cos 338 day 16. day 16 agenda capstone proposals overdue 3 accepted, 3 in mediation capstone...
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COS 338
Day 16
DAY 16 Agenda
Capstone Proposals Overdue 3 accepted, 3 in mediation
Capstone progress reports still overdue I forgot to mark in calendar so I will grant a reprieve
Second capstone progress report over due Lab 5 write-up not graded
Will be corrected by next class
Assignment 5 Due Today we will begin discussing Security
Security
Chapter 9
Copyright 2004 Prentice-HallPanko’s Business Data Networks and Telecommunications, 5th edition
Trends in Computer and Network Security
Figure 9-1: CSI/FBI Survey
Survey conducted by the Computer Security Institute (www.gocsi.com).
Based on replies from 530 U.S. Computer Security Professionals.
If fewer than twenty firms reported quantified dollar losses, data for the threat are not shown.
Link to 2005 CSI/FBI Survey
Figure 9-1: CSI/FBI Survey
Had at LeastOne SecurityIncident inThis Category(May HaveHad Several)
PercentReporting
anIncidentin 1997
PercentReporting
anIncidentin 2003
NumberReportingQuantified
Lossesin 2003
AverageReportedAnnual
Loss PerFirm
(1000s)in 1997
AverageReportedAnnual
Loss PerFirm
(1000s)in 2003
Viruses 82% 82% 254 $76 $200
InsiderAbuse of NetAccess
NotAsked
80% 180 NotAsked
$136
Figure 9-1: CSI/FBI Survey
Laptop Theft 58% 59% 250 $38 $47
UnauthorizedAccessby Insiders
40% 45% 72 NotAsked
$31
Had at LeastOne SecurityIncident inThis Category(May HaveHad Several)
PercentReporting
anIncidentin 1997
PercentReporting
anIncidentin 2003
NumberReportingQuantified
Lossesin 2003
AverageReportedAnnual
Loss PerFirm
(1000s)in 1997
AverageReportedAnnual
Loss PerFirm
(1000s)in 2003
Figure 9-1: CSI/FBI Survey
Denial ofService
24% 42% 111 $77 $1,427
SystemPenetration
20% 36% 88 $132 $56
Sabotage 14% 21% 61 $164 $215
Had at LeastOne SecurityIncident inThis Category(May HaveHad Several)
PercentReporting
anIncidentin 1997
PercentReporting
anIncidentin 2003
NumberReportingQuantified
Lossesin 2003
AverageReportedAnnual
Loss PerFirm
(1000s)in 1997
AverageReportedAnnual
Loss PerFirm
(1000s)in 2003
Figure 9-1: CSI/FBI Survey
Theft ofProprietaryInformation
20% 21% 61 $954 $2,700
FinancialFraud
12% 15% 61 $958 $329
Had at LeastOne SecurityIncident inThis Category(May HaveHad Several)
PercentReporting
anIncidentin 1997
PercentReporting
anIncidentin 2003
NumberReportingQuantified
Lossesin 2003
AverageReportedAnnual
Loss PerFirm
(1000s)in 1997
AverageReportedAnnual
Loss PerFirm
(1000s)in 2003
Figure 9-1: CSI/FBI Survey
TelecomFraud
27% 10% 34 NotAsked
$50
TelecomEavesdropping
11% 6% 0 NotAsked
NotAsked
ActiveWiretap
3% 1% 0 NotAsked
NotAsked
Had at LeastOne SecurityIncident inThis Category(May HaveHad Several)
PercentReporting
anIncidentin 1997
PercentReporting
anIncidentin 2003
NumberReportingQuantified
Lossesin 2003
AverageReportedAnnual
Loss PerFirm
(1000s)in 1997
AverageReportedAnnual
Loss PerFirm
(1000s)in 2003
Figure 9-1: CSI/FBI Survey
Conclusion Attacks are like multiple poisons
Several of them are fatal
Defense is difficult
Major Attacks
Viruses and Worms
Human Hacking (Break-Ins)
Denial-of-Service Attacks
Figure 9-2: Viruses and Worms
Viruses
Pieces of code that attach to other programs
Virus code executes when infected programs execute
Infect other programs on the computer
Spread to other computers by e-mail attachments, webpage downloads, etc.
