contents contentsi 1. summaryresearch.dnv.com/skj/fsahla/hlareportrev1.pdf · solas ship or not....

DET NORSKE VERITAS Report No. 97-2053 Page No. .

FSA of HLA on PassengerVessels

Reference to part of this report which may lead to misinterpretation is not permissible

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CONTENTS

Contents .......................................................................................................................................... i

1. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................... 1

1.1 Executive summary............................................................................................................. 11.2 Actions to be taken.............................................................................................................. 11.3 Related documents: reference to any supporting documentation........................................ 1

2. DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM ............................................................................... 2

2.1 Definition of the problem.................................................................................................... 22.2 Regulation affected by the proposal to be reviewed ........................................................... 32.3 Definition of the generic model .......................................................................................... 4

3. Background Information ................................................................................................. 5

3.1 Lessons learned from recently introduced measures to address similar problems.............. 53.2 Casualty Statistics ............................................................................................................... 63.3 Description of Scenario and Model .................................................................................... 7

4. METHOD OF WORK...................................................................................................... 8

4.1 Composition and level of expertise of project team ........................................................... 84.2 Description of the assessment ............................................................................................. 84.3 Start and Completion Date of the Assessment.................................................................... 9

5. Description of the Results Achieved in Each Step ....................................................... 10

5.1 STEP 1 - HAZARD IDENTIFICATION.......................................................................... 105.1.1 Foundering of ships................................................................................................... 105.1.2 Fires and Explosions ................................................................................................. 105.1.3 Stranding ................................................................................................................... 115.1.4 Collisions .................................................................................................................. 115.1.5 Missing...................................................................................................................... 115.1.6 Hazid for HLAs......................................................................................................... 11

5.2 STEP 2 - RISK ASSESSMENT ....................................................................................... 115.3 STEP 3 - RISK CONTROL OPTIONS ............................................................................ 12

5.3.1 Use of Helicopters in Search and Rescue Operations............................................... 125.3.2 Use of Helicopters in Combinations with Helicopter Landing Areas on PassengerVessels 13

5.4 STEP 4 - COST BENEFIT ASSESSMENT..................................................................... 135.4.1 Risk Reduction Considerations................................................................................. 135.4.2 Assumptions Made and their Effect on the Results .................................................. 195.4.3 Costs of Passenger Vessel Helicopter Landing Areas .............................................. 205.4.4 Implied Cost of Averting a Fatality .......................................................................... 21

5.5 STEP 5 - RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DECISION-MAKING .................................... 23

6. Final Recommendations for Decision Making ............................................................. 23

7. References........................................................................................................................ 24




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Annexes

Annex 1 Passenger Vessel Evacuation Descriptions

Annex 2 Passenger Vessel Evacuation Risk Data

Annex 3 Benefits of Helicopter Landing Areas Based on Accident Experience

Annex 4 Names and Credentials

Annex 5 Helicopter Operations, Conclusions/Assumptions

Annex 6 Hazard Identification for Helicopter Landing Areas

Annex 7 Weather Conditions and Helicopter Landing

Annex 8 Helicopter Rescue Statistics

Annex 9 Note by Norway and the International Council of Cruise Lines (ICCL) toCOMSAR

Annex 10 Report of Intersessional Correspondence Group on Helicopter Landing Areas(HLAs)




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1. SUMMARY

1.1 Executive summaryThis report considers the requirement of introducing Helicopter Landing Areas (HLAs) on non-ro-ro ships. The work described in the report has been carried out as a Formal Safety Assessment(FSA) in accordance with the ‘IMO Guideline on FSA’. Based on two different models, onebased primarily on a review of historical data, and one based on a theoretical model, it isconcluded that requiring HLA on non-ro-ro passenger ships cannot be justified.

