C E N T E R F O R M I L I T Æ R E S T U D I E R

K Ø B E N H A V N S U N I V E R S I T E T

Flemming Pradhan-Blach

Gary Schaub Jr.

Matthew LeRiche

January 2014

Cooperation between International Organizations in Complex Emergencies in Eastern Africa The Views of Danish Practitioners on Cooperation

from an Expert Seminar

I

This report is a part of Centre for Military Studies’ policy research service for the Ministry of

Defence. Its purpose is to provide a conceptual and empirical context for Danish decision

makers about the state of international development assistance in countries where the ability

of local authorities to provide governance and essential services have been severely

attenuated. International, nongovernmental, governmental, and private organizations have

developed mechanisms for exchanging information about their activities, for dividing efforts

amongst themselves, for reconciling conflicting efforts, and even cooperating on common

objectives amongst themselves. These should be developed further and extended to

incorporate local actors so that their capabilities to govern themselves and provide essential

services on their own can be improved.

Centre for Military Studies is a research-based centre located at the Department of Political

Science at the University of Copenhagen. The centre performs research in connection with

security and defence policies and military strategies and this research constitutes the

foundation for the policy research services that the centre provides for the Ministry of

Defence and the political parties to the Defence Agreement.

This report is an analysis based on research methodology. Its conclusions should therefore

not be understood as the reflection of the views and opinions of the Danish Government, the

Danish Defence or any other authority.

Read more about the centre and its activities at http://cms.polsci.ku.dk/.

Authors:

MA Flemming Pradhan-Blach, Military analyst, Centre for Military Studies

Dr. Gary Schaub Jr., Senior researcher, Centre for Military Studies

Dr. Matthew LeRiche, Fellow in Managing Humanitarianism in the Department of

International Development of the London School of Economics

ISBN: 978-87-7393-718-1

II

Abstract

This report is addressing the challenges of cooperation between international organizations in

complex emergencies in fragile states of East Africa. An expert seminar was conducted on

the basis of a paper on the subject to discuss problems, challenges, and possible solutions.

Denmark and the rest of the international community often face the problem of poor

coordination, lack of cooperation, and de-confliction of assistance in such situations.

Countries and organizations are aware of these problems and have undertaken efforts to

resolve them, but it remains insufficient. Attempts to better coordinate have been made at

various levels—between governments, between organizations, and between local actors.

Some improvements in effectiveness are being observed. Since 2005, Danish development

policy has tried to take these efforts into account, as do policies that are still under

development. The necessity of a comprehensive, coordinated, and fully analyzed approach

are among the lessons learned. Local ownership and involvement is a must, and one way of

doing so could be to follow the “New Deal” principles. The Danish approach is currently

leaning in this direction, and Denmark must work to influence its partners to use this

approach to achieve the best results possible in complex emergencies.

III

Dansk resumé

Denne rapport adresserer de udfordringer der eksisterer blandt international organisationer

når de skal samarbejde i komplekse situationer og skrøbelige stater I Østafrika. Ved et

ekspertseminar er dette emne blevet præsenteret, hvor problemer, udfordringer, og mulige

løsninger er blevet diskuteret. Danmark har som resten af det internationale samfund ofte

problemer i forhold til mangel/dårlig koordinering og mangel på samarbejde ved assistance til

lande i komplekse nødsituationer. På trods af at både organisationer og lande er klar over

problemet og at der faktisk foregår forsøg på at forbedre dette er det ikke godt nok. Der

foregår forsøg på at gøre dette på forskellige niveauer såsom på regeringsniveau, i

organisationerne og hos de lokale aktører. Sammenlignet med tidligere ses der tegn på

forbedring af effektiviteten af hjælpen. Den danske regering har siden 2005 indopereret disse

problemstillinger i deres udviklings strategier og politikker. Nødvendigheden af en

sammentænkt, koordineret og fuldt analyseret tilgang er nogle af de lektier der er lært fra

tidligere og nuværende programmer. Lokalt ejerskab og involvering er nødvendig og en måde

at gøre dette på er blandt andet at følge principperne i ’New Deal’, hvilket Danmark i

øjeblikket forsøger. Danmark skal derfor forsøge at influere sine partnere i at følge denne

tilgang for at opnå de bedst mulige resultater i komplekse nødsituationer.

IV

Contents

1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1

2. METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................... 3

3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DANISH FOREIGN ASSISTANCE .............................. 5

4. THE DILEMMAS OF COMPLEX EMERGENCIES ................................................ 8

4.1. Cooperation in Complex Emergencies: Better than You Might Expect ................................... 9

4.2 More Effective than Before, But Room for Improvement .......................................................... 14

4.3 The Next Agenda: Improving Coordination between Supply and Demand ............................ 18

5. CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................... 20

6. NOTES ................................................................................................................. 23

7. BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................. 27

1

1. Introduction

The problems of failed and failing states have been high on the agenda of the international

community since the end of the Cold War. These states lack the institutional wherewithal to

govern their territories effectively or provide sufficient public services for the effective

functioning of their respective societies and economies. Whether caused by conflict or

natural disaster, these territories suffer from considerable social, economic, and political

problems that have overwhelmed the ability of legitimate authority to manage, ultimately

resulting in massive human suffering. Indeed, 1.5 billion people are living in countries or

regions characterized as “fragile.”1 “About 70% of fragile states have seen conflict since

1989.”2 Tens of millions of people in 2011 were affected by natural disasters and political

disorder around the world.3

Often these failed states are in a situation that can be characterized as a complex emergency.

