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Contents
List of Illustrations ix
List of Maps and Tables x
Abbreviations xi
Acknowledgements xii
Introduction: Rethinking Post-Revolutionary Europe 1
1. Endings and Beginnings: Europe in 1815 5
1814–1815: the end of Napoleonic hegemony in Europe 5
Problems of post-revolutionary transition 6
‘Redemptive’ and ‘integrationist’ transitions 10
The Congress of Vienna, 1815 12
Europe’s ‘French problem’ 13
Italy, Germany and Central Europe 15
A framework for international co-operation 18
An evaluation of the Congress of Vienna 20
2. Re-Inventing the Monarchy: France, 1814–1830 22
Continuity and rupture 22
The impact of the Hundred Days 24
The White Terror and ultra-royalism 26
The crisis of legitimacy 29
An alternative style of monarchy 34
Conclusion 36
3. Conservatism and Political Repression, 1815–1830 38
Metternich and conservatism 38
Metternich’s policy in Germany 40
Metternich’s policy in Italy 42
The ‘movements’ of 1820–1821 in Italy, Spain and Portugal 45
Threats of revolution in Britain, 1817–1820 48
v
Revolution and repression in Russia 51
Conclusion 54
4. The Underground Republic: Opposition Movements
1815–48 56
The four sergeants of La Rochelle 56
The frustrations of youth 57
Carbonari and secret societies 58
Bonapartism in France 60
Republicanism in France 63
The barricade 66
Utopian socialism and the ‘social question’ 68
Afterword 75
5. The Fragility of Nationalism 76
The fragility of nationalism 76
Imagined communities in the Habsburg Empire 81
Italy – Mazzinianism 84
Germany – the Burschenschaften 85
Germany – the Zollverein 86
The War of Greek Independence, 1821–1829 90
Conclusion 96
6. The Revolutions of 1830 98
Introduction 98
France: the July Revolution 99
Britain: the crisis of parliamentary reform, 1831–1832 103
Germany and Switzerland: the ‘regeneration’ of the cantons 106
Southern Europe: liberalism and clericalism 107
The Netherlands: Belgian Independence 108
Poland: the ‘November Rising’ of 1830 109
Conclusion 111
7. The Rise of Public Opinion 113
The revival of a public sphere 113
The ‘conspiracy in broad daylight’ 114
Forms of political action 118
The gendering of the public sphere 120
Public opinion mobilized in Germany 123
vi CONTENTS
Public opinion mobilized in Britain and France 124
Conclusion 126
8. The ‘Juste Milieu’ and Gathering Unrest, 1830–1848 128
Introduction: threats to the ‘happy medium’ 128
The July Monarchy and the search for legitimacy 129
The juste milieu 129
Italy – the modernization of Piedmont 132
Liberal Spain 133
Britain – Peel and Chartism 135
Pio Nono 138
Conclusion 140
9. The Jews: The Dilemmas of Emancipation 142
Introduction: the Mortara Affair, 1858 142
Before emancipation 143
The process of emancipation in Western Europe 145
The status of Jews in Western and Central Europe 146
Jews in Eastern Europe 150
Jewish assimilation and Jewish identity 153
The case of the Rothschilds 155
Jew-hatred traditional and modern 158
Conclusion 159
10. The City 161
Introduction: what made Dostoevsky nervous 161
Urban demography 162
Urban poverty 165
Was the city sick? 168
Cholera 171
Conclusion: varieties of urban life 173
11. The Peasant World 175
Introduction: a gradual expansion 175
A world of peasants 175
Economic change in the countryside 180
The consequences of agrarian change 183
Russia 185
Conclusion 186
CONTENTS vii
12. The Crisis of the Artisans 188
Industry without factories 188
Threats to artisan production 190
The social basis of popular politics 192
Conclusion 195
13. Bourgeois Culture and the Domestic Ideology 197
In search of the bourgeoisie 197
Bourgeois wealth, bourgeois values, bourgeois leisure 199
The domestic ideology 201
Divorce 207
Challenges to conventional gender expectations 210
Conclusions 212
14. The Revolutions of 1848 214
Introduction: romantic failure or apprenticeship in democracy? 214
The Revolution of 1848 in France (1848–1852) 218
The Revolutions of 1848 in Germany 222
The Revolutions of 1848 in the Habsburg Empire 227
The Revolutions of 1848 in Italy 231
Conclusion and interpretations 235
15. The Crimean War and Beyond 238
Politics after 1848 238
The Eastern Question and the Crimean War, 1853–1856 238
Conclusion: 1856 as a turning-point 246
Afterword – Europe overseas 248
Notes 251
Recommended Further Reading 275
Index 287
viii CONTENTS
1 Endings and Beginnings: Europe in 1815
1814–1815: the end of Napoleonic hegemony in Europe
The defeat of Napoleon in 1814 brought peace to a war-weary continent.
For more than 20 years, the European powers had been almost continu-
ously at war with revolutionary and Napoleonic France. To be sure, they
had not always opposed France with a united front – far from it, since for
many years their own ancient quarrels had overshadowed the French
menace. Meanwhile, Bonaparte’s diplomacy had offered powerful
inducements to remain neutral, first to Prussia and then to Russia. Since
1813, however, an invincible coalition had gathered around France’s
two most persistent opponents: the Austrian Empire, ruled by the
Habsburgs and guided by the architect of the coalition, Prince Clemens
von Metternich, and Britain, led by its reserved and depressive Prime
Minister Viscount Castlereagh. The victorious Allies dismantled the
French Empire, restored the Bourbon King Louis XVIII to the French
throne, and packed Napoleon off to the island of Elba, near the coast of
Tuscany.
The peace of 1814 was short-lived. Napoleon escaped from Elba, landed
on the south coast of France, and gathered his forces for another attempt at
power. As Louis XVIII hurriedly repacked his luggage and fled to the safety
of Brussels, Napoleon promised France a liberal constitution. In the
Hundred Days, as this brief period was to be known, he tried to distance
himself from his dictatorial past, in order to rally all anti-monarchical forces
to his cause. Only with Napoleon’s final defeat near the Belgian village of
Waterloo in 1815, at the hands of the Prussians aided by the British, could
Europe look forward to a definitive peace.
The year 1815 did not simply mark the end of a long cycle of general
European warfare. It was a turning-point in two other senses. First, 1815
represented the end of the long Napoleonic hegemony which had
redesigned the map of Europe, and imposed French rule on Italy,
Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, the Croatian
coast and (temporarily) Spain. European strategists now had to organize the
continent along new lines in the aftermath of the French imperial collapse.
This chapter will examine how they went about this task, how they treated
5
the defeated power which had dominated Europe for so long, and what
priorities guided them.
Second, the ultimate defeat of Napoleon and his exile to St Helena in the
Atlantic constitute an ideological turning-point. Conservatism was now
triumphant after two decades of the social, religious and judicial reforms
which followed the French Revolution. French conquests had brought in
their wake an attack on the privileges of the aristocracy, an attack on the
seigneurial system, the nationalization and sale of Church property, the
introduction of the Napoleonic law codes and the new French system of
secondary education. These changes offered a more egalitarian, secular and
rationally administered alternative to the hierarchical structures of Old
Regime Europe. French reforms could not be uniformly applied in every
territory of the Empire. The French had to make compromises with local
elites in order to secure their collaboration. In some parts of Europe, like
Spain, French rule did not endure long enough for reforms to take root. But
in those areas which had a long and continuous experience of French rule,
the impact of the French Revolution was very tangible. In the areas closest
to France, which Michael Broers has called ‘the inner Empire’,1 especially
in Belgium, the Rhineland and northern Italy, the revolutionary and
Napoleonic era had a lasting influence.
The aftermath of 1815 therefore had three important characteristics: the
disappearance of Napoleon inaugurated a long period of peace; it forced
territorial and strategic adjustments in the wake of the collapse of the
French Empire; and it comforted conservatives by neutralizing the threat of
revolutionary change. Europe now had to face up to the realities and prob-
lems of its post-revolutionary condition.
Problems of post-revolutionary transition
How was the legacy of the revolutionary and Napoleonic past to be assim-
ilated or rendered harmless? How were the memories of those revolution-
ary years to be either nurtured or suppressed? These questions remained
fundamental after 1815, both for the conservatives who came to power, and
for their enemies. Later chapters will discuss some of the different responses
they gave. Here it is appropriate to introduce some general themes.
The conservative monarchies of the Restoration period (1815–1830) had
an ambiguous relationship with the revolutionary and Napoleonic past.
Those who had been deposed by Napoleonic conquests needed to reclaim
their legitimate right to rule, and to refashion the royal aura of sacrality
which the execution of Louis XVI had terrifyingly shattered. This could
6 POST-REVOLUTIONARY EUROPE, 1815–1856
only be done by condemning the French Revolution and its awful progeny
– Bonaparte, the usurper of thrones. On the other hand, the Napoleonic
machinery of state presented the Restoration regimes with unprecedented
sources of power, based on a centralized administration, more efficient
policing and tax collection, as well as a system of conscription whose
wartime value had been fully demonstrated. In Turin and Rome, therefore,
the new regimes retained Napoleon’s enviable and efficient police force, the
gendarmerie, renaming it the carabinieri. The French Bourbons, and others like
them, had no wish to surrender such advantages inherited from the
Napoleonic years. For them there was no question of ‘turning the clock
back’ to the kind of political struggles which had embroiled the French
monarchy before 1789. Instead, in the areas which had experienced French
imperial rule, rulers found themselves at the head of a state apparatus
which was now potentially more rational and effective than any Old
Regime bureaucracy had dreamed of. The fall of the French Empire there-
fore produced governments whose rhetoric condemned the Revolution and
all its works, but who in practice maintained a pragmatic view of what
should be preserved from the changes of the recent past. Even in reac-
tionary Spain, King Fernando would not reverse the sales of Church prop-
erty conducted under French rule. Marco Meriggi called this the ‘hidden
legacy’ of Bonapartism.2 Many historians still find the vocabulary of
‘Restoration and Reaction’ useful to describe this period, yet what emerged
was not a replica of the past, but something different, which incorporated
many features of the French reforms.3 Rather than a simple restoration of
the dynastic Old Regime, this was a distinctive period of post-revolutionary
change.
Naturally there were many all over Europe for whom the watchword
was not reconciliation, but revenge on the revolutionary iconoclasts and
Bonapartist sympathizers who had overthrown traditional institutions and
attacked long-established beliefs. The French ‘ultra-royalists’ are an exam-
ple of such a group apparently bent on widespread administrative purges,
and demanding compensation for their sufferings in exile. The past,
however, could not be so easily erased. The reactionaries themselves had no
intention of forgetting it. They regularly observed the sinister anniversary
of the execution of Louis XVI on 21 January 1793 – an anniversary which
for them stood as a permanent warning of the disasters to which revolution
could lead.
