converted

Gochan vs. GochanFacts: Petitioners filed for a motion for inhibition on the grounds of partiality, pre-judgment and gross ignorance of the law regarding the judge’s acts regarding Civil Case No. CEB-21854. In the motion, the petitioners argued that the respondent judge denied their Motion to Hear Affirmative Defenses and instead proceeded to the pretrial, the admission of the exhibits without indicating the complaining party’s objections, declaring that there is an absence of possibility of a compromise despite the party’s raising its possibility, the denial for requests for postponement and the forced cross-examination of witnesses and the denial of the motion for inhibition.Issue: WON Judge Dicdican should be inhibited from hearing the Civil Case on the ground of bias and prejudice.Ruling: Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court (paragraph 1 of which Rule 3.12 of the CJC was based and later adopted by Section 5 of Canon 3 of the New Code) contemplated two kinds of inhibition. The compulsory inhibition (paragraph 1) and voluntary inhibition (paragraph 2).

Nothing in those allegations that the respondent Judge indeed acted with bias or partiality against the parties. For as long as opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings are based on the evidence presented and the conduct observed by the judge, such opinion – even if later found to be erroneous on appeal or made with grave abuse of discretion on certiorari – will not necessarily prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge.Request of Judge BatinganaFacts: Judge Batingana had requested for an extension of time (fourth and fifth) to decide Civil Case 2049 but was denied by the OCA for the first three requests for the extension of the decision of that case was not received by the office. Later, OCA found out that the same case was decided only on 16 October 2009 or more than a year later from the 5 September 2008 date where the case was due for resolution by the Respondent Judge.Issue: WON the respondent Judge violated the New Code of Judicial ConductRuling: Yes. Granting that the request of 180 days was granted, the respondent Judge would still be seven month delayed.The New Code of Judicial Conduct, particularly Section 5, Canon 6 requires judges to “perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.” The failure for the Judge to do so was in contravention with the Constitution which mandates that cases are to be decided within 90 days.Sy vs. DinopolFacts: Judge Dinopol presided over a case against Metrobank for Civil Case 1403-24 between the Sys and Metrobank. On 16 April 2004, the respondent Judge inhibited himself from further acting on the case in order to avoid being charged with partiality after ranking officials from the Philippine Judicial Academy and OCA interceded in behalf of the opposing parties.

A year later, a Misc. case related to the earlier case involving almost the same parties was filed and raffled to the same respondent Judge. Therein, he granted the petition and issued the writ of possession in 2006. However, the writ was not satisfied due to an earlier stay order of Marawi City RTC Branch 8.

Consequently, the respondents in the Misc. case filed a motion to suspend proceedings due to the issuance of the stay order, and a motion to inhibit on the grounds of partiality and bias. Judge Dinopol denied the motions and re-implemented the writ of execution.

It was also found out that the Judge asked from petitioner Victoriano Sy commodity loans in the form of

Ethics Digests Compilation 1 of 16

construction materials to be used for the construction of the judge’s house as well as cash loans made on several occasions.

Thus, Sy filed the present administrative case for gross ignorance of the law in relation to proceeding with the implementation of the writ despite the stay order and conduct unbecoming of a judge for the loans acquired.Issue: WON Judge Dinopol is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming of the judiciaryRuling: Judge Dinopol is not guilty from gross ignorance of the law. However, the same cannot be said for the other charge. Although Judge Dinopol pleaded innocence about the loans, he has still committed serious impropriety in contravention with Sections 2 and 3 of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.Angeles vs. DiyFacts: This is an administrative complaint for disbarment and dismissal from judiciary service filed by complainant Judge Angeles against respondent Judge Sempio Diy, Presiding Judge of the RTC Quezon City, which stemmed from consolidated Criminal Cases.

Judge Angeles contends that the Joint Decision in the subject criminal cases was rendered way beyond the 90-day period prescribed by the Constitution. In addition, complainant Judge Angeles raises another instance where respondent Judge Sempio-Diy is supposed to have incurred unjustifiable delay. By failing to decide/resolve the subject cases and the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration within the period mandated by law and jurisprudence, given her seasonably-filed three requests for extension of time, as well as in falsifying official documents, complainant Judge Angeles asserts that respondent Judge Sempio Diy violated the pertinent provisions of the Constitution, New Code of Judicial Conduct, Code of Judicial Ethics, Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials. Complainant urges the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to examine the numerous violations allegedly committed by the respondent and to make an assessment if, indeed, she is still worthy to wear the judicial robe or, if her continued presence on the bench would unduly tarnish the image of the judiciary.

In her Comment, respondent Judge Sempio Diy denies the material allegations in the complaint. Siempo Diy counters that she decided the subject cases in due time and within the extended period granted by the Supreme Court. She maintains that the orders resetting the promulgation of judgment were issued in good faith and in the interest of full transparency, pursuant to her request to decide the subject cases expeditiously. She claims that complainant’s charges are harsh, rash and baseless, calculated merely to harass and “destroy the reputation of a younger sister in the profession.”Issue: Whether or not Respondent Judge committed undue delay.Ruling: YES. Respondent indeed gave the defense 10 days to submit its reply to the prosecution's comment on the motion for reconsideration and thereafter, she would resolve all pending incidents on said consolidated cases. The reglementary period to resolve the motion in question began to run from Feb 8, 2009 or after the lapse of 10 days from Jan 29, 2009. Respondent, however, did not act on the matter and allowed a hiatus in the consolidated criminal cases. A judge cannot choose to prolong the period for resolving pending incidents and deciding cases beyond the period authorized by law. Let it be underscored that it is the sworn duty of judges to administer justice without undue delay. Under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Judges should act with dispatch in resolving pending incidents so as not to frustrate and delay the satisfaction of a judgment.


