CONTESTATION AGAINST

EXTRACTIVISM AS DEVELOPMENT

AND PEACE STRATEGY IN COLOMBIA Wetenschappelijk artikel

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Sarah Vergaerde Stamnummer: 01105532

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Academiejaar: 2017-2018

Abstract

On the 26th of September 2016 the government of Colombia and the rebel group FARC-EP made an

end to the five decade old civil conflict in Colombia. The peace agreements have received criticism

because they guarantee the continuation and deepening of extractivism, the country´s development

model. This is problematic as extractivism has proved to be one of the main causes and drivers of the

civil conflict and it is now generating socio-environmental conflicts around Colombia. The historical

connection between extractivism and civil conflict pushes forward our main question, namely if

continued state support for extractivism will undermine the success of peace building efforts. This

article argues that it does, based on the incompatibility of the views on the relationship between

extractivism, development and peace between the state and the socio-environmental movements

(SEM). To verify our hypothesis we make use of a case study that zooms in social-environmental

resistance against a gold mining project in Tolima. This article analyzes and compares the views of

the Colombian government and SEM towards extractivsm, peace and development. The Colombian

state supports extractivism on the grounds that the revenues can be used to generate national

development and peace. SEM on the other hand reject extractivism for its destructive impact on the

environment and its inhabitants. Instead they want peace and development based on sustainable

relations with nature and human coexistence. SEM make use of the consulta popular to express these

alternative and contentious visions and halt extractivist projects. In this way they have been

successful to impact on the national development and peace model. However, the Colombian

government has reacted with attempts to centralize political power regarding mining issues. It is to

be expected that the exclusion of alternative views will generate more conflict in the future and thus

undermine the success of the post-conflict period.

Nederlandstalige samenvatting

Op 26 september 2016 ondertekenden de Colombiaanse overheid en de FARC-EP, de grootste

rebellenbeweging in de geschiedenis van de burgeroorlog, een vredesakkoord. Dit vredesakkoord

werd bekritiseerd omdat het de voortzetting en verdieping garandeert van het op extractivisme

gebaseerde nationale ontwikkelingsmodel. Dit is problematisch omdat dit ontwikkelingsmodel een

van de belangrijkste oorzaken en aandrijvers was van de burgeroorlog. Bovendien genereert het

model overal in het land socio-milieu conflicten. Deze historische connectie tussen extractivisme en

conflict lokt onze hoofdvraag uit, namelijk zal blijvende staatsteun voor dit ontwikkelingsmodel het

succes van de post-conflict periode in het gedrang brengen? In dit artikel stellen we dat dit inderdaad

zal gebeuren omdat de Colombiaanse overheid en de socio-milieu bewegingen een tegenstelde kijk

hebben op de link tussen extractivisme, ontwikkeling en vrede. Om deze hypothese te verifiëren,

maken we in dit artikel gebruik van een case study die inzoomt op socio-milieu bewegingen in

Tolima. Uit deze case study wordt duidelijk dat de staat extractivisme promoot omdat de

opbrengsten geïnvesteerd kunnen worden in nationale ontwikkeling en post-conflict initiatieven.

Socio-milieu bewegingen daarentegen verwerpen extractivisme omwille van de destructieve impact

op het milieu en de mensen die daarin leven. In plaats daarvan stellen ze vrede en ontwikkeling voor

die gebaseerd is op duurzame relaties tussen mens en het milieu. Socio-milieu bewegingen maken

succesvol gebruik van een volksreferendum om hun mening te uiten en extractivistische projecten

tegen te houden. De Colombiaanse overheid probeert daarom politieke macht meer te centraliseren

om het voortbestaan van het ontwikkelingsmodel te vrijwaren. De verwachting is dat de blijvende

steun van de overheid voor extractivsme en het onderdrukken van alternatieve ideeën conflict zal

blijven genereren en dus het succes van het vredesakkoord zal ondermijnen.

1

Introduction

In July 2013 the inhabitants of Piedras, a municipality in the department of Tolima, held the

first public referendum to decide whether or not they wanted the presence of the gold

mining giant AngloGold Ashanti on their territories. This was the first public referendum

ever held regarding mining issues in Colombia. The overwhelming success of the no-camp

inspired other mining affected communities in the country to organize a referendum as well,

all of which were won by the opponents of mining projects. Against this backdrop of

widespread protest against extractivism, president Santos started peace talks with FARC-EP

(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo), the largest rebel

group in the history of the Colombian civil conflict. On the 26th of September 2016, after

four years of negotiation and five decades of war, the parties signed a peace accord. It was

agreed that the preconditions for ‘lasting and durable peace’ consisted primarily of

demobilization and political participation of FARC-EP, comprehensive rural and agricultural

reforms, fighting illicit drug trade, victim compensation and transitional justice (Steele,

2016). One thing that was not up for negotiation, was the country’s extractive accumulation

model. The Colombian government argued that the revenues of extractivist projects are

needed to finance peace building efforts. In this way extractivism transformed from being

solely a development strategy to being a peace building tool as well. With assigning this role

to extractivism, the peace accords allowed the continuation of extractivism as accumulation

model. Moreover, because of the disarmament of FARC-EP, vast areas of untouched

territories that were previously under control of the rebels will become accessible to mining

companies. In this way the peace accords not only permit the continuation of extractivism

but facilitated its deepening as well. This is problematic as this accumulation model was one

of the main causes of violence and civil conflict in the past (Thompson, 2011; Oslender,

2007; Ampuero & Brittain, 2005; Hylton & Tauss, 2016). Moreover, the increase in socio-

environmental movements1 shows that extractivism not only sustains old conflicts, but has

given rise to new ones as well.

