Controlled FreedomCognitive Economy versus Hierarchical Organisation

in Jazz Improvisation

__________________________

Artur C. Jaschke

i

Controlled Freedom

Cognitive Economy versus Hierarchical Organization in Jazz

improvisation

Artur C. Jaschke No.: 6268013

Amsterdam, 2011

Supervision: Dr. Wim van der Meer (Universiteit van Amsterdam) Prof. Dr. Eric Scherder (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

A dissertation submitted to the Universiteit van Amsterdam in accordance with the

requirements of the Degree of Master of Arts in the Faculty of Humanities

ii

ABSBRACT

This study demonstrates that one cannot speak of freedom in jazz improvisation.

Analyzing music as a stimulus and thus improvisation with all its different

characteristics in a cognitive and neurological framework, one cannot view

improvisation as ultimately free. Nonetheless, it is generally believed that

improvisation is the most ultimate form of freedom in music.

This paper however, will show through the application of cognitive economy,

hierarchical organization and the analysis of neurological imaging data, that

improvisation is based on pre-learned parameters, which define the way a

musician performs.

Combining these scientific findings with a philosophical, musicological and

cultural framework, allows me to create the hypothesis of controlled freedom.

The interdisciplinary observations, theories and suggestions elaborated in this

dissertation are based on extensive literature and experiment reviews,

conducted interviews and my own experience as a jazz musician.

Throughout the paper I argue that there is no freedom in improvisation, only the

freedom to choose freedom. Improvisation always works within a framework and

therefore is the improviser merely able to negotiate the boundaries in which to

operate.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am indebted to all researches who have paved the way to make this research possible.

At the Universiteit van Amsterdam, I would like to thank Prof. Rokus de Groot for his positive attitude both in his teaching and encouragement to follow this

research. I regard myself as extremely lucky to have had Dr. Wim van der Meer as personal advisor. His devotion, support, encouragement and inspiration have

had an immense influence on me and my work.

At the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, my utmost special thanks go to Prof. Erik Scherder. Without sharing his passion, devotion, inspiration and support, this work would

have not been possible. Had he not taken upon the effort to co-supervise this research, I would have not written this thesis.

I would like to thank my parents, Danuta and Marek (to whom I dedicate this dissertation), my sister Agnieszka and her husband Ronny and Dina for their

constant support and believe, even though from far away. Special thanks go to my niece Sophie, who has always been a shining light

through the course of this work. Further I would like to thank Mirjam and Rene Rauch, for their believe in this

research. Finally, my very special thanks go to Elte Rauch, whose love and support has

carried me through the most difficult moments while writing this paper.

Nevertheless, the content of this piece of work is my sole responsibility.

iv

DECLARATION

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the

Regulations of the Universiteit van Amsterdam. The work is original except

where indicated by special references in the text and no part of the text has

been submitted for any other degree.

Any views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and in no way

represent those of the Universiteit van Amsterdam.

The dissertation has not been presented to any other University for examination

either in the Netherlands or abroad.

Signed:____________________ Date:____________________

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title page

i

Abstract

ii

Acknowledgement

iii

Declaration

iv

Table of contents

v

List of abbreviations

vii

1. Introduction

1

2. Methods and Methodologies

5

3. Music in the cognitive context

7

3.1 Introduction

3.2 The terminology of music as stimulus

3.2.1 Neurological comprehension of music processing

10

4. Improvisation

16

4.1 Introduction

4.2 The Hindustani and Western educational model of improvisation

4.3 Different characteristics of musical improvisation

19

4.4 Neural circuitry of improvisation

23

5. Cognitive Economy

25

5.1 Introduction

5.2 Cognitive economy until now

5.3The effortful nature of skill learning

28

5.4 Episodic auditory memory in the event of improvisation

30

5.5 The role of working memory

33

vi

6. Hierarchical organization

36

6.1 Introduction

6.2 First steps in understanding hierarchical organization

6.3 Hierarchies of stability in music

38

6.4 Hierarchical organization and the sensory register

40

7. The freedom to choose freedom

42

7.1 Introduction

7.2 A short introduction to the philosophy of free will

43

7.2.1 The neurology and cognition of improvisation versus free will

44

7.3 Tonality versus atonality in improvisation

47

7.4 The negotiation of freedom in the jazz improvisation idiom

49

8. Conclusion

52

9. Bibliography

56

10. Appendices

a-c

vii

LIST OF ABREVIATIONS

CE cognitive economy

DLPFC dorsolateral preforntal cortex

EAM episodic auditory memory

EEG Electroencephalography

fMRI functional magnetic resonance imaging

GTTM generative theory of tonal music

HO hierarchical organization

MCM motor control memory

PET positron emission tomography

PFC prefrontal cortex

PMC premotor cortex

1

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction and Motivation of the study

Improvisation has its roots in the Latin term

improvisus, which means „unforeseen‟, and is meant to

be the production of music without the aid of

manuscript sketches or memory

(Harvard Dictionary of Music, 2003).

But is improvisation really creatio ex nihilo

– the creation out of nothing?

Improvisation seems to be one of the most researched, but

simultaneously the most incomprehensible phenomenon in music.

To my surprise, however not unexpected, I came across a notion of

controlled freedom in a publication about freedom and limits of jazz

improvisation, by Aart van Bergen (Journal of the Indian Musicological

Society, 2007). As a musician and musicologist, he draws alternative

conclusions about the freedom and limitations in jazz, namely the

musicians‟ sensitivity to “each others‟ interpretation of the framework

and therefore the creation of something new” (van Bergen, 2007: 42).

Nonetheless, I will propose an extension to this conclusion,

incorporating the neurological and cognitive side, to strengthen the

hypothesis of this paper of improvisation not being a form of free

musical expression.

The cognitive approach therefore, questions the creation out of

nothing; the creation of something new.

It is the combination of underlying neurological, cognitive and

musicological aspects in improvisation, which serve as a motivation for

this research.

Even though this topic as such, has not been researched, I undertook

an extensive literature review for this paper, which will attempt to re-

2

visit and re-define the terminology and the involved processes of

improvisation.

It is not only a question of (re-) production of a musical event, but the

ability of creating something out of thin air in the required situation.

Although this seems as improvisation being an ever evolving process

(Hamilton, 2000), this process is based on pre-learned parameters and

thus not the ceatio ex nihilo (Benson, 2006).

But what is improvisation and how can it be analysed? To answer these

questions, I will attempt to give a glimpse of the term music, which

through centuries remained unresolved throughout different domains

of musical research. Music seems to be more than just a great human

invention. It enhances our lives, evokes emotions, has the ability to

enrich our well-being or allows us to visit different states of our

emotional being (Levitin, 2006). However, I will only elaborate on

different views of what music can be, without trying to solve the

meaning of music. The different comprehensions of music shall serve

as a starting point to apply them to human cognition. The

understanding of how an auditory signal „travels‟ and is perceived in

the brain will give a basic framework in which the discussion of

improvisation will take place.

With a basic definition of music and an analysis of different forms of

improvisation, in an educational as well as through different

characteristics of improvisation (Benson, 2006), I will apply two

concepts related mostly to music cognition and memory (Berkowitz,

2010; Eyseneck and Keane, 2005, Murphy, 2002 and Lerdahl and

Jackendoff, 1983), namely cognitive economy and hierarchical

organization.

These concepts are two prime elements in the event of improvisational

performance (Engel et al., 2011 and Berkowitz, 2010); how and why

3

does a performer choose particular notes during improvisation? These

questions will be discussed in relation to cerebral activity during the

event of improvisation. Different parts of the brain are active while

improvising. It is a global cerebral event, which originates in listening,

processing and reproducing, of musical material „on the spot‟ (Ball,

2010). The analysis of these active cerebral areas during

improvisation, will further contribute to the understanding and acting

of cognitive economy (Murphy, 2002) and hierarchical organization

(Lerdahl and Jackendoff, 1983).

Cognitive economy, is understood as information (patterns, notes,

rhythms, the general comprehension of music), which is „stored‟ in our

memory ready to be accessed in real-time (Berkowitz, 2010). It

decreases the amount of information we need to learn, perceive,

remember and recognize during a perceptual event (Eysenck and

Keane, 2005). This perceptual support is originating in the

hippocampus, which is associated amongst other cerebral areas as the

main memory centre in the brain. Therefore allowing pre-learned

responses to newly perceived material, like for example during working

memory tasks (Murphy, 2002).

However, one can see cognitive economy as a subordinate of

hierarchical organization, thus only playing a minor role in the

perceptual process of musical information.

Yet, it is difficult to say, if hierarchical organization can take place at

all, without a memory (i.e. cognitive economy) to base it upon.

This essay will elaborate on the concept of cognitive economy

(developing this model) and apply hierarchical organization as a trigger

of pre-learned cognitive information. Hierarchical organization assists

cognitive economy in finding the best suitable representation in the

improvisational moment.

4

Consequently, one has to regard more than just the plain cognitive

influences in improvisation.

Through reviewing different teaching methods of improvisation and the

evidence of memory being a key aspect of musical performance, the

question of „freedom‟ during improvisation has to be asked.

Improvisation is generally regarded by musicians and listeners, as the

ultimate form of „free‟ expression in a musical moment (Bailey, 1992).

However, it is based on pre-learned motives and phrases; to learn how

to improvise, one has to copy the great masters‟ improvisations and

learn their musical expressions first (Vosloo, 2010). Although it seems

credible to copy the great masters to then develop the own „musical

voice‟, as will be further discussed in chapter four, I argue that one

cannot speak of ultimate „freedom‟ within the context of improvisation.