1.2 Actions to be takenThe Sub-committee is invited to consider recommending that MSC 69 amends SOLASregulation III/28 (as contained in Resolution MSC.47(66)) as follows

(Note: Underlining indicates proposed new text)

Regulation 28

Helicopter landing and pick-up areas

1. All ro-ro passenger ships shall be provided with a helicopter pick-up area approved by theAdministration having regard to the recommendations adopted by the Organization.*

2. Ro-ro passenger ships of 130 m in length and upwards, constructed on or after 1 July 1999, shallbe provided with a helicopter landing area approved by the Administration having regard to therecommendations adopted by the Organization.**

3. Passenger ships, other than ro-ro passenger ships, of 130 m in length and upwards, constructedon or after 1 July 1999, shall be provided with a helicopter pick-up area approved by theAdministration having regard to the recommendations adopted by the Organization. *

* Refer to the Merchant Ship Search and Rescue Manual (MERSAR) adopted by the Organization by resolutionA.229 (VII), as amended.** Refer to recommendations to be developed by the Organization.

1.3 Related documents: reference to any supporting documentation.MSC 68/9/1, SOLAS 1997 III/24-3.3, IMO FSA Guideline- MSC 68/WP.13, MSC.47(66), DE40/12, annex 7, MSC 68/9/1, Interim Guideline for the Application of FSA to the IMO RuleMaking Process’ (MSC 68/WP.13).




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2. DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM

2.1 Definition of the problemThe introduction of helicopter landing areas (HLA) on passenger ships larger than 130 meters isregarded as a safety measure for the shipping industry as such. The intention of the introductionof HLA has not been targeted at any particular ship type. Although the focus seems to be onintroducing HLA to assist other ships in an emergency situation where helicopter evacuation maybecome necessary, this report also includes the effect of HLA assisted evacuation of own ships.

The generic model is based on the assumption that the historic situation, as described by usinghistorical data on accidents, casualties, and evacuations are unchanged. The only change that hasbeen assessed is the effect of introducing HLA. This implies that a number of issues are notconsidered. These assumptions may result in somewhat optimistic or pessimistic assessment ofthe effects of HLA, e.g.� Historic accident and fatality data are assumed. For the HLA this results in an optimistic

estimated effect of HLA, due to generally improving safety standards (e.g. stability, fireprotection, ISM). With higher safety standards there will be less effect of life savingequipment in general.

� Increase in passenger ship traffic. This increases both the lives saving capability and thecosts. The ration is, however, unchanged

� Increase in non-passenger ship traffic. This intuitively should lead to slightly pessimisticestimates of the effect of HLA. The increased traffic does, however, also increase thelikelihood that another ship is close to a casualty, and therefore the helicopter rescuingoperation would not be necessary or called for.

� When evaluating historical evacuation data, it was not considered whether the casualty was aSOLAS ship or not.

SOLAS regulation III/28.2 (as amended by MSC 66, originally referred to as regulation III/24-3.3 by the SOLAS Conference Report) requires that ‘passenger ships constructed on or after 1July 1999 of 130 m and upwards in length shall be fitted with helicopter landing area’.

The International Council of Cruise Lines (ICCL), MSC 68/9/1, suggested that it would beappropriate to refer this regulation to the suitable Sub-Committees for technical evaluation,review of passenger vessel safety implications, and an analysis of economic impacts. In doing so,ICCL refers to resolutions A.500(XIII) and A.777(18), which require a compelling need.

ICCL make note of the following

� The regulation was proposed by the Panel of Experts, which did not include representationfrom conventional cruise shipping

� The differences between Ro-Ro and conventional cruise shipping were not observed� Medical evacuation from cruise ship is not uncommon and is done by a winching operation.

This does not require landing� This is considered safer than landing� Mass evacuation is impractical by landing or winching




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� Receiving survivors from the sea may be done in various other ways� The likelihood of potentially being of assistance to survivors from other ships is less from

conventional cruise ships than Ro-Ro ferries

The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC68/WP.11.Add.3) has considered the proposal by ICCLthat the DE and other Sub-Committees should further discuss the matter. MSC has instructed DEand COMSAR Sub-Committees to consider the implications of requirement of regulationIII/28.2 to non Ro-Ro passenger ships and advise as appropriate.