1 From now on SEM

2

This observation is the starting point of this article. The historical connection between

extractivism and civil conflict pushes forward our main question, namely if continued state

support for extractivism will undermine the success of peace building efforts. Our

hypothesis is that it will, based on the increase of SEM that can be seen as the embodiment of

alternative and contesting views on the relationship between extractivism, development and

peace. These incompatible views on extractivism as development and peace building tool

between the Colombian government and SEMs will generate conflicts. To verify this

hypothesis we will have to answer two questions. First, what are the views of those two

actors on the links between extractivism, development and peace and in what way do they

clash? The second question asks how and to what extent these movements impact on state-

society relations. Does the state allow and accommodate alternative views on extractivism as

development and peace building tool? Or does it try to suppress these views, which would

undermine real peace in Colombia. To answer these questions we will first present a

historical overview of the political economy of extractivism in Colombia and show how this

accumulation model caused, sustained and exacerbated the civil conflict. The second section

looks into the political economy of the peace agreements and shows how these agreements

create the conditions for the continuation and deepening of the extractivist development

model. In this way the peace accords not only sustain old conflicts, but create new ones as

well. The third section introduces the case study that zooms in on SEMs in Tolima. I stayed in

the capital of Tolima, Ibagué, from the 29th of November to the 20th of December. From the

24th of April to the 11th of May I stayed in Cajamarca, a crucial town for the mining project

of AGA. During this period, I talked to four representatives of three different SEMs, namely

Colectivo Socio-Ambiental Juvenil de Cajamarca (COSAJUCA), Comité Ambiental en Defensa

de la Vida (CADV) Ibague and CADV Piedras. In addition to these semi-structured interviews,

I gathered information about the working, strategies and discourse of COSAJUCA and CADV’s

by means of participatory observation. I attended workshops, marches, charla’s or public

talks, public meetings, assemblies of the committees and so on. In the fourth section the

motives of the state and SEMs in Tolima to support and reject mining will be discussed. We

will analyze the discourse of the state and SEM in Tolima from a political ecological

framework which will be complemented with insights from the liberal peace debate, the

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post-development critique, the Buen Vivir principle, ecofeminism, development - and

democracy studies. Much has been written about resistance against extractivist development

models in Latin American societies2. However, this research has tended to focus on social

protest in countries with progressive governments that were part of the so-called ‘left turn’,

referring to a series of victories of left-wing governments in the region at the beginning of

the 21th century (Levitsky & Roberts, 2011). These governments promoted neo-extractivist

policies to distribute revenues from extractive projects. Colombia was never part of this left

turn and has been given less academic attention. Another peculiarity about Colombia is that

this model is proposed as a peacekeeping tool as it is used to finance post-conflict initiatives

(Suarez et al., 2016, McNeish, 2016). This has implications for socio-environmental protest

against extractivism as well, because this protest is not only directed against national

development strategies but peace building as well.

In the fifth section we will pick up on the debate about how and to which extent contestation

against national extractivist development models affects state-society relations (Engels &

Dietz, 2017; Bebbington et al., 2008; Dietz, 2018). The question we want to answer is how

and to which extent contestation on the local level against extractivism is shaping and

limiting state power regarding choices made about development and peace. Again this

article will add an extra layer to the existing debate as in Colombia, contestation against

extractivism as development model is also contestation against a certain kind of peace

imposed by the government. So the protest will not only impact state national development

plans but also whether or not peace in Colombia will be a success. To answer this question,

we will use the same case study as presented above.

2 See for example Svampa, 2015 / Brand et al., 2016 / Dietz & Engels, 2017 / Redner, 2014 / Bebbington et al., 2008 / Porto-GonÇales, & Leff, 2015 / Renfrew, 2011 / Shiva, 1988/ Lang & Mokrani, 2013 / Gudynas, 2013 / Macleod, 2016 / Jenkins, 2015 / Escobar, 2010

4

Political economy of extractivism in Colombia

Historically, unequal access to land has played a central role in the civil conflict in Colombia.

Colombia got integrated in the global economic system at the beginning of the 21th century

when it started exporting coffee. Export agricultural products became the heart of the

economic system, meaning that land was the source of capital accumulation and economic

power, which in Colombia meant political power as well. This extractivist development

model stimulated land concentration in the hands of a small elite and caused the

displacement of many peasants. The Colombian government facilitated this process with

financial and institutional support and the use of state violence (Ampuero & Brittain, 2005 &

Thomson, 2011; Oslender, 2007). Displaced farmers decided to form self-defense groups to

protect themselves from state violence. This eventually led to the erection of guerrilla

groups in the 1960’s who decided to do ‘politics by other means’ (Von Clausewitz, 1997).

They picked up arms to address economic and political exclusion, which that could not be

addressed by means of democratic opposition and negotiation because of the elitist nature of

the Colombian political system (Thomson, 2011). This is why Ampuero & Brittain (2005)

describe the Colombian civil conflict as a rural based struggle for inclusion in national

development processes.

These agricultural tensions were exacerbated by neoliberal transformations at the end of the

20th century (Ampuero & Brittain, 2005; Thomson, 2011). The economic opening of

Colombia started in the early 1990’s under the government of president César Gaviria

(1990-1994). This administration issued a new constitution that included a whole range of

institutional reforms which facilitated the implementation of neoliberal policies like

privatization of state assets and the liberalization of foreign trade (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2010;

Hylton & Tauss, 2016). At the beginning of the 21th century, a financial crisis threw the

country into a deep economic recession. The International Monetary Fund and the World

Bank offered Colombia a loan in return for the implementation of a Structural Adjustment

Program which aimed to shift the focus of Colombia’s neoliberal accumulation model from

the agricultural sector towards the extraction and export of minerals and hydrocarbons like

oil, coal, nickel, and gold (Hylton & Tauss, 2016; Ampuero & Brittain, 2005). This led to a

5

mining boom and the further consolidation of extractivism, which is generally defined as “a

national, growth-orientated development pathway based on rent-seeking activities, that is, the

large-scale exploitation, production and exportation of raw materials” (Dietz & Engels, 2017,

p.2). And this shift has been a lucrative move. Over the past decade, Colombia has

experienced an unprecedented economic boom which transformed the country into Latin

America’s fourth largest economy (Hylton & Tauss, 2016).

However, this accumulation model not only brought economic growth, but huge levels of

displacement and a deepening of the civil conflict as well (Ampuero & Brittain, 2005). It is

estimated that some 5.5 million hectares of peasant land were stolen or usurped between

1999 and 2007 by paramilitaries who were hired by domestic and foreign companies. Trade

liberalization and the increased presence of multinationals also caused a dramatic expansion

of the FARC-EP, who started extorting multinational corporations for protection rackets

(Hylton & Tauss, 2016). It must be clear that neoliberalism in Colombia was implemented in

the context of a country at war (Gutiérrez Sanin, 2010). Foreign extractivist companies

offered an opportunity to all armed actors to enrich themselves and grow stronger. In

contrast to the general assumption that war is bad for business, in Colombia economic

progress and civil war not only overlapped but even reinforced each other (Gutiérrez Sanin,

2010; Thomson, 2011).

In spite of this, current president Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) decided to hold on to the

same accumulation model (Gutiérrez Sanin, 2010). In 2014 he published his National

Development Plan (NDP) in which he presents five sectors that will propel economic growth

in Colombia: infrastructure, housing, agro-industry, innovation and mining and energy. The

revenues are said to be used to finance social economic goals like education, peace and

equality (Willems, Craenen & Tenthoff, 2016.). However, as the NDP holds on to

extractivism, it maintains old problems like land concentration and economic inequality. For

example, the agrarian census of 2015 showed that 81.5 percent of Colombian land fit for

agricultural activity is used for cattle ranching, mining, and agribusiness, while only 20

percent is used to sow crops (Ampuero & Brittain, 2005).