On the other side of the political fence, republicans all over Europe drew
inspiration from the immediate revolutionary past. The surviving actors of
the French revolutionary drama personally incarnated the continuity of the
historical memory of radical egalitarianism. Ex-revolutionaries in exile in
ENDINGS AND BEGINNINGS: EUROPE IN 1815 7
Brussels and Switzerland, and ageing veterans of the French National
Convention of 1792–3 were a living link with the past, and helped to keep
alive what Alan Spitzer called ‘the underground republic’ in these conserv-
ative years after 1815.4 Napoleon’s belated adoption of constitutional liber-
alism in the Hundred Days provided a platform on which both liberals and
Bonapartists could briefly unite.
Only later in the nineteenth century did the revolutionary tradition
come under more intense scrutiny, as some socialists began to find it confin-
ing, suspecting that constant reference to the great example of 1789 was a
symptom of the immaturity of the radical Left. But there was no doubting
the importance of the revolutionary and Napoleonic decades. As Karl
Marx commented in relation to the 1848 Revolution in France, ‘the dead
traditions of all past generations weigh like a nightmare on the spirit of the
living’.5
The years of revolution and Bonapartist rule in Europe had been cata-
strophic for established regimes. How were these years and their impact to
be confronted, forgotten, or used by the left as a platform for further radi-
cal change? We might envisage Europe’s problem after 1815 as the prob-
lem of managing a post-revolutionary transition. There are perhaps
instructive parallels to be drawn with other twentieth-century regimes
which emerged after decisive historical ruptures. The issues and problems
facing Europe after Napoleon may be compared with issues of change and
continuity in Spain after Franco or Germany after Hitler. The fate of the
Soviet Union and its European Empire after the fall of communism offers
an even more interesting basis for reflection.
The fall of Soviet hegemony in East Central Europe ushered in a
period in which post-communist societies searched for new political forms
and the foundations of a new kind of civil society. Similarly, with the
collapse of the Napoleonic Empire in 1815, the expansion of the newspa-
per press led to the revival or the creation of a public sphere in which poli-
tics could be debated, after years of strict censorship and control. Just as
in Europe after 1815, there were voices seeking to wipe out entirely the
memory of an odious Soviet regime. There were those clamouring for the
restitution of confiscated property, like the French ultra-royalists after
1814, and residents of the former German Democratic Republic in the
1990s. Just as after 1815, there were other voices ready to accommodate
some aspects of the past, and others still, especially amongst the older
generation, who were increasingly nostalgic for some of the certainties of
life in the former Soviet Union. Both 1815 and 1991 were endings and
beginnings, intending to break decisively with the past but unable to
dismiss it entirely.
8 POST-REVOLUTIONARY EUROPE, 1815–1856
Like the Napoleonic Empire, Soviet hegemony had imposed subordi-
nation to the economic needs of the dominant power, and after collapse
both in 1815 and 1991 this economic subservience to imperial interests
was over. A large part of the continent was again opened up to competi-
tion and to the economic powers of the age. In the 1990s, the potential
beneficiaries seemed to be the United States and the European Union. In
1815, British manufactures were once more able to exploit continental
markets which had been partially closed to them under Napoleon’s
Continental Blockade. Great Britain’s new industrial strength and naval
supremacy gave her a global influence which no other power could yet
challenge.
The example of the end of the Soviet Union points to another problem
of transitional politics: the survival of elites with material interests and
power bases firmly embedded in the previous regime. The former Soviet
nomenklatura (the administrative elite of high-ranking privileged functionar-
ies) did not simply dissolve into thin air, but sometimes remained in posi-
tions of regional authority from which they could resist change. Similarly,
former Bonapartist administrators everywhere after 1815 remained a
source of anxiety for the ‘restored’ regimes. The former soldiers of
Napoleon’s Grande Armée posed another problem: when a great Empire
collapses, what happens to its armies? Demobilization was a major political
problem, both for the post-communist east and for post-Napoleonic
Europe. Significantly, former officers of Napoleon’s army were often impli-
cated in revolutionary conspiracies and in nationalist movements after
1815.
To talk in terms of the post-revolutionary politics of transition begs an
obvious question: it is fairly clear what the societies of 1815 and 1989–91
put behind them, but it is far less clear where they were heading.
Transition, then, but transition to what? The political struggles and
Revolutions of 1815–48 were all contests between rival versions of the ideal
destination of this transitional process. Would that end-point be an ordered,
peaceful and authoritarian Europe, as Prince Metternich desired, deferen-
tial to its monarchies and to organized religion? Or was Europe heading, as
the liberals wished, towards some limited form of representative and consti-
tutional government, in which private property would be sacred, and
monarchies would be subject to the rule of law? What were the conse-
quences in all this of the apprenticeship in popular democracy which the
French above all had experienced during the French Revolution? Would
that experience of popular sovereignty be developed and deepened in the
following decades? For as the dominant classes were to discover, liberty and
equality, like the wheel, could not be un-invented.
ENDINGS AND BEGINNINGS: EUROPE IN 1815 9
‘Redemptive’ and ‘integrationist’ transitions
There are no doubt many different models of post-revolutionary transition,
but following Dirk Moses, we might categorize new regimes as either
‘redemptive’ or ‘integrationist’ in the positions they adopt towards a trau-
matic past. A ‘redemptive’ transition is one in which the dominant policy is
to erase and to expiate the sins of the past. A redemptive transition aims at
a spiritual rebirth and a social transformation. The new regime seeks to
distance itself clearly and symbolically from the one it has replaced in order
to establish its moral credentials. To some extent the French revolutionary
regimes of the 1790s fit this model, as they attempted to transcend the
perceived evils of what after 1789 they started to call the ‘Ancien Régime’.
The de-Nazification process in postwar Germany and the purges of
Bonapartist personnel in Europe after 1815 also resemble a redemptive
transition. The French clericals and ultra-royalists aimed to cleanse society
of its subversive elements and to redeem a sinful and violent past.
Redemptive change in this case was compromised by the tainted birth of
the restored Bourbon monarchy, which was established by foreign powers
in the wake of a French national defeat.
An ‘integrationist’ transition, on the other hand, is more pragmatic and
willing to compromise with the previous regime and its followers.
Integrationist regimes accommodate ‘yesterday’s men’, hoping to achieve a
smooth handover of power. Sometimes the expertise and experience of
those who have served a compromised regime are commodities too valu-
able for an incoming administration to discard. In Germany after 1918, the
persistence of old imperial elites in positions of power is one example of this,
although this continuity with the imperial Reich is usually seen as a source
of weakness rather than strength in the new Weimar Republic. To a certain
extent, such an integrationist policy might miss some opportunities for a
radical renewal of the national polity. Similarly, some perpetrators of the
Nazi genocide were notoriously integrated into the German Federal
Republic in the late 1940s and 1950s. In the Spanish model of transition,
too, in the interests of social cohesion there were no trials of human rights
abuses committed under the Franco dictatorship.
Europe after 1815 offers examples of both redemptive and integrationist
transitions, and sometimes characteristics of both appear side by side.
Neither set of protagonists was completely able to impose their particular
vision on the course of events. Some regimes of our period were determined
to repress any move to resurrect the spirit of revolution, and this was
Metternich’s aim above all. In contrast, other regimes (like the July
Monarchy of Louis-Philippe) came to power as integrationist regimes. By
10 POST-REVOLUTIONARY EUROPE, 1815–1856
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organizing the return of Napoleon’s ashes from St Helena, Louis-Philippe’s
Prime Minister Adolphe Thiers tried to incorporate the Napoleonic legend,
and at the same time to circumscribe its disruptive potential. The
Revolutions of 1848 were to show, however, that both redemptive and inte-
grationist regimes were vulnerable to the powerful forces of historical
memory, when harnessed for a revolutionary cause or for the personal
dictatorship of Napoleon III.
The Congress of Vienna, 1815
The diplomatic elite of Europe gathered at Vienna in search of an equilib-
rium between the national interests they each represented, and the need for
European security as a whole. The leading protagonists were the ‘big four’:
Great Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia, although France, Spain, Sweden
and Portugal would also be signatories of the final treaty. Metternich, as
Austrian foreign minister since 1809, had most at stake, since Napoleon had
destroyed the role of the Habsburg Empire as a leading force in Germany
and Italy, and threatened to reduce it to the status of a Balkan power. He
set out to re-establish Austria’s dominant position in both Germany and
Italy.
Metternich, like the other European statesmen, had a lingering eigh-
teenth-century notion of the balance of power, whereby territorial gains
made by one major power had to be ‘compensated’ by corresponding terri-
torial gains by the others. This theory still influenced the way in which the
Great Powers managed their own competing claims in East Central
Europe. The ‘balance of power’, however, was always a flexible and
dispensable concept. Thanks to British naval supremacy, it could only apply
on the European continent itself. No-one contemplated trying to ‘balance’
Britain’s awesome sea power.
Britain emerged in a very strong position, holding most of the overseas
possessions which had been seized during the Napoleonic wars. She
retained Gibraltar and Malta and exercised a protectorate over Corfu. In
the West Indies, Britain acquired Tobago and St Lucia. The Cape Colony
was also now a British possession. The creation of the new enlarged king-
dom of the Netherlands made sure that the mouths of the Rhine and the
Scheldt were in friendly hands. Similarly, when Norway passed from
Danish control to Swedish rule, this ensured that no single power could
dominate the vital entrance to the Baltic Sea, which satisfied another
requirement of British maritime commerce.
Apart from the traditional, but very loosely interpreted idea of the
12 POST-REVOLUTIONARY EUROPE, 1815–1856
balance of power, there were new forces operating in the field of European
international relations. Ideological issues were important, as Metternich
developed ways of suppressing liberal and national revolts wherever they
might occur. European diplomacy had also to reckon with the new ideas of
Tsar Alexander I, who believed international relations could be recon-
structed on a moral and Christian basis. Alexander imagined himself as a
victorious Messiah, emerging from the fires of Moscow to bring peace to
Europe. The Tsar had experienced a religious conversion during the
trauma of the French invasion. He immersed himself in the Bible and
visited the English Quakers, whose pacifism corresponded with his own
Christian vision of the world.6 Metternich found it easy to ridicule such
fantasies, but less easy to dismiss the presence of Russian troops in the heart
of Europe. A Russian army now occupied Paris itself, signalling to the rest
of Europe that Tsarist power could not be ignored. The Vienna Congress
needed to settle the longstanding conflicts between Prussia, Austria and
Russia in Eastern Europe, and it needed to find a framework for interna-
tional co-operation and security in the future. Balance-of-power theory
would prove a feeble instrument for achieving such grand ambitions. First
of all, the diplomats had to solve Europe’s ‘French problem’.