However, a fragile or failed state does not necessarily mean a complex emergency exists in

that particular state. So what is a complex emergency? There are many definitions of what

constitutes a complex emergency. Humanitarian organizations often use the term in

connection with a humanitarian crisis, where war, violent conflict, ethnic cleansing, and

genocide happen or co-exist.4

These complex emergencies can result in failed states and have a dramatic impact on the

population. Looking at Africa, and more specifically eastern Africa, a large number of the

states can be categorized as failed states or in danger of becoming a failed state. Eastern

Africa is defined by the United Nations as consisting of Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea,

Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mozambique, Réunion, Rwanda,

Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and

Zimbabwe.5 Ten of these countries are ranked in the top-40 of the failed states index, with

Somalia holding the top spot, South Sudan as number four, and Zimbabwe as ten.6 Almost

30 million people live under poor conditions and endemic insecurity in these states.7

2

Figure 1: Failed States Index 2013 World Map8

Such complex emergencies invite the intervention of the international community to alleviate

these difficulties. Intervention often involves multiple international organizations,

governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, for-profit nongovernmental aid

organizations, religious charitable organizations, and even multinational corporations. None

of these entities can resolve all of the difficulties to be encountered. They must therefore

cooperate with one another to be effective, either through de-confliction, coordination, or

cooperation.

The Danish government has expressed concern about the situation in eastern Africa. Prime

Minister Helle Thorning has declared

We are one of the richest countries in the world, and we should be proud that we can

take part in helping outside our own borders. Not just for their sake, but also because

it is a part of creating a more stable, just and safe world.9

Minister of Defence Nick Hækkerup has indicated that his ministry will take action to address

the difficulties in eastern Africa. “In 2012, Denmark is chairing the Nordic Defence

Cooperation (NORDEFCO). We will use it actively, e.g. in East Africa for capacity-

building, as well as strengthened political dialogue and multinational cooperation.”10

Denmark has indeed engaged in eastern Africa in a variety of development programs:

development of state institutions, humanitarian assistance, advisors to governments, and

security forces. Figure 2 shows how Denmark has chosen to focus its development aid.

3

Compared to Figure 1, the definition of the geographical area for East Africa, it becomes

apparent that the majority of Danish development aid is aimed at eastern Africa.

Figure 2: Danish Priority-Countries11

The Danish military is also increasing its involvement in the development of Africa and

especially eastern Africa. Advisors have been sent to Ethiopia and Kenya to provide military

support in the form of training, education, and consultancy. Furthermore, the Danish military

is also focused on how to cooperate with other organizations to support development and how

to handle difficult situations in particular countries, such as Somalia.

As part of this action, the Danish Ministry of Defence asked the Centre for Military Studies

to explore the difficulties possibly facing international organizations when intervening in

complex emergencies in eastern Africa. This report is the result.

2. Methodology

The project team utilized a common technique to elicit expert opinion from a community of

practice: the expert seminar. Expert seminars provide opportunity for a diaspora of academic

experts, practitioners, and other stakeholders to discuss their area of concern in a focused and

guided manner. When skillfully conducted an expert seminar can elicit an effective

4

combination of expert judgment and extant experience to inform members about conceptual

issues, theoretical approaches, and practical realities. Indeed, it is a means of quickly

combining and validating or invalidating abstract notions and limited experience, thereby

providing an effective quality control mechanism for the group’s shared knowledge. A

beneficial effect of this method is to provide the basis for this diaspora to develop into a

community of practice that can be accessed when necessary to address the issues inherent in

international humanitarian intervention in African complex emergencies.

As a basis for the expert seminar and parts of this report, Dr. Matthew LeRiche of the London

School of Economics, an expert in humanitarian intervention in eastern Africa,12

provided an

analysis of the approaches that international organizations, governmental agencies,

nongovernmental organizations, and corporations have taken to cooperate more effectively

when operating together in eastern Africa. After providing an analysis of complex

emergencies in theory and in the reality of eastern Africa, the paper discussed the nature,

interests, and approaches to intervention taken by these different types of actors. The

analysis then proceeded to the means that have been utilized to enhance situational awareness

amongst these actors to provide a baseline for avoiding conflicts between their efforts,

promoting coordination between related efforts, and supporting cooperation amongst efforts

in the same problem and geographic areas. The discussion of how the suppliers of

humanitarian assistance have attempted to make their efforts more efficient then led to an

analysis of whether they have become more effective. This naturally led to discussion of the

interaction of the international community with local actors and the problems encountered

therein. These problems included different cultural expectations of the roles, purposes,

interests, and capabilities of actors on each side, differences in their knowledge of the

situation on the ground and one another, and the manner in which the problems were framed.

This analysis set the stage for the seminar to finally consider potential solutions to these

dilemmas as the next stage of advancing the cause of effective and efficient humanitarian

intervention.

Dr. LeRiche’s analysis provided a focal point for the discussion. The seminar produced

legitimation of the paper’s arguments and conclusions within the Danish context—i.e.,

amongst the Danish community of practice. The seminar participants agreed with and

elaborated upon the notion that complex emergencies result from the absence of effective

governance to provide for basic security, social stability, economic exchange, and essential

services. There was substantial discussion of the degree of effectiveness to date of the

5

mechanisms for increasing the coordination and cooperation between these actors that led to

further consideration of means of improvement. Finally, the practical judgment of

practitioners combined with the conceptual arguments provided by the scholars in the

community of practice produced a viable framework for characterizing and addressing the

problems that the international community faces when interacting with local officials,

leaders, organizations, and people in the area. These problems are those that will require

further discussion amongst the extant community of practice that was originated by the expert

seminar organized and hosted by the Centre for Military Studies.

The report proceeds in the following manner. First, we provide an overview of Danish

Development Assistance, accounting for how Danish development aid has evolved since its

introduction after World War II. This is followed by an analytic synthesis of the expert

seminar. The work of Dr. LeRiche and the project team is intertwined to capture both the

preparatory materials available to the members of the expert seminar as well as the

subsequent discussion that built upon these arguments, facts, and judgments.

