conti 2 digested (police power)

7/28/2019 Conti 2 Digested (Police Power)

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ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL

OPERATORS v. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA

Facts:

Thepetitionersfiledapetition

forprohibitionagainstOrdinanceNo.

4760forbeingviolativeofthedue

processclause,contendingthatsaid

ordinanceisnotonlyarbitrary,

unreasonableoroppressivebutalso

vague,indefiniteanduncertain,

andlikewiseallegetheinvasion

oftherighttoprivacyandthe

guarantyagainstself-incrimination.

OrdinanceNo.4760proposes

tocheck

theclandestineharboring

oftransientsandguestsofthese

establishmentsbyrequiringthese

transientsandgueststofillupa

registrationform,preparedforthe

purpose,inalobbyopento

publicviewatalltimes,andby

introducingseveralother

amendatoryprovisionscalculatedto

shattertheprivacythatcharacterizes

theregistrationoftransientsand

guests."Moreover,theincreaseinthe

licensedfeeswasintendedto

discourage"establishmentsofthe

kindfromoperatingforpurpose

o ther than legal " and at the

same t ime, to increase " the

incomeo f the c i t y

government."Thelowercourtruledin

favorofthepetitioners.Hence,the

appeal.

Issue:

WhetherornotOrdinanceNo.4760is

unconstitutional

Held:

No.

Rationale:

Themantleofprotection

associatedwiththedueprocess

guarantydoesnotcover

petitioners.Thisparticular

manifestationofapolicepower

measurebeingspecificallyaimed

tosafeguardpublicmoralsis

immunefromsuchimputation

ofnullityrestingpurely

onconjectureand

unsupportedbyanythingof

substance.Toholdotherwise

wouldbetoundulyrestrictand

narrowthescopeofpolicepower

whichhasbeenproperly

characterizedasthemostessential,

insistentandtheleastlimitable

ofpowers,

4

Extendingasitdoes"toallthegreat

publicneeds."Itwouldbe,to

paraphraseanotherleadingdecision,

todestroytheverypurposeofthe


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stateifitcouldbedeprivedor

alloweditselftobedeprivedofits

competencetopromotepublic

health,publicmorals,publicsafety

andthegeneralwelfare.Negatively

put,policepoweristhatinherentand

plenarypowerintheStatewhich

enablesittoprohibitallthatis

hurtfulltothecomfort,safety,

andwelfareofsociety.Onthe

legislativeorgansofthegovernment,

whethernationalorlocal,primarily

resttheexerciseofthepolice

power,which,itcannotbetoo

oftenemphasized,isthepowerto

prescriberegulationstopromote

thehealth,morals,peace,goodorder,

safetyandgeneralwelfareofthe

people.Inviewoftherequirementsof

dueprocess,equalprotectionand

otherapplicableconstitutional

guarantieshowever,theexerciseof

suchpolicepowerinsofarasitmay

affectthelife,libertyorpropertyofany

personissubjecttojudicialinquiry.

Wheresuchexerciseofpolicepower

maybeconsideredaseither

capricious,whimsical,unjustor

unreasonable,adenialofdue

processoraviolationofany

otherapplicableconstitutional

guarantymaycallforcorrection

bythecourts.TheCourtreversedthe

judgmentofthelowercourtandlifted

theinjunctionontheOrdinancein

question.

***

Libertyisablessing,without

whichlifeisamisery,butliberty

shouldnotbemadetoprevail

overauthoritybecausethensociety

willfallintoanarchy.Neithershould

authoritybemadetoprevail

overlibertybecausethenthe

individualwillfallintoslavery.

TAXICAB OPERATORS OF

METRO MANILA VS. BOARD OF

TRANSPORTATION, digested

PostedbyPius

MoradosonNovember8,2011

GR#L-59234,September30,

1982(ConstitutionalLawPolice

Power,EqualProtection)

FACTS:Petitionerassailedthe

constitutionalityofanadministrative

regulationphasingouttaxicabsmore

thansixyearsoldongroundsthatitis

violativeoftheconstitutionalrightsof

equalprotectionbecauseitisonly

enforcedinManilaanddirected

solelytowardsthetaxiindustry.
http://piusmorados.wordpress.com/author/piusmorados/http://piusmorados.wordpress.com/author/piusmorados/http://piusmorados.wordpress.com/author/piusmorados/http://piusmorados.wordpress.com/author/piusmorados/http://piusmorados.wordpress.com/2011/11/08/taxicab-operators-of-metro-manila-vs-board-of-transportation-digested/http://piusmorados.wordpress.com/2011/11/08/taxicab-operators-of-metro-manila-vs-board-of-transportation-digested/http://piusmorados.wordpress.com/2011/11/08/taxicab-operators-of-metro-manila-vs-board-of-transportation-digested/http://piusmorados.wordpress.com/2011/11/08/taxicab-operators-of-metro-manila-vs-board-of-transportation-digested/http://piusmorados.wordpress.com/author/piusmorados/http://piusmorados.wordpress.com/author/piusmorados/


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Respondentscontendthatthe

purposeoftheregulationisthe

promotionofsafetyandcomfortof

theridingpublicfromthedangers

posedbyoldanddilapidatedtaxis.

ISSUE:Whetherornotan

administrativeregulationphasingout

taxicabsmorethansixyearsoldisa

validexerciseofpolicepower.

HELD:No,theStateintheexerciseof

itspolicepower,canprescribe

regulationstopromotethesafetyand

generalwelfareofthepeople.In

addition,thereisnoinfringementof

theequalprotectionclausebecause

itiscommonknowledgethattaxicabs

inManilaaresubjectedtoheavier

trafficpressureandmoreconstant

use,creatingasubstantialdistinction

fromtaxicabsofotherplaces.

Republic vs. Meralco [G.R. No.

141314. November 15, 2002.]

Facts:

On23December1993,Manila

ElectricCompany(MERALCO)filed

withtheEnergyRegulatoryBoard

(ERB)anapplicationfortherevision

ofitsrateschedules.Theapplication

reflectedanaverageincreaseof

P0.21/kwhinitsdistributioncharge.

Theapplicationalsoincludeda

prayerforprovisionalapprovalofthe

increasepursuanttoSection16(c)of

thePublicServiceActandSection8

ofExecutiveOrder172.On28January

1994,theERBissuedanOrder

grantingaprovisionalincreaseof

P0.184/kwh,subjecttothecondition

thatintheeventthattheBoardfinds

thatMERALCOisentitledtoalesser

increaseinrates,allexcessamounts

collectedfromtheapplicants

customersasaresultofthisOrder

shalleitherberefundedtothemor

correspondinglycreditedintheirfavor

forapplicationtoelectricbills

coveringfutureconsumptions.

Subsequenttoanauditbythe

CommissiononAudit(COA),theERB

rendereditsdecisionadoptingCOAs

recommendationsandauthorized

MERALCOtoimplementarate

adjustmentintheaverageamountof

P0.017/kwh,effectivewithrespectto

MERALCOsbillingcyclesbeginning

February1994.TheERBfurther

orderedthattheprovisionalreliefin

theamountofP0.184/kwhgranted

undertheBoardsOrderdated28

January1994isherebysuperseded

andmodifiedandtheexcessaverage

amountofP0.167/kwhstartingwith


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MERALCOsbillingcyclesbeginning

February1994untilitsbillingcycles

beginningFebruary1998,berefunded

toMERALCOscustomersor

correspondinglycreditedintheirfavor

forfutureconsumption.TheERBheld

thatincometaxshouldnotbetreated

asoperatingexpenseasthisshould

bebornebythestockholderswho

arerecipientsoftheincomeorprofits

realizedfromtheoperationoftheir

businesshence,shouldnotbe

passedontotheconsumers.Further,

inapplyingthenetaverage

investmentmethod,theERBadopted

therecommendationofCOAthatin

computingtheratebase,onlythe

proportionatevalueoftheproperty

shouldbeincluded,determinedin

accordancewiththenumberof

monthsthesamewasactuallyused

inserviceduringthetestyear.

