and Ivan Bechevin, a rope maker and spinner and hardly anexceedingly rich man, who left little compromising trace in the records. While therebels were already on their way to Irkutsk, the witnesses claimed Pezhernskii

158 Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720

had declared sympathy one that he wanted to 'thrust thevoevoda's office in front of the town walls] into the river'. anyinvolvement in the Pezhemskii was soon convicted when Cossacksordered to search his house found Pezhemskii and theArsen'ev brothers to the dense network of unofficial connections betweenSelenginsk and which existed competition between the twotowns. These connections and were by no means restricted to ordi-nary or poor without some of the latter also fled with the

A few local like Gerasirn showed their sympathywith the rebels by Irkutsk or their family to the whenthe rebels' left.92 Thus there were many ways news about the voevoda'scaravan could travel to in time since networks of informationand not different from those maintained by voevodas or detiboiarstae, were common among Cossacks and merchants on Lake Baikal andelsewhere in Siberia.

Afonasii Savelov's taken at Posol'skii Mys, were sealed and broughtto In town, a Cossack circle was convened by Petr and thepiatidesiatniks Anton Berezovskii and Dmitrii Tarakanovskii." Berezovskii,leader of the Cossacks the to Irkutsk and soon-to-be elected was but an uprooted or lower-class Cossack.

from his for the common stance Itarusynsk Buryats,implying he owned land, he had also lost three of his native in 1691,who were killed by when fled from their master; Berezovskii wascompensated with 150 horses and cattle.94 The Tarakanovskiis ranked among thewealthiest and oldest clans of Tarakanovskii's father, the merchantAndrei Fedorov syn had already in Irkutsk in 1674, where he contractedand delivered 1,000 pud of to Irkutsk in 1687.95 His sons, Dmitrii, Filip and".J! '5'" 11 entered Cossack two of them continued their father's businesswith considerable success. Dmitrii was a well-known merchant in Nerchinsk andSelenginsk. He contracted rye in 1688-9 and travelled with merchandise toChina without a service a substitute for service at

In 1692-1700 regularly declared furs. Dmitrii and Filipwere also among the settlers in the Kudarinsk who petitioned against theItantsynsk Buryats.?? Thus men who were comfortably off took seernmgtyradical measures.

The circle accused voevoda Afonasii Savelov of treason a 'sovereign'affair' claiming he had sent weapons abroad, which was a particularly graveoffence under 1693 trade regulations forbidding any arms sales to theDzhungars.w Witnesses cited 'Don Cossack customs' when how theydivided the booty among the Cossacks. Several Cossacks who had acquired partof the loot before its official distribution were beaten ritually in the circle everyCossack had to hit them with karshi to make sure the unity of thePersonenverband was .99 Booty was also divided among the Cossacksof Udinsk and Ilinsk. Cossacks thus lived up to the implicit con-ditions of the treaty, to secure peace by considering booty as a common posses-

Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720 159

sion, Ilinsk Ivan Iziurev and desiatniks Matfei Ivanov and VasiliiSherniakinskoi rode to to claim pan of booty, which was dividedamong the Cossacks: 'Two polar fox furs or corsac foxes for and othersreceived one corsac for their losses of [salary], which sold ... at low

, later that too, had not received their that

Selenginsk Cossacks differed from theircomrades, who in 1695 had defined as their aim the

removal of Turchaninov. His role as a for all those distilling liquoron the eastern bank of the Baikal made them his sworn enemies. Their

grievance was that did 'not receive to serve the sovereign'since Turchaninov it 'to starve us'. had the recentlyarrived voevoda Afonasii Timofeevich Savelov when he travelled Irkutsk

in 1695, yet obtained but punishment. 101Yet the Udinsk Cossacks'role in down on distilleries is overshadowed by inconsistenciesin their own Thus, among those who contributed to distilling was Udinsksyn boiarskii Ivan Novikov, who was soon in Il'insk with-out proper election by Udinsk rebels after they had Turchaninov, Theother person who was not reconciled with a common rebellion directed

distilleries and was Vasilii A. the co-initiator of the meet-at Il'rnsk. to the of Irkutsk Cossacks who were sent to con-

fiscate distillery equipment in early January 1696, he was among those warned inadvance, up their trace s.102 U dinsk Coss acks, rather than at the

eradication of distillerie s, intende d to control them, as the under-lined. It the voevoda, that due to the rebellionSavelov could not summon those responsible for distilling activities. Instead ofthe Savelov fell victim to an The leader of the investigation,Irkutsk as mentioned above, was soon afterwards

as a clandestine of the rebels. The tacit agreementbetween the rebels and the distillers was that Turchaninov was to bethe culprit, while Udinsk seized real power in Ilinsk, rather than the nominal sub­ordination to Udinsk district Golovin had institute d. The distiller andSelenginsk syn boiarskii Ivan Uvarov had the petition against theItantsynsk Buryats, and gave his new enmity to Turchaninov additional vent byaccusing him of forcibly Chinese silk worth 600 roubles. hewas also among those who had been elevated to their rank by voevodas Savelovand G and were demoted during the subsequent investigation. On IS April,Udinsk Cossacks turned back a delegation offering negotiations, sent fromIrkutsk and headed by Ivan Perfil'ev, with the remark 'we are to live on ourown'. Udinsk rebels threatened to dispatch Cossacks to Irkutsk to incite the gar-rison to the voevoda.Iv'

Confrontation was inevitable with the Ilinsk who took a differentview of the situation at the Tension was palpable already on 7 March1696, when at night piatidesiatnik Borisov with 50 Udinsk Cossacks rode to thevillages of Kolesnikov and Iugovoi, near Il'rnsk. Turchaninov reported that

160 Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720

several men, including a Buryat and a from Iugovoi, had complained thatUdinsk Cossacks had robbed their horses 'and they did not tell us for what rea-son or on what orders' . to Udinsk, shot at the walls of II' insk,when Savelov later ordered an the new syn boiarskii

Kazan' declared he could not in Udinsk for he feared the retal-iation of Borisov 'and comrades' 104 even if he 20 Cossacks for support.He was not alone with his for all the and other witnessessoon refused to reiterate their statements. The Buryat Oneiko declared thatUdinsk Cossacks had returned his the from Iugovoi discoveredthat Cossacks had only 'watched' the while not even totake his and Il'insk Cossacks the was just 24 strong asserted

had seen the but could neither see who it was, nor how many rodewith them. Vasilii Ivanov syn who and wrote the first let-ter for a of the and his tried to sparethemselves trouble in the immediate future when they stated: '[We] did not hearany shots. [Although we] have seen the bullet which hit the southern wall, [we]do not know who fired' .105

This Ilinsk had already proven very unstable dur-the days between the two statements, when a few of them, most prominently

Ivan had turned the rest. with five other Cossacksat decided to take he had reason. In the aforementioned

by Irkutsk Cossacks sent in early 1696 to apprehend illegal distillers,as one of those who to before the arrival of the

Irkutians, One of the tiny group of of Borisov, Okhera, rode toUdinsk to inform Turchaninov's enemies about a opportunity to seize theprikazchik; Okhera was later awarded a horse from the Udinsk booty.IO~

On 20 March, 30 Udinsk Cossacks arrived at Il'msk, little forthe locals: They us Il'insk their horses to themat the caravanserai', and encircled Turchaninov's home. Turchaninov hid in hishomestead, which he defended with the help of his brother-in-law Petr Fedorov,clerk Fedor Kotiurev, Cossack desiatnik Emelian Panikadilshchikov and IvanBechevin. The last two are remarkable for their role in the rebellion. Bechevin,whose role at Turchaninov's place is not clear, was an unassuming rope maker and

and hardly a rich man, but he disapproved of the that he wasone of the witnesses who accused Pezhemskii.w? Significantly, he was not amongthose whom the rebels beat, a disparate group after all, which also included out­siders to the immediate Panikadilshchikov's position, as already men­tioned, was much more ambivalent at this stage, he identified with the majorityof Il'insk slightly over-fulfilling their to portrayhim as Turchaninov's devoted supporter would distort the rebellion.

The next day, while the continued, abbot Misailo of Trinity monasteryon the near Il'insk arrived, but could not convince the rebels to spareTurchaninov, Nevertheless, Turchaninov went with Misailo to church. The rebelsrecognized the monastery's immunity as well as the right of the prikazchik toattend church service. U dinsk Cossacks only seized him in the caravanserai after

Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720 161

he had left church on his own. led him to the office and casthim in he was by Udinsk Cossacks 'and by Ilinsk Cossacks onduty to the decree'.

Il'insk Cossacks this e vent stressed the absence of SelenginskCossacks. There were more of Turchaninov at Il'msk than historiansallow who follow the of a conflict between the upper class and thepoor Cossacks Ivan for , added:

Udinsk Cossacks and the Cossacks Aleksei Balmashnoi, Anika Moiseev .I UJ":;""~. Petr Shestakov and ... Okhera beat the clerk Fedor Kotiurev ..Panikadilshchikov, Ivan the retired Cossack Petr Kyzylovand me with sticks not about our lives.

Kotiurev actually died after the The Ilinsk witnesses in1699 were all rather obscure rank-and -file who claimed that hadalso suffered from Savelov's reluctance to payout their in the pre-

year. evident links between Savelov and Turchaninov, at least inall of them strong disapprov al of Turchaninov's

arrest:

Udinsk Cossacks detained Turchaninov and him forcibly,the will of Ilinsk Cossacks. We do not know for what theydeposed him and took him to Udinsk, And [we], the Cossacks of Il'msk, toldthe Udinsk Cossacks 'for what reason did you Grishka Turchaninovand fetch him to Udinsk, and who will hold office at Il'insk to take care ofthe affairs?'

Harassed U dinsk Cossacks countered this argument by an uncommonly elaboratewhich the witnesses verbatim:

We escort Grishka Turchaninov to Udinsk since he detained traders ontheir way to Udinsk. He intercepted them at Ilinsk and took for him-self, brewed beer and distilled alcohol from it; he wanted to starve [us].Grishka also prohibited Udinsk musketeers from overnight in Il'rnsk.Grishka falsely to Irkutsk that [we] rode through therobbed the and shot at fort Il'insk with harquebus. Nothing like thathappened, and so we Grishka to Udinsk for his treachery.

Because of the pointed question about a new the Udinsk '-V~~Ql"'rc",

«rr"rrl ina to II' insk als 0 did not hesitate to confront them and declinedto ask the Il'rnskans for a suitable candidate: 'They said "in Turchaninov's placewe leave you two prikazchiks at once" , .109

A minority of witnesses the Cossacks Semen Tarkhov, Aleksei Balmashnoi,Anika Moiseev and Petr Sernenov however, were not entirely satisfied with thisversion of Turchaninov's deposition. At least two of them had been implicate d in

162 Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720

the confrontations on the Udinsk side. hinted at conflict with the iasak-Buryats who accused Turchaninov publicly at Il'insk of illicitly acquiring

the furs. These Cossacks were nevertheless content with amendingthis to a common statement of disapproval about Udinsk interference with Ilinskaffairs. Just one rank-and-file Ivan Alenin, made a statementdeviating from the common stand taken by other witnesses at Ilinsk. In his ver-

emphasis was put on Turchaninov's illicit collection of theand he acquitted Udinsk Cossacks and their supporters at Ilinsk of some

of the most extreme and actions of which had been accused such asthe 'uninvolved' Ivan Ievlev and Vasilii Sherniakinskii as well as chain-

Turchaninov, He also strove to shorten the which the appointedprikm:chiksruled without a proper election or other written document, claiming,'within a day Savelov sent a decree Kazan' to hold office' .110 Itwas thus by no means unfeasible after the accession of the new voevoda IvanFedorovich Nikolev in late 1698 to express sympathy with Udinsk Cossacks.

between many Ilinsk rank-and-file Cossacks and Udinsk was a reality inI and cannot be dismissed as a mere attempt to reduce witnesses' culpabilityin 1699.

On 22 March 1696, just before the Udinsk Cossacks left Ilinsk, someSelenginsk Cossacks from the hamlets in the Kudarinsk made theirappearance. of the Udinsk choice for the post of nrilrarr-hi]:

Instead of Novikov, they favoured syn boiarskii Stepan Kazan'. Once conflictwith had proven to the settlers' cause,their priorities and to arrange more peaceful relations with the nomads.Kazan' was a law-abiding person, as far as the records can tell. In 1699,his as a yielded a rare petition by ItantsynskBuryats which criticized the appointed of Leont'eiChiuzhakin, while out in favour of Kazan's candidacy, because he 'iswell versed in to our customs'; this was quarrels overland in which he, as a Kudarinsk was involved.'!' Leont'ei's son Ivan wasrecruited for Cossack service at in 1711 as a newly baptized Mongol;his father's was the town of while the bribe worth tenroubles which he paid for the recruitment of his son shows that he was moder­ately well-established in all of which may explain the alienation. I 12

M()J1l!;OIS were not always on easy terms with the Bury ats. 113Ivan petitionscharging Savelov and Turchaninov with favouring distillers, indicating he sidedwith the rebels.

Shortly after the accession of Novikov and Kazan' as prikazchiks, conflictbetween Udinsk and the lower was rife The merchandise of thevoevoda of Nerchinsk, Anton Ivanov syn Savelov, had been seized by UdinskCossacks, but the issue was contentious, and the wares, primarily alcohol andhops, were sealed in the cellar at Il'insk by Udinsk piatidesiatnikOshurkov and Kazan'. Soon afterwards, Oshurkov was sent on orders fromUdinsk to weigh the seized commodities but was prevented from accomplishinghis task at Il'msk, Thereupon piatidesiatnik Borisov, leader of the Udinsk rebels,

Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720 163

rode to Il'insk with more than ten armed men. he orderedKazan' to return immediately; Kazan', who had left for a ceremony at

returned to Il'insk with the of Il'insk herefused to open the he was orders from Irkutsk. Borisovillicitly as Il'insk witnesses 'by force and the will of Il'inskCossacks' the seals and sold of the alcohol, while the rest was drunkon the to 14 As Kazan' was yet to the Udinskf'el'SO;!Jerlve;rbcmdpr,ovE:d the more on the After all, con-flict between Udinsk and the by the Cossacks was also proofof more fault lines. Before the establishment of wasthe undisputed centre of the valley, whereas in administrative terms it was

by Golovin, and by 1696 the Udinsk Personenverband evenattempted to sever ties between the lower and by

(,("""'''1''; '0"'" to a distant outpost.Nevertheless, conflicts between the law and the Cossack of supply were

not confined to those between Il'msk and they also played a role inter­nally in Udinsk, boiarskii Maksirn Posel'skii was in trouble for tosecure Iakutsk voevoda M. Arsen'ev's which were safe instorage, sealed by Posel'skii and a Nerchinsk sworn man. For theirdemand to break the Borisov's Cossacks beat Posel'skiiand a number of rank-and-file Udinsk Cossacks. Yet this was neither a conflictabout different nor was it caused by distinctions of wealth among the par­nciparns. Five rank-and-file Cossacks broke the silence otherwise so inUdinsk, Borisov of 'with many , Nerchinsk voevodaAnton I. Savelov's barley without even the to the barn. Rank-and-file Cossacks who tried to dissuade Borisov's comrades from this action werethreatened with sabres. lIS It may well be doubted, in this case too, that only the'housed' Cossacks the distribution of Mikhail Arsen'ev's merchandise'according to Cossack custom' .11i) As discussed voevodas a cer­tain the prohibition of trade, since Moscow knew very wellthat under frontier conditions, the best and only means to persuadeadministrators to take up their was to exploit their self-interest. A voevodaand stol'nik with connections such as M.M. Arsen'ev was likely to be held insuch esteem that a syn boiarskii would fare better if he did not raise his hand. Onthe other hand, the leaders could on clandestinely supported if theychose, during a rebellion, to stylize themselves as loyalists. the samewas not necessarily applicable to Borisov, who as the leader of aPersonenverband was under pressure to succeed in providing supplies to justifyhis role as a leader and to avoid punishment by the group. He was already tooe xposed to avoid tainted. even Borisov trie d to make such acase, to his journey with 200 Cossacks to Irkutsk: during investigationhe claimed that he was 'sent [by the Cossack circle] with the newly recruitedCossacks to Irkutsk".'!" He knew very well that his statement could not berefuted, even though he could not corroborate it, nor would any of his formerfollowers suffer from it.

164 Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720

All of these cases were characterized by requisitions resolved in exclusiveCossack circles, while even rank-and-file Cossacks frequentlyWitnesses attributed them to recruited whohad a record of their way from western Siberia. In pan these req-uisitions were motivated by concerns of supply, but there was also theaim of the Udinsk Cossacks' influence over the settlements.Opponents of the did not fit into any social category.Despite the there was also a sense ofity among even in Udinsk, Two considerations of cus-tomary as well as codified law conflicted the of Cossacks to be feda and the of the voevodas and other administrators to receive remu-neration for their more this was a concern with reliability intrade relations. Over and above the immediate there were alsoconcerns for power and influence in the Baikal

Confrontation

When Cossacks from Udinsk, Il'insk and Kaban'sk united in May totravel across Lake Baikal to to claim their salary, they did not formone army, but stuck to their Personenverbdnde. Even the

of the there was no one all SelengaCO'SS11Cks, let alone an estate. Cossacks used two flat-bottomed vessels anda smaller boat for across the unpredictable Lake Baikal, each of whichwas manned by either and lower Cossacks or by UdinskCossacks and a few from II' insk, 118 Blinded by their belief that IrkutskCossacks would support the rebellion, they turned down the most extensive con­cession voevoda Savelov ever made: to avert the threat by the he

to payout salary in advance for 1696-7 as well as for the currentyear. This seemed insufficient to the rebels, who felt in numbersand still nourished the futile belief that Afonasii Beiton would open the gates ofIrkutsk to them, or at least orders to turn away the cannons onthe towers .119 They dem anded that their full allowance in cash should be paid inadvance, too, but Savelov re fused. During negotiations, the Cossackswere already kept at a distance; the voevoda did not allow them to enter thefortress. When they finally opted for his deposition, to Irkutsk,Selenga Cossacks were surprised to find that in town nobody was interested in thesoveretsm's affair they had declared, claiming that Savelov had tried to sell pro­hibited wares such as weapons to the Mongols. 120 According to Aleksandrovand 'obviously the Irkutsk upper class' was for thwartingthe attempt to Savelov, since they wished to retain their influence inIrkutsk. It is indeed futile to question whether wealthy Irkutsk Cossacks wereinterested in the possibility of a representative of the ruling in Irkutsk.However, there is much less indication of lesser Cossacks' sympathies for therebels. The between Irkutsk and the were largely based onissues of trade politics, involving most of the Irkutsk since their econ-

Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720 165

trade. Only a handful of some townspeoplemost of them in the countryside and a few flee-

oppression on the of the voevoda, who tried to cover up

Afonasii Beiton was not the only person the rebels , andexpressed their disappointment, Irkutsk inhabitants in of

traitors who, in the Nerchinsk treaty, 'left three towns in the hands of theChinese 122 veterans of the battles for the Amurhad lost their stake in trade up to the of the townsserved as markets for Chinese but lost that position when hos-tilities ceased on the Amur. Due to the war between the Manchus and theDzhungars, from 1689 to 1703 the Manchurian caravan route became the soleroad to it was much than the Central or routebeginning at For war on the Amur held the prom-ise of survival, booty and, for many, increased opportunities for profitable trade.Betrayed over their share in the of the peace of Nerchinsk and the war

IVL'lSl1C, Selenga Cossacks were now denied the leader hadfor to them to the Amur. What is more, in a petition 'inhabitants of allranks of the town of Irkutsk' condemned the of Irkutsk, 'therebels came with many men to town ... rudely and not to custom' andreferred to their overblown demands. Little is known about the way thispetition was drawn up. Its and formulaic claims the rev-enue Savelov had to increase his tenure, were not backed up byfacts and were probably intended to be helpful to the voevoda in his deanngswith the Siberian to claim that this petition 'did notexpress the mood of all of Irkutsk inhabitants' on all counts seems too far-fetched .123 In July 1696, Savelov was still able to collect statements corroborat-

the view of the petition of almost all Irkutsk inhabitants as well as theCossacks, peasants and of settlements and forts of thewestern Baikal 124

Where the Irkutsk petition describes the a much less formulaic languagecomes to the fore than in the flattering the voevoda, that the rebelswanted to 'rule the town of Irkutsk'. Not only had the rebels called for the depo­sition of the voevoda, but also once it became obvious that Irkutsk Cossacks weredisinclined to comply, the rebels them with treason and rebellion, claim-

that they had conspired with the voevoda, Tellingly, the petition claimed thatit was deti boiarski e and Cossacks who had been robbed, but did not mention anytownspeople. Cossacks identified the posad with its agents of loftyMoscow merchants as a potential and not, as they viewed IrkutskCossacks, as rivals blocking their access to wealth. In this, they differed from ear­lier rebels, for example in Tomsk, where Moscow merchants were confronted asallies of the voevoda, Probably the much-increased distances and higher turnoverof caravan trade on the direct route to China changed these perceptions. The peti­tioners also confessed that they were appalled by the threats uttered towardsIrkutsk inhabitants:

166 Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720

said: 'We are not to leave Irkutsk, we will livetearlessly. But if we are indeed forced to leave ... we will return in

with five or six hundred men, and the voevoda'. rebelsalso] threatened that we [Irkutians] will not be able to hide.

Before that the opportunity was fnr~>tk'PTl PTlr'>tQ',>rt Selenga rebels inim-ically warned that:

If anybody shoots a bullet at us, we will burn the fortress from oneand on the other side we will kill the inhabitants of Irkutsk! 125

The loyalty to the Siberian and the tsar displayed by the IrkutskCossacks was also motivated by a kind of and patronageafforded by chancelleries to certain kinds of low-born motivated by theirtax-pavms potential, which usually on their group status.12~ Irkutsk wasa similar case, as Andrei Osharov's loyalty demonstrates. Although he was suf-

harassment in 1696 from syn boiarskii Sidor She stakov and the VQE: VOl::! a,Osharov nevertheless did not support the rebels. his recordof financial reliability afforded by the Siberian a bindingpromise of Osharov's future reimbursement to his creditorShestakov, Osharov had little reason to break away from the chancellery

In 1698-9 Osharov, the trust of Irkutsk Cos sacks and theirelected sud'ia Ivan the treasury to Moscow with his'comrade' Tit Evseev. 127

Evseev was loyal to the Siberian too. In 1697-8 hedenounced an Ilirnsk T. Kopytov, who had written a 'letter of advice' toE vseev in 1696 the Krasnoiarsk rebellion, what had happenedin Irkutsk and whether 'you are staunch of the affair?'Kopytov was banned to 'Iurukhansk.Ff Evseev's son Ivan was a major witness infavour of the townsman Gerasirn who accused voevoda Savelov ofembezzlement and the theft of his Thus, noblen>tll"''',;>tc,,'' networks controlled by voevodas, there existed networks spon­sored by the Siberian chancellery as well as others, at least to a based onfriendship. None of with the potential exception of some networksspawned by great nobles, could subsist for a time without the support of thePersonenverband.

Much less obvious are the motives that inclined the rebels to adopt athreatening stance. Rather than universal hatred, a more flexible attitude mayhave prevailed. Their threats served them well when it came to loanson advance salary. In addition to the reimbursement drawn from the Bel'skiifortre ss for the upcoming year 1696-7, the actu al extent of which was contestedby the rebels and the voevoda, they also managed to compel several Irkutsk detiboiarskie and the founder of the Irkutsk monastery of the Ascension to lend them500 quarters of rye each. Considering the aforementioned, the rebels may well

Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720 167

have credited themselves with a deal, since Moscow appeared predisposedto grant rena vment, 1:

After the of Irkutsk and raids on the hamlets of two deti boiarskie in thevicinity of the town, the point of unity among Cossacks drew close.

and quarrels after the near-failure at Irkutsk have beenexplained by different of tactics by the upper ranks and ordinaryCossacks.the latter more radical than the former, Close examination of thesources, a welter of evidence to that showed that it washardly this issue which so divisive. on their way across LakeBaikal back to the 'radical' leaders for survivaltheir strategy had failed and needed a new incentive, failed in theirbid for wealth. Thus Borisov wrote a letter to the immediatedeposiuon of the Andrei Belton. Cossacks who had in Udinskcomplied without hesitation. Yet Beiton had been a trusted sincebefore the treaty between and U dinsk had been . Aleksandrovand Pokrovskii continuity in their account of the and

even to the although witnesses unequiv-ocally stated that he was only once, when the Cossacks returned fromIrkutsk. Indeed, the uncorroborated first of Andrei Beiton serves as thecrucial for the of a democratic in Udinsk.t>' Realitywas not so factions to the institutional cultureof autocracy, allowing for considerable leeway through conflicting ideas.Borisov was motivated by the mechanisms of power in the Personenverband --once its aims were thwarted, it sought to its leader. Thus there was indeeda network spun between forts but instead of exclusively based on ordi-nary and oppositional in outlook, it was based on the reputation ofleaders and knitted between Cossack leaders and Personenverbdnde or at leastpotential for they had to be formed first. Since Afonasii

the father of had refused to act as the spy andrepresenrative, his son, too, lost influence.

Trade and rebellion

The disintegration of the rebel forces was already underway during their return tothe An incident on the upper reache s of the close to Lake Baikal,proved very divisive, as revealed during an investigation in I highlightingthe tensions between Cossack customs and their adherence to due process. Thereare several versions who robbed and tortured the rank-and-file IrkutskCossack Ivan Isakov and his servant Fedor Kochnev, Isakov, fromNerchinsk with merchandise, met with the rebels on the aboveIrkutsk. He had probably made a good profit at Nerchinsk, as yields even in inter­nal Siberian trade 22 to 25 per cent. 132 The Cossack claimed later, in arather formulaic way, that almost every Cossack had committed thecrime.

168 Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720

Il'insk and Kabansk Cossacksand their traitorous iasaul Ivashko Ivanov and comrades

over 200 men assailed me ,.. beat and wounded me to within an inch ofmy life with larch rods ... badly maimed and robbed me and my serf

Court the Irkutsk witnesses he cited have not ~m'"i"Prl

although virtually everyone who was involved in this incident for inter­rogation by voevoda Nikolev,

There are no doubts several of the Udinsk Cossacks,in the Ilinsk incidents most among them Borisov,

Ivanov syn and their Il'insk ally and former Udinsk CossackBorisov admitted that he was a member of the band which had assaultedalthough he claimed that all the Cossacks had 'to the lastone', his claim that the Personenverband had forced him to participate.He also tried to to the mercy:'We did not receive your sever-

merciful at that we were scraggy and ' .134

His strategy for defence, post factum to create a unifiedPersonenverband. failed, although it was by II Udinsk Cossacks andmusketeers.who always backed him. admitted that had taken Isakov'spossessions 'by force'. Six other Udinsk Cossacks also refused to make any state-ment at all; four of them, were listed as robbers.