Figure 9-2: Viruses and Worms
Viruses
Many viruses spread themselves by sending fake e-mail messages with infected attachments
Antivirus programs are needed to scan arriving files
Users often fail to keep their computer antivirus programs up to date
Antivirus filtering on the e-mail server works even if users are negligent
How Viruses Work
Figure 9-2: Viruses and Worms
Worms
Complete programs
Self-propagating worms identify victim hosts, jump to them, and install themselves
Can do this because hosts have vulnerabilities
Vendors develop patches for vulnerabilities but companies often fail to apply them
Figure 9-2: Viruses and Worms
Worms Worms take advantage of specific vulnerabilities
Firewalls can stop many worms by forbidding access to most ports
E-mail worms can get around antivirus filtering
Famous Worms Morris worm – the first worm Code Red – went after IIS servers Melissa – e-mail worm Slammer - SQL worm Blaster – Windows RPC worm MyDoom – another e-mail worm that creates a BackDoor on your
computer
Figure 9-2: Viruses and Worms
Blended Threats Combine the spreading characteristics of viruses
and worms
Payloads Programs that can do damage to infected hosts
Erase hard disks, send users to pornography sites if they mistype a URL
Trojan horses: exploitation programs disguise themselves as system files
Figure 9-3: Human Break-Ins (Hacking)
Human Break-Ins: Viruses and worms rely on one main attack method
Humans can keep trying different approaches until they succeed
Hacking Breaking into a computer
Hacking is intentionally using a computer resource without authorization or in excess of authorization
Prosecutable if do a certain amount of damage
Figure 9-3: Human Break-Ins (Hacking)
Scanning Phase
Send attack probes to map the network and identify possible victim hosts
Like a robber casing a neighborhoodFinds active IP addresses Identifies type of computer at that address via
open ports, etc.
Nmap program is popular (Figure 9-4)
Figure 9-4: Nmap Scanning Output
IP Range to Scan
Type of Scan
Identified Host and
Open Ports
Figure 9-3: Human Break-Ins (Hacking)
The Exploit The Term “Exploit” is Used in Two Ways
The actual break-inExploit is the program used to make the break-in
Super user accounts (administrator and root) can do anything
If application running with super user privileges is compromised, the attacker gains super user privileges
Figure 9-3: Human Break-Ins (Hacking)
After the Break-In Become invisible by deleting log files
http://www.rootkit.com/
Create a backdoor (way to get back into the computer)
Backdoor account—account with a known password and super user privileges
Backdoor program—program to allow reentry; usually Trojanized
Do damage at leisure
Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attacks
Make a computer or network unavailable to users
An exploding threat
Rarely: sending a single message to bring down a computer
Usually: overload a victim with a flood of messages
Figure 9-5: Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) Flooding Attack
Attacker1.34.150.37
AttackCommand
AttackCommand
Handler
Zombie
HandlerZombie
Victim60.168.47.47
Attack PacketZombie
AttackPacket
AttackCommand
AttackCommand
AttackCommand
AttackPacket
Attackers
Figure 9-6: Types of Attackers
Traditional attackers: Curious hackers
Disgruntled employees and ex-employees
Growing number of criminal attackers
Potential for far more massive attacks Cyberterror attacks by terrorists
Cyberwar by nations
Security Management
Figure 9-7: Planning Principles
Security is a Management Issue, Not a Technical Issue
Without good management, technology cannot be effective.
Like a car. If you don’t know how to drive, not likely to be able to use effectively.
Soldiers are not just given weapons. Must be trained extensively in tactics, etc.
Figure 9-7: Planning Principles
Plan-Protect-Respond Cycle
Three phases endlessly repeating
Planning: preparing for defense
Protecting: implementing planned protections
Responding: stopping attacks and repairing damage when protections fail
Figure 9-7: Planning Principles
Risk Analysis Cost of protections should not exceed probable
damage
Annual probability of damage
Damage from a successful incident (Say, $50,000)
Times the annual probability of success (say 10%)
Gives the probable annual loss ($5,000)
Figure 9-7: Planning Principles
Risk Analysis Cost of protection
If a protection can reduce the annual probability of damage by a certain amount, up to this amount can be spent on the protection
ExampleProtection A can reduce the annual probability of
damage by 50% ($2,500) If Protection A costs $1,000 per year, use it. If Protection A costs $4,000 per year, don’t use it.