Onappeal(CAGRSP46888),the

CourtofAppealssetasidetheERB

decisioninsofarasitdirectedthe

reductionoftheMERALCOratesby

anaverageofP0.167/kwhandthe

refundofsuchamounttoMERALCOs

customersbeginningFebruary1994

anduntilitsbillingcyclebeginning

February1998.SeparateMotionsfor

Reconsiderationfiledbythe

petitionersweredeniedbytheCourt

ofAppeals.Hence,thepetitionbefore

theSupremeCourt.

TheSupremeCourtgrantedthe

petitionsandreversedthedecisionof

theCourtofAppeals.MERALCOwas

authorizedtoadoptarateadjustment

intheamountofP0.017/kwh,effective

withrespecttoMERALCOsbilling

cyclesbeginningFebruary1994.

Further,inaccordancewiththe

decisionoftheERBdated16

February1998,theexcessaverage

amountofP0.167/kwhstartingwith

theapplicantsbillingcycles

beginningFebruary1998isorderedto

berefundedtoMERALCOs

customersorcorrespondingly

creditedintheirfavorforfuture

consumption.

1.Regulationofratesbypublic

utilitiesfoundedontheStatespolice

powers

Theregulationofratestobecharged

bypublicutilitiesisfoundeduponthe

policepowersoftheStateand

statutesprescribingrulesforthe

controlandregulationofpublic

utilitiesareavalidexercisethereof.

Whenprivatepropertyisusedfora

publicpurposeandisaffectedwith

publicinterest,itceasestobejuris

privationlyandbecomessubjectto


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regulation.Theregulationisto

promotethecommongood.

Submissiontoregulationmaybe

withdrawnbytheownerby

discontinuinguse;butaslongasuse

ofthepropertyiscontinued,thesame

issubjecttopublicregulation.

Lao Ichong vs Jaime

Hernandez

on November 22, 2010

ConstitutionalLawTreatiesMayBe

SupersededbyMunicipalLawsinthe

ExerciseofPolicePower

LaoIchongisaChinesebusinessman

who entered the country to take

advantage of business opportunities

hereinabound(then)particularlyin

theretailbusiness.Forsometimeheandhis fellowChinesebusinessmen

enjoyed a monopoly in the local

market in Pasay. Until in June 1954

whenCongress passed the RA1180

ortheRetailTradeNationalizationAct

thepurposeofwhichistoreserveto

Filipinos the right to engage in the

retailbusiness.Ichongthenpetitionedfor thenullificationofthesaidActon

thegroundthatitcontravenedseveral

treaties concludedby the RPwhich,

according to him, violates the equal

protection clause (pacta sund

servanda).HesaidthatasaChinese

businessman engaged in the

business here in the country who

helpsintheincomegenerationofthe

country he should be given equal

opportunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not a law may

invalidate or supersede treaties or

generallyacceptedprinciples.

HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a

treaty or a generally accepted

principle. In this case, there is noconflict at all between the raised

generallyacceptedprincipleandwith

RA1180.The equalprotection of the

law clause does not demand

absolute equality amongst residents;

it merely requires that all persons

shall be treated alike, under like

circumstances and conditions bothas to privileges conferred and

liabilities enforced; and, that the

equal protection clause is not

infringedby legislationwhichapplies

only tothosepersons fallingwithina

specifiedclass,ifitappliesaliketoall

persons within such class, and

reasonable grounds exist formaking

a distinction between those who fall

within suchclass and thosewhodo

not.

For the sake of argument, even if it

would be assumed that a treaty


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would be in conflict with a statute

then the statute must be upheld

becauseitrepresentedanexerciseof

the police power which, being

inherent could not be bargained

away or surrendered through the

medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong

can no longer assert his right to

operatehismarketstallsinthePasay

citymarket.

LIM vs. EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY

Facts:

BeginningJanuaryofyear2002,

personnelfromthearmedforcesof

theUnitedStatesofAmericastarted

arrivinginMindanaototakepart,in

conjunctionwiththePhilippine

military,inBalikatan02-1.Theyarea

simulationofjointmilitarymaneuvers

pursuanttotheMutualDefense

Treatyabilateraldefenseagreement

enteredintobythePhilippinesand

theUnitedStatesin1951.Itsaimisto

enhancethestrategicand

technologicalcapabilitiesofour

armedforcesthroughjointtraining

withitsAmericancounterparts;the

Balikatanisthelargestsuchtraining

exercisedirectlysupportingtheMDTs

objectives.Itisthistreatytowhichthe

VFAadvertsandtheobligations

thereunderwhichitseekstoreaffirm.

OnFebruary1,2002,petitionersArthur

D.LimandPaulinoP.Ersandofiled

thispetitionforcertiorariand

prohibition,attackingthe

constitutionalityofthejointexercise.

Issue:

WhetherBalikatan02-1activities

coveredbytheVisitingForces

Agreement?

Ruling:

Toresolvethis,itisnecessarytorefer

totheVFAitself.TheVFApermits

UnitedStatespersonneltoengage,

onanimpermanentbasis,in

activities,theexactmeaningof

whichwasleftundefined.Thesole

encumbranceplacedonitsdefinition

iscouchedinthenegative,inthat

UnitedStatespersonnelmust

abstainfromanyactivityinconsistent

withthespiritofthisagreement,and

inparticular,fromanypoliticalactivity.

TheViennaConventionontheLawof

Treaties,Articles31and32contains

provisosgoverninginterpretationsof

internationalagreements.Itclearly


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providesthatthecardinalruleof

interpretationmustinvolvean

examinationofthetext,whichis

presumedtoverbalizetheparties

intentions.TheConventionlikewise

dictateswhatmaybeusedasaidsto

deducethemeaningofterms,which

itreferstoasthecontextofthetreaty,

aswellasotherelementsmaybe

takenintoaccountalongsidethe

aforesaidcontext.

Itappearedfarfetchedthatthe

ambiguitysurroundingthemeaning

oftheword.activitiesarosefrom

accident.Itwasdeliberatelymade

thatwaytogivebothpartiesacertain

leewayinnegotiation.Inthismanner,

visitingUSforcesmaysojournin

Philippineterritoryforpurposesother

thanmilitary.Asconceived,thejoint

exercisesmayincludetrainingon

newtechniquesofpatroland

surveillancetoprotectthenations

marineresources,seasearch-and-

rescueoperationstoassistvesselsin

distress,disasterreliefoperations,

civicactionprojectssuchasthe

buildingofschoolhouses,medical

andhumanitarianmissions,andthe

like.

Undertheseauspices,theVFAgives

legitimacytothecurrentBalikatan

exercises.Itisonlylogicaltoassume

that.Balikatan02-1,amutualanti-

terrorismadvising,assistingand

trainingexercise,fallsunderthe

umbrellaofsanctionedorallowable

activitiesinthecontextofthe

agreement.

LUTZ VS ARANETA

Facts: Walter Lutz, as the Judicial

AdministratoroftheIntestateEstateof

Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to

recover from J. Antonio Araneta, the

CollectorofInternalRevenue,thesum

ofmoneypaidbytheestateastaxes,

pursuanttotheSugarAdjustmentAct.

UnderSection3ofsaidAct,taxesare

levied on the owners or persons in

control of the lands devoted to the

cultivation of sugar cane.

Furthermore, Section 6 states all the

collectionsmadeundersaidActshall

be for aid and support of the sugar

industry exclusively. Lutz contends

that such purpose is notamatter of

publicconcernhencemakingthetax

levied for that causeunconstitutional

and void.TheCourt ofFirst Instance

dismissed his petition, thus this

appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or Not the tax levied


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under the Sugar Adjustment Act (

Commonwealth Act 567) is

unconstitutional.

Held: The tax leviedunder theSugar

Adjustment Act is constitutional. The

tax under said Act is levied with a

regulatorypurpose,toprovidemeans

for therehabilitationandstabilization

of the threatened sugar industry.

Sincesugarproduction isoneofthe

great industries of our nation, its

promotion, protection, and

advancement, therefore redounds

greatlytothegeneralwelfare.Hence,

saidobjectivesof theAct isapublic

concern and is therefore

constitutional. It follows that the

Legislature may determine within

reasonableboundswhatisnecessary

foritsprotectionandexpedientforits

promotion.If objectivesandmethods

are alike constitutionally valid, no

reasonisseenwhythestatemaynot

levy taxes to raise funds for their

prosecutionandattainment.Taxation

maybemadewith the implementof

thestatespolicepower.Inaddition,it

is only rational that the taxes be

obtained from those thatwilldirectly

benefit from it. Therefore, the tax

levied under the Sugar Adjustment

Actisheldtobeconstitutional.