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Political economy of the peace agreements

The end of civil conflict brings opportunities to rethink a country’s development model

(Bustos & Jaramillo, 2018) and to address problems and injustices that might have

contributed to the conflict (Bruch et al., 2016). While the Colombian peace agreements

address some of the main issues of the conflict like political exclusion, state neglect and

displacement, the accumulation model that is partly responsible for these issues stays

untouched. The government legitimates its support for extractivism stating that the

revenues are needed to finance peace building efforts. As a result, extractivism has

transformed from being solely a development strategy to being a peace building tool as well.

In this way the agreements provide the conditions for the continuation of extractivism in

spite of widespread proof that it sustained and exacerbated the civil conflict in the past.

Moreover, with the accords, the government has succeeded to remove “the country’s biggest

obstacle to the extensive reproduction of the accumulation model that has emerged over the

past three decades” (Hylton & Tauss, 2016, p.258). The pacification of territories opens

access for mining companies to vast areas of territory that were previously under control of

the rebels (Bustos & Jaramillo, 2016). In addition to that, these companies do not have to

worry anymore about security of staff and paying of protection rackets (Forero & Urrea,

2016). In this way the agreements not only offer the conditions for the continuation of

extractivism as an accumulation model, but for its deepening as well.

This is why some have accused the president of trying to establish a liberal peace in which

peace is synonym for security and the subjugation of armed actors with the only aims to

establish a secure investment environment to push economic growth (Forero & Urrea,

2016). This concept grew out of discussions amongst academics and policymakers in the

90’s and 2000’s who tried to make sense of wars that were raging at that time. Some came to

the conclusion that poverty and underdevelopment were dangerous and made civil war

more likely, (economic) development on the other hand would bring security (Duffield,

2001). This led to the conviction that malfunctioning, war torn societies should be

transformed into democratic, liberal states that are connected to the global free market

(Duffield, 2011 & Maher, 2018; Heathershaw, 2013). For these academics and policymakers,

7

economic progress was the most efficient tool against war. It is clear that president Santos

and the peace agreements support this idea. For example, during a visit to the Food and

Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO, 2016), president Santos talked about

his ambition to increase the exploration of natural resources and turning Colombia into “a

major food supplier for the world” (FAO, 2016). “Peace in our country is a peace that will

benefit the whole world on many fronts, one of which is that of food security and agricultural

development” - according to the president. However, in the last years Colombia has

experienced an increase in socio-environmental protest. This makes clear that the

government’s idea of peace based on extractivist development is not bringing peace but

more conflict.

Case study

In the next section we will present our case study that zooms in on SEMs in Tolima. A first

aim of this case study is to explore the different views on the links between extractivism,

peace and development of the actors that are involved in a socio-environmental conflict that

can be seen as representative for these kind of conflicts in Colombia in general. In this way

we will show how these different conceptions generate conflict. A second aim is to look how

at to which extent these movements impact on state-society relations. With this case study

we want to verify our hypothesis that extractivism is not compatible with peace in Colombia.

Background information

The South-African gold mining company AngloGold Ashanti (AGA) is the third-largest gold

mining company in the world. The company currently has 14 mines and 3 projects in ten

countries (AngloGold Ashanti, s.d.). The company arrived in Colombia in 1999 but it was

only in 2007 that the Colombian people learned of AGA’s presence after president Uribe

announced that the company had found a large deposit of gold beneath the soil of

Cajamarca3, a small municipality in the department of Tolima4. The company released its

3 Municipality located in Tolima, in the Central Mountain Range of the Colombian Andes. Considered to be

the agricultural heart of Colombia (CSC, 2013). 4 Department in Colombia, contains a mountaineous region and lowland plains. Agriculture is predominant economic activity(CSC, 2013).

8

plans to start with La Colosa, a mining project of colossal scale indeed. Many municipalities

in Tolima were targeted for the future project, Piedras5 for example was planned to be the

place to process the ore (CSC, 2013). The envisioned communities started organizing from

the moment these plans were announced (Bongaerts et al., 2015). In 2011 the first Comité

Ambiental en Defensa de la Vida (CADV) was established in Ibagué. Soon after, many other

municipalities created their own environmental committees. Since 2011 these committees

organize an annual ‘carnaval march’, a big manifestation against mining with tens of

thousands of participants in the streets of Ibagué (Dietz, 2018).

In July 2013 the inhabitants of Piedras organized the first public referendum or consulta

popular6 regarding mining issues in Colombia. The inhabitants had to vote whether or not

they wanted mining activities in their municipality7. The results clearly expressed the

rejection of the people towards the project: from a total of 5105 eligible voters, 2971 voted

against (98, 8 percent) and only 24 in favor. This inspired Cajamarca and other affected

communities to organize their own CP (Dietz, 2018; CSC, 2013; Bongaerts et al., 2015). The

CP in Cajamarca took place on the 26th of March 2017 and 97.92 percent voted against

mining activities in the municipality. The mayor of Ibague announced to organize a CP but

until the moment of writing this did not happen yet.

Theoretical Framework

SEMs like these are the central research topic of political ecology (Robbins, 2004 in Walter,

2004). Social environmental movements can be understood as “a response to the

threats that particular forms of economic development present, or are perceived as

5 Municipality located in the Plains of Tolima, area mostly used for rice growing, cattle ranching and cultivating corn (CSC, 2013). 6 From no won CP 7 The complete question: “Está de acuerdo, como habitante del municipio de Piedras, Tolima, que se realice en nuestra jurisdicción actividades de exploración, explotación, tratamiento, transformación, transporte, lavado de materiales, provenientes de las actividades de explotación minera aurífera a gran escala, almacenamiento y el empleo de materiales nocivos para la salud y el medio ambiente, de manera específica el cianuro y/o cualquier otra sustancia o material peligroso asociado a dichas actividades y se utilicen las aguas superficiales y subterráneas de nuestro municipio e dichos desarrollos o en cualquier otro de naturaleza similar que pueda afectar y/o limitar el abastecimiento de agua potable para el consumo humano, la vocación productiva tradicional y agrícola de nuestro municipio” (Torres Rojas, 2013).

9

presenting, to the security and integrity of livelihoods and to the ability of a population

in a given territory to control what it views as its own resources” (Bebbington, 2008,

p.2890). However, “the defense of livelihood should not be understood only as the

protection of a livelihood but also as the protection of its embedded meanings, values

and identities (Walter & Urkidi, 2017; Bebbington et al., 2008; Engels & Dietz, 2017).