Europe’s ‘French problem’
The European powers sought guarantees for their own security. They
needed protection against French aggression, fearing that any future revo-
lutionary regime in France would launch another war of liberation against
the conservative monarchies, as the French Revolution had done in
1792–3. At the same time as restraining France, Europe needed to rehabil-
itate her. The welcome presence of France’s veteran diplomat Talleyrand
at Vienna testified to this desire to reintegrate France as quickly as possible
into the so-called ‘Concert of Europe’. Nothing in the treatment of France
at Vienna, therefore, prefigured the treatment of Germany in the Treaty of
Versailles a century later. There was no war-guilt clause, no enforced disar-
mament, and a relatively light burden of reparations was imposed. At
Vienna, the victors were magnanimous. France’s frontiers were pegged
back to their limits in 1790. She suffered an army of occupation and was
forced to pay the allies an ‘indemnity’ – we might call this ‘reparations’ – of
700 million francs. Within three years, however, the occupying forces
departed, and by 1820 the indemnity was paid.
The Treaty of Vienna established a ring of reinforced ‘buffer states’
which would stand between French expansionism and the rest of Europe.
ENDINGS AND BEGINNINGS: EUROPE IN 1815 13
On France’s northern frontier, Belgium (formerly part of the Napoleonic
Empire) and the Netherlands were united in a single kingdom, ruled by the
Dutch House of Orange. This artificial unification of French and Flemish
speakers, and of Catholics and Calvinists, endured only until 1830.
On France’s eastern frontier, the Rhineland now became a part of
Prussia, with enormous consequences for the future. The absorption of the
Rhineland was both an asset and a problem for Prussia. The Rhineland
cities had an advanced economy, French-influenced social and legal insti-
tutions, and a substantial Catholic population. They also had strong tradi-
tions of municipal independence, all of which made the culture of the
Rhineland quite different from that of Prussia’s Protestant agrarian elite.
The Köln banker Schaaffhausen shrugged his shoulders in 1815 and
lamented: ‘Well! We have married into a poor family here.’7 The Prussian
annexation of the Rhineland also made it inevitable that any future French
aggression would instantly bring France into direct conflict with north
Germany’s leading military power.
Switzerland, or to be more accurate the federated Swiss cantons, formed
another link in the protective chain of states encircling France. In 1815, the
general principle of Swiss neutrality was first advanced and accepted by all
the powers. It has been a ‘given’ of international relations ever since.
Finally, Vittorio Emanuele of Savoy returned to Turin from his refuge in
Sardinia to reassume the throne of Piedmont, his small Alpine kingdom in
northwestern Italy, which had been absorbed into the Napoleonic Empire.
He profited from some territorial reinforcement, as his kingdom was now
to include the old Ligurian Republic, based on the important commercial
port of Genoa. The Piedmontese now had a Mediterranean outlet.
These arrangements were inherently fragile in at least two respects. First,
the union of Belgium and the Netherlands would not endure. Second, the
system depended on the compliance of the Piedmontese monarchy with
Great Power strategy. As the Austrians were later to discover, this compli-
ance would be reluctant at the best of times, and Piedmontese policy could
as easily take an anti-Austrian as an anti-French turn.
More generally, however, the notion of the ring of states encircling
France was predicated on a false assumption and accompanied by an
impossible contradiction. The assumption that France was Europe’s most
likely disturber of the peace turned out to be alarmist. France after
Napoleon did not have an expansionist agenda in Europe. In 1830 and
1848, the revolutionary regimes which came to power in Paris carefully
reassured the European powers of their peaceful objectives. Europe,
however, remained fearful of French intentions. In 1815, the diplomats fell
into the habit, common to their species, of trying to prevent the last war,
14 POST-REVOLUTIONARY EUROPE, 1815–1856
rather than forestalling the next one. The impossible contradiction of
neutralizing France was exposed in 1823. Then Metternich, far from want-
ing to restrain France’s military action, actually invited armed French inter-
vention in order to crush the liberal movement in Spain.
Italy, Germany and Central Europe
The reorganization of Italy and Germany incorporated much of
Napoleon’s rationalization of the political map, but it put Austria firmly in
control. Austrian domination in the Italian peninsula was based on her
direct rule of Venetia and Lombardy. The port city of Trieste and the
Dalmatian coastline were also annexed by the Habsburg Empire.
Habsburg princes or their acolytes returned to power in the Duchies of
Tuscany, Modena and Parma, which was handed to Napoleon’s second
wife, Marie-Louise of Austria. Pius VII returned to govern the Papal States,
which included Umbria, the Marches and the Romagna (the papal enclave
of Avignon had been definitively lost to France in the Revolution). Within
the Papal States, the Austrians maintained military bases at Ferrara,
Piacenza and Comacchio in the ‘Legations’, the Papal provinces of the
Romagna, so named because they were delegated to cardinals to adminis-
ter. The Neapolitan Bourbons ruled the sprawling Kingdom of Naples and
Sicily in alliance with Austria. All these rulers depended on Vienna to
protect them from threats of revolution.
Austria assumed a similar controlling position within the new German
Confederation, which comprised 34 states, including Prussia, and four free
cities. The member states renounced war with each other, and agreed to
establish a German Federal Diet, or council. The Diet, however, was not
an elected representative assembly, but a body made up of delegates
appointed by the governments of the various German states. Luxembourg
was included, represented by the King of the Netherlands, while Holstein
was represented by the King of Denmark. The final power structure of the
Confederation was the outcome of considerable wrangling between Prussia,
Austria and other German states. Eleven major states each had a single
vote, and the smaller states were to share their votes in units of six. Austria
presided over the Confederation, and many small German states looked to
Vienna for protection against Prussian expansion, as well as against domes-
tic upheavals. This, then, was a body of German princes held together by
its opposition to German nationalism. Metternich was soon to enlist the
German rulers in his crusade against liberalism and nationalism.
In post-revolutionary Germany, however, the enduring legacy of
ENDINGS AND BEGINNINGS: EUROPE IN 1815 15
Napoleon was clearly apparent. The independent cities, bishoprics and
micro-states which had dotted the map of Germany before the French
conquests were not revived. The Napoleonic secularization of Germany
was permanent. The main beneficiaries of this process, alongside Prussia
itself, had been the middle-sized kingdoms of southern Germany. Under
Napoleon’s territorial reorganization, for example, the territory of Baden
16 POST-REVOLUTIONARY EUROPE, 1815–1856
Map 1.2 The Italian States in 1815
Source: David Laven and Lucy Riall, eds, Napoleons Legacy: Problems of Government in RestorationEurope, Oxford (Berg Publishers), 2000.
had grown by 750 per cent, and its population almost doubled.8 Together
with Württemberg and Bavaria, Baden therefore had strong material
reasons to align itself with France. In Metternich’s vision, however, such
sovereign Mittelstaaten (middle states) were a useful barrier against the devel-
opment of German nationalism. Chapter 3 will examine how Metternich
was able to enlist the German Confederation in the counter-revolutionary
cause.
The territorial settlement in Eastern Europe posed difficult problems,
and threatened to resurrect ancient antagonisms between Prussia, Austria
and Russia. Prussia wanted control of Saxony, while Russia demanded
Poland, and these conflicts brought the powers to the brink of another war.
The compromise solutions which emerged reflected Russia’s impressive
military strength. The Russians took control of Finland, and it was they too
who essentially determined the fate of the Poles. The Napoleonic Duchy of
Warsaw was now reduced to a smaller Polish state, known as ‘Congress
Poland’, with a population of 3.3 million, which was effectively dependent
on Tsarist Russia. Between 1815 and 1830, therefore, Poles found them-
selves dispersed among several different territories. About 850,000 lived
under Prussian rule in Poznàn (Posen), and approximately 4 million lived
under Austrian rule in Galicia, the poorest of all these Polish regions.
Others were subordinated to Russia, in the Ukraine, Bielorussia or
Lithuania, or inhabited Congress Poland itself, which had its own army and
its own Polish schools.9 Only in Cracow, which was declared an indepen-
dent city, were Poles temporarily free of foreign rule.
Throughout the eighteenth century, French support had sustained
Polish aspirations for independence from the Eastern powers. Deprived of
this source of assistance, the fractious Polish gentry faced limited options.
For the time being, Prince Czartoryski’s policy of accommodation with the
Russians seemed the only one possible. This strategy was vindicated by a
bizarre turn of events, in which Tsar Alexander granted the Poles a limited
constitution – something which would have been unthinkable in Russia
itself. Although only the Tsar could initiate legislation, Poland had a
Parliament, for which over 100,000 electors, mainly members of the gentry
or szlachta, had voting rights. Paradoxically, the exiled Polish revolutionary
Kosciusko wrote a letter of gratitude to Tsar Alexander, thanking him for
‘protecting’ Poland. Even before the death of Alexander I in 1825, the
future of this relatively liberal arrangement was in doubt and, as discussed
in Chapter 6, a Polish revolution was brewing, which would have fatal
consequences for the existence of a Polish state.
Since Russia dominated Poland, Prussia looked for territorial ‘compen-
sation’ elsewhere for this increase in Russian power. Prussian and Russian
ENDINGS AND BEGINNINGS: EUROPE IN 1815 17
greed for territory threatened to impede the progress of the Vienna negoti-
ations. In the past, the powers might have solved the problem simply by
partitioning Poland between them. This time, however, the Tsar insisted on
a nominally independent Polish state, which was a far more advantageous
solution from Russia’s point of view. The situation was rescued by handing
most of Saxony (except for its capital Dresden), as well as the Rhineland
and the Napoleonic Kingdom of Westphalia, to Prussia. Austria, as we have
seen, annexed Lombardy and dominated the German Confederation.
A framework for international co-operation
Designing a blueprint for European stability was one thing; making it work
in practice was another. At Chaumont in 1814, the allies had already
declared their plans for continuing postwar co-operation when they opti-
mistically announced that their alliance would last for 20 years. In a series
of conferences after 1815, European leaders continued to meet in order to
regulate the security arrangements they had put in place, and to deal with
crises as they occurred. This so-called ‘Congress System’ simply consisted
of a series of summit meetings of the five major powers – France, Britain,
Austria, Russia and Prussia. It worked for as long as it did because all the
powers were in fundamental agreement about maintaining the interna-
tional order which had been established at the end of the Napoleonic wars,
and because they found it useful to tackle problems within a collective
framework.
This consensus was underpinned by two treaties of alliance. The
Quadruple Alliance united Austria, Britain, Russia and Prussia. Tsar
Alexander’s Holy Alliance of the three eastern Empires – one Catholic, one
Protestant and the other Orthodox – was another element of conservative
solidarity, but it also reflected Alexander’s own Christian and ecumenical
objectives. Castlereagh dismissed the Holy Alliance as ‘a piece of sublime
mysticism and nonsense’ but, as far as Metternich was concerned, if
Christian humanitarianism united reactionary rulers against revolutionary
contagion, then he could use it to advantage. In any case, enclosing Russia
within a system of alliances seemed the best way to restrain her expansion-
ist tendencies.