3. The Development of Danish Foreign Assistance

Development assistance has been an important tool in Danish engagement with the

international community since the “Law on Cooperation with Developing Countries” was

unanimously passed by Parliament in 1962. Throughout the period, development

assistance—whether in the form of agricultural or medical demonstration projects, water and

health clinics, or human rights and gender equality—has been designed to express and

promote Danish values in the developing world.13

In the 1990s, a new approach to Danish foreign aid was taken. Denmark wanted its foreign

aid to be more focused and have greater impact. Denmark wanted to engage in a different,

more critical manner with the international and multilateral institutions and thus be able to

promote Danish views.14

In the mid-1990s poverty reduction became a general objective of

Danish assistance. This led to a new strategy involving a focus on sectors rather than

individual projects.15

This approach has been the cornerstone of Danish development aid

since, with refinements and the streamlining of policies, as well as a definition of priorities

for Danish foreign aid in recent years. Since 2003, these sectors have included:16

6

European development, environment, and democracy

International stability, democratization, refugees, and the fight against terror

Social and economic development

Global environment

Denmark and the rest of the international community have been interested in harmonizing the

administrative procedures of donors, the alignment of aid, and the ownership of the recipient

countries of the development activities. The OECD Development Assistance Committee

(DAC) issued recommendations in its report on how to make aid work better, Shaping the

21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation.

17 These recommendations are

very similar to the five fundamental principles of the Paris Declaration from 2005:18

Ownership

Alignment

Harmonization

Results

Mutual Accountability

In 2005 Denmark was one of the more than 120 countries to endorse the Paris Declaration on

Aid Effectiveness.19

This was an important step toward trying to agree on standard ways to

cooperate and coordinate. The Declaration has since become the norm for donors and aid

recipients.

In 2010, the Danish policy towards fragile states, “Peace and Stabilisation 2010–2015,” was

adopted. This policy clearly states Denmark’s focus areas when talking with respect to

fragile states:20

Stabilization and security

Promotion of improved livelihoods and economic opportunities

Democratization, good governance, and human rights

Conflict prevention

Regional conflict management

Another important aspect of this policy is cooperation. The policy clearly states that

“Denmark does not engage in fragile states in isolation, which is why coordination with other

countries and organisations involved and with the authorities of the country is key.”21

7

The current Danish Policy highlights four specific principles that will guide Danish efforts in

assisting fragile states: 22

Alignment

“Whole of government” approach

Willingness to take risks

Division of labor

These four priorities indicate that Denmark is aware of the coordination and cooperation

difficulties facing development agencies. Denmark wants to ensure the proper analysis of the

situation in each country it is engaged in as well as ensuring the proper coordination and

cooperation from the outset of any engagement. This is seen as a corrective for UN efforts

that “… at country level are often too fragmented and uncoordinated and without a common

strategic direction.”23

The Danish Government has initiated a whole-of-government

approach between different Danish ministries and non-governmental actors, encompassing all

Danish efforts—political, development, humanitarian, civilian, and military—to achieve

more integrated cooperation.24

The whole-of-government approach is being integrated in the

defence force policy and strategy.25

This is also being emphasized in the recently published

“Denmark’s Integrated Stabilization Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-affected Areas of

the World” where the importance of cooperation between civilian actors and the military is

emphasized.26

This framework has also resulted in the establishment of the Danish Stabilisation Fund. The

fund “…has both development assistance and non-development assistance funds at its

disposal. The aim of the fund is to enable an enhanced effort in the overlap between security

and development, including interventions in fragile states.”27

The fund has become a tool for

Denmark to cooperate with other countries more effectively and to better engage in fragile

states. Furthermore, the policy emphasizes that key actors, national and international, must

be prepared to coordinate to avoid overlapping as well as contradictory efforts. Working

with and in fragile states is not without risks (political, economic, or operational). Therefore,

it is important that actors are willing to take risks in order to achieve their goals and desired

end state.28

Moreover, Denmark will focus on choosing its partners based on thorough

assessments and analyses. It is important for Denmark that national and local authorities in

the receiving countries also take responsibility.

8

Emphasis on local ownership and responsibility is in line with the “New Deal”29

initiative of

some African countries, Somalia being the latest country to adopt the New Deal principles.30

The New Deal was initiated in 2011 by a group of G7+ and 19 post-conflict countries as a

more inclusive and trusted framework for donor engagement with fragile states. Thus the

New Deal is not a treaty or binding contract, but a framework—a set of promised

guidelines—meant to promote a more effective and equitable development partnership

between donors and beneficiaries, the government being in the driving seat. Countries are

given the space to design their own compact based on a set of peace-building and state-

building goals (PSGs), and then develop mechanisms between country and donor partners to

coordinate and monitor aid to ensure that it effectively addresses national priorities. It applies

many of the same principles of past aid effectiveness frameworks, but with greater emphasis

on social cohesion, state-building, and national ownership. Eight African countries have

signed up to implement the New Deal. That Denmark welcomes this approach and initiative

is also emphasized by the fact that the co-chair of the International Dialogue on Peace

building and State building for the New Deal is Christian Friis Bach, the former Danish

Minister for Development and Cooperation.

The Danish approach and its commitment to the New Deal demonstrates a Danish

commitment to achieving better coordination and cooperation amongst international actors in

fragile states and complex emergencies. These are important tools and policies for reaching

effective and successful solutions when assisting in complex emergencies. Denmark’s

engagement and tools, developed together with the international donor community, represent

the path forward to facilitate more effective aid and cooperation in the affected countries.