Bcrisov's statement was word by word by Durnitsyn andwere to such a that any other strategy couldNevertheless it was more than the dilemma that brought

united front. the 150-200 Cossacks on thewas nobody else who was to out at all. Once the of Udinskwas in prison in Irkutsk, other Cossacks defied him. Il'insk E.Panikadilshchikov, as already mentioned, had reasons to wish Borisov and

the worst, even though he had taken part in the campaign to Irkutsk led byBorisov. On top of that it was Durnitsyn and who hadled the band, he did not fail to call the extortion by the proper orthodox term'vymucnenie, thus adding to the ostracism Borisov faced by 1698-9.This term linked the issue to Orthodox advisory literature on the treatment oftyrants and the of the rule of law. 135

Selenginsk desiatnik Anton leader of the second who in1698-9 was sent to Eniseisk under guard on other claimed that he hadnever wanted to be involved in the crime, although the above-mentioned Udinskwitnesses asserted that he was among the active robbers. He claimed that he hadjumped on the bank to stop the when he heard Isakov's cries onthe While nobody supported his over-assertive claim, Cossacksdid not fail to support their leader. Although they had not seen anything of the rob­bery and torture, they claimed it was Borisov and his comrades who had broughtIsakov's to the where they were divided. One of thesewitnesses was a godovalshchik from Udinsk, who was not accused and not even

Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720 169

mentioned in any of the three lists of those Cossacks who divided the booty. Sincehe had become part of the he accommodated to hisnew if of abode and to his comrades' version.l'"Udinsk voices are more although some of them are themselvesnot free of doubts, such as Ivan Alernasov, who in his statementsconcerning earlier events also attempted to distance himself from the atrocitiescommitted by Borisov and his comrades. His to exclude Borisov and hisclosest entourage from the Personenverband was cast in unambiguous words:

He [Alernasov] did not tell them to rob or to behave traitorously and villain-ously. did that all on their own and asked nobody else [toadvice] .137

about the of Anisirn Kozrnin synpi(j!tidesil'ltnikelected in May 1696, with the task of

representing the Udinsk Personenverband in Moscow at least until 1698. Thetsar's first decree of the dated 23 June 1 wasprompted by Paderin's at Moscow denouncing the robberies.t-f His caseshows that even among Udinsk at an stage in the unfolding of therebeIIion, individuals could their Even Borisov hadPaderin's election for a member of the upper strata. While thePersonenverband was isolated most of the time in the frontier issues of

and confrontations with merchants could open a field of opportunity whichmade it look more like a network, split into shifting coalitions which wereby and followed events.

The Siberian chancellery was alerted to the to trade by thePersonenverband. The decree answered to this peculiar condition of trade in thefrontier area in a typical Muscovite and appropriately ambiguous way:

... they robbed merchants and of all ranks and distributed the pro-ceeds among themselves. thoroughly all available means.If [your investigation], Afonasii Savelov's and the interrogation ofAnisirnko Paderin show that the [Selenga] servitors are ... guilty, first try tocoax them from their traitorous ... ways and reassure them of our great sov-

grace and salary, the local customs. Aim ... to win themover to petition the... and deliver the worst traitors, instigatorsand those who started this smuta for investigation. When they .Inves-

... how much they robbed from the ... voevodas, which chattels andwares and their and what they took from other of all ranks andfrom merchants. each of them individually. Put all stolenin our ... treasury and put those ... worst instigators in prison ... until youreceive our ... decree.t-?

The decree made provisions for settling the conflict by punishing its alleged insti­gators. This was a form of negotiation frequently applied in the dealings between

I70 Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720

the Cossacks and the govemrnent, which meant former leaders no dear tothe Personenverband were used as chips.l''?

It was Ivan letter which was most detrimental to the common causeso set in motion by Borisov. His letter also documents the involve-ment of the rebels in trade networks. admitted to have cashed in thekabala had stolen from while any further resolution concern-

appropriaticn of the debt to the Udinsk Cossacks. Inhis address he left little doubt as to whom he considered his master and source oflegitimate power he included the to Aleksandrov, the

in the Personenverband at a rather late point:

To our masters the Udinsk desiatniks and rank-and-fileCossacks ... Ilinsk Cossack Ivashko syn knocks the fore-head. 100 roubles have been received from Afonasii Putimets' but he did notpayout nine roubles. He entreated to be on account of these nineroubles the merchants Ivan Maksirnovich and Iakovlev aguarantee for Afonasii that are on the bill for us in Irkutsk. Now it isyour decision, masters, whether the rest shall be recovered from Afonasii ....Our masters above], have mercy on me masters and

me my remuneration for my travel expenses and for the zeal I haveshown. I will be your slave in future as you see fit. For this I am knockingmy forehead.t-'

The putative stratification of Cossacks on Lake Baikal is called into question bythis which also concems the of the extorted kabala. This prom-

note was part of Isakov's the robbers exacted it along with avoluntary conveyance the kabala payable to Ivan It ismost for the structure of Muscovite and Siberian that mer-chants collaborated to such a with the rebel Cossacks who were describedby Isakov as: 'traitors, rioters and murderers of the soul tdushegubtsy)",

however did not content himself with verbal abuse. After his wretchedreturn to Irkutsk he soon started litigation. His aim was to exact from his debtor,Afonasii Putirnets, or from Putirnets's agent at Irkutsk, Prokof'ii Ivanov, themoney left from his transactions. But Ivanov failed to comply with his obliga-

although Isakov produced a letter to Ivanov from Putirnets's salesman atIl'insk, which ordered the payment of 109 roubles to Isakov, In a moodafter the voevoda Savelov ordered Ivanov to be daily between 22and 30 July 1696, a practice called a procedure to exact debts.142

On the 31st Ivanov demanded a delay in payment whieh was until 18August; even from day to day Ivanov tried to convince Isakov that hispatron would reurrn and arrange for payment, yet Isakov found out that his debtorhad set out for northern China, to the emporium of Naun. According to Isakov,Ivanov soon proceeded to threaten him with the loss of his debt, Putirnetswould pay the robbers at Ilinsk. With Savelov's power already waning, nothingwas done until, in early 1697, Afonasii Putimets returned to Irkutsk. Irkutsk

Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720 171

Cossacks had Savelov in a kind of velvet rebellion, but eventhen the so-called unity of the Cossack upper strata did not exert any influence onIsakov's Summoned to the voevoda's office by elected sud'ia and synboiarskii Ivan Putimets bluntly stated that he had paid 109 roubles to

and at Il'msk when with the kabala and the volun-tary conveyance, and added that did not use any force to me'. UIUI<:;<:;'J,

there was no need to resort to brute force in this case, since the Cos sacks couldon the assurance by two other merchants at Ilinsk the

rernaining nine which Putimets had not paid on the To Durnitsynand Putimets was of the trade networks with which and theirallies on the wanted to do business. On the one hand, the newly estab­lished trade partners relied on a sense of due process all too in Putimets'sand As the Moscow Aleksei Filat'ev's sales man-ager, on the other hand, Putirnets could also on his yetwhat most interfered with any serious towards redress of Isakov's smevancewas the power of the Udinsk Cossacks in the valley. Althoughthis power was as we have seen Isakov's casewas at the very heart of the rebellion. Isakov never attempted to reclaimthe money from until the rebel leaders had been . Unlike othercases, he did not succeed until a new voevoda arrived in Irkutsk with renewedqualities of and readiness to impart . It was only his petitionin 1699 that set in motion the investigation on 2 mentioned

when voevoda Nikolev summoned and Durnitsyn toIrkutsk for The total judgement debt owed to Isakov amounted to329 roubles plus the not even this modestly wealthy rank-and-fileCossack could find any redress to his a coalition of rebelPersonenverbdnde and the Moscow-based networks of merchants.ts-

If Isakov entertained a notion of his foes as traitors, rioters and 'soul-destroyers'the rebels mirrored it as best they could. The infuriated Isakov reportedthat when robbing him in the winter-hut on the the Cossacks day­dreamed of their plans, which Chinese would never allow in their lifetime,and the treaty of Nerchinsk finally sealed: 'It would be wonderful, father(batiushkay, to recover the Amur!'144

Protected from all sides Irkutsk much from the treaty of Nerchinsk,whereas the had fought the Chinese allies, the Mongols, but lostmost in the terms of the treaty. In other words, Udinsk Cossacks told the rank­and-file Cossack Isakov through this seemingly unconnected turn of phrase thatin their e yes he was a traitor like all the rest of Irkutsk, who with the termsof the treaty, and a merchant and therefore was rightfullyrobbed. the Chinese on the Amur would have meant that trade wasdiverted to the route through Mongolia and left Russian territory at Selengmsk,or at least booty. This was indicative of the self-image of the Setenga

which was based largely on their towards Savelov, and, byimplication, all of Irkutsk. Most ominously, Isakov's interrogation protocol con­tains no questions who owned his merchandise on the part of Borisov,

172 Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720

keeping his distance from a still who claimed thattorturing Isakov he and his Cossacks tried to establish whether these wereSavelov's had to admit that the Cossacks had stolenIsakov's merchandise and movables, as well as that such an action was

all law and custom. More forthrightly, disdain forllJ"UC~J", he also asserted that 50 roubles out of the booty from this raid were usedto pay back the Udinsk Cossacks' loans to the Irkutsk monastery of the

to veil his attempt to live up to the disappointed rebels'expectations of their leader at the expense of another rank-and-fileBorisov failed dramatically; his closest Udinsk allies and the very few hard­liners from Il'insk had gone too far. were in consequence gradually isolatedamong most, if not all of their forrner followers, at the very latest themvesugauon, Robbing a rank-and-file Cossac k threatened to destabilize trade;thus one of the basic tenets of the to facilitate the mercantilerivalry with Irkutsk and was in No merchant dare send his

through the valley, the very official caravans, even1"111'1"",,1 irrc it to a Coss ack group, as as the rebels cou ld not even avoid rob-

one of their own, a fellow Cossack.it was to Borisov after the near-failure at

the first on the road to the of the rebellion.Isakov had felt secure when he left Irkutsk. He travelled to and from the Selengawith only one servant, without any cover from fellow Cossacks or other mer­chants a Personenverband could have saved him from the small group ofCossacks which assaulted him. The l690s was already a period in which mer­chants could travel fairly safe most of the time; apart from the open com­rnencing beyond and the first part of the way from Udinsk toNerchinsk.nomad assaults were Under such conditions, merchants.Irkutsk Cossacks and the Siberian chancellery contended that a discontentedCossack band halfway to Nerchinsk had to be satisfied at anycost.

It was the same disillusion which drove the rebels after the ofIrkutsk to attack syn boiarskii Stepan Kazan' in his homestead in the small vil-

of Kolesnikov, Althou gh during the investigation U dinsk Cossacks tried toprotect their leader, piatidesiatnik Maksirn Posel'skii, they could not stop theirSelenginsk comrades, who, as already mentioned, had earlier elected Kazan'prikazchik in II' insk, from and, in the most important details, con­CU1:Tll11g testimony of the injury inflicted on Kazan' and his family. It took somecarefully calibrated provocation to overcome the inhibition to rob Kazan'. Onreturning from Irkutsk, where the Udinsk Cossacks had at least received a sub­stantial part of their salary, they moored on the banks of the in thehamlet of Kolesnikov, where Kazan' lived. According to custom, and with theearlier confrontations with Borisov in mind, Stepan Kazan' came to theoffering a barrel of sturgeon as a gift (v pochest'y, thus acknowledgingPosel'skii's and the absent Borisov's authority and the Cossacks.The Udinsk Cossacks also about another barrel, and Posel'skii 'and com-

Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720 173

rades', as witnesses bothered to finally on a of two roubles.Although Cossacks fetched the Posel'skii and his men never paid the

Kazan' at the and demanded his money. Reluctant topay, Posel'skii sent his men, the Udinsk desiatnik Semen Uteshev and comradesto get even more fish. When his to oneSelenginsk witness. Kazan' stood in the doorway if

wanted to rob him. Without ceremony Uteshev and hispiatidesiatnik with a musket. One witness saw Uteshev and his

Kazan's and found the wounded family, wife anddaughter 'staggering about in their blood'. Kazan' claimed that 57 roubles-worthof clothes were stolen and others tom, there was no substantiation of thisdetail; but every witness remembered the five to six barrels of stolen fish. Theprikaz:chiikstressed that he had suffered and thus feared to leavehis house. Honour was an important force in Muscovite therewere frequently cases of injured honour in court at Irkutsk.t-? Honour could haveserious on the ability to offer to Cossacks. Thus in 1700,Nerchinsk Cossacks dishonoured the new sent from Moscow. OneCossack the opinion

at the voevoda's court ... before many with disobedience.'We do not those who are sent [from Moscow: theranks]' .148

Thus, Kazan' risked all chance of future position if his reputation was

Kazan', estimated the motive for the crime: Posel'skii'stactical choice is less attributable to his social but rather to his currentposition as the Personenverband's leader. He had to reassert his role even morevigorously to embody the aims of the group he led, just as Kazan' had done ear­lier in confrontations with Borisov and the Udinsk Cossacks. After their unex-

defeat at the Udinsk Cossacks to get even with their foeson the Consequently, to evade on the part of the '-V~~U"''-':''

Posel'skii unleashed them on another putative member of the 'upper layer ofCossack ' who was in fact a leader of a rival rebel Personenverband.Aleksandrov and Pokrovskii named Posel'skii as a candidate of the 'housed'Cossacks for the position of elected prikazchik at Udinsk in the early stages ofthe rebellion, to pronounce the difference to the 'golyt'ba"; in an analogy to theUkrainian and Don Cossacks. This was a seemingly clear-cut case involving anumber of Cossacks frustrated by their forced who shared an expe­rience of brutal requisitioning unrestrained by any law or command. Still, therewas no resentment directed at Kazan' .149

Posel'skii chose a different tactic when he returned to Udinsk, When the pos­sessions of Anton Savelov, the voevoda of Nerchinsk, were fetched from theIl'rnsk Trinity monastery on the to Udinsk, it was Posel'skii's task to sealthe storehouse's entrance. He repeatedly attempted to persuade the recently

174 Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720

elected Ivan Novikov, who relieved Borisov on aaffair, to confiscate these in favour of the treasury;

Novikov, was reluctant. Posel'skii's stance later pitched himsome of the recruited who in the summer of 1697 seized thechattels on the way to the office. Other Cossacks tried to dissuadethem, but were at sabre point, while the assets were distributed .150

NE: verthele ss, Pose!'skii remained a on the at least until1700, the remnants of the rebels' power. His policy was stillto appease the but to out criminal leaders who had fallenfrom the Personenverband's favour: thus, he gave testimony Borisov in1697-8.151

The alliance between and Udinsk was shattered after theassaults on Kazan' and and threats uttered by Borisov in Irkutsk concern-

another common Udinsk and to Irkutsk witheven more Cossacks remained Still, Borisov's power on the wasunbroken for another year, and Kazan' did not dare to accuse Udinsk Cossacksuntil I 700 .152

The of power that remained with the Udinsk Cossacks was not coter-minous with Moisei Borisov's tenure of the position of which endedrelatively soon, in 1697. 153 Whereas some historians have himan ideal and believed him exclusively by members of theupper strata, the Udinsk Cossac ks had serious him .154 At firs t

, it seems to confirm the strata that Semen D'Iakonovaccused Borisov a year after the of Irkutsk, in 1697, invokingpublicly the delo, D'Iakonov, was one of Borisov's closestadvisors at least until the first week of Lent 1697, when Borisov's followersthreatened to drown the 'fat' Cossacks in the water of the river Uda, whileD'iakcnov was still a member of the circle. His ambiguous role shows that thecalculations of Borisov's closest advisors included the victimization of someCossacks and deti boiars kie if sueh a might control of the Coss acks;but the Borisov also testify to D'rakonov's acute aware-ness that the had gone too far. Borisov was and syn boiarskiiIvan Novikov was elected prikazchik 'by the whole , as he reported.r"While many of the 'old and fat' Cossacks fled Udinsk for a while, andconflict was undoubtedly the confrontation over Anton Savelov's belongingsshows that between those who maintained a legalist stance and theothers who redistributed at sabre's point did not follow simple patterns of wealthand social standing. These were rather drawn by radicalization stem-

from forced recruitment, dislocation and the loss of from whichthe newly recruited Cossacks still suffered.

brought against Borisov amounted not just to 'a deficit in the"O',I'Y'E'19n'" finances and gunpowder'. The Cossacks claimed arrears amountingto half their salary for the year 1697-8 by January, which meant that Borisov hadnot bothered to payout the full annual allowance, although Moscow and Irkutskhad taken every imaginable to ensure satisfactory levels of supplies.

Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720 175

Altogether, Borisov was indicted of 3,498 roubles, 150 furs of sableand fox and 51 bales of Nankeen a record sum his short tenure. Two

worth of were lost without a trace in the whohad acceded to the office of elected by to uphold the commonweal (the 'dobroe thus failed where Savelov had been too.D'iakonov also blamed Borisov for favour to his sworn the for-mer Cossack Matfei who was sent to China with some of the wares andcash seized from the voevodas, As the sworn man Pavel Paderin asserted, theprikazchik clandestinely exempted Leont'ev from the tithe on whichUdinsk Cossacks had bothered to fix at 30 roubles in the circle. In this case, how-ever, the rank-and-file Udinsk Cossacks remained neutral, 57

It is thus not clear whether the was Borisov's initiative orbacked by his supporters, and it cannot be ruled out that who could notbe saved anyway, was the beast of burden of his former supporters.

Bcrisov's closest provided a number of for a new engage-ment in trade. Some even to continue years after Borisov's deposition,enlisting the of Udinsk just as did in his transactionswith Isakov's kabala. In 1699 the son of the former Cossack andmember of Irkutsk Nikifor Lanin in Udinsk

to claim a kabala worth 90 roubles. Only one of the faultingthe musketeer Vasilii could be found in town, He cunningly

persuaded the callow Kozma to petition by mutual agreement the prikazchik;Andrei to release so that he could pay his debt at Kabansk. InOctober, Kazanets returned with empty hands; he was offered horses andNankmg couon at an unacceptable as was confirmed by the witness he hadtaken to Kabansk, Udinsk desiatnik Vasilii Starozhilov, also asserted thatIvan Novikov as to deceive Kazanets, Kozmapetitioned to Beiton, only orally, without any written confirmation, to sendfor and his father Ivan and arrest them for failing to pay compensation,However when the messenger arrived at Kabansk, Vasilii had disappeared andhis father forcibly resisted arrest. To make worse for Andrei Belton, a wit-ness to assert that he had seen Beiton a bribe, a horse offeredby Tsynkov, The Kabansk Cossack desiatnik Maksirn Lobanov, alsoclaimed that he had obliged himself to the horse back to Udinsk, The sec-ond guarantor for the deal he named, musketeer Sidor deniedany involvement, although he admitted he had heard that Beiton had aninducement.

Desperately a way out, Beiton accusedLobanov of slander.There mayhave been some truth in this, yet in the first it sheds light on conditions onthe Beiton was still to the Personenverband, dominatedin no small measure by the remaining rebels. Lobanov was caught right in themiddle; he indeed had a , and he was determined to carry his issuethrough. He backed another allegation at the same time, directed againstBalmashnoi and Okhera, who still lived in Ilinsk in 1700.As Ilinsk clerk FilipLeon'tev claimed, these three were notorious for their unruly behaviour; they

176 Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720

owned for the all day in the tavern andplayed at hazard and dice. In the eyes of Lobanov and other ,-·v~~a",,,,~,

were also not averse to further acts of treason and re bellion , an expectati onthat was by their role in the confrontations between Ilinsk andUdinsk Cossacks and the seizure of Turchaninov and the voev odas' possessions,Moreover, Maksim Lobanov suffered from their blows and acts of whichhad cost him a horse and further 58The two cases were connected bymore than just a lone plaintiff Vasilii's Nefed who was co-signatory of the had worked with and his comradesin 1696 with the aim of Turchaninov.P? Andrei ofUdinsk he was, had undertaken to detain Balmashnoi and

were only taken to Moscow for when theBeiton/Kazanets case was well under way in 1701. What is more, Nefed Tsvnkovhad been sent as a with the official caravan of merchantLiangusov in 1699 to he was thus unavailable when Kazanets trie d torecoup the debt. Whether he owed this favour and the connected benefits inadvance to Beiton or to his old friends in the and Udinsknetwork cannot be decided from the files; these appointments were often handled>!('('(n'r! ;1",0- to the 'queue'; that Coss acks decide d on these issues in a formalis­tic way. This kind of controlled rotation is indicative of distributive principlesrooted in equality; inasmuch as over life, it was not 'mod­em' principles of selection that applied. In the majority of cases, unlike the 'free'Cossack groups Kumke observed in the queue did not apply to ,~uU""5

functions. Merit, popularity and honour were the more frequent principles ofselection observed by Siberian which had a certain fororganization and were not completely averse to hierarchy and social status. HiO

Still, whether the queue decided or not, it meant that Cossacks aof influence on matters of assignmenr,

Thus it is hardly a coincidence that there were at least three well-knownUdinsk rebels and of Borisov among the caravan's II Apartfrom these were Aleksei Uvarov, who was sent with the secret rebels'letter to in 1696 and aceompanied the tsar's fur treasure to Moscowunder Borisov in 1696-7. I was not able to establis h his kinship in Udinsk,although a syn Liubirn, owner of saltworks who a caravan toChina and served as an envoy to the Mongols lived there. So did the piatidesiat­

nik Ivan, whose amounted to at least 600 roubles in Chinese atlas,which he claimed were illegally appropriated by Turchaninov.tv' The third formersupporter of Borisov on the 1699 caravan was Petr Kainov, indicted for killingIrkutsk Coss acks in a conflict the and of Irkutsk. 1l)2 AndreiBeiton became even more involved in this case when Kainov was eventuallyfound in 1701 while he hid in Nerchinsk living 'on building sites by his ownfancy, not enlisted as a Nerchinsk Cossack', after returning from China, thevoevoda reported. Andrei Beiton stopped the convict's transport, changed the

and ordered sureties in Udinsk, Kainov, unsurprisingly, thepower relations on the fled on his way to Irkutsk .1l)3 It was no exagger-

Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720 177

arion for the piatidesiamiktormentors before

at

Kazan' to claim that he could not accuse his1701, as he feared retaliation. Maksim Posel'skii was still in

as an unsalaried in thecapacity he observed Kozma Kazanets' and

he took no but a very distanced account which cr rm...",'tprl

Beitcn's case in llJ"UC~J".

,ucuV"5U the is it is obvious in the that Nikolevindicted Beiton for not sureties before he released Vasilii a pro-cedure by the 1649 Ulozhenie code of laws and explicitly cited byLobanov and in the opinion. Kozma did not improve his casewhen he dishonoured Beiton and his father Afonasii in front of the then leftthe voevoda's office a confrontation while the court was not fin-ished. Thus, Beiton is likely to have got away with a minor sentence; neverthe-less, taken with the arrest of some of the amongthem Aleksei Uvarov and the Il'insk Cossacks mentionedthe rule of the rebel Personenverband suffered a severe blow in 170 I. Most ofthis was or at least initiated by local court ratherthan by central even as some of the following inEniseisk or Moscow.

Similar conclusions can be drawn if we look at the picture of the demiseof the rebellion. Aleksandrov has stressed that it was 'liquidated' fromabove once the new voevoda arrived in October 1698. In his the localimpetus to pacification is called into question. Thus it is that mvesuga-tions started only after Nikolev arrived in Irkutsk, while the elected sud'iaPerfil'ev as voevoda below) did not dare to interferewith the rebels when Moscow ordered an investigation. Yet it was notNikolev who launched this it had a more It wasindeed the Siberian chancellery that decided first, on I December 1697, to havethe of both the voevoda and the rebels yet its decisiontook an estimated nine months to reach Irkutsk. Still without news of this deci-

Udinsk Cossacks planned to seize Sidor Shestakov's caravan in March. Anatrocity during Shestakov's journey to China provoked confrontations betweenthe syn boiarskii and the Nerchinsk which resulted in his death. Yeteven in this period there was no in the typical Personenverband patternof collaboration with their leaders and In the same month, the SelengmskCossacks elected another syn boiarskii, Petr hostile to the UdinskPersonenverband and proud of his connections at Peter's court, prikazchik ofKabansk.ls> Only in Udinsk in the first week of Lent did the short-lived capriceof Borisov and his comrade s develop a certain momentum. Under threat ofkilled Borisov and his advisors boasted that they would throw them in the water

the 'fat and old' Cossacks fled to live elsewhere. 1M

As already mentioned, Irkutsk Cossacks did not side with voevoda Savelovbecause of his virtues, but rather on account of the lack of alternatives during the

When the wife of the relieving voevoda arrived at Irkutsk in 1697 all alone,apart from her young son, after the voevoda Semen T. Poltev had died

I 78 Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720

the the Cossacks did not allow Savelov to serve a second term,the last week before Easter they Nikolai Sernenovich Poltev as

their new voevoda, and elected the but and IvanMaksirnov syn Perfil'ev sud'ia a traditional institution in also knownfrom Krasnoiarsk and but in this case this was a kind of sec­ond in view of the immature voevoda, When Moscow's letter of confir-mation arrived, Perfil'ev to Savelov's misdeed s in

With to the he indeed was at first reluctant to take astem It is not clear whether it was still the last of Savelov'stenure of office or on Perfil'ev's initiative, but at some stage in 1696-7Irkutsk Cossacks the claims of the Cossacks for moreto be sent from Nerchinsk, There was obviously a felt need to appease theCossacks on the other side of the lake. Hi8

In I Borisov's advisor Semen D'Iakonov decided that theprikaz:chiikshould finally be The of his decision is notand there may be doubts about the of Novikov's thatafter D'iakonov had invoked the affair, 'Cossacks of all ranks'deposed Borisov, The syn boiarskii Novikov was elected prikazchik by 'all thegarrison' to rule and them until further notice by the Siberian chan-

Yet there are unrnissable of broader dissatisfaction among theUdinsk Cossacks on 8 I a written petition was delivered at theUdinsk office, by 'Udinsk deti mounted and footCossacks and musketeers', half their for the current year, whichBorisov had not yet them. to Novikov, Borisov was reluctant tohand over the account that he had no such Already inDecember syn boiarskii Staisupov had accused Borisov of alienating theUdinsk share of 505 out of the total of 1,010 roubles sent from Nerchinsk for theSelenga Cossacks' salaries under Staisupov's which Borisov did notaccount for at all; there were also no accounts of distribution among Cossacks .170

This supports the view that it was highly unlikely that 'the upper layer' of theCossacks, all on their own and the will of the majority, Borisov.

Poltev and Perfil'ev the instruction for investigation to Irkutsk syn

boiarskii Andrei Savelev syn Moskvitinov in June 1698, which was probably notan accidental choice. Moskvitinov was connected to Turchaninov by eventsreaching back as far as 1678, when a court case reveals serious conflicts betweenthe then ordinary Cossack Moskvitinov and Cossack Petr Studenitsyn, Theirwives, Anna doch and Maritsa Ivanovna doch had quarrelled publicly,accusing each other of debauchery and serious dishonour. During the usual courtproceedings, the plaintiff and the defendant had to agree on whichturned out to be difficult since several were not acceptable to Andrei Moskvitin,who referred to earlier conflicts and dishonour. Among them were the wife ofElizar Sadovnikov and Katerina Turchaninova, Three ofTurchaninovs are known to the records in Irkutsk between 1672 and 1720: IvanAleksandrov syn, his sons Gerasirn, Leont'ei and Iakov, and grandson'Ierentei; all Turchaninovs in the records unequivocally relate to the same kin,

Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720 179

with the only of Katerina for whom no kin has been recorded. In Iwhich is highly Petr Studenitsyn lived in the same neighbourhood asIakov Turchaninov, with their Cossacks who lived shoulderto shoulder among them a Sadovnikov in that year, tried to aneighbouring peasant of his land. Konakov with comrades apprehendedthem on the voevoda's order. Konakov's wife had disappointedStudenitsyn in 1678 in court by with Andrei Moskvitin.!" Once thisshows that honour was an resource throughout the Siberian frontier,where it was among the issues about the popularity of a leader.

such as these are indicative of groups linked by kinship, thePersnnenverhand: and women as plaintiffs or defendantsoccur very infrequently in the Irkutsk these cases show that could pleadtheir case in court and defended in conflicts concernmghonour.In It is more than likely that Katerina's kin was to some inimicalto Andrei Moskvitin at this stage. Subsequent events the aftermathof the rebellion suggest that, with Moskvitin, Perfil'ev consciously chosea well-known foe of Turchaninov,

With to the Moskvitin was bound by clear governmentinstructions. Rebels were to be accommodated, while only those who had perpe­trated serious crimes from murder and to embezzlement were tobe in the very month Moskvitin was sent to the inves­tigation had commenced seriously in Il'insk and Udinsk Lovtsov, Tarakanovskiiand made their statements; in July such as MaksimP,,~pl'd,ii Ivan Oshurkov, Pavel Paderin, and the Il'insk rank-and-file added evi-dence. Poltev and Perfil'ev sent the first on Borisov's and theUdinsk petitions, including records of the allegations

former voevoda Savelov and Turchaninov to the Siberianchancellery on II August, whereas only in October did the new voevoda,Nikolev, arrive in Irkutsk. m His presence between1699 and 170I, yet they had already started without him, and largely on accountof the of the Udinsk Cossack discussed above, which were directed attheir former elected Borisov's mishap as a prikazchik is hardly sur-

Once the Udinsk Cossacks had returned from campaign, Borisov wasthrown back on his closest entourage, since he couId no promise unlimitedm111(w·tlH·,iti,"~ for booty in wealthy Irkutsk, not to of the famed Amur. Toshow of accommodation increased their loyalty, but alienated thoseCossacks who were excluded from the narrowest circle. Since the rebellionually broke down by itself, there was little need to suppress or 'liquidate' it fromabove. As with other Siberian town rebellions, it was common sense to accom­modate ordinary rather than a particularly cunning move by Peter 1.Therewas much less continuity in the uprising than has heretofore been claimed; nev­ertheless, there were many persons who remained in their position and wieldedconsiderable power. The threat which the old Personenverband, constituted bythe treaty on the 'dobroe delo"; posed to trade made sure that Moscow and Irkutskhad to accommodate demands raised on the However, another

asked for an

1689-1720180 Local and central power in the Baikal

Persnnenverband: which partially

'WU5V!11 Turchaninov's misdemeanours were Finally in1700-1, when scores were settled on all he had to pay 822 roubles toSelenginsk and Udinsk claimants. This considerable sum cannot be broken down,however, since Moskvitinov's only list claims, nowhere recordingany to corroborate them.'?" Due process in Muscovy relied on sroupingsof inhabitants in a similar vein to the The decision to inves-

Turchaninov's misdemeanours and therefore meant, in aclimate of if somewhat weakened social cohesion in thePersnnenverhand: Irkutsk's basic with the demands. Unlikemany Siberian Turchaninov's lasted He remained in

until 1698-9. Not even then did he receive his for his lost years.Only remuneration for 1698-9 was on behalf of his petition in which hetried to incline voevoda Nikolev to mercy, at his utter destitution.Similarly, Savelov could not escape he was fined 4,000 roubles.t'"The rebellion had about to in theBaikal area, and at least temporarily, Turchaninov was not included inthese alliances.