By transcribing the masters‟ soli, one incorporates this knowledge as

cognitive economy, „ready to be used‟, therefore operating in a context

of previously learned conventions and practices.

This essay will elucidate the „freedom‟ to choose freedom within a

given form. This controlled freedom will be discussed from a

neurological, cognitive, cultural, musicological and philosophical view

in the case of jazz improvisation.

5

CHAPTER TWO

Methodologies and research methods

Improvisation has been researched in many different ways throughout

the years. Nonetheless, has the discussion of combining systematic,

historical and cognitive musicology been one of the key questions in

cross-domain music research (Krumhansl, 1995; Louhivuori, 1997 and

Leman and Schneider, 1997).

Coming across a vast amount of literature, discussing philosophical,

cultural, cognitive, neurological and musicological aspects, it is very

difficult to march on with the hypothesis of this thesis under one

methodological banner (Krumhansl, 1995).

The timeframe given and the lack of funding to conduct own neuro-

cognitive empirical studies, I have to rely on the analysis and

interpretation of existing experiments.

Nonetheless, I will propose extensions to existing models, which will

contribute to the discourse of this research.

Through my approach of incorporating self-conducted interviews with

musicians from different cultural backgrounds, and the analysis of

literature and experiments, I am attempting to connect different views

and findings. This interdisciplinary connection serves as the foundation

for the understanding of this paper.

Within the literature reviews I have conducted, there has been a

missing interdisciplinary comprehension, which was advocated by

Krumhansl (1995) amongst others in the field of systematic and

cognitive musicology.

For example, anthropologists regarded the cultural backgrounds, which

appear to serve as one candidate in the understanding of

improvisation, whereas fields like cognitive and neuro-sciences do not

seem to regard these influences as primary to the results of the

6

research. One cannot view brain functions while improvising, without

taking into account the understanding of the socio-cultural

backgrounds in which the musician learned to improvise or the

parameters of generally acquiring improvisational methods. Thus

speaking of freedom within improvisation has to be analysed out of

two approaches, namely the ontological and the epistemological1.

The hypothesis of controlled freedom in jazz improvisation, is clearly

posing on the understanding of freedom as a whole. The discussion

about freedom has fuelled heated debates over centuries and it is not

my intension to solve this issue in this paper. It is more a question of

the ontological understanding of freedom within improvisation, hence

the question, if freedom can at all exist in this context.

Leading up to the discussion about freedom in improvisation, it is

important to review improvisation in an epistemological context. It is

crucial within interdisciplinary practises to analyse how knowledge is

acquired and what this knowledge consists of and entails (see chapter

seven).

At this juncture one has to note qualitative and quantitative research

methods in the field of improvisation, which I consult in this paper.

Addressing improvisation and its analysis I draw back on the review of

the wide range of literature, which discusses this issue out of the

above mentioned aspects. This literature incorporated a variety of

musicians‟ testimonies, which appear to be one of the main

approaches in understanding improvisation within the qualitative

research domain. The combination of investigating these testimonies,

gives insight into the epistemological understanding of educational

methods of improvisation and more so the parameters of improvisation

in a performing context.

1 Ontological assumptions concern the very nature of the social world investigated. It poses the

question of being, existence or reality out of a philosophical view. Epistemological assumptions refer to the “grounds of knowledge”, i.e. what is knowledge, how do we acquire knowledge and how do we know what we know (Burrell & Morgan, 1979).

7

The re-evaluation of psychological and neurological experiments,

further contributes to the key question of freedom in improvisation. By

reviewing this quantitative data, obtained through functional Magnetic

Resonance Imaging, Electroencephalography and Positron Emission

Tomography scans, as well as music psychological experiments, the

hypothesis proposed in this paper is supported with empirical

evidence.

Due to the scope of this paper, it is impossible to analyse all possible

methodologies, which can be applied in this field. However it is my

intension to continue the interdisciplinary research approach within the

field of improvisation. This appears to me as a fruitful ground for

research on any topic related to the appreciation of music generally.

The following chapters will apply the above mentioned research

methods and methodologies from an interdisciplinary point of view, to

outline the complexity of controlled freedom in jazz improvisation.

8

CHAPTER THREE

Improvisation in the cognitive context

3.1 Introduction

What is improvisation and what are the underlying cognitive functions

that allow a performer to create a new „master piece‟ by midnight,

every night (Burns, 2000)? Improvisation holds different influencing

factors, e.g. cultural and the ability to master an instrument and the

necessary theory (Monson, 1996). However, before one can elaborate

on these different aspects of improvisation, it is important to review

different definitions of music and its stimulating factor. On that

account, a basic neurological comprehension of music processing will

support the cerebral process involved during improvisation.

3.2 The terminology of music as stimulus

Different theories were created and contributed to an understanding of

music. However there is still no ultimate answer to what music really is

and therefore there are different uses for its meanings.

For example, somebody in the orchestra is asking for the „music‟,

which here would mean the score or instrumental part; or people are

proud of their „music‟ collection, which refers to the actual quantity of

their CD‟s, MP3‟s etc. Music can also be seen as an agent of social

interaction and/or identification with a certain group, and so can

improvisation be seen as the constant dialogue with other musicians or

the composers‟ notation.

Babbitt (1965: 79) proposed a view of psychological music

representation, derived from the acoustic (or physical), the auditory

(or perceived) or the graphemic (or notated) domain. None of these

however, describes music in total.

9

A complex stimulus like music consists of different layers (Ball, 2010).

In the physical sense (and the one mostly applicable for this paper), it

consists of waves which are the key factor in understanding

frequencies. Here music is composed of different dimensions and

therefore frequencies (MacDonald and Henson, 1977) Thus one can

speak of music as organised sound. This comprehension can go as far

as micro tonality2, which can arguably have significant influence on the

perception of timbre and therefore the overall perception of music3 and

musicality in general (Krumhansl, 1979).

Although this approach is only one level of understanding music and is

in no sense complete, it shall serve as the initial argument for

cognitive comprehension. It is the ability to analyse musical data in a

neurological framework, which supports this view of music.

In this approach the aspect of tonality or atonality does not apply and

therefore classifies everything (incorporating „on the spot free‟

improvisation) that has been created with „sonic waves‟ (here in

musical terms: rhythm, pitch, melody, timbre, etc.) as a

representation of music.

Henceforth the concept of music as organised sound and the scientific

approach of music as a combination of waves and frequencies will be

used and therefore enable its application in a neurological sense.

2 Micro tonality is seen as the underlying physical concept, of which individual tones consist of.

3 The musical Thalamus, research proposal. There is still a lack of literature and research on the

effect of micro tonality and its’ perception. It is likely that micro tones, which are only perceived passively, could give a deeper insight into how music is perceived. Through the passive perception of micro tones, the pathways of the thalamus and its effect on our neuro-circuitry, a key question of musicality could be answered.

10

3.2.1 Neurological comprehension of music processing

The way auditory sound is processed in the brain has fuelled heated

debates for over more than twenty years. Patel (2009) and Peretz

(2009), have both created two different hypotheses, which attempt to

explain this issue. Patel posed the recourse sharing hypothesis, in

which he argues that every perceived auditory information (e.g.

language or music), shares similar to the same neural bases (Patel,

2009).

He further argues that through these shared components music and

language must have a common origin in their evolution. Peretz on the

other hand, poses the modularity hypothesis and argues that auditory

information must have different neural foundations, therefore being

processed in different parts of the brain (Peretz, 2009). Both of these

hypotheses are based on case-studies around the cerebral processing

of language and music. Key words are aphasia and amusia developed

after major cerebral strokes. At this point, I will not discuss aphasia

and amusia further due to their secondary importance to this paper

(see Patel, 2009 and Peretz, 2009 for clinical experiments and results).

For the soundness of cognitive processes in improvisation and

further how music is perceived and processed, it is important to re-

view both these hypotheses. Through my experience as a jazz

musician, I understand that one has to first listen and process the

music around oneself, before being able to musically react on it (read:

improvise).

Analysing the presented theories by Peretz (2009) and Patel (2009), I

would like to propose an extension to these, based on their conducted

case studies. Regarding both, modularity and resource sharing, which

in themselves are valid theories, I want to suggest a combination of

both. Although I am aware of the missing empirical evidence for the

synthesis of both these theories, my suggested combination is to be

11

regarded as an approach to explore the missing link in music

processing and perception. I am supporting this approach with existing

literature, discussing the problematic of the missing fragment in music

processing and perception (Ball, 2010; Rose, 2010; Peretz, 2009;

Patel, 2009; Trepel, 2008; Sherman and Guillery, 2006; Fletcher et al.,

1992 and Cowan, 1988). Therefore in my view, are Peretz‟s and

Patel‟s hypotheses interlinked and can be divided into two stages,

namely stage 1) resource sharing and stage 2) modularity in the event

of sound perception and processing (see Figure I). Here the thalamus4

serves as crucial link between both theories. The thalamus has through

the centuries been regarded as a sole relay station of incoming

information (Kandel et al., 1993). Recent research however, suggests

that the thalamus is more than just a relay station and thus

contributes to the perception and processing of incoming information

(Barraud and Berthat, 2009 and Sherman and Guillery, 2006).

Significant evidence on this last point is currently not

available, possibly because it has not been looked for in

the past.