4. The Dilemmas of Complex Emergencies

On 4 March 2013, the Centre for Military Studies hosted a seminar to examine the difficulties

and opportunities presented by the necessity of cooperation among the entities intervening in

complex emergencies in eastern Africa. Led by Dr. Gary Schaub, a Senior Researcher at

CMS, the seminar focused on a presentation by Dr. Matthew LeRiche of the London School

of Economics and Political Science. The participants included Ms. Josefine Kühnel Larsen

(doctoral student at CMS), Dr. Lars Bangert Struwe (Researcher at CMS), Dr. Henrik

Breitenbauch (Senior Researcher at CMS), Mr. Salem Dandan (doctoral student at the

Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen), Dr. Thomas Mandrup (Assistant

Professor at the Royal Danish Defence College), Mr. Peter K. M. Jensen (Copenhagen Centre

9

for Disaster Research), Mr. Anders Bergen, Dr. Holger Bernt Hansen (Professor Emeritus,

Centre for African Studies, University of Copenhagen), Mr. Flemming Nielsen (Head of the

International Division, Danish Emergency Management Agency), Mr. Peter Frøslev

Christensen (PFC Consulting), and Major Jens Jakobsen (Danish Army).

4.1. Cooperation in Complex Emergencies: Better than You Might Expect

Dr. LeRiche opened the seminar with a presentation of the three arguments in his paper: that

complex emergencies present more difficulties than the intersection of substantial political,

social, economic, health, and security problems would suggest; that the variety of entities that

have chosen to intervene to ameliorate these problems complicate their ability to cooperate

with one another; and that the UN has developed processes and procedures to facilitate

cooperation amongst these organizations—and that it has been quite successful.

Complex Emergencies Are Complex

It is important to define a complex emergency. The term complex emergency originated in

the 1980s, where it was introduced to describe a situation in Mozambique in which the

international assistance organizations realized that the emergency aid and humanitarian

assistance needs were caused by the then on-going armed conflict.31

Today, there is still no

agreed-upon definition of a complex emergency. Many organizations have their own

definitions that are similar in their own ways. The World Health Organization (WHO) and

the United Nations Secretariat’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

(UNOCHA) have very similar definitions:

WHO: “… are situations of disrupted livelihoods and threats to life produced by

warfare, civil disturbance and large-scale movements of people, in which any

emergency response has to be conducted in a difficult political and security

environment.”32

UNOCHA: “… a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is

total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external

conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or

capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing United Nations (UN) country

program.”33

10

In contrast, an organization such as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red

Crescent Societies (IFRC) also includes a disaster possibly leading to a complex emergency

but generally describes the typical characteristics of a complex emergency to be:

IFRC: “Some disasters can result from several different hazards or, more often, to a

complex combination of both natural and man-made causes and different causes of

vulnerability. Food insecurity, epidemics, conflicts and displaced populations are

examples. A humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or

considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and

which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of

any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country program (IASC).”34

Such “complex emergencies” are typically characterized by: 35

extensive violence and loss of life;

displacements of populations;

widespread damage to societies and economies;

the need for large-scale, multi-faceted humanitarian assistance ;

the hindrance or prevention of humanitarian assistance by political and military

constraints;

significant security risks for humanitarian relief workers in some areas.”

The three examples above are just a few of the many different definitions that somehow are

alike, but there is not really any consistent definition when examining organizations’

definitions. This is also a cause of confusion and could lead to difficulties in cooperation, as

the institutional definition of the same term is not in sync in the different organizations.

A leading scholar in the area, David Keen, has also defined the concept of a complex

emergency as “humanitarian crisis that are linked with large-scale violent conflict—civil war,

ethnic cleansing and genocide.”36

Keen continues, explaining that “[c]omplex emergencies

should be distinguished from natural disaster[s]—that is, from disasters caused primarily by

drought, floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, tidal waves or some other force of nature.”37

Thus

both Keen and OCHA emphasize that complex emergencies are linked to internal or external

conflict.38

Examples of countries where a complex emergency exists include Afghanistan,

Sudan, and Somalia.

11

At the expert seminar, Dr. LeRiche argued that complex emergencies are the intersection of

massive political, social, economic, health, and security problems that are linked to large-

scale violent conflict and cause humanitarian crises. They arise in areas where the state

institutions have not developed or have been eroded or overwhelmed by the intensity,

duration, and/or scale of these problems. Governance is lacking, in other words, and

inventing or restoring it is a necessary condition for ameliorating the humanitarian crisis over

the long term.

But, Dr. LeRiche argued, those who consider complex emergencies to be characterized only

by these conditions fail to grasp the multiple objectives that local participants and intervening

entities may have. It is not as simple as “victory” in a conflict. Indeed, not all actors are

interested in solving the crisis; some may benefit from it as it provides opportunity for profit,

undermines competitors, and advances political objectives. Organizations that intervene

might also have reasons beyond “doing good.” They may be following media attention so as

to demonstrate presence in areas of the highest salience to Western governments and publics,

thereby increasing their donor base.

A Difficult Coordination Problem

Second, Dr. LeRiche argued that numerous types of entities have chosen to intervene in

complex emergencies in eastern Africa: governmental organizations such as the United States

Agency for International Development (USAID), international organizations such as the

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), secular

non-profit humanitarian organizations such as Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), religious

non-profit humanitarian organizations such as Samaritan’s Purse, for-profit humanitarian

organizations such as Population Services International (PSI), and multinational corporations

that are conducting business in the area, such as Chevron.39

These entities vary in terms of

their size, resources, motivation for being involved, mission, ethos, and willingness to overtly

involve them selves in the local politics of the situation.