Conclusion

Rather than by divisions between social groups, rebellion on the wast1";,yo-p1"prl by competition between different Personenverbdnde and towns. A ten-

to seek the support of the central institutions and was therebefore the rebellion; it lasted during the rebellion and after it as well. It took

different and varied in arguments, but united all warring parties However,the central state could not rule in a despotic fashion or by a strategy of divide et

it had to on the strongest or at on more thanone, without able to divide local agents like the rebelliousPersonenverbdnde. At the heart of the conflict in 1696-7 were aboutthe terms of trade and competition about eligibility to official positions and toreceive or distribute subsidies. Rather than ousting all voevodas from Siberia, thequarrelling Personenverbdnde pursued different political One optionwas to build various, more equal than hierarchical, forms of networks1"1"1""'0- on the local of the Personenverband in the trading frontier, andthe capacity of wealthy nobles, monastery authority, local or centralchancellery personnel, or merchant agents for advancing money and soliciting thecnanceuery on behalf of the rebels. The aim was to the monopoliespl1i""",rl by a voevoda or a competing town, such as Irkutsk. Due to characteris­tic Personenverband dynamics, however, after the failure of the initial aspirationsto rule Irkutsk from the there was a strong impulse to break the law andallow unrestricted booty-making in order to preserve the authority of the Cossackleader. While this had the unwanted disadvantage of seriously disrupting the flowof trade, and consequently led to the split in the Personenverband, another

Local and central power in the Baikal 1689-1720 181

strategy consisted of the aforementioned elements, but observed due proce ss andequal administration of the mentioned this previouslyneglected tendency is observable from the onset of the rebellion, on theSelenginsk side of the rift between rebel and the Personenverbdnde. It increas-

united the sides after the of Irkutsk throu ghout the late l690suntil the first decades of the century. It can be traced from the conflictsover the treatment of Turchaninov and the fort Il'rnsk, to the local initiatives indelivering the errant former leaders of the rebellion. The individual statements inthe ordered the cases of members of the rebelPersonenverband and outsiders the voevoda for their recruitment inSelenginsk and Udinsk in 1720 add to this In the aftermath of therebellion.a temporary balance took into account, on the one hand, the confronta-tion with the over the issue of their ancestral of the Kudarinsk

that had proven disruptive to the point of theSignificant demands of the Buryats were fulfilled under Kazan' in Udinsk,On the other hand, Andrei whom he relieved, had yielded to trade-relateddemands of members of the former rebel Personenverband. His trial, although hewas eventually acquitted, is another of the towards due process andequal

Moscow the administrator Nikolev,who, his toward the former observed the rules ofdue process, thus promoting the inner peace that was needed for smooth

local agents like the elected sud'ia Perfil'ev orCossacks on the successfully initiated this policy, which central agentsafterwards sustained. The rebels for a few of the most recruitedand most socially dislocated who could more by robbery

for and their former leaders when it turned out thatthey did not sufficiently advance inner peace and stability and misappropriated

The relevant central decree reached the Baikal area only after this deci­sion. A side effect of this was a of the Personenverband, sincemvesugauon was then conducted individually rather than collectively, disruptingjury traditions that had stabilized the Personenverband. This policy was pro­moted by the successes of the rebels in trade, by the promising intrade with China, and by the timely inclination of Irkuuans to compromise. Thus,local elite and Cossacks central support in a situation with per­spectives that critically involved local affairs, but also those of the empire as awhole. This explains why the centre found it difficult to seize initiative, whilelocal aspirations took the ascendancy.

Similarly, on trade until 1703, was reluctant on all butmoderate terms to join the rebel movemeru.!"

Conclusion

Much more than has been until the Muscovite wasdependent on local elites and groups the collaboration of the tsarand central to bolster their own influence. central sup-

as the local became involved in the affairs of byened mobility of land and and of local elites oninterregional trade and regulation.' centralization cannot fully explain

imperial in Siberia. The tsar and the central chancelleries neededthe and initiative of local agents and Cossack groups, who had astake in and provided by the centre, in order toaccelerate this movement and provide, in sufficient financial resourcesfor Muscovy's military reforms. It has been overlooked that of Russian

to Siberia increased the economic and social destruction of the North,the tsar of it, the capability of a group

that was not part of the elite, to exploit other of the WhileKivelson has demonstrated that the provincial gentry could influencegovernment decisions that concerned them, this study proves that the SiberianCossacks;a non-noble group, wielded similar powers. Cossacks exercised thesepowers by writing and collective petitions during rebellions.Thus, established a new Cossack group that around a aim

to the terms of trade, to stand in for each other during investigation,to display loyalty to the tsar while upholding their ends, and to adminis­trators and their followers who had, in their gone too far. Limited, butVll!;On)US public control helps to explain both enhanced sensitivity to administra­tive maltreatment and effective tax collection that have been noticed before butexplained, in with the myth of Siberia, exclusively in unsuitable modemterms of efficiently centralized bureaucracy irreconcilable with contradictoryclaims that the 'tsar is far away' and unable to enforce orders. Cossacklanguage and symbolic systems and the fledgling, albeit limited Siberian public

integrated seamlessly, though with conflicts, into the autocraticempire. Mutually contradicting guiding ideas, derived from a multitude of laws,U"'.I"'C~, local and Cossack customs, interpreted the empire's institutional mech­anisms, such as the affair according to the needs of particular localCossack groups while simultaneously allowing to claim loyalty and harmony

Conclusion 183

with the tsar's interests. Cultural and the of the expandingwere promoted by the institutionalization of Cossack customs, in particu-

lar the group, the of advice and deposingthe leader the voevoda if he did not live up to the

while reliance on the group reinforced collective a funda-mental institution of autocracy. In this sense, this book moves away fromassertions of autocratic control the towards a new explana-tion based on the way in which local groups the institutional culture ofthe to further their own needs and to settle the fierce local disputes.

The Cossack group, the was a suitable power basis for theSiberian Cossacks to influence political decisions in their favour since it wasadapted to frontier conditions. As a temporary group it was orientedtowards aims rather than the acquisition or maintenance of social status,not based on kinship relations and could therefore flexibly to the

demands of service and trade. The defensive valour of a primary group is hardto match by an modern army, in numbers. The CossackPersonenverband therefore was the most cost-efficient ofprotecting valuable government in frontier conditions. Thearmy was never sent in, partly because it quickly would have exhausted resourcesbrought from Muscovy at great expense, partly because it was less efficient inprotecting transports in the frontier environment than Cossacks. The over-Y'W mzconcern was that the furs inevitably would have been tempting for any

therefore far more numerous force sent to thematerial means for such an army to go to Siberia inevitably meant that theyacquired the opportunity to barter furs. In sum, a force capable of therebels was never worth the costs of its deployment and would have interruptedtrade and the of fur-tribute to a far greater than any recalcitrantvoevoda or rebels. This, and the bottlenecks created by frontier conditions, rein-forced by the authority of the Personenverband over and the to

advice to their commander and the tsar's , the voevoda, gener-ated a favourable basis for with him and with Moscow. From thesenegouations arose a whole system of that were made conditional onservice achievements, but were allotted flexibly and mostly locally by thevoevoda or by rebels to individual Cossacks and Cossack groups on a case­to-case basis. These grants and credit agreements of up to three years promotedtrade and expansion and made the rank-and-file who protected trans­ports, fundamentally interested in matters of trade. Consequently, to ensure thesmooth functioning of the system that was so vital for the tsar's revenues, as theSiberian fur was a commodity and readily convertible revenue forfinancing wider military reforms, the Cossacks received their salary in afashion that was uncommon in early modern service relationships.

Cossacks, on the one hand, became actively interested in due process of lawto ensure reliability in trade relations. On the other hand, since thePersonenverband was aim-oriented, conflict with due process was inevitable,especially when local Cossacks perceived the terms of trade and obligations

184 Conclusion

unjust. Differences of opinion were out in the public ofreviews and Cossack assemblies on in the town square, or in thechurch Service issues limited these public thematically, but

were accessible members of other social groups also took in cam-and although the Cossacks predominated numerically.

Honour, although the tsar and the voevoda in the last instanceit, referred to this limited Cossack public eligibility for prestigious andlucrative service means of Cossacks for thehonour of the elected and for their to return from rona-terrnrnents that was often disputed in manned outlying forts.

In the last resort, all Siberian Cossacks to wares withMoscow and across the frontier. Only a common institutional culture could guar­antee the smooth and reliability of internal and external trade relations.

accepted the tsar as an equal , whileCossacks as traitors as soon as they were not in the tsar's refusing theto trade. Universal service was the in the Muscovite ;:;JlJfJJjI~,

not, as for in the of estate In w!U<:;1 ,,~,

concepts of service therefore became embedded in the of Cossack trade.The affair, in this context primarily the tsar's mainly finan-cial interests and the tasks that his the chan-

personnel.and the voevodas were to carry out, into themain institution of their trade. Institutions put the symbolical order and perma­nence of an on display, although this order is naturally more likely tobreak down than to endure. To enhance reliability and permanence, any institution,and the affair, on an element of illusion. Those whoadhere to it ritually confirm to each other that it is derived from pure and authen-tic sources of the decrees and even where the association istenuous at for in the case of formal deposition of the voevoda, Thus,institutional analysis helps to in a dominated by themythical, illusionary elements in the affair, noticed but hardly under-stood by and modern observers. With to the wordand affair, Lukin has cautioned that 'illusion' is a judgemental term,which should not be used in historical accounts,' but here it is used analytically toexplain reliability. This derivation from the 'pure' source also made independentCossack which they claimed to be in accordance with the insti-tution of the tsar's his interests or 'profit', impregnable to investigationsand the justice. Where in some early modern republics limited public

were structured and focused by symbols of community," in Siberiaalthough in rebellions they sometimes up as well, such as the karshi inUdinsk the affair provided analogous functions in the Siberian par-titioned and public limited by service issues. As a set of related norms,expectations and patterns of behaviour, this institution provided resources ofpower of which actors could make use in the pitched semi-public battles for infor­mation and control that were characteristic of seventeenth century Siberia. Theserelatively open debates, often attracting too, corresponded to the

Conclusion 185

of a Cossack Personenverband before its aims wereunanimously and the leader was elected or a new leader waselected when the group disagreed.

Since social relations are unstable, and Siberian was particularly unsta-ble due to its economic dynamism and territorial an institution estab-lished to stabilize social relations also had to adapt. To facilitate this adaptation,but at the same time to its authentic sources in appearance, conflict isexpressed by way of ideas. ideas set certain often contradic-tory elements of laws, instructions, and custom considered to be relatedto the institution, above others and made them temporarily, locally, or in asocial group to the needs of that group or an inter-regionalnetwork of patronage that could inclu de merchants and nobles.The affair was also an article in the law code of 1649, which in theform of writs was in force even before that and thehonour and of the tsar. the was transferred toMoscow immediately and thus removed from the influence of local authorities.The Siberian Cossacks introduced a idea of which had aninteresting status: the Tobol'sk archbishops had institutionalized it as part ofCossack Personenverband custom, which the tsar had but it neverbecame imperial law. Although it was not considered by the tsar, the localpower of the Personenverband meant that it was unimpeachable at least asas the Cossacks not to deliver each other to impending investigation.As far as is the status of in Siberia was unique inthe Muscovite where as Lukin has limita-tions of the power of the tsar or his rested exclusively on moral

without institutionalized Muscovy west of the Urals further dif-fered in the character of virtually all published cases of the>;()',I'Y,E'l>Jn'>; word or affair. Moreover, these were usually directed personsof lower status,S as compared to the mostly limited public character oftions that referred to this institution in Siberia, typically indicting persons of moreexalted statu s.

Besides, the of non-deliverance reinforced one of the major institu-tions of Muscovy, collective responsibility. For the same reason, Cossackspetitions collectively, thereby constituting a Personenverband. the col-lective petition and, occasionally, secret oaths of mutual and non-deliverance, to the second, exclusi ve of the Personenverband,characterized by isolation in the frontier and environment, to purposeful-ness, and to temporarily disappearing individuality as the collectively deliveredsignatures and statements in show. As an institutional mechanismproviding appeal to the tsar that promoted an Personenverband, thesovereisn's affair was used in almost all of the frequent town rebellions, and onnumerous other occasions of lesser importance, in small forts, on campaigns oramong members of a Cossack group. Some of the Siberian cases, especiallyminor ones, are probably still buried in the archives, though the known evidenceis already impressive.

186 Conclusion

There is a between the recent tum to institutionality in thesocial sciences and the history of the Siberian seventeenth century. It is a symp­tom of crisis and related fears that, on the one hand, has fromthe transitions in Eastern effects of and other recent socialand cultural processes. On the other hand, the Muscovite Time of Troubles andthe rebellious seventeenth century have contributed to such though ofcourse in were incited by a century in the throes of internal war.Arreacv the Institutionalism of Arnold Gehlerr' was impelled by the Hobbesianfear of the dissolution of all order and the natural human condition of club-lawembracing instituticns as a safe harbour from human (' Entartul1g'j,7Cossacks in Siberia as well as their constantly referred to the Time ofTroubles, claiming for each side that it had stemmed and was still thetide of while the tsar as pacifier,

As cultural determinations of institutions have a func-tion. Thus, one of the great institutions of the post-me diev al world, the state,

in this as a fixation of civil war, animportant impulse in Muscovy in the aftermath of the Time of Troubles. This isnot a issue, but already the basis of Jean Bodin's theory of sever­ersrnv.s In Muscovy, this took root without known transfer of these terms, moreor less autonomously. Elias's of civilization can be read in this way: thedevelopment of the later state monopoly that successfully put throughits norms the partial economic and social powers, the estates, albeit, as

mentioned, in Muscovy the estates were less powerful and the stillcould not achieve this without their collaboration. On this background, Elias con­ceived his of civilization, which could not without or

but had a pacifying effect." In Siberia, in a rough-and-ready frontier world,institutionalization also had a although it cannot be overlookedthat its most efficient was the Cossack Perso 11ell verband,straddling the divide between and as well as not fitting com-fortably the of an elite power group.

In the debate about social the variant of the process ofcivilization, recent appraisals of Moscow and Russia have adopted a rather neg­ative attitude to the concept,'? although they have also identified potential islandsof an increased consciousness of law among the population, such as in the man­ufactories at Tula or in the inner town of Moscow.!' This study does not claim tobe an investigation of the implementation of criminal law in Siberia; it can onlysuggest lines of enquiry towards the aim of an appreciation of the developmentof social discipline in Siberia. Schmidt's findings are conclusive at least for thecity of Moscow and much of Russia in the century, not least

to serfdom, the concomitant monopolization of justice by the noblelandowner, and resulting waves of rnigraticn.l? which did not find an equivalentin Siberia.!' Criticizing Oestreich's concept of social discipline as lopsidedly ori­ented at the promulgation of law instead of at its effects, Schmidt has underlinedthe importance of dialogic, inclusive, absolute, and formal law for the effective­ness of prosecution and the consciousness of law, which were largely absent in

Conclusion 187

late seventeenth and century central Russia. The same was true for thereplacement of with authority, and innovation in law away indistant as the results of Siberian Cossack prove, dis-tance is not an absolute category; its effects on the economic andcultural and in particular, on the distribution of resources of powerand the capability to use them. The Cossacks showed for due processof law in political and for the limited public, and the latedevelopments towards individualization'" in prov ide clues forresolving the question whether there was an urge for more individual reliabilityand in of eventually thePersonenverband's isolation. since it involved a great ofthe population, had a of the attitude of Russians

The downside of this relatively evaluation of Siberia is that the effortsto meet Cossack needs had to be financed and in cash-starved Muscovy eventhe tsar that this meant that the of the north of Russia weremilked their means. IS Thus, although this is usually overlooked, beyondthe importance of the fur trade for weapons and instructors abroad, theliberties and of the Siberian Cossacks affected the developmentof Russia. The 'Siberian supply' tribute in was among the more ominousreasons for pressures for enserfrnent in Russia and for peas­ants to desert northern and therefore, problems with social discipline.Thus, the frontier safer and the Military Revolution contributed to theundermining of social control in Russia's older

With continued in the century, the Cossac ks move d tothe south and east and important towns were now situated further and furtherfrom the and less in need of locally Withincreased security, trade became the monopoly of the merchants, while manywealthy Cossacks converted to their ranks. The Personenverband was thusremoved from the centres of decision and administration and deprived of its for-mer economic and political not least by the decrease in importanceof the fur tribute. Studies on the century are few," often narrowlyfocused, and the evidence of further development is contradictory. In the lastquarter of the century, it eventually resulted in a regionalism that wasnot always loyal to the tsar; in the nineteenth century, a minoritytion and support across the Pacific, in the frontier federation, which alsoproduced the for the Trans-Siberian Railway. Compared to most parts ofEuropean Russia, Siberia an early and vigorous educational andr'P~I(hT10' revolution, actively involving local in school politics. Intellectualcircles published voicing Siberian lay culture to itselfand to the rest of the empire. Remarkably continuing and the lines ofdevelopment highlighted in the study, business-minded local merchantsand administrators rather than the usual Russian gentry supported and organizedthis cultural Still, an uncanny division of labour between urbanmerchants and Cossacks guarding the border developed, who were remarkably

188 Conclusion

Ill;:;! au~, if not cultured but, at the same in the flourish-contraband on which the veil has not been lifted. The ruthless atamanshchina

the civil war bears witness to the shadow side of the of frontierculture. IS

Agreement exacung obligation of labour for a creditor in case of non-

Glossary

amanat Official in forts and towns to ensure relatives paid theiasak. Institution with antecedents in custom.

ataman Leader of a Cossack group. probably Turkish: head of a kingroup. Traditional Cossack rank in Siberia.

1 quarter (chetvert') 146.4 or 164.7 (4 or 41h pu d) before 1710.den'ga 0.5deti boiarskie PI.: syn boiarskii.desiatnik Official Cossack literally: 'leader of ten'; his group (desiai'ka)

was not ten strong.doshchanik Flat-bottomed transport length (keel) <21.6 rn.'godovalshchik Cossack a year in distant forts or towns.gorodnichii Town governor.gost' Moscow merchant.guliashchie liudi not attached to tiaglo or itinerant workers.iasak Tribute, in Siberia usually furs, sometimes cattle. According to prevailma

conditions collected as a or as an tax a form of barter.Iasaul Elected Cossack leader.iasyr" Cossack captives taken during campill gJl. Cossacks were allowed to

them to custom, but not by law.igumen Abbot.kabala

payment of debt.kormlenie Alimentation; service remuneration collected, paid and controlled

locally by the community or the voevoda,llan (Chinese monetary unit) 9 zolotniks 38.34 grams.litva Special unit of of war from Poland-Lithuania; later, Russians

were also included.mestnichestvo System of (ranks) of Muscovite nobles.(za-)odinachnaia zapis' Written resolution stipulating not to hand over each

other during investigation.okolnichi Second duma rank.otkaz Deposition of the voevoda by the Cossacks.

190

Specific Cossack form of a temporary

[meeting] house'. Cf.lit.

Personenverband, (pI.) -verbandemary group.

piatidesiatnik 'Leader of fifty' Cossacks; cf. desiatnik,pismennyi golova Officer statistics and attending

to official communication; but not reserved forMoscow sometimes voevoda in the voevoda's absence.

pod"laehiipod"iachii s pripis'Iu Official for and other clerical

associate of the voevoda similar to a second voevoda not nee-essarilv a noble.

posad Community of towns-uemne.prikaznaia izba, or: prik. palata Voevoda's office.prikazchik Head of administration in small assigned by the voevoda.prisud When of Siberia became more settled at the end of the

seventeenth century, local towns, forts and formed the localvoevoda held court in the town of the in Irkutsk.

promyshlenniki Hunters and tr''''1nPr'~

1 pud 36.6Razriad Military the service rolls. Appointed voevodas,razriad-town or -voevoda First and second level of Siberian administration:

I st 2nd Iakutsk (I TheSiberian chancellery regularly maintained communications with all Siberiantowns. had nominal control, which was mosteffective in urgent military affairs, sometimes in public whileotherwise nominally subordinated towns often disputed and theirauthority. Moscow introduced the to disputes betweentowns and their voevodas and to enhance defence.

1 rouble = 10 grivny = 100 kopeks = 200 deu'gi, 6 den'gi = 1 altyn I roublecorresponded roughly to I ducat or 5 Dutch On relations:Hellie , Material Culture.

s"ezzhaia izba Voevoda'sprikaznaia izba.

smuta Time of Troubles (1605-1 Generally: political turmoil.sotnik 'Leader of hundred'; Cf. desiatnik.stol'nik rank of the Moscow list beneath the duma ranks.sud'ia Head of chancellery in Moscow, or, during rebellions, elected 'i",iO'",e

heading the town administration.syn boiarskii Hereditary rank. Similar tasks as and appointment from among

Cossacks, though better paid and more frequently appointed to responsibletasks. Not identical with Russian syn boiarskii.

tseloval'nik Elected official, responsible for collecting taxes.ukaz writ.voevoda / first and second Governor. The voevodas to a town formed

a collegiate itovaryshchiv; instructions formally advised colleagues to decide

191

Booty

mestnichestvo regulated whoadvice'. Until I

Coin: 4.26 grams.

zipun"and captives.

1 zolotnik

harmoniously, 'inhad the say among coueagues,

zimov'e 'Winter-hut', blockhouse with a small window for "VJ.lc,",.uU5 or barter­the fur tax.

silken shirt allowing arrows to be extracted more

Notes

Introduction

273-7 and

Ragsdale (ed.)

2

Michael David-Fox, 'Post-Post 5 (2004), 647;Christoph Schmidt, Russische Geschichie Miinchen: Oldenbourg, 2003,1-2. Overview of literature: Martin Aust, 'Writing the Review (f

vol, 10 (2003), 375-91. Mark v. andDiasporas', AHR vol, 109 (2004),445-68. and

1552-1917, London: 1997.Wortman, Scenarios vol, I, Princeton: UP, 1995. See Dominic

Lieven's bibliographical essay London: Murray, 2000,464-70. The influ-ence of imperial institutionson a of cultures and subsequent arrangement:MarkMancall, Russia and Cambridge/MA: Harvard, 1971.

3 Cf. Alexei Miller, 'Between Local and " Kritika vol, 5 (2004), 15.Periods from 1700: ,464.

4 'Persistent Factors in , inRussian r oreturi i-V!,rcv.Camt,ridge: UP, I ,322.

5 G.F. Miller, tstoriia 2nd edn,Moscow: Akad., 1999,vol, I,

6 Golovachev (ed.) Tiumen' v XvII stoletii, Moscow: Kusnerev, 1903, 5.Insistence on the role of towns: N.N. Pokrovskii, 'Introduction', in id. (ed.) Pervoestoleti e sibirskikh Novosibirsk: Sibirskii Khronograf, 1996, 13-18.

7 N.Ia, za materialami po istorii Sibiri, St Petersburg:Al'tshuler, I 20-1; vernadskii, '0 dvizhenii russkikh na vostok',Nauchnyi HUlr/r'I1."."1<:1I rhurnal vol, I (191 52-61; id., 'Gosudarevy sluzhilye i

liudi v vostochnoi Sibiri XVII veka', 2hMNP vol, LVI (1915),Repercussions in Western historiography: cf. Richard Russia under

the Old New York: Scribner, 1974, edn vor derRevolution, Munchen: I 102-3]; G .V. Lantzeff,Siberia in the Seventeenth­Century, 2nd edn, New York: Octagon, 1972.

8 Phrase by Adam Olearius, the Travels (f Olearius in Russia,transl., ed. by S. Baron, Stank)rd/CA: UP, I 173.

9 Wolff, Eastern Stanford: UP, 1994.10 Nancy Kollmann, By Honor Bound, Ithaca/NY: Cornell, 1999, 175.II Overview: ibid., 176n. 22-3. A parallel development in another field of power rela­

tions: Christoph Witzenrath, 'Review Kurukin, I.V.: Epocha "dworskich bur'" ...1725-1762 gg. Rjazan 2003', Historische Literatur vol, 2 (2004),379.

12 Andreas Russland als vielvolkerreich, Munich: Beck, 1992, 14-15 [Eng!.:The Russian A Multiethnic History, Longman: Harlow, 2001]. Cf. theeighteenth century historians of Siberia, articles by Bakhrushin and Andreev inMiller, lstoriia, vol, 1,17-149. Hagen, ,467; Marc Raeff, 'Toward a NewParadigm?', in Thomas Sanders (ed.) Historiography Imperial Russia,Armonk/NY: Sharpe, 1999,481-6.

Notes 193

1516 33.17 Arctic Mirrors, Ithaca: I.18 Paul Avrich, Russian Rebels 1972; N.1. Nikitin, '0

traditsiiakh i obshchirmogo v Rossii XVII v.' , trvesiiiaSO RAN. lstoriia I no. 3, 3-8; id., '0 proizkhozhdenii, strukture i sotsial'noi

soobshchesrv russkikh kazakov', tstoriia SSSR (l986) no. 4, pp. 167-77;Geoffrey Russia and the Russians, Allen Lane: 2001, 115; A.P.

Rostov-on-Don 1995: Izdat. OblIUU, vol, I,

13 H.-J. Torke's Lexikon der Geschichie Munich: I has no entryon Dominic Lieven's bri sk evaluation in his 'Russia as , in

London: Arnold, I 20.14 N.N. /648-J I64:9, Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1989,98; PSRL vol, 36.1

40 1. 110; RGADA f. 1121 1. 26. On internal divisions"'~'·m~,." Russia and the Don: on the DonFrontier, Ph.D. HarvardLantzen , ,;,wena, 122-3.

the ScandinavianScholarship', .JEMH vol, 7

sein'" JBGO vol. 37 (l989),

and distance: Witzenrath, 'Femmacht' .'Review Article: Modern

Machtstaat, and the of Anvro-Saxon168.