(Sherman and Guillery, 2006: 363)

Nonetheless, in stage 1 an auditory signal (i.e language or music) is

perceived by the auris interna, sent via the thalamus to the auditory

cortex and then back to the thalamus. During this stage the brain is

sharing resources, in generally perceiving the signal. Here it perceives

the signal as auditory without interpreting the signal as either music,

language or any other sound. After the signal reached the thalamus for

further processing, the modularity hypothesis (stage 2) comes into

place to finally process the signal in different hemispheres for either

language or music. Regarding both hypotheses as inter-dependent

4 See appendix page a, Figure II, main functions of the thalamus include relay sensation, spatial

sense and motor signal to the cortex, together with the regulation of consciousness, sleep and alertness.

12

rather than two individual approaches, one can now regard the specific

functions during music perception and processing.

Figure I: Extension of the modularity (Peretz, 2009) and resource sharing (Patel, 2009) hypothesis in the event of processing auditory information

When sound (here: music) is sent to the ear, the cochlea (or auris

interna) sends this information through the thalamus which is part of

the brain stem, to the primary auditory cortex. The cochlea is equipped

with different sensory receptors, or „hair cells‟, which vibrate

accordingly to different frequencies. These hair cells react to auditory

information and generate fluid waves in the cochlea through the

vibrations of the conductive apparatus (Kandel et al., 1991). To

translate these vibrations into neural signals, the cochlea identifies the

pressure of the fluid waves of each individual hair cell. Each hair cell is

responsible for identifying one frequency. These stimuli are achieved

13

through mechanical and electrical response. But how is the electrical

response achieved? While using pressure and therefore movement in

the cochlea (mechanical stimulus), it further...

[...] increases and decreases the amplitude of the

spontaneous oscillation of electrical currents, namely and [positive Calcium and Cilium ions].

(Kandel et al, 1991: 488)

This translation of mechanical into electrical responses is sent to the

thalamus, which already serves as an initial sound processor (Rose,

2010). Neuronal axons send this information to the relevant parts of

the brain for processing. However, it is not known yet how auditory

pathways in the thalamus are precisely linked with the cortex and

therefore contribute to the perception and processing of auditory

information (Ball, 2010; Trepel, 2008 and Sherman and Guillery,

2006). Once the auditory cortex has identified the signal as being a set

of organised frequencies (with layers specialised in individual

frequency perception5) it is sent back via the thalamus, to different

hemispheres of the brain.

Music listening and performing is a global cerebral process activating

different parts, like for example the Heschl‟s gyrus in the temporal

lobe, dealing with pitch perception (pitch intervals and melody), the

planum temporale, dealing with timbre and spatial location of sound

and the anterior superior temporal gyrus which identifies streams of

sound (Levitin, 2006).

The processing stage after having identified the signal in the auditory

cortex activates the „primitive‟ sub cortical brain, identifying this signal

as auditory information (see Figure IV). The cerebellum and basal

ganglia proceed with the identification of the timing circuits to pick the

rhythm. The thalamus, in communication with the amygdalae, is

checking the information for danger signals, hence evoking an

5 See appendix page a, Figure III

14

emotional response in the amygdalae6 (MacDonald Critchley and

Henson, 1977). The hippocampus starts to compare the new signal

with previously memorised information (believed to be the starting

point of cognitive economy) and is than sent to the prefrontal cortex7,

where a series of anticipations and expectations of the music are

triggered (Levitin, 2006). Additionally the Broca‟s area, which is mainly

associated with the processing of language, serves as a further

interpreter and finally the signal is sent to the motor cortex, resulting

in a motor response, i.e. foot tapping, dancing or the application to the

instrument (Ball, 2010).

Figure IV: Music processing; description of step 5 in preceding Figure I.

6 This process however, is still an enigma to scientists. One knows that the emotional response is

triggered in the amygdale, being the emotional centre of the brain, however there are more aspects influencing the emotional choice. 7 Is mainly considered to be active during “decision making” processes and individual expression.

15

All of this information processing is happening instantly as soon as

musical information is sent to our ears and moreover consolidates the

idea of musical perception as global cerebral phenomenon. However, it

is believed that there are more neurological functions involved other

than the above mentioned (Ball, 2010; Rose, 2010 and Levitin, 2006).

Here again, ongoing research will help deciphering the enigma of

music perception and will give a deeper insight into the development of

our neurology and cognition.

16

CHAPTER FOUR

Improvisation

4.1 Introduction

Having created a comprehension of music and its neurological circuitry,

one can now branch off to improvisation. This discussion is based on

the above mentioned fundamental concepts with its extensions on the

cognitive processes.

Improvisation consists of different aspects and appears in

different forms. Influential aspects of improvisation are varying

educational concepts based on cultural as well as different

improvisational characteristics (Benson, 2006).

At this stage I will give a brief overview of two different educational

methods, which will show how an improvisational proficiency is

acquired before outlining the different characteristics of improvisation.

4.2 The educational model of Hindustani and Jazz improvisation

Every musical culture holds a tradition of improvisation; it reaches as

far as early European baroque or Spanish flamenco music (Bailey,

1992). Here however, I will review two educational models, which hold

improvisation as an important aspect in the creation of these; the

Hindustani (through an interview with young sitar player Farhan Khan)

and the conservatorium jazz-curriculum (through an interview with

educator and jazz-double bassist Riaan Vosloo). Both methods rely on

the importance in knowing the instrument and being able to utilise

technical proficiencies on it.

Farhan Khan, son of renowned Sitar player Ustad Rais Khan received

his education on the Sitar in the traditional Hindustani sense.

17

Although, Hindustani music appears to be more experimental, tolerant

of change and with a broad interest of development in comparison with

other Indian music traditions, improvisation is a central aspect of all

Indian music (Ibid.). More so, does Hindustani improvisation shift away

from traditional texts towards a more adventurous attitude,

comparable to the western jazz-tradition (Ibid.). The performance of

music as well as acquiring ultimate proficiency on the instrument and

the theoretical knowledge are indistinguishable from a book of religious

instruction and has therefore a great effect on the spiritual experience

of the musician (Ibid.).

I was asked to sit in-front of my father and copy

everything he was playing. He would not say if I was

doing it correctly or not, so I had to develop a feeling

for what was allowed and what was not.

(Khan, 2011)

Here one can already see that by having to copy the master and

therefore develop a „feeling‟ for the music, certain parameters of the

music were given in-which one can perform. Here there is little space,

as well as in the jazz-tradition, for the development or lack thereof, of

a „free voice‟ on the instrument. In the Hindustani tradition, one has to

understand the masters‟ way first, which was handed down over

generations, to be able to create their own voice. Only once the

framework, in terms of sruti8, svara9, tala10, laya11, raga12, alapa13 and

8 Smallest interval used. It is considered the single most important element of Indian music.

9 Is selected and regarded as the central point around which melodic activity takes place. It

stands in a “non-harmonic” relationship to the sruti. 10

Rhythmic cycle of the second part of the raga with variations of fixed lengths, e.g. 16, 12, or 8 matra. 11

The pulse of the music. It is regarded as the forward motion, the feel, of the rhythm. 12

Is the framework of the whole piece and the context of improvisation of the musicians. It is unformed until the performance. 13

Slow introduction to the raga

18

gat14 is established, one was allowed to develop these into a musical

conversation with the fellow musicians (Khan, 2011 and Bailey, 1992).

A similar phenomenon appears in the conservatorium jazz tradition;

you have to transcribe as many soli as possible, of all

the great jazz masters, so you know what you are

allowed to play and what sounds good. You have to

stick to these boundaries otherwise they will not call

you again for the next gig.

(Vosloo, 2010)

The conservatorium tradition thus demands the „novice‟ to memorise

important gradations of so-called „important soli‟. Therefore, are these

transcriptions incorporated into the memory of the novice jazz

musician. The following example will help to clarify this statement.

If the eager jazz musician is asked to transcribe a solo by Charles

Mingus, Mingus‟ style and choice of notes will become part of the

novices‟ improvisational vocabulary. However, what appears less

obvious is that the predecessors who had influence on Mingus‟ playing,

will passively become part of the students understanding of

improvisation, hence memorising a tradition, which can be applied in

musical situations of improvisation.

Therefore, it is believed that for the development of a musical voice it

is crucial to know these parameters and to have them memorised to

be able to perform successfully (Berkowitz, 2010). In this tradition it is

important for the musician to know the limitations of the musical

discourse (Benson, 2006).

However through this way of teaching, the information is stored in the

memory as cognitive economy (see chapter five) and is ready to be

used at any given moment in the future (Berkowitz, 2010). This might

appear as a valid approach to professionalism in music, however

simultaneously strengthens the hypothesis that there is no truly free

14

Treatment of the raga in various standard ways.

19

improvisation; only improvisation which is based on pre-learned

musical fragments. It appears like there is no alternative to be able to

learn how to improvise without having to „copy somebody else‟s ideas‟

and therefore the convention and framework in which they operate

(Hall, 1992). In chapter seven I will discuss this issue further based on

these educational methods and the cognitive evidence of acquired

contexts.

4.3 Different characteristics of musical improvisation

Throughout different literature on the topic of improvisation, there

appears to be only one method to capture it; musicians testimonies. In

thinking jazz; the ultimate art of improvisation (1994), Berliner has

written “one of the most thorough defences of jazz” (DeVeaux, 1998:

404) and improvisation. He explores the tradition of musical creativity

(i.e. improvisation), from as many angles as possible. His ethno-

musicological view on the subject puts the musician and therefore the

socio-cultural aspects to the forefront. This analysis however, only

supports the hypothesis argued in this paper (see chapter seven) that

improvisation is based on pre-learned concepts and parameters, which

are applied in a given context. Consequently improvisation can never

be an expression of ultimate freedom, but the choice of it in a given

tradition.