The variety of organizations poses difficulties for cooperation. Organizations of different

size have different forms, bureaucratic procedures, different reporting requirements, and

likely different resource endowments to apply to the tasks at hand. Larger organizations tend

to prefer operating independently to cooperation with others that is not on their terms—and

they possess the resources to act unilaterally. Different motivations for entry into the

complex emergency can reduce the willingness of organizations to cooperate: religious and

12

secular organizations tend to see their missions in different terms, the former tending to the

spirit as well as the body; civilian organizations tend to focus on health, sanitation, and

development issues, while military organizations focus on security; non-profit organizations

tend to coordinate with international organizations such as the UN—if at all—while for-profit

organizations tend to contract with state organizations such as USAID; and non-profits might

not be willing to collaborate, as they are competing with one another for donor funds. Ethos

can pose barriers to cooperation that are difficult to overcome. Organizations that conceive

of themselves as one in solidarity with the people they seek to help cannot but involve

themselves in the political (and other) disputes causing the conditions they hope to

ameliorate. They tend to assess what the people need and then provide it. Organizations that

conceive of themselves as apolitical or above the local fray will take substantial steps to

ensure their neutrality, perhaps to the detriment of fulfilling their humanitarian mission.

These organizations tend to assess what the people need and then provide what the local

authorities want and permit.

The Effective Organization of Supply

Third, Dr. LeRiche argued that many of these barriers to cooperation have been surmounted,

particularly in what he characterized as one of the most iconic complex emergencies with one

of the longest running sets of international interventions, running from the UN humanitarian-

focused Operation Lifeline Sudan to intervention in Rwanda by the UN to direct military

interventions in Somalia by the US, Canada, and other governments. Over two decades of

working together on the ground have brought the era of poor cooperation, coordination, and

deconfliction amongst these entities to an end—for the most part. At a minimum, most

organizations have increased awareness of one another and what they are doing within the

shared humanitarian space. This can be seen in Figure 3, a UNOCHA map of “Central

Africa: Humanitarian Presence in the LRA-Affected Region”40

and Figure 4, “Mogadishu—

IDP Settlements and intervening agencies.”41

As one participant noted, such knowledge of

who was doing what and where was not available even 5 years ago. This level of situational

awareness is something that should not be taken for granted but rather appreciated as the

advance that it is.

13

Figure 3: Central Africa: Humanitarian Presence in the LRA-Affected Region

Figure 4: Mogadishu—IDP Settlements and Intervening Agencies

14

These advances in cooperation have been driven by two trends. The first is that the entities

that intervene in complex emergencies have expanded their missions from narrow issues,

such as sanitation or women’s education, toward the multifunctional concept of

“governance.” This has been driven by a conceptual evolution within the humanitarian

community, wherein the provision of systematic assistance with the goal of enabling local

authorities to take over the functions performed by external service providers has displaced a

generic desire to simply “do good.” This shift has been enabled in part by donor preferences

and requirements to explain how each organization contributes to the whole. It has also been

facilitated by the response of recipient organizations that have, quite naturally, responded to

these incentives by expanding their mission statements to consider governance issues and

enabling, rather than simply assisting, locals. Thus a loose paradigm of governance has

begun harmonizing the conceptions of purpose that these organizations bring to their

activities in country.

The second trend has been the development of a UN organizational approach to coordinate

and de-conflict the efforts of entities on the ground. Dr. LeRiche argued that the cluster and

sector approach devised by the UN in 2005 has blossomed over the past 8 years and provides

a fairly effective means of tracking the sectors of action and geographic areas being

addressed by different organizations. Each of the main sectors have a “lead” organization

responsible for “managing” those in the cluster. This approach has increased everyone’s

awareness of who is operating within the space, improved coordination through regular

meetings and reports, enabled cooperation between entities, and enhanced financial

accountability. These processes reside within the UN Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and this organization has provided the institutional basis

for settling basic issues that had hampered coordination and cooperation in the past. As with

the concept of governance, the clusters and sectors approach to conceiving of the

humanitarian space dominates funding mechanisms, and humanitarian organizations have

been encouraged to participate. Therefore, increasing numbers of organizations have been

willing to cooperate with others through the UN.

4.2 More Effective than Before, But Room for Improvement

The participants in the seminar shared various opinions regarding the effectiveness of

coordination and cooperation between and among the organizations within the UNOCHA

framework. Many actors, particularly large ones and those with a solidarity-based approach,

15

have not participated fully with UNOCHA. The former have sufficient resources and

gravitas to resist the financial blandishments of donors who otherwise see the UNOCHA

processes as an effective means of monitoring and policing humanitarian efforts and the UN

as an imprimatur of legitimacy. The latter see the apolitical stance of the UN as either

ineffective, constraining, or as a fiction as it means siding with local authorities that may be

considered as having precipitated, perpetuated, and profited from the suffering that these

organizations aim to alleviate. Furthermore, bilateral efforts on the part of some major states,

such as the United States or Japan, often remain untethered to the UN, leading to disjointed

efforts. One participant noted that this was the case with police training as part of security

sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Even among those choosing to cooperate within the UNOCHA structure, it was argued,

coordination is by no means easy. Ponderous administrative processes requiring approval

from higher (and distant) authorities for even the simplest tactical decisions reduce the

effectiveness that cooperation is supposed to deliver. Procedure can assume a life of its own,

and coordination “within the walls” may not equate to coordination outside of them.

Weber in Africa: Barriers to Cooperating With Locals

Indeed, it was argued that the effective organization of supply does not necessarily equate to

the effective delivery of services (outputs) or the effective amelioration of conditions on the

ground (outcomes). This requires effective coordination and cooperation with local actors,

between the suppliers of humanitarian assistance and the demanders of it. Dr. LeRiche and

seminar participants identified many barriers to effective relations between supply and

demand.

First and foremost, the organizational culture of the United Nations constitutes an effective

barrier to coordinating with local actors. UN personnel have expended much energy and

effort toward constructing institutional processes to channel their efforts and those of

cooperating entities. They expect local actors to understand these processes and be able to

interact with the UN and other actors in those terms. Yet local actors often cannot do so.

After all, the enabling condition of a complex emergency is the lack of effective governance

structures. The lack of effective local partners leads to mutual frustration. As one participant

explained, the locals fail to appreciate the amount of paperwork necessary to coordinate the

efforts of supplying them with the services they need to survive.