Political ecology offers a framework to study socio-environmental conflicts as

conflicts “linked to the access and control of natural resources and territory, which

suppose divergent interests and values between opposing parties, in the context of a

great asymmetry of power.” (Svampa, 2015, p.68). According to his definition, political

ecologists study the processes of “signification, valuation and appropriation of nature”

by society and state or “the different rationalities about the social appropriation of

nature” (Leff, 2003 in Walter, 2014, p.26; Porto-Gonçalves & Leff, 2015, p.68).

Political ecologists thus assume that socio-environmental conflicts are generated by

different conceptions about the significance and value of nature which lead to

different ideas about how nature should be appropriated by society and state and

how costs and benefits of nature appropriation should be distributed (Dietz & Engels,

2017; Renfrew, 2011; Martinez-Alier and O'Connor, 1996 in Walter 2014). In other

words, political ecologists study the discourse of the actors involved regarding the

relationship between nature-state-society and the power struggle behind socio-

environmental conflicts about who can decide on that relationship (Walter, 2014;

Porto-Gonçalves & Leff, 2015). In the next section we will analyze the discourse of the

SEMs in Tolima and the Colombian government from a political ecological point of

view. This will inform us about their different views on the relationship between

nature, state and society. This section will also draw on the post-development

critique, the buen vivir principle, ecofeminism and the insights of development and

democracy studies to present an overview of how these different actors motivate

their rejection or support for extractivism as development and peace strategy.

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Stance of the Colombian government

Looking from a political ecological point of view, the governments of extractivist countries

claim that, on the grounds of sovereignty, they have the right and power to decide that

natural resources should be extracted to benefit the nation (Bebbington, 2009 & 2012a;

Lang & Mokrani, 2013). These governments present the countryside as “a space to be once

again colonized in order to extract, and profit from” (Bebbington, 2009, p.13). That is why

according to the post-development critique contemporary development can be seen as the

current expression of the “ideology of progress” (Gudynas, 2013). This ideology is the

backbone of the project of Modernity, which originated in Europe and was later imposed on

other regions like Latin America through colonization. Central to this worldview is a belief in

the progressive linearity of history from backwardness towards a better future. The

appropriation and exploitation of nature is accepted to fulfill this goal. This instrumental

attitude towards nature was only possible because of the ideology’s anthropocentrism.

Meaning that in this worldview, the human sphere is divided from and seen as superior to

the natural sphere that is seen as a passive object that can be dominated and exploited

(Gudynas, 2013, p.31; Escobar, 2010; Shiva, 1988).

Extractivism is the outcome of the ideology of progress in which development is understood

as economic growth based on the appropriation of nature. “Again and again, we hear the

myth of the region replete with immense wealth – without environmental limits – that must not

be wasted, but rather taken advantage of intensively and efficiently” (Lang & Mokrani, 2013,

p.26). In the case of post-conflict Colombia, revenues are even said to be used to finance the

peace building process (Suarez et al., 2016; McNeish, 2016).

SEMs in Tolima do not accept this financial legitimization for extractivism. Mining is

lucrative but the economic growth that it creates is only a bubble that will explode when

natural resource prices go down, demand decreases or when stock is running out. Financial

legitimizations did not convince my informants to support the La Colosa project either.

These movements are part of national and international networks and exchange information

about the issues that mining brings along. That is why they know from other projects in

11

Colombia and beyond that the profit for the local economy will be low for several reasons (El

Tiempo, 2018b). First of all, Colombia has the most favorable tax and royalty policies for

mining companies in the region and is missing out on a lot of money (Willems et al., 2016;

Rudas, 2014; Pax, 2009). Second, it is known that corruption is widespread in the mining

sector. For example, the municipality of Barrancas in the Guajira department has received

huge amounts of royalties from the Cerrejón coal mine since the late 1980’s. However, the

inhabitants still live in terrible living conditions because of widespread corruption in the

municipality (Pax, 2009). According to the informants, corruption made it hard to believe

that the revenues will be adequately distributed to finance post-conflict policy and national

development. One informant seemed to be very pessimistic about this: “The government

opens the gates for multinationals. They permit them to do what they want, and the reason is

corruption. They attract these companies just to profit from it, not to benefit Colombia.

According to this person, the peace accord is full of empty promises: “They say, we are going

to build schools, hospitals, highroads, bridges, universities… False. False. Corruption will not go

away. It’s just hollow talk, they talk and talk but do not act. Because of corruption, that is the

explanation” (Personal communication, 11/12/2017). For this informant the peace accords

are nothing more than an attempt of the government to consolidate extractivism and keep

old privileges safe from harm. Another informant complained about corruption as well:

“Multinationals finance the campaigns of the politicians, and once they are elected, they return

the favor to the company” (Personal communication, 10/12/2017). A third reason why

financial legitimizations for mining do not convince SEMs is because they know from other

projects that the mine brings less work opportunities than promised by mining companies

and the national government. In most cases, local citizens only get jobs as basic laborers who

are only employed during the construction phases as during the operational phases almost

no people are needed. Engineers and other technical experts are mostly hired from other

locations like other departments or even other countries (Pax, 2009).

As mining is presented as generator of economic progress, opponents to mining projects are

presented as obstacles to a prosperous Colombia. This is a continent wide trend as

governments of different countries in Latin America try to delegitimize and criminalize anti-

12

mining activists by presenting them as terrorists, anti-development, infantile leftists, childish

and so on (Bebbington, 2012b,c; Gudynas, 2013 in Walter, 2014). Unique in Colombia is that,

as revenues of extractivism are presented as a tool to build lasting peace, opponents of

extractivism based development are also accused of trying to sabotage a successful

implementation of the peace accords by causing an economic crisis. One informant said:

“They threaten that Colombia will become the new Venezuela, that we will face an economical

crisis” (Personal communication, 20/12/2017). At the time of the referendum, the mayor

and AGA wrote an article titled Rejection of Mining Operation Puts Cajamarca Checkmate in

which they warned that the departure of AGA would lead to unemployment and economic

crisis (Hernández Bonilla, 2018).

Stance of opponents

The opponents of the La Colosa project are a very heterogeneous group, with different

reasons to be against the project and with different social positions. However, they still

manage to work together. This is possible because they are united in their rejection of the La

Colosa project (Dietz, 2018). In the next section we will explore the motives of the SEMs to

be against extractivism as development and peace strategy and the alternatives that they

propose. Results from the case study will be combined with insights of political ecology, the

buen vivir principle, ecofeminism, development and democracy studies.