Jazz is not just, “well, man, this is what I feel like

playing.” It‟s a very structured thing that comes down

from a tradition and requires a lot of thought and

study.

(Wynton Marsalis in Berliner, 1994: 63)

Even if analysed out of a music theoretical point of view, as

demonstrated in Monson‟s, Saying something (1996) the hypothesis is

strengthened. Monson chose musical examples in combination with

20

musicians‟ testimonies, to create an understanding of the individual

parts of an improvising jazz band. She divides these into their different

roles within the band, e.g. the rhythm section (piano, drums and bass)

and the front line or melody line (brass, wind and vocals). Although

she deconstructs each individual instrument in terms of the chosen

musical examples, she comes to the same conclusion as Berliner does;

namely that successful improvisation can only happen, when musicians

have acquired a thorough knowledge of harmonic, rhythmic, dynamic

and melodic relationships.

Therefore one can define improvisation as the acquired knowledge of

elements, utilised in a musical context.

Benson (2006), in The improvisation of musical dialogue, a

phenomenology of music, develops this definition further.

He states different possible distinctions with a variety of types and

degrees. Despite the fact that his list of examples is in no way

complete, he presents eleven different types of improvisation. These

variations of improvisation reach in the first stage from minimalistic

changes in tempi, attack, dynamics and to some extend

instrumentation to expected (by the composer) additions of notes and

cadenzas. Benson refers to this changes as a necessity in Baroque and

classical music, to be able to perform these graphemic representations

of music. Breaking away from the Baroque and classical tradition he

mentions several other forms of improvisation, which give the

performer more and more influence on the actual compositional

process. Benson goes as far as putting the performer on the same

level as the composer in stating that by working in the same tradition

the line between composer and performer vanishes (Ibid.).

Consequently one can argue that by becoming part of the musical

tradition (as composer and performer) the rules and expectations of

this tradition are modified and therefore improvised upon within the

tradition itself (Ibid.).

21

Taking these different developments into account, one can argue that

jazz improvisation is a combination of all those variations. With regard

to the model of improvisation, which is most commonly found in jazz

with the influences of the above mentioned developments, he specifies

this further. Jazz musicians chose several degrees of alterations.

Considering melody, they either change the melody slightly so the

original is still recognisable, the melody line is strongly changed, so the

connection to the original is very difficult to grasp, or the melody is

completely disregarded and replaced with an alternative (Ibid.). On the

one hand, are chord changes altered enough to create a new sounding

chord, while sticking close enough to the original harmony of the

chord.

On the other hand, chords can be severely changed, but will still

correspond to the basic chord structure.

Each act of improvisation therefore requires a...

[...] kind of reworking of something that already exists

and is therefore not something created on the spur of

the moment out of nothing.

(Ibid.: 30)

The above quote confirms the hypothesis that improvisation is

operating within a context of cognitive and neurological memory

systems as will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

22

4.4 Neural circuitry of improvisation

Having shown the main characteristics of improvisation, one can now

regard the neural circuitry underlying these.

Nonetheless, I will only show the cerebral pathways and elaborate on

the cortical areas involved in improvisation. Having presented these

cortical principles I will amplify on the fundamental cognitive functions

in chapters five and six (cognitive economy and hierarchical

organisation) in the event of improvisation.

Based on the knowledge from the preceding chapter 3.2.1 Neurological

comprehension of music processing, the question arises; what are the

cerebral principles involved in improvisation15 in addition to basic

music processing? Improvisation usually happens within a musical

context and therefore is a combination of listening to the music

surrounding the performer and choosing the notes for the

improvisational framework.

When jazz musicians […] improvise, they suppress their

limbic systems, notably their amygdalae, and they

activate their frontal cortices while deactivating their

dorsolateral prefrontal cortices.

(Limb and Braun, 2008: 7)

Limb and Braun (2008)16 noticed a strong change of pattern activity in

the prefrontal cortices. More so, they found strong deactivations of

lateral portions and focal activation of the medial prefrontal cortex17

(Ibid.). Knowing that these brain areas are mostly associated with

15

Cerebral motor circuitries are left out at this point, due to their minor importance to this paper. However, one should note that motor control (hand, finger, leg, etc. movements) is the visible result of the underlying neural circuitries in the event of improvisation. 16

neuronal functions were recorded of 6 professional jazz musicians during the event of improvisation. This experiment was conducted, while the participants were undergoing a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scan. See Limb and Braun (2008) for experiment set-up. 17

See appendix page b, Figure V

23

decision making and the process of personal expression, the conclusion

of improvisation as expression “of one‟s own musical voice” (Ibid.: 7)

is not farfetched. Therefore do activations in the frontal polar cortex

(part of the medial prefrontal cortex) support the necessary

requirements for improvisation. As stated by Limb and Braun (2008),

these requirements are characterised as sets of rules of progressive

behaviour whilst performing different behavioural subroutines. Lateral

prefrontal regions, which assess and monitor goal-directed behaviours

were deactivated and therefore allow a “free-floating attention that

permits spontaneous unplanned associations” (Ibid.: 7). Improvisation

is therefore often compared with intuitive decision making and

creativity (Pressing, 1984). Thus can improvisation be seen as an

“emergence of unconscious or random thoughts and sensations” (Limb

and Braun, 2008: 7).

Analysing the findings concerning the limbic system, Limb and Braun

reported both activity decrease and increase, which they linked to the

relationship of creativity and emotional response. However, the

deactivation of the amygdalae (emotion centre of the brain), can be

traced back to positive emotional associations with improvisation

(Ibid.).

Bengsston18 et al. (2007) as-well as Limb and Braun (2008), agree

that memory systems and mechanisms play an important role in

improvisation. In spite of this, as discussed in the preceding chapters

4.2 and 4.3 of this paper, one has to acquire a certain musical

knowledge to be able to improvise at all (Hall, 1992). Therefore one

can never fully eliminate the influences of memory systems and

notably an involvement of hippocampal activity (Limb and Braun,

2008).

18

Conducted a similar study to the one of Limb and Braun, with classically trained pianists, however, differed in several parameters. See Bengtsson et al. (2007), cortical regions involved in the generation of musical structures during improvisation in pianists.

24

Based on this evidence, the following chapters will further discuss the

hypothesis of controlled freedom, out of the view of memory systems

(cognitive economy) and its trigger (hierarchical organisation).

25

CHAPTER FIVE

Cognitive Economy

5.1 Introduction As discussed in the preceding chapter, improvisation is a series of

listening, copying and reproducing. With this understanding of

improvisation and its characteristics and both the educational and

neurological understanding, one can now analyse the underlying

complex cognitive functions of memory. In this context I will elaborate

on the concept of cognitive economy, which plays a central role in

improvisation (Berkowitz, 2009). Cognitive economy is an application

to the human memory system and allows the brain to retrieve pre-

learned information for active support of perception, processing and

production (Murphy, 2002; Eyseneck and Keane, 2005 and Zbikowski,

2002). At this point one has to take the function of working memory

into consideration, which appears to be linked to the above mentioned

retrieval.

Although there are still unclear elements in the neurophysiology of

memory systems, this chapter will consult case-studies to consolidate

the opinion that improvisation is constricted by a „learned‟ framework

and can therefore never be totally free.

5.2 Cognitive economy until now

Chapter 3.2.1 Neurological comprehension of music processing, has

asserted that music „travels‟ through the hippocampus. Understanding

the learning methods of improvisation, which rest on the idea of

constant copying and reproduction procedures and therefore

intensifying neural pathways (note chapter 5.3), one can view this

process as retrieving information from this memory system.

26

As discussed by Berkowitz (2010), it is this retrieval which is based on

a rationalisation and categorisation of hippocampal working processes,

and is known as the concept of cognitive economy (henceforth, CE).

The model of CE is defined as a...

[...] mental representation of classes of objects or

other entities [including music]. It allows abstracting

away from our experiences to develop by dividing the

world into classes of things to decrease the amount of

information we need to perceive, remember and

recognize.

(Eysenck and Keane, 2005: 294)

This statement entails that „stored‟ information in the memory system

is approached, to be able to easier understand and react upon specific

groups or events. In the event of improvisation, the musicians‟

cognition would fall back onto the stored information, hence applying

them in the musical moment. Zbikowski (2002) and Murphy (2002)

have further sub-divided this definition into conceptualizing categories

of music; namely the prototype approach and the exemplar approach.

According to the prototype approach;

the prototype is either a collection of characteristic

attributes or the best example(s) of the concept.

(Zbikowski, 2002: 216)

Therefore, the musician is able to retrieve certain musical phrases

from his/her extensive acquired library. By finding the „best example‟

(read: cognitive representation), which is suitable for the musical

framework in which the improvisational process is taking place, the

performer is falling back onto pre-learned musical relationships. Here

however, it would be seen as one overall attribute, without a

subdivision into more specific - and to improvisation more important -

aspects.

27

At this juncture, the exemplar approach once more augments the

notion of relying on pre-learned musical concepts, more suitable for

individual aspects in improvisation. This approach suggests no overall

collection of characteristics, which define the action, but individual

groupings of all stored...

[...] instances, encountered in the past. Therefore one

would search the memory for instances that have

occurred similar to this concept.

(Murphy, 2002: 48)

This elaboration on CE shows that through constant repetition, not only

do the neural pathways for improvisation get consolidated, but are also

supported through a cognitive retrieval mechanism.

While the definition appears to be satisfactory in the general event of

the initial cognitive aim of perception and (re-)production, musical

improvisation suggests more underlying mechanisms (Berkowitz,

2010).