16

Secondly, for many reasons, the services delivered often fail to meet the needs of the people.

First, the nature and procedures of the UN require coordination with host nation authorities.

These authorities may not understand the needs of the people suffering in areas outside of

their effective control. Or they may not desire to see these needs met. Regardless of the

reason, the UN delivers the assistance that host nation authorities request and approve rather

than assistance tailored to meet the needs of the people in any given locality. Furthermore,

this bias in favour of host nation “authorities” discourages systematic analysis of the local

situation. This situation is almost always complicated, as graphic examples such as that

indicated in Figure 5, “Distribution of Ethnic Groups in Southern Sudan,” illustrates.42

What is often necessary to understand the situation on the ground is deep knowledge of the

local population, leaders, and their relationships. Yet the trends favoring cooperation

between organizations also disfavour the maintenance of area expertise. The

professionalization of humanitarianism accompanying the bureaucratization of humanitarian

organizations as they alter their forms and processes so as to better meet the requirements of

donors and the UN tends to crowd out personnel with deep and particularized knowledge of

local persons, practices, cultures, and languages. Seminar participants noted that the

traditional “do-gooders” of humanitarian organizations have been replaced by professionals

that rotate in and out of the area, bringing generic management knowledge with them when

they arrive to make their mark and taking whatever specific knowledge of the situation that

they gained during their experience with them upon departure. Such personnel prefer to stay

“inside the wire” and interact with their fellow administrators, managers, and functionaries

rather than interacting with local actors to determine how best to meet their needs.

17

Figure 5: Distribution of Ethnic Groups in Southern Sudan

Even when a person with deep knowledge is put in charge, Dr. LeRiche argued with

agreement from seminar participants, the organization tends to preclude their ability to

incorporate their knowledge into the behaviour of their organizations. Seminar participants

speculated that the lack of knowledge of subordinates combines with the bureaucratic nature

of the coordinated supply effort to produce standard responses that may not effectively meet

variation in general needs or any special circumstances. What is offered is what is

available—rather than what is needed—be it plastic tent material or gender advisors.

Furthermore, the lack of situational awareness, preference to coordinate inside the walls

rather than with those outside, and rotational policies that accompany professional career

paths preclude developing long-term relationships with trusted locals. In many of these

communal cultures, it was argued, relationships are personal rather than institutional. The

impersonal performance of bureaucratic duties is a foreign concept to those who have not

been socialized into a bureaucratic state apparatus or have never dealt with one on a regular

basis. In those increasingly rare instances when a representative from a humanitarian

organization does develop a trusting relationship with a local figure, it was argued, the

rotational policies in place destroy them when that particular person rotates out of the area.

This not only hamstrings cooperation in the short term, as cultures such as those in Sudan

18

regard any arrangements to be tied to the person who agreed to them rather than to their home

institution, it also undermines future cooperation, as it demonstrates that humanitarians

cannot be trusted to keep their word. This is but one example among many of how the

increased organization of suppliers may reduce their ability to interface effectively with local

demanders of their humanitarian services.

4.3 The Next Agenda: Improving Coordination between Supply and

Demand

The seminar concluded with a discussion of the problems to be faced when the corporate

structure of coordinated humanitarian suppliers must interface with the uncoordinated,

conflictual, and confused mass of demanders of humanitarian services. Of course,

humanitarian institutions have always interacted with the people to whom they were

supplying assistance. But there have been problems with these interactions. Despite the

fundamental principles of impartiality in service delivery and neutrality in local affairs that

have guided Western humanitarian organizations, they have often been co-opted into local

conflicts and struggles―sometimes inadvertently, sometimes not. Dr. LeRiche offered the

example of local authorities distributing different maps of their territory with the names of

villages altered to different aid organizations so that assistance efforts would be duplicated.

Indeed, the larger point is that humanitarian intervention changes the material situation on the

ground by introducing new players and resources into the equation. This, in turn, affects the

incentive structures facing local actors who will quite rationally respond to these changes.

The more entrepreneurial actors will engage in profit maximization and perhaps rent-seeking

behaviour, be they warlords, governors, or local liaisons to humanitarian organizations. The

systematic recalibration of the environment and actor incentives leads to inefficiencies and

ineffectiveness in the delivery of humanitarian assistance and perhaps to the perpetuation of

the conflicts underlying the complex emergency itself.

19

Figure 6: SOMALIA - Banadir: Cluster Presence – Who, What, Where (as of April 2012)

Some seminar participants argued that this inevitable situation can be ameliorated if not

solved through the coordination of suppliers discussed earlier. Situational awareness of who

is doing what, where, and with whom, as illustrated in Figure 6,43

“SOMALIA – Banadir:

Cluster Presence – Who What Where (as of April 2012),” can reduce the ability of local

actors to manipulate individual suppliers, as has happened in the past.

Furthermore, the evolution of the interventionist agenda from pure humanitarianism—i.e.,

delivering help to people in need—toward governance—the development of sustainable local

institutions and personnel that can eventually accept the responsibility to deliver these

services themselves—may eventually force the overt engagement of the suppliers with the

demanders. Indeed, its implicit objective is coordination and consolidation of demand.

Developing the capacity of such local partners will necessarily entail deeper understanding of

the local economic and political authority structures of the area, vetting and accepting local

leaders even if imperfect—i.e., corrupt or associated with previous misdeeds. Such hard

lessons have been noted, if not necessarily learned, in the military interventions and

stabilization operations that have occurred in the post-Cold War era and may be transferrable

to humanitarian interventions in complex emergencies.