Political Ecological Analysis

Looking from a political ecological view, the SEMs have a very different idea about the

significance and value of nature and the desired relationship between nature, society and

state. In contrast to the Colombian government, they do not think that it is legitimate to

destruct nature solely to generate economic growth. Instead they acknowledge the inherent

value of nature for their livelihood and survival. During the preparation of the CP, AGA did

its utmost best to hide future environmental disasters by a propaganda campaign in the local

media that focused on the benefits of the La Colosa project, like infrastructure improvement

and job creation (CSC, 2013). However, SEMs work together on a national and international

scale and share information and strategies. As a result SEMs are well informed about the

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potential negative environmental impact of mining. For example, on the website of CADV it is

written: “We denounce the extractive development model that is risky and responsible for

severe social and ambiental destruction like we have seen in Campo Lizama and other parts of

the country.” (CADV, 2018). In the case of La Colosa, it has been estimated that the mine

would generate around 100 million tonnes of waste rock that would potentially be deposited

in valleys near the mine. This would make contamination of rivers very likely. The project

also threathened to destruct the sources of those rivers, as some of the concessions

overlapped with the páramo, a unique ecosystem which is only found in the northern Andes

and gives birth to some of Colombia’s major rivers. Studies have shown that water

consumption would be gigantic as well (CSC, 2013). Historically Tolima is an agricultural

region and its inhabitants are strongly aware of the importance of water. “Agua vale mas que

oro” (Water is worth more than gold) is a well-known phrase. The future contamination of

water sources worried all of the informants. “It appears to us that mining in ecosystems and

places like Cajamarca is not viable because it is a mountainous area with a páramo”

(Robinson). Someone else said that: “Cajamarca is a territorium with unique ecosystems. You

will not find this fauna and flora somewhere else and it is so well conserved. It produces so

many resources like agua that benefit the whole community, the whole country.” (Personal

communication, 20/12/2017). Someone even called La Colosa a ‘macaber project’ because of

its environmental impact: “A horrible, catastrophic, diabolic project. Imagine they arrive at

your country, your land, your place of origin, and tell you they are going to cut all the trees and

we are going to contaminate all your rivers, the rivers you use as a water source, to grow food

and to live from” (Personal communication, 11/12/2017).

One informant also explicitly complained about the unequal distribution of costs and

benefits of nature appropriation: “Colombia has been ruled by the same families since a long

time, this is a constant reality, they benefit from these projects, it is the communities that

always have to suffer the consequences” (Personal communication, 10/12/2017).

Mining brings “bread for today and hunger for tomorrow”, as one farmer so vividly catches

the rejection of the unsustainable nature of mining among SEMs (Montaño Vásquez, 2018).

14

Instead of mining these SEMs propose to hold on to agriculture as development strategy, the

traditional economic activity of the region that maintains a more sustainable relationship

with nature. “Mining is not compatible for this region; historically this region is destined for

food production” (Personal communication, 20/12/2017). Someone else said: “The important

thing is that development is durable and that economic activities are in harmony with nature

and the people, in contrary to mining that would destroy everything” (Personal

communication, 20/12/2017). Another person said that development has to be “sustainable

and dignified” (Personal communication, 10/12/2017). One statement really sums it all up:

“We have to benefit from all this richness” (Personal communication, 20/12/2017). Ironically

this is the exact same opinion of the Colombian state and companies like AGA. However, it is

based on a whole different idea about how to benefit from this richness, namely in way that

does not have a negative impact on nature and society.

Buen Vivir

This desire for more sustainable, harmonious relationships with nature reminds of the

academic literature that explores the alternatives to development. According to Escobar

(2010) Latin America is the only place in the world were some real alternatives to the

conventional development paradigm can be found. For Escobar, this is due to the political

activation of relational ontology’s. This ontology is very different from the dualist worldview

of liberal modernity as it does not accept the divisions between nature and human, men and

women, us and them, individual and community. These relational ontology’s can be found in

the cosmovisions of indigenous people who hold on to a holistic worldview wherein

everything is connected. These indigenous communities also reject the other conceptual

foundations of Modernity like perpetual growth, linear progress, appropriation of nature

and anthropocentrism. These ideas of indigenous people have now been popularized and

brought together in a school of thought known as Buen Vivir (Living well) (Gudynas, 2013,

p35). The Buen Vivir principle rejects the assumption of the contemporary development

paradigm that human well being is the result of economic progress based on nature

appropriation. Instead it seeks to establish “another society characterized by human

coexistence, in diversity and in harmony with nature” (Prada, 2013, p.84).

15

As we have seen, SEMs reject extractivism out of a desire for more harmonious and

sustainable relationships with nature. However, they also attach importance to other values

from the Buen Vivir principle like solidarity, coexistence and cooperation between people

(Prada, 2013). These values give them another reason to reject extractivism as in most cases

it causes militarization of the territory, violence and social conflict. AGA is notorious for its

human rights offences, for example in Congo the company financed paramilitary groups and

in 2011, AGA was awarded the prize of Most Irresponsible Company in the World by

Greenpeace (CSC, 2013). In the case of the La Colosa project, experiences of violence and

threats have been reported as well. According to the report A Death Foretold (2013) several

people reported being the subject of intimidation because they expressed their opposition to

the La Colosa project. The people I interviewed talked about this as well. “Our opponents are

not only the people who are against the CP but also armed actors who have tried to harm me

and a lot of my companions” (Personal communication, 20/12/2017).

These armed actors refer to paramilitary organizations who have harassed and threatened

the opponents of the project on several occasions. In 2015 several social leaders and

activists received death threats from an email account that was called Tolima Limpio (Clean

Tolima) signed by the ‘Águilas Negras’ (Black Eagles), an organization of former

paramilitaries. In the email the activists were presented as guerrilla’s that are opposed to

progress (Pax, 2016). They also spread pamphlets in which the alternative press of Tolima

was accused of working together with the guerrilla groups FARC and ELN. This tactic is used

very often and also occurred to our informants. “They treat us like guerrillas and stoners. A

professor from the University of Antioquia said we were environmental jihadists. We are

stigmatized solely because we think different.” (Personal communication, 10/12/2017) This

makes clear how the mining project is used to pick up on old conflicts between

paramilitaries and guerrilla’s. The Tolima region has been marked by violence since the

fifties. The FARC was born in the southern rural area of the department, an ideal place for

the guerrillas because of its impermeable mountainous geography and large presence of

displaced farmers who were easy to recruit. From the 1990’s on, front 21 and 50 of the FARC

gained control over the region, including the villages of Anaime, Cajamarca and the rural

16

areas around Ibagué. The problems exacerbated when the Tolima Block of the Autodefensas

Unidas de Colombia (AUC), the largest paramilitary organization of the country, arrived in

the region in 2002 (PAX, 2016). Not coincidentally, AGA got it first mining concessions at

that time, which gave them ownership over the subsoil; the soil itself stayed the property of

the peasants that own the territory. The present peasants thus created a problem for AGA. In

the following years, paramilitaries and the army used violence, extortion, murder and forced

disappearances to displace more than 5000 peasants in Cajamarca (Carlier, 2017).