Magtajas Vs Pryce Properties

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THECITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO,petitioners,vs.

PRYCE PROPERTIESCORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINEAMUSEMENT AND GAMINGCORPORATION,

FACTS:There was instant opposition

when PAGCOR announced the openingof a casino in Cagayan de Oro City.Civic organizations angrily denouncedthe project.The trouble arose when in

1992, flush with its tremendous successin several cities, PAGCOR decided toexpand its operations to Cagayan deOro City.he reaction of the SangguniangPanlungsod of Cagayan de Oro Citywas swift and hostile. On December 7,1992, it enacted Ordinance No.3353.Nor was this all. On January 4,1993, it adopted a sterner OrdinanceNo. 3375-93Pryce assailed theordinances before the Court of Appeals,where it was joined by PAGCOR asintervenor and supplemental petitioner.Their challenge succeeded. On March31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declaredthe ordinances invalid and issued thewrit prayed for to prohibit theirenforcement


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ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and3375-93 valid

HELD: NoLocal Government Code, local

government units are authorized toprevent or suppress, among others,"gambling and other prohibited games ofchance." Obviously, this provisionexcludes games of chance which arenot prohibited but are in fact permittedby law.The rationale of the requirementthat the ordinances should notcontravene a statute is obvious.Casinogambling is authorized by P.D. 1869.This decree has the status of a statute

that cannot be amended or nullified by amere ordinance. Hence, it was notcompetent for the SangguniangPanlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City toenact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibitingthe use of buildings for the operation ofa casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93prohibiting the operation of casinos. Forall their praiseworthy motives, theseordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869and the public policy announced thereinand are therefore ultra vires and void.

Miners Association of thePhilippines v. Factoran, CaseDigest

G.R. No. 98332 January 16,

1995

Facts :

Former President Corazon Aquino

issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279

in the exercise of her legislative powers.

EO No. 211 prescribes the interim

procedures in the processing and

approval of applications for the

exploration, development and utilization

of minerals pursuant to Section 2,

Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO

No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary

to negotiate and conclude joint-venture,

co-production, or production- sharing

agreements for the exploration,

development, and utilization of mineral

resources.

The issuance and the impeding

implementation by the DENR of

Administrative Order Nos. 57 which

declares that all existing mining leases

or agreements which were granted after

the effectivity of the 1987

Constitutionshall be converted into

production-sharing agreements within

one (1) year from the effectivity of these

guidelines. and Administrative Order

No. 82 which provides that a failure to

submit Letter of Intent and Mineral

Production-Sharing Agreement within 2

years from the effectivity of the

Department Administrative Order No.

57 shall cause the abandonment of the

mining, quarry, and sand and gravel

claims, after their respective effectivity

dates compelled the Miners Association

of the Philippines, Inc., an organization

composed of mining prospectors and


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claim owners and claim holders, to file

the instant petition assailing their

validity and constitutionality before this

Court.

Issue :

Are the two Department Administrative

Orders valid?

Ruling :

Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the

application of Presidential Decree No.

463, as amended, as the governing law

on the acceptance and approval of

declarations of location and all other

kinds of applications for the exploration,

development, and utilization of mineral

resources pursuant to Executive Order

No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential

Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to

the old system of exploration,

development and utilization of natural

resources through "license, concession

or lease" which, however, has been

disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of

the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the

said constitutional mandate and its

implementing law, Executive Order No.

279 which superseded Executive Order

No. 211, the provisions dealing on

"license, concession or lease" of mineral

resources under Presidential Decree No.

463, as amended, and other existing

mining laws are deemed repealed and,

therefore, ceased to operate as the

governing law. In other words, in all

other areas of administration and

management of mineral lands, the

provisions of Presidential Decree No.

463, as amended, and other existing

mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of

Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus:

Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential

Decree No. 463, as amended, other

existing mining laws, and their

implementing rules and regulations, or

parts thereof, which are not inconsistent

with the provisions of this Executive

Order, shall continue in force and effect.

Well -settled is the rule, however, that

regardless of the reservation clause,

mining leases or agreements granted by

the State, such as those granted

pursuant to Executive Order No. 211

referred to this petition, are subject to

alterations through a reasonable

exercise of the police power of the State.

Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of

its police power in this regard, may not

be precluded by the constitutional

restriction on non-impairment of

contract from altering, modifying and

amending the mining leases or

agreements granted under Presidential


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Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant

to Executive Order No. 211. Police

Power, being co-extensive with the

necessities of the case and the demands

of public interest; extends to all the vital

public needs. The passage of Executive

Order No. 279 which superseded

Executive Order No. 211 provided legal

basis for the DENR Secretary to carry

into effect the mandate of Article XII,

Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is

DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Pollution adjudication vs ca

G.R. No. 93891, 11 March 1991Third Division, Feliciano (J), 4 concur

FACTS: Respondent, Solar TextileFinishing Corporation was involved inbleaching, rinsing and dyeing textileswith wastewater being directlydischarged into a canal leading to theadjacent Tullahan- Tinerejos River.Petitioner Board, an agency of theGovernment charged with the task ofdetermining whether the effluents of aparticular industrial establishmentcomply with or violate applicable anti-

pollution statutory and regulatoryprovisions, have been remarkablyforbearing in its efforts to enforce theapplicable standards vis-a-vis Solar.Solar, on the other hand, seemed verycasual about its continued discharge ofuntreated, pollutive effluents into theriver. Petitioner Board issued an ex

parte Order directing Solar immediatelyto cease and desist from utilizing itswastewater pollution sourceinstallations. Solar, however, withpreliminary injunction against the Board,

went to the Regional Trial Court onpetition for certiorari, but it wasdismissed upon two (2) grounds, i.e.,that appeal and not certiorari from thequestioned Order of the Board as wellas the Writ of Execution was the properremedy, and that the Board'ssubsequent Order allowing Solar tooperate temporarily had renderedSolar's petition moot and academic.Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the

Court of Appeals, which reversed theOrder of dismissal of the trial court andremanded the case to that court forfurther proceedings. In addition, theCourt of Appeals declared the Writ ofExecution null and void. At the sametime, the CA said that certiorari was aproper remedy since the Orders ofpetitioner Board may result in great andirreparable injury to Solar; and that whilethe case might be moot and academic,"larger issues" demanded that thequestion of due process be settled.Petitioner Board moved forreconsideration, without success.

Arguing that that the ex parte Order andthe Writ of Execution were issued inaccordance with law and were notviolative of the requirements of dueprocess; and the ex parte Order and theWrit of Execution are not the propersubjects of a petition for certiorari, Oscar

A. Pascua and Charemon Clio L. Borrefor petitioner asked the Supreme Courtto review the Decision and Resolutionpromulgated by the Court of Appealsentitled "Solar Textile FinishingCorporation v. Pollution AdjudicationBoard," which reversed an order of the


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Regional Trial Court. In addition,petitioner Board claims that under P.D.No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legalauthority to issue ex parte orders tosuspend the operations of an

establishment when there is prima facieevidence that such establishment isdischarging effluents or wastewater, thepollution level of which exceeds themaximum permissible standards set bythe NPCC (now, the Board). PetitionerBoard contends that the reports before itconcerning the effluent discharges ofSolar into the River provided prima facieevidence of violation by Solar of Section5 of the 1982 Effluent Code. Solar, on

the other hand, contends that under theBoard's own rules and regulations, anex parte order may issue only if theeffluents discharged pose an"immediate threat to life, public health,safety or welfare, or to animal and plantlife." In the instant case, according toSolar, the inspection reports before theBoard made no finding that Solar'swastewater discharged posed such athreat.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court ofAppeals erred in reversing the trial courton the ground that Solar had beendenied due process by the Board.