Figure 9-7: Planning Principles
Comprehensive Security
Attacker is intelligent
Attacker only has to find one weakness
Firm needs comprehensive security to close all avenues of attack
Figure 9-7: Planning Principles
Defense in Depth
Every protection breaks down sometimes
Attacker should have to break through several lines of defense to succeed
Providing this protection is called defense in depth
Defense2
Defense1
(fails)
Authentication
Figure 9-8: Authentication and Authorization
AuthenticationServer
Applicant
Applicant
1. Credentials(Password, etc.)
Verifier
Verifier
Figure 9-8: Authentication and Authorization
2. OK?
AuthenticationServer
Applicant
Applicant
Verifier
Verifier
Figure 9-8: Authentication and Authorization
AuthenticationServer
Applicant
Applicant
Verifier
Verifier
3. OK andAuthorizations
Figure 9-8: Authentication and Authorization
AuthenticationServer
Applicant
Applicant4. Welcome
Verifier
Verifier
Figure 9-9: Password Authentication
Passwords Strings of characters
Typed to authenticate use of a username (account) on a computer
Benefits Ease of use for users (familiar)
Inexpensive because built into operating systems
Figure 9-9: Password Authentication
Often weak (easy to crack) Word and name passwords are common
Can be cracked quickly with dictionary attack
Passwords should be complex Mix case, digits, and other keyboard characters
($, #, etc.)
Can only be cracked with brute force attacks (trying all possibilities)
Figure 9-9: Password Authentication
Passwords should be long
Six to eight characters minimum
Each added character increases the brute force search time by a factor of up to 75
http://www.umfk.maine.edu/password/password.ppt
Figure 9-10: Digital Certificate Authentication
Digital Certificate
User gets secret private key and non-secret public key
Digital certificates give the name of a true party and his or her public key
Figure 9-10: Digital Certificate Authentication
Testing a Digital Signature
Applicant performs a calculation with his or her private key
Verifier tests calculation using the public key found in the true party’s digital certificate
If the test succeeds, the applicant must be the true party
Figure 9-11: Testing a Digital Signature
Digital Signature Digital Certificate
Authentication
Name of True PartyPublic Key of
True Party
Digital SignatureCreated with Private Key of
Applicant.Added to each
Message.
Figure 9-10: Digital Certificate Authentication
Strong Authentication The strongest method today
Expensive and Time-Consuming to Implement Software must be added to clients and servers, and
each computer must be configured
Expensive because there are so many clients in a firm
Figure 9-10: Digital Certificate Authentication
Client Weaknesses Sometimes, only server gets digital certificate
Client uses passwords or something else
Figure 9-11: Testing a Digital Signature
Verifier must test the digital signature with the public key of the true party.
If the test succeeds, the applicant must have the true party’s private key.
Only the true party should know this private key; so the applicant must be the true party.
Figure 9-12: Biometric Authentication
Biometric Authentication Based on bodily measurements
Promises to dramatically simplify authentication
Figure 9-12: Biometric Authentication
Fingerprint Scanning Simple and inexpensive
Substantial error rate (misidentification)
Often can be fooled fairly easily by impostors
Dominates biometrics today
Figure 9-12: Biometric Authentication
Iris Scanners Scan the iris (colored part
of the eye)
Irises are complex, so strong authentication
Expensive
(Do NOT shine light in your eyes; scanner is a camera.)
Figure 9-12: Biometric Authentication
Face Recognition
Camera allows analysis of facial structure
Can be done surreptitiously—without the knowledge or consent of person being scanned
Very high error rate and easy to fool
Figure 9-12: Biometric Authentication
Error Rates and Deception
Error and deception rates are higher than vendors claim
Usefulness of biometrics is uncertain
Firewalls, IDSs,and IPSs
Figure 9-13: Firewall Operation
Corporate Network The Internet
Log File
Arriving Packets
Permit (Pass)Legitimate
Packet
Deny(Drop)AttackPacket
Application Message
Application Message
ICMP MessageIP-H
IP-H
IP-H TCP-H
UDP-H
StaticPacketFilter
Firewall
Figure 9-14: Access Control List (ACL) for a Packet Filter Firewall
1. If destination IP address = 60.47.3.9 AND TCP destination port = 80 OR 443, PASS [connection to a public webserver]
2. If ICMP Type = 0, PASS [allow incoming echo reply messages]
3. If TCP destination port = 49153 AND 65535, PASS [allow incoming packets to ephemeral TCP port
numbers]
Figure 9-14: Access Control List (ACL) for a Packet Filter Firewall
4. If UDP destination port = 49153 AND 65535, PASS [allow incoming packets to ephemeral UDP port
numbers]
5. DENY ALL [deny all other packets]
Figure 9-15: Stateful Firewall Default Operation
Internal HostExternal
Host
Internally initiatedcommunication
is allowed.