Cajamarca also experienced a militarization of the municipality as from 2002 on the National

Army had a base camp in and outside the town, mostly for protection of infrastructure and

staff of the company. The AUC disarmed in 2006 and around that time the army regained

control over many areas in the region from the guerrilla’s, which improved the security

situation. However, the FARC and former paramilitaries stayed active in Cajamarca and

neighboring municipalities. Groups of former paramilitaries like "Los Rastrojos" or "Águilas

Negras" are still active and are supposedly working for AGA, based on the threats that the

opponents to the La Colosa project received. The company denied all accusations in an

official statement (PAX, 2016).

AGA gets away with harassment and anonymous attacks due to lack of political will of the

Colombian state to protect social leaders and because of the political and economical power

of AGA in Colombia (CSC, 2013). And this is a country-wide trend. Research by Global

Witness shows that 32 environmental activists were killed in Colombia in 2017. According to

the organization this is mostly due to land conflicts and assassinations in the wake of the

peace deal (Watts, 2018). Cajamarca has experienced some severe violence as well. César

García, a community leader who was actively involved in opposing the La Colosa project, was

assassinated on 2 November 2013 by an unknown gunman (CSC, 2013). In 2013 one

member of COSAJUCA was shot in the back and one year later another member was found

hanged at a mandarin tree after a search of several days (Carlier, 2017). For the opponents

of La Colosa these experiences of violence in the context of extractivist projects proof that

extractivism cannot be a peace building tool. “Extractivism is an obstacle to peace”, as one

informant put it (Personal communication, 10/12/2017).

17

Ecofeminism

The informants also referred to the specific negative consequences that mining brought for

women. The gendered impact of contemporary development is a central theme of

Ecofeminism. Just as the Buen Vivir principle, ecofeminists criticize the project of Modernity

and its expression in contemporary development practices but for different reasons.

Ecofeminists see historically grown parallels between the exploitation of nature and women

in the name of modernity and development that are seen as patriarchal projects (Shiva,

1988; Aguinaga, Lang, Mokrani, & Santillana, 2013).

Ecofeminists also assume that women have an important role to play in protecting nature, as

they are supposed to be closer connected to it. Some believe that this is the result of the

female essence, which gives women a maternal instinct and an ethics of care that makes

them more likely to look after living beings. Others reject this essentialism and state that

women’s connection to nature is the result of the historical and social construction of gender

identities that assigned caring roles to women (Aguinaga, et al., 2013).

These ideas were mentioned by the female informants as well. One pointed out that women

are more strongly presented in the SEMs of Tolima because they are more preoccupied with

the future of their children and grandchildren (Personal communication, 11/12/2017). This

aligns with the assumption of ecofeminists that women care more about the destruction of

nature because they are responsible to take care of the family. The other female informant

also acknowledged that the impact of mining is gendered: “The whole community is impacted,

but i feel that the impact for women is different and more direct. When we listen to the stories

of women living close to the mine, you understand that they have a greater sensitivity to the

negative consequences of mining. They are more attached to the topic and are more

preoccupied.” (Personal communication, 20/12/2017).

For the Latin American context and our case study the concept of territorial feminism is

important as well. This concept asks attention for the particular experience of extractivism

18

by female socio-environmental activists, and the intersections of the body, territory and

nature in their struggle (Ulloa, 2016). In Latin America women are often the main

protagonists of territorial and environmental struggles. These women who speak out in

defense of nature and territory often put their lives at risk in the process. According to

Global Witness, 122 of the 185 female environmental defenders killed worldwide in 2015

were living in Latin America (Acknowl-ej, 2017). According to territorial feminists the

female body has become a battlefield in these struggles that are not only about defense of

territory, but of life and body as well.

During my stay in Ibague I attended a workshop for the female farmers in Cajamarca and

Anaime organized by COSAJUCA. During this workshop a discourse was used that aligned

with the ideas of territorial feminism. The workshop was about natural gynecology and

traditional ways to take care of the female body, which was important because “women are

the protagonists of change, love and the defense of our bodies and territories” (Cosajuca,

2018). I also joined the girls from COSAJUCA to an international meeting of female activists

for gender issues in Cali, named ELLA. There we attended a talk about the links between the

female body and territory that was called ‘the female body, the primary battlefield’. The talk

was about the female body in a context of extractivism. The female body was discussed as a

disputed territory, as the victim of state violence, referring to the abuse and murders of

female socio-environmental leaders and activists.

These ideas discussed by ecofeminists definitely inform the stance of some members of

SEMs in Tolima and beyond. Realizing that development has a gendered impact shapes the

notion of development and peace, namely that they should promote gender equality instead

of upholding patriarchal structures. Acknowledging the patriarchal nature of development

shapes their demands as well, for example for gender sensitive development and peace

strategies.

Here we have to mention that the original peace agreements were groundbreaking in regard

to gender issues. In 2014 a gender sub commission was established to guarantee a gender

19

perspective during the peace talks. As a result, the peace agreements paid specific attention

to addressing the gendered experience of the conflict and the gendered needs during the

post-conflict period (Kristalli & Theidon, 2016). For example it addressed gender based

violence that took place during the conflict, ensured the of social, economic and political

rights of women and LGBTI groups, made sure women would have access to rural property

and so on (Kristalli, 2016). However, this version of the peace agreements was voted away

by the people of Colombia after a referendum on October the 2nd 2016. One of the main

objections of the no-camp, led by former conservative president Uribe, was that the accords,

and especially the provisions for LGBTQ groups, promoted a ‘confused gender ideology’. This

would affect traditional gender norms of the Colombian society and threaten the traditional

set-up of the family. After negotiations for a new version of the peace accords, a lot of the

special provisions for a gender focus were left behind (Kristalli & Theidon, 2016).