HELD: The Court found that the Orderand Writ of Execution were entirelywithin the lawful authority of petitionerBoard. Ex parte cease and desist ordersare permitted by law and regulations insituations like here. The relevantpollution control statute andimplementing regulations were enactedand promulgated in the exercise of thatpervasive, sovereign power to protectthe safety, health, and general welfareand comfort of the public, as well as theprotection of plant and animal life,

commonly designated as the policepower. It is a constitutionalcommonplace that the ordinaryrequirements of procedural due processyield to the necessities of protecting vital

public interests like those here involved,through the exercise of police power.Hence, the trial court did not err when itdismissed Solar's petition for certiorari. Itfollows that the proper remedy was anappeal from the trial court to the Court of

Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal. TheCourt gave due course on the Petitionfor Review and the Decision of the Courtof Appeals and its Resolution were setaside. The Order of petitioner Board and

the Writ of Execution, as well as thedecision of the trial court werereinstated, without prejudice to the rightof Solar to contest the correctness of thebasis of the Board's Order and Writ ofExecution at a public hearing before theBoard.

TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ

Facts: The petitioners sought

to enjoin the Secretary of

Education, Culture and

Sports, the Board of Medical

Education and the Center for

Educational Measurement from

enforcing a requirement the

taking and passing of theNMAT as a condition for

securing certificates of

eligibility for admission,

from proceeding with

accepting applications for

taking the NMAT and from

administering the NMAT as


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scheduled on 26 April 1987

and in the future. The trial

court denied said petition

and the NMAT was conducted

and administered as

scheduled.

The NMAT, an aptitude test,

is considered as

an instrument toward

upgrading the selection of

applicants for admission into

the medical schools and its

calculated to improve the

quality of medical education

in the country. The cutoff

score for the successful

applicants, based on the

scores on the NMAT, shall be

determined every year by the

Board of Medical Education

after consultation with the

Association of Philippine

Medical Colleges. The NMAT

rating of each applicant,

together with the other

admission requirements as

presently called for under

existing rules, shall serve

as a basis for the issuanceof the prescribed certificate

of eligibility for admission

into the medical colleges.

Issue: Whether or not Section

5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act

No. 2382, as amended, and

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985

are constitutional.

Held: Yes. We conclude thatprescribing the NMAT and

requiring certain minimum

scores therein as a condition

for admission to medical

schools in the Philippines,

do not constitute an

unconstitutional imposition.

The police power, it is

commonplace learning, is

thepervasive and non-

waivable power and authority

of the sovereign to secure

and promote all the important

interests and needs in a

word, the public order of

the general community. An

important component of that

public order is the health

and physical safety and well

being of the population, the

securing of which no one can

deny is a legitimate

objective of governmental

effort and regulation.

Perhaps the only issue that

needs some consideration is

whether there is some

reasonable relation between

the prescribing of passing

the NMAT as a condition for

admission to medical school

on the one hand, and the

securing of the health and

safety of the general

community, on the other hand.

This question is perhaps mostusefully approached by

recalling that the regulation

of the practice of medicine

in all its branches has long

been recognized as a

reasonable method of

protecting the health and

safety of the public.

Tio vs video regulatory board

Facts:The case is a petition filed

by petitioner on behalf of

videogram operators adversely


14/37

affected by Presidential Decree No.

1987, An Act Creating the

Videogram Regulatory Board" with

broad powers to regulate and

supervise the videogram industry.

A month after the promulgation of

the said Presidential Decree, the

amended the National Internal

Revenue Code provided that:

"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There

shall be collected on each

processed video-tape cassette,

ready for playback, regardless of

length, an annual tax of five pesos;

Provided, That locally

manufactured or imported blank

video tapes shall be subject to

sales tax."

"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or

Disposition of Videograms.

Notwithstanding any provision of

law to the contrary, the province

shall collect a tax of thirty percent

(30%) of the purchase price or

rental rate, as the case may be, for

every sale, lease or disposition of a

videogram containing a

reproduction of any motion picture

or audiovisual program.

Fifty percent (50%) of the

proceeds of the tax collected shall

accrue to the province, and the

other fifty percent (50%) shall

accrue to the municipality where

the tax is collected; PROVIDED,

That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax

shall be shared equally by the

City/Municipality and the

Metropolitan Manila Commission.

The rationale behind the tax

provision is to curb the

proliferation and unregulated

circulation of videograms including,

among others, videotapes, discs,

cassettes or any technical

improvement or variation thereof,

have greatly prejudiced the

operations of movie houses and

theaters. Such unregulated

circulation have caused a sharp

decline in theatrical attendance by

at least forty percent (40%) and a

tremendous drop in the collection

of sales, contractor's specific,

amusement and other taxes,

thereby resulting in substantial

losses estimated at P450 Million

annually in government revenues.

Videogram(s) establishments

collectively earn around P600


15/37

Million per annum from rentals,

sales and disposition of

videograms, and these earnings

have not been subjected to tax,

thereby depriving the Government

of approximately P180 Million in

taxes each year.

The unregulated activities of

videogram establishments have

also affected the viability of the

movie industry.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not tax imposed by

the DECREE is a valid exercise of

police power.

(2) Whether or nor the DECREE is

constitutional.

Held:Taxation has been made the

implement of the state's police

power. The levy of the 30% tax is

for a public purpose. It was

imposed primarily to answer the

need for regulating the video

industry, particularly because of

the rampant film piracy, the

flagrant violation of intellectual

property rights, and the

proliferation of pornographic video

tapes. And while it was also an

objective of the DECREE to protect

the movie industry, the tax

remains a valid imposition.

We find no clear violation of the

Constitution which would justify us

in pronouncing Presidential Decree

No. 1987 as unconstitutional and

void. While the underlying

objective of the DECREE is to

protect the moribund movie

industry, there is no question that

public welfare is at bottom of its

enactment, considering "the unfair

competition posed by rampant film

piracy; the erosion of the moral

fiber of the viewing public brought

about by the availability of

unclassified and unreviewed video

tapes containing pornographic films

and films with brutally violent

sequences; and losses in

government revenues due to the

drop in theatrical attendance, not

to mention the fact that the

activities of video establishments

are virtually untaxed since mere

payment of Mayor's permit and

municipal license fees are required

to engage in business."


16/37

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is

hereby dismissed. No costs.

Ynot vs iac

Facts:Executive Order No. 626-A

prohibited the transportation of

carabaos and carabeef from one

province to another. The carabaos

of petitioner were confiscated for

violation of Executive Order No

626-A while he was transporting

them from Masbate to Iloilo.

Petitioner challenged the

constitutionality of Executive Order

No. 626-A. The government argued

that Executive Order No. 626-A

was issued in the exercise of police

power to conserve the carabaos

that were still fit for farm work or

breeding.

Issue:Whether or Not EO No.

626-A is a violation of Substantive

Due Process.

Held:The challenged measure is

an invalid exercise of police power,

because it is not reasonably

necessary for the purpose of the

law and is unduly oppressive. It is

difficult to see how prohibiting the

transfer of carabaos from one

province to another can prevent

their indiscriminate killing.

Retaining the carabaos in one

province will not prevent their

slaughter there. Prohibiting the

transfer of carabeef, after the

slaughter of the carabaos, will not

prevent the slaughter either.

LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ [146SCRA 323; NO.L-63419; 18DEC 1986]Monday, February 09, 2009Posted by Coffeeholic WritesLabels:Case Digests,PoliticalLaw

Facts: A motion to quash the

charge against the petitioners for

violation of the BP 22 was made,

contending that no offense was

committed, as the statute is

unconstitutional. Such motion was

denied by the RTC. The petitioners

thus elevate the case to the

Supreme Court for relief. The

Solicitor General, commented that

it was premature for the accused

to elevate to the Supreme Court
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17/37

the orders denying their motions to

quash. However, the Supreme

Court finds it justifiable to

intervene for the review of lower

court's denial of a motion to quash.

Issue: Whether or not BP 22 is

constitutional as it is a proper

exercise of police power of the

State.

Held: The enactment of BP 22 a

valid exercise of the police power

and is not repugnant to the

constitutional inhibition against

imprisonment for debt.