Rifts naturally occurred amongst the victorious allies of 1815, and the
system of congresses did not survive beyond 1823. It had marshalled its
forces to suppress revolutionary movements in Italy in 1821 and Spain in
1823. Tsar Alexander I and his Greek-born foreign minister Capodistria
saw these repressive projects in terms which prefigured the rhetoric of
18 POST-REVOLUTIONARY EUROPE, 1815–1856
George W. Bush. In 1820, the Tsar had faced a mutiny of the Semenovsky
Guards in his own capital, and he now attributed all the revolutionary
movements of the early 1820s to ‘the empire of evil’. Paris was the sinister
epicentre of subversion, propagated by ‘the synagogues of Satan’.10 The
outbreak of the Greek War of Independence in 1822, however, introduced
tensions of a new kind between the major powers, confronting Metternich
and the British with the disturbing reality of Russian military power in the
Mediterranean. As we shall see in a later chapter, Metternich’s system of
congresses could not survive this.
Castlereagh’s untimely suicide in 1822 further altered the pattern of
international relationships. Even before his death, Britain had been rela-
tively unmoved by Metternich’s attempts to organize armed intervention in
Europe’s revolutionary trouble spots. Britain’s principal interests lay outside
continental Europe, and were increasingly focused on protecting her global
commercial connections. For Austria, on the other hand, the stakes were
very different. The Habsburg Empire was a multi-ethnic dynastic state,
which had been thoroughly bankrupted by the Napoleonic wars. At the
heart of Europe, Austria felt uniquely vulnerable to revolutionary threats.
Austria had had no English Channel to protect it from the Napoleonic
onslaught at Wagram, Ulm and Austerlitz. Moreover, the very idea of
national independence threatened its cohesion; it would set Germans
against Czechs, against Poles, against Italians and against Magyars, it
would set Magyars against Slavs, and everyone against Jews. Nationalism
was potentially a centrifugal force which could destroy the Habsburg
ENDINGS AND BEGINNINGS: EUROPE IN 1815 19
Table 1.1 The ‘Congress System’
1814 Treaty of Chaumont: the coalition against Napoleon pledged a 20-yearalliance
1815 Quadruple Alliance: Austria, Britain, Prussia, Russia offered mutualsupport against French aggression, and agreed on regular conferences
1815 Holy Alliance: Russia, Prussia, Austria announced a new counter-revolutionary order based on Christian morality
1818 Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen): Allies decided to withdraw troops from France,and renewed Quadruple Alliance
1820 Troppau (in Galicia): Austria, Russia and Prussia (but not Britain)supported principle of armed intervention to forestall revolutions
1821 Ljubljana (Laibach): Austrian intervention in Naples and Piedmontapproved
1822 Verona: French intervention in support of Ferdinand VII of Spainapproved
1822 Suicide of Castlereagh1825 Death of Tsar Alexander I
Empire. In this sense, Metternich’s struggle against the spread of revolu-
tionary ideologies was a struggle for the survival of the Austrian Empire
itself. Although their priorities were very different, Castlereagh and
Metternich had nevertheless co-operated closely, and Metternich was
shaken by the British Prime Minister’s violent demise. Castlereagh was, he
said, my second self. In his place, the brilliant George Canning gave British
world policy a more independent direction. For Metternich, Britain soon
became ‘gangrenous to the bones with the revolutionary spirit’.11
An evaluation of the Congress of Vienna
The settlement of 1815 gave Europe a century of peace. This is not to deny
that wars broke out, but the Crimean War, the wars of German and Italian
unification, and the Balkan wars were all localized wars, and most of them
were short. Between Waterloo and Sarajevo, Europe was spared a general-
ized conflict, and this makes the Treaty of Vienna one of history’s outstand-
ing diplomatic triumphs. Territorial changes proved necessary, like the
creation of independent Belgium in 1830, but they did not spark off any
widespread conflagration. The Vienna Settlement sought a lasting settle-
ment in which hegemony would be shared, conflicts could be managed, and
the rights of all states collectively recognized. As Paul Schroeder, the most
incisive recent historian of the Vienna Congress, concluded: ‘No other
general peace settlement in European history comes anywhere close to this
record.’12
It was a settlement drawn up by reactionaries keen to crush any revival
of liberalism or Bonapartism in Europe. Yet under Metternich’s influence
they maintained a pragmatic view of the recent past. They were not vindic-
tive towards the defeated power, and after all they wanted to strengthen the
position of the Bourbon monarchy in France. When it suited them, they
believed in the doctrine of the balance of power, and at other times they
ignored it. They believed in principle in defending the legitimate rights of
monarchs, but in practice many petty princes, swept away by the
Napoleonic conquests, were not restored to their miniature thrones. In the
interests of stability, the settlement of 1815 recognized and incorporated
much of the Napoleonic legacy in Germany.
The European statesmen who negotiated the Vienna settlement are
often accused of ignoring popular aspirations for self-determination.
Indeed, they saw no need for democratic consultations. ‘Peoples?’, asked
the Austrian Emperor Francis I, ‘What does that mean? I know only
subjects.’13 The French people were not asked whether they wanted the
20 POST-REVOLUTIONARY EUROPE, 1815–1856
Bourbon monarchy back or not. When the Austrians took control of
Lombardy, no-one thought to consult the disgruntled bourgeoisie of Milan.
Nor did the Genoese have any say in the liquidation of their Republic, or
in suddenly becoming subjects of Turin. The rights of nations did not come
into consideration.
One reason for this was that in 1815 most nationalist movements were
merely whispers in the wind. The Vienna statesmen were inclined to view
conspiracies and uprisings as the inevitable aftershocks of the revolutionary
earthquake, which would eventually die away. The idea of national self-
determination was still the obsession of a handful of intellectuals without a
mass following. We should not read the enormous power of nationalism in
the twentieth century back too far into the early nineteenth. The idea that
there had been a German ‘War of Liberation’ against the French oppres-
sor in 1813 was largely a myth elaborated retrospectively for nationalist
purposes. When, in Livorno in March 1814, the British Admiral Bentinck
invited the Italians to rise up in defence of their liberties, his appeal fell on
deaf ears. In Poland, the French military presence in the country had not
aroused the gentry, although the de facto Russian protectorate produced a
revolution in 1830. To say that the 1815 settlement ignored nationalism is
therefore an anachronistic criticism, for nationalism had not yet emerged as
a serious political force.
With hindsight, we might level another criticism at the Vienna states-
men, and one that they would perhaps have recognized on their own terms:
they had not found an answer to the ‘Eastern Question’. Europe’s so-called
‘Eastern Question’ stemmed from the weakness and long-term decline of
the Ottoman Empire. This posed a serious problem for the Great Powers:
when the Ottoman Empire did eventually collapse, how would the spoils be
divided? Russia’s ambitions for a Mediterranean foothold dated back at
least to Catherine II’s so-called ‘Greek project’. Containing Russian expan-
sion in south Eastern Europe was thus a priority for all the other powers.
Yet international antagonisms in this region were too thorny to disentangle,
and the Treaty of Vienna largely left them conveniently alone. As a result,
the Balkans soon became the source of serious threats to European peace,
from the Greek struggle for independence to the Crimean War and
beyond. Like many of their successors, the statesmen of Vienna found the
problems of the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean too baffling to
resolve.
ENDINGS AND BEGINNINGS: EUROPE IN 1815 21
Abd el-Kader, E. 249–50Adelfi (secret society) 58Agulhon, Maurice 65–6, 119, 217,
278–9, 283Alexander I, Tsar 13, 17, 18–19, 47,
51, 92, 95, 150–1, 185Alexander II, Tsar 243Alexander, Sally 286Algeria 30, 222, 249Alsace 102, 149, 154, 158Alvarez Junco, José 281Amann, P. 219Amsterdam 147, 167, 169Anderson, Benedict 77, 80, 277Anderson, Matthew S. 276Angoulême, Duke of 27Anti-Corn Law League 113, 124anti-semitism 86, 143, 148, 151,
158–9Anti-Slavery Society 125anticlericalism 33, 65, 100, 108,
109Antwerp 109, 162, 164, 166, 167apprenticeship system 125Ariège peasants, revolt of 102–3Arndt, M. 223artisans 54, 64–5, 70, 101, 188–96,
198, 216, 225and 1848 revolutions 214, 220,
226alliances with liberals and
nationalists 112industry without factories 188–90and mechanization 99, 123and politics 192–5, 217production, threats to 190–2in Warsaw 111
Athens 96Attwood (leader of Birmingham
Political Union) 104Austerlitz 19Australia 237, 248Austria 4, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20
bourgeois culture and domesticideology 200–1
and the Church 140Congress of Vienna 12, 13, 21Eastern Question and Crimean
War 239, 241, 242, 245, 246international co-operation
framework 19Jews and emancipation 147, 148Juste Milieu 141Kremsier Constitution (1849) 238liberalism and clericalism 107,
108Metternich and conservatism 39Metternich’s policy in Germany
42Metternich’s policy in Italy 44, 45‘movements’ in Italy, Spain and
Portugal 46, 48Napoleonic hegemony, end of 5nationalism 85peasants and agriculture 176, 180political action, forms of 119revolutions of 1830 112revolutions of 1848 214, 216,
224–5, 230–1, 232, 233, 234,235
urbanization 169Zollverein 87, 90see also specific towns
Austro-Slavism 229
287
Index
Note: the notes section has not been indexed.