Democracy and territorial autonomy

As we have mentioned before, political ecologists understand socio-environmental conflicts

as conflicts about the signification and valuation of nature, but also as power struggles about

who has access and control over nature and who can decide about distribution of costs and

benefits (Svampa, 2015). In Colombia extractivism as development model is imposed by the

national government, but it is not accepted on the local level. By contestating extractivism,

SEMs question state-society relations and challenge notions like democracy, state

sovereignty and territorial autonomy. These movements have sparked a debate about

questions like who gets to decide on national development strategies, the people or the

state? Who decides about whether or not to extract natural resources? To what extent

should the wider country’s economic development be privileged over the protection of those

who carry the burden of that economic development? To what degree can the state decide -

using the argument of sovereignty - how the nation’s natural resources will be used? (Vittor,

2014).

This debate is of great importance for the social-movements in Tolima, based on official

statements by these groups and what informants told me. One of the informants said that

20

“We are not only fighting against a company. The discussion is also about the development

model that they want to impose.” (Personal communication, 10/12/2017). These movements

want to define their own development strategies. For example, in May 2018 more than 50

SEMs met in Puerto Boyaca for the third meeting of the National Environmental Movement

with the aim ‘to tighten ties of solidarity and unity and strengthen strategies in defense of our

territory, our rights to participation and territorial autonomy’ (CADV, 2018) This makes clear

in the struggle of SEMs demands for sustainable development intersect with demands for

inclusion in the national development process. For example, as a reaction to attempts of the

Colombian government to centralize political power regarding extractivism, Movimiento

Nacional Ambiental (2018) stated that “the people want their fundamental rights to

participation, a healthy environment and territorial autonomy”. The annual Carnaval Mars is

organized “in defense of water, life and territory” in which “No a la dictatura mineria” (No to

the mining dictatorship) is a popular slogan. A declaration of the CADV sums it up very

clearly and shows how SEMs are not only fighting for sustainable development and peace,

but also for democratic rights:

“We are united by common dreams and the enthusiasm to construct alternative ways of

life and sustainability in harmony with the real calling of our territories, with cultural

diversity and with the aim of constructing peace with social and environmental justice.

We denounce the extractive development model that is risky and responsible for severe

social and ambiental destruction like we have seen in Campo Lizama and other parts of

the country. We reject the actions of the Colombian government that tries to restringe

the right to participation of communities that try to defend their territory and the

environment. We warn the people that our constitutional rights, including the right to

self determination of the town, are in danger due to the systematic obstruction by the

national government to the exercise of the consulta popular.” (CADV, 2018)

The consulta popular

With the use of the CP, these SEMs have found a way to channel their views on development,

peace and democracy. The CP is a non-violent and democratic mechanism that enables

citizens to make their voices heard and demand public participation. It is a clear example of

21

what scholars call ‘prefigurative politics’. This concept is used to describe the ways in which

nonviolent movements seek to be the change they wish to see in the world and link means

with ends (Hallward, Masullo & Mouly, 2017, 191). The consulta popular is used by SEMs

across the continent. From the ‘neighborhood referendum’ in Peru, the ‘goodfaith

referendum’ in Guatemala to the ‘community referendum’ in Ecuador (Vittor, 2014). In

Colombia the CP has only become successful in recent years, 92 from the 1122 municipalities

in Colombia have already organised a CP since the first one in Piedras in 2013 (El Tiempo,

2018a. ).Vice

The right to hold a consulta popular was adopted in the 1991 Constitution to give citizens the

possibility to decide on matters on a national, departmental or municipal level. In other

words, it gives citizens the right to decide on the use of the territory of their municipality

when a company like AGA wants to start extractivism projects there. The CP can be

organized on the initiative of local governments but also by citizens, if they can collect

signatures from at least 10 percent of the eligible voters. The proposal is then presented to

the Municipal Council who will decide by voting if the CP will be organized or not. On the day

of election the winning team has to collect half of the votes plus one. The result is valid if at

least one third of the eligible voters voted. The outcomes of CP are binding, meaning that the

competent authorities have three months to undertake the necessary administrative and

legal actions to enforce the outcome of the voting. If they do not, the responsibility is given to

the Senate. If the Senate has not taken its responsibility after three months, the president,

governor or mayor have to take responsibility by decree with force of law. So legally

speaking, the Colombian state might be the owner of the subsoil but its inhabitants can

decide what happens on top of it (Cardenas, 2014; Dietz, 2018; Semana Sostenible, 2017).

According to Dietz (2018), these CP cannot radically transform the existing structures, or the

power relations, neither can they automatically halt the mining projects. However, they do

have a great emancipation potential for SEMs as they create a space for democratic

participation that can be used by SEMs to articulate their interests. The importance of the CP

was also emphasized by our informants. “The most important contribution of the CP is that it

22

puts the economic model in question. In addition to that, it generates hope, yes we can, even

though we have to fight against the richest and most criminal people, yes we can” (Personal

communication, 20/12/2017).

In sum, SEMs in Colombia have found a way to express their views on what kind of

development and peace they want, based on a sustainable relationship with nature, peaceful

human coexistence, gender equality, political inclusion, territorial autonomy and so on.

These subaltern ideas clash with the view of the Colombian government. They want to

impose an extractivist development model on the grounds that they are the rightful owners

of the subsoil and have sovereignty regarding national development. This is why it is crucial

not to speak of development in the singular as within a territory competing models and

concepts of development coexist, sometimes in conflict and sometimes in synergy

(Bebbington et al., 2008). In the case of Colombia these different concepts of development

are definitely in conflict. SEMs are the proof that a real power struggle is going on in

Colombia for the right to realize certain views on development and peace.

Impact of SEMs on national development model and peace building strategies

What is sure is that these SEMs have put the relationship between economic development,

environmental quality, territory, and human rights on the public agenda (Bebbington, 2009).

In this way our case study confirms previous research on the links between contestation,

extractivism and state-society relations. Central conclusions from this debate are that social

movements are able to influence on the political agenda and impact on trajectories of

national development (Dietz, 2017; Bebbington et al., 2008; Bebbington, 2009; Dietz &

Engels,). In this way, rural development is co-produced by social movements, mining

companies and other actors like the state (Bebbington et al., 2008). The question is now, to

what extent are SEMs in Colombia able to change the national development model and peace

building strategies?

According to Bebbington et al. (2008), the extent to which mobilization modifies subsequent

economic development depends greatly on the relative power of the actors involved. In most

23

cases, SEMs have to compete with economically and politically powerful actors like

multinationals and national governments. SEMs on the other hand have to derive power

from their capacity to mobilize big parts of society and open new spaces for debate and

democratic participation, for example by means of the CP (Dietz, 2018). As this mechanism

is constitutionally binding, it has the power of a veto vote against national mining policy - or

at least in theory. On the 27th of April 2017, not long after the CP in Cajamarca, AGA

announced that it would halt all activities until there would be more clarity on the issue of

mining in Colombia (ibid.). Although it is not clear if this decision is permanent, for the

moment it looks like the social movements in Tolima have halted the La Colosa project. And

the success of the CP does not stop with AGA. The Minister of Mining and Energy has even

called these referenda a threat (ibid.) as they already stopped 230,000 million pesos in

royalties that these companies were going to pay to the Colombian government as owner of

the subsoil (El Tiempo, 2018b). So in financial terms, SEMs in Colombia definitely have an

impact on the national development model.