26 M.O. Akishin, Politseiskoe eosudarstvo i sibirskoe obshchestvo, Novosibirsk, 1996,6-7.

22

21

19 299-302.20 Arnold Gehlen defined 'institution' as 'stabilized tensions': K.-S.

"Weltreprasentanz und verkorperung', in Gert Melville (ed.) instituiionalitatSymbolisierung;Cologne: Bohl au, 200 I , 9-17, citation: 13.

Rau Gert "Offentliche Raurne in der Fruhen Neuzeit', in id.Zwischen Gotteshaus und Taveme, Bohlau 2004,24-5.

Lle"C;.II, L""j~,,,,,24-5;S.N. The r "''''LU' L."lUlI ~.,. New York:Macmillan, 963.

23 Nada Boskovska, "Tron werden wir selber345-86.

24 On25 R.1.

27 201,205; Basil Dmytryshyn, 'The Administrative Apparatus of theRussian Colony in Siberia and Northern Asia, 1581-1700', in Alan Wood (ed.) The

London: 1991,18-21,34-5.28 203-4; voevodas as 'satraps': Russ/and, 126. Hartrnut Russ,

Herren und Diener, Bohlau, 1994,317.29 Rau, "Offentliche, 16-17.30 A vivid debate about the public in later periods unfolds between, among others,

Baberowski, M. Rolf, Schulze-Wessel, Hausmann, and Manfred

31 Jiirgen Haberrnas, 'Concluding Remarks', in Calhoun (ed.) Habermas andthe Public Cambridge/MA: MIT, I ,464-5; Jurgen Habermas,

Cjferulichkeit, Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkarnp, 1990,58-61.32 Overview of literature: , I 27-52.33 Cf. Guido Hausmann, "Tagungsbericht: Die Geschichte des Moskauer Russland aus

der Perspektive seiner Regionen. Internarionale Konferenz, Wien 19.-21. Juni 2003' ,JBGO vol, 52 (2004), 143-4; Andreas Kappeler, 'Einleitung', in id. (ed.) DieGeschichte Russlands im /6. und /7. Jah~hundert aus der seinerRe,gloneI2,Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz,2004, 10.

34 A ago, Valerie Kivelson rejected a (Habermasian) public sphere in her path-breaking study of the Vladimir and Suzdal' gentry, but a developing pub­lic 'without the benchmarks of opposition offered by a free press, literate culture, orinstitutional autonomy', in which 'premodern people could function apart from auto-cratic regulation' : in the Provinces, Stanford: UP, 1996, 6-7.

194 Notes

soriale und politische OrganisationMichael Khodarkovsky, Russia's

Kotosixin, 0v.rarenuon, 1980, 107 fol. I

43 76. Cf. Dmytryshyn, , 17-36.44 Philip The Rinehart & Winston, I 67,

75. Cf. S.V Bakhrushin, Sibiri v istoricheskoi literature', inid., Moscow: 955, vol, III pt 1,17-19.

A.P. Zabaikal'skie karaki, vols I-III, Chita, 1918, vol,f.lll1VL,1l., 25; N.N. Ogloblin, Obozrenie stolbtsov i Moscow

I 1900 pt III, 101. In 170 1, Siberian musketeers were asCossacks: Akishin, 13. Cf. 67.

46 57.47 Mongol double-circuit administration and its Muscovite adoption in the four-

teenth century, the namestniks and the were divided into andmilitary The voevodas the military the volostels:Donald Ostrowski, and the UP, 1998, In the latesixteenth century, replaced namestniks thus civilLantzeff, 47-61. On harmony in and Byzance:Wolfram v. Scheliha, Russland und die orthodoxe in derPatriarchatsoeriode /589-/72/, Wiesbaden: 2004; Daniel Rowland,

ioeorogy Place any Limits on the Power of the Tsar', RR vol,

I 27153 'Review', 745.54 Aleksandrov, Vlast', 1-10, 15-16,351-7.55 Nicholas Henshall, The Myth (f Absolutism, London: Longman, 1992; Heinz

Duchhardt, Das Zeitalter des Absolut ismus, Munich: Oldenbourg, 1998, 37-9,57-67.

56 Akishin , 6-7. E.V. Vershinin , voevodskoe v Sibiri,Ekaterinburg: Razvivaiushchee obuchenie, 1998, 145-6.

'Did Russian49 (1990), 140-2.

48 Aleksandrov, Vlast', I 267.49 47-59.50 Aleksandrov, Vlast'; Pokrovskii, Tomsk,51 N.E. Nosov, Stanovlenie 'nykh uchrezhdenii v Rossii,

Lenin grad: Nauka, 1969; L.V Zemskie sobory gosudarstva vXVI-XvII vv., Moscow: Nauka Gunther Stokl, 'Gab es im Moskauer Staat"S tande"?' , JBGO vol, II (1 321-42; Russ, Herren, 442-3.

52 Brian Boeck, 'Review of Mininkov ... Plokhy ... Sen' ... and O'Rourke', Kritikavol, 4 (2003),738,744; Serhii Plokhy, The Cossacks and Religion in ModernUkraine, Oxford: UP, 2001,110, Ill. N.A. Mininkov introduces the of vas-

doubtable in the absence of written contracts or oaths: Donskoe karachestvoRostov-na-Donu: Izdat. Rostovskozo univer-

45

42

35 V.1. 'Iz istorii zaseleniia Sibiri nakanune i vo vrernia , in Russkoenc..selenie Pomor'ia i Sibiri, Moscow: Nauka, 1 53-5.

36 356-7.37 VA. Aleksandrov and N.N. Vlast' i obshchestvo. Sibir' v Xv]! v.,

Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1991, 240-1 , 246-8.38 A winterhut in 1652: A.N. '0 date osnovaniia Irkutska', lstoriia

SSSR no. 5, 165-6.39 ,24.4041

Notes 195

57 Brian 'Capitulation or Negotiation: Relations Between the Don Host andMoscow in the Aftermath of the Razin , FzOG vol, 63 (2004), 389,

1997,

Town GovernorsMuscovy's Soutnern Frontier, unpub­

Sedov, 'Podnosherriia v

the nuances of the German term:a unitary character, while 'association'

'ho,,.,,-j.',.,<T t()o'e:tfle:rof individu als' .caporoger «osaken, Wiesbaden:

636465

61

'Review',743; Russians, 115; Skorik, Don, vol, I, 140-4; E.D.'Cossacks', in J.L. (ed.) The Modern and

Soviet Gulf Breeze/FL: Intemat., vol, VIII,from mentioned: Avrich, Rebels; Longworth. Cossacks; GuntherDie Munich: Isar, Mikhail Astapenko ,

Istoriia karachestva Rossii. 2 Rostov-on-Don: Izdat. Rostovskozo Universiteta,I vol, 1,29-32.

60 There is no equivalent

59

58

479-97.62 Anne i-eroun-Liumon. 'The Pirate and the Emperor, Power and the Law on the Seas

1450-1850', in J.D. (ed.) The MerchantCambridge: UP, 1991, I

r ~"m":.'. 33-4.Heinsius.Das Bohlau, 1986,240-2.

LdJIl£."" .Siberia, 205; Vlast', 135-40;154; liudi vostochnoi Sibiri '10 vtoroi

polovine Xvlt pervoi chetverti XVIII vv., Diss ... kand., Moscow I 77; id.,"volneniia sluzhilykh liudei v vostochnoi Sibiri', in Russkoe naselenie Pomor'ia,94-105; N.!. Nikitin, liud! v Sibiri XviI v., Novosibirsk: Nauka,I 94. in : Russ, Herren, 309-26.

66 P.B. nor Fowl: AdministrativeRussia', vol, 50 (2002), 15,20; Brianin the and Military Colonizationlished University of IMoskovskikh prikazakh XVII ,01 (I 139-52.

67 Carsten Goehrke, Russischer Alltag, Zurich: Chronos, 2003, vol, 1,273-4.68 E.N. Gosudarstvo i krest'iane Rossii, Moscow: Arkheograficheskii

tsentr, 1997; C.B. Soldiers on the DeKalblI11.: Northern Illinois UP,1995.

69 K.-S. Rehberg, 'Institutionenwandel und Funktionsveranderung des Syrnbolischen'in Gerhard Gobler (ed.) lnstitutionenwandel, Opladen: Westdeutscher102. '

70 Ibid.: K.-S. 'Wie verandern sich Institurionen?', in ibid., 21-56; GerhardStoltin g, 'Wandel und Kontin uitat der Institu tionen', in ibid., 181-203; HeinzDuchhardt and Gert Melville (eds) 1m Spannungsfeld von Recht und Ritual, \"'VjV~;J1C;.

Bohlau, 1997; Gert Melville, lnstitutionaliuit und Symbolisierung; BerndSchimmelpfennig, 'Das Papsuum im Mittelalter: eine Institution?', in Gert Melville(ed.) tnstituiionen, Bohlau, 1992,209-29.

71 Marshall Poe, 'What Russians Mean When They Called Themselves "Slaves ofthe Tsar"?', SR vol, 57 (1998),599-608.

72 Valerie Kivelson, 'Bitter Slavery and Pious Servitude: Muscovite Freedom and itsCritics', FzOG vol, 58 (2001), 115.

73 David Goldfrank, 'Aristotle, Bodin and Montesquieu to the Rescue', FzOG vol. 58(2001),42,44.

74 H.-J. Torke, Die Gesellschaft im Moskauer Reich, Leiden: Brill, 1974,275-83. Recent contributions stress the ritual properties of the boyardoubt that either the or the boyars enjoyed a monopoly on power:Bogatyrev, The His Councillors, Saarijarvi: Acad., 2000, 220-2.

196 Notes

75 Goldfrank, 'Aristotle',Muscovy', in SheilaIdyllwild/CA: "'V""''"·''-~,unpublishedRR vol. 45 (I

44; 'The of Denunciation inPetitions and Denunciations in Russia,

""'''IJJU''JI, Political Denunciation in /vh/SCOV)I,

'Muscovite Political Folkways'

81

exclusivelv on the Moscow rebellionPokrovskii. 'Sibirskie po

obshchestvennogo myslii Nauka, 1 . A.M.Kantor asserts that the 'democratic masses' was secu-

limited by codified law: gosudar", bunt', in 2-ipoloviny XVII-XIX v., Moscow: Akad., 1 P.Y. Lukin, Narodnvestavleniia o vlasti v Rossii XVII Moscow: Nauka,

79 Lukin concentrates on the archival sources of the sovereign's word,rebellions: ibid.

80 Maureen Perrie, 'Popu lar Monarchism', in I63; id.,'Indecent, UJI""";"") and Words', FzGO vol, 58 ), 143-9; LI.Ditiatin Rol' Rostov -on-Don: Donskaia Rech.', I905.Isabel Russia in the Catherine the London:Weidenfeld, 1981; Valerie Kivelson, Stole His Mind', AHR vol, 98(I 733-56.Rehbergv'Instiunionerrwandel', 103;Translation of the German term Leitidee: leafletof the Deutsche reseach area 537 'Institutionalityand , Dresden.

82 Michael Maser, Diskurs, Macht und Frankfurt/Main: '-"JUpU~,82; Michel Foucault, 'Das Subjekt und die Macht', in H.L.

Frankfurt/Main: Athenaurn, I 241-6 I, here: Ian"Overcoming Metaphysics, Elias and Foucault on Power and Freedom', rnuoscpny

Sciences vol, 23 (1993), 56.83 'Papsttum '.84 ,103.85 In this sense, a denunciation is an action and possibly a moral evaluation and not

an institution. Muscovites did not appreciate' denunciation unconditionally: N.N.Pokrovskii, istochniki vremeni 0 "slove i deledarevorn?", inNovosibirsk: Nauka, I

86 O.Y. Churnicheva, vosstanie, /667-/676 gg. Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1998;G.s. Michels, 'The Monastic Reforms of Archbishop Afanasii of Kholmogory(1682-1702)', FzOG vol, 63 (2004),220-36; id., At War with the Church, Stanford,1999.

87 "verrat und Worte', FzOG vol, 56 (2000),27 I.88 2 I A.Y. Kamkin, 'Russkii Sever i Moskovskii

tsentr v XV-XVII vekakh', FzOG vol, 63 (2004),185-98.89 Y.N. 'Mestnoe upravlenie na Rossii v XVII v.', FzOGvol, 63 (2004)

69-83. .90 162-4; Brian 'Village into Garrison', RR vol, 51 (1992),

481-501; id., 'The Politics of Give and Take', in A.M. Kleimola (ed.) Culture andIdentity in Muscovy /359-/584, Moscow: ITZ-Garant, 1997,39-67.

91 Kivelson, I 189,267.92 Torke, 216.

78

Notes 197

Ernich etHistorische

Cambridge: UP,

Moscow:Different (Pskov):

i remskiia

96en

93 A.I. Namestnich'i,Moskovskii Universitet, 1909,ibid., 241-3.

94 I am to Kollmann for expressing similar concerns at the Vienna con-ference 2003. Cf. her i nstrucrive chapter of , HOMr, 169-202.

95 On Ivan IV's own of his 'Mehr als eineder Ehre', JBGO 359.

2001,98 Cf. Kivelson, Autm;racy, 159.99 Influence of local culture on patterns of patronage, cf.

'Stand und derForschung 32 248-9.

100 Kollmann, HOMr.101 On election in the eighteenth century, see A.S. Zuev, my s tovarishchi rnezh

soboiu", Traditsii v XVIII v.', in Sotsial'no-politicheskie problemy istorii Novosib, Gos, I

Expansion in the

244.

222-3.

7-34.

Trade and Economic193-205.

102 Lantzeff, 200-1 .103 V.B. Kobrin, Vlast' i sobstvennost' v srednevekovoi Rossii (XV-XvI

, 1985. Other contri bution s to this 1ine of inquiry by veselovskii.Shmidt, M.E. A.L. Gustave Alef, Ann

Samuel Baron, Hartrnut Russ and Robert Crummey,104 vershinin, 148-83.105 P.B. Brown, the Gate-keepers", JBGO vol, 50106 vershinin, 148-83.107 Cf. Jarmo Russia's

Seventeenth Leiden: Brill,108 Lantzeff, I109 Vlast', 136-9.110 122-3.III 205.112 Ibid., I Fur, 120. Other estimates: P.N. Miliukov, 'Gosudarsrvennoe khozi-

aisrvo Rossi i' , ZhMNP vol, CCLXXI (Oct. 1890), 346; G. V, Vernadskii, 'Protiv sol-ntsa', Russkaia (1914), 63. The secretary of the foreign chancelleryKotoshikhin, the annual shipment of furs was worth 600,000 roubles:KOtOSlX111, Rossii, 106 fol. 135" co, equivalent to one-fourth of the budget. Nearlyhalf of the Arkhangel 'sk were furs (200 ,000 in the l640s. Therelied on fur Kotilaine, 193,

113 Victor East- West , Modern Asian Studiesvol, 31 (1997),508-9.

114 Dmytryshyn, 'Apparatus', 24; Lantzeff, 87-9.115 Miller, lstoriia, vol, 1,249-50,273-7 and passim; Chapter I.116 Achirn Landwehr, im Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 2000.117 'Institutionenwandel', I118 Kurnke, 33; Khodarkovsky,119 Penrose, , 388-92.120 S.D. Krasner, An Institutional Comparaiive Political

Studies vol, 21 (1988), ; Claus Offe, ueSlgn/}'j~g InstitutionsTransitions, Vienna: Universitat Wien, 1994,

121 Khodarkovsky, 221-9.122 vols 1-2; Khodarkovsky,

198 Notes

123 89-91.124 10, 115; David Moon, The Russian London:

280-1.125 Medieval Russia, UP, I 237.126 25-53.127 's forced relocations: 'Localism and in

Muscovy', in id. Russia Finnish Acad., 90.Deliberate destruction of an on the Banda islands by theVOC governor: ,2-5.

2004,

Pravednoe, Freiburg i.Br.:

128 Bozatvrev, Locansm, 59-In129 N.E. Nosov, Ocherki po istorii mestnogo upravleniia Russkogo gosudarstva

IJOI,;JVi!lyXVI Moscow: Akad., 1"';1")1, ,,"V"';1.Kivelson, Autocr,acy, 171-5.R.I. Frost, The Wars, Harlow: ,2000,69.P.B. Brown, 'Bureaucratic Administration' Jarmo Kotilaine and Marshall Poe(eds) Moderniring MrUSt~OVY.London: ,2004,64.

133 Khodarkovsky, Janet, 'Multiethnicity in Muscovy. AConsideration of Christian and Muslim Tatars in the 1550s-1580s', JEMH vol, 5.1(2001), 1-23.

134 S.C. Lithuania Ascending; Carnbrid ge: UP, 1994, 82-117.135 Patricia God's Rule. Governmetu New York: Columbia

148-65; Witzenrath, 'Fernmacht'. Rudolf Die moralisch-belehrendenArtikel im Altrussischen Sammelband MenloI XIX. Inconclusive evidence suggests that there may have been sirrn iart vtured intentions and traditions Muscovite and Kazan' practiceselection: Donald 'The of the LandRepresentative Institution', in KotilaineIskander UjllaZO'l,' Islam i v srednern p'21vc11' zhe poslevol, 63 (2004), 316-20; Khodarkovsky, 'FourCon structing Non -Chri stian Iden tities in Mu scovy' , in Kleimola ,

137 Janet Martin, 'Mobility, Forced Resettlement and Identity in Muscovy', inKleimola, ,u~"""",431-49; Cf. P.W. Werth, At the Margins Ithaca:....."''''''11. ,,"VIJ,,", ..)e'-..1.

Slave Trade and Decentralized Societies', Journalvol, 42 (2001),49-65. Cf.

Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters, Houndrnills: Macmillan,Hans 'Die Christenpflicht als Rechtsnorm: Der Loskauf der GefangenenUlozenie', in: Uwe Halbach et al. (eds) Geschichte Alirusslands in der [je~'r,lrS\1i'elt

ihrer Wiesbaden: 1986,156; Khodarkovsky,Jaroslaw ,..'-"'-'",<KI. Russia and Kazan', The Mouton, I 90, 199,205;Rowland, 'Limits'; "verrar, 272; Shifting, 44-60,236-41; FrankJoyeux, Der von Moskau nach Daurien, Diss, Phil., Cologne, 1981,49.

142 Frost, Northern, 322-7 on Poland -Lithu ania's predicament of rnodemi ty and liberty.143 William Jr, 'European Mercenaries', in Kotilaine (ed.) Modernizing Muscovy,

229-30.144 D.C. Waugh (O.K. UO), lstoriia odnoi knigi. viatka i 'nesovremennost" v russkoi

kul'ture petrovskogo vremeni, St Bulanin, 2002.145 Cf. M.S. Arel, 'The Archangel'sk Trade', in Kotilaine (ed.) Modernizing, 175-20 I on

the benefits various chancelleries and court dignitaries derived from their involve­ment in Dutch-English and English-Russian trade wars.

146 Frost, Northern, 15. Aleksandr Filiushkin, in Michael Schippan (report), 'Conferenceon Political and Cultural Relations between Russia and the Baltic Region States, 30April-4 May 2003, Narva', in >http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.del tagungsberichte/id=268<.

136

130131132

141

Notes 199

the Hadiacz

147 ,200-1.148 Trade. John Bushnell, 'The Russian Soldiers artel', 1700-1900' ,

Land 1990,381-2:C.B.'F.,"~I" arin 0' Peter's , in Eric

Lohr and Marshall Poe The Leiden:Brill 170-1: Brian , in ibid., lO5-7:Frost, 318-19.

149 W.F. 'Peter the Great andPeter the Great and the West. New r ersnecuves, Basingstoke: r-sn vt a vc ,

Zakharine, Von zu Angesicht,The Transfigured Kingdom,

150 Ibid., 322. Cf. S.N. Eisenstadt's(ed.) "''''''V'~ Mn,rlC'r;niti,?~,

151 Frost, 334.152 A.S. 'The Cossack Experiment in Szlachta Dernocracv:

Union' , Ukrainian Studies vol, I (l 178-97.153 303-12,485-97.154 Peter Soldner im Nordwestdeutschland des /6. und /7. Jahrhunderts

Gouingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994.155 Willard Sunderland, the Wild Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2004, 58-9.156 Frost, I I 183-7: Henadz Sahanovich, Neviadomaia

vaina 1 1995: 'Szlachta,Bauern und in Srnolensk I 63 (2004),146.

157 546.158 Cf. Jeff and Nomadism on the Eurasian

Kritika vol. 4 (2003),159 Chapter I : Khodarkov sky.Steppe, 51-69: Collins, 'S utju gation' ,42.160 Charles Halperin, 'Ivan IV and Khan' , JBGO vol, 51 497.161 Michael Khodarkovsky, 'The Stepan Razin , .JBGO 42 (l994), 1-19:

Sunderland, 31. However, links with crop and the difficult transitionto agriculture can hardly be ruled out, for the Khmel'nyts'kyiKumke, 117.

162163 C.B. Stevens, 'Modernizing the Military', in Kotilaine (ed.), Muscovy,

252. Martin, 'Multiethnicity', 18-19.164 63-4: A.L. Yurganov, 'Idei I.S. Peresvetova v kontekste

istorii i kul'tury, VI (l no. 2, pp. 15-27: Sochineniia I. Peresvetova,ed.D.S. Likhachev, A.A. Zirnin, Moscow: Nauka, I I 161, I I I 180.

165 Cf. of Hashemite, Ibn Sa'ud, Rashidi, and Kuwaiti in com-bined nomad and urban state-building: Joseph Kostiner, 'The Role of Groupsin State , in Joseph Ginat (ed.) Changing Nomads in a World,Brighton: Acad, Press, 1998, esp. 146. for DivineWisdom', 360. also used expan-sion, cf', Wilhelm und im

,in Klaus Schilling (eds) /648. Kriegund in Europa, catalogue, Textband I, Munster: veranstalumgsgesellschaft,1998, 262-3. Ivan 'the Terrible' repented later: Ludwig Steindorff, 'Mehr als eine

der Ehre, JBGO vol, 51 (2003),359. Arnold Toynbee popularized the idea thatMoscow's was a 'Byzantine heritage' of messianic imperialism:Civilizations on Trial, New York 1948, 164-83. Erroneously, this view of messianicexpansiornsm is often associated with the 'Third Rome' theory: the original text pri­marily calls for the piety of the ruler and defends the role of the church. Overview ofliterature: Kollmann, Honor, 6. Ostrowski, Mongols, 219-43: Frank Kampfer, 'Die

200 Notes

35-46.Century', in Kotilaine,

moment, historiographische Folklore?' , .1 BGO vol.

I180 RGAOA f. 214 kn. 1619,181 /607-/636, Moscow: Izd. yost. lit., 1959, no. 22,

11. 3-4, 14-5: RGAOA f. 199 Portfeli G .F. Millera no. 478 I, 1. 66 (petition):

171172

Adelman and ..n"p'''''Jll'1"Vj', 'From Borderlands to Borders. Empires, Nation-and the in North American , AHR (1999),

814-41. Cf. 227-8.170 Cf. Frank (Moskovskii Woher hat Herberstein

diesen ,FzOGvol. 63 159-66: Samuel Baron, 'Thrust and Parry.AnmO'-KIUSSlan Relations in the Muscovite North', 040rd Slavonic vol. 21(I 19-40. See I on Tobolsk voevoda Kurakin's of navalpower, cf. the Indian where inward-oriented failed tocontain influence:. Chaudhuri, 'Reflections on inpremodern trade' ,in Political 421-42 .

•)ftI,/lIng, 278-310. Sunderland,'Peter and the Seventeenth

Mode mi:ing , 371 Frost, 320-1.173 Frost, 320.174 Gramotki Xvlt-nachala XVIII Moscow: Nauka, 1969: V.A. Aleksandrov,

"Materialy 0 narodnykh dvizheniakh v Sibiri v kontse XVII veka', Arkheograji-cheskii za /96/ (I no. 1/2, 345-82.

175 M.P. Alekseev (ed.) der Reise und weiter ins Land ... ,Moscow: Akad., 1936: Michael Hundt (ed.) der chinesis-chen Reise ... Ides und ... Brand, Stuttgart: Steiner, I Anton Kuczynski (ed.)Dwa z Xvii i XvIII Wrooraw: Polskie Tow.

996.176 N.N. Pokrovskii and E.K. Romodanovskaia (eds) Tobol'skii arkhiereiskii dam v XVII

veke, Novosibirsk: Sibirskii Khronograf, 1993: Pokrovskii (ed.), Pervoe stoletie;O.Ia. Rezun (ed.) sibirskikn Novosibirsk: Novosibirskoe kn. izdat.,1986: A.P. Okladnikov (ed.) Pt I:Moscow: Nauka, 1987.

177 Turchaninov'sreport: Chapter I .178 Pokrovskii, Pervoe stoletie, no. 26, p. 88: Pokrovskii, Arkhiereiskii, kniga v. Earlier

P.M. Golovachev (ed.) Pervoe stoletie lrkutska, StKusnerev, 1902, 104: RIB vol, 143-4: vol, 18, 8: vol, Iprilozh, see the recent re-edition of Miller's tstoriia Sibiri: PSZvol. IV no. 1822,p.116.

179 O.Ia. Rezun 'Pokhod Ia.O. Tukhachevskogo 1641 g. i osnovanie Achinskogo,in id., Russkie v Srednem Prichulyme XVII-XvIII vv., Novosibirsk: Nauka,

Lehre vorn Oritten Rom49 (2001),430-41.

166 Erik 'From "Landsknecht" to "Soldier". The Low German Foot Soldiers of theLow Countries in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century', International ReviewSocial 51 (2006),75-92. rebellious Russian musketeers in I ,Gordon between punctilious of their unfamiliar to

necative judgements and of arrears to those toMoscow. were of local support for the insurrection:Graeme 'Rebellion and Reformation in the Muscovite Military', in Kotilaine(ed.), 270-1, 274.

167 Christoph mOSK-aU, Stuttgart:402-8.

168 Jarmo Kotilaine and Marshall Poe, 'Introduction', id.4-5.

169

Notes 201

N.F. Dernidova (ed.) Russko-kitaiskie otnosheniia v XVII v., vol, I:Moscow: Nauka, I I 115.

182 'Caert des Lands en Stadt Yrkutskoy' , in CherterhnaiaTobol'skim synom boiarskim Semenom v

Moscow: FGUP PKO Kartograiiia,183 RGADA f. 1121 I no. 42211. II

91 Richard (ed.) The Muscovite LawSchlacks, 1988, I; iii slovar '<ukaratel' k Sviashchennomu Pisaniiu (red.)

Moscow: Izdat. Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, I vol, II,; Miller, lstoriia vol, 1,201,206-7; B.N. 'So Nemoevskii 0 russkorn

gosudarstve i obshchesrve Xv l-nachala XVII vv.', Russia Media eva lis vol, IX105-14. V.N. Nauka, 1979,

'Khoziaistvennye zaniatiia sluzhilykh liudei vostochnoiv 1I-n<~rV()l cnervem XVIII v.' , in A.A., Ag rarnyi stroi

x v-nacnaio Xv III v., Moscow: Institut Istorii SSSR, 1986; L. V.deiatel 'nost' naseleniia Zabaikal 'ia' ,

142-9. Aleksandrov and Pokrovskii made use,ucnn'C,Ke<::plllg to the main of the rebellion: Vlast',Ekspeditsionnye materiaiv GF. kak istochnik po istorii Sibiri,

143.184 Lukin, Predstavleniia, 4-5.185 G.A.

Sibiri vdal'noi

1 The Cossack group

Frontier, unpublished thesis,Oxford: westview.

illuminating on collaboration Cossacks.at the centre of the relations between the host and Moscow.