Alfonso vs. Alfonso - LegastoFacts: Several employees of the city government were appointed and assigned at the Office of the Clerk of Court (MTC-QC) to assist the organic staff of the judiciary. However, the executive judge, in view of a reorganization plan, returned those employees to different offices of the government saying that the court is already overstaffed. Thus, requested the mayor to re-employ the laid odd employees. Issue: WON the judge can order the return of said employees. Ruling: No. An executive Judge has no authority to cause the transfer of court employees as the jurisdiction is lodge solely upon the Supreme Court through the office of the court administration. This is so because of the need to maintain judicial independence. Moreover, a judge shall be free from inappropriate connections with the and from the executive branch. Here, the judge didn’t act independently of the Local Government Unit when she asked the mayor to re-employ the laid off employees instead of informing the Supreme Court through the OCA of the need to streamline her court of its personnel needs. Bagatsing vs. HerreraFacts: Pulido was appointed by Villegas as chief deputy sheriff and chief of division of the sheriff's office in Manila. Villegas later promoted Pulido to executive sheriff and court liason officer. When Bagatsing succeeded Villegas as mayor, admin chargers were filed against Pulido which prompted the former to suspend the Pulido. On Pulido’s application for reinstatement; the lower court asks that Pulido be reinstated and restrained the admin investigation. Now, Bagtasing questions if whether the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in its resolution and whether Pulido is an employee of the court or of the executive government.Issue: WON the judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the orderRuling: YES.Judicial independence is the reason for leaving exclusively to the courts the authority to deal with internal personnel issues, even if the court employee in question is funded by the local government. Because a reasonable person could conclude that Local Government Unit maintained some influenced over the MTC Judge, under the new code of Judicial Conduct, respondent judge’s actions created an improper connection with an executive admin body – the Local Government Unit. The reality in the Philippine political system is that judges can easily get an appointment or promotion with some assistance or support from political leaders, religious groups, military stalwarts, big companies and the affluent. The most pervasive influence comes from leaders in the legislature and those closely allied with the executive department. For instance, most members of the bench have received appointments through the grace of past and present political leaders of this country. It is natural to suppose that considerations of fealty and utang-na-loob would compel the judge to consider such factors when rendering his or her decision. However, acting upon such considerations violate this code.Arban vs. BorjaFacts: 1. Ponciano A. Arban, the then District Engineer for Camarines Sur, Ministry of Public Works & Highways, filed the instant admin. for grave misconduct against Judge Melecio B. Borja, alleging that: * Respondent fired his gun in the balcony of the apartment he is lodging in, and without any justification whatever, respondent pistol-whipped the Arban on the left side of his head, sending him sprawling to the floor and rendering him momentarily unconscious and Respondent also threatened with his said gun Arban’s companions. 2. In his Answer, Judge Borja denied the charge against him. Borja moved for the resetting of the case w/c was granted. Later, Arban filed a Motion toWithdraw the Petition, stating that the “filing of the petition was caused by a misunderstanding by the petitioner of the motives of the respondent” &


that“after the public apology by the respondent, the petitioner believes that the scandal caused on the public by the act of the respondent has been duly appeased.” 3. Despite the withdrawal of the complainant, the SC undertook presentaction, even before Engr. Arban filed the present petition considering our responsibility to discipline erring members of the bench and bar and topreserve the integrity of the judiciary.Issue: WON Borja should be penalized for his pistol whipping ArbanRuling: Yes.Judge Borja violated Sec. 3, Cannon of Judicial Ethics: "A judge's official conduct should be free from appearance of impropriety, & his personal behavior not only upon the bench & in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach." "The judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice…Thus, for the judge to return that regard, he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow. He should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law." Holding: Borja found guilty of grave misconduct, hereby ordered DISMISSED from the service, w/ forfeiture of retirement benefits & with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the gov’t or any of its agencies or instrumentalities. However, he shall be paid any back salaries or accrued leaves which are due to him as of this date Rural Bank of Barotak Nuevo vs. CartagenaFacts: Rural Bank of Barotac Nuevo, Inc. charged Judge Sergio Cartagena of Dumangas, Iloilo with dishonesty and irresponsibility for failure, despite repeated demands, to make good his promise to pay within the stipulated period, the agricultural loan (secured by a chattel mortgage for 90 piculs of sugar quedan) granted in his favor by the Bank. As a defense, the respondent judge forwarded to the Court the OR showing full payment of the loan and manifested that "the delay in settling his obligation with the Bank was not intentional but rather predicated on the resolution of the previous understanding between him and the previous manager of the Bank.Issue: Whether or not the Judge violated the CJCRuling: YES. Despite the Admin Complaint becoming moot and academic, the Judge must be admonished against a repetition of the same act for, being an incumbent member of the Judiciary he is expected to be a model of uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in all his official conduct but also in his personal actuations, including business and commercial transactions.Fernandez vs. HamoyFacts: In an administrative complaint, Judge Jaime T. Hamoy was charged with Abuse of Authority, Dereliction of Duty and Violation of Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The complainant Jose e. Fernandez is the counsel for the plaintiffs in civil cases in Zamboanga, which were both being presided by respondent Judge. Despite the lapse of more than ten years, respondent Judge failed to render judgment in the said cases. After respondent Judge was transferred to the RTC of Caloocan City, complainant learned that he brought the records of the subject cases to his new station. Thus complainant wrote a letter to the Court Administrator seeking help in the speedy disposition of his clients’ cases. The Administrator referred the letter to respondent Judge for comment or appropriate action but nothing was heard from the respondent despite repeated follow-ups. Eventually, the Court Administrator rendered a Resolution requiring respondent Judge to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for his failure to file comment; and to submit the said comment within ten days from notice.Respondent Judge finally filed an Explanation/Compliance, alleging that he simply forgot to submit his comment; that he misplaced the records the Civil Cases; that his Utility Aide in Caloocan City mixed up the records of the said cases with the records of cases assigned to the Caloocan court; that the missing case records were found only when the old records were transferred to the newly-acquired storage/filing