Under these circumstances, I will propose an extension to the so far

understood concept of CE in the event of musical improvisation. This

extension will suggest the effortful learning of skills, motor (or muscle)

memory, working memory and episodic auditory memory (see Figure

VI). All of which appear to contribute to the comprehension of CE in

the event of improvisation.

28

Figure VI: The extended process of cognitive economy

- acquiring and retrieving musical information in the event of improvisation

5.3 The effortful nature of skill learning

With regard to the educational approach of improvisation in chapter

4.2 of this paper, I will embellish on the underlying cognitive aspects

important for the extended theory of CE. Against this backdrop, I will

discuss the basic19 concepts of motor memory and skill learning, which

19

A detailed elaboration would exceed the scope of this paper.

29

play an important role in the event of improvisation before moving on

to memory retrieval systems during improvisation. This discussion will

be based around an extended model of CE.

As discussed in chapter 4.2, the novice has to copy and reproduce

compositions and soli of the „great masters‟ to be able to learn how to

improvise. Through this constant repetition of repertoire, the human

memory system incorporates these into the long-term memory

(Cowan, 1988). Thus, will this information become part of the sub-

conscious human cognition, ready to be retrieved in real time when

required.

However, there is another level to the effortful nature of skill learning,

which appears to be important in musical performance. The above

mentioned repetition, does not only incorporate this information into

the human long-term memory (see below for further discussion), but

triggers systems of motor control memory; commonly known as

muscle memory (Altenmueller; 2003 and Sudnow, 1993). This form of

memory has to be included into the extended theory of CE, due to its

connection to the basic definition of CE; “decreasing the amount of

information we have to remember” (Eysenck and Keane, 2005: 294).

The phenomenon of motor control memory, allows the muscles to

remember certain fingering or diaphragm positions, which are

connected to the knowledge of producing sound. Through constant

practise and association processes between finger placement and

sound, the skilled musician is able to „trust‟ this finger-movement, to

achieve a perfect intonation on the instrument. Through this so-called

trust-principle, is the musician able to focus better on other elements

of musical production, e.g. the score, timbre and/or the possible

interaction with fellow musicians (Wiesendanger, 2010; Altenmueller;

2003 and Sudnow, 1993).

30

This connection is created passively as sub-category of skill learning.

But how does human cognition actively acquire information to be

stored in long-term memory (Fletcher et al., 1994 and Grasby et al.

1992)?

Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) have proposed a memory model, which is

still valid today (see appendix page b, Figure VII). This model has

three stages of processing, namely the sensory register, working or

short-term memory and long-term memory. Synthesising the event of

learning how to improvise and the Atkinson and Shiffrin model, the

„novice‟ is perceiving the stimulus (here: music) and records it in the

sensory register (origin of hierarchical organization as trigger of CE,

see chapter six). Here, the sensory register conducts a „quick‟ scan for

importance and certain pre-coding processes, which are than as a

result sent to the working or short-term memory. At this stage of

memory, main coding, rehearsal and recoding processes take place,

which serve as initiation to the long-term memory system (Atkinson

and Shiffrin, 1968). Once the information has been transferred to the

long-term memory, the mind can further process, store and is able to

recall this information. In the event of learning how to improvise, the

novice would be constantly repeating (read: rehearsing) a certain

fragment in the working or short-term memory, hence reinforcing the

coding process, which is important for long-term memory storing

(Ibid.).

Through this constant repetition process the acquired knowledge is

becoming part of the episodic auditory memory20; a main aspect of CE

(Muonz-Lopez et al., 2010 and Eysenck and Keane, 2005).

20

EAM is also known as episodic musical memory, which is part of EAM

31

5.4 Episodic auditory memory in the event of improvisation

Episodic auditory memory (EAM) can be understood as a sub-conscious

recollection and retrieval system of the „what, where and when‟

(Munoz-Lopez et al., 2010: 3) involving the long-term memory. It does

not require specific training and is most often happening automatically,

based on triggering factors of our surrounding (Ibid.).

Based on the automatic recollection and retrieval mechanisms and its

innate quality to our cognition, the term „sub-conscious‟ can in a broad

sense be connected to the term automatic21. The human mind has only

little influence on what is stored in the sub-conscious. However, one

can through constant repetition incorporate certain actions,

movements or comprehensions into the sub-conscious, and

consequently these actions become automatic recollection and retrieval

processes (Ibid.).

In the event of improvisation the mind has already „remembered‟ the

framework and structures of improvisational methods and can

therefore „automatically‟ apply those on a new event, due to them

being part of the sub-conscious (read: episodic auditory memory).

Once acquired, a pattern will remain stored [...] like an

electrical field, holding and forming anything entering

its sphere of influence. Acquired information is so basic

and so fundamental that it is almost inevitably equated

with the self, and its patterns are automatic and totally

out of awareness.

(Hall, 1992: 225)

21

This link shows that we have only little influence over our sub-conscious and thus are certain actions performed without actually being consciously aware of them. As an example one can look at a rather simple action; cycling. While we cycle, we are consciously aware which direction we are going, observing the traffic, road signs and lights. We are however not consciously aware of keeping balance on the bicycle. At this stage our sub-conscious mind retrieves the parameters to be able to keep balance and performs them as automated processes.

32

Here, cerebral functions of episodic auditory memory will contribute

through its inter-dependence with auditory processing and the

neurology of improvisation to the understanding that improvisation is

based on pre-learned and memorised parameters (Limb and Braun,

2008 and Bengsston et al., 2007).

As well as in fMRI studies of auditory processing and improvisation,

EAM shows a strong activation in the hippocampal areas of the brain

(Munoz-Lopez et al., 2010). Activations in the hippocampus appear

less surprising in this context. The interesting link here is that in the

event of memory retrieval this particular area is active in exchange

with the prefrontal cortices. This neural trade combination is

furthermore found during improvisation (see chapter 4.4). Therefore,

this relation does additionally consolidate the conception of controlled

freedom in jazz improvisation, which leads to the comprehension of

memory activation during performance.

Against this backdrop, the question arises, which hippocampal areas

are activated during episodic auditory memory retrieval and their

connection to the prefrontal cortex?

The ability to store and retrieve context-rich information depends on

the hippocampal formation (Ibid.). Munoz-Lopez and colleagues have

analysed EAM streams, which showed an increase in direct connections

of the auditory association areas of the parahippocampal region and

the PFC. They concluded out of this connection that the storage and

retrieval of information can only happen on a multimodal level. The

theory of multimodality, suggest the above mentioned direct

connections of the auditory association areas and the prefrontal cortex

on a multi-synaptic level with the memory system of the medial

temporal lobe22 (Ibid.). This interaction allows a direct retrieval of

22

The medial temporal lobe memory system is believed to be the main storage space of long-term memory, incorporating the hippocampus, the perirhinal-, postrhinal- and entorhinal-cortices.

33

information in the event of prefrontal cortex activation, which is

strongly present during improvisation.

Including this retrieval system into the concept of CE, one can

conclude that the connection of memory systems and the constant

decision making process during jazz improvisation only allow a

reinterpretation of previously learned musical concepts (Limb and

Braun, 2008). Therefore one will „search‟ for similar events, or the best

representation of this event, to fit into the existing context (Eysenck

and Keane, 2005). Consequently, improvisation cannot be regarded as

creatio ex nihilo.

5.5 The role of working memory

Although working memory (WM) plays a crucial role when learning

improvisational methods, the role during the actual performance still

seems unclear.

As mentioned in the preceding chapter, working memory or short-term

memory is one stage in the human learning procedure of new

information, being responsible for coding, rehearsal and recoding.

Smith (2000) has discovered that the processes of WM are originating

in different parts of the prefrontal cortex.

WM allows the human mind to...

[...] maintain information briefly in an active state.

Sometimes we keep information active until we

externalize it, as when we hold on to a phone number

until we dial it.

(Ibid.: 45) This statement confirms the above mentioned learning processes,

which through constant repetition of certain information, humans are

able to exceed the loop in WM and transfer this information to long-

term storage. However, looking at the neural bases of human

34

workingmemory in more detail, a paradox to the neural bases during

improvisation occurs.

Smith (2000) showed in his study that during a WM task,

predominantly the premotor cortex (PMC) and the dorsolateral

prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) are active. Applying this finding on cerebral

functions during improvisation, the same activation in the premotor

cortex occurs, which links working memory tasks and improvisation in

terms of motor responses. These PMC functions coincide with the

above mentioned acquired muscle memory systems (Wiesendeger,

2010 and Sudnow, 1993), contributing to the ability to perform music.

However, activations in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during

working memory tasks stand against a deactivation of the dorsolateral

prefrontal cortex during improvisation, hence the paradox. The DLPFC

is mainly responsible for motor planning, organization and regulation.

It also plays an important role in the integration of sensory and

mnemonic information (Kandel et al., 1991). Here however, I would

like to suggest the bypass hypothesis, which is based on the findings

of Smith (2000), Limb and Braun (2008) and the theory of the above

mentioned higher level episodic auditory memory system.

Based on the obtained knowledge of improvisation and therefore

incorporating this information into the EAM system, the DLPFC in

working memory is bypassed in the event of improvisation. Having this

information stored in long-term memory on „standby‟, the brain does

not have to recode or rehearse this information again and can directly

retrieve it from memory (Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1968). Therefore, the

mind does not have to organise or regulate this information in the

dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. The neuronal pathways between

decision making and memory got consolidated to an extent23, which

23

Note appendix page c, Figure VIII. The connection of white matter between the PFC and the Hippocampus is an anatomical strong structure, which links our ability of decision making to the human memory retrieval system. By acquiring improvisational skills, this ‘bridge’ is strengthened, which makes memory retrieval in the event of performing, a more ‘natural’ process.