The present report investigates whether the SOLAS requirement is justifiable in cost benefitterms, by using the ‘Interim Guideline for the Application of Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) tothe IMO Rule-Making Process’ approved by the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC 68/WP.13).FSA is a rational and systematic process for assessing the risks associated with shipping activityand for evaluation of the costs and benefits of IMO’s options for reducing these risks. FSA isconsistent with the current IMO decision-making process and provides a basis for makingdecisions in accordance with resolutions A 500(XII) “Objectives of the Organisation in the1980’s”, and A.777(18) “Work Methods and Organisation of Work in Committees and theirSubsidiary Bodies”.

2.2 Regulation affected by the proposal to be reviewed

After review of the documents it was found that only a limited number of the regulations wouldbe affected by the results of this study. The remainder of the documents contain requirementsthat would not be changed as the results of this study (these regulations depend on therequirement or owner’s request for installing a helicopter landing area or facility). The followingregulations have been found to involve helicopter operations aboard passenger ships (non ro-ro)and may therefore be affected by the proposal to be reviewed:

� International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1997, CHAPTER III, PART B,Regulation 24-3: “Helicopter landing and pick-up areas”, Subject: ”Requirementsapplicable to new passenger ships”.

The full text of this regulation is:

1. All ro-ro passenger ships shall be provided with a helicopter pick-up area approved by theAdministration having regard to the recommendations adopted by the Organization. 1

2. Ro-ro passenger ships constructed before 1 July 1997 shall comply with the requirements ofparagraph 1 not later than the date of the first periodical survey after 1 July 1997.

3. Passenger ships of 130 m in length and upwards, constructed on or after 1 July 1999, shall befitted with a helicopter landing area approved by the Administration having regard to therecommendations adopted by the Organization. �




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1 Refer to the Merchant Ship Search and Rescue Manual (MERSAR) adopted by the Organization by resolutionA.229 (VII), as amended.� Refer to recommendations to be developed by the Organization.

Similar regulations are given for ro-ro passenger ships but are considered outside the scope ofthis study, i.e. Regulation 28.1 and Regulation 24-3.1 & .2, respectively, with reference to thetwo documents above.

As an example of classification rules, the DNV Rules for Ship Classification were also reviewed(Pt.6 Ch.1, SECTION 2, Helicopter Decks). These rules are considered to be generic rules thatwould apply to helicopter landing areas on a case-by-case basis. These rules would have to berevised mainly to account for a standard size pad to be used for emergency landings. (Pads wouldhave to be designed to a standard size in order to accommodate most helicopter types now usedfor Search and Rescue Operations.)

2.3 Definition of the generic model

To evaluate the benefits of introducing helicopter landing areas on passenger vessels thefollowing assumptions are made:

� All passenger vessels of 130 m and upwards in length are equipped with helicopter landingareas.

� The helicopter landing areas will contribute to increased safety at sea by being used inhelicopter rescue operations. If a casualty (merchant vessel or another passenger vessel)occurs close to a passenger vessel with a helicopter landing area, a helicopter may shuttlebetween the casualty and the vessel to save more people, if the passenger vessel is closer tothe casualty than the SAR base is. If the casualty involves a large number of people, thehelicopter may finally end the rescue operation on the passenger vessel if the remainingamount of fuel is not sufficient for it to return to the SAR station.

� Helicopter landing areas offer no “facilities” (i.e. no fuelling, maintenance, or long termparking)

To evaluate the costs of introducing helicopter landing areas on passenger vessels of 130 m andupwards in length the following is assumed:

� Only the marginal added costs are considered. Cost items considered are:� Construction/maintenance cost (in terms of additional cost per tons of additional steel

required� Training� Administration (manuals, procedures, roosters, etc.)� Inspections (related to the helicopter landing area, obstacle-free areas and special

equipment required)




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3. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