Interrelation s between the mi litary components of their customs and theenvironment, and their dear to Moscow,

superficially, Gunther Stokl, Die Entstehungat length on the relations between Tatar and East-slavic

describing extraordinary Cossack leaders in some detail, fails to probeas a defining factor of social structure and value. Philip

Longworth, The London: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969,extensive onCossack identity, liberties and their warlike nature deals with structure.In his book, N.A. Mininkov, Donskoe v epokhu pordnego

(do 1671), Rostov-na-Donu: Izdat. Rostovskogo universiteta, Istrives to the relations with the tsar the lines of vassalage,unknown to the area and period. Serhii Plokhy, The and inModern Ukraine, Oxford: UP, 2001, offers a new and view ofKhrnel'nytsky rebellion as a uprising uniting various sectors of Ruthenian

Catholic Poland. He concedes that the emphasis on corpo-itself a difference to Cossacks related to Muscovy often trumped

confessional concerns, but all too often refers to 'the Cossacks' as if they were anundifferentiated mass. N.1. Nikitin, liudi v Zapadnoi Sibiri XviI v.,Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1988, V.A. Aleksandrov and N.N. Pokrovskii, Vlast' i obshch­estvo, Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1991, and N.N. Pokrovskii, Tomsk 1648-1649 gg.,Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1989, can hardly be overestimated as reference works onSiberian Cossacks, although they adhere to the theory overrat-

Cossack devotion to their rights and and Cossack orientation ataims.

202 Notes

5

3 Petersburg: Sibiriakov, 1882; P.lvl.istoricheskogo izucheniia Sibiri" ZhMNP (I

no. 9, pp. 49-68; P.N. Butsinskii, Zaselenie Sibiri i byr eia "m,,,I':,,i/r,~lJ

Khar'kov: Gub, 1889.4 N.N. Krasnoiarskii bum /695-/698 Tomsk: Makushina, 1902; id.,

o rosni boiarskikh detei i .Russkaia starina vol, 8 (I ,375-92; id., bunt 1637-1638 , lstoricheskii vestnik vol, 85 (190 I),229-50; id., 'K istorii bunta g.', ChlOIDR vol, 3 (1903), 1-30; id.,"Zanovor Tomskoi "litvy" v I " Chieniia v istoricheskom obshchestve Nestoraietcpisca, kn. 8, Kiev 1894, II id., 'Bunt i na Arnur polka

Sorokina', Russkaia starina (I no. I,U M.lU 15,U' , ,o !lTIovn :ye cherty russkoi kolonizatsii Iuzhnogo

Novosibirsk: 1961, 67-8;lVll[Z,UCV. Y.G., Prisoedinenie osvoenie Sibiri v istoricheskoi literature XVII v.,Moscow: Izdat. sots-ekonom.Jit., 1960,60-1.

6 Y.I. Moskovskoe vosstanie kontsa Xv /I v., Moscow: Nauka, 1969; N.B.Ocherki po istorii Rossi, Moscow: Izdat,

Universiteta, 1982.

2 1774; K.B. Gazenvinkel' ,1892,54-5.

Novosibirsk:

upravlenie v Sibiri, Ekaterinburg: Razvivaiushchee

8

7 G.A. liudi vostochnoi diss ... kand., Moscow 1972; N.I.Nikitin, liudi i osvoenie Sibiri v XVII veke', tstoriia SSSR (1980)no. 2, pp. 161-73; A.A. 'K 0 formirovanii torgovo-promysh-

naseleniiaTomska', in O.N. Vilkov GorodaSibiri,Nclvosib'irsk:Y.N. Kurilov, 'Uchastie sluzhilykh liudei v stanovlenii g. Tiumeni kak

torgovo-promyshlermogo tsentra v XVII v.', in ibid., 80-8; N.I. Nikitin, Slushilyecapaanoi Sibiri XV II v.,Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1988.

l'-U'W,,"', 'Volneniia v Tiumeni v 1654 g.', trvestiia SOAN SSSR. Seriia obshch­3 no. II, pp. 99-104; E.Y. Chistiakova, Gorodskie vosstaniia

v Rossii v XVII v., Voronezh: Izd-vo Voronezhskogo Universiteta,1975; I. P. Kamenetskii, 'Volneniia sluzhilykh liudei v Kuznetskom , in O.N.Vilkov (ed.) Sibirskie Xvtl-nachala XX v., Novosibirsk: Nauka, I.

9 Geoffrey Hosking, Russia and the Russians, Allen Lane: 200 I, 115; A .P.Rostov-on-Don 1995: Izdat. OblIUU, vol, I,

13

Skorik, Karachii140-4.

10 Chester Dunning, 'Terror in the Time of Troubles', Kritika vol, 4 (2003), 494,512-13.

II lstoriia Sibiri, red. V.I. Shunkov, Leningrad, I vol, 2, 125.12 M.O. Akishin, Politseiskoe i sibirskoe obshchestvo,

"Avtor', 1996,74-110.Vlasr', 291; Ogloblin, 'Krasnoiarskii', 25-70; S.Y. Bakhrushin,

"Ocherki po istorii Krasnoiarskogo uezda v XVII v.', in id., Nauchnye trudy vol, IV,Moscow: Akad., I 170-92.

14 Ibid., 180, 187-8.15 Aleksandrov, ViasI', 292.16 Ibid., 1-10,351-6,17 E.Y. Vershinin, 1toevod~koe

obuchenie, 1998, 138-47.18 Aleksandrov, Vlasr', 92-101.19 Basil Dmytryshyn, 'The Administrative Apparatus of the Russian Colony in Siberia

and Northern Asia, 1581-1700', in Alan Wood (ed.) The History cfSiberia, London:Routledge, 1991,27; Lantzeff, Siberia, 85-6.

20 Aleksandrov, ViasI', 296, 299.

Notes 203

35.

276; cf.

Geschichie und Gesellschajt

Chinggisid Principle in Russia' , RH vol, 19 (I

III; Peter Rostankowski, undSiediungsjormen in den Landern der russischen Kosakenheere ,Berlin: FU, I 7.

proizkhozhdenii, strukture i sotsial'noi soobshchesrv russkikhXVII veka', tstoriia SSSR no. 4, 168. Use of this

r\.u,M.U,M.f. 1121 op. 2 no. 107 1. 6 (investigation).Kumke, Gejunrte , 134 n. 10I.

21 Ibid., 328.22 Akishin, Politseiskoe, 8-21.23 Ibid., 205. Cf. vershinin, ~oe'vOltS!u7e, 143; N.1. Nikitin, '0 traditsiiakh

obshchirmogo v Rossii XVII v.', lrvestiia SO RAN. istoriia (Ino. 3, 6.

24 N.F. Slurhi laia biurokratiia v Rossii X11 II v., Moscow: Nauka, I25 80-7; Akishin, 205-6; Nikitin, "Traditsiiakh ', 6.26 Cf. Nikitin, 48; A.A. Ural i Sibir' v kontse

Xv t-nachale XVIII Moscow: Nauka, I 359.L"'L~lC;J1. Fuhrer und bei den ZUJoorOJ?I,r K.osakell, Wiesbaden:

Harrassowitz, I I 0 f -''::1 f • '+O'J- '::I" •

28 In other areas: Maureen Perrie, 'Outlawry (vorovsrvo) and Redemption throughService' , in Anne Kleimola and G. Lenhoff Culture and in M~~sc(JVY

J.).)~'J'),'''I, Moscow: I 530-42; id., 'Cossack "Tsareviches"Russia', FzOG vol, 56 (2000),243-56.

I.2930 Junko Mivawaki.

Sti:\kl, Erustehung ,31 For Siberia: Nikitin, Sluzhiiye, 95.32 Michael Frank, und Kriminalitai, Paderborn: Schoningh,

1995; Schlumbohrn, 'Gesetze, die nicht werden einStrukturmerkmal des fruhneuzeitlichen St~~tf',~'1' vol ,

647-63.

34

3536 Ibid., 114.37 Ibid., 109. On tolerance: Jean Richard, 'Le Christianisme dans I'Asie cen-

trale', Journal for vol, 16 (I 101-24. Mixed ofSiberian rebel Personenverbande: Vlast', 184.

38 Charles Social New York 1909, cited ace, to AlexanderOrganization and Military Performance", in Little

'fMilitarv Hills: 1971 , 297.Ivan IV.

(i etunrte . 108-9.

33

394041 Ibid.,42 Pokrovskii,43 Ibid.,303.44 G.F. Miller, istoriia Sibiri, 2nd edn, Moscow: Akad., 1999, vol, 1,312-4; cf. E.V.

Chistiakova, "Tomskoe vosstanie 1648', in Russkoe naselenie Pomor'ia i Sibiri,Moscow: Nauka, I 80.

45 Ogloblin, 'K istorii ', 6; Pokrovskii, 70-1; vershinin, 41;N.N. Pokrovskii and E.K. Rornodnnovskaia Tobol'skii arkhiereiskii dam v XVII

Novosibirsk: Sibirskii Khronograf, 1993,25.46 P.M.Golovachev (ed.) Pervoe stoletie lrkutska, St Petersburg: Kusnerev, 1902, 104.47 On the 'sunken' costs in institutions: Claus Offe, lnsti tut ionsfor

East Transitions, Vienna: Universitat Wien, 1994, S.D. Krasner,'Sovereignty. An Institutional Political Studies vol, 21(1988),81.

48 Kumke, (iri;;fUh,rte.269 n. 52.

204 Notes

49 Aleksandrov, Vlast', 96.50 191; Peter Hofstetter, Gruppendynamik, Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1971,

52

147.51 N.N. Pokrovskii (ed.) Pervoe stoletie sibirskikh. gorodov, Novosibirsk: Sibirskii

Khronograf, I no. 88.',"U.I U""~, G, tiihrte, 220; Aleksandrov, Vlast', 77; A.L. Grozhdanskaiavoina v Rossii XviI v., Moscow: , 1990, 9; RIB vol, 143-4; vol, 18, 8; cf.:M.A. Usrnanov,Tatarskie Kazan" Izdat. Kazan. Univ., 1972,94.

110.

207.

68,70 (decrees).95 ob.: kn. 583 11.

\J"J''Mu,~.109.

Ursprune, Geschichie und

11. 324 ob., 325.n.p., 1930, vol, I, 113-15;

5th New Haven: Yale 1961,54-5.Nikitin, "Traditsiiakh', 5,7. Cf. Kumke,

vernadsky, A H I.I'tOr'V (; t

5354 I.S. Bykadorov,

1983,(I 663-79.

71 Bakhrushin, Krasnoiarskogo', 189.72 Mashanova, ' , 147.

Bedeutung des russischen 2 Dorpat, 1890-1.73 Bakhrushin, ,72-3.'74 Kumke, (;cfiihrt".

75 Bakhrushin, Krasnoiarskogo'76 RGADA f. 112177 PSZ vol, IV no. I78 Leont'eva, Slurhi lye, 303; RGADA f. 214 kn. 1228 11.

kn. 618 11. 312-359 ob.79 The Polish diet prohibited marriage between Cossacks and townspeople

tinuing a policy of limiting between the fluid categoriesthe sixteenth century. Trade was a of townspeople:36-7; Mikhail Astapenko, istoriia , Izdat.Rostovskozo Universiteta, 1998, vol, I, 55. Personal communication with BrianBoeck.

80 Mark Mancall, Russia and China, Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard, 1971, 43-4, 49-51,106,141.

81 Leont'eva,Sluzhilye, 304.

55 vershinin, "O,,~v0l1skoe,

56 Russians, 156.57 Cf. 'Proizkhozhdenii', 167-77.58 David Moon, The Russian London: LV1Ign.lltn,

59 Russians, 18.60 Ibid., 17.61 RGADA f. 214 kn. 1619,62 Nikitin, 76-7; Aleksandrov,63 This is not to that the mir was evervwhere equivalent to a Personenverband. In

the town dominated64 Aleksandrov. Vlast', 265-7.65 Nikitin, 103.66 'U nas' in this contex t refers to the ;)eJ<~nglt, not the Irkutsk Cossacks.67 RGADA f. 1121 2 no. 164 11. 9-17 Cf. Kurnke, Gejunrte. 193.68 Aleksandrov, , 296.69 Cf. Kumke, 189-90.70 "Chioby emu u nikli byt' u indicates albeit not akin to Roman law,

including towards : cf. H.-H. Nolte,"Eigenturnsrecht im Moskauer et al. (eds) Staat undGesellschc]i in Mittelalter und Fruher : Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,

Weickhardt, 'The Pre-Petrine Law of Property, SR vol, 52

Notes 205

60-1

vol. 3.1,

dokumentov arkhivov moskovskikliArkheograficheskii tsentr, 1994, 249.

tsarev

casetetue, 174;RIB vol. II no. II,

1 u,n-·lUJU. Moscow: Izd, vosr.Iit., I no.22,

prikarov XvI nachala XVIISukhotin, Zemel pozhalovaniia

vladislave, Moscow, 191 ,£,C;'m'''' .... , Polen und Berlin: Athen aurn, 1994, 193.

rcjicheskii slovar ', vol, St 1903. Baron, 'Thrust' ,Gazenvinkel', 22; Frank Der von

c/aurten; Diss, Phil., 1981 , 219; N.P. Russko-mon-gotskie posoiskie otnosheniia XVII I zdat. Yost. 22.According to uncorroborated Vf.I,LJIl\)lI, in 1605: N.P. Likhachev, Razriadnve d'iaki

Ukaz, lich. 41.russkie diplomaiy v Kitae, Moscow:

9596

93

91

94 Russko-mongol'skie

82 G.L. Penrose, 'Inner Asian Influences on the Earliest Russo-Chinese Trade andDiplornaticcontacts", RH vol. 19 (I 361-92.

Bakhrushin, razriada v XVII v.' in id.,Moscow: Akad., I

84 Overview of literature on the Petlin mission: Michael Hundt, 'Einleitung, in id. (ed.)Beschreibunu der chinesischen Reise ... Ides und ... Stuttgart:

24n.

88

8687

XVI v., St I89 Baron, 'Thrust', 35; N.F. Demidova,

Nauka, I 15.90 'Rodoslovie Kniaziakh X-XIX vv.', in Arkhiv kn. F.A. Kurakina.vci: 2,

St Balashev, 1890, Russ, Herren, 428 n. 103.Cf. N.F. etRomanovv na rossiiskom Moscow: Izdat ... RAN, I

amnestv: Penrose, 'Influences', 204.Pokrovskii, Arkh.iereiski«. kniga v., 11. I 142 ob., 145. Christoph Witzenrath,"Orthodoxe Kirche und Fernrnacht', in Christian Hochmuth and Susanne Rau (eds)Machtraume der Konstanz: UVK, 2006. Kurakin faced achanged climate at court, since Poles after captivity in Poland, hadreturned to Muscovy in 1619.

92 An ostrorhek with a of 40 to 50 men was set up near the portage: Butsinskii,I

83

16.suiesnov, in Russkii biogrcficheskii slovar", izdanie Imperatorskago

Istoricheskago Obshchesrva, St 1912, 138; on Suleshev: Chapter 2.97 M.N. Tikhornirov, Klassovaia bor'ba v Rossii XVII v., Moscow: Nauka, 1969,

79-85.98 Bakhrushin, 'voevody', 262.99 RGADA f.199 PortfeliG.F. Millera no. 478 11.66 (petition).

100 Stanislavskii, 85. '101 Pokrovskii, kn. v 11. I 142ob., 145.102 Bakhrushin,' ',262 this as evidence for the overwhelming power of

Tobol'sk as to Siberian towns.103 vernadsky, Mongols, 214-15.104 Russko-mongol'skie, no. 11. 3-4.105 Charles Halperin, 'Ivan IV and Chinggis Khan', .!BGOvol, 51 (2003),481-97, here

497; Kappeler, vielvolkerreich, 42; N.F. Demidova (ed.) Russko-kitaiskie otnosheniiav XviI v., vol, I: /608-/683, Moscow: Nauka, 1969, 108-9, 115.

106 Demidova believes an instruction since the Petlin report answered 'directlyto all questions discussed by Russian diplomats with Merrick'. However, through his

206 Notes

own channels, Kurakin may have known about these negotiations that were no secret:21.22.contemporary translation in Moscow, The text states 'sibirskie

107108 RKQ vol. ,

liudi',

the voevoda, If

On Maksirn: A.P.I no. 60 11. 65-6 (Iakov Turchaninov'siz istorii rapadnykn Buryat-mongolov ; Leningrad: Sotsekgiz ,

118119120121

109 5.110 ,....Uf1.Uf1.f. 1121

Okladnikov,I 60-2.

, ....Uf1.Uf1. f. 1121 op. I no. 60 1. 65.III112 Ibid.113 156-8.114 RGADA f. 1121 op. I no. 601. 65.115 Ibid. 1. 66.116 Kumke, Gejiihrte,117

36;

vol, III, 19, 30,31.

and Pious Servitude.

"''''C;JIJ'Y, it signified

Notes 207

144 Pokrovskii, p. 93 kn. v 11. 44 ob-46.145 Vlast' , 195. Cf. Chapter 5: Isakov and Panikadilshchikov: RGADA

I no. 8, 14, 23; Beiton and Cherkasov: ibid. op. 2 no. 1641. 10;AndreiOsharovskoi: ibid. no. I 1.2; ibid. no. 153 1. I.

146 25-6; Krasner, ,81;'Institutionenwandel'. intnsututionenwandel, 21-56.

147 62 n. 2.148 "formed a A.P. Zabaikal'skie karaki,

Chita I 25.

\ooe11ods!roe, 38.

(investigation); RGADA

149 Kivelson, A,ulOl:rac:y.150 RGADA f. 1121 I no. 468 1. 28 (mvesngauon151 RGADA f. 214 no.152 Akishin, 13.153 118.154 Akishin, 178-9.155 Ibid.,31O,313,320;RGADAf.1121

f. 214 kn. 161911. 21, 25,37,vershinin, \ooevods!roe, 160; Bakhrushin, 'Krasnoiarskogo'

156 63.157 Vershinin, 38.158 Aleksandrov, ViasI', 322.159 'Caert des Lands en Stadt Yrkutskoy', in Cherterhnaia

Remerovym, facsimile, Moscow: FGUP PKO Kartografiia,1<oe\'odsJ~oe, 39.

160 RGADA f. 1121 no. 419 11. 18-25 (investigation).161 vershinin, 38-9.162 Ibid.,40-1.163 S.Y. Bakhrushin, Ocherki istorii koloniratsii Sibiri v XV! i XvII vv., Moscow:

Sabalnikovykh, 1927, 167; 'Sorokina', 206, 210-11; Lantzeff, 82.164 In I some deli boiarskie were granted the new rank of Siberian dvor ianin:

LdJlIl£'C,IJ, ';'I(J~"u,63.

S lurhiiye, 80-1; N.N. Ogloblin, Obozrenie900, pt I, I 135-6; Lantzeff,

165 Bakhrushin, Krasnoiarskogo, 183.166 Akishin, Politseiskoe,167 vershinin,

stolbtsov i63.

168 Lantzeff, 'J""~' ,,~,

169 Bakhrushin, Krasnoiarskogo', 181.170 Ibid., 180.171 Pokrovskii, 277-320; Aleksandrov, VlaSI', 305-16, 322-6. Chapter 5.172 Zabaikal'skie, vol, I prilozh, 25; Ogloblin, pt III, 101.173 Chapter 2.174 Lantzeff, ,)I(J~' ,,~,49.175 Cf. Ibid., 53.176 Aleksandrov, ViasI',177 Ibid., 288.178 vershinin, 1<oevodskoe, 'Prilozheniia' .179 Lantzeff, 83.180 Ogloblin, 'Iakutskii, 375-7.181 Ibid., 383.182 Ibid., 389.183 Cf. ibid., 391.184 RGADA f. 1121 op. I no. 145 11. 60-2 (investigation).185 vershinin, 1<oevodskoe, 48-55.

208 Notes

186 Barrett,187 D.Ia. Rezun, Russkie v Srednem Prichuiyme Xvtl-Xvttl vv., Novosibirsk: Nauka,

I 67.

2 The economics of Siberian service

Holt, Rinehart &

University of California Press,

Prichulyme XviI-XVIII vv., Novosibirsk: Nauka,Mangazeia, Leningrad: Gidrometeoizdat, 1980, pt 1, 33-5,

v Sibir v XVI-XVII vv.', in id., Nauchnye Trudy72-111.

Cambridge: UP, 1984.DeK alblI11. : Northern Illinois UP, 1995.

Recoverv of Russian Cities from 1500 to 1700', CASS

5

6

78

I James A UP, 1992,40.2 G.L. Penrose, 'Inner Influences on the Earliest Russo-Chinese Trade and

Diplomatic Contacts", RH vol, 19 (1 361.3 Der von nach. Daurien, Diss. Phil., 1981.4 Rossii, vol, 1/2: Donskoe karachestvo ,

1998,107.

12

13 49.14 Cf. M.A. Vodolagin, Ocherkii istorii ltbII!OJ,ra,da.Moscow: Nauka, I 22.15 N.N. "Tomskii bun t 1637-1 , tstoricheskii vestnik vol, LXXXV

(1901),16 E.N. Shveikovskaia, Gosudarstvo i krest'iane Rossii, Moscow: Arkheograficheskii

tsentr, I 219:A.L. Grarhdanskaia voina v Rossii XVII v.,Moscow:, 1990, 31,41, 105, Ill, I 244-5. Cf. the of German rnerce-

Peter Burschel , SOldner im des /6. und /7.Jahrhundens, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994.

17 Carsten Goehrke, Wiistungen dermittelalterlichen Rus ', Wiesbaden:Harrassowitz, 1968, 209: N.N. Pokrovskii and E.K. Romodanovskaia (eds) Tobol'skiiarkhiereiskii dom v Xv II Novosibi rsk: Sibirskii Khronograf, 1993, 172-4, 1.125.

18 Ibid., 11. 331-33. Tobol'sk archbishops' rights to secular local administra-tion: Christoph Witzenrath, 'Orthodoxe Kirche und Femmacht', in ChristianHochmuth and Susanne Rau Machtraume derKonstanz: UVK, 2006.

19 Recent debate on the ability of the early modern state to enforce its norms is summa­rized by Achim Landwehr, "'Norrndurchsetzung" in der Fruhen Neuzeit? Kritik einesBegriffs', vol, 48 (2000), 146-62. Landwehr asserts that terms like 'implemen-tation' and of ordinances and norms have been applied unreflectively.Cf. Marc Raeff, The Well-ordered New Haven: Yale, 1983, 45.Landwehr combines both strands of the debate: the effectiveness and mid-dle range powerlessness of the state and the efficient of the subjects, Basedon a carefully observed case study, he claims that the long-term effectiveness of state

Notes 209

initiativesoccurred throughcomplexforms between the subjects andvar-ious authoritiesin a processwhich could fosternew and through the sub-

use of norms the intentions of the Norms and organizationstheir enforcement weight when and abused Achirn

Frankfurt/Main: 2(((1.20 V.A. Aleksandrov and N.N. Pokrovskii, Vlast' i

ob,~hche~,tv(),Novosibirsk: Nauka 1991,204; N.I. Nikitin, liudi v ZapadnoiSibiri Xv]! v., Novosibirsk: Nauka, I 104; S.v.T"ih"l' d,,,,,,,, razriada v XVII v.' in id., vol, 3.1 , Moscow: Akad., 1:1-','), ," ~r--,

')OI,:U ers, 46-8.21 E.V. Vershinin, 1tbevodskoe v Razvivaiushchee

obuchenie, I 82-3.22 A.N. "Sud'ba iz "pribylykh del" P.I. Godunova', in Russkoe nase-

lenie Pomor'ia i Moscow: Nauka, 129-48. Vlast', 105-6.23 conclusion: Nikitin, 195.Astrakhan: N.B. Golikova, Ocherki po

Rossi, Moscow: Izdat. I 54-6.24 137-8; K.B., rhalovan'e poslurhnikam

1892.25 G.A. liudi vostochnoi diss ... kand., Moscow I III,

141.26 N.I. Nikitin, 'K 0 sotsial'noi

(1986) no. 2, Aleksandrov, no dal' nevostochnykb ruoernasn,Moscow: Nauka, I 151. In Tiumen' and Tara in 1700-01, livestock registeredwith the absolute of servitors. Even in the northern towns theyand other livestock: P.N. Butsinskii, Zaselenie Sibiri iKhar'kov: Gub. Pravl., I 140; N.N.Sibirskago V'''''''''-'-', Moscow 1895-1900, pt 137; pt 3, 228; L.A.Semen Remezov, Moscow: Nauka, I1182; st. 761.204; st. 18611. 154-155; st. 81. 90 (registration).Statisticheskoe obozrenie St 1854, II, 83.

27 A.I. Ocherki po istochnikovedeniiu Sibiri, : Akad., 1960-65, 151 .28 A.P. Okladnikov (ed.) Krest'ianstvo Sibiri v Novosibirsk: Nauka,

1982, 191 271. Given the latter chetvert' was equal to 8 results 20-4Nikitin, 227 n. 123; Shunkov, V.I., Mery v Sibiri Xv]! v., inAkademiku BD. Grekovu ko dniu Moscow: Nauka, I 167-71.

29 Ace, to Americana.30 Cf. 9.31 Okladnikov's daily norm cal, or kcal annually;but it is unclear to

how persons this32 M.P. . (ed.) Beschreibung der Reise @Jf Moscow: Akad., I

17-18.33 Okladnikov, Krest'ianstvo, 33.34 N.F. Gored Tomsk v epokhu, Tomsk: Izdat. Tomskogo

Universiteta, 1984,24; S.P. Krasheninnikov v Sibiri, Moscow: Nauka, 1966,53-5;O.N. Vilkov, 'Rybnaia Tobol'ska XVII v.', in 1tbprosyistorii sotsialno-eko-nomicheskoi i kulturnoi Si biri, Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1968,vol, I, 5-14.

35 Nikitin, 141.36 Bernhard Kroener, 'Conditions de Vie et Sociale du Personnel Militaire

Subalteme, Francia vol, 15 (1987),321-50.37 Burschel, 181-2; N.N. Pokrovskii, Tomsk /648-/649 gg., Novosibirsk:

Nauka, 1989,96.38 Cf. the transactions of Lonshakov, Burschel, SOldner, 241-55; Markus Meurnann,

'Soldatenfamilien und uneheliche Kinder', in Bernhard Kroener (ed.) undFrieden, Paderbom: Schoningh, 1996,219-36.

210 Notes

no.

g.', in

for fur transport).

i-rencn- bflQ:ll:;m cultural rnisun­Thompson, Customs in Common,

'_"'/.WTV. 2nd edn, New York:

London, I41 Cf. the case of Katerina Turcheninova, Chapter 5.42 210-11.43 Lantzen , ,;,wena, 102-4.44 On Studenitsyn: 5; RGADA f. 1121 op. I no. I 1.96;no. 35 1.60

331. 90 (invesugationj. no. 1. 120; 2 no. 74 (investigation).45 RGADA f. 112 I no. 11. 108-946 Ibid., no. 2,11. 2 ; no. I47 A.P. Okladnikov, Ocherki iz istorii zapadnykn

Sotsekgiz, 1937, 113-14.98-9.

Laruzen , ,;,wena, 103.Siurhi lye, 117.J01':l-le's, 64.

Ogloblin, "Tomskii', 235.Aleksandrov, Vlast', 247-8. Id., 'Narodnye vosstaniia v vostochnoi Sibiri', IZvol. 59(I 272-3.