35

eliminates the regulation of this information, consequently becoming a

„natural‟ recall and application process (Altenmueller, 2010).

[An] attenuated DLPFC no longer regulates the contents

of consciousness, allowing unfiltered, sub-conscious, or

random thoughts and sensations to emerge.

(Limb and Braun, 2008: 7)

Nonetheless, working memory regulates the organisation of motor

planning in the context of improvisation.

This hypothesis however, would require further research in the field of

neuro-cognitive imaging during improvisation.

Therefore, one can regard episodic auditory memory or long-term

memory, the sensory register and active connections to the PFC as

fundamental for the retrieval of information in human cognition.

36

CHAPTER SIX

Hierarchical Organisation

6.1 Introduction

As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the sensory register does

appear to be the origin of hierarchical organization, which quickly

scans the external stimulus for importance. Hierarchical organisation

(henceforth, HO), will be regarded as a cognitive function, part of the

sensory register, to allow to pick out the more important information

of the perceived stimulus. This triggers the episodic auditory memory

system for a matching response applied during improvisation.

6.2 First steps in understanding hierarchical organisation

Lehrdal and Jackendoff (1983) have posed one of the most thorough

concepts of Hierarchical organization in the event of perceiving music.

Their theory is based on the so-called „grouping‟ system, which find

their origin in language analysis. This analysis, proposes that certain

words in language or melodic, rhythmic or harmonic figures in music,

have a higher importance in perceiving and understanding of these.

Both scientists based their theory of „grouping‟ on Gestalt psychological

principles, which show that similar „forms‟ can be summarised under a

specific group (Leman, 1997).

Through this understanding, a listener is able to comprehend the

phenomenon of tonal centres in music and anticipates a musical

phrase to resolve in the tonic (Justus et al., 2002). For example, a

musical phrase is written in the key of C major, therefore C would be

perceived as the „strongest‟ point within that phrase. The composition

around this tonal centre will be perceived in different levels of

hierarchy, with the 5th (G in the scale of C) as the second highest in

37

the scale. Other notes involved in the melody and within the scale will

therefore fall under these two strong hierarchical points, but will

nevertheless contribute to the resolution to the tonic (Ibid.). This

perceptual attribute can be also applied on rhythmical structures and

further on the combination of phrases, which show, higher and lower

points of hierarchical groupings24.

The principal influence the performer has on grouping

perception is in his [/her] execution of local details,

which affect the choice of small-level grouping

boundaries […] and of larger boundaries […].

(Lehrdal and Jackendoff, 1983.: 63)

Although this grammar appears to be a powerful instrument by which

certain criteria can have a partial control of the whole listening

structure (Baroni, 2010), it lacks in two additional and thus

fundamental parameters reviewing the above statement about the

performer. Having agreed above that improvisation is a combination of

listening and the application of musical knowledge in a context, these

influencing parameters have to be included into the understanding of

HO. One aspect is the presence and function of sound structures and

the other are „primary‟ and „secondary‟ parameters of music (Meyer,

1989).

Sound structures have to be incorporated into the equation, due to

their fundamental role in the production of music. Therefore are sound

structures part of the production and thus the perception of music

(Baroni, 2010).

Meyer (1989) proposed two parameters, which play an integral part in

the production of sound structures. He divides these parameters in

„primary‟ and „secondary‟, whereby „primary‟ parameters include

discrete units as pitch and duration and „secondary‟ parameters such

as dynamics, tempo, texture and timbre.

24

See Lehrdal and Jackendoff (1983), GTTM, for an extensive discussion of this theory.

38

These three parameters have also to be seen as fundamentally

important to the „musical grammar‟ as proposed by Lehrdahl and

Jackendoff, which where however not fully included in the construction

of the generative theory of tonal music.

Based on the understanding discussed in this paragraph, the following

will use and extend this knowledge on hierarchies of stability in music.

6.3 Hierarchies of stability in music

Event hierarchies refer to temporal organization of a

specific piece of music, with more important musical

events represented higher in the hierarchy, while tonal

hierarchies refer to the organization of categories of

pitch events, with some pitch classes being regarded as

more stable in the context. A tonal hierarchy plays a

role in organization of an event hierarchy.

(Justus et al., 2002: 16)

The perception of pitch can be considered by two dimensions, namely

pitch height as varying from high to low and pitch class, which is the

perceived similarity of tones (Schenker, 1935 and Deutsch, 1999).

These two dimensions were further divided into Dowling‟s (1978) four

levels in musical scales. Dowling states that the most abstract level is

perceived as the psychophysical scale, which transmits pitch on a

logarithmic manner to frequency. Secondly, tonal material divides

pitch categories within the octave. Finally, Dowling added tuning

systems and mode, which establish a hierarchy within a musical

context. This entails that certain musical notes within the system, are

more stable than others (Justus et al., 2002). Therefore the perception

of a musical fragment is build upon the stability of related notes in the

context. Applying this knowledge onto chords and harmonic structures

a similar event occurs. Chords and harmonic structures are

constructed from individual tones, which were already identified in

terms of stability. Using this principle, chords follow a hierarchy of

39

stability with the tonic (I), dominant (V) and subdominant (IV) as most

stable chords, which consequently create a perceptual expectancy

(Ibid.). This statement is supported by Krumhansl‟s et al (1979, 1990)

probe tone experiment.

In this experiment, the researchers have presented probates with

descending or ascending major scales, which were followed by one of

the chromatic notes of the scale, which are referred to as the probe

tone. The participants were asked to rate the contribution of this tone,

to the completeness of the musical context. Based on their finding,

Krumhansl and colleagues have shown that certain tones out of the

presented scale (I, V and IV as the strongest) contribute stronger to

the stability of a musical fragment. Similar experiments were

conducted in the event of chord stability (Bharucha et al., 1982).

Applying the findings described in the preceding chapter on cognitive

economy, one can find convincing relationships between tones and

chords, contributing to a „musical event hierarchy‟. Regarding musical

events, which are constructed out of tone and chord hierarchies, one

can conclude that these fragments will inevitably follow a hierarchy of

stability. This principle represents a modification of tones and chords in

three ways (Krumhansl and Bharucha, 1983; Krumhansl, 1990);

contextual identity, contextual distance and contextual asymmetry.

First, an important event in the hierarchy of stability is

considered more similar to other instances of itself than

is a less important event (contextual identity). Second,

two important events in the hierarchy of stability are

considered more similar to each other than are less

important events (contextual distance). Third, the

asymmetry in a pair of similarity judgements is largest

when the first event is less important in the hierarchy

and the second event is more important (contextual

asymmetry).

(Ibid., in Justus et al. 2002: 11)

40

This shows that stable tones and chords in a musical event serve as

cognitive reference points (Rosch, 1975), thus can HO be regarded as

a trigger of CE; the representation from memory.

6.4 Hierarchical organization and the sensory register

At this stage one is now able to apply HO to the above mentioned

memory retrieval system.

Out of the three stages of memory (see chapter five), the sensory

register appears to utilize HO in the event of „scanning‟ for importance

in the perceived stimulus. As argued above does HO allow categorise

music into more „stable‟ units, which contribute to the overall

perception (Justus et al., 2002, Leman, 1997). Furthermore, the

memory retrieval system, is finding a suitable auditory representation

or reaction to the perceived stimulus.

In the event of improvisation, the sensory register, being the first

stage in the memory system, will search for stable events in music.

This initial „search‟ or „scan‟, allows to perceive points of hierarchical

stability, which appear to be crucial for the first step of pre-coding

(Fletcher et al., 1992 and Grasby et al., 1992). Through this

„recognition‟ process, the sensory register is identifying stable musical

points and based on this judgement, is evoking a response in the EAM.

Against this backdrop are perceived stable events in music related to

similar events in memory. Therefore, hierarchies in the music trigger

previously learned phrases and structures, which correspond with the

performers‟ musical knowledge.

This however, poses the question of how this link is established, which

is crucial in understanding the cognitive processes involved. Arguing

HO as a triggering system of CE, human cognition must have through

the pre-coding process in the sensory register, already created

relations to hierarchal stable sounds (Justus et al., 2002). This

41

knowledge seems to be evidence from self-organizing networks

suggesting implicit musical knowledge, which was learned passively

when rehearsing the contexts and conventions of improvisation

(Tillmann et al., 2000). Thus will this learned HO process analyse the

music based on existing knowledge to find the best representation in

the event of performance (Eysenck and Keane, 2005).

Musical events however, are not only processed in terms of hierarchic

stability in the sensory register. Another contributing factor is melodic

contour, which allows the listener (read: improviser), to discriminate

between the shape of the melody‟s „ups and downs‟ (Dowling and

Fujitani, 1971). This entails that an improvisation within an atonal25

context, will rely on the contour of the musical line. Nonetheless is the

perception of musical contour part of the HO. Although a tone, chord,

or harmonic hierarchy would be difficult to establish within an atonal

context, HO would fall back onto the above discussed scheme of

analysing musical phrases and place these into a hierarchical order.

This would consequently trigger memory, based on hierarchies of

musical phrases (Ibid.).

HO does trigger certain episodic musical memories, which support the

performer in the event of improvisation (Justus et al., 2002).

The following example will bring the above mentioned factors in line.

My experience as a jazz musician showed me that when a performer

improvises, s/he firstly perceives the musical context around him/her.