3.1 Lessons learned from recently introduced measures to address similar problemsA number of risk analyses has been carried out in the last few years. Few of them haveaddressees a particular ship type, or one particular safety measure, which have been done in thisreport. One previous study that is relevant for the FSA of HLA is the ‘Safety assessment ofPassenger/Ro-Ro Vessels’ in the joint North West European Project on Passenger Ro/Ro Safety.This study first carried out a Quantitative Risk Analysis for one particular ship, and discussedseven different Risk Reduction Measures. The Quantitative Risk Analysis was then used to makemore general statements about Ro-Ro passenger safety, which is the scope of an FSA. Four ofthe safety measures, for the particular ship, were evaluated on a cost benefit basis. This impliesthat the Implied Cost per Fatality Averted (ICAF) was quantified. One safety measure, 3 fullheight car deck bulkheads, were judged to be on the borderline of cost-effectiveness. The ICAFof this measure was estimated to ICAF = 27 MNOK (about 4 million USD). As we now knowthis measure has not been implemented as international regulations.

Following the high casualty rates of bulk carriers, particularly in 1990 and 1991, IACS hascarried out several studies with the aim of introducing measures that would enhance the safety ofexisting bulk carriers. In the light of the casualty database available, DNV performed a CostBenefit Analysis (CBA) to see what improved insight such a methodology can provide in termsof assessing the effectiveness and cost efficiency of a safety measure. Mathiesen (1997) describesthe use of CBA for bulk carriers, with emphasis on structural survivability. The ICAFsestablished in the report may be found in Figure 1. As we know IACS considered thestrengthening of the Bulkhead between cargo holds no. 1 and no. 2 cost efficient.

Cost benefit of upgrading bulkhead between cargo hold no. 1 and 2

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

Capesize Panamax Handysize

Size

ICA

F (U

SD)

10 Years15 Years20 Years




6

Figure 1: Implied cost of averting a fatality for different ship sizes and ages when upgradingbulkhead between cargo hold no. 1 and 2.

FSA is in its early phase of introduction at IMO as a method to support the rule making process.As experience increases it is expected that FSA will provide a rational approach to decisionmaking with respect to decisions regarding introduction of new safety regulations, or removingobsolete ones.

3.2 Casualty StatisticsAnnex 1 contains descriptions of 48 evacuation incidents for cruise liners, 37 for Ro-Ropassenger ferries, 16 for high speed ferries, and 4 for conventional ferries. Non-SOLAS shipshave not been excluded. General conclusions from the 48 evacuations of cruise ships are:� Most evacuations were from fires. In these, an HLA on the ship being evacuated would with

high probability be impaired by smoke. HLAs on nearby passenger ships would be useful forhelicopters rescuing survivors from the water.

� Apart from fires, most loss of life occurred in collisions, where rapid heeling and capsizewould have impaired an HLA on the ship being evacuated. Again, HLAs on nearbypassenger ships would be useful for helicopters rescuing survivors from the water.

� In many cases, evacuation by lifeboat was successful, with no fatalities. Therefore helicopterswould not reduce fatality risks in these events.

� In many evacuations, helicopters were either not within range, or arrived too late to rescueany survivors.

� In one case (Prinsendam, 4 Oct 80) an HLA was fortuitously located on a nearby tanker.Without it, there may have been some fatalities among people in lifeboats. This suggests thatHLAs on other ships might have some benefit.

� In one case (Oceanos, 4 Aug 91) helicopters were used to help evacuate the ship. Withoutthem, there may have been some fatalities among people evacuating by lifeboat and jumpinginto the sea. This confirms that helicopter evacuation sometimes has some benefit. However,neither the evacuated ship nor the other ships had HLAs, and no lives were lost, so HLAscould not have reduced the number of fatalities in this case.

� In two cases (Regent Star, 22 Jul 95, Romantica, 4 Oct 97), the nearest passing ship was apassenger ship.

� In a few cases (Royal Pacific, 23 Aug 92, Achille Lauro, 30 Nov 94, Romantica, 4 Oct 97),HLAs on rescue ships would have been useful to help the evacuation. However, no fatalitiescould be attributed to not having them, so HLAs could not have reduced the number offatalities in these cases.