Externallyinitiated
communicationis stopped.
X
Figure 9-16: Application Firewalls
Application Firewalls
Examine application layer messages in packets
Packet filter firewalls and stateful firewalls do not look at application messages at all
This makes them vulnerable to certain attacks
Figure 9-16: Application Firewalls
Application Fidelity
Requiring the application using a well-known port to be the application that is supposed to use that port
For instance, if an application uses Port 80, application firewall requires it to be HTTP, not a peer-to-peer file transfer program or something else
This is called enforcing application fidelity
Figure 9-16: Application Firewalls
Limited Content Filtering
Allow FTP Get commands but stop FTP Put commands
Do not allow HTTP connections to black-listed (banned) websites
E-mail application server may delete all attachments
Figure 9-16: Application Firewalls
Antivirus Scanning
Few application firewalls do antivirus filtering
Packets also must be passed through separate antivirus filtering programs
Figure 9-17: Defense in Depth with Firewalls
ClientwithHost
FirewallSoftware
Internet
ApplicationFirewalle-mail,HTTP,
etc.
MainFirewall:Stateful
InspectionFirewall
ScreeningBorder
Router withPacket Filter
FirewallSoftware Site
Figure 9-18: Firewalls
Log File
HardenedServer
IDS
HardenedClient PC
Network ManagementConsole
InternalCorporateNetwork
InternetFirewall
Allowed LegitimatePacket
LegitimateHost
LegitimatePacket
Attacker
Figure 9-18: Firewall
Log File
HardenedServer
IDS
HardenedClient PC
Network ManagementConsole
InternalCorporateNetwork
InternetFirewall
LegitimateHost
AttackerAttackPacket
DeniedAttackPacket
Figure 9-18: Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
Log File
IDS
HardenedClient
PC
Network ManagementConsole
InternalCorporateNetwork
IDS
LegitimateHost
AttackerAlarmAbout
SuspiciousPacket
Suspicious Packet
Hardened Server
SuspiciousPacket
Figure 9-18: Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPSs)
Firewalls stop simple attacks
IDSs can identify complex attacks involving multiple packets But many false positives (false alarms)
Intrusion prevention systems (IPSs) Like IDSs, can identify complex attacks
Unlike IDSs, also stop these attacks
Only allowed to stop clearer complex attacks
Figure 9-19: Cryptographic System (SSL/TLS)
Applicant(Customer Client)without Digital Certificate
Verifier(Merchant Webserver)with Digital Certificate
Provides Protection at Transport Layer
Protects all Application TrafficThat is SSL/TLS-Aware (Mostly HTTP)
Figure 9-19: Cryptographic System (SSL/TLS)
Applicant(Customer Client)without Digital Certificate
Verifier(Merchant Webserver)with Digital Certificate
1.Negotiation of Security Options (Brief)
2.Merchant Authenticates Self to Customer
Uses a Digital CertificateCustomer Authentication Is Optional and Uncommon
Figure 9-19: Cryptographic System (SSL/TLS)
Applicant(Customer Client)without Digital Certificate
Verifier(Merchant Webserver)with Digital Certificate
3.Client Generates Random Session Key
Client Sends to Server Encrypted by Merchant’s Public Key
4.Ongoing Communication with Confidentiality
and Merchant Digital Signatures
Figure 9-19: Cryptographic System (SSL/TLS)
Perspective
Initial Hand-Shaking Phases are Very Brief (Milliseconds)
The Last Phase (Ongoing Communication) Is Almost All Total Communication
Encryption for Confidentiality
Figure 9-20: Symmetric Key Encryption and Public Key Encryption
Symmetric Key Encryption for Confidentiality
Message“Hello”
EncryptionMethod &
Key
SymmetricKey
Party A
Party B
InterceptorNetwork
Encrypted Message
Encryption uses anon-secret encryption method and
a secret key
Figure 9-20: Symmetric Key Encryption and Public Key Encryption
Symmetric Key Encryption for Confidentiality
Encrypted Message
SymmetricKey
Party A
Party B
InterceptorNetwork
Interceptor cannot readencrypted messages
Encrypted Message
Figure 9-20: Symmetric Key Encryption and Public Key Encryption
Symmetric Key Encryption for Confidentiality
Message“Hello”
EncryptionMethod &
Key
Encrypted Message Message“Hello”
DecryptionMethod &
Key
SymmetricKey
SameSymmetric
Key
Party A
Party B
InterceptorNetwork
Receiver decrypts the messageUsing the same encryption message
And the same symmetric key
Encrypted Message
Figure 9-20: Symmetric Key Encryption and Public Key Encryption
Public Key Encryption for Confidentiality
EncryptedMessage
EncryptedMessage
Party A Party B
Encrypt withParty B’s Public Key
Decrypt withParty B’s Private Key