Based on this framework, s/he picks out either tonal/chord/harmonic

hierarchies or phrase hierarchies, which triggers an appropriate EAM

response. Therefore does this response find the best representation in

this moment and thus combines suitable pre-learned structures by

applying the concept of cognitive economy. Finally this results in a

musical (re-) production, thus a seemingly free improvisation

(Berkowitz, 2010; Eysenck and Keane, 2005 and Murphy, 2002).

25

Either difficult to pinpoint a hierarchical stability or there is none at all.

42

CHAPTER SEVEN

The freedom to choose freedom

The illusion of free will is itself an illusion.

(Harris, 2010)

7.1 Introduction

Having presented the neurological, cognitive and musicological views

of improvisation, one can now merge these findings to pose the

question of freedom.

The following chapter will discuss the discourse of „freedom‟ or „free

will’ and the lack thereof in jazz improvisation. However, it is not my

intension to solve the philosophical question of freedom, but discuss

freedom in the context of improvisation. The above mentioned

discourse about acquiring improvisational skill, in relation with

cognitive mechanisms of memory and the neurology of music

perception and improvisation, will serve as the foundation to this

discussion.

However, the question arises, which attributes define „freedom‟ and

how they can be applied to musical improvisation?

The aspect of „freedom of will‟ has been argued and discussed by

philosophers for more than two millennia. The question however, what

free will entails, still remains. At this junction, I will give an

understanding of what can be incorporated into the notion of free will,

most suitable for the discussion of freedom in jazz improvisation.

43

7.2 A short introduction to the philosophy of free will

The belief of „free will‟ is understood as the decision-making process

free of all constraints (Pereboom, 2003). Philosophy however, has

regarded freedom out of an abstract understanding of determining the

future based on past and present events. This entails that there are

different views to the conception of free will. One of these views is the

religious concept, which takes an omnipresent divinity into account.

Consequently, the choices are made based on the knowledge of a

„higher being‟ influencing them (Harris, 2010). Another implication to

the terminology of free will is an ethical comprehension, which argues

the view, if individuals can be held morally responsible for their actions

(Ibid.)26.

The interesting, hence most applicable conception to this paper is the

scientific belief.

Science in general abnegates the notion of free will. However, the

illusion of free will is created, based on the comprehension of finite

rules and parameters (Kenricke et al., 2003 and Epstein et al., 1996).

These create a framework in-which freedom of will is executed.

Although an ontological entity appears not to be valid in this debate,

the perception and thus illusion of free will can be achieved within a

deterministic framework.

This belief is based on this philosophical thesis of determinism. The

proposal encompasses the view that an action can only have a certain

outcome in relation to given circumstances in the moment. As stated

by Harris (2010) this concept is more so understood in the context of

human cognition (decision-making, perception and behaviour) as the

underlying theory of every event being based on a previous event.

Furthermore, philosophy divides this conception into two sub-

26 These views are mentioned at this stage for the soundness of the philosophical view of free will

and will be not taken into further account, due to their irrelevance for this paper.

44

categories, which try to explain the notion of determinism, namely

incompatibilism and compatibilism. These sub-groups argue the

existence of free will within the idiom of determinism, whereas

compatibilism argues the point of existence and incompatibilism the

point of non-existence of free will (Epstein et al., 1996; Kenricke et al.,

2003 and Harris, 2010).

As shown in the preceding chapters on improvisation, cognitive

economy and hierarchical organisation, the concept of incompatibilism

strengthens the chain of thought proposed. These notions, state that

through pre-learned conceptions of improvisation and neuro-cognitive

human dispositions, an improvisational outcome, can only be created

on preceding parameters, hence an event is based on a previous

event27. Therefore the notion of free will operates in an

incompatibilistic framework of determinism.

7.2.1 The neurology and cognition of improvisation

and free will

Recent research in the realm of neuro-cognitive behaviour of free will,

shows that the brain has the ability to trigger a decision up to six

seconds before humans are consciously aware of this decision (Haynes

et al., 2008).

Haynes and colleagues, created an experimental design in which

subjects had to execute motor task. These motor tasks consisted of

pressing a button with either their right or left hand, while their brain

function was measured with an fMRI scanner (Ibid.). The scientists

were able to record strong activities in the prefrontal cortex, the

thalamus and hippocampus during these tasks, which were supposed

to show the process of free will; the freedom to make a choice. The

27

Incorporating, learning, rehearsing and performing

45

analysis of this data showed next to the active cerebral areas that a

decision is made sub-consciously, before actually being consciously

aware of this decision. This however, does not mean that sub-

conscious brain activity rules over our decision-making process (Ibid.).

It is more an interaction of the conscious decision-making, memory

and based on this pre-learned parameters and triggers, which support

humans in the decision. It is a delicate balance of difference and unity,

which can still not be fully described. However, how can the brain

areas active during a „free‟ decision-making process be linked to the

notion of incompatibilistic understanding in improvisation?

Taking Haynes et al. (2006, 2008) findings and the neuro-cognitive

mechanisms described above in this paper into consideration, one can

find similarities between those functions. During improvisation, the PFC

is active. This activity is similarly recorded during a free decision-

making process regardless of the stimulus. Improvisation being a

continuous process of decisions, it appears not to be surprising in this

context hence one is free to make the decision. However, having the

DLPFC deactivated during improvisation, sub-conscious, unfiltered or

random thoughts have the ability to emerge (note chapter 5.5, Limb

and Braun, 2008). This deactivation of the DLPFC shows that the sub-

conscious decision, which was recorded during the „free-will‟

experiment described above (Haynes et al, 2008) and the „decision-

making‟ during improvisation (Limb and Braun, 2008) correlate with

the notion of the non-existence of freedom of choice during

improvisation. Furthermore one can compare the activation of the

hippocampus and the thalamus in this context. As shown in chapter

5.5 there is an anatomically strong connection between the PFC and

the hippocampus. In both experiments conducted by Haynes et al.

(2006, 2008) and Limb and Braun (2008), this connection shows that

decisions are based on the inter-dependence of pre-learned structures,

parameters and conventions (Haynes et al., 2008; Limb and Braun,

46

2008; Bengsston et al., 2007; Harris, 1992). These factors became

part of the sub-conscious understanding of the world or in this case

improvisation and are therefore, through cognitive functions available

within the decision-making process. This statement can be further

consolidated with the similarities of thalamo-cortical activation during

both processes.

As mentioned in chapter 3.2.1, the thalamus has been understood

throughout the history of neuro-science as a sole relay station, where

information is transferred to the relevant cerebral areas (Kandel et al.,

1993). As mentioned above, it appears that the thalamus is more than

just a relay station. Assumptions go as far as it being an initial

interpreter of incoming stimuli to be able to further process them

(Ibid.). This discussion however, will exceed the scope of this paper.

Nonetheless, does the thalamus play a crucial role in the decision-

making process during improvisation, by linking the incoming stimulus

with the relevant areas of the PFC, hippocampus and motor cortex, as

presented in the extension of Peretz and Patel‟s theory in chapter

3.2.1.

Furthermore, do aspects as CE triggered by HO allow this ongoing

decision-making on a sub-conscious level, within a thalamo-cortical

loop (Haynes et al., 2008, 2006), which continuously engages the

necessary areas involved in improvisation. Thus can the activity in the

thalamus be regarded as the interpreter of the incoming signal, the

supporter in finding a HO triggered and relevant CE representation in

the hippocampus, to support a decision in the prefrontal cortex. Due to

the constant repetition in the initial stage of learning how to improvise,

this information became part of the sub-conscious cerebral systems

and does therefore not require the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex to be

triggered by the thalamus. This however, is assumed on the base of

existing literature and will require further empirical research.

47

Conclusively, one can say that the „choice of notes‟ during the event of

improvisation, is based on the sub-conscious knowledge of the

parameters available for this specific context, hence is triggered in

memory and negotiated in a new environment.

7.3 Tonality versus atonality in improvisation

It is important to learn as much about jazz as possible.

But once you have learned it, forget it and use the tools

to create something free.

John Coltrane, 1966

Taking the above mentioned discussions into consideration, one could

argue that hierarchies in the perception of music, which trigger CE, can

be only applied on tonal improvisations in jazz. However as argued in

chapter 6.4, do hierarchical stabilities appear in a broader sense,

namely melodic contour (Dowling and Fujitani, 1971). This statement

entails that tonality is not important in the triggering process of EAM

and thus a representation in the performing context.

Nonetheless, it is worth to briefly explore atonal improvisation in this

framework, based on an example.

Analysing one of the pioneers of Free Jazz, John Coltrane, the listener

hears a „structure less‟ and „seemingly free‟ performance. However

regarding the creation process of his music, it was always based on

previously acquired musical knowledge (Berendt, 1989).

Looking at Ascensions (1966), Coltrane gave only bare indications of

the music to be played. He asked his fellow musicians to end their

improvisations on a crescendo, and left them to explore their own

musical limits. Nevertheless, one has to understand that the ability of

playing was among all participants of the Avant-Garde movement

originating in tonal jazz (Lewis, 2008). Therefore, where the musicians‟

abilities already developed with a certain knowledge of “what was

possible” (Vosloo, 2010). The opening fragment of Ascensions

48

however, was based on variations of a previous motif, recorded by

Coltrane; A love Supreme (1965). This shows that there was a starting

point from which the musicians could expand on their improvisational

ideas. Against this backdrop and regarding the soli performed on this

Album, one can hear different mode progressions. Based on these

mode progressions, one could establish a modal hierarchy, which

would allow the musicians to identify a point of disembarkment for

their improvisation.