Annex 2 gives passenger evacuation risk data. Frequencies are here estimated for total losses ofpassenger ships, for total losses of merchant ships, and for evacuations of cruise liners and Ro-




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Ro passenger ferries. Information is also given about evacuation fatalities, time available forevacuation, helicopter rescues, and rescue ship availability.

Annex 3 gives estimates of benefits of helicopter landing areas based on accident experience (seeSection 5.4 for a summary).

3.3 Description of Scenario and ModelA ship casualty occurs at distance X from a helicopter base, and the people on board the shiphave to be rescued either from the ship, from life boats, or from the sea. The casualty may be amerchant ship, a passenger vessel with or without helicopter deck, or any other ship. Anotherpassenger vessel with helicopter deck is located close by, and the rescue operation takesadvantage of this.

The helicopter arrives at the casualty scene first, and the pilot chooses to bring the rescuedpeople to the passenger vessel (if necessary it shuttles between the casualty and the passengervessel until all people are rescued), and returns to base if there is sufficient fuel left. In case thehelicopter runs out of fuel it lands on the passenger vessel.

The helicopter is able to rescue N people and return to base within a radius, Ri, withoutrefuelling. Ri is a function of the number of trips, j, the helicopter has to make in order to rescueall people involved in the casualty. Ro is the largest distance away from the helicopter base thehelicopter can operate. In these situations the passenger vessel has to be situated right next to thecasualty for the helicopter to be able to pick up the crew from the casualty and then land safelyon the passenger vessel, if the weather conditions permit.

If there is a passenger vessel with a helicopter landing area located within a radius of Rs from thecasualty at the time of the rescue operation, then the helicopter will be able to shuttle betweenthe casualty and the passenger ship and finally land the helicopter on the passenger vessel at thelatest when it runs out of fuel. For the passenger ship to be within a radius of Rs at the time of therescue operation, it has to be located within a radius of R’s at the time of the casualty alert.

If any ship arrives at the casualty scene before the helicopter arrives, it is assumed that thehelicopter will not be used in the rescue operation.

RiR’s

Rs

Ro

CasualtyHelicopterX




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4. METHOD OF WORK

4.1 Composition and level of expertise of project team

The study group consisted of experts from the following areas (short CVs are found in Annex 4):

� Rolf Skjong, Project Responsible, Prepared Project Proposal and Strategy for the Study(DNV, Oslo)

� Patrick Adamcik, Project Manager, Helicopter Operations & Accident Investigations(DNV, Oslo)

� Monika L. Eknes, Theoretical Model & Risk Estimations (DNV, Oslo)

� John Spouge, Passenger Ship Accident Case Studies and Risk Estimates from HistoricalData (DNV, London)

� Sverre Gran, Weather and Sea conditions (DNV, Oslo)

� Rune Karlsen, Ship/Heli-deck Construction, Cost Estimation (DNV, Oslo)

Hazid team:

� Emil Dahle, Hazard Identification Facilitator (DNV, Oslo)

� Patrick Adamcik, Project Manager, Helicopter Operations & Accident Investigations(DNV, Oslo)

� Anders Tosseviken, Hazard Identification, Fire Safety Standards (DNV, Oslo)

� Arne Jørgensen, Hazard Identification, Ship Operations (Norwegian ShipownerAssociation)

4.2 Description of the assessment




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The tasks to be accomplished in this study were broken down into several speciality areas (basedon the expertise given above). The following figure illustrates the speciality areas and meetingsheld to perform this assessment.

A hazid meeting with selected experts was held to identify the added risk of helicopters landingon passenger vessels. A mid-term progress meeting was held to provide the NMD, ICCL, andNSA with some of the preliminary results. Additional DNV internal meetings were held toreview progress and evaluate available data. Due to the short time available to gather the data asproposed in the proposal, the distribution of a questionnaire to ship masters was omitted. Aquestionnaire was prepared and sent to SAR (Search and Rescue) organisations in countrieswhere most of the passenger ships operate. Good responses were provided from the Europeanand the North American countries although they were only able to answer the technicallyoriented questions due to lack of computerised information concerning the operational/statisticalquestions asked. A few responses were received from the Asian/Indonesian countries while noresponses were received from the Mediterranean countries.