cabinets; that he was unable to act on the cases notwithstanding the discovery of the records because he had to attend to the many family-related cases, being then the only designated Family Court; that his docket became more congested when the other courts forwarded to his sala cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Family Court; and that he had no intention of disregarding the directives of the Court Administrator or of this CourtIssue: WON the judge is guilty of the charges filed against him.Ruling: YES. Respondent Judge cannot be absolved from liability for the inefficiency of his court personnel as he is ultimately responsible for ensuring that court personnel perform their tasks and that the parties are promptly notified of his orders and decisions.Judges are charged with the administrative responsibility of organizing and supervising his court personnel to secure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, requiring at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.

In addition, he is also guilty of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.02: A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay. Members of the judiciary have the sworn duty to administer justice without undue delay. A judge who failed to do so has to suffer the consequences of his omission. Any delay in the disposition of cases undermines the people’s faith in the judiciary.

Further it was shown that despite failure to decide cases, he still collected his salary upon a false certificate is guilty of dishonesty amounting to gross misconduct and deserves the condemnation of all right thinking men. In view of the primordial role of judges in the administration of justice, only those with irreproachable integrity and probity must be entrusted with judicial powers.Therefore due to a previous admonition of the court and the gravity of his offenses, Judge Hamoy was thus dismissed from service.Lachica vs. FlordelizaFacts: One day, Dr. Amparo Lachica, the Municipal Health Officer of Jose Abad Santos, Davao del Sur, was approached by Dina Masaglang and Norma Ruton, who were asking Dr. Lachica to sign a death certificate. Dr. Lachica refused to sign saying that the attending physician in Gen. Santos should be the one to sign. Later in the day, Dr. Lachica met the two again and the two told her that Judge Rolando Flordeliza, MTC judge, was ordering her to sign the death certificate. Dr. Lachica again refused.Later in the evening, at the Municipal Employees’ Night Party, Judge Flordeliza, who was drunk, asked Dr. Lachica to sit beside him. Judge Flordeliza then said to Dr. Lachica, in an angry manner, “Bakit hindi mo pinirmahan and death certificate?” Dr. Lachica then tried to explain but to no avail, this is when Judge Flordeliza threatened to bring an administrative complaint against Dr. Lachica.Issue: WON Judge Flordeliza should be penalizedRuling: YES . Judge Flordeliza is fined 10,000. The SC was convinced that the charge of misconduct against the respondent judge was established by substantial evidence. Dr. Lachica presented the testimony of certain witnesses confirming that Judge Flordeliza was indeed drinking that night. There was also testimony debunking Judge Flordeliza’s excuse that he could not have acted in such a manner because the mayor was sitting with them (the testimony proved that the mayor was not with them). The Court believed that Judge Flordeliza did threaten Dr. Lachica in order to coerce the latter to sign the death certificate. Also, his inebriated demeanor and incoherent behavior during the festivities, as attested to by a witness, is reprehensible in a judge. Allowing himself to get intoxicated is not the conduct expected of a judge.

Dimo Realty vs. DimaculanganFacts: Herein respondent filed with the courts a complaint for specific performance against petitioner (Dimo Realty & Development, Inc). Complaint alleges that petitioners engaged his services for geodetic survey to subdivide petitioner’s subdivision, and as such, for services rendered, petitioner would pay