Avignon 149Azeglio, M. d’ 38, 114, 120
Babeuf, G. 60Baden 16–17, 41, 87, 124, 146, 148,
223, 224Archbishop of 123
Bakunin, M. 229Baldwin, Peter 284Balkan Wars 20Balkans 21, 39, 90, 178, 179, 239,
246Baltic 181Balzac, H. de 31Bank Charter Act (1844) 135Bank of England 105, 135Barcelona 134barricades 66–8, 100–1, 216, 220,
223, 232Basle 106, 107Basque provinces 135Baumgart, Winfried 243, 286Bavaria 17, 41, 87Beecher, Jonathan 276Belgium 4, 14, 90, 133
artisans and urban economy 188Catholics 77cholera 172and the Church 139Congress of Vienna 20divorce 210Napoleonic hegemony, end of 5and the Netherlands 108–9revolutions of 1830 98, 111–12urbanization 162–3, 164, 166, 167see also specific towns
Bentham, J. 105Bentinck, Admiral 21Béranger, P.J. de 61, 102, 120Berend, I.T. 275Berlin 214, 223Bern 106, 107Berry, Duchesse de, Marie-Caroline
34–5Berry, Duke of 36Bertier de Sauvigny, Guillaume de
278
Bezucha, Robert, J. 65, 278Biedermeier style 201, 202Bielorussia 17biens nationaux 30Birmingham 105, 137Birmingham, David 281Birmingham Political Union 104–5Bismarck, O. von 225, 227, 235,
236Bissette, C. 126Black Sea 240Blackbourn, David 226, 279‘Blacks, the’ 86Blanc, Louis 74, 101, 193, 219, 221Blanqui, Auguste 59–60, 70, 219blood libel 159‘blue horizon’ chamber 29Blum, Jerome 281Bohemia 97, 147, 148, 158, 188,
195, 227Bolivar, Simon 248Bologna 108, 142, 190Bolshevism 52Bonapartism 26, 56, 60–3, 102, 108,
120, 129book-burnings 32–3Bordeaux 149Born, S. 193Bouches-du-Rhône 178Boulogne conspiracy 62Bourbon regime 15, 20, 26, 36–7,
46, 138, 246alternative style of monarchy 35continuity and rupture 23, 24divorce 208Jews and emancipation 149July Revolution 99, 101juste milieu 129legitimacy, crisis of 29, 30, 32, 33Napoleonic hegemony, end of 7republicanism 63White Terror and ultra-royalism
27bourgeois culture and domestic
ideology 65, 100, 197–213, 219,221, 226, 229
divorce 207–10
288 INDEX
gender expectations, challenges to210–12
public and private sphere 201–7wealth, values and leisure
199–201Bradford 162Brandreth, J. 49Brazil 248–9Bremen 90, 147Breuilly, John 279Briggs, Asa 104, 280, 284Bright, John 170Bristol, riots in 104Britain 3, 4, 38–9, 47, 114, 115,
116, 118, 237agriculture 176, 178, 181, 182–4artisans and urban economy 189,
190, 191–2, 194, 196bourgeois culture and domestic
ideology 197, 198, 199, 212–13Chartism 135–8cholera 172, 173commercial treaty with Italy 133Congress of Vienna 12conservatism and political
repression 54divorce 208, 209, 210domestic ideology 204, 205, 207Eastern Question and Crimean
War 239, 241, 242, 243, 247,249
international co-operationframework 18, 19, 20
Jews and emancipation 146, 147,148–9, 155
juste milieu 128, 141liberal bourgeoisie 226liberalism 107Napoleonic hegemony, end of 5, 9Netherlands and Belgian
independence 109parliamentary reform (1831–1832)
103–6Peel, Sir John 135–8Peterloo massacre 49–51public opinion, rise of 113, 124–6republicanism 64
revolutions of 1830 98, 99, 111,112
Revolutions of 1848 236–7threats of revolution (1817–1820)
48–51urbanization 161, 162, 163, 164,
170and War of Greek Independence
93, 95youth opposition movements 57see also Ireland; Scotland; Wales
and specific townsBritish Empire 248British and Foreign Anti-Slavery
Society 125Brittany 179Brock, Michael 277Broglie, Duc de 126Brune, General 26Brunswick 87, 106Brussels 8, 24, 108, 109, 172Buchez, P.B.J. 71Budapest 214Bunsen, G. 86Buonarroti (Tuscan revolutionary)
60Burgundy 102Burschenschaften 41–2, 85–6Bury, J.P.T. 277Byron, Alfred Lord 93, 95
Cabet, Etienne 59, 68, 73–4Cadbury family 206Caine, Barbara 286Calvinism 14, 27, 108, 123, 167Camphausen ministry 223Canada 248Candeloro, Giorgio 43Canepa, Andrew M. 146, 147, 285Canning, George 20, 248Cape Colony 12, 237, 248Capodistria 18–19, 92, 95, 96Captain Swing riots 105–6carabinieri 7Carbonari 44, 45, 46, 50, 56, 58–60,
61, 108Cardigan, Lord 243
INDEX 289
Carlist War/Carlists 47, 107, 134Carlo Alberto, King 46, 132, 147,
231–2, 233–4Carlo Felice, Prince 46Carlsbad Decrees (1819) 42, 86Carr, Raymond 47, 281Carrel, Armand 115–16Castlereagh, Viscount R.S. 5, 18,
19, 20, 39, 95Catalonia 134, 135Catherine II, Empress of Russia 21,
151Catholic Association 124Catholicism 14, 18, 26, 36, 47,
138–9, 140, 167Belgium 77divorce 208domestic ideology 203, 205emancipation in Britain 103,
124France 241Germany and the Burschenschaften
85Italy 77Jews and emancipation 143, 147,
154July Revolution 100legitimacy, crisis of 32, 33liberalism and clericalism 107Netherlands and Belgian
independence 108, 109peasants 187Revolutions of 1848 221, 225Switzerland 106
Cato Street Conspiracy 50Cattaneo, Carlo 77, 234Cavaignac, General 219, 220Cavour, Count C.B. di 128, 132–3,
140, 235censorship 30, 42, 44–5, 51, 54, 55,
113, 114, 141, 229Central Negro Emancipation
Committee 125Ceylon 237Chaloner, W.H. 283chambrées 65Champagnat, M. 138
Charles X, King of France 23, 36,37
Algeria 30Eastern Question and Crimean
War 249July Revolution 99, 102legitimacy, crisis of 29, 30, 33–4republicanism 63
Charpentier (publisher) 118Charter of 1814 28, 29–31, 36,
99–100Chartist movement 49, 105, 113,
127, 128, 135–8, 188, 237Chaumont 18Chevalier, Louis 168, 284Child Custody Bill (1839) 210Chile 248China 249Chios 93cholera 171–3, 231Church, Clive 98, 277Church of England 104Church/religion 3, 22, 27, 46, 48,
134, 167, 176, 203–4and the 1812 Constitution 63see also Calvinism; Catholicism;
Greek Orthodox; Jesuits; Jews;Lutheranism; Protestantism;Russian Orthodox
Civil Code (Napoleonic) 207Clark, Timothy 68, 283clericalism 46, 107–8
see also anti-clericalismClermont-Tonnerre (legislator) 145club movement (Paris) 193, 219co-operative organizations 64, 70–1Cobban, Alfred 198, 285Cobbett, W. 115Codrington, Admiral 95Comacchio 15common land, enclosure or
privatization of 181–2Communist League 75Communist Party Manifesto 75compagnonnages (fraternal association
of workers) 191‘Concert of Europe’ 13, 246
290 INDEX
Congress Poland 17, 18, 19, 51, 150Congress of Vienna (1815) 12–13,
20–1, 147, 249Consalvi, Cardinal E. 44conservatism and political repression
(1815–1830) 38–55Britain, threats of revolution in
(1817–1820) 48–51Italy, Spain and Portugal 45–8Metternich 38–40Metternich’s policy in Germany
40–2Metternich’s policy in italy 42–5Russia, revolution and repression
in 51–4Considérant, Victor 74‘conspiracy in broad daylight’
114–18Conspiracy of the Equals 60Constant, Benjamin 24, 126Constantine, Russian Grand Duke
Nikolaevitch 51–2Constantinople 91, 93, 241Constitution 1812 (Spain) 45, 46, 63Constitution 1831 (Switzerland) 107Constitution 1837 (Spain) 47, 133Constitution 1848 (Italy) 47, 132Constitution 1849 (Austria) 238constitutionalism 47, 98
liberal 216–17, 236Consulta (Roman State Council)
139Cooper, Thomas 194Coppa, Frank J. 281Corfu 12Cortes of Cadiz 63cottage industries 189–90Cracow 17, 150craftsmen 193, 223, 229Crémieux, A. and family 150, 154,
155, 160crime 169Crimean War and beyond 20,
238–501856 as turning-point 246–8Eastern Question 238–46Europe overseas 248–50
politics post 1848 238crisis of 1816–17 38Croatia 5, 82, 83–4, 230, 231Crouzet, F. 283Cubitt, Geoffrey 278Customs Union 42, 85
see also ZollvereinCustozza 234Czartoryski, Prince A. 17, 51, 111Czechs 82–3, 224, 231, 235
Dalmatian coastline 15Danubian Principalities 91, 92, 95,
180, 241–2, 243, 246Daumard, Adeline 200Daumier, H. 1 16, 117, 118, 121,
122Davidoff, Leonore 206, 286Davies, Norman 280Davis, John A. 281de Broglie (liberal aristocrat) 130De Musset (writer) 116De Vigny (writer) 116Deak, Istvan 283Decembrist revolt/Decembrism
51–3, 55Delacroix, Eugene 68, 70, 93, 94,
100, 101Denmark 80, 181, 191, 226Dennis, Richard 284Derby, riots in 104Derry, T.K. 280Dickens, Charles 171diet and nutrition 178–9Dinwiddy, J.R. 277Disraeli, B. 155, 160, 174Dissenters 125divorce 207–10Divorce Act (1857) (in Britain) 208,
209Dom Miguel 47, 107Dom Pedro, Emperor of Brazil 47,
107domestic service 204–5domesticity 210–11Don Carlos (brother of King
Fernando) 47
INDEX 291
Dona Maria, Infanta (daughter ofKing Joao VI) 47
Dordogne 31Dowe, Dieter 283Dresden 222Droz, Jacques 1Dubbelt (Director of Third
Department) 54Duisburg 163, 164Dukes, Paul 280Dusseldorf 227Dwyer, Philip G. 277
East Anglia 182Eastern Europe 3, 4
cholera 173Congress of Vienna 13, 21imagined communities 82Jews and process of emancipation
144, 145, 150–3, 159nationalism 76, 78peasants and agriculture 176, 180public opinion, rise of 126
Eastern Question 21, 238–46economic modernization 182Egypt 239, 241Eisenbach, Artur 285Eley, Geoff 226émigrés 2–3, 23, 27, 28, 30, 34Endelman, Todd M. 155, 285Enfantin, P. 71, 211Engels, F. 2, 68, 75, 170, 174, 217,
223, 224Enlightenment 32–3, 45, 121Epidauros 93Esdaile, Charles 281Essen 170Evangelical Protestantism 125,
205–6Evans, Richard J. 282–3, 284
Factory Acts (1844 and 1847) 135,138
Falloux Law of 1850 221family limitation 178fatherland associations 123Fay, General 119
February Revolution (1848) 218,219
fédéré movement 60feminism 211–12Fenton, R. 244Ferdinand I, Emperor of Austria 40Ferdinand III, Grand Duke of
Tuscany and Archduke ofAustria 44
Ferdinand, King of Naples 231, 232Ferguson, Niall 156, 157, 158, 285Fernando VII, King of Spain 7, 45,