20

5. Conclusions

Clearly, the Danish government is inclined to undertake action abroad. An active Danish

foreign policy is oriented toward cooperating with others through international organizations,

such as the UN. Indeed, former Defence Minister Nick Hækkerup has argued that “the threat

against Denmark is that a largely weak world society cannot intervene when the strong or the

brutal are trying to get their way… Therefore, we support the United Nations. Therefore this

government wants to strengthen the United Nations.”44

As Danish policy makers turn their attention to the complex emergencies that have engulfed

eastern Africa over the past two decades, they will find that the UN has developed a

substantial set of processes and procedures to coordinate the efforts of a large number of

variously sized, organized, resourced, and motivated humanitarian actors. The UNOCHA

cluster and sector approach has increased the situational awareness of most external actors,

informing them of who is doing what, where, and with whom within the humanitarian space.

This baseline level of cooperation represents a major advance that should be appreciated.

Beyond this minimum, however, more effective coordination and cooperation has occurred

among these organizations as they inform one another of their activities and plan future ones.

The experience and knowledge of the gathered community of practice that participated in the

CMS seminar on 4 March indicated that the coordinated supply of humanitarian assistance

has been noticeably improved, but more remains to be done. Many of the informal trends

driving this cooperation—the acceptance of the governance paradigm and the various

reporting requirements imposed upon humanitarian organizations by large donors—should

facilitate further cooperation “behind the wall.”

The next level of challenge exists in coordinating supply with demand. Complex

emergencies occur because there are no local authorities that are able, or perhaps willing, to

perform the functions of a state, such as providing a stable and secure environment wherein

economic development, public health, and, indeed, even bare subsistence can take place. The

primary challenge to be overcome is to increase the situational awareness of the local

political and economic scene, understanding the motivations and relationships amongst local

actors, so that the underlying context of the complex emergency can be properly understood.

Only such knowledge can allow humanitarian organizations of any stripe to avoid being

taken advantage of, being co-opted into local rivalries and conflicts, and failing to achieve

their objectives of ameliorating human suffering today and into tomorrow.

21

Increased organization, bureaucratization, and professionalization on the part of the suppliers

of humanitarian assistance have helped overcome the difficulties that they had cooperating

with one another but have raised substantial barriers to cooperation with local actors that lack

even the basic knowledge of how modern organizations function. It would appear as though

moving beyond the humanitarian agenda of merely helping people toward the governance

agenda of enabling local peoples to tend to their own needs more effectively in the first

instance means helping local leaders understand bureaucratic organization and how to

interact with it. Only once this basic cultural artefact is dealt with, and local leaders begin to

grasp the impersonal nature of organizations and accept their legitimacy, will demand assume

a that can be developed into an effective local partner. Luckily, Danish inheritors of Max

Weber’s inclinations and lessons are themselves more inclined to involve themselves more in

complex emergencies in eastern Africa. No doubt their involvement will advance this agenda

further than has heretofore been possible.

The New Deal should continue to be the strategic basis for Danish aid. The New Deal should

be strengthened and used as the coordination and cooperation forum in the future for

international aid at all levels, not just in complex emergencies.

Denmark should seek a leading role in programs directed toward the development of complex

emergencies and fragile states, thus being in a position to impact the coordination and

cooperation in a direction where the most effective aid will be provided. Partner countries

sharing the same values, such as the United Kingdom and its Danida equivalent, the

Department for International Development, can allow Denmark to leverage its ideals and

achieve its objectives more efficiently and effectively, as in Somalia and its sub-region,

Somaliland,45

where the New Deal is being implemented.

To do so, it is important for Denmark to emphasize its four principles of Danish engagement:

alignment, whole of government, willingness to take risks, and division of labour. To do so,

it is important to understand the situations wherein Denmark wants to engage and address

problems with a comprehensive solution. These solutions must be planned across different

sectors and with a mutual understanding and agreement between the actors, both international

and local. Denmark must therefore continue to emphasize these principles in its planning

together with other countries as well as organizations when developing assistance strategies.

In this process, it is important that lessons learned and evaluations from former or on-going

22

efforts are being utilized and that there is an understanding of the problems and a willingness

to take risks.

23

6. Notes 1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark, “Skrøbelige Stater,” available at http://um.dk/da/politik-og-

diplomati/retsorden/skroebelige-stater/ (accessed 4 July 2013).

2 “A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States,” International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding,

http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/documentupload/49151944.pdf, (accessed 26 June 2013).

3 United Nations Organization for the Coordination Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA Annual Report 2011, (Geneva:

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2011), available at

https://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/2011%20OCHA%20Annual%20Report%20Final%20150dpi.pdf

(accessed 29 May 2013), page 2.

4 David Keen, Complex Emergencies, (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2011), page 1.

5 United Nations Statistics Division, “Composition of macro geographical (continental) regions, geographical

sub-regions, and selected economic and other groupings,” available at

http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm, (accessed 18 June 2013).

6 The Fund for Peace, “The Failed States Index 2013,” available at http://ffpagestatesindex.org/rankings-2013-

sortable (accessed 02 July 2013).

7 Data for Somalia and Zimbabwe is from 2010 and originate from United Nations Statistics Division,

http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx/_Images/Explorer.aspx (accessed 02 July 2013). Data for South Sudan

is obtained from United Nations in South Sudan, “About South Sudan,” http://ss.one.un.org/country-info.html

(accessed 02 July 2013).

8 The Fund for Peace, “The Failed States Index 2013,” http://ffpagestatesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable

(accessed 03 July 2013).

9 “Thorning tager til Afrika efter travl politisk uge,” MetroExpress (3 March 2013), available at

http://www.metroxpress.dk/nyheder/thorning-tager-til-afrika-efter-travl-politisk-

uge/qefmcc!Km67Wp15xYCKVUqkAOsTDw/, (accessed 4 July 2013).

10 Forsvarsminister Nick Hækkerup, “100-dages talen,” at Copenhagen University, Centre for Military Studies,

(10 January 2012) http://www.fmn.dk/nyheder/Documents/100-dages_talen.pdf (accessed 04 July 2013).