respondent Php9,200 in installments and one(1) specific subdivision lot (Lot 19, Block 17 with TCT T-25975). Petitioner’s paid respondent the Php 9,200.xx, however the said specific subdivision lot title was not given by the former without any valid reasons whatsoever, even if the latter has been making verbal demands every now and then. As the trial ensued, the judge who heard this case dismissed the said complaint for improper venue. Respondent immediately filed a motion for reconsideration with a motion for INHIBITION. Trial court granted respondent’s motion for INHIBITION, hence the case was re-raffled to another branch RTC of QC. In this court, respondent’s motion for reconsideration was also granted. Trial continued with petitioner’s filing for complaints for unlawful detainer which prompted respondent to file for a TRO and a writ for preliminary injunction against the petitioner. Petitioner likewise filed a motion to lift the TRO and the injunction and also filed a motion for INHIBITION. Trial went up to the Court of appeals as well as to the Supreme Court.Issue: Whether the judges in these hearings committed grave abuse of discretion in hearing the cases which prompted the parties to file for several inhibitionsRuling: SC ruled this way. Suffice it to state that whether judges should inhibit themselves from a case rests on their own "sound discretion." Otherwise stated, inhibition partakes of voluntariness on the part of the judges themselves. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased or partial. In a catena of cases, we held that “bias and prejudice, to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved with clear and convincing evidence. Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice. These cannot be presumed, especially if weighed against the sacred obligation of judges whose oaths of office require them to administer justice without respect to person and to do equal right to the poor and the rich.Here, petitioners merely alleged the arbitrary issuance of a temporary restraining order without however showing bias or prejudice on the part of the trial judge. In fact, the Court of Appeals held that “such error of the respondent judge does not necessarily warrant his inhibition in the case.”Pimentel vs. SalongaFacts: Herein petitioner, a practicing attorney and a counsel of record for various cases pending before this respondent judge. Petitioner argues that respondent judge should inhibit himself from hearing the cases he is holding because apparently, petitioner’s misgivings stem from the fact that he is a complainant in various administrative case he himself lodged against the respondent judge. That respondent judge has committed serious misconduct, inefficiency in office, ignorant of the law as well as incompetent. Petitioner now wants that respondent judge disqualify himself from sitting in the cases he is holding and prays that these cases will be transferred to another sala.Issue: Whether respondent judge should inhibit himself from said casesRuling: No. Even under Sec 1, Rule 137 of the rules of court, a judge cannot be disqualified by a litigant or his lawyer for grounds other than those specified in the first paragraph of this rule. Better stated yet, when a judge does not inhibit himself, and he is not legally disqualified by the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, the rule remains as it has been — he has to continue with the case.This is not to say that all avenues of relief are closed to a party properly aggrieved. If a litigant is denied a fair and impartial trial, induced by the judge's bias or prejudice, we will not hesitate to order a new trial, if necessary, in the interest of justice Prejudice is not to be presumed. Especially if weighed against a judge's legal obligation under his oath to administer justice "without respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the rich. To disqualify or not to disqualify himself then, as far as respondent judge is concerned, is a matter of conscience.Therefore, the Court is persuaded to say that since respondent judge is not legally under obligation to disqualify himself, we may not, on certiorari or prohibition, prevent him from sitting, trying and


rendering judgment in the cases herein mentioned.Ty vs. Banco FilipinoFacts: This was already given in the previous batch of casesIssue:Ruling:Kaw vs. OsorioFacts: Kaw filed a complaint for violation of Rule 5.04, Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct against Judge Osorio. Kaw, during one of the trials for estafa, was approached by one of the prosecutors, who served as a messenger for the Respondent. The judge’s emissary told George Kaw that a favorable decision in all cases would cost P100,000.00, P40,000.00 of which was to be paid immediately and the balance of P60,000.00 to be handed over upon promulgation of the judgment in all cases. Issue:Ruling: Respondent judge’s conduct fell short of the standard expected of a magistrate of the law. His act of inviting complainant and his wife to his birthday party corroded public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, considering that complainant had a pending case in his sala. A judge is not only required to be impartial; he must also appear to be impartial. Fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this image. Respondent judge likewise openly transgressed Rule 5.04, Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct: a judge or any immediate member of the family shall not accept a gift, bequest, favor or loan from anyone except as may be allowed by law. Likewise, the Canons of Judicial Ethics expressly provides that a judge should not accept any present or favors from litigants or from lawyers practicing before him. Parayno vs. MenesesFacts: F: This petition for certiorari seeks to set aside the orders, dated 22 October 1993 1 and 16 November 1993, 2 of respondent Judge Iluminado Meneses of Branch 49, Regional Trial Court, of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, voluntarily inhibiting himself from hearing the election cases and denying petitioners' motion for the reconsideration thereof. The mayoralty protest involving Parayno, was originally raffled and assigned by Judge Manuel Villanueva. The councilors' protest involving the other petitioners, was assigned respondent Judge Iluminado Meneses. On 22 October 1992, a motion for the inhibition of Judge Villanueva was filed by petitioner Parayno, which the court promptly granted. The case was thereupon re-raffled to Branch 49, where the councilors' protests were then pending. The Committee on Revision in Case No. U-5346 (the mayoralty protest) terminated its work on 07 October 1993 but prior to the submission of its report, a "Motion to Use Revision Committee Report Blank Form" was filed by protestant Lorenzo Mateo (herein private respondent). In the afternoon of 21 October 1993, while the revision of ballots in Case No. U-5347 (councilors' protest) was in progress, private respondent Mateo, the Revisor for the protestants-councilors in the Revision Committee, manifested: 3 . . . I would like also to make of record that the Trial Presiding Judge of Branch 49 is the same Trial Judge of this Electoral Protest Case U-5346, Parayno versus Mateo (sic) and therefore the Protestant look at it that there seems to be a certain degree of greater sympathy of the Trial Presiding Judge to the Protestee. . . . (Verceles Transcript of Stenographic Notes, Civil Case No. U-5347, revision of Ballots on October 21, 1993, 1:45 p.m., pp. 6-7) The following day, respondent judge issued the assailed order inhibiting himself from further hearing the two cases. The motion for a reconsideration of the order was denied by the judge. Issue:Ruling: H: Petition granted. Motion for inhibition to set aside. We take note that the electoral protests here involved have remained unresolved for quite some time now. Any further delay in the disposition of


the cases, particularly election protests where public interest is heavily involved, cannot be countenanced. Martinez vs. GiorenellaFacts: F: In Criminal Case No. 21 of the Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch II, Cresencio Martinez, as principal, and Viernes Duclan and Arnold Bayongan, as accessories after the fact, were charged with the murder of one Alfredo Batoon. As the first two were not apprehended, trial proceeded with respect to the third, Arnold Bayongan. Thereafter, decision was rendered, the pertinent and dispositive portions of which are as follows —

xxx xxx xxx It is worthy to state, however, that the offense of murder was clearly established and was committed by Cresencio Martinez, from the evidence on record, there is no showing that Arnold Bayongan is an accessory after the fact. The evidence as a whole, however, tends to allude Gregorio Banawa, the then incumbent Mayor of Sallapadan to have knowledge of the perpetrator and commission of the crime but did not take any action. It is further informed that Gregorio Banawa to date is hiding the principal accused Cresencio Martinez. In view of the foregoing consideration, the Court hereby dismisses the charge against Arnold Bayongan and is therefore ordered ACQUITTED. The Provincial Fiscal is hereby directed to investigate this case further to avoid miscarriage of justice and the possibility of including Gregorio Banawa and for the prompt apprehension of the principal accused Cresencio Martinez. (pp. 10-11, rollo). xxx xxx xxx