46Ferrara 15Finland 17, 79, 243First Republic (France) 218Five Days of Milan 232–3Flanders 108Florence 116, 166–7Forest Code (1827) 102, 182, 184Four Ordinances of 1830 36, 99‘four sergeants of La Rochelle’ 56–7Fourier, Charles 71–3, 74, 210Fraisse, Geneviève 286France 1, 2–3, 4, 17, 47, 49, 109,
114, 115, 1161814–1830 22–37, 98, 111, 112
continuity and rupture 22–4Hundred Days 24–6legitimacy, crisis of 29–34monarchy, alternative style of
34–5White Terror and ultra-royalism
26–8artisans and urban economy 188,
189, 190, 191, 192–3, 196bourgeois culture and domestic
ideology 198, 199, 200Catholicism 241Chamber of Deputies 99, 101,
102, 131, 220, 221cholera 172, 173and the Church 138, 139Congress of Vienna 12conservatism and political
repression 54divorce 208, 209
292 INDEX
domestic ideology 204, 206–7Eastern Question and Crimean
War 239, 241, 242, 246, 247,250
gender expectations, challenges to211
imagined communities 82international co-operation
framework 18invasion of Algeria 249Jewish assimiliation and identity
154Jews and emancipation 146, 147,
149–50July Revolution 99–103juste milieu 128, 141liberal bourgeoisie 226liberalism 107Metternich and conservatism 38,
39Metternich’s policy in Italy 43Napoleonic hegemony, end of 5nationalism 80opposition movements 56peasants and agriculture 175,
176, 178–9, 181, 182, 183, 184,187
political action, forms of 118, 119,120
public opinion, rise of 113, 124–6revolutions of 1848 214, 217,
218–22, 235, 236secret societies 59urbanization 161, 163, 164,
168–9, 170and War of Greek Independence
93, 95youth opposition movements 57
Francis I, Emperor 20Frankel, Jonathan 285Frankfurt 87, 146, 147, 214, 223,
224Franz Josef I, Emperor of Austria
229Frayssinous, Cardinal 32Frederick William III, King of
Prussia 41
Frederick William IV of Prussia 23,214, 223, 224
French Alps 178French Charter (1814) 63French National Constituent
Assembly 145French National Convention
(1792–3) 8French Revolution 2, 9, 22, 28, 30,
32–3artisans and urban economy 191,
193continuity and rupture 23divorce 207Jews and emancipation 142, 145,
146peasants and agriculture 176, 177
Frevert, Ute 286Fribourg 107Friends of Light movement 123Fulbrook, Mary 279Fundamental Rights of the German
People 223–4funeral processions 119
Galicia 17, 128, 135, 147, 181, 184,186
Gard 27Garibaldi, G. 232, 234–5Gavroche (street urchin) 68Geary, Dick 282Gellner, Ernest 77, 277Gemie, Sharif 283gender expectations, challenges to
210–12General German Workers’ Fraternity
123, 193Geneva 106, 204Genoa, port of 14, 44, 132, 171Gentz, F. von 42German Confederation 15, 17, 18,
40, 85, 86, 223, 224, 238Germany 2, 14, 15–18, 114, 141
artisans and urban economy 188,189, 191, 192, 193
bourgeois culture and domesticideology 201, 213
INDEX 293
Germany (cont.):and Burschenschaften 85–6Catholic movement 123cholera 172Congress of Vienna 12, 20conservatism and political
repression 54, 55domestic ideology 203, 204, 205Eastern Question and Crimean
War 246Federal Diet 15Frankfurt Monday Circle 123Frankfurt Parliament 124, 148,
223, 224, 225, 226, 227gender expectations, challenges to
211gendering of public sphere 121Greater Germany (Grossdeutsch)
225imagined communities 81jew-hatred 158Jews and emancipation 142, 144,
146, 147, 148, 149, 154legitimacy, crisis of 30Little Germany (Kleindeutsch) 225Metternich’s policy in 39, 40–2Middle German Union 87Napoleonic hegemony, end of 5nationalism 78peasants and agriculture 181, 182,
183public opinion, rise of 123–4, 126revolutions of 1830 98Revolutions of 1848 214, 216,
217, 222–7, 235, 236South German Union 87unification 90urbanization 173and War of Greek Independence
93youth opposition movements 57and Zollverein 86–90see also Prussia; Rhineland and
specific townsGhent 109Gibraltar 12Gildea, Robert 275
Ginsborg, Paul 233, 283Gioberti, V. 139, 140Girardin, E. de 115–16Glasgow 137Goldfrank, David M. 246, 286Goldsmid, F.H. 149Goldstein, Robert J. 276Gorchakov, Prince 243Goudchaux family 150Graetz, Michael 285Grande Armée 9Greece 4, 39, 55, 96, 124Greek Orthodox Church 77, 92Greek War of Independence
(1821–1829) 19, 55, 90–6, 239Grégoire, Abbé 146Gregory XVI, Pope 139Grey, Lord 104, 105Grimm brothers (J. and W.) 42, 81Grochow, battle of 111Grogan, Susan 276Grossick, Geoffrey 282Grundrechte declaration 223–4Guelphs (secret society) 58guerre des demoiselles (Ladies War)
102–3, 184guilds 190–1Guizot, Prime Minister 101, 126,
130–1, 140, 218, 227, 229
Habermas, Jürgen 113, 114Habsburg Empire 12, 15–18
artisans and urban economy 188,191, 195
Congress of Vienna 12conservatism and political
repression 54Eastern Question and Crimean
War 242imagined communities in 81–4international co-operation
framework 19Jews and emancipation 144,
146–50, 154Napoleonic hegemony, end of 5, 8nationalism 80peasants and agriculture 180, 181
294 INDEX
public opinion, rise of 126Revolutions of 1848 214, 216,
225, 227–31, 235see also Austria; Eastern Europe
Hales, E.E.Y. 281Halévy, E. 103Hall, Catherine 206, 286Hambach festival 124Hamburg 90, 146, 147, 172Hamm, Michael F. 284Hanover 89
King of 42Hardenberg, K.A. 41Hardy, T. 209Harsin, Jill 286Hartley, Janet M. 280Haupt, H.-G. 282Hearder, Harry 281Hegel, G.W.F. 222Heidelberg university (Germany)
85Heine, H. 147, 156Hellenism 92Hep-Hep riots 158Herder, J.G. 78, 158Herzen, Alexander 238Herzog, Dagmar 123, 279Hesse 148Hesse-Cassel 87, 106Hesse-Darmstadt 87Hetherington, H. 115Higgs, David 28, 278Hobsbawm, E.J. 77, 103, 275, 277Hohenzollern dynasty 222Holstein 15Holt, P. 280Holy Alliance 18Hong Kong 249House of Commons 104, 105, 136,
138House of Lords 104House of Orange 14Hroch, Miroslav 76, 83, 86, 92, 97,
277Hugo, V. 66, 67, 118, 168, 222Hundred Days 5, 8, 24–6, 36, 60Hungary 79
Eastern Question and CrimeanWar 246
imagined communities 81, 82Jews and emancipation 147peasants and agriculture 176, 180,
183, 185political action, forms of 119Revolutions of 1848 214, 216,
229–30, 231, 235see also specific towns
‘Hungry Forties’ 128, 175, 183Hyman, Paula E. 285
Illyrism 83, 230India 171, 248, 249Industrial Revolution 190industrialization 78, 175, 196Infamous Decree 149inheritance 177Inquisition 46, 134, 138, 143, 147intelligentsia 53international co-operation
framework 18–20Ireland 77, 138, 139, 183–4
potato famine 164Isabella, Queen of Spain 47, 128,
134Isle, Rouget de l’ 31Italy 2, 4, 15–18
artisans and urban economy 190Carbonari and secret societies 58,
59Catholicism 77cholera 171, 172and the Church 139, 140Congress of Vienna 12, 20, 21conservatism and political
repression 54‘conspiracy in broad daylight’ 114divorce 208Eastern Question and Crimean
War 246international co-operation
framework 18Jews and emancipation 143, 146,
147, 149juste milieu 128, 141
INDEX 295
Italy (cont.):liberalism and clericalism 108and Mazzinianism 84–5Metternich and conservatism 38,
39Metternich’s policy in 42–5modernization of Piedmont 132–3‘movements of 1820–1821’ 45–8Napoleonic hegemony, end of 5nationalism 79opposition movements 56peasants and agriculture 176, 179,
182, 183, 184political action, forms of 119–20public opinion, rise of 126revolutions of 1830 98, 111, 112Revolutions of 1848 214, 216,
217, 218, 231–5unification 90urbanization 166–7youth opposition movements 57see also specific towns
Jardin, André 1, 278JelacicV, J. 230Jelavich, Barbara 281, 286
Charles 281Jena University (Germany) 41–2, 85,
86, 158Jennings, Lawrence C. 284Jerusalem 241Jesuits 43, 46, 139Jewish Learning movement 154Jews and process of emancipation
142–60, 167Ashkenazi Jews 144, 149, 159assimilation and identity 153–5conversions from Judaism to
Christianity 154–5, 160Eastern Europe 150–3endogamous marriage 155, 157–8ghettos 143–4Hebrew 154jew-hatred, traditional and
modern 143, 158–9Mortara Affair (1858) 142–3pre-emancipation 143–5
progroms 151re-ghettoization 142Rothschild family 155–8Sephardic Jews 144, 149, 155,
159shops as targets of workers’
protests 195status in Western and Central
Europe 145–50Yiddish language 154
João VI, King of Portugal 23, 47John of Austria, Archduke 225Johnson, Christopher H. 276Johnson, Douglas 278Jones, Gareth Stedman 280Jones, Peter 187journeymen 54, 64, 123, 193, 223July Monarchy 62, 63–4, 65, 116,
118bourgeois culture and domestic
ideology 198, 200Eastern Question and Crimean
War 249juste milieu 128, 131and legitimacy, search for 129Revolutions of 1848 218urbanization 163
July Revolution (1830) 30, 57–8, 98,99–103, 115
June Days (1848) 219–20
Kennington Common march 138Kertzer, David I. 285Kielstra, Paul M. 284Kiev 151, 163, 169, 171Kieval, Hillel J. 285Kingsley, Charles 161Kollar, J. 82Köln 123, 124, 163, 166Kolokotrones, T. 92Kolowrat (politician) 40Kosciusko, T.A.B. 17Kossmann, E.H. 280Kossuth, L. 119, 230, 231Kotzebue, A.F.F. von 42, 86Kremsier Constitution (1849) 238Kroen, Sheryl T. 33, 37, 278
296 INDEX
Krupp 170Kudlick, Catherine 173, 284
Labrousse, Ernest 283Ladies’ Society for the Relief of
Negro Slaves 125Lafayette (revolutionary) 59, 63, 98,