The offense punished by BP 22 is

the act of making and issuing a

worthless check or a check that is

dishonored upon its presentation

for payment. It is not the non-

payment of an obligation which the

law punishes. The law is not

intended or designed to coerce a

debtor to pay his debt.

The law punishes the act not as an

offense against property, but an

offense against public order. The

thrust of the law is to prohibit,

under pain of penal sanctions, the

making of worthless checks and

putting them in circulation. An act

may not be considered by society

as inherently wrong, hence, not

malum in se but because of the

harm that it inflicts on the

community, it can be outlawed and

criminally punished as malum

prohibitum. The state can do this in

the exercise of its police power.

Association ofSmall Landowners vs.Secretary ofAgrarian Reform

(land for the landless case)

Facts:In a consolidated petition to review thedecision of the respondent, the petitioners

contends that theimplementation of the CARP(RA 6657) is violative of dueprocess and theirright of equal protectionThe petitioners in thisconsolidated petition are riceand sugarlandowners. All of which are agriculturallands.They question the validity of theimplementation of the CARPLaw, contendingthat it is violative of their right to theequalprotection clause.The Act in questionprimarily states that landownerswill retain five tothe maximum of seven hectares of their

landand the excess will be given to tenantfarmers, depending onthe terrain, viable familysize and fertility of the soil.They alleged that inthe CARP law implementation,agriculturallandowners are the only class that will carrytheburden of the effects of the law and not anyother landowners, thus, violating their right toequal protection of thelaw?


18/37

Issue:Does the contention tenable?

Held:No.The equal protection clause providedby theconstitution is defined as all personor things similarlysituated must be treated

alike as to both rights conferred andliabilitiesimposed. And as held in the Cayat case, thevalidclassification test should occur.

De Knecht v. Bautista

100 SCRA 660 (1980)

FACTS:

The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas

Boulevard to be ultimately linked to theCavite Coastal Road Project, originally

called for the expropriation of properties

along Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City.

Later on, however, the Ministry of Public

Highways decided to make the

proposed extension pass through

Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets.

Because of the protests of residents ofthe latter, the Commission on Human

Settlements recommended the

reversion to the original plan, but the

Ministry argued the new route which

save the government P2 million. The

government filed expropriation

proceedings against the owners of

Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets,among whom was petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a genuine need

to expropriate the properties owned by

De Knecht and others similarly situated

on the ground that the choice of

properties to be expropriated seemed

arbitrarily made by the DPWH.

HELD:

The choice of Fernando Rein and Del

Pan Streets is arbitrary and should not

receive judicial approval. The Human

Settlements Commission concluded that

the cost factor is so minimal that it can

be disregarded in making a choice

between the two lines. The factor of

functionality strongly militates against

the choice of Fernando Rein and Del

Pan Streets, while the factor of social

and economic impact bears grievously

on the residents of Cuneta Avenue.

While the issue would seem to boil

down to a choice between people, on

one hand, and progress and

development, on the other, it is to be

remembered that progress and

development are carried out for the

benefit of the people.

Republic v. De Knecht

182 SCRA 142 (1990)

FACTS:De Knecht was one of the owners of

several properties along the Fernando

Rein-Del Pan streets which the

Government sought to expropriate to

give way to the extension of EDSA and


19/37

the construction of drainage facilities.

De Knecht filed a case to restrain the

Government from proceeding with the

expropriation. Her prayer was denied by

the lower court but upon certiorari, the

SC reversed the lower court decision

and granted the relief asked for by De

Knecht ruling that the expropriation was

arbitrary. The case was remanded to the

lower court. No further action was taken

despite the SC decision until two years

later, in 1983, when the Government

moved for the dismissal of the case on

the ground that the Legislature has

since enacted BP 340 expropriating the

same properties for the same purpose.

The lower court denied the motion.

Appeal.

ISSUE:

Is the final judgment of the court on the

subject becomes the law of the case

between the parties?

RULING:

While it is true that said final judgment of

this Curt on the subject becomes the

law of the case between the parties, it is

equally true that the right of petitioner to

take private properties for public use

upon payment of just compensation is

so provided in the Constitution and the

laws.Such expropriation proceeding

may be undertaken by the petitioner not

only by voluntary negotiation with the

land owners but also by taking

appropriate court action or by

legislation. When BP 340 was passed, it

appears that it was based on

supervening events that occurred after

the 1980 decision of the SC on the De

Knecht case was rendered. The social

impact factor which persuaded the Court

to consider this extension to be arbitrary

had disappeared. Moreover, the said

decision is no obstacle to the legislative

arm of the Government in thereafter

making its own independent

assessment of the circumstances then

prevailing as to the propriety of

undertaking the expropriation of

properties in question and thereafter by

enacting the corresponding legislation

as it did in this case. The Court agrees

in the wisdom and necessity of enacting

BP 340. Thus the anterior decision of

the Court must yield to the subsequent

legislative fiat.

EPZA VS. DULAY [148 SCRA 305;

G.R. No. L-59603; 29 Apr 1987]

Facts:

The four parcels of land which are the

subject of this case is where the Mactan

Export Processing Zone Authority in

Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed.
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20/37

Private respondent San Antonio

Development Corporation (San Antonio,

for brevity), in which these lands are

registered under, claimed that the lands

were expropriated to the government

without them reaching the agreement as

to the compensation. Respondent Judge

Dulay then issued an order for the

appointment of the commissioners to

determine the just compensation. It was

later found out that the payment of the

government to San Antonio would be

P15 per square meter, which was

objected to by the latter contending that

under PD 1533, the basis of just

compensation shall be fair and

according to the fair market value

declared by the owner of the property

sought to be expropriated, or by the

assessor, whichever is lower. Such

objection and the subsequent Motion for

Reconsideration were denied and

hearing was set for the reception of the

commissioners report. EPZA then filed

this petition for certiorari and mandamus

enjoining the respondent from further

hearing the case.

Issue:

Whether or Not the exclusive and

mandatory mode of determining just

compensation in PD 1533 is

unconstitutional.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that the mode

of determination of just compensation in

PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

The method of ascertaining just

compensation constitutes impermissible

encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It

tends to render the courts inutile in a

matter in which under the Constitution is

reserved to it for financial determination.

The valuation in the decree may only

serve as guiding principle or one of the

factors in determining just

compensation, but it may not substitute

the courts own judgment as to what

amount should be awarded and how to

arrive at such amount. The

determination of just compensation is a

judicial function. The executive

department or the legislature may make

the initial determination but when a party

claims a violation of the guarantee in the

Bill of Rights that the private party may

not be taken for public use without just

compensation, no statute, decree, or

executive order can mandate that its

own determination shall prevail over the

courts findings. Much less can the

courts be precluded from looking into

the justness of the decreed

compensation.


21/37

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS.COMELEC [244 SCRA 272; G.R. No.119694; 22 May 1995]Saturday, January 31, 2009 Postedby Coffeeholic Writes

Labels:Case Digests,Political Law

Facts:Respondent Comelec

promulgated Resolution No. 2772

directing newspapers to provide

free Comelec space of not less than

one-half page for the common use

of political parties and candidates.

The Comelec space shall be

allocated by the Commission, free

of charge, among all candidates to

enable them to make known their

qualifications, their stand on public

Issue and their platforms of

government. The Comelec space

shall also be used by the

Commission for dissemination of

vital election information.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute,

Inc. (PPI), a non-profit

organization of newspaper and

magazine publishers, asks the

Supreme Court to declare Comelec

Resolution No. 2772

unconstitutional and void on the

ground that it violates the

prohibition imposed by the

Constitution upon the government

against the taking of private

property for public use without just

compensation. On behalf of the

respondent Comelec, the Solicitor

General claimed that the

Resolution is a permissible exercise

of the power of supervision (police

power) of the Comelec over the

information operations of print

media enterprises during the

election period to safeguard and

ensure a fair, impartial and

credible election.

Issue:

Whether or not Comelec Resolution

No. 2772 is unconstitutional.

Held:The Supreme Court declared

the Resolution as unconstitutional.

It held that to compel print media

companies to donate Comelec

space amounts to taking of

private personal property without

payment of the just compensation

required in expropriation cases.