Subsequent to the acquittal of Arnold Bayongan, Cresencio Martinez surrendered to the Philippine Constabulary and later was arraigned before Branch II of the same Court of First instance. After having pleaded "not guilty" to the charge, and before the prosecution started to present its evidence, counsel for accused Cresencio Martinez moved that the trial Judge inhibit himself from hearing the case on its merits on the grounds "(1) that the respondent had the chance to pass upon the issue and has formed an opinion as to who committed the crime of murder; (2) that it would not be fair that he would sit, hear and pass judgment; and (3) that the respondent is no longer impartial," and prayed that the case be transferred to Branch I of the same Court. Respondent denied the oral motion. Petitioner did not move for a reconsideration of the denial of the motion so the trial proceeded. When the trial was already in the rebuttal stage for the government, this Petition for Prohibition was filed. In his petition, Cresencio Martinez asks for a writ of prohibition commanding respondent Judge to desist from hearing and deciding Criminal Case No. 21 of the Court of First Instance of Abra; declaring the hearing heretofore had as a mistrial; and ordering that said criminal case be heard anew by the presiding Judge of Branch I of the said Court or any other Court within the Judicial District. On being required to comment, the Solicitor General did so, and, citing the cases of Dais vs. Torres, et al., 57 Phil. 897, 903; Luque vs. Kayanan, 29 SCRA 165; and Geotina vs. Gonzales, 41 SCRA 66, opined "that it would be in the best interest of justice and in keeping with the clear intendment and pronouncements of the Honorable Court that the case should be tried anew by another judge and that the respondent Judge should desist from further taking cognizance of the case." On the other hand, respondent Judge maintains that the trial was fair, impartial and liberal to the herein accused-petitioner as can be gleaned from the records of Criminal Case No. 21. Respondent explains that the statement that the "crime was committed by Cresencio Martinez" appearing in the decision acquitting Arnold Bayongan after a separate trial "was based merely on the prosecution evidence where petitioner was not on trial, therefore did not confront witnesses, did not submit his defense evidence and surely will not in any way affect or apply to him. The decision to be rendered shall be based upon the evidence adduced and submitted by both parties."


Issue: Two issues are presented before us — first, whether or not to order a new trial for petitioner; and second, whether or not respondent judge should be allowed to decide petitioner's case. Ruling: It cannot be denied that elementary due process requires that a case be heard by a tribunal that is impartial and disinterested. And if an accused has been the victim of an unfair and partial trial, this court will certainly not hesitate to order a new trial in the interest of justice. 1 In asking that the case be tried by another Judge, petitioner alleges in general that respondent should not be impartial as contemplated in the New Constitution. No specific resolution, order, or ruling of respondent is cited in particular as one of partiality. It should be noted that after petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty, and after respondent had denied petitioner's motion for the former to inhibit himself from trying the case, petitioner did not move for a reconsideration of the denial of the motion. Instead the trial proceeded. Petitioner took no further action towards the disqualification of respondent until the trial was already in the rebuttal stage for the government at which time the present Petition for Prohibition was filed. The only conclusion we can draw from these circumstances is that the trial was fair and impartial. We are, therefore, not inclined to order a new trial for petitioner. As to the second issue: A Judge has the duty not only to render a just and impartial decision, but also render it in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality, and also as to the judge's integrity. 2 While we grant respondent's capacity to render a just and impartial decision, his statement in the decision acquitting Arnold Bayongan to the effect that the "crime was committed by Cresencio Martinez" renders it impossible for respondent to be free from the suspicion that in deciding petitioner's case, respondent will be biased and prejudiced. We therefore hold that under these circumstances petitioner has the right to have his case decided by another Judge. Aparicio vs. AndalFacts: Pictured by Alman. Sira raw ang laptop. Issue:Ruling:Sandoval vs. CAFacts: Pictured by Alman. Sira raw ang laptop. Issue:Ruling:Carual vs. BrusolaFacts: Pictured by Alman. Sira raw ang laptop. Issue:Ruling:Dulay vs. LelinaFacts: The case stems from the letter-complaint filed by Onofre G. Dulay with the OCA dated July 11, 1998. Onofre’s charges against respondent judge can be summed up as follows:

1) Respondent judge arbitrarily cited him, his mother Victoria Gacote Dulay, and his aunt, Marita G. Rosal, for indirect contempt in a civil case no longer pending in respondent judge’s sala;

2) Corollary to the first charge, Onofre’s mother and aunt were each meted fines of P15,000.00 and imprisonment of 3 months while Onofre was meted a fine of P30,000.00 and imprisonment of 6 months;

3) In Criminal Case No. 1395 filed against Onofre for Grave Threats, respondent judge arbitrarily increased his bail from P50,000.00 to P200,000.00 and immediately issued a warrant for his arrest;