100, 103Lafitte, Jacques 101Lamarque, General 119Lamartine, A. de 219Lamennais, abbé 71, 139Lancashire 49, 137, 192Landwehr 41language 78–80, 81–2, 83Las Cases, E.D., Comte de 62Laslett, Peter 178Latin America 248Lausanne 106, 107Laven, David 43, 276, 281Le Creusot 170Ledru-Rollin, A.A. 220Lee, W.R. 279Leeds 162Legal Reading Club 119Legations 15legitimists 23Leicester 49Leipzig 85
Schillerfest 123Lenin, V.I. 31, 52, 60Leopold, Grand Duke of Habsburg
44Leopold of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha 109Leplay, F. 182Leslie, R.F. 277liberal constitutionalism 216–17, 236liberalism 15, 47–8, 54, 56, 98,
107–8, 133–5, 216and 1848 revolutions 214Italy 132
libraries 194Liège 109Limoges 172Linda, Josef 81linguistic politics 81–2Linz 227
Lis, Catharina 284literary salons 121, 123Lithuania 17, 78, 111Little Germany (Kleindeutsch) 225Livermore, H.V. 281Liverpool 162, 164Livorno, port of 21, 44, 45, 147, 171Lofland, L. 201–2Lombardy 15, 18, 21, 43, 44, 45, 97,
232economic change 183Jewish communities 147revoutions of 1848 233, 234
London 114, 147, 161, 162, 172,174, 204
London Working Men’s Association136
Louis XVI, King 7, 22, 24, 29, 31,33–4
Louis XVII, King 29Louis XVIII, King 5, 37
continuity and rupture 23, 24death of 29Hundred Days 25, 26legitimacy, crisis of 30, 34White Terror and ultra-royalism
27, 28Louis-Philippe, King 100–1, 116,
117, 128, 129, 218Lovett, William 194Lübeck 147Lucca 120Ludwig I of Bavaria 123Lutheranism 123, 167Luxembourg 15, 89
Commission 219Lyon 64, 74, 128, 191
uprising (1834) 64–5, 102, 188,189
Macartney, C.A. 279McBride, Theresa 286McPhee, Peter 65–6, 278, 282Madrid 134Magraw, Roger 222, 278Mahmud, Sultan 241Mainz 195
INDEX 297
Malta 12Malthus, T. 165Manchester 49, 137, 162, 164, 170,
174Manin, Daniele 233, 234Margadant, Jo Burr 278Margadant, Ted 282Marie-Louise of Austria 15, 44Mario, Jesse White 172Marist brothers 138Marrinan, Michael 278Marseilles 26, 192Marx, Karl 2, 8, 75, 101, 154, 197,
198, 217, 283revolutions of 1848 219–20, 222,
224, 225–6utopian socialism and the ‘social
question’ 68, 70, 71Marxism 151Masonic lodges 51, 119, 150, 154Mastai-Ferretti, Cardinal (bishop of
Imola) see Pius IX, PopeMaza, Sarah 197, 285Mazowiecki, T. 3Mazzini, G. 84–5, 96, 114
Carbonari and secret societies 58,59
Revolutions of 1848 232, 233, 234Mazzinianism 84–5Mechanics’ Institutes 194medical care 179Mediterranean 92Meissonnier, E. 68, 69Mendizábal government 134Meriggi, Marco 7Merriman, John M. 283, 284Merthyr Tydfil, riots in 104Mesta (sheep grazier corporation)
133–4Metternich, Prince C.L.W. 5, 15,
17, 511820 uprisings 55Concert of Europe 246Congress of Vienna 12, 13and conservatism 3 8–40‘conspiracy in broad daylight’
114
Eastern Question and CrimeanWar 242, 247
Germany and the Burschenschaften85, 86
Germany and Switzerland andregeneration of the cantons 106
Germany and the Zollverein 87international co-operation
framework 18, 19, 20‘movements’ in Italy, Spain and
Portugal 45, 46–7, 48Napoleonic hegemony, end of 9nationalism 76Netherlands and Belgian
independence 109policy in Germany 40–2policy in Italy 42–5politics post 1848 238public opinion, rise of 124, 126revolutions of 1830 112Revolutions of 1848 227, 229,
230, 232and Third Department 54utopian socialism and the ‘social
question’ 73views on Popes 140War of Greek Independence 95
Mexico 248Midgley, Clare 284Mignet, F.A.M. 101migration 163–4, 168, 177–8Miguelists 39, 47Milan 43, 45, 66, 68, 116, 120, 214
revolutions of 1848 232, 234Millet, J.F. 180milliard des émigrés 30Milward, Alan S. 275Mines Act (1842) 135Mitchell, B.R. 275Modena 15, 44, 108, 147, 234moderados (Spain) 133–4Moldavia 91, 243Montefiore, Sir M. 142, 149Montenegro 242Moon, David 281–2Mortara Affair (1858) 142–3, 158,
160
298 INDEX
Moscow 13, 53, 62, 162, 186Moulin, Annie 282Münchengratz, Convention of 112Munich 222mutual aid societies 64
Nada, Narciso 234Nadaud, M. 163–4, 194Namier, Sir Lewis 217, 282Naples 15, 40, 44, 45–6, 48, 119,
120agrarian change 184cholera 171, 172economic change 182Revolutions of 1848 218, 231
Napoleon I (Bonaparte) 2, 60, 242Civil Code 207constitutional liberalism 8Continental Blockade 9continuity and rupture 23defeat of 246exiled 5Hundred Days 26July Monarchy and search for
legitimacy 129legitimacy, crisis of 31Metternich and conservatism 39,
43, 45Peninsular War 46return of ashes from St Helena 12sale of Church property 44settlement with Catholic Church 36slavery 126
Napoleon III, Emperor (CharlesLouis Napoléon Bonaparte) 59,60, 62
Eastern Question and CrimeanWar 2 41, 246
election of 238Revolutions of 1848 214, 216,
220–2, 232, 235, 236seizure of power 2
Napoleonic Codes 29–30, 41, 208Napoleonic hegemony, end of
(1814–15) 5–12Napoleonic Wars 19, 40Naquet Law (1884) 208
Narváez, General 134Nassau 41, 87National Convention (1793) 24, 63National Guard (France) 102, 229National Union of the Working
Classes 105National Workshops 219nationalism 3, 15, 17, 19, 54, 76–97,
216–17, 236fragility of 76–81Germany and Burschenschaften 85–6Germany and Zollverein 86–90Habsburg Empire, imagined
communities in 81–4Italy and Mazzinianism 84–5War of Greek Independence
(1821–1829) 90–6Navarino, battle of 95Nesselrode, Count K.R. 40Netherlands 14
Belgian independence 108–9Congress of Vienna 12divorce 208Jews and emancipation 146, 147,
149Napoleonic hegemony, end of 5peasants and agriculture 183–4potato famine 183–4revolutions of 1830 98urbanization 167, 169see also specific towns
New Zealand 237, 248Newman, Edgar Leon 100, 277newspapers 114–16, 193, 219, 224Ney, Marshal 24, 26Nicholas I, Tsar 53, 95, 111, 151,
238, 242Nightingale, Florence 243Nipperdey, Thomas 279Normandy 183Northern Society 52Norway 12, 79, 80, 82, 98notables 131Nottingham 49, 104Novara 234Nuisances Removal and Disease
Protection Act (1855) 173
INDEX 299
O’Boyle, Lenore 57, 197, 276, 285O’Connell, D. 124O’Connor, Fergus 137Odessa 92, 151, 153O’Higgins, B. 248Okey, Robin 279Old Regime 2, 22, 23, 27, 73, 103,
108, 115bureaucracy 7Cobban’s views on 198discriminatory legislation in Italian
states 147hospitals 166Jews in Frankfurt 144pageantry 34and resacralization 31social structures 41values in decline 40
Oldham 174Opium War (1839–42) 249Oporto (Portugal) 47Orleanists 101, 102, 129–30Orthodox Patriarch 90–1Orton, Lawrence D. 283Otto of Bavaria, Prince (King of
Greece) 96Otto, Louise 211–12Ottoman Empire 21, 90, 239, 241,
242Oudinot, General 232Owen, Robert 68, 72Ozanam, F. 138, 208
Palacky, F. 82, 229Pale of Settlement 151–2Palermo 45–6, 67, 218, 234Palestine 241Palmerston, Lord H.J.T. 39, 109,
209, 242pamphlets 219Papal States 15, 44, 98, 107, 114,
142, 147revolutions of 1848 231, 234
Paris:and 1848 revolutions 217, 219,
220anticlericalism 100
barricades 66, 68bombing (1835) 128bourgeoisie 199, 200cholera 172, 173club movement 193diet and nutrition 178–9economic change 183Education Ministry 38Jewish communities 149July Revolution 100, 102newspapers 116overthrow of July monarchy 214pamphlet literature 113public sphere 114threats to artisan production 191urbanization 161, 164, 168–9women’s involvement in politics
211youth movements 57–8
Parma 15, 44, 108, 147, 234Pasha of Egypt (Mohammed Ali) 93,
239, 241Peace of Paris (1856) 243Peace of Vienna 246peasants 216, 217, 225, 226, 230
emancipation 231protests 99radicalism 65republicanism 66in Switzerland 107
peasants and agriculture 175–87consequences of agrarian change
183–4economic change 180–3Russia 185–6
Pech, Stanley Z. 277Peel, Sir R. 105, 128, 135–8, 140Pellerin (engraver) 61–2Pellico, Silvio 132Peloponnese 92, 93, 95, 96, 250Peninsular War 46Pentridge Rising 49Péreires family 150, 154Périer, Casimir 101–2periodicals 193Perkin, Harold 280Perrot, Michelle 285–6
300 INDEX
Pestel, P.I. 52, 53Peterloo massacre 49–51petitions 49, 224Petrashevsky conspiracy 54Phanariots 91–2Philhellenic movement 93, 95, 124Philipon, C. 116, 118, 120Piacenza 15, 44Picardy 176Piedmont 14, 38, 44, 45, 46, 48,
84–5, 128, 246and constitution 238Jewish communities 147modernization 132–3Revolutions of 1848 231, 233,
234Piedmont-Sardinia 43, 233Pilbeam, Pamela 73, 198, 199, 276,
277, 285Pinkney, David 277Pius IX, Pope (Cardinal Mastai-
Ferretti, bishop of Imola) (‘PioNono’) 15, 44, 128, 138–40,142, 231
Plug Plot 137Po valley 184Poland 2, 4, 18, 54, 128
cholera 173Congress of Vienna 21Diet or Sejm 51Eastern Question and Crimean
War 243Jews and emancipation 146, 149,
150–1Napoleonic hegemony, end of 5nationalism 77‘November Rising’ 109–11Partitions 148, 151peasants and agriculture 176, 185revolutions of 1830 98, 111, 112,
151Revolutions of 1848 224, 229, 235see also Congress Poland and
specific townspolice repression 42Polignac, Prime Minister 28, 36, 99political banquet 118–19
political caricature 116–18political clubs 224, 225political repression see conservatism
and political repressionpolitics of forgetting 30–1Poor Law reform 136, 138, 167poor relief 166–8popular politics 4population expansion 98–9, 181,
196Portugal 4, 22–3, 248, 249
clericalism 107Congress of Vienna 12conservatism and political
repression 54divorce 208Eastern Question and Crimean
War 248, 249Jews and emancipation 144liberalism 107, 134Metternich and conservatism 39‘movements of 1820–1821’ 45–8revolutions of 1830 98