54 'Tomskii' , 241.55 230. Similar (1641): Rezun, Prichuiyme.Ss .56 Ogloblin, "Tomskii', 240-1.57 Ibid., 239.58 Nikitin, Slurhilye, 135-7.59 E.P. Thompson, 'The Moral of the Crowd', in id., Customs in Common,

London: Merlin, 1991, 200. Adrian (ed.) Moral and r n nutar

Protest, London: Macmillan, 2000. I am indebted to Bartlett this hint.00 Ogloblin, "Tomskii', 240.61 Ibid., 251.62 E.Y. Chistiakova, Gorodskie vosstaniia v Rossii, Voronezh: lzd-vo Voronezhskogo

Universiteta, I 209.63 S.Y. Bakhrushin, po istorii Krasnoiarskogo uezda v XVII v.'. in id.,

vol, IV, Moscow: Akad., I64 ,202; 171, 176; cf. Nikitin, Sluzhiiye, 125.65 Chistiakova, 1.obsstaniia, 220; E.Y. Chistiakova, "Tomskoe vosstanie

Russkoe naselenie Pomor 'ia i Sibiri, Moscow: Nauka, I 81.66 Okladnikov, 55.67 Bakhrushin, ,75-6.68 Ibid., 179.69 Aleksandrov, Vlast', 115, I 134, 154, 155, 371, 373; N.N. Pokrovskii, "Sibirskie

materialy po "slovu i delu gosudarevu'"; in id. (ed.) lstochniki po istorii obshch­eSt11eni'10110 mysli i kultury Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1988,

40

70 Nikitin, 106,227.71 Astapenko, tsioriia, 107.72 Rezun, Prichulyme, 47.73 Ibid., 47; Ogloblin, Oborrenie .pt I, 279.74 Rezun, Prichulyme, 52-3.75 Ibid., 53.76 Ibid., 46, 54.77 Ibid., 45-61.78 Ibid., 73-4.

Notes 211

" 54-55; EG.

(file' "c,'/flu,c',

Emelka Evdokirnovwas a local leader

8485

79 Ibid., 74. Chapters 1,5,80 Ibid., 42.81 Ibid., 73-5.82 Cf. Ibid., 67.83 RGADA f. 1121 I no. 211. 22-3

5), another fi'~lm~~ 'with comrades'Konvlov, '0 date osnovarriia Irkutska', tsioriia SSSR (1960) no. 5,166.

Vlast', I 164; David 'The Altai. Fortified ResourceFrontier', in E.-M. The Siberian Frankfurt/Main: 2005, 32.

claims without evidence were caused by voevodas,86 106; S.Y. Bakhrushin, Ocherki po istorii koloniratsii Sibiri v XVI i

XVII vv., Moscow: Sabalnikovykh, 1927, 167.Aleksandrov, Vlast', 200.87

88 Ibid., 91.89 RGADA f. 214 kn. 161 11. 21-110 (mvesnganonso 3191 RGADAf.1121 I no. 317,11. 1-6.92 Ibid. no. 11. 7. Cited to93 Ibid. no. 11. 147.94 Ibid. no. 1. 117.95 I 409.596 116, 125-6.en Vlast', 324. 5.98 RGADA f. 1121 2 no. I 2-4 \U"'"'C;C').

99 Ibid.op. I no. 11. 41-2.100 Ibid. no. 1. 7.101 327.102 Astapenko, 107; Nikitin, Slurhilye, 103-41; id., '

Safronov,Russkie na severo-vostoke Moscow: Nauka, I103 307.104 Cf. Dal'nevosiochnykli.Lu».105 Aleksandrov, Vlast', I 375; Nikitin, Sluzhilve,106 Cf. 216. eve.Slushiiye, 310-12,315,351-3,

327.

114115116

110

107 312.108 341-3.109 Richard Hellie The Muscovite Law Code (f /649, Irvine/CA 1988,

I., 81. Debt bondage: id., Slavery in Russia, UP, 1982.S.Y. Bakhrushin, Nikitina v Sibiri i Kitaie' ,

id., Nauchnye Trudy voi. III 1, Moscow: Akad., 226-51.III M.S. a Honest Rubel in the Russian North', FzGO vol, 54 (l998),

15-20.112 RGADA f. 1121 op. I no. 451 11. 17-19 (report).113 N.N. Pokrovskii (ed.) Pervoe stoletie sibirskikli gorodov; Novosibirsk: Sibirskii

Khronograf, 1996,no. 26, pp. 86-9.Table 18.

Ibid., 298-300.I.I. Serebrennikov, Pamiatniki starinnago dereviannogo rodchestva v trkutskoigubernii, Irkutsk: Kazantsev, 1915,Table 17.

117 Ibid., 5; P.A. tstoricheskoe Obozrenie Sibiri; St Petersburg: Skorokhodov,1886,108.

118 N.D. Zol'rrikova, Sibirskaia prikhodskaia obshchina, Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1990,178-82.

119 RGADA f. 1121 op. I no. 185 1. 53.

212 Notes

120 P.lv1. Golovachev (ed.) Pervoe stoletie lrkutska, St Petersburg: Kusnerev, I121 6.

1.

3 Integration of the trading frontier: the sovereign's affair

G.F. Miller, tstoriia Sibiri, 2nd Moscow: Akad., I vol, 1, 273-7 and

in Colonial

Rywkin (ed.)

1992: Achirn

2 Sk,vI'«w. lstoricheskoe Oborrenie Sibiri: St Petersburg: Skorokhodov, I87: D.N. 'Russia's of Siberia', Studies Review

vol, 17-44.3 Y.A. Aleksandrov and N.N. Vlast' i obshchestvo , Novosibirsk: Nauka

1991, 1-10, I 16, 351-7: M.M. , ZemskoeRusskom Severe v Xv II v., Moscow 1912, vol, II, 261 .

4 Nicholas The Myth cf London:Landwehr, im Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann,

5 Basil 'The Apparatus of the Russian Colony in Siberiaand 1581-1700', in Alan Wood (ed.) The London:ROLltle(lge, 1991, 18-21,34-5.

6 Ibid., "".J,,,"";!-·.Jv,34.7 Ibid., 31.8 H.R. Huttenbach, 'Muscovv's Penetration of Siberia', in Michael

Russian London: Mansell, I 100,97.9 G.Y. in the Seventeenth A

New York: 1972,80.10 Ibid., 205.II Collins, 'Conquest', 33.12 S.Y. Bakhrushin. Nauchnye vol, IV,Moscow: Akad., I13 Y.A. in Provinces, Stanford: UP,

Exceptions: N.N. Ogloblin, Oborrenie stolbtsov i1900, III,184.

14 39-45.15 R.O. 'The Latest from Muscovy' , RR vol, 60 (2001), 475-6.16 Lantzeff implications for rebellions and litigation: 32. The

rarriad was emulated under the first Romanovs the frontiers in Novgorod,Ukraine, Tambov, Riazan', and Kazan': Y.O. Kliuchevskii, 'Kursrusskoi istorii', in Moscow: Izdat, Polit, I vol, I, 195:B.N. Chicherin, B.N., uchrezhdeniia Rossi i v XV II-m veke, TheMouton, I 61.

17 Ogloblin, Obozrenie, pt III, 215, 36: N.N. Pokrovskii (ed.) Pervoe stole tie sibirskikhIIVfUUUV. Novosibirsk: Sibirskii Khronograf, 1996,no. 26, pp. 78-9.

18 Initially a voevoda ruling over small forts frontier character. only tobecome the takutskii rarriad in 1697. Lantzeff, Thus, wereorganizations of the frontier.

19 Ibid., 42.20 G.G. Weickhardt, 'Due-Process and Equal Justice in the Muscovite Codes', RR vol ,

51 (l 477.21 S.V. Bakhrushin, 'Ocherki po istorii Krasnoiarskogo uezda v XVII v.', in id.,

Nauchnye trudy vol, IV,Moscow: Akad., I 175-6.22 DAI II, . 1613 g.: Richard Hellie (ed.) The Muscovite Law Code (Ulorhenie) cf

/649, Irvine/CA 1988, pt I, Chapter 2, art. 18-21.23 Why Shishkov deemed himself more honourable than Sobakin is not clear. Several

Sobakins were chamberlains in tsarevich Ivan's household in 1682: PaulBushkovitch, Peter the Cambridge: UP, 2001, 133. One was Mikhail, but the

Notes 213

21-2.

Irkutsk, Siberia, and

the Muscovite Political

verkhotur'ia, Ekaterinburg: Izdat.

in

relationship of his father Vasilii and uncle Nikiforovich, boyars andwith and his brother Aleksei, a voevoda in Viatka in 1683-4,

remains unclear. G. brother Semen died as a voevoda at in 1678:Arbuchny! ukaratel' imen russkikn 2nd Vad uz: Kraus, I

24 Krasnoiarskogo, 156-7.25 squabbles: Aleksandrov, Vlast', 241 Guiding ideas: Introduction.26 Aleksandrov. Vlast', 225; N.N. Poh:rmlski.i.' Sibirskiematerialv

darevu'", in id. (ed.) lstochniki istorii obshchestvennogopordnego [eodaiirma, Novosibirsk: Nauka, I

Brown, 'Neither Fish nor Fowl. AdrninistrariveRussia', JBGO vol, 50 21.

28 S.N. The Political New York:Macmillan, I29 Valerie 'The Devil His , AHR vol, 98 (I 733-56.30 Cf. Rudolf 'Interaktion und Herrschaft', in Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger ted.),

Was heisst des Berlin: Duncker & 2005,II 124-8.

31 Christoph Witzenrath ,Muscovy' , forthcoming.

32 G.H. Geist, tdentitat und Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1960.33 Cf. Uwe Dork, 'Der verwilderte Raurn. Zurn Strukturwandel von Offentlichkeit in

der fruhneuzeitlichen Stadt am Berns', in Susanne Rau and Gert Schwerhoff(eds) Zwischen Goueshaus und Taverne , Bohlau 2004, I where thecentre of attention differed.

34 N.N. Tomsk /648-/649 Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1989.50-1, cf. 86-7.Examples in Pokrovskii, 'Slovu', Aleksandrov, Vlast', 171 238.

35 Ibid., 237. Whether this derive from or custernremains to be 378 n. I N.N . doku-rnent 0 volneniiakh krestian v XVII v.', in N.N. (ed.)Sibirskoe istochnikovedenie i Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1980, 178-84;ValerieKivelson, 'Merciful Father, Impersonal State', Modern Asian Studies vol, 31(I 635 661-2. On reviews: Aleksandrov, Vlast', 200.

36 Aleksandrov, Vlast', 176-7; Pokrovskii, Tomsk, 94, 145; RGADA f. 214 st. 1424,11.79-80, 122, 124 (petitions); Christoph Witzenrath, "Orthodoxe Kirche undFenmacht",in Susanne Rau (ed.) Machtraumeder fruhneuzeitlichen Stadt, Konstanz:UVK,2006, 331.

37 Introducrion.38 V.I. Baidin, Ocherki istorii i kul'tury

Ural'skogo 1998.39 Aleksandrov, Vlast', 259-61. Similar by Cossacks: Pokrovskii,

246-9; Nada Boskovska, '''Dort werden wir selber Bcjaren sein'", JBGO vol, 37(I 351, 367-8, 381-2. Cf. "verrat und Worte' ,FzOG vol, 56 (2000),269.

40 Aleksandrov, Vlast', 259-62.41 Lantzeff, 38-9.42 Ibid., 38.43 Nancy Kollmann, Kinship and Politics: the Making

1375-1 Stanford: UP, 1987.44 Weickhardt, 'Due-Process'.45 Aleksandrov, Vlast', 261-4.46 Rau, "Offentliche, 19.47 Kollmann, Honor, 84; Rau, "Offentliche, 19; Klaus Schreiner and Gert Schwerhoff

(eds) Verletzte Ehre, Cologne: Bohlau, 1995.48 Cf. Aleksandrov, Vlast', 261 265.

214 Notes

Called Themselves "Slaves of

Aleksandrov, Vlast', 265-7.4950 Ibid., 172.51 Ibid., 189.52 Ibid.,53 K.-S. Rehberg, 'Institurionenwandel und Funktionsveranderung des Symbol ischen,

in Gerhard (ed.) Opladen: Westdeutscher 1997,102-3.

54 Victor Lieberman, "Transcending East-West Dichotomies', Modern Asian Studiesvol. 31 (I

55 Witzenrath,56 Marshall Poe, 'What Did Russians Mean When

the Tsar"?' , SR vol, 57 (I 594-8.57 Donald and the Mongols, UP, I 87.58 V.A. 0 narodnykh dvizheniakh v Sibiri v kontse XVII veka' ,

Arkheogrcjicheskii ernegoaruk ra 1961 (I no. I p. 375 ueuers).59 I no. 1.4360 Richard in Russia, 1450-1725, i.tncago:

context: Daniel Kaiser (ed.) The Laws; B.D. Grekov (ed.) Sudebniki XV-XVI Moscow: Akad.,

Ulorhenie . Hellie considers indentured labourers as slaves in a wide sense thatwould be however, to 'slaves' in almost all Western soci-eties. Different and terms Siberia: 70;David 'Subjugation and Settlement in Seventeenth and CenturySiberia', in Alan Wood (ed.) The Siberia, London: 1991,37-54.

61 L.M. Mordukhovich, 'Iz Tllk,,,n; ~',;"c,,, nasledstva lu. Krizhanicha', isioricheskiiarkhiv(l no. 1,185.

62 natives: Bakhrushin, 'Ostiatskie', 135.63 Valerie 'Bitter and Pious Servitude. Muscovite Freedom and its

Critics', FzOG vol. 58 (2001), I 4.64 RGADA f. 1121 op. 2 no. 1641. 9 (petition). Cf. nc;lllc;,,,ww~,y,93.

65 'Bitter', 112-14.66 P.v. Lukin, Narodnye oredstavleniia 0 eosudarstvennoi vlasti v Rossii XviI

Moscow: Nauka, "-1A1V,"-';';-'J.

67 Aleksandrov, Vlast', 318.68 Ulolfte;'ue,Chapter 2 art. 1-21.69 Ibid., art. 22.70 I am using the term 'institution' in the sense attributed to it by the 'Theory and analy­

sis of institutional mechanisms (TAIM)': Rehberg et al., 'Abschlussbericht fur dieDFG' , Ms., Dresden 1996; Rehberg, "Institu tionenwandel ' , 101-4.

71 N.Ia, 'Slovo i delo do izdaniia Ulorheniia tsariaAlekseia 1649 g., vol. I, Moscow: 1911, vol. 2: Materialy,lrvestiia un-ta vol, 36 (1910). I.I. Rol' chelobitii i remskikhsoborov v upravlenii Rostov-on-Don: Donskaia Rech' ,I and H.-J. im Moskauer Leiden:Brill,1974.

72 E.L. Keenan, 'Muscovite Political Folkways', RR vol, 45 (1986),147.73 Mark Lapman, Political Denunciation in Muscovy, unpublished thesis, Harvard

University 1981,74-90.74 Pokrovskii, 'Sibirskie materialy ': Aleksandrov, Vlast', 224-33.75 Khodarkovsky, 'Razin', 9.76 Maureen Petrie, 'Cossack "Tsareviches" in Seventeenth-Century Russia', FzOG vol.

56 (2000), 243-56; id., Pretenders and Popular Monarchism in Early ModernRussia, Cambridge: UP, 1995, 250.

Notes 215

24.

Frontier,

gramOly, Moscow:

in to Garrison', RR vol. 51 (l992),

88

81

77 Lukin, Predstavleniia, 168-9.78 250; Brian

l,-",,;;·,~vJl,'Bitter' .79 Pokrovskii, ,50.80 Skta; entry 'delo', nos 1,3. This has led some to translate the term as 'the sovereign's

business' which, is with to the observations on ritual.Pokrovskii, "Slovu", 59; Ulorhenie, IX, art. 1; X, arts 1, 2,

I 149-50.82 Chapter I .83 DAI II, 2. 1613 Ulorhenie . Chanter II, arts 18-21.84 Aleksandrov, 248-9; Rezun, Prit~hu,!yme,59-68; Pokrovskii,

Slurhilye, 192.85 Ulozhenie, Chapter 2, art. 22.86 S.D. Krasner, An Institutional Perspective' Comparative Political

Stuidies vol, 21 (1 ; Claus lnstitutions fOITransitions, Vienna: Wien, I

87 Y.N. 'Mesmoe na Rossii v XVII v.', FzOG vol, 63 (2004),69-83. , 481-501. now: Brian State Power and

L:.UI s v Modern Russia, Houndrnills: 2004. Petitions from thefor a renewal of term: Andre 'Liens familiaux et

reseaux d dans l'administrarion locale de la (XVII-esiecle)', FzOGvol, 63 (2004),86.

RustemeyervUkrainians in Seventeenth-Century Political Trials', JournalUkrainian Studies vos. 24 (l 43-58.

89 Maureen 'Outlawry (vorovsrvo) and through Service', in AnneKleimola and Gail Lenhoff (eds) Culture and in Me(SCfJVV UJY-j'JIl·4.

Moscow: I 530-42; 'Cossack "Tsareviches" in Seventeenth-Century Russia', vol, 2000),

'Xl On the southern frontier: Michael Khodarkovsky, Russia'sBloomington: Indiana UP, 2002.

91 Yuri Arctic Mirrors, Ithaca: \-VllJlC;ll, 1994,7.92 DAlvol. 4 (l851), 104-5.93 Ibid., 89-90.94 Rehberg, 'Insritutionenwandel, 101-4.95 N.N. Ogloblin, 'Iakutskii 0 rosni boiarskikh detei i kazakov', Russkaia starina

(l no. 8,383.96 Aleksandrov, Vlast', 288.97 Pokrovskii, 322-3.98 vol, 2,287-90.99 Namestnich'i, gubnyia i remskiia

ITliv,~nil"'l 1909,188.100 266-9.101 Important news travelled four to six months from Tomsk: Pokrovskii,102 DAI vol, 2 (l846), no. 82, pp. 231-4; Lantzeff, 84.103 DAlvol. 4 (l848), no. pp.91-2.104 RGADA f. 1121 01" 2 no. 176,1. 4-5 (report).105 DAlvol. 4 no. 37, pp. 91-2.106 Cf. Rustemeyer, 'Verrat', 272, 269-70.107 Duchhardt, "vorworr', in id. and Gert Melville (eds) 1m Spannungsfeld von Recht und

Ritual , Cologne: Bohlau, 1997, VII.108 Gert Melville, 'Institutionen als geschichtswissenschaftliches Thema, in id. (ed.)

Ins tnutionen, Cologne: Bohlau, 1992, 14.109 PSRL vo1.36.1, 40,1. 110; I 1. 140b.110 'Outlawry', 534-9.

216 Notes

III 'N akaz iakutskirn voevodani' 1658, DAI vol, 4 (1851), no. 46, p. 108.112 Aleksandrov, Vlast', 224-33.113 David Russian Peasants and Tsarist Houndrnills: Macmillan,

I I Maureen 'Popular (ed.)Reinierpreting Russia, London: Arnold, I

351-68.

: SRla, vol, 18,98: 'Pravda-S.' .

the sources of the Kliucharev debate.

... umeret by v325-6.

Ibid.Michael Maser, Diskurs, Macht und Geschichte. Foucaults Anaiysetechnikenhis torisch.e Frankfurt/Main: 2002, Michel'Das Sutjekt und Macht' in H.L. and Paul Rabinow

Frankfurt/Main: 1, 257; Ian Burkitt, "OvercomingMetaphysics. Elias and Foucault on Power and Freedom', PhilosophySciences vol, 23 (l 56.Re hberg, ,Institutionenwandel' , 103.Po~,rO',sk:ii, Tomsk, 51.

116117118119120121 Khodarkovsky,122123124 Pokrovskii,125 Ibid., 251.126 Ibid.127 Lukin, Predstavleniia, 71-3.128 Pokrovskii, 252.129 Ibid., 26.130 Ibid., 252.131 Aleksandrov, Vlast', 355-7.132 Ibid., The exact number is hard to establish due to the nature of the subject,

the sources and the literature; suffice it that any of the Siberiantowns were touched less than a few times. Rebellions to some cluster arounddates of crisis but were by no means restricted to these cf. the dates

mentioned for Tomsk: Introduction 7.133 Pokrovskii, 326.134 Ibid., 319.135 Ibid., 350; cf. E.V. Chistiakova, "Tomskoe vosstarrie 1648 s', in Russkoe naselenie

Pomor' ia i Sibiri, Moscow: Nauka, 1973, 78; Chapter 5.136 Pokrovskii, 318-21.137 Weickhardt, 'Due-Process'; Brown, 'Neither', 4, 20. Similar evaluation of another

event, cf. Bakhrushin, 'Krasnoiarskogo, 180.138 328-9.139 Aleksandrov, Vlast', 251,276; Torke, Staatsbedmgte ,87-9.140 Pokrovskii, 335-6.141 Maser, Macht, 82.142 Pokrovskii, 351-68.143 Ibid., 368.144 Ibid., 365.145 Ibid., 371.146 ' ... stoim v147 Pokrovskii,148 Ibid., 372.149 According to C.S. Ingerflorn, in this letter 'the tsar is dead': 'Entre le Mythe et la

Parole: I'Action' , Annales vol. 51 (1996), 751-4.150 Aleksandrov, vlast', 288.

114115

Notes 217

Moscow:

28.

Pavlovich

151

159

Further invocations of the sovereign's affair against voevodas: Aleksandrov, Vlast',171-329; Pokrovskii, '''Slovu''', Bakhrushin, , 175.

152 Ibid., 156-61, 175-6.153 Andreas Russland als Vielvij,lkel'reich,!vlunchen:154 Khodarkovsky, Steppe, 223.155 Cf. f. 1121 op. I no. 42211. 80, 112-14 (pennons),156 Kaiser (Aix) in oral communication during the 2004, Kie1.157 21 223; M.O. Akishin, Politseiskoe gosudarstvo

sibirskoe obshchestvo, Novosibirsk: 'Avtor", 1996, 10.158 Cf. und Fondouk, Transkultureller Handel und

Sudeuropa und dern in der Fruhen Neuzeit",,Stadtische Komrnunikationsraume' .

exhilarating case of self-liberation of annerceived as in which the 'benevolent'

Daniel Brower and Susan Layton, 'Liberation Through259-79.

160

259;

non-

in Seventeenth

'Due-Process'; Pokrovskii,

188.

Prosveshchenie, 1991,94.Miller, lstoriia, vol. 1,201,206-7.B.N. 'S. Nernoevskii 0 russkom gosud arsrve i obshchesrve XVI-n achalaXVIIvv.', Russia Mediaevalis vol. IX (I 113.Miller, tstoriia, vol, 1,266.Chapter I. S.H. Baron, 'Thrust and Relations in the MuscoviteNorth', Slavonic N.S (I 34. Later conflicts aboutaccess to trade: 'The Archangel'sk Trade', in Jarrno rs.ouun ne

(ed.) London: 196.Bogoslovskn,Samoupravlenie, vol, II,165

166 AI, vol, 5 (I167168 Chapter 2.169 Cf. Maser, Macht, 84.170 Pokrovskii, 94. Chapter 5.171 A.M. Kleimola, 'The Duty to Denounce in Muscovite Russia', SR vol, 31 (I

759-79.172 Cf. William Absolutism and

Power and Provincial ArI'stc'Crl:lcy in Languedoc, Cambridge:Au,(ocl"ac'v: Landwehr,

173 Early form of theAleksandrov, ViasI',

174 RGADA f. 1121 op. 2 no. 94 (mvesuganon)175 '''Slovu'''. Slovo, published proceedings

officials, mostly of lowly status.176 Chapter 5. Aleksandrov, Vlast', 154; Pokrovskii, "'Slovu''', 40.177 Orlando A London: Cape, 1996,232-41,361-2.

161162

163164

4 Konnlenie and bribery: local influence and administration

MD. Akishin, Politseiskoe i sibirskoe Novosibirsk:"Avtor', 1996, 9; N.D. 'Pis'rna iz lichnogo arkhiva sibirskogo voevodykontsa XVII v.', trvestiia SOAN. lstoriia, vyp. 3 (Sept.-Dec.1991), 8-14; N.!.Pavlenko, AIeksandr Darulovicn Mensh.ikov, Moscow: Nauka, 1981, 29; PaulBushkovitch, Peter the Cambridge: UP, 200I, 183-5, 235 n. 44.

2 In I 18 members of the princely Gagarin kin fell out of favour: Akishin,Poiitseiskoe, 186. '

218 Notes

77.and

116.

Izdat.

Razvivaiushchee

in Seventeenth-Century

191.3 S.Y. Bakhrushin, 'Ocherki po istorii Krasnoiarskogo uezda v XVII v.', in id.,

vol, IV,Moscow: Akad., I4 Bushkovitch, Peter, 276-80.5 J.D. 'Introduction', id. (ed.) The Political Economy r i Mc,rr·,'Jnr'.t empires,

Cambridge: UP, 1991, 1-21.6 P.B. Brown, 'Neither Fish nor Fowl.Administrative

Russia',JBGOvo1.50 5.7 Ibid., 1-6.8 B.N. Mouton,

I 85; N.N. Moscow1895-1900, vol, III, 31; vol, IV,52; G.Y. Siberia in the Seventeenth

A in Colonial Administration, 2nd edn, New York: 48;II, 143.PSZ,

9 G.A. liudi vostochnoi diss ... kand., Moscow I10 Cathy Potter, 'Paymentv Gift or Bribe?', in Alena Ledeneva et al.

Blat in Russia, Macmillan, 2000, 31; F. Slovar' iuridicheskoiMoscow: Univ. For the nineteenth cf. now Susanne Schattenberg.

II RGADA f. 1121 I, no. 11.5-14 (investigation).12 P.M.Golovachev Pervoe stoletie Petersburg:13 Y.N.Tatishchev, irbrannye proirvedeniia,14 Roland La venalite des

623;Charles Montesquieu,De II, 76; cited ace, tovierte.jahreschr.ft fur Sorial-

15 Michael Khodarkovsky, Russia's Frontier. The Making/500-/800, Indiana UP, 2002,223-4.

16 R.1. Frost, The Wars, Harlow: 2000, 53;Autokraiie und Justir, Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 996, Chapter I.

17 G.P. 1<oevodswe kormlenie v Rossii v XVII veke, St Petersburg:Rossiiskoi natsional'noi biblioteki, 2000, 315.

18 H.-J. "Statthalter", in LGR.19 Lantzeff, 55; Oborrenie pt 11,58-64.20 E.V. Vershinin, v Sibiri, Ekaterinburg:

obuchenie, 1998, 190n. 59; 85.21 On prohibiting kormlenie: Lantzeff, Enin, Kormlenie, 267-305.22 Reinhard,' Kreditproblerrr' , 230-1.23 Mettam, Power and Faction, Oxford: Blackwell, 1988,312-13,24 In France and other officially approved and managed

rnon: Reinhard, 'Kreditproblerri', 233-5 n. 6-18.25 G.A. . Pavlovich Khabarov, Moscow: Prosveshch-

1991,94.26 Lantzeff, 48-9.27 RGADA f. 1121 op, I no. 39411. 10-17 \UC<v'C").

28 Mikhail's two daughters were Peter's sister Natal'ia's boiaryshni (l adies-in-waiting).In 1704 in their company at St was Marta, a Livonian servant's daughter,the later Catherine I: Bushkovitch, Peter, 237; A.P. Barsukov, Spiski gorodovyknvoevod gosudarstva XviI st., St Petersburg: Stasiulevich, 1902, 283.

29 V.A. Aleksandrov and N.N. Pokrovskii, Vlast' i obshchestvo , Novosibirsk: Nauka1991; Vershinin, 33.

30 N.1. Nikitin,Sluzhilye liudi v Zapadnoi Sibiri XvII v.,Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1988,49.31 Lantzeff, Siberia, 19-32.32 Brian 'The Politics of Give and Take. Korrnlenie as Service Remuneration

and Generalized Exchange 1488-1726', in AM. Kleirnola (ed.) Culture and Identityin Muscovy, Moscow: ITZ-Garant, 1997, 39-67.

Notes 219

and Pious Servitude: Muscovite Freedom and its Critics' ,

33 Nikitin, 132.34 A.P. Okladnikov, Ocherki iz istorii zapadnykh. buriat-mongolov (XVII-XvIII vv.I,

Lenin grad: Sotsekgiz, 1937, 113-14.35 pt IV, 132.36 'Remuneration' , 39-41.37 Bakhrushin, ,171.38 Vlast', I 247; N.N. Pokrovskii, "Sibirskie rn ater-ial v

gosudarevu'"; in id. (ed.) Istochniki istori i obshchestvennogo myslipozdnego feodalirma, Novosibirsk: Nauka, I

J[)"IO- JIJ"o'gg -: Novosibirsk: Nauka, I 321 ; K.D. Loginovskii ,Materialy kZabaikal'skikn karakov, Vladivostok: Remezov, I Vershinin, VO/~vo,1skoe,

Bakhrushin, Krasnoiarskogo', I 183. Vladimir Dal', slovar' vol, 4,'ukho', I.