By applying this hierarchy on the modal changes and structures of this

seemingly free performance, the musicians still executed their

improvisation within a framework, which allowed them to apply their

acquired musical knowledge. This application can be seen as the

stimulus which is organised in terms of event hierarchies and thus

triggers the above argued functions of episodic auditory memory in CE.

This constant triggering of different structures within the established

hierarchy, leads to the constant neuro-cognitive decision-making

process about the following notes, which are sub-consciously retrieved

from the EAM.

Furthermore, can the drum groove be seen as an extension of the HO

process. It is known by musicians that comping, is a common way to

articulate or accentuate certain rhythmical figures on the drum kit.

These accentuations can support a certain melodic structure

rhythmically or initiate a change in melodic contour. Taking this into

consideration, the hypothesis, of operating in a structured framework,

which allows the musicians to take different cues from each other so

they can apply their previously learned musical skills in the context, is

strengthened.

Hence is the aspect of tonality or atonality not important in the

production of improvisation. In either context, it is based on the

knowledge which was previously acquired. The musical context is

49

hierarchically analysed in a broader senses than just individual notes

and chord progressions. It is expanded on the organisation of modal

and rhythmical fragments and more so on melodic contour, which is

than able to trigger CE through the above mentioned thalamo-cortical

loop of decision-making (Haynes et al. 2008, 2006).

Consequently it is the self-negotiation of freedom in the

improvisational context.

7.4 The negotiation of freedom in the jazz improvisation idiom

Staying in the neuro-cognitive and musicological discourse, it appears

as improvisation is deprived of every possible nuance of freedom. The

decision-making about musical structures, the interaction with musical

fragments and their application, propose a view in which a performer

relies on his acquired musical memory.

Based on the above given arguments, this has to be appreciated in the

moment of the performance.

The complex notion of freedom in improvisation however, shines a

light at the end of the tunnel and ignites a broader discussion.

This spark allows the performer to define the boarders in which s/he

improvises. It is the choice to choose freedom and its negotiation of

expanding this framework. It has to be taken into account that even

though an improviser will stay within the framework of his/her own

musical knowledge the context in which it can take place is

expandable.

Piet Mondriaan‟s (1872-1944), Compositie met gele lijnen28 (1933),

shall serve as an illustration, for what is meant by having the choice to

choose freedom within a framework, hence creating the illusion of

freedom (Harris, 2010).

28

Translation: Composition with yellow lines

50

When looking at this painting, the first thing that presents itself in-

front of the observer is a plain white space, which is framed by four

yellow lines. Applying this illustration on jazz improvisation, one can

regard the plain white insight of the painting as the freedom, in which

everything is possible, according to the tradition of improvisation in

jazz and the ability to break free from this tradition. However, the

space is framed by four yellow lines, which indicates that even when

breaking away from „traditional29‟ improvisation it will always be

perceived within a given context. This frame can be regarded as the

pre-learned improvisational knowledge and the neuro-cognitive

functions behind the performance. On a closer look at the yellow lines

however, one begins to see that each of them has a different width.

Furthermore, can the lines be expanded or narrowed around the plain

space, which allows an increase or decrease of the space. In terms of

improvisation, one can see the ability to expand or narrow this space,

as the negotiation of personal freedom.

The difficulty in laying out this view is the definition of personal

freedom. The question, which until today cannot be answered,

requests the existence of „ultimate‟ freedom: a freedom without

boundaries and consequences. Improvisation cannot be seen as this

sort of freedom, due to the educational aspect, of how one acquires

those methods and the neuro-cognitive retrieval systems.

Even though, one cannot speak of a freedom of choice, when

retrieving a suitable representation in improvisation, the performer has

the ability to expand the tradition s/he is performing in. This can be

illustrated through the different line width in Mondriaan‟s painting. It is

up to the performer to incorporate different musical genres outside the

own tradition, incorporating different cultural understandings and

29

Traditional improvisation would be mostly understood as the improvisation within a tonal context

51

expand on the constructive ability to explore the own instrument or

voice.

It is therefore the negotiation, with the own neuro-cognitive functions

in combination with the ability to develop a wider framework. The

construction of this wider framework can thus be seen as the self-

negotiation of the context in which the improvisation takes place. It is

looking beyond the illusion of „freedom‟ and appreciate the possibility

to choose to expand the contextual boundaries.

Jazz improvisation is controlled freedom, which poses a framework in

which the mind and performance takes place, with the ability to

expand it.

52

CHAPTER EIGHT

Conclusion

Are we just our brain during improvisation and has the notion of

freedom to be taken out of it?

Through the course of this essay, I proposed different schemata

showing the lack of freedom in improvisation; an aspect of music,

which is believed to be the highest form of ultimate freedom.

However, how is music understood? Music is regarded from a physical

point of view, due to its application to neurological and cognitive data

analysis. Although I have shown different meanings to the terminology

of music, the answer to what ultimate music is, still remains unclear.

To be able to understand the cognitive and neurological function

involved in improvisation, it is crucial to look at proposed theories of

musical perception. These theories I attempted to extend, to lay the

foundation for the understanding of music and thus improvisation

processing by inter-depending the proposed resource sharing and

modularity hypotheses. Although the complex mechanical and

electrical mechanisms of the inner ear, which translate sonic waves

into a conception of music, trigger certain cortical areas via the

thalamus for the interpretation of music, it is still believed that there

are more areas involved in this process.

Throughout different musical disciplines, which have

improvisation as a key element, acquiring the knowledge of how to

improvise is shared. Different educational models, like the Hindustani

and the jazz conservatorium tradition, have both the same approach in

teaching students how to improvise. In both cases, the student is

required to copy the master or the masters‟ soli to be able to develop

her/his own voice on the instrument. Through this approach however,

does the student, through constant repetition incorporate musical

phrases into the sub-conscious, which eliminate the notion of free

53

creation in the context of later performances. At this stage different

characteristics of improvisation give only an idea about alternative

forms of improvisation. These changes, which can alter between slight

changes in a melody, to completely replacing a given melody with

another, are based on previously acquired knowledge during rehearsal

and therefore it is a reproduction of something which already exists.

Against this back-drop, are important cerebral activations and

deactivations supporting the hypothesis of controlled freedom.

Cerebral areas, which are mainly associated with decision-making,

personal expression and memory centres are active during

improvisation. These activations and deactivations, especially in the

Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex allow sub-conscious thoughts to emerge.

These neurological functions are further supported by cognitive

functions and its triggers. Here Cognitive Economy allows the human

mind to decrease the amount of information, one has to perceive,

remember and recognise. Applying cognitive economy on

improvisation however, I proposed an extension to this concept, by

adding skill learning, motor memory, working memory and episodic

auditory memory.

Through the constant repetition during skill learning, information is

stored in long-term memory, which contributes to the episodic auditory

memory system. During EAM, the hippocampus and the PFC are

active, which coincide with cerebral activations during improvisation.

Therefore, is improvisation based on the memory retrieval of pre-

learned structures; thus one cannot view the creatio ex nihilo in

improvisation.

By having introduced the Bypass hypothesis during activated working

memory in improvisation, I have shown that the DLPFC is not relating

to the retrieval of the information from the EAM system.

Therefore does a deactivated DLPFC allow sub-conscious thoughts to

emerge. Working memory however, remains important for the process

54

of motor planning. Nonetheless, will this hypothesis require more in-

depth research.

Having shown the different contributing factors of cognitive economy

during improvisation, the trigger of the memory retrieval system has

to be taken into consideration. Hierarchical organisation allows

establishing hierarchically more stable notes and forms in the sensory

register, to trigger a memory response.

Therefore is the EAM system triggered by the incoming stimulus, which

was hierarchically analysed and thus retrieving a suitable memory

representation of the event.

Connecting those functions on the notion of freedom an additional level

of complexity is added to the discussion.

Science generally abnegates the notion of freedom and free will.

Through the analysis of experiments, I have shown that similar

cerebral activities occur during improvisation and experiments

researching „free will‟ and are mainly found in the deactivation of the

DLPFC. These similarities are further found in the thalamo-cortical

activity, which places the thalamus in the middle of the understanding

of freedom and improvisation in a neurological and cognitive context.

The thalamus has to be seen as an individually operating system,

which is more than just a relay station. This furthermore, will require

more specialised research.

In any case of neurological and cognitive functions, it is not important

if the improvisation operates in a tonal or atonal context, due to the

cognitive and neurological mechanisms applied.

Consequently, there is no freedom within the process of improvisation.

The data presented in this research, suggests that improvisation is

based on pre-learned parameters, which operate in a given framework.

More so are these pre-learned parameters retrieved from memory,

55

through complex cognitive mechanisms, namely cognitive economy

and hierarchical organisation.

However, it is the performers‟ ability to expand the operating

framework and thus the negotiation of personal freedom in the musical

context.

Improvisation is controlled freedom: controlled by a framework with

the freedom of choosing to expand this structure.

56

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a

APPENDIX

Figure III, (no name/date) the primary auditory cortex

Figure II, (no name/ no date), the thalamus and its location in the human brain.

b

Figure V, Limb and Braun (2008) axial slice renderings of mean activations (red/yellow

scale bar) and deactivations (blue/green scale bar) associated with improvisation during

Scale and Jazz paradigms.

Figure VII, Attkinson and Shiffrin (1968) Model of Memory Systems

c

PFC

Hippocampus

Anatomical strong connection between the PFC and the hippocampus

Figure VIII, Schlaug (2009), Neural wiring with indication to the anatomically strong

connection between the PFC and the hippocampus