4) Respondent judge showed bias in resolving the matters submitted to him in Civil Case No. 445;5) Respondent judge ordered Onofre to give him 160 square meters of a home lot in Cabarroguis,


Quirino which respondent directed to be registered in the name of one Agnes Mariano; and6) Respondent judge prepared the pleadings filed in court by Onofre’s opponents in behalf of the

latter’s counsel, Atty. Beltejar.Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed acts of impropriety.Ruling: The Court ruled that although the investigation revealed that most of the allegations were based on misrepresentation of facts by Onofre, sufficient evidence however exists which shows that respondent judge was guilty of gross misconduct. Respondent judge failed to live up to these standards. Despite knowledge of Onofre and Mariano’s intentions in offering the business to his daughters, respondent judge allowed his daughters to accept the offer of business partnership with persons who have pending cases in his court. Respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct for which he is administratively liable. Respondent Judge Elias O. Lelina, Jr., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cabarroguis, Quirino, Branch 31, is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED from office for six (6) months without salary and other benefits. He is WARNED that the commission of the same or similar infractions in the future will merit a more severe penalty.People vs. OrtillesFacts: Marlon Ortillas was convicted of the crime of murder by Judge Florentino Alumbres of Branch 255 of Las Pinas. The accused was then only 16 years old. When accused appealed before the Supreme Court, he points out that his counsel, Atty. Jose de Leon, raised the minority of appellant and invoked the provisions of P.D. No. 603 during the initial hearing conducted but Judge Alumbres outrightly denied his request. Atty. The records further disclose that he likewise ignored the letter of Director Milda S. Alvior of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) filed with his court informing him that appellant at that time was only 16 years old and alleging that his prolonged stay in the Las Piñas Jail for one year and one month at the time, mixed with hundred criminals affected him physically, intellectually, emotionally and socially.Issue: Whether or not the Judge was remiss of his duty to ascertain the minority of the accused.Ruling: The Court ruled that indeed there is merit to the complaint of appellant Marlon Ortillas. Judge Alumbres was remiss of his duty to ascertain the minority of appellant at the onset of the proceedings. The Presiding Judge should be sanctioned for his negligence in the performance of his duties with respect to accused minor - but these particular omissions are not sufficient grounds to merit the reversal of the assailed decision.Lacurom vs. MagbanwaFacts: The instant case stemmed from a complaint filed by complainant Judge Ubaldino Lacurom, Presiding Judge of Branch 29 of the RTC in Cabanatuan City, against respondent Manuel J. Magbanua, Court Aide of the said branch. Complainant Judge Lacurom charged respondent with dishonesty on the grounds that on 6, 7 and 8 of January 1999, respondent was absent; yet he later registered his name in the attendance book as present on those dates; and although respondent would leave the office at 3:00 p.m. on Fridays, he would write in the logbook and daily time record (DTR) 5:00 p.m. as the time of his departure. Judge Lacurom further alleged that respondent had been lazy for a very long time and had reformed only recently. Finally, Judge Lacurom asserted that he had totally lost confidence in the respondent.Issue: Whether or not respondent committed acts of dishonesty.Ruling: The Court ruled that respondent is guilty of gross dishonesty and falsification of public documents and hence, It is clear to us that respondent made it appear in his DTRs that on Fridays he was present at his workstation up to 5:00 p.m., when the truth was otherwise. Complainant Judge, upon notice and knowledge of the transgressions of respondent, should have called the attention of the respondent and taken appropriate disciplinary action. Instead of doing so, he, as well as the Clerk of


Court, tolerated respondent’s dishonesty and improper conduct despite their knowledge thereof. Complainant Judge has an explicit duty, provided in Canon 3, Rule 3.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. A judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware. The respondent, Court Aide, Regional Trial Court in Cabanatuan City, is hereby DISMISSED from the service for gross dishonesty and falsification of official documents, with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the Government service, including government-owned and controlled corporations.OCA vs. GinezFacts: Facts: An administrative case against Judge Gines with other officers of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union. Respondent judge is the assigned judge for Branch 26 of the said court. It was alleged that, in conspiracy with his co-accused, the respondent judge machinated the raffling of cases to the multiple branches of the said trial court. The respondents did not submit some of the cases under the RTC’s jurisdiction for mandatory raffling and instead, assigned the same to Branch 26 for the respondent judge. A picture of impropriety was also shown in some of the cases decided by the respondent judge, such as Special Proceeding No. 1965 which includes an issue for guardianship, and Special Proceeding No. 1967 which involves a suit for confirmation of a de facto adoption. In the former case, irregularities in the evidence used as basis of the respondent’s decision shows that the notices of proceedings have not been sent to the proper parties; hence, jurisdiction has never been acquired by the court and formulating a decision is grave error. In the latter case, the respondent judge made a grave error when he decided for adoption without sending the proper notice to the adoptee nor calling her to give testimony before the court given that she is already of age. Also, this kind of case is beyong the procedures of legal adoption. The same procedures cannot be applied in such unique cases. Because of these findings, the OCA recommended dismissal of the respondent judge. Issue: WON the Judge should be punishedRuling: The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of Judge Gines. A judge is a visual representation of justice. He is called to remain independent, impartial and with propriety in his every deed, in or out of the courtroom, in order to maintain the good name of the judiciary. The acts of respondent in conspiring with other court officials to contravene the rules of mandatory raffling of cases for his personal interest mark serious lack of the necessary judicial integrity. Also, the fact of not giving notice to grave irregularities in court proceedings and evidential support in the deciding the aforementioned cases are signs of partiality in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct; hence, the dismissal of respondent judge. Espiritu vs. JavellanosFacts: Facts: Espiritu charged an administrative case against respondent Judge Jovellanos for ignorance of law, grave abuse of authority and gross partiality in the preliminary investigation of his case against the Dumlaos. Espiritu alleges that Judge Jovellanos gravely erred in setting a bail for the Dumlaos even if they are not under custody in an amount grossly inadequate for the case, even reducing the same in violation of the Rules of Court. The granting of bail and the fulfillment of the same are also done irregularly in the absence of hearing and notice to both parties. Espiritu also alleges partiality to the judge in having Dumlao in his chambers without the presence of the other party.Issue: WON the Respondent Judge should be disciplinedRuling: Espiritu charged an administrative case against respondent Judge Jovellanos for ignorance of law, grave abuse of authority and gross partiality in the preliminary investigation of his case against the Dumlaos. Espiritu alleges that Judge Jovellanos gravely erred in setting a bail for the Dumlaos even if they are not under custody in an amount grossly inadequate for the case, even reducing the same in violation of the Rules of Court. The granting of bail and the fulfillment of the same are also done irregularly in the absence of hearing and notice to both parties. Espiritu also alleges partiality to the