39 Bakhrushin, Krasnoiarskogo, 183.40 Ibid., 171.41 Aleksandrov, Vlast', 186.42 132-3.43 Below.44 Akishin, Politseiskoe ,7 6.45 Ibid., 76-7.4647

1649, Irvine/CA:

266.I no. 451 11. 160-2 (report).

MM. Bogoslovskii,1912, II,64.

55 Pokrovskii,56 RGADA f. 112157 Potter, 'Bribe?',5859 Ibid., 247.60 Ibid., 267-70.61 Ibid., 301.62 On institutions: Introduction.63 Hast', 354-5; Bazi levich , K.V. (ed.) Gorodskie vosstaniia v

Moskovskom XVII v., Leningrad: I 48,51; Pokrovskii ,370.

64 Brown, 'Neither', 4.65 Ernst Fursten und Machte, Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000,

238-41,66 Cf. Ulorhenie, 17; Hans Hecker, 'Die Christenpflicht als Rechtsnorm. Der

Loskauf der Gefangenen im Ulozenie, in Uwe Halbach et al. (eds) GeschichteAlt russlands in der ihrer Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1986, 156.

67 Khodarkovsky,68 The term used in Ulorhenie is close to booty, fitting small-scale steppe warfare

and raids. Cf. Max Vasrner, W6rterbuch, vol, 2, entry 'polon', SRla,vol, 16,entry 'polonianik. Ulorhenie, 17.

69 Ibid.

220 Notes

70 iii slovar' -ukaratel' k Sviashchennomic Pisaniiu, (red.) mitropolita ..Moscow: Izdat, Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, 1988-2000, vol, II, entry

LJltlcm.IUlI, 1985,Enseijmeru and

LllJ.,,,,,~;v Press, I I, 232, 258-9;Peter New Haven: Yale I 30,63-4.

76 Smith, 'Muscovite 1462-1598' ,SEER vol, 71 (I 49,B.N. 'S. Nemoevskii 0 russkorn gosudarsrve i obshchesrve XVl-machalaXVII vv.', Russia Mediaevalis vol, IX (1997), 110-11; Bushkovitch, Peter,

312.77 Carol Belkin Soldiers on the Reform and Social in

Modern Russia, DeKalblI11.: Northern Illinois UP, I II, Chapters78 Lantzeff, 49.79 P.N. Zaselenie Sibiri i eia nasel Khar' kov:Gub.

I 191-4.

75

74

71 17-18.72 Rowland, 'Did Russian Literary Ideology Place any Limits on the Power of

the Tsar (I 540s-1 ,RR vol, 49 (1990), 141; Ivan, vremennik IvanaY.P. Adrianova-Peretts, Moscow: Akad., 1951, 72.

73 of ransom: 'Loskauf", 159;1ulii

Donald Ostrowski, Muscovy and the Mongols,

88

Ul()l}l,enl,e,Chapter 10 no. 150.Cf. the amount of paperwork generated overthe recompense of Reval citizens by the Swedish administration, for val-ued incomparably higher: Frost, Northern, 309-10.

81 David Moon, The Russian London: i.ongman, I 243.82 Bushkovitch, Peter, 266; Brian 'The Chigirin Campaign', in Eric

Lohr and Marshall Poe The Military and in Russia 1450-/9/7, Leiden:104,113-8.

83 'Nemoevskii', 113.84 Ibid., 111-13.85 Pomest'e as Tatar

Cambridge: UP, 1998.86 Richard Russland vor der Revolution, Miinchen: 1977, 102-3.87 Nada "'Dort werden wir selber Bojaren sein", Bauerlicher Widerstand im

Russland des 17.Jahrhunderts', JBGO vol, 37 (1989),347,376; N.E. Nosov,Ocherkipo istorii mestnogo upravleniia Russkogo Moscow: Akad., I 209;C.B. 'B anditry and Provincial in Sixteenth-Century Russia', inKleimola, 592; Sergei 'Localism and in Muscovy', inid. (ed.) Russia FinnishAcad., 2005,

3; "verrat und Worte, FzOGvol, 56 (2000),.Ia, Novornbergskii, 'Slovo i delo ' do irdaniia Ulorheniia tsaria

Alekseia Mikhailovicha /649 g., vol, I, Moscow: 1911,537.89 Richard in Russia, Chicago: UP, 1982; Brown, 'Neither', 20;

Governors, vols 1-2 passim.so RGADA f. 1121 I no. 82 11. 35-7,65-8 (receipts),91 vershinin, 148-83; S.Y. Bakhrushin, 'Vc",w"lliv Tobol'skogo razriada v

XVII v.' in id., Trudy, vol, IILI, Moscow: Akad., I

80

Notes 221

92 K.-S. xenoerg, 'Institutionenwandel und Funktionsveranderungdes Syrnbolischen' ,in Gerhard (ed.) Opladen: Westdeutscher 1997,101-4.

93 vershinin, ltc'evo,-:1skc'e, 95-8.

eia

5 Local and central power in the Baikal region 1689-1720

I FA. ltbsstaniia krest'ian, posadskikn i karakov v ltbstoc/mom Sibiri,Irkutsk: ObI. Izdat, 1939.

2 V.A. Aleksandrov and N.N. Pokrovskii, Vlast' i obsncnesivo, Novosibirsk: Nauka,1991,306.

3 G.v. Siberia in the Seventeenth Lo~/."'J.lV.

I 65; N.N. Oborrenie stolbtsov i1895-1900, vol, III, 103; P.N."'''H'ol' ,n;"'", Khar ' kov: Gub,

4 Aleksandrov, Vlast', 305-16,5 Ibid., 308.6 I.7 Leonteva. SIU1)'Jily'e liudi vostochnoi Sibiri, Diss ... kand., Moscow 1972,

305-6.8 Ibid., 327.9 Mark Mancall, Russia and 1971, 188.

10 Ibid., 182.II N.G. Kirshbaum, 115;

Norbert Gotha: Klett-Perthes, 1999, 197.12 Mancall, China, 156-8, Michael Hundt, ,in id. (ed.) Resr-hreihtsn o

dre.jahrigen chinesischen Reise ... Ides und ... Stuttgart:6.

13 304; Iurii Bartenev, 'Geroi Albazina i Daurskoi zemli', RusskiiArkhiv (1899) kn. 11,318;V.I. Ogorodnikov, Tuzemnoe i russkoe naselenie na Amurev XviI v., Vladivostok: Dal'nevost, 1927,63-4.

14 v.v. Kirillov, 'Proekty "obraztsovykh domov" S. dliaTobol'ska', Arkhitekiumoe nasledstvo vol, 12 (1960), I 'Caert des Lands enStadt Yrkutskoy, in Cherterhnaia kniga Sibiri, sostavlennaia ... fac-simile, Moscow: FGUP PKO Kartografiia, 2003, 20, depicts Irkutsk tosketches drawn locally before 1701: L.A. Gol'denberg, Sibiri.U.Remezova', in O.N. Vilkov, Goroda Sibiri, Novosibirsk: Nauka, I 170.

15 T.M. Barrett, At the Oxford: 1999, 36.16 "Caert'; D.N. Collins, and Settlement in Seventeenth and Eighteenth

Century Siberia', in Alan (ed.) The History (1 London: Routledge,1991,39; EA. Irkutsk, Irkutsk: Irkutskoe knizhnoe Izdat., I

17 RGADA f. 1121 1. 22 (petition).18 Ibid. no. 2,11.19 Ibid., 1.6.20 Aleksandrov, Vlast', 308, 310, 325.21 RGADA f. 1121 op. 2 no. 146,1. 3 book).22 Ibid.op. I no. 429,1. 22.23 Ibid. no. 407,11. 1-16; no. 452, 11. 1-8 (1699).24 Ibid. no. 420, 11. 41-3.25 L.K. Minert, Arkhitektura UIan-Ude: Buriatskoe Izdat., 1983, 18.Collins,

"Subjugation", 39; Kudriavtsev, Irkutsk, 6-29; A.P. vasil'ev, Zabaikal'skie karaki,Chita 1918,120-1; Spafarii, 192.

26 Ibid., 115. .

222 Notes

Minert,

'Udinsk' means Verkhneudinsk:Buryaria,Ulan-Ude.

"""' t ' "'l~ ,)I!urnu y" , 297.

Slurhilye, 295; v.A. Aleksandrov, Russkoe naselenie Sibiri, Moscow:

vol, I, 212. In thissince the revolution it has become theVVeIJl, "WI! ,r~lt, 18, 209.Spararn, rutesnestvie, 127-8.

349n.18.

2829 Balzhan Zhirnbiev, cf the Urbanisation

Cal'nblrid~~e/lJK: White Horse, 2000, 30: in 1666!lrkru t etaura,20.

27

30

31323334 Ibid., 54- 6; .J pd. J dill, riaesn ej;tvIt, ,

35 Mancall, 349 n. 19.36 Ibid., 349 n. 16; 117-18. DAI, vol, X, 369.37 RGADA f. 214, st. 1059,1. 282 (report).

38 Ibid., II. 290-2.3940

Leont'eva, Siurhiiye, 67-8; f. 214, st. 855,1. 86 \UOvleC;).

Horace 'From the Kinship Group to Man His Brother'sJBGO vol, 30 (I 321-35.

41 69-70.42 P. Macura, Elsevier's Russtan-Engusti Dictionary, Amsterdam 1990, pt III, entry

and

1. 6 (petition).

eonr'eva, Slurhilye, 68.I no. 145,1. 37 (petition).1-9.

3.Leont'eva, Sluthilye, 295; Aleksandrov, Naselenie.Zss),Aleksandrov, Vlast', 315.RGADA f. 1121 2 no. I II. I RGADA f. 214 kn. 768, 1.236; kn.1034, II. st. 1141, II. 26-42 (excerpts, st. 1424, 1. 80 (petition)Leonr'eva omits deliveries in 1692/1693 to from the lowerthe reasons for arrears.

52 135.53 RGADAf.1121 op. 2 no. 130,11. 2-7 (excerpt.decision).54 RGADA f. 214 st. 1034,1. 243 (excerpt)55 126.56 136.57 RGADA no.58 Ibid.59 Ibid. no. 1. 102 \UO~Ie<:'}.

60 Zabaikalskie, vol, I, 212.61 RGADA f. 214 st. 1424, II. 123-4 (petition).62 RGADAf.1121 I no. II. 99':"105 (rescript).63 Ibid. op. 2 no. I II. 1-2 (petition).64 RGADA f. 214 st. 1424, II. 79-80, 122, 124 (petitions).65 Donald Ostrowski, Muscovy and the Mongols, Cambridge: UP, 1998,53.66 V.A.Aleksandrov, 'Materialy 0 narodnykh dvizheniakh v Sibiri v kontse XVII veka' ,

Arkheogrcficheskii erhegodnik ra /96/ (1962), no. 1/2,p. 351 (letter). RGADA1. 26 (investigation).

67 Leont'eva,Sluz/Jilye, G.F. Miller, istoriia Sibiri, 2nd edn, Moscow: Akad., 2000,vol, II, 91; V.A. Aleksandrov, Rossiia na dal'nevostochnykli ruberhakh, Moscow:Nauka, 1969, 152.

43 ev, Zabaikal'skie vol, 1,212.44 Ibid., 217.4546 RGADA f. 112147 Kollman,48 Introduction;495051

Notes 223

68 Aleksandrov, Vlasr', 307; RGADA

L'+I-.r-L"~.J (excerpt): f. 1121(mvesnganon): Aleksandrov, Vlasr',

op. 2 no.

,nd'\C"d') , 356.

Siaaisbedingte Gesellschajt im Moskauer Leiden: IAleksandrov, Vvedenskii, 'Klassovaia bor'ba i "OOi-

no. 5,116-23.

Petersburg.Akad., 1787, 188;Uglobllll,"."",n.I-'1> f. 1121 op. I no.

79 Aleksandrov,80 Ibid., 353.81 ,5Rla, entry 'karsha', On ritual and state-building: OJ. Kertzer, 'The Role of Ritual

in State-Formation', in E.R. Wolf (ed.) and Suue-Formaiion,Albany: State of N.Y., 1991,85-1

82 RGAD A f. 214 st. I , 1. 98 (mvesnganon83 ,356 (investigation).84 RGADA f. 1121 op. I no. 11. 44-6 (mvesuganon85 Aleksandrov, ' , 347, 375. Rtishchev's

Bushkovitch, Peter the86 Simon The Modernisation 16;'6-1825, Cambridge: UP, 1999, 138;

cf. J.P. LeDonne, 'Ruling Families the Russian Order', CMRS vol, 28(I 233-322; David Ransel, 'Character and of Patron-Client Relations inRussia', in Antoni Maczak, Klieruelsysteme der Fruhen Neuzeit, Munich:Oldenbourg, 1988,211-14.

87 RGADA f. 214 kn. 619,11. 13-100 (investigation)88 Aleksandrov, Vlasr', 307.89 RGADA f. 1121 op. 2 no. 147,11. 1-3 (petition, decision).90 Ibid.,op. I no. 'II. 31-6 '91 Aleksandrov, Vlasr', 313.92 RGADA f. 1121 op. 2 no. 160,1. 3 (investigation).93 Aleksandrov, ViasI', 307.94 RGADA f. 214 st. 1424,1. 122 (petition); Leont'eva, Siurrutye,95 RGADA f. 1121 2 no. 33 (oath); Aleksandrov, 152.96 322,336; RGADA f. 1121 op. I no. 533 11. (investigation);

V.I. Shunkov, po istorii remledeliia Sibiri(XVII vek), Moscow: Akad., 1956,332.

97 L.Y. Mashanova, 'Promyslo-torgovaiadeiarelnost' russkogo naseleniia zabaikal'ia vkontse XVII-nachale XVIII veka' , lstori ia SSSR (1983)no. 2, p. 146; RGADA f. 214no. 1424,1. 122 (petition). '

98 Mancall, China, 175.99 Aleksandrov, vlast', 307.

70 eonr'eva, Slurhilye, 116.71 Aleksandrov, lndlC;UdlY, 365 .Aleksandrov, Vlasr', 307.72 RGADA f. 214 st. 75, 4-19; f. 1121 op. I no. 11. 2,4,6 and

41Aleksandrov, 'Materialy', 363-5.

77 On and78 Maureen Perrie, "Outlawrv (vorovstvo) through Service', in Anne

Kleimola (ed.) Culture Muscovy, ITZ-Garant, I 530;KG. S ibirskaia Novosibirsk I 135-7;

224 Notes

1. 47 (investiga-

11. 1-8 (mvesuganon)

1. 124 (investigation), no. 420, 11. 41-3

11. 120-9 (investigation).

Moscow:

315.

Notes 225

PNm~,.h" in Old Russian Administration' ,Dmitri Zakharine, von zu Angesicht ,

142 HoraceCASS vol. 9Konstanz: UVK,

143 RGADA f. 1121144 Ibid. no. 1. 5145 Ibid. no. 11. 24-5 (investigation).146 Ibid. no. 422, 11. 79-81, 88, 112-4 (petitions and excerpts): Hundt, Beschreibung ,

143-4.

prikashcruk by the Udinsk Cossacks: ibid. no.

147 vol, III, 89-90; "Tornskii bunt 1637-1638istoricheskii vestnik vol. LXXXV (1901), E.V. Vershinin, 1.oOevodskoenie vSibiri (XvII Razvivaiushchee obuchenie, I 39; RG.AD.Af. 1121 I no. 2 no. 16,1. 94 (petition); no. 123,11. 1-8 (investiaa-tion), On honour: Nancy Kollmann, Honor,"--ulJ,cll.1999.

148 93; RGADA f. 214 kn. I 1. 224149 , 15;RGADA f. 1121 op. I no.150 Ibid. no. 403, 1. 24 Dated to Novikov's151 Ibid. no. 11. 18; no. 1. 23 \.jj'''O~'L!1'>0'''V.''~)'

152 Ibid. no. 11. 1-9 (investigation),153 On 8 January, he was called

88, 1. 83 (rescript),154 Cf. Vlast', 315,325.155 RGADA f. 1121 I no. 419, 1. 2 ; no. 403, 1. 4 (investigation)156 Ibid. no. 88, 11. (rescript): Vlast', 326.157 RGADA f. 1121 I no. 419, 1. 11; no. 403, 1. 14; no. 419, 1. 3 (investigations).158 Ibid. no. 509,11.159 ,361.160 Carsten Kumke, FUhrer und bei den Wiesbaden:

I 261. On high frequency ochered': N.!. Nikitin,Slurhilve liudi v Sibiri XviI v., Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1988,98-100; S.v.Bakhrushin, trudy, vol. IV,Moscow: Akad., I 73; Vlast',I 357; f. 1121 I no. 1. 34 (report).

161 Ibid. no. 11. 4-5; no. 1. 47 (investigation); Leonr'eva, Slurhilye, 321;ev,Zabaikal'skie 216.

I no.162 RGADA,f.1121163 Ibid. no. 468, 11.164 Ibid., 11. 18 (investigation).165 Vlast', 324-5.166 RGADA, f. 1121 op, I no. 403, 11. 4, 27 (investigation).167 Aleksandrov, Vlast\ 322-4.168 RGADA,f. 1121 op. I no. 88,11. 84-5 (rescript),169 Ibid. no. 419, 1. 2 (petition).170 Ibid. no. 88,11. 84-5 (rescript): no. 145,1. 56 (petition).171 Ibid. no. 33,1. 90; 2 no. 74, 11. 1-6 (investigations).172 Eve Sex in the World the Orthodox Slavs, 900-/700, Ithaca:

Cornell, I Daniel "'He Said". and Gender Discourse inEarly Modern Russia', Kritika vol, 3 (2002), 197-202.

173 RGDA f. 1121 op. I no. 419, 1. 18 (instruction); no. 403, 11. 21-3,48, 50,56tigation): Aleksandrov, Vlast', 325.

174 RGADA, f. 1121 no. 500,11. 23-4 (investigation).175 G.G. Weickhardt, 'Due-Process and Equal Justice in the Muscovite Codes', RR vol.

51 (l992), 479-80.176 RGADA,f. 1121 op. I no. 1. 120 (petition); Aleksandrov, Vlast', 326.177 RGADA f. 214 kn. 1619,11. 13-100 (investigation).178 Aleksandrov, vlast' , 301-2.

226 Notes

Conclusion

455-6.

5

Victor Lieberman, "Transcending East- West Dichotomies', in Modern Asian Studiesvol, 31 (I

2 Ibid.3 P.v. Lukin, Narodnye oredstavleniia 0 vosudarstvennoi vlasti v Rossii Xv]]

Moscow:4 Ulrich und Horbarkeit der Macht. Der Florentiner Palazzo Vecchio

im Spatmittelalter", in Susanne Rau and Gerd Schwerhoff Zwischen GotteshausGi/enrllc!le Raume in unci Friiher Neureii, Cologne:

LlXJ4, a')-L!,~; Uwe 'Der verwilderte Raurn, Zurn Strukturwandel vonOffentlichkeitin der fruhneuzeitlichen Stadt am Berns', in ibid., 124-9.Lukin, Predstavleniia, 253-4; Daniel Rowland, 'Did Literary Place

on the Power of the Tsar (I 540s-1 ' , RR vol, 49 (1990),No vornbergskii , 'Slovo i delo .vol, I, Moscow: 1911,

M1Iterial:y,lzvesriia un-ta vol, 36 (1910). however, AndreBerelowitell, farniliaux et reseaux d 'influence dans l' administration locale dela (XVII siecle)', FzOGvol, 63 (2004),86.

6 K.-S. Rehberg Der Mensch [by A. Gehlen], in Arnold Gehlen Gesamtausgabe ,vol, 3, Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1993; Arnold Gehlen, AnrhrOIJ(710,f(iSI~he

soriaipo!itische Untersuchungen, Reinbek: Rowohl r, 1986.7 K.-S. xenoerg, 'Institutionenwandel und des Symbolischen",

in Gerhard (ed.) lnsuuaionenwandel, Opladen: Westdeutscher 1997,98.

8 Ibid., 99.9 Norbert Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1969.

10 Lars Modern Russia', in Heinz Schilling (ed.) ,Ins titu tionen , lnstrumerue Akreure sorialer Kontrolle unciFrankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1999,325-57.

II Hans 'Die Christenpflicht als Rechtsnorm. Der Loskauf der imUlozenie' in Uwe Halbach et al. Geschichie Ahrusslands in der Begr.jfsweltihrer Wiesbaden: I 158, 162-3; Christoph Schmidt,Sorialkontrolle in Moskau; Stuttgart: 1996,405.

12 Ibid., 13,397-8.13 In 1662, Siberia's proportion of exiles the Russians was at 10.5 per cent, just

above one tenth of what Australia Alan Wood, 'Russia's "Wild East'" ,in id, (ed.), The History 1991, 117-8.

14 Cf. Ludwig Steindorff on memoria of nobles in to seventeenth centuryMuscovy: 'Wer sind die Meinen? Individ uurn und Memorialku ltur im friih­neuzeitlichen Russland', in Yuri (ed.) Das Individuum und die Seinen,Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001, I-58.

15 N.N. Pokrovskii and E.K. Rornodanovsknia (eds) Tobol'skii arkhiereiskii dam v XVIIveke, Novosibirsk: Sibirskii Khronograf, 1993, kn, vII. 124 ob.-125.

16 But cf. A.S. Zuev, Russkoe karachestvo Zabaikal'ia vo vtoroi chetverti XVIII per-voi XIX vv., Novosibirsk: Novosid, 1994; id., '''Vybrali my s tovarishchi

soboiu", Traditsii samoupravleniia v Sibiri XVIII v.', in v.I.Shishkin (ed.) Sotsial problemy istorii Sibiri, Novosibirsk: Novosib,Gos, Universitet, 1994, N.A. Minenko (ed.) lstoriia karachestva AriatskoiRossii vol, I, Inst, istorii, 1995; id, (ed.) Karaki Urala i Sibiri vXVII-XX vv., Inst. istorii, 1993; A.P. Ivonin, Chislennost' i SOSlaVgorodovykli karakov Sibiri Xvltl-pervoi chetverti XIX vv., in O.N. Vilkov(ed.) rarvitie Sibiri perioda Novosibirsk: Akad.,1991, II Now: David Collins, 'The Altai. Fortified Resource Frontier', inE.-M. Stolberg (ed.), The Siberian Frankfurt/Main: 2005.

Notes 227

17 Gary Marker, and the Intellectual in Russia,1700-1800, Princeton: UP, I 144-6, 150. Waugh (OK. Uo), tstoriiaodnoi St Bulanin, 2002. School committees were activein even after II: Jan Eliten- und im

2004.478; Chinahandel, 25-6. On the frontier: E.-M .

.JlV1UC'l1;;, 'Frontiers and Borderlands', in id. (ed.) 13-28.

Glossary

I E.V. vershinin, 'Doshchanik i koch v zapadnoi Sibiri (XVII v.)", in A.T. Shashkov(ed.) Evrariiskoe 'e, Volot, 2001,95.

References

Abbreviations

AIAHRCASSChlOIDRFzOGIZJBGOJEMH01PSRLRGADARHRIBRRSEERSRSRlaVIZfGZhMNP

Akty istoricheskieAmerican Historical ReviewCanadian-American Slavic StudiesChtenia v obshchesrve istorii i drevnostei RossiiskikhForschungen zur GeschichteIstoricheskieJahrbucher fur Geschichte OsteuropasJournal of ModernOtechestvennaia istoriiaPolnoe sobranie russkikh letopiseiRossiiskii arkhiv drevnikh aktovRussianRusskaia Istoricheskaia BibliotekaRussian ReviewSlavonic and Eastern European ReviewSlavic ReviewSlovar' XI-XVII vv.Voprosy IstoriiZeitschrift fiir GeschichtswissenschaftZhurnal Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia

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246

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Ulan-

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Index

archaism 34Aristotle 2army 24, 164; Mandzhurian 57arrest 114, 115, 131, 177;see also

prikazchik, voevodaArsen'ev: Ivan Aleksandrov

156-7; Mikhail M. I IAleksandrovsyn I II 177

artel' 44, 156Samson 106-7

Asia: Central 62-3; -nizarion 27assemblv of the land 10

148, I 178;Cossack 10,deti boiarskie 55-7; journeys 57,

149; 57, 140, 143, 144,I

Astrakhan 124atarnan 46, 142see also electionatrocity 135, I 177authority 35,39, 55,60,90,96,97,

136; search for 19,25autocracy I, 2,4,6, 16, 182-3Azov 27

Babarykin, Ivan 40Baikal 7, 49,140, I 164,167,180bailiff IIIBakhrushin, S.Y. 32Balmashnoi, Aleksei 161, 175-7Baltic 220 n80banditry 21, 23, 133, 136, 137, 138banned 45, 79,89, I 166Barguzinsk 49-51,60, 140, 143, 148Baron, Samuel 45barter 8, 104Bashkir 92Bashkovskii, Aleksei 57, 128Beauplan, Guillaume le Vasseurde 38Bechevin, Ivan 157, 160

90,140,144, 167Akishin, M.O. 10,33Albazin (Amur) 42,45,57,78alcohol 89,98, 162-3; illicit distilling

60, I 140, 159-62Aleksandrov,VA. 10,14, 93,

112, I 143,164, 173, 177Aleksei Mikhailovich Romanov 112,

116,146Alemasov, Ivan 155, 169alimentation (kormlenie) 18, I 128Altai 7Auennra, Vasilii 131amanat 106Amur7, 57,60, 105,142,165,

171,179anarchy 38Andrusovo 25Angara 7,49,73,144,167animist 22Antsyforov, Iakov 104

absolutism 2, 10, 125accountability 5, 18,40,42,90,

I I 138administration 21, 44, I 130,

I 178; blackmail 129; Bvzantine 9;Chinese 97; fee I 150;misdemeanour 41,137,144,179,180; 9,194n47;

115, I 138; usus fructussee also hll1·"~IIl'.r:"l'.V

chancellery, hierarchy, Y""'HfiJl"

1,54,61, 87,91,155, I I 174;evil 52-3,

55, 133; divine 10; literature 22,168; Persian 22

agriculture 31, 36, 67-8, 74, 142, 143,144, 145, 150, 152; viability 13,21

89-9040,41,48,

248 Index

censoring Zcensuscentrali zation 2, 113, de- 97centre-periphery relations 6, 16, 55,

90, 100, 140, I

168 21,22,134; Siberian

55, 78,80,81,179; staff 16, 17-18, I138

Chanchikov, Fedor 43Ch,lrkasov, Fedor 98Cherkasskii, El'rnurza-Bekovich 142Chernihiv 25Chicherin, Boris 2China7,8, 118, 170

48Chistiakova, E.V. 31Chiuzhakin: Ivan 144, 162; Leont'ei 153,

162church architecture 84cleric 2, 5,92; abbot 141, 160-1; bishop

46,51, 74, 108, 117; patriarch22 69

cloth: 6;nankeen I 175

coercion 2,4,40, 105-6; see also forcecolonial 97; -ization 31communication I, 41, 85, 90-1 ,

107, I 138competition 61, 73-4,77-8, 140,

143-9, I I 162; see alsoPersonenverband

compliance 39, 58, I 180compromise 15, 38, 181comrade du, I 160, I 172-3;

see also Personenverbandconfessional boundary 37conflict see competition, voevodaconformity 120conquest 1,6, 9,31,55,85, 128; Crimea

25; movement 26consent 10, 40,41con spira tion 47,56,59consumption 66-7, 67convivi ality 57, 89, 113, 128-9co-optation 3, 16, 27, 137corruption 11-12, 127; see also general

exchange, feeding, venalityCossack 3,10, I I n l : circle

39,41,43, 92,115,155,I I 164, 174, 175; colleen veresponsibility 9, 183; discipline 26,