Decrypt withParty A’s Private Key
Encrypt withParty A’s Public Key
Note:Four keys are used to encryptand decrypt in both directions
Figure 9-21: Other Aspects of Protection
Hardening Servers and Client PCs
Setting up computers to protect themselves
Server HardeningPatch vulnerabilitiesMinimize applications running on each serverUse host firewallsBackup so that restoration is possible
Figure 9-21: Other Aspects of Protection
Hardening Servers and Client PCs Client PC Hardening
As with servers, patching vulnerabilities, minimizing applications, having a firewall, and implementing backup
Also, a good antivirus program that is updated regularly
Client PC users often make errors or sabotage hardening techniques
Figure 9-21: Other Aspects of Protection
Vulnerability Testing
Protections are difficult to set up correctly
Vulnerability testing is attacking your system yourself or through a consultant
There must be follow-up to fix vulnerabilities that are discovered
Incident Response
Dealing with attacks that succeed
Figure 9-22: Incident Response
Response Phases Detecting the attack
If not detected, damage will continue unabated
IDS or employee reports are common ways to detect attacks
Stopping the attackDepends on the attackReconfiguring firewalls may
work
Figure 9-22: Incident Response
Response Phase Repairing the damage
Sometimes as simple as running a cleanup utility
Sometimes, must reformat a server disk and reinstall software
Can be very expensive if the attacker has done much damage
Figure 9-22: Incident Response
Response Phase Punishing the attackers
Easier to punish employees than remote attackers
Forensic tools collect data in a manner suitable for legal proceedings
Figure 9-22: Incident Response
Major Attacks and CSIRTs
Major attacks cannot be handled by the on-duty staff
On-duty staff convenes the computer security incident response team (CSIRT)
CSIRT has people from security, IT, functional departments, and the legal department
Figure 9-22: Incident Response
Disasters
Natural and attacker-created disasters
Can stop business continuity (operation)
Data backup and recovery are crucial for disaster response
Dedicated backup facilities versus real-time backup between different sites
Figure 9-22: Incident Response
Disasters Business continuity recovery is broader
Protecting employees
Maintaining or reestablishing communication
Providing exact procedures to get the most crucial operations working again in correct order
Topics Covered
Topics Covered
A Wide Variety of Attacks Viruses and Worms
Hacking (Break-in)ScanningBreak-InExploitation (delete log files, create backdoors, do
damage)
Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attacks Employee misuse of the Internet Growing in frequency (and viciousness)
Topics Covered
A Wide Variety of Attackers Traditional Attackers
Wizard attackersEmployees and Ex-Employees
Criminals (Exploding)
Cyberterrorists and National Governments
Topics Covered
A Management Issue, not a Technical Issue Technology does not work automatically
Planning Risk analysis
Comprehensive security
Defense in depth
Topics Covered
Authentication and Authorization Authentication servers give consistency
Passwords (weak)
Digital signatures and digital certificatesHigh security but difficult to implement
Biometric authenticationCould eliminate passwordsError rates and deception
Topics Covered
Firewalls Drop and log packets
Packet filter firewalls and ACLs
Stateful firewalls (dominate for main firewalls today)
Application firewalls filter application contentUsually do NOT provide antivirus filtering
Defense in depth with multiple firewalls
IDSs to detect complex attacks
IPSs to stop some complex attacks
Topics Covered
Cryptographic Systems Negotiate security parameters
Authentication
Key exchange
Ongoing communication (dominates)
SSL/TLS Cryptographic system used in e-commerce
Protects HTTP communication
Topics Covered
Encryption for Confidentiality Symmetric key encryption
Both sides use the same symmetric keyDominates because fast and efficient
Public key encryptionEach side has a secret private key and a non-
secret public key
Topics Covered
Hardening Servers and Client PCs Patching vulnerabilities
Minimize applications
Host firewalls
Backup
Clients: antivirus filtering (users may sabotage)
Vulnerability Testing
Topics Covered
Incident Response
Detection, stopping, repair, punishment
CSIRTs for major attacks to big for the on-duty staff to handle
Disaster response and business continuity recovery