judge in having Dumlao in his chambers without the presence of the other party,

Almonte vs. BienFacts: yung bien case, andun na sa 19. meron digest kay che so di ko na ginawa hihi salamat – Var.Issue:Ruling:Tan vs. EstoconongFacts: Dr. Tan filed 3 complaints, a complainant on 4 different Criminal Case for estafa, against respondent judge. The criminal cases were lodged before the sala of the respondent judge. In sum, respondent is being charged by complainant with the following: (1) undue delay in rendering judgments in Crim. Cases Nos. L-1355, H-121, H-124 and H-211; (2) misdeclaration of monthly reports; (3) gross ignorance of the law and rendering an unjust judgment; and (4) manifest partiality and bad faith under R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3(e).

Respondent filed his Comment, to both complaints explaining that: complainant filed the present cases only to harass him and to stop him from further hearing complainant’s other criminal cases pending before his court; there is no delay in the rendition of his decisions since he just wanted the three criminal cases involving the same private complainant to be promulgated simultaneously; there are also no misdeclarations as the audit team came on October 2002 and found nothing wrong in his sala; and there was no bias or partiality in the orders that he issued.Issue: Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of the allegations declared by Petitioner.Ruling: Undue delay. The Code of Judicial Conduct also directs judges to dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. This is in view of the right of all persons to the speedy disposition of their cases. It was found that Respondent judge failed to render decisions within the 90-day reglementary period.

The Court usually allows reasonable extensions of time provided that the judge asks for an extension and such request is generally granted. But respondent did not ask for any extension in these cases. Having failed to decide a case within the required period, without any order of extension granted by this Court, respondent is liable for gross inefficiency that merits administrative sanction.

Misdeclaration of monthly reports. As found by the OCA, the cases subject of the present administrative complaints were not reflected in the required monthly reports particularly under the list of cases submitted for decision. Erroneous statistical accomplishment of the monthly report is equivalent to the submission of inaccurate report making the same a ground for disciplinary action. Proper and efficient court management is the responsibility of the judge.

Gross ignorance of the law and rendering unjust judgments. Complainant claims that respondent is guilty of ignorance of the law when he denied the manifestation of the prosecution that it be allowed to present rebuttal evidence. Respondent’s reason for the denial is that there were no issues and no new matters that were raised by the defense. There exists no competent evidence that respondent in disposing of the four criminal cases has been moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other motive.

Violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019. The complainant failed to demonstrate partiality on the part of respondent in the subject criminal cases. The fact that accused are acquitted does not necessarily indicate partiality. The Court cannot presume partiality based on the circumstances alleged in the


complaints.Duduaco vs. LaquindanumFacts: Complainant Mercedes G. Duduaco charged respondent Judge Lily Lydia A. Laquindanum with grave misconduct, abuse of judicial office and/or gross ignorance of the law.

Complainant alleged that respondent brought her vehicle to the Toyota Service Center for repairs and replacement of parts that were damaged due to a vehicular mishap. In the course of the repairs, Respondent allegedly refused to pay insisting that the same will be paid by the insurance company. She then asked to speak with the manager, herein complainant, but the latter was in a meeting. Upon being told that complainant was in a meeting, respondent furiously replied that she should be given preferential treatment over said meeting.

At this point, respondent asked for a demand letter and upon presentation thereof, she paid the amount stated therein under protest. Saragoza, the Administrator, required respondent to sign the Release of Claim with Subrogation but she again refused. She allegedly became enraged and said that as a judge, she knew better than to sign a blank form. In her Comment, respondent denied that she threw her weight around and abused her judicial authority. Issue: Whether or not the allegations proved that the Judge is guilty of the complaints filed against her. Ruling: The Investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, insufficiency of evidence and reasonable doubt. He observed that respondent’s refusal to pay the deductible franchise was not intended to violate the law. No fault can be attributed on respondent for refusing to sign a blank form.

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but were motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty and corruption. On the other hand, misconduct is any unlawful conduct that It generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.

Respondent’s refusal to pay the deductible franchise was justified. She was only exercising her legal right. Had respondent signed the blank form, she would be deemed to have waived her earlier protest and would have lost the right to claim for refund.