See Annex 5 for details.

4.3 Start and Completion Date of the Assessment.

The assessment started on 22 September 1997 and was completed on 19 November 1997.

Proposal TasksHazid team for establishing

addition risk

Modelling Risk and Cost Benefit

Progress Meeting with

ICCL, NMD,NSADNV

Addition Cost of Helicopter Landing Area

on Ship Construction

Risk Assessment Due to Helicopter Operations on

Passenger Vessels

Passenger Ship Accident Case Studies

SAR Locations and Helicopter Operations

Modelling refinement and

Calculation of Risk and Cost Benefit

Evaluation of Risk & Cost

Benefit

Final Report

(Preliminary Data)

SAR/Helicopter Questionnaire

Sent to Selected Countries.

Final Report reviewICCL,NMD,NSA,DNV




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5. DESCRIPTION OF THE RESULTS ACHIEVED IN EACH STEP

5.1 STEP 1 - HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

The introduction of HLAs on passenger vessels of 130 m and upwards in length can contribute toreduce the loss of life at sea due to failed evacuation of ships.

The main categories of accidents that cause loss of life at sea are given in Table 1.

Table 1: Loss of life at seaAccident Category approx. % of all fatalitiesFoundering 50Fires and Explosions 15Stranding 10Collisions 10Missing 5Other (e.g. machinery accidents,hostile actions etc.)

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5.1.1 Foundering of shipsThe main causes for fatalities in foundering accidents are drowning and hypothermia. The lifeboats are the primary life saving appliances in the foundering accidents, and when fatalities occurthe main reason for this is that escape, mustering, evacuation, or pick-up fail. This can haveseveral causes:� Rapid escalation of accident, not giving the people on board sufficient time to escape.� Access to too few life boats where mustering is possible� Failed life boats/life boat systems

The first explanation is believed to be the most likely, but over the years, several examples havebeen seen in the developing world involving foundered passenger ships carrying far morepassengers than intended.

Given a rapid escalation of the accident, a large number of the fatalities occur as an immediateresult of the accident, e.g. due to people being trapped inside the sinking ship. For the people thatend up in the water or on life rafts, there is a potential for helicopter rescue by aid of passengervessels’ landing areas. However, for people in the sea, the time aspect is very important.

5.1.2 Fires and ExplosionsThe main causes for the fatalities due to fires and explosions are suffocation, direct exposure toflames or radiation, and failed evacuation, either by people being unable to evacuate from theship or people that end up in the sea.




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The fatalities caused by failed escape (people being trapped by smoke or fire) will occurrelatively early in a fire scenario. They can therefore hardly be averted by helicopter rescueoperations.

Failed evacuation can e.g. be caused by life boats being unavailable due to fire or smoke. Forpeople being unable to evacuate a ship, helicopter rescue and nearby helicopter landing areas canbe efficient to avert fatalities. For people in the sea, the time aspect is crucial, but still there is apotential that fatalities can be averted by use of helicopters in these cases too.

5.1.3 StrandingThe main causes for fatalities due to stranding are drowning and hypothermia. Helicopters can beused to rescue people in these cases, but it is unlikely that the rescue operations will takeadvantage of any helicopter landing areas on nearby passenger vessels.

5.1.4 CollisionsThe fatalities in collision accidents are mainly caused by drowning and hypothermia. Some ofthe fatalities will occur rapidly, e.g. due to people being trapped inside sinking ships, whileothers will occur later, e.g. before people are rescued from the sea.

Rescue by helicopter aided by helicopter landing areas on nearby passenger vessels may avertfatalities due to collision accidents.