potato famine (1846) 183–4Pouthas, C. 163Poznàn (Posen) 17, 146, 148, 224Prague 68, 195, 214‘Pre-March’ (Vormarz) 85press freedom 99Price, Roger 283print nationalism 55, 80producers’ co-operatives 194progresistas (Spain) 133, 135proletariat 219–20pronunciamento (revolutionary
manifesto) 46Prothero, Iorwerth 282Protestantism 18, 27, 85, 108, 123,
126, 176, 182, 225Dissent 213and divorce 208, 210Evangelical 107, 125, 205–6Nonconformists 103in Switzerland 106, 218
proto-industrialization 189Proudhon, P.J. 70–1, 74Provence 26, 178
INDEX 301
Provisional Government of 1848(France) 218–19
Prussia 4, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 182artisans and urban economy 192bourgeois culture and domestic
ideology 197, 199cholera 173Congress of Vienna 12, 13Customs Union 42divorce 208, 209, 210Eastern Question and Crimean
War 246Jews and emancipation 146–8,
150, 154Metternich’s policy in Germany
40–1, 42Napoleonic hegemony, end of 5National Assembly (1848) 227nationalism 85peasants and agriculture 176,
180–1, 182politics post-1848 238Revolutions of 1848 217, 222–3,
225, 226, 235urbanization 163Zollverein 87, 90
Public Health Act (1848) 173public opinion, rise of 113–27
Britain and France 124–6‘conspiracy in broad daylight’
114–18Germany 123–4political action, forms of 118–20public sphere, gendering of 120–3public sphere, revival of 113
Quadruple Alliance 18, 39Quakers 125
Radetsky, Marshal 231, 232, 233,234, 235
Raeff, Marc 53, 280Raglan, Lord 243Ramel, General 27Ranger, Terence 277Raspail, F.V. 59Rath, R. John 276, 283
re-sacralization 29, 31–2Redcliffe, ambassador 242Reform Act (1832) 103, 104, 105,
112, 135, 136, 236Reign of Terror (1793–4) 63religion see Church/religionRepeal of the Corn Laws (1846)
124, 135–6, 138, 183, 236republicanism 56, 63–6, 77, 101Resnick, Daniel 27, 278Restoration 7, 27–8, 32, 34, 36, 38,
138, 246revolutionary songs 120revolutions of 1830 28, 35, 98–112,
188Britain: parliamentary reform
(1831–1832) 103–6France: July Revolution 99–103Germany and Switzerland:
‘regeneration’ of the cantons106–7
liberalism and clericalism 107–8Netherlands: Belgian
independence 108–9Poland: ‘November Rising’
109–11Revolutions of 1848 1, 4, 8, 100,
101, 214–37France (1848–1852) 218–22Germany 222–7Habsburg Empire 227–31Italy 231–5romantic failure and
apprenticeship in democracy214–17
Rhine-Hesse 223Rhine-Main region 123Rhineland 14, 18, 57, 89, 124, 148,
163, 188, 195agitation in wake of bad harvest
(1831) 106political agitation 123revolutions of 1848 224urbanization 163
Riall, Lucy 276Riasonovsky, Nicholas 280Rich, Norman 286
302 INDEX
Riego, Major 47Rochdale 174Romagna 15, 44, 108Romania 82, 91, 93, 230, 246Rome 7, 44, 139, 146, 147, 214, 221
revolutions of 1848 234, 235Rosanvallon, P. 36Rothschild family 143, 148, 149,
155–8, 159, 160Rouen 206royalists 24, 26Royle, Edward 280Rudé, George 277Ruge, A. 148rule of law 114Russell, Lord J. 104Russia 4, 17, 18
artisans and urban economy 196cholera 173Congress of Vienna 12, 13, 21conservatism and political
repression 54divorce 208, 210Eastern Question and Crimean
War 239, 241, 242, 243, 245,246, 247
Jews and emancipation 150, 151,153
legitimacy, crisis of 31Metternich and conservatism 38,
39Napoleonic hegemony, end of 5,
8, 9nationalism 80peasants and agriculture 176, 177,
178, 179, 180, 181, 185–6Poland and the November Rising
111political action, forms of 119politics post 1848 238public opinion, rise of 126revolution and repression in 51–4revolutions of 1830 112Revolutions of 1848 214, 226,
230, 231, 235, 236–7and War of Greek Independence
92, 95, 96
Russian Orthodox Church 210, 241Russification 81, 151, 153
Sahlins, Peter 282Saint-Simon, C.H. de R., Comte de
71, 72, 73Saint-Simonian movement 154, 210,
211San Martin, J. de 248Sand, George 121, 212Sand, K. 86sans-culottes 193Santarosa, Count 46Saul, S.B. 275Savoyard monarchy 43
see also PiedmontSaxe-Coburg-Gotha 87Saxony 17, 18, 87, 106, 123, 188,
193, 223, 224Scandinavia 80, 81
see also particular countriesSchaaffhausen (Köln banker) 14Schleswig war 226Schlieffen Plan 56Schneider 1670 170Schoelcher, V. 126Schroeder, Paul 20, 242, 276Schwarzenburg, Prince 238Scotland 137, 176Scott, Joan 286Second Republic (France) 218, 220,
246secret societies 58–60Seditious Meetings Act 48–50Segalen, Martine 282Semenovsky Guards 19Serbia 95Serbo-Croat language 83serfdom and emancipation 52,
176–7, 180–1, 183, 185, 235Sewell, William 192, 193, 282share-cropping 176Sheehan, James J. 279Sheffield 191Sheremetev, Count 185Shubert, Adrian 281Siccardi Laws 133
INDEX 303
Sicily 15, 44, 45–6, 48, 231Siemann, Wolfram 123, 124, 223,
283Sigmann, Jean 282Silesia 89, 148, 183, 188, 192Simms, Brendan 279Simonton, Deborah 286Six Acts 49–50Sked, Alan 230, 276, 279, 283Slav Congress (1848) 229slavery abolition 114, 124–6, 235,
249Slovakia 78–9, 82–3, 229, 231Slovenia 79Sluga, Glenda 286Smith, Anthony D. 77, 277Smith, Bonnie, G. 204, 285Smith, Denis Mack 84, 132, 278,
281‘social question’ 68–74socialism 56, 210–11, 217
utopian 68–74Société de la Morale Chrétienne 126Société des Familles 59Société des Saisons 59–60Society of Friends (Philike Etaireia)
92Society for Human Rights 64Society of Jesus 34Society of St Vincent de Paul 138Solingen 191, 195Sonnenberg-Stern, Karina 285Sorel, Julien 27, 32Soult, Marshal 130Southern Society 52Spain 2, 4, 15, 63
clericalism 107Congress of Vienna 12conservatism and political
repression 54Constitution 1812 45, 46Constitution 1837 47divorce 208international co-operation
framework 18Jews and emancipation 144juste milieu 128
legitimacy, crisis of 30liberalism 107, 133–5Metternich and conservatism 38‘movements of 1820–1821’ 45–8Napoleonic hegemony, end of 5,
7nationalism 80revolutions of 1830 98
Sperber, Jonathan 2, 195, 225, 227,236, 275, 282, 283
Spitzer, Alan B. 8, 57, 278Squire, P.S. 280St Petersburg 51, 52, 54Stadion (Habsburg governor) 184Staël, G. de 120Stark, G.D. 279Statuto 231–2, 234Stearns, Peter N. 282Stedman Jones, G. 136–7, 280Stein, H. 41Stendhal 27, 57, 118Stern, W.M. 283Stone, Lawrence 205, 286Straits Convention (1841) 241Strasbourg conspiracy 62student guilds 158student leagues see BurschenschaftenStuttgart 211subsistence crisis 38Sue, Eugene 171suicide 169Sweden 12, 80, 191Switzerland 4, 8, 14, 133
divorce 208Metternich’s policy in Italy 45Napoleonic hegemony, end of 5‘regeneration’ of the cantons
106–7revolutions of 1830 98, 111Revolutions of 1848 218, 235see also particular towns
Syria 239Szechenyi, Count 82
Talleyrand Périgord, C.M. de,Prince of Benevento 13, 23–4,39
304 INDEX
Tamworth Manifesto 135tariff barriers 87Taylor, A.J.P. 90, 226, 279, 283Taylor, M. 236–7Thiers, Adolphe 12, 62, 100, 101,
118, 130, 221Third Department 53–4Thistlewood, A. 50Thomis, M.I. 280Thompson, Dorothy 280Thompson, E.P. 136, 194, 198,
280Thuringian states 87Tilly, Louise 286Tocqueville, A. de 60Tolpuddle Martyrs 136Tolstoy, L. 53Tombs, Robert 277Tory party 103–4Toulouse 27Toussenel (author) 159Townsend, L. 125Trade Unionism 105–6Treaty of Adrianople 95Treaty of London (1827) 95Treaty of Vienna 13–14, 20, 21, 38,
246Trevelyan, G.M. 281Trieste 15Tristan, Flora 210–11Trubetskoi, Prince 52Tsarism 81Tudesq, André-Jean 1, 278Turin 7, 14, 132Turkey 95, 239, 241, 242Turley, David 284Tuscany 15, 44, 45, 147, 182, 234
Ukraine 17, 79, 185, 229Ulm 19ultra-royalists 7, 8, 26–8, 35, 36, 37,
65Umbria 15Union of the Fatherland
(Vaterlandsverein) 86United States 3, 4, 9, 247, 249Universal Jewish Alliance 160
universal male suffrage 45, 105, 193,216–17, 219–20, 222–4,229–30, 233, 235–6
urbanization 161–74cholera 171–3social and material problems
168–71urban demography 162–4urban poverty 165–8varieties of urban life 173–4
utopian socialism 68–74Uvarov (minister to Tsar Nicholas)
153
van Leeuwen, Marco H.D. 167, 284Varnhagen, Rahel 121, 123Vaud canton 107Vendée revolt (1793) 28Venetia/Venice 15, 43, 44, 45, 146,
147, 171, 214revolutions of 1848 232–3, 234
Vernet, Horace 129, 130Versailles 204Vick, Brian 78, 225, 283Vienna 147, 148, 169, 200–1, 214,
227, 229Vienna Congress 13Vieusseux (Swiss wine merchant)
116Villèle, Count J. 28, 30, 34Vilna 153Vincent, David 282Vital, David 150, 285Vitebsk province 151Vittorio Emanuele, King of
Piedmont 14, 22, 43, 46Voilquin, Suzanne 210, 211von Gagern government 223von Strandmann, Hartmut Pogge
226, 282–3
Wagram 19Wales 137Walker, Mack 284Walkowitz, Judith R. 286Wallachia (now Romania) 91Walton, John K. 280
INDEX 305
War of German Liberation 85‘war of the unstamped press’ 115Ward, J.T. 280Warsaw 17, 111, 146, 150–1Wartburg Festival 85–6Waterloo 5Webb, R.K. 138, 280Weber, W. 201Weill, G. 2Wellington, Duke of 103, 104, 105West Indies 12Westphalia 18, 146, 182Whigs 103, 104, 105White Terror 26–8, 36Wilberforce, W. 125William, King (of Netherlands) 108,
109Williams, Gwyn A. 277Williamson, George S. 279Windischgrätz, General 229, 231
Wooler (author) 51, 115Woolf, Stuart 281workers’ associations 194World Anti-Slavery Convention
125Württemberg 17, 41, 87, 223
Yorkshire 49, 105, 137Young Germany 58Young Italy 58, 84Young Poland 84Young Switzerland 58, 84youth movements 57–8Ypsilantes, Major-General 92–3
Zabreb (previously Agram) 83Zawadski, W.H. 278zelanti 44Zollverein 86–90, 133Zurich 106, 107
306 INDEX