We agree with OCA’s recommendation that complainant be sanctioned for filing this unfounded complaint. Indeed, no person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate. This right, however, must be exercised in good faith. This Court could not be the instrument that would destroy the reputation of any member of the bench, by pronouncing guilt on mere speculation. Briones vs. Ante, Jr.Facts: Complainant, Jocelyn T. Briones, alleged that she was instructed by clerk of Court to docket the order archiving a particular case. Not finding the docket book in its place, complainant and saw it in the possession of Court Interpreter who was in the courtroom. Complainant asked for and got the docket book and went back to the staff room and placed the docket book on top of a filing cabinet but it fell on the floor, causing a loud sound. Respondent judge appeared and shouted at her “Why did you throw the docket book?” Respondent also added, “You get out of here, punyeta, we don’t need you.” Worse, respondent got a monobloc chair and threw it at complainant, hitting her on the forehead and right arm.

Another complainant was filed against respondent judge, this time for sexual harassment.


Respondent judge denied the allegations and asserted that these two complaints against him were purely for harassment purposes as complainant knew that he was about to file a complaint against her for falsifying her Daily Time Record.

Complaints were consolidated and assigned to Executive Judge Alipio V. Flores of the Regional Trial Court for investigation, report, and recommendation. Executive Judge Flores’s Report absolved respondent from the charge of sexual harassment, finding that the remarks allegedly uttered by respondent - the basis of the complaint - was actually made as a joke. However, with regard to the charges of grave misconduct, acts unbecoming of a judge, and abuse of authority.Issue: Whether or not respondent judge be suspended for the complaints alleged against him.Ruling: The Court has evaluated the record of this case and come to the conclusion that respondent is indeed guilty of grave misconduct, acts unbecoming of a judge and abuse of authority. The Investigating Judge himself stated that the testimony of complainant and her witnesses were categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank, thereby, the evidence positively shows that respondent judge shouted invectives and threw a chair at the complainant, as a result of which, complainant, as proven by a medical certificate, sustained wrist and other injuries. Clearly, this behavior of respondent judge cannot be sanctioned.

Respondent’s act, coupled with his being a public official, holding a position in the judiciary and specifically entrusted with the sacred duty of administering justice, violates Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which mandate, respectively, that “a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities,” and that “a judge’s official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of official duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.” These most exacting standards of decorum are expected of magistrates if only to promote public confidence in the judiciary.

Judge Francisco Ante, Jr. is hereby found guilty of grave misconduct.Pantaleon vs. GudezFacts: In this case, respondent Judge is charged with Gross Inefficiency, Neglect and Delay in Elevating the Records of Civil Case No. 88-2187, to which the complainant was the plaintiff’s counsel. After receiving an adverse decision, complainant filed a Notice of Appeal within the reglementary period and consequently, respondent Judge issued an order for the transmittal of the records of the case to the appellate court. However, despite constant follow-up by counsel, three years have passed and the records of the case have not been transmitted.

In his Answer, judge contends that the court stenographer misplaced the transcript of the testimony of one of the witnesses, hence the record could not be transmitted to the Court of Appeals. He further averred that complainant should have invited his attention by filing the proper motion or by writing a personal letter informing him of the non-transmittal of the records within three months from the date of his order of transmittal. Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge is liable or guilty for gross inefficiency.Ruling: YES. A judge cannot hide behind the incompetence of his subordinates. He should be the master of his own domain and take responsibility for the mistakes of his subjects.

The non-transmission of the records by reason of inefficiency of the staff cannot exonerate respondent judge from administrative liability. As administrative officer of the court, a judge is expected to keep a watchful eye on the level of performance and conduct of the court personnel under his immediate supervision who are primarily employed to aid in the administration of justice as required by


Canon 3, Rule 3.09 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Citing another case: “his responsibilities include being an effective manager of the court and its

personnel. He is presumed to be cognizant of his responsibilities as a worthy minister of the law. At the very least, he is expected to keep abreast with his docket.” Certainly, a delay of three years in the transmission of court records to the appellate court, where only a period of 30 days is required, is inexcusable.Beso vs. DagunanFacts: Respondent Juan Daguman, MCTC Judge of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan_Pagsanjan, Samar, solemnized the marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso to Bernardito Yman, on August 28, 1987, at the Judge’s residence in Calbayog City, Samar, or outside his jurisdiction, because complainant was to leave for abroad the same day as she was an OFW, among other reasons. After the wedding, Yman abandoned Beso for no clear reason. She then went to check the marriage contract with the Local Civil Registrar of Calbayog, from which she learned that said marriage was not registered. Responding to Beso’s letter about the matter, Daguman told her that all copies of the marriage contract were taken by Yman, and none was retained by the judge. Issue: (1) Whether or not respondent Judge is liable for solemnizing the marriage outside of his court’s jurisdiction;(2) Whether or not respondent Judge is liable for negligently not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage before the office of the Local Civil Registry. Ruling: (1)YES. The authority of a judge to solemnize marriage is only limited to those municipalities under his jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog City is no longer within his area of jurisdiction. Moreover, a marriage can be held outside the judge’s chambers or courtroom only: (1) at the point of death; (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29; or (3) upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. None of these instances was present in this case.

(2) YES. As solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when he failed to register the marriage of complainant to Bernardito Yman. Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Code which provides:

“It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificates not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. xxx”

Lastly, a judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the cases and official documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events. The records show that the loss was occasioned by carelessness on respondent Judge’s part. It is, incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system in his court because he is after all the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions.


converted

Documents