These movements are also able to carry out alternative development strategies in spite of

state support for extractivism. For example in Cajamarca, the consulta popular opened the

door for new economic opportunities. Not long after the consulta popular some farmers

were asked by the food chain Crepes & Waffles to become suppliers of arracacha, a typical

product from the region. The company was impressed by the dedicated choice of the

Cajamarcans for sustainable development and decided to offer a helping hand (Martínez

Polo, 2017; El Espectador, 2017). Tourism in the region has a lot to offer as well. Touristic

destinations include the páramo Anaime-Chili, the wax palm tree forest of Tochecito, the

national parc of Los Nevados and the thermal baths of volcano Machín (MontañoVásquez,

2018).

However, the success of SEMs does not mean that the Colombian government has

surrendered. It is doing it utmost best to centralize political power and limit the scope of the

CP. For example, when the results of the CP in Piedras were released, the government stated

that the CP is illegal as according to the constitution, the subsoil of the national territory

24

belongs to the state. At the same time the Attorney General threatened to sue the councilors

who had allowed the CP to happen (Durán Crane, 2017). And the stance of the state towards

the issue has not changed since. In June 2017 the inhabitants of Cumaral in the department

of Meta held a CP to decide if they wanted to allow exploitation of petroleum on their

territory. The ‘no’-camp won, but the company Mansarovar Energy Colombia did not want to

recognize this result on the grounds that the state is the rightful owner of the subsoil. As a

reaction the company and the Ministry of Mines and Energy filed a complaint. To settle the

issue, the Constitutional Court of Colombia held a public hearing on the 12th of April this

year with the representatives of the different sectors involved. The goal of the meeting was

to decide on the limit and scope of the CP in the future (El Tiempo, 2018b). In the meantime,

a protest was going on in front of the Supreme Court, organised by Movimiento Nacional

Ambiental. For this organization, the public hearing was an attempt “to limit the effect of the

CP and make sure that decisions regarding mining are taken in Bogota, by people who do not

have knowledge of the reality of our territories and the ways we live while causing

displacement and social and environmental damage as well” (Movimiento Nacional

Ambiental, 2018). So for the MNA the state is trying to centralize political power to impose

an extractive development model.

Conclusion

This thesis started from the observation of a historical connection between extractivism as

development model and violence in Colombia. Extractivism as a development model was one

of the main causes of the civil conflict, prolonged the duration of the conflict and is now

generating socio-environmental conflicts across the country. In spite of this, the Colombian

government did not want to negotiate the extractivist based development model during the

peace talks with FARC-EP. They argue that the revenues of extractivist projects are needed

to finance peace building, which secures the continuation of extractivism. Moreover, the

pacification of territories facilitates the deepening of the accumulation model, as large areas

of untouched natural resources will become available. This observation pushed forward our

main question, namely if continued state support for extractivism will undermine the

success of peace building efforts. The hypothesis of this thesis is that it does, based on the

25

increase of SEMs which can be understood as the embodiment of widespread alternative and

contesting views on the relationship between extractivism, development and peace. To

verify this hypothesis, we had to answer two questions. First, what are the views of the state

and the SEMs on the links between extractivism, development and peace and in what way do

these views clash? The Colombian government promotes extractivism on the grounds that

Colombia should benefit from the abundance of natural resources that are found in the

national territory. In other words, the government promotes extractivism as the revenues

can be used to generate economic growth and finance peace building efforts. The Colombian

government sees itself as the rightful owner of the national territory and uses the argument

of state sovereignty to impose extractivism as it is supposed to benefit the whole of

Colombia.

However, the economic growth that extractivism generates is characterized by great

inequality. The accumulation model is based on access to land, which has generated huge

proportions of land concentration and (violent) displacement. In addition to that, corruption

and favorable tax policies make sure that profits flow to the national government and the

multinationals that it supports. That is why the government has been accused of creating a

liberal peace, in which peace has nothing to do with offering real solutions to the causes of

the civil conflict, namely extractivism that caused land concentration, economic and political

exclusion, and eventually the erection of rebel groups like FARC-EP. Instead the peace

agreements focus on disarming the rebels to secure the continuation and deepening of

extractivism in an attempt to sustain the status quo and safeguard its old privileges.

SEM have different views on the relationship between extractivism, peace and development

which come forth from different ideas about the relationship between nature, state and

society. For SEMs, extractivism can impossibly bring development and peace as it causes the

destruction of their environment and livelihood and brings along violence and militarization

of their territory. Instead they demand peace and development based on sustainable

economic activities, human coexistence, gender equality and democracy. They also reject the

argument of state sovereignty and challenge the imposition of extractivism as national

26

development model. Instead they ask for public participation in decisions about

development and peace strategies that are made on a national level. They want to define

their own development and peace strategies as their views on what constitutes peace and

development are different from the view of the government. With their demand for

transformation of the extractive development model and demand for political inclusion,

these SEM do look for real solutions to the causes of the conflict. In contrast to the state that

only looks to address the consequences.

The second question that this article wanted to answer was how and to what extent these

SEMs impact on state-society relations and national development and peace strategies. Does

the state allow and accommodate alternative views on extractivism as development and

peace building tool? Or does it try to suppress these views, which would undermine real

peace in Colombia. With the CP, SEM have found a suitable way to express their views on

extractivist projects in a non-violent, democratic way. This has allowed them to challenge

the status quo and make clear that alternative and contesting views about the national

development model exist. As we have seen, the CP has also allowed SEM to book some

successes in halting, or at least slowing down, extractivist projects. The Colombian

government has even stated that the CP is a threat as it is blocking royalties to flow to the

national treasury. As a reaction, the Colombian government has tried to centralize political

power to decide on extractivist projects to keep the accumulation model safe from harm. For

the moment, alternative views are allowed, but the government is definitely trying to

suppress these views, for example by trying to limit the power of the CP.

As there is no reason to believe that these alternative views will stop to exist any time soon,

it can be expected that the incompatibility between the views of the state and the SEM will

keep on generating conflict. In that way, we can expect that if the state holds on to

extractivism based development and peace, it will undermine the success of the post-conflict

period.

27

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