11 Denmark’s Priority Countries, Development aid 2012 (Millions DKK), http://um.dk/da/danida/det-goer-

vi/aarsberetning2012/danmarks-prioritetslande/ (accessed 4 July 2013).

12 Matthew Arnold and Matthew LeRiche, South Sudan: From Revolution to Independence, (London: C Hurst &

Co Publishers Ltd, 2012); Matthew LeRiche, “Terror and Crisis in Sudan’s Blue Nile State,” The Huffington Post

(15 January 2013); Matthew LeRiche, “The World’s Youngest Nation: South Sudan,” (documentary, 2012).

24

13

Christian Friis Bach, Thorsten Borring Olesen, Sune Kaur-Pedersen, and Jan Pedersen, Idealer og Realiteter.

Dansk udviklingspolitiks historie 1945–2005. Gyldendal 2008. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, “Danida

through five decades,” available at http://um.dk/da/danida/om-danida/hist/danida-gennem-fem-aartier/,

(accessed 30 November 2013).

14 Lars Engberg-Pedersen, “The Future of Danish Foreign Aid: the Best of the Second-best?” in Nanna Hvidt and

Hans Mouritzen, editors, Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2009, (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International

Studies, 2009), page 110.

15 Engberg-Pedersen, “The Future of Danish Foreign Aid,” page 109.

16 Regeringen (Danish Government), Danmarks internationale indsats – nye udfordringer i en verden i

forandring, (Copenhagen: 2003), pages 4–5.

17 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development , Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of

Development Co-operation, (Paris: OECD, 1996), pages 15–16.

18 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the

Accra Agenda for Action, (2005/2008), http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf, (accessed 4

August 2013).

19 Engberg-Pedersen, “The Future of Danish Foreign Aid,” page 113.

20 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, “Peace and Stabilisation, Denmark’s Policy towards Fragile States,

2010–2015,” (Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010), page III.

21 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, “Peace and Stabilisation,” page II.

22 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, “Peace and Stabilisation,” pages 5–9.

23 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, “Peace and Stabilisation,” page 21.

24 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, “Peace and Stabilisation,” page 6.

25 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, “Aftale på forsvarsområdet 2013-2017” (in Danish), 30 November

2012, http://www.fmn.dk/videnom/Documents/Aftale_paa_forsvarsomraadet_2013-2017a.pdf (accessed 10

August 2013).

26 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Justice of Denmark, Denmark’s Integrated

Stabilisation Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-affected Areas of the World, (Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Justice, 2013), pages 16–23.

27 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, “Peace and Stabilisation,” page 7.

28 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, “Peace and Stabilisation,” page 8.

29 “New Deal Snapshot,” available at http://www.newdeal4peace.org/new-deal-snapshot/, (accessed 12

December 2013).

30 “Somalia Launches New Deal,” http://www.newdeal4peace.org/news-and-events/somalia-launches-new-

deal/ (accessed 7 january 2014).

25

31

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Evaluation and Aid Effectiveness 1, Guidance for

Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies, DAC, (Paris: OECD, 1999),

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/50/2667294.pdf, (accessed 18 June 2012).

32 World Health Organization, Complex Emergencies, available at

http://www.who.int/environmental_health_emergencies/complex_emergencies/en/, (accessed 16 December

2013).

33 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA Orientation Handbook On Complex

Emergencies, (Geneva: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, August 1999), available at

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/3D153DA3049B322AC1256C30002A9C24-

ocha__orientation__handbook_on__.html, (accessed 16 December 2013).

34 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, “Complex/manmade hazards: complex

emergencies,” available at http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-management/about-

disasters/definition-of-hazard/complex-emergencies/, (accessed 16 December 2013).

35 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, “Complex/manmade hazards.”

36 Keen, Complex Emergencies, page 1.

37 Keen, Complex Emergencies, page 1.

38 Keen, Complex Emergencies, page 1.

39 For more on the role of multinational corporations in eastern Africa, see Luke A. Patey, “A Complex Reality:

the Strategic Behaviour of Multinational Oil Corporations and the New Wars in Sudan,” DIIS Report 2006: 2,

(Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2006) and Luke A. Patey, “Understanding

Multinational Corporations in War-torn Societies: Sudan in Focus,” DIIS Brief, (Copenhagen: Danish Institute

for International Studies, April 2006).

40 Central Africa: Humanitarian presence in the LRA-affected region (October 2012), OCHA, reliefweb,

http://reliefweb.int/map/central-african-republic/central-africa-humanitarian-presence-lra-affected-region-

october-2012 (accessed 04 July 2013).

41 Mogadishu-IDP Settlements and intervening agencies 16th April 2012, OCHA, reliefweb,

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/map_2563.pdf (accessed 05 July 2013).

42 Distribution of Ethnic Groups in Southern Sudan (as of 24 Dec 2009), OCHA, reliefweb,

http://reliefweb.int/map/sudan/distribution-ethnic-groups-southern-sudan-24-dec-2009 (accessed 04 July

2013)

43 Somalia - Banadir - Info graphic: Cluster Presence - Who What Where (As at April 2012), OCHA, reliefweb,

http://reliefweb.int/map/somalia/somalia-banadir-info-graphic-cluster-presence-who-what-where-april-2012

(accessed 04 July 2013).

44 Minister of Defence Nick Hækkerup, “A New Realism – Principles for an active defense and security policy,”

(8 March 2013), http://www.fmn.dk/forsvarsministeren/talerogartikler/Documents/FM-tale-ved-CMS-

seminar-5marts2013.pdf, (accessed 16 June 2013).

26

45

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, “Danish Ambassador signs Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)

with Somaliland authorities,” (Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 November 2013),

http://kenya.um.dk/en/news/newsdisplaypage/?newsID=CAECDE02-D730-423A-BC4F-C24BA24B89BB,

(accessed 28 November 2013).

27

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