Moreover, the element of necessity

for the taking has not been

established by respondent

Comelec, considering that the
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22/37

newspapers were not unwilling to

sell advertising space. The taking

of private property for public use is

authorized by the constitution, but

not without payment of just

compensation. Also Resolution No.

2772 does not constitute a valid

exercise of the police power of the

state. In the case at bench, there

is no showing of existence of a

national emergency to take private

property of newspaper or magazine

publishers.

REPUBLIC VS. PLDT [26 SCRA 320;G.R. No. L-18841; 27 Jan 1969]Saturday, January 31, 2009 Postedby Coffeeholic WritesLabels:Case Digests,Political Law

Facts:The plaintiff Republic of the

Philippines is a political entity

exercising government powers

through one of its branches, the

Bureau of Telecommunication.

Herein defendant, PLDT is a public

service corporation holding a

franchise to install operates andmaintains a telephone system.

After its creation, the BOT set up

its own government telephone

system by utilizing its own

appropriations and other

equipment and by renting trunk

lines of the PLDT to enable the

govt offices to call privately. BOT

entered into an agreement with the

RCA communications for joint

overseas telephone service

whereby BOT would convey

overseas calls received by RCA to

local residents. PLDT complained to

the BOT that it was a violation of

the condition of their agreement

since the BOT had used trunk lines

only for the use of government

offices but even to serve private

persons or the general public in

competition with the business of

PLDT. Subsequently, the plaintiff

commenced suit against PLDT

asking the court judgment be

rendered ordering the PLDT to

execute a contract with the

plaintiff, through the BOT for the

use of the facilities of PLDT's

telephone system throughout the

country under such conditions as

the court may consider reasonable.

The CFI rendered judgment stating

that it could not compel PLDT to

enter into such agreement. Hence

this petition.

Issue:Whether or Not PLDT may
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23/37

be compelled to enter into such

agreement.

Held: Yes, the state, may, in the

interest of national welfare transfer

utilities to public ownership upon

payment of just compensation,

there is no reason why the state

ma not require a public utility to

render services in the general

interest provided just

compensation is paid.

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZONCITY VS. ERICTA [122 SCRA 759; G.R.No. L-34915; 24 Jun 1983]Friday, January 30, 2009 Postedby Coffeeholic WritesLabels:Case Digests,Political Law

Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance No.

6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance

Regulating The Establishment,

Maintenance And Operation Of

Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or

Burial Ground Within The

Jurisdiction Of Quezon City And

Providing Penalties For The

Violation Thereof" provides:

Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of

the total area of the memorial park

cemetery shall be set aside for

charity burial of deceased persons

who are paupers and have been

residents of Quezon City for at

least 5 years prior to their death,

to be determined by competent

City Authorities. The area so

designated shall immediately be

developed and should be open for

operation not later than six months

from the date of approval of the

application.

For several years, the aforequoted

section of the Ordinance was not

enforced but seven years after the

enactment of the ordinance, the

Quezon City Council passed a

resolution to request the City

Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any

further selling and/or transaction of

memorial park lots in Quezon City

where the owners thereof have

failed to donate the required 6%

space intended for paupers burial.

The Quezon City Engineer then

notified respondent Himlayang

Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section

9 of the ordinance would be

enforced.

Respondent Himlayang Pilipino
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24/37

reacted by filing a petition for

declaratory relief, prohibition and

mandamus with preliminary

injunction seeking to annul Section

9 of the Ordinance in question.

Respondent alleged that the same

is contrary to the Constitution, the

Quezon City Charter, the Local

Autonomy Act, and the Revised

Administrative Code.

Issue: Whether or Not Section 9 of

the ordinance in question is a valid

exercise of police power.

Held: Section 9 of the City

ordinance in question is not a valid

exercise of police power. Section 9

cannot be justified under the power

granted to Quezon City to tax, fix

the license fee, and regulate such

other business, trades, and

occupation as may be established

or practiced in the City.

Bill of rights states that 'no person

shall be deprived of life, liberty or

property without due process of

law' (Art. Ill, Section 1

subparagraph 1, Constitution). On

the other hand, there are three

inherent powers of government by

which the state interferes with the

property rights, namely-. (1) police

power, (2) eminent domain, (3)

taxation.

The police power of Quezon City is

defined in sub-section 00, Sec. 12,

Rep. Act 537 that reads as

follows:

To make such further ordinance

and regulations not repugnant to

law as may be necessary to carry

into effect and discharge the

powers and duties conferred by

this act and such as it shall deem

necessary and proper to provide

for the health and safety, , and

for the protection of property

therein; and enforce obedience

thereto with such lawful fines or

penalties as the City Council may

prescribe under the provisions of

subsection (jj) of this section.

The power to regulate does not

include the power to prohibit. The

power to regulate does not include

the power to confiscate. The

ordinance in question not only

confiscates but also prohibits the

operation of a memorial park


25/37

cemetery, because under Section

13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of

the provision thereof is punishable

with a fine and/or imprisonment

and that upon conviction thereof

the permit to operate and maintain

a private cemetery shall be

revoked or cancelled. The

confiscatory clause and the penal

provision in effect deter one from

operating a memorial park

cemetery.

Moreover, police power is defined

by Freund as 'the power of

promoting the public welfare by

restraining and regulating the use

of liberty and property'. It is

usually exerted in order to merely

regulate the use and enjoyment of

property of the owner. If he is

deprived of his property outright, it

is not taken for public use but

rather to destroy in order to

promote the general welfare.

It seems to the court that Section

9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of

1964 of Quezon City is not a mere

police regulation but an outright

confiscation. It deprives a person

of his private property without due

process of law, nay, even without

compensation.

CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESECOMMUNITY [40 Phil 349; No. 14355;31 Oct 1919]Saturday, January 31, 2009 Postedby Coffeeholic WritesLabels:Case Digests,Political Law

Facts: The City of Manila, plaintiff

herein, prayed for the

expropriation of a portion private

cemetery for the conversion into

an extension of Rizal Avenue.

Plaintiff claims that it is necessary

that such public improvement be

made in the said portion of the

private cemetery and that the said

lands are within their jurisdiction.

Defendants herein answered that

the said expropriation was not

necessary because other routes

were available. They further

claimed that the expropriation of

the cemetery would create

irreparable loss and injury to them

and to all those persons owing and

interested in the graves and

monuments that would have to be

destroyed.
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The lower court ruled that the said

public improvement was not

necessary on the particular-strip of

land in question. Plaintiff herein

assailed that they have the right to

exercise the power of eminent

domain and that the courts have

no right to inquire and determine

the necessity of the expropriation.

Thus, the same filed an appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the courts

may inquire into, and hear proof of

the necessity of the expropriation.

Held: The courts have the power

of restricting the exercise of

eminent domain to the actual

reasonable necessities of the case

and for the purposes designated by

the law. The moment the municipal

corporation or entity attempts to

exercise the authority conferred, it

must comply with the conditions

accompanying the authority. The

necessity for conferring the

authority upon a municipal

corporation to exercise the right of

eminent domain is admittedly

within the power of the legislature.

But whether or not the municipal

corporation or entity is exercising

the right in a particular case under

the conditions imposed by the

general authority, is a question

that the courts have the right to

inquire to.

Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. ReyesFacts: The Philippine Tourism Authority

filed 4 complaints with the Court of First

Instance of Cebu City for theexpropriation

of some 282 hectares of rolling land situatedin barangay Alubog and Babag, Cebu City,

under PTAsexpress authority to acquire bypurchase, by negotiation or by

condemnation proceedings any private land

withinand without the tourist zones for the

purposes indicated in Section 5, paragraphB(2), of its Revised Charter (PD564). The

heirs of Juancho Ardona et. Al, ) filed their

oppositions, and had a common allegation inthat the taking isallegedly not impressed

with public use under the Constitution;alleging that there is no specific

constitutional provision authorizing thetaking of private property for tourism

purposes; that assuming that PTA has such

power,the intended use cannot be paramountto the determination of the land as a land

reform area; that limiting the amountof

compensation by legislative fiat isconstitutionally repugnant; and that since the

land is under the land reform program, it is

the Court of Agrarian Relations and not theCourt of First Instance (CFI), that hasjurisdiction over theexpropriation cases. The

Philippine Tourism Authority having

deposited with the Philippine National Bank,

CebuCity Branch, an amount equivalent to10% of the value of the properties pursuant

to Presidential Decree No. 1533,the lower


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court issued separate orders authorizing

PTA to take immediate possession of the

premises and directingthe issuance of writsof possession. The Heirs of Ardona, et. al.

then filed a petition for certiorari with

preliminaryinjunction before the SupremeCourt.Issue: Whether the expropriation ofparcels of land for the purpose of

constructing a sports complex by

thePhilippine Tourism Authority beconsidered taking for public use.Held: The

states power of eminent domain extends to

the expropriation of land for tourism

purposes although thisspecific objective isnot expressed in the constitution. The policy

objectives of the framers can be expressed

only ingeneral terms such as social justice,local autonomy, conservation and

development of the national patrimony

publicinterest, and general welfare, among

others. The programs to achieve theseobjectives vary from time to time

andaccording to place. To freeze specific

programs like tourism into expressprovisions would make the constitutionmore

prolix than bulky code and require of the

framers a prescience beyond Delphic

proportions. The particular mention in theconstitution of agrarian reform and transfer

of utilities and other private enterprises to

publicownership merely underscores themagnitude of the problems sought to be

remedied by this programs. They do

not preclude nor limit the exercise of thepower of eminent domain for the purposes

like tourism and other development program

Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) v. Court ofAppeals, 249 SCRA 538

FACTS: Petitioner ISA was created byPD No. 272 in order, generally, todevelop and promote the iron and steelindustry.

PD No. 272 initially created ISA for aterm of 5 years counting from August 9,1973. When ISAs original term expiredon October 10, 1978, its term wasextended for another 10 years by EO

No. 555 dated August 31, 1979.

The National Steel Corporation (NSC)then a wholly owned subsidiary of theNational Development Corporationwhich is itself an entity wholly owned bythe National Government, embarked onan expansion program embracing,among other things, the construction ofan integrated steel mill in Iligan City.The construction of such steel mill was

considered a priority and majorindustrial project of the government.Pursuant to the expansion program ofthe NSC, Proclamation No. 2239 wasissued by the President of thePhilippines on November 16, 1982withdrawing from sale or settlement alarge tract of public land located in IliganCity, and reserving that land for the useand immediate occupancy of NSC.Since certain portions of the aforesaidpublic land were occupied by a non-operational chemical fertilizer plant andrelated facilities owned by Maria CristinaFertilizer Corporation (MCFC), LOI No.1277, also dated November 16, 1982,was issued directing the NSC tonegotiate with the owners of MCFC, forand on behalf of the Government, forthe compensation of MCFCs presentoccupancy rights on the subject land.

Negotiations between NSC and MCFCfailed.

ISSUE: WON the Government is entitledto be substituted for ISA in view of theexpiration of ISAs term.

RULING: Yes


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.Clearly, ISA was vested with some ofthe powers or attributed normallyassociated with juridical personality.There is, however, no provision in PD

No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessinggeneral or comprehensive juridicalpersonality separate and distinct fromthat of the government. The ISA in factappears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentalityof the RP, or more precisely of theGovernment of the Philippines. It iscommon knowledge that other agenciesor instrumentalities of the Governmentof the Republic are cast in corporate

form, that is to say, are incorporatedagencies or instrumentalities,sometimes with and at other timeswithout capital stock, and accordinglyvested with a juridical personalitydistinct from the personality of theRepublic.

We consider that the ISA is properlyregarded as an agent or delegate of theRP. The Republic itself is a bodycorporate and juridical person vestedwith the full panoply of powers andattributes which are compendiouslydescribed as legal personality.

When the statutory term of non-incorporated agency expires, thepowers, duties and functions as well asthe assets and liabilities of that agencyrevert back to, and are reassumed bythe RP, in the absence of special

provisions of law specifying some otherdisposition thereof, e.g., devolution ortransmission of such powers, duties andfunctions, etc. to some other identifiedsuccessor agency or instrumentality ofthe RP.

When the expiring agency is anincorporated one, the consequence ofsuch expiry must be looked for, inthe first instance, in the charters and, byway of supplementation, the provisions

of the Corporation Code. Since in theinstant case, ISA is a non-incorporatedagency or instrumentality of theRepublic, its powers, duties andfunctions, assets and liabilities areproperly regarded as folded back intothe Government and hence assumedonce again by the Republic, no specialstatutory provision having been shownto have mandated succession thereto bysome other entity or agency of the

Republic.In the instant case, ISA substituted theexpropriation proceedings in its capacityas an agent or delegate orrepresentative of the Republic of thePhilippines pursuant to its authorityunder PD 272.The principal or the real party in interestis thus the Republic of the Philippinesand not the NSC, even though the lattermay be an ultimate user of theproperties involved.

From the foregoing premises, it followsthat the Republic is entitled to besubstituted in the expropriationproceedings in lieu of ISA, the statutoryterm of ISA having expired. Put a littledifferently, the expiration of ISAsstatutory term did not by itself require or

justify the dismissal ofthe eminentdomain proceedings.

National Power Corporation vs. Zain B.

AngasG R . N o s . 6 0 2 2 5 -2 6 M a y 8 , 1 9 9 2 Ponente: ParasJ.Facts:On April 13, 1974 and December 3,1974, petitioner National Power


29/37

Corporation,a government-owned and controlled corporation and the agency through which thegovernment undertakes the on-going infrastructureand development projects throughoutthe

country, filed two complaints for eminentdomain against private respondentswiththe Court of First Instance. Bothcases were jointly tried upon agreementof the parties.On June 15, 1979, aconsolidated decision in CivilCases Nos. 2248 and 2277wasrendered by thelower court, declaring andconfirming that thelots ment ioned anddescribed in

the complaints have entirely beenlawfully condemned and expropriatedbythe petitioner, and ordering thelatter to pay the privaterespondents certain sums of moneyas just compensation for their landsexpropriated "with legal interest thereonuntilful ly pai d." Two con secu tiv emot ions for recons idera t ion o f the said consolidateddecision werefiled by the petitioner. The same weredenied by the respondentcourt.Petitioner did not appeal theaforesaid consolidated decision, whichbecame final andexecutory.Thus, onMay 16, 1980, one of the privaterespondents [Sittie Sohra Batara]filedanex-partemotion for the execution of theJune 15, 1979 decision, prayingthatpet i t ioner be d i rec ted to payher the unpaid ba lance o f P14,

300.00 for the landsexpropriatedfrom her, including legal interest whichshe computed at 6% per annum.Thesaid motion was granted by the lowercourt. Thereafter, the lower courtdirected thepetitioner to deposit with itsClerk of Court the sums of money as

adjudged in the jointdecision datedJune 15, 1979. Petitioner compliedwith said order and depositedthesums of money with interestcomputed at 6% per annum. On

February 10, 1981, one of the privaterespondents [Pangonatan Cosna Tagol],through counsel, filed with the trialcourtanex-partemotion in Civil Case No. 2248 praying,for the first time, that the legalinterest onthe just compensation awarded to herby the court be computed at 12%per annum as allegedly "authorizedunder and by virtue of Circular No. 416

of the CentralBank issued pursuant toPresidential Decree No. 116 and in adecision of the SupremeCourt that legalinterest allowed in the judgment of thecourts, in the absence ofexpresscontract, shall be computed at12% per annum." On February 11,1981, the lowercourtgranted the said motion al lowing 12% in teres t per annum.[Annex L , Pet i t ion ] .