39,40,55,

93,135

BibleBlack Sea 36Boboriko 65

Jean 186Brian 10

BOQoslclvskii.M.M.86Bolshe'liks 31

Beiton: Afonasii177; AndreiIakov 82

bell 94Beloozero 105Berezov 40, 148Berezovskii, Anton IBemadskii, Mikhail 89

141,155, I179

116; kou tou 9721, 41, 93, I 133;49, ; Novgorod 4071, 131, I 143,

I 175; likhoimsrvo I 128;overseas colonies 122; see alsocorruption,genleraJe)(chang~,

venalityBriukhovetsky, Ivan 25Brown, Peter B. 17-18,90, 130Bunakov: Andrei 113; Il'ia 111-17, 133Burdukovskiis 81bureaucracy 5, 10, 18, 154;

historical 11-12, 17-18,90; -tization108, 113, 136; see also administration

burgher 26Buryat 7,49,

Itantsynsk I IBushkovitch, Paul 17

caravan 44, I176; route 81, 145, 146, 165

career 24,42,81-2; voevoda 137-8carriage 46Catholics 37

Index 249

drumDumovo, S.1. 43, I 128Durnitsyn, Ivashko Ivavnov syn I 171Durov, Fedor 47dvorianin 55, 107 n 164Dvorianinov, B.S. 41,94Dzhungar 32, 147, 158, 165D'rakonov, Semen 174-5

174,185: attempted 165-6: twice167

desertion 78desiamik 40,60,62

129: see also

discontent 76disgrace 41 , 95, 129distance 8: 17,19,41, 70, 83,

119, I I I I 163:Irkutsk I 177: relative 186: andtime 55, 131-3: Tobol'sk 63

Drnytryshyn, Basil 5,86down-to-earth 24

66'-'lld!,>"'" Fedor 41 , 95

eConOTIlY 8, 31, 44, 85, 142,147, backwardness 126:cash-starved 8, II, 13, 118,I 137: crisis 66: diversification 23,134: rnercan tilism 23: 8, 83:prosperity 62,80, 97: scarcity 8: seealso alcohol: distilling, caravan,

craft, market,mercantilism, trade

effectiveness 1,2,5, 11-12, 46,123 126

40,58,153Egupov-Cherkasskii, Nikita Ivanovich 59,

71Eisenstadt, S.N. 90elder 40,41,42Eldezin, Nikifor Ivanovich 96election 17, 38,40,43,

77, 147: atarnan 39, 116:57, 184: judge 43, 57,58, I 166,171, 177-8: leader 40, 154: officials 21,42: petitioner I 169: Polish king 45,

discipline 210,85, 154: social 186: see also

deti boiarskie 9, 38,'V,Q~,Q~,149, 163:asCossacl<ssee also career, election

diplomacy 45: 45: see also

158: officer 41,

187-8: -al blindness 130:183: 1,3,25,49,

see also

167denunci arion 99, 101, I 196 n85:

duty 120dependency 100depopulation 19,36deposition 35,41,43,55,59, 88,91,95,

99,109,115,1 I 139,161,171,

queuecustoms 18, 44, I

147culture

.J I U<;ll d' I , tradecourt 17, 55,88craft 42,44, 80, 142, 145,

I 157, I 176credit 18, 125, 140, 165: see alsocrime 14,21, 186-7crowd 40, 92custom 3, 13,

I I I

83, 143, 170, 175-641,49-54,

I 177, I see alsoPersonenverband

decree 51, 111,113,160,163:forged 133: forrnu la 53: see alsotsar

defence 2, 130, I 147Demidov, Nikita 124Demidova, N .F. 45d"l1'lfleT'~ev 4, 11,32,34,43, 87, 140, 143,

250 Index

153,

60-1,I

155, 159-61,174;see also

fortification zo.ss.as.ao, 51,61, I145; fence 151; lines 117,135

France 10, 85Frantsbekov, D.A. 127free 14,40-1, 112;friend I 104, I 60,

II I 175;frontier 1,3,38,60,61,

152,154,163,183,187;also isolation

Frost, Robert 2113-14,

fur 62, I 162; trade 8,135; treasure 44,60, 176; see also

tax, tradeFyk, Danilo 155, 177

Filshin, A. 57finance 5, 118, 125; aid 147, 152Firsovs 82

19,68, 8513, 91

104, 128-9, 130; 129, 172;see also generalized exchange

God 54; law 85; wrath 26Godunov: Boris 135; P.I. 66Golden Horde 21, 136Golenishchev-Kutuzov, Ivan F. 60Golikova, N.B. 31Golovin, FA. 142, I 147-8, 150,

I I 163governance 88governor (gubemator) 57; see also

voevoda

172,

5,9; colonial

elite I Iembezzlement 3, 5, 141, I

179

IEvdokirnov,Khariton 60Evseev: Evsei 157; Ivan, 166;Tit 166expansion 1,2,8,23, 62,85, 182, 185;

China 63; commercial 45; influenceof 187; Petrine 24; Siberia147;westward 24

expectation 35,55,85exploitation 86, 119, 136, 138exploration 55

face-to-face 34,37favour I I 128fear 12, 48,166Fedorov, Kozemka 70Filaret 51, 65Filar'ev.Aleksei 127

24ethnic 37

19, 44,62,97; 107;mercenaries 67-8; southern 22; western

10, II, 118; -anization 27,

Enlightenment 97enrolment. Cossnck 143,148, I

162; deti boiarskie 57; rank-and-file 10,41; restrict 78

enserfment 13-14, 27environment 133Ererneev:Trifon 90; Matfei 58Ermak 6,9,40; accounts of survivors

51-2; see also sinodikLlJJ.1VllJl, Petr 98escort 44,estate 14,

Index 251

Jew 37joint-stock company 27,46, 118; see also

Muscovy Companyjourney 63; diplomatic 45-8, 81, 176;

service 41,44, 75,80,132-3

judge 124; see also electionjustice 98,116

individual 14,37 169, 181, 187information 55, 88,90,91, 109, 119,

133, 156-8; embargo II o-n24

permallence and

42,44,84, I I 142,

I I I 179;(prisud) 49,81,84, I 159;monastery of the Ascension 140, 150,172

Irtysh 7,68Isakov, Ivan 167-72isolation 12, 146, 186;see also

frontierIstopnikovs 81Italian 22, 120Ivan III IV I, 118Ivanov: Kurbat 104-5; Matfei 159;

Prokofii 170-1Iziurev, Ivan 159

55,66,86; culture 1,167;mechanisms

13, 105, I 134;-izarion 77, 107, 119, I 154

integration 4,19-20, 25,26, 69,91,98; dis- 167

interest rate 83; l1tf,rnr.~t"'r 152i nterreonum 45

174

110; see also

guarantee 17721,32,136Andrei 72

idea 15,II 116, I I Isee also accountability,generalized

supply,

Habermas, Jurgen 6hamlet 57, 140, I 162harmon y 28; 194 n47; see also unanimityhierarchy 33,59, I 176;

bureaucratic 3,90Thomas 186

honour 17,41, 94,148-9, 155, 173, 176, 177, 178-9

house 147, 155, 163, 173, 179hunting 37, 100, 124, 143

144;164; supply 10,

83-4,119, Ialso supply

40,136152

icon 49,54identity 136,160ideology 14,26,53Ignat'ev, lvashko 69Ilimsk 166illusion 4, 115, 184;monarchist 14,

112Il'insk 84, 98, 140, 141, 143, 144, I

154-81inc1u sion 34, 91, 92indentured 214 n60independence 40,48

Iakutsk 7, 40, 74, 104,105,106,1145,1212nI8

Iarlykov,Aleksei 58, 128Iaroslavl 127iasak 2,8, 19,

153; collector 49,106,143,154; fall revenuepeople 59,60,110, I 130, 162

Iasaulovsk 58

252 Index

Kuchiurn 52Kudarinsk I I 162

Carsten 11, 176Kurakin, LS. 45-8Kuznetsk 7, 103

48,61, 76

labour 86landlord 4, 15,40, 186

5,9,17,8771, 93, 107, 116,

172; administrative I100, 117;canon 125;

50,162, I 186;131, I 186;

implementation Ill,procedural dv Sf),

91 ;154; -less

;see custom40,146,155,1 I

59,60,77,1 171;capability 46; 103; limitsof authority 39; (,never') turn in 58,103,114, II I I 169-70; rites43, 155;see popular,

I I I 174;confrontation14;due 113, 130,

1180; 69,70,111,141,144,179; 113,115,128-9; see also litigation

legiltimation48,50, 77,118-19,31,155

Lena 7,40, 83L-"A)'JlVV'1'> 19Leonr'ev 157; Filip 175-6; Matfei 175

"",,Tl"""iJ~ Galina A. 8249, 98,105,116,127,

131,148, I I 158, I 170,176; see also literacy

106,112Liangusov, Spiridon 44,82licences 37 .Likhachev,M. 92likhoirnsrvo 123

10,55Lisovskii: Stepan 43,55; Samoil

Aleksandrovsyn78literacy 59,91,96,97, 107-8, 109, 119,

187; book 156; see also letter, scribe,signature

Lithuania 21, 38,45; -n IIIlitigation 41, 74, 91, 170;see also law,

legality

Kabakov, M. 41, 95Kaban'sk I 140, I 144, I

I IPetr 155, 176

110,138Kappeler, Andreas 2,3, 16

15,24Kazakhs 52Kazanets: Kozma 177; Nikifor Lanin

175Kazanovs 156Kazan' (town and khanate) 21, 152;

140,141,1 160,1177

Keenan, E.L. 100Ket7khan 117,145; Altyn-Khan 48-9Khantaisk 7Khilka 145Khilkov, LA. 57Khiva 63Khludnev, Y. 82Khmelev, Ivan Kandrageev syn 79Khmelnyts'kyi, Bohdan 24Kiev 25; cathedral 22kin 19, 41,51,57,

88, I 134;Cossack 75, 81,113, 147, 148, I 160, 178-9;

see also voevoda(Srarorusenko) 46, 51, 108

Kislianskii, Leont'ii 49Kivelson. Valerie 6, 13, 16, 182Kizliar 142Kliapikov, Savva 74Kliucharev, Mikhail 111-14Kliuchevskii, v.o. 2Klubkov-Mosal'skii, S.Y.75,77Kobylskii, L 77Kokovinskii, Andreevich 113-14Kolesnikov IKollmann, Nancy 17Kol'tsov, Ivan: Ermak 52; Krasnoiarsk

39Koracha 52Korchazhenskii, L. 148-9kormlenie see alimentationKorotov, Vasilii 49Korytov, Ivan 106Kotiurev, Fedor 160-1Kotoshikhin, G. 8, 197 n112Krasnoiarsk 7, 44,

89-91,96,103, I IKremlin: Golden Palace 22Krizhanich, Iurii 98

Index 253

Merrick, John 45-6messenger IIImestization Sv:see also

Orthodoxy,womenrnestnichesrvo 90, 191micro-sIWl y 6Middle East 22middle 27

186;see alsoFedorovich Romanov 45, 49,

112

modern: 107; -ization 27, 107Iakovlev syn 79

Moiseev, Kondrat'ei 107rnolodets, pl. 116Molodois82monarchism 99, 100, 108, 112monastic 53; see also Irkutsk, .JC;I'~llg",

Tobol'skMongol 8,20, 38,45,150,157,162,

164; descendants of 22-3;19,36,48; influence 136;

invasion 40; Oirats 49monopoly II, 145Montesquieu 97,125Moon, David 108Morozov, Boris N. 132Moscow I 15, 44, 115,

131, IMoskovskaia Rus' 3Moskvitinov/-a: Andrei Savelev syn 57,

178-9; Anna doch 178Mousnier, Rolandmuchitel' (vyrnuchenie) 52,54, 168; see

also tormentor, tyrannyMuller, G.F. 2, 19,28,86murder 47, I 176, 179; instigation 38,

177; -er of the soul 170Muscovite 3,153Muscovy 49, 62, 83, I 156;west of the

Urals 14,98; Company 8,45;peripheral 20; great power 20; 2,26

Musin-Pushkin, P.S. 73musket 19, 68, 173

172; see

74,91,108,

mother 93I 165;

'C;gUI"'.IVll 72155, 163,204

martyr 51 168;see also tormentormasterMarveev, Ivan 71medieval 44, 107, 125; strategy 20,22,

25Mediterranean 118Menshikov,Aleksandr Danilovich 122mercenary 21, 23, 26, 67-8, 78merchandise 44, I 143, I 167merchant 7, 18, 31,47,70,81-2,

141,145,1 169,171,187;Bukharan 19, 46, I 146;Cossack39,79, 153; corporation II; II,26,27,36; gosti 142, 145, 165

mercy 41, 108, 116, I 134,136,168,170,180

merit 50,51,55, 57,60, I147-8,176

Madov,Andrei 48Makovskyi 7Manchu 7,Mangazeia 7,manipulation 3, 53,

109manufactureMarfa, tsarmarket 8,

Isee also convivialitv,

, I.I. 129Lonzworth,Philip 9Lonshakov,Grigorii 44, 81Lovtsov, 179

55,57,78,104,108,109,120,I 179; dis- 47

Luzovskiis 82P.V.184

Lukianovna, Evdokiia 92Semen 127

Lyskovets, Gerasirn 158

254 Index

musketeer 9, 31 , 64, I148, I 175; -S head

Muslim 13, 52

147, oppression 21,40, III, 151, 165oprichnina 21organization 13, 62

97orphan 13Orthodoxy 52; 22;

baptized 162;see also salvificOsharov,Andrei 80, 166Oshurkov, Ivan Ivanov syn 162,

179otherness 41Ottoman 11,36; 22outlaw 148, 156outsider 41, 55, 181

Pacific seaboard 726,177,179

224 n138;Anisim Kozmin syn169; Pavel 175, 179

Panikadilshchik, 106, I160-1,168

parncipanon 26,31, 90Patrikeev, Boris Isakovich IIIparrimorrial vr-Bpatronal~el6-17,21 22,23,25, 41,

106,113-14,I I I I 140,

I 171, 180;see alsoPersonenverband, strongvoevoda

Ivan 104-5peasant 5,8,19,21, 31,37,40-1,

142, 145, I 179;central 16;northern 15; settlement 65

Pechora 4661,148

Pereiaslav 25Perfil'ev: Ivan Maksirnovich 49-51,

I I I 171, 177-9;Mak~rr149Maureen 14,100,108

Personenverband 11-13, .)'t-.), ."-0,

42,43,44, 71,91,103,120,I 144, 147, 149, I 164, I 195

'stand together as one' 154;cornpetition 56, 106, 141, 165-73;constitute 41,92, 168, 179; II,32, 130;disintegration 10,35, 38;panderer 39; 17, 144, I166, 179; size 47; see also Cossack,pacification, power, primary group,ritual,

PeshkovsPeterI2,5,IO,24, 137,

179

110;elite 3,150-2; see also

125Niemcjewski, S. 136Nikitin, N.I. 66-7Nikitins 83Nikolev: Ivan Fedorovich I I

179,180; I. 129; SamoilFedorovich 156

noble 3,4, 5,6,9, 16, 17, 55,88, 125, I 156, 186; and Cossacks37,52; petty 61,90

nomad 84, 150; confederation147; leader 25; raid 13, 19,I I 142, 145, 172;resistance 7

North-East passage 45, 118northern Russia 7,70,84, 186;see also

protectorateNorthern Wars 24Novgorod 21,26; cathedral 22Novikov, Ivan 140, 143, 144, I

I I 174, 175Novombergskii, N.Ia. 2,99

oath 9, 35,44, 131, 153; shert'25

Ob'7,46,68,132obedience 42, 47, 173obligation 98,136,154,156,170-1odinachnaia 114Odoevskii, N.I.Ogloblin, N.N. 31,32Okhera, Stepan 160-1, 175-7Old Believer 15, 156

Semen 129name 40, I 155; 'no-name' 60;

patronymic 157, 206 n131narnestnik 9,194 n47

61,75,1478,19,

142;

Index 255

ephemeraI 92, 184;148;quay 71;

refectory,72,84, 184; review 60,133;Tobol'sk St Sophia 107; local

office 49, 91, 109, IIIpunishment 40,60,80,96, 110, 112, 117,

I 141, 150, I 177, 179;Cossackgroup 38, 43-4,60-1,148,156,163; fine 61,1 180; tsar 42,

130; Ustiug 115Pushkin,Grigorii and StepanGavrilovich

113 .Pushchin, Fedor 39,60, 104-5, 113, 114,

132-3Putimets,Afonasii 170-1

pretender I00-1prikazchik 57, 60-1, 137, I

140,143,144, I 160,168,179;arrest I 160-1

II, 44;temporary 36-7; see alsoPersonenverband

39,71, 76,77,80,91,116, II 16944,45, 118, 172

rrrivilece 4, II, 19, 44, I I141, 186;customs 81, 143; trade 44,45; 23; local 25; distribution26

158protectorate 8, 46, 118-19protest 5,40,71, 150Protestant 22nT,,·viTl{·'" 15-17, I 134;border 21;

central 55, 106;eastern and southernOrthodox 21; Left Bank 103;Middle 112; North Caucasus 142;southern frontier 64, 100-3; seealso northern l....U:'~ld, .J1UClld

Pskov 21, 178public: bourgeois

6,89,

proiessionalizauon 5,24,90I 141,149,167;

94,116,138Vasilii 76

proletarianization 26

qazaq 36,48

nUJl~"-.L1. P.I. 74property 80, 94, 144, 147, 156, 166, 171,

220'n8'0; land-holding I 149,

159

160-1,168,

43Pleshcheev: L.S. 39; Fedor47Podrez-Pleshcheev, Ull"Ulll Osipovich

109pod"iachii s 9,41,92Pokhabov, IvanPokrovskii, N.N. 10, 14,

100,112, I I 173Poland-Lithuania II, 44-5,

52, 125;tov,~Z\ISZ-SYSI~rrl

Pole III ; noblePoliakov, Ivan 80Poli anskii, Dmitrii Leont' evich 122political culture 99Polotsk 21-2Poltava 24Poltev: Nikolai Semenovich 178, 179;

Semen Tirnofeevich 17716, I 137

popular 54,55,56, III, 176;consciousness 118; leader 48, 137,179; un- 95-6; see alsomonarchism

population I 142Posel'skii, Maksim 163, 177,179Posrnikov, EM. 92Potylitsyn, Tirnofei 58power 5, 93,132, I I 159;. balance 14,61, 80;Cossack group

39, 89,179; European 24;limitation 185;maritim 118-19; rnisuse68,70,72,88, 93,132; 16;Personenverband 77, 94, II I175-7; resource 109, 114, 125;22,25; tsar 8, 154;vacuum 19,virtual 119

Pozharskii, OM. IIIpragmatic 22precedent 150, 153, 187presence 41,43,59-60,91, 131

256 Index

Romodanovskii, Ivan I. 71-2Rozgildeev.Jvan 144, 179Rtishchev, Fedor Mikhailovich 156

Ivan 75-6Rus' collection of lands 21Russo-Chinese war I 165

21

94,44,

I 160, I I I179; inhibition 172-3

Rornanovs 45; see also rUC;'.... ""'I, Mikhail,Peter

149,I

108,75,81 ;

Handgeld 78; 68;merchandise 83; Moscow 62; notapplied 81; reduction 26, 109, 119,180; 80; and trade 146;see also

west of Urals 20; see also deposition,Razin

risk 83ritual

s ~ ltv kov. Ivan I. 96, 134history 54-5

Samoilov: Ekirn 79; 70Samoyeds 63Sarnsonov, Konon 58Savelov,Afonasii T. 80, I

144, I I I I177-8; Anton I. 140, I

Savvateevs 81Schmidt,Christoph 186science 27; scholar 156scribe 17, 79scurvy 59sea route, closing 46seal 18, 111,1 173secrerarv 9, 17, 110-1 131security 36,40,63,79-80,83, Ill;

financial I I 127; trade 172, 187;tsar 99

sedentarization 150-2

Sabanskii, Petr 113, 115sable 44,63Sadovnikov, Elizar 178Saians 48St Petersburg24,salary 10,

149, I81,

racist 97radical 112, 115, 143, 144, I 167raid 141, 148, 152;see also

nomadrank 57,

exalted 90;Table of

ransom 12, 138;seealso slave

queue 176;see also custom

I I Irelocati on 16, 21 , 22; see also socialRemezov, Semen Ulianovich 28remuneration I I I 170;see

also

republic 24,requisition Iretinue 59revenue 145,

147,149, Ireward 131;

see alsoRezun,D.Ia"

Alfred I42, I 164; political 90; see

also Cossacksrighteousness 94

4,8,16, 39,40,41,48,86,99,I ,216 n 132;Achinsk 74-8; Angarsk60-1 ; Bashkir 26; bread and grain 72;Buryat 49; Iakutsk 60; Irkutsk 171;Khmelnyts'kyi 24; Krasnoiarsk 32,

166; Kuznetsk 31 ; Moscow 47I ; musketeers 31; 6,39,42,143,152,155,157-81;Tomsk 7, 91, 109-17,132-3, 165; town 31,34, 108;Tiumen'129;Tobol'sk 40,66; Verkhoture 47;

Razriad (Militaryrebellion seerecompense 135,redress 151reform 55,

Index 257

85220 n80

suppression 26, 86Surgut 67,75survey 66suzeraintySweden 24,

Sobakin,SA 89social: change I; cleavage 140; dislocation

140, 148, 149, 173, group 131,stability 4, 15, 180

S"],'lV'"v S.M. 2Solovki 15sovereign 46, 48; 's affairs 57, 8I, 148;

dobroe delo I 179; treasure117, I I 174

sovereign's word and affair 14, 15,28,91, ,105,117,1 I I140,1 I 215n80;enserfment103; frontier 106-7; invocation I 4 I ,90, 94, 99, 100, 107, 109,217 n 15I; 165;zagovor 96

Soviet I I;space 2,

free, Ul~l"J1V",

36,152; Baraba75;Mongolian 147; 20,25, 117,136;wooded see also Kudarinsk

stolnik 50, 77,89,163Stre:shnev,M.F. 134Stroganovs I18Stroikov, Kornei 153strong 16, I 138; see also

patronageStudenitsyn/a: Maritsa Ivanovna doch 178;

Petr 70, 178-9subject 25, 97subjugation 40, 60subordination 46, 88; in- 57, 6 I, 90subsistence 13, I I I 53Suleshev, lu. la. 94supply 15, 26,45,57,59,67-8,78,

82,85, I I 148, 163; officialsI 138; Siberian I 19, 186;see also

4445

Startsov.Daniil dSstate 3, 34, I 86, 208 n 19; all-powerful

77-8; fiscal-rni litary 2 I,princely 19, 3I, 125;revenue 63

state historical school 2, 31status 103, 176; frontier

context 59

and Dutch

160-1177

157,158;oftheI 36; see also

38I

Shemiakinskoi, Vasilii IShestakov, Sidor 80, I

-building 92;

serf 5,servant

voevoda 92service9,13,21, 41, 53,

82, 109-10, I 184; attraction of44, 81;dues65;ethos51130,159;Moscow 154; 80, 148,168-9; substitute 58; voevoda I137

servitor 9, 2I , 58Shcherbatyi: Konstantin O. 89; Osip I. 7,

5 I , 94, 109-17, I I

Shishkov,G.1. 89-90, 121 n23shop 84Shtinnikovs 8IShuiskii, Vasilii 45Shul'gin, Pavel 60Shunkov, v.r. 32Siberia 1,7; myth 182;western 8,45; 'on

people' 45,48-9Sibir' (khanate) 7, 9, 107Sibirskoe tsarsrvo 3

42, 65,73,138,141,160,16513

signature 13, 17,29,41,79,89,3-15,120,140,144,147, I

176, 178; see also book, literacySigismund, king of Poland 45

kaftan 6 I , 95Sinodik Ermakovym kazakarn 54,

107-8, 154; Likhachevskaia edition 53slander 175slave 13, 117, I

tsar I 3, 98; traderansom

Slezkine, Yuri 3slovo i delo gosud'lre'i'osee ~\)Y"'''''''J1

affairSlovtsov, P.A. 84, 86Smolensk 2 I, 61smuggle 18,135smuta see troubles

258 Index

170;91,117,142;97; see also

104, 106, 110,148,149,

171,176

62; convict 176; 120;road andstations 114, 131;see also supply

18,31,128,165I

permission 10, 18,voevoda 125; -ogue 2,

Udinsk (Verkhne-) 56, 81,84, 120, 127,140, I I 155,175,222n30

Ukrainian I 173, 176Ulozhenie see lawunanimity 50,52, 116;see also harmonyundersecretary 10,41,43,79, 156, 159,

160,175unruliness 34,41Urals 1,124

Tubinian 129Tukhachevskii.Turii 61,74-7Tula 186Tundra 8Tungus 60, 80, 130, 158Tunkinsk 44, 80Tupal'skii, Iurii 132Turchaninov/a: Gerasirn 60, 178;

49-51,140,144,150,152 I178-80; Iakov 49-51, I IvanAleksandrov syn 178; Katerina 178-9;Leonr'ei 178;Terentei 178

Turukhansk 7, 166Tutolmin, Fedor 57,129tyrant 2, 136, 168

Tsvnkovr Ivan 175; Nefed 176; Vasilii

158;158;

106, I

Tara8

sworn man 10, 81, I5, 13, 184; karshi

155, I 161syn boiarskii see (pl.) deti boiarskieszlachta 23

Dmitrii 81, I158

Tatar II,152; nobles

Tatishchev, Y.N.tavern I 176tax 10,13, 40,44, 103, I

I 154; border 3, 135;evasionI 175; extraction 6, 12, 18; loss 42,80; musketeers' 64-5; tithe 18,146; see also

Taz 7,63technique 20, 23, 24'T",k·",' ,>V I. 128Terek II, 142

: contingent 26-7199n 165

Tiurnenets.Vasilii 46Tiumen' I 147,148Tobol'sk 8,19, 31, 70,

75, I 147, 148;cathedral51 ; see also razriad,

Tolbuzin, L.B. 57Tomsk7,51,

147, 148; see alsotormentor 54; see also martyr, tyrannyTorshievskiis 81torture41,95,11 150,1 172town 2, 31, 40, , 148; caravan serai

145, 160; hall 10; smaller and middle61 ; urbani zation 118; western 2;-sPt:OPI.e32,41, 147,165, II

trade I 96, 125, 142, 164,172; 44, 81, 140, I 170,175;commodities 84, I 146;

63; 26,81I government 104; grain 70,73,161; Mongolian 70, 84, 146; Russo-Chinese 20, 81-2, I 145,146,I 175; terms I 171; see alsocaravan, credit, fur, security,slave

transport 119, 164; bottleneck 73, 183;143, I I 155;boat36,43,

158

110,118, I21On40,218

Ushakovs 83II 119

Uvarov: I 177; EE 78; IvanI 176; Liubirn 176

Verkholensk 140Verkhoture I, 18,41,

I 137Ver:nad!lkii,G.V. 2Vershinin, E.V. 10-11, 66

Vasilii Anofriev syn I 159Viatka 119

Vinius,Vitirn49-51

Ivan 70voevoda 4, 5, 16, 91, I

I I I 177; access 25; arrest41, 113; associates 9-10; conflicts9-10, 57, 89,93; 40,43,76; entry 96, 125, Iinstruction 9-10, 49,90, 113, 115,130; kin 10,59; force 10-11,91-2; northern Russia office 10,40,59; patronage 131, 137; powers

Index 259

9-10, 18,57,62; private business138; relief 113,1 I I177-8; 9, 18, II secondtenure 141, 178; 59; see alsoadrninistration, career, patronage,

profit, public, razriad"~1~~,'~ cathedral 22volunteer 147-8volynskii, Mikhail Petrovich 113-14Vsevolozhskii, R.R. 95

Yakut 104

Mikhail and Ivan 57