Subsequently, the other privaterespondents filed motions also prayingthat the legalinterest on the

just compensation awarded to thembe computed at 12% per annum, onthebasis of which the lower court issued on March10, 1981 and August 28, 1981 ordersbearingsimilar import. Petitioner moved for areconsideration of the lower court'slastorder dated August 28, 1981,

alleging that the main decision hadalready becomefinala n d e x e c u t o r y w i t h i t sc o m p l i a n c e o f d e p o s i t i n gt h e s u m s o f m o n e y a s j u s tcompensation for the lands condemned,with legal interest at 6% per annum; thatthesaid main decision can no longer be


30/37

modified or changed by the lower court;and thatPresidential Decree No. 116 isnot applicable to this case because it is

Art. 2209 of theCivi l Code whichapplies. On January 25, 1982, the

lower court deniedpetitioner's,motion for reconsideration,stating that the rate of interest at the time of thepromulgationof the June 15, 1981 decision isthat prescribed by Central Bank Circular No.416 issuedpursuant to PresidentialDecree No. 116, which is 12% perannum, and that it did notmodify orchange but merely amplified its order of

August 28, 1981 in the determinationofthe legal interest.Issue:WON in the

computation of the legal rate ofinterest on just compensationfor expropriated lands, the lawapplicable is Article 2209 of the CivilCode which prescribesa 6% legalinterest rate or Central Bank CircularNo. 416 which fixed the legal interestrateat 12% per annum.Ruling:WHEREFORE,the petition is granted. The Orderspromulgated on February 11,1981,March 10, 1981, August 28, 1981 andJanuary 25, 1982 [as to therecomputationof interest at 12% perannum] are annulled and set aside. It ishereby declared that thecomputationof legal interest at 6% per annum isthe correct and valid legalinterestallowed in payments of

just compensation for landsexpropriated for public use tohereinprivate respondents by theGovernment through the National PowerCorporation. Theinjunction heretoforegranted is hereby made permanent. No costs

NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1

(1991)

Plaintiff National Power Corporation

(Napocor), for the construction of its 230

KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, its

lines have to pass the lands belonging to

respondents Matias Cruz, heirs of

Natalie Paule and spouses Misericordia

Gutierrez and Recardo Malit.

Unsuccessful with its negotiations for

the acquisition of the right of way

easements, Napocor was constrained to

file eminent domain proceedings. Trial

courts ordered that the defendant

spouses were authorized to withdraw

the fixed provisional value of their land

in the sum of P973.00 deposited by theplaintiff to cover the provisional value

of the land to proceed their construction

and for the purpose of determining the

fair and just compensation due the

defendants, the court appointed three

commissioners, comprised of one

representative of the plaintiff, one for

the defendants and the other from the

court, who then were empowered toreceive evidence, conduct ocular

inspection of the premises, and

thereafter, prepare their appraisals as to

the fair and just compensation to be

paid to the owners of the lots. The lower

court rendered judgement ordered

Napocor to pay defendant spouses the

sum of P10.00 per square meter as the

fair and reasonable compensation for

the right-of-way easement of theaffected area and P800.00 as attorney's

fees'. Napocor filed a motion for

reconsideration contending that the

Court of Appeals committed gross error

by adjudging the petitioner liable for the

payment of the full market value of the


31/37

land traversed by its transmission lines,

and that it overlooks the undeniable fact

that a simple right-of-way easemen

transmits no rights, except that of the

easement.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should

be made to pay simple easement fee or

full compensation for the land traversed

by its transmission lines.

RULING: In RP v. PLDT, the SC ruled

that "Normally, the power of eminent

domain results in the taking or

appropriation of the title to, and

possession of, the expropriatedproperty, but no cogent reason appears

why said power may not be availed of

to impose only a burden upon the

owner of the condemned property,

without loss of title or possession. It is

unquestionable that real property may,

through expropriation, be subjected to

an easement of right of way." In this

case, the easement is definitely a taking

under the power of eminent domain.

Considering the nature and effect of the

installation of the transmission lines, the

limitations imposed by the NPC against

the use of the land (that no plant higher

than 3 meters is allowed below the lines)

for an indefinite period deprives private

respondents of its ordinary use. For

these reasons, the owner of the property

expropriated is entitled to a justcompensation which should neither be

more nor less, whenever it is possible to

make the assessment, than the money

equivalent of said property. Just

equivalent has always been understood

to be the just and complete equivalent of

the loss which the owner of the thing

expropriated has to suffer by reason of

the expropriation. The price or value of

the land and its character at the time of

taking by the Govt. are the criteria for

determining just compensation.

TELEBAP vs. COMELECFacts:TELEBAP and GMA Network togetherfiled apetition to challenge the validity ofComelec Timedue to the fact that saidprovisions: (1) have takenpropertieswithout due process of law andwithout just compensation; (2) it deniedthe radio andtelevision broadcastcompanies the equalprotection of thelaws; and (3) that it is in excessof thepower given to the Comelec to regulatetheoperation of media communicationor informationduring election period.

Held:Petitioners' argument is without merit,

Allbroadcasting, whether by

radio or bytelevision stations,

is licensed by thegovernment.Airwave frequencies have to

beallocated as there are moreindividuals whowant tobroadcast than there arefrequenciesto assign.9A franchise is thus a

privilegesubject, among otherthings, to amended byCongress

in accordance with

theconstitutional provision that"any suchfranchise or rightgranted . . . shall besubject to

amendment, alteration orrepealby the Congress when

the common good sorequires."Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Timehave beenmade by amendment of the


32/37

franchises of radio andtelevisionbroadcast stations and, untilthe presentcase was brought,

such provisions had notbeen

thought of as taking property

without just compensation. Art.XII, 11 of theConstitutionauthorizes the amendment

of franchises for "the commongood." Whatbetter measure can

be conceived for thecommongood than one for free air time

forthe benefit not only ofcandidates but evenmore of the

public, particularly the voters,sothat they will be fully

informed of the issuesin anelection? "[I]t is the right oftheviewers and listeners, not

the right of thebroadcasters,which is paramount."Nor indeed can there beany constitutionalobjection to therequirement that broadcaststations give freeair time. Even in the UnitedStates, thereare responsible scholars

who believethat government controls onbroadcast media canconstitutionallybe instituted to ensure diversity of viewsand attention to public affairs to furtherthesystem of free expression. For thispurpose,broadcast stations may berequired to give free airtime tocandidates in an election.In truth,radio and televisionbroadcastingcompanies, which aregiven franchises, do not owntheairwaves and frequencies through whichtheytransmit broadcast signals andimages. They aremerely given thetemporary privilege of usingthem. Sincea franchise is a mere privilege,theexercise of the privilegemay reasonably beburdened with the

performance by the grantee of someform of public service

Sison vs. AnchetaG.R. No. L-59431 July 25, 1984

Fernando, CJ.

Doctrines:

Where the due process and equal protection

clauses are invoked, considering that they are not fixed

rules but rather broad standards, there is a need for of

such persuasive character as would lead to such a

conclusion. Thus, mere allegations of arbitrariness do

not suffice.

Where the assailed tax measure is beyond the

jurisdiction of the state, or is not for a public purpose,

or, in case of a retroactive statute is so harsh and

unreasonable, it is subject to attack on due process

grounds.

At any rate, it is inherent in the power

to tax that a state be free to select

the subjects of taxation, and it has

been repeatedly held that

inequalities which result from a

singling out of one particular class for

taxation, or exemption infringe no

constitutional limitation.

The rule of uniformity does not call for perfect

uniformity or perfect equality, because this is hardly

attainable. The taxing power has the authority to


33/37

make reasonable and natural classifications for

purposes of taxation. In this regard, the Court

constantly held that classification, if rational in

character, is allowable.

Facts:

A suit for declaratory relief or

prohibition was filed by petitioner Sison,

challenging the constitutionality of Section I

of Batas Pambansa Blg. 135, amending

Section 21 of the National Internal Revenue

Code of 1977, which provides for rates of tax

on citizens or residents on (a) taxablecompensation income, (b) taxable net income,

(c) royalties, prizes, and other winnings, (d)

interest from bank deposits and yield or any

other monetary benefit from deposit

substitutes and from trust fund and similar

arrangements, (e) dividends and share of

individual partner in the net profits of taxable

partnership, (f) adjusted gross income.

Petitioneras taxpayer alleges that byvirtue of such provision, "he would be unduly

discriminated against by the imposition of

higher rates of tax upon his income arising

from the exercise of his profession vis-a-

visthose which are imposed upon fixed

income or salaried individual taxpayers. He

further contends that such law is arbitrary,

amounting to class legislation, oppressive and

capricious in character and that it transgresses

both the equal and due process clauses of theConstitution as well as the rule requiring

uniformity in taxation.

Issue:Whether or not Secti

conti 2 digested (police power)

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