5.1.5 MissingLittle information exists about the fatalities on missing ships. However, the fact that the shipsend up as missing indicates that rapid escalation scenarios caused many of the losses. It istherefore unlikely that helicopters and landing areas can affect the fatality rates for the missingaccident category.

5.1.6 Hazid for HLAsThe introduction of helicopter landing areas on passenger vessels will introduce new risks to thepassenger vessel. This is addressed in Annex 6. The added risk due to the introduction ofhelicopter landing areas has been neglected in the cost benefit analysis.

5.2 STEP 2 - RISK ASSESSMENTThe maritime traffic imply many types of risks; individual, societal (to groups of individuals),environmental (e.g. risk of pollution) and economic (e.g. loss of ship and cargo). Only theindividual and societal risk can be reduced by the combined actions of helicopter rescue andhelicopter landing areas on nearby passenger vessels.

Since the present report only addresses the risk control option to introduce helicopter landingareas on passenger vessels of 130 m and upwards in length, a complete risk assessment as such isnot conducted. However, some general risk data established in previous analyses are givenbelow.




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Figure 2 shows the relation between number of fatalities per ship year for passenger vessels andother ships. These data are used when estimating the risk reduction due to the introduction ofhelicopter landing areas. The introduction of helicopter landing areas is regarded as a generalsafety measure for shipping as such. The base case is therefore the current accident statistics.

1.0E-06

1.0E-05

1.0E-04

1.0E-03

1.0E-02

1.0E-01

1.0E+00

1 10 100 1000Number of fatalities, N

Freq

uenc

y of

N o

r mor

e fa

talit

ies

All ships exceptpassenger vesselsPassenger ships

5.3 STEP 3 - RISK CONTROL OPTIONSOnly one risk control option is considered in this report: The introduction of HLA on passengerships of 130 m and upwards in length. This option is proposed by the panel of experts. Acomplete FSA would have suggested and evaluated a number of risk control options. This is,however, outside the scope of this study.

5.3.1 Use of Helicopters in Search and Rescue OperationsThe use of helicopters in search and rescue operations at sea has in many occasions provedbeneficial as compared to the use of ships only. The main advantages of the helicopters are:� The higher speed� The overview obtained in search situations

Figure 2 Frequency of accidents involving N or more fatalities




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Data on search and rescue operations show that the majority of the operations involve few peopleto be rescued.

5.3.2 Use of Helicopters in Combinations with Helicopter Landing Areas on PassengerVesselsThe risk control option evaluated in the present report is the introduction of a helicopter landingarea at passenger vessels of 130 m and upwards in length. As pointed out above, the helicopterlanding areas will not contribute to reduce environmental or economic risks, but may reduceindividual and societal risk. The landing areas could prove beneficial in the following situations:� Evacuation of the passenger vessel itself. However, helicopter evacuation due to a fire on

board is relatively likely to be obstructed by smoke. In case of a Ro-Ro ferry with water ondeck, capsizing is likely to occur so quickly that helicopter evacuation using the ferry’slanding area is likely to be obstructed. It should also be kept in mind that passenger vessels ingeneral carry a large number of people, while the helicopters can only evacuate a limitednumber per landing. The impact of the helicopter landing area on the probability of asuccessful evacuation of a passenger ship is therefore concluded to be small. This conclusionis also supported by the historical data on evacuation of passenger ships (see Annex 1).

� Evacuation of nearby ships. If a casualty occurs close to both a SAR station and a passengervessel with a helicopter landing area, the rescue operation may use helicopters and the landingarea at the passenger vessel. Consequently, more people could be saved than by helicoptersalone. This situation is investigated in the cost benefit analysis below.

5.4 STEP 4 - COST BENEFIT ASSESSMENT

5.4.1 Risk Reduction Considerations

Risk Reduction Estimates Based on Historical Data

Since no cases can be identified where HLAs would have reduced the actual fatalities, astatistical approach is used to estimate the risk benefit, as follows. The risk benefit is assumed tobe the product of the following values, assumed to be independent:

Table 2: Risk Reduction Estimates Based on Historical Data (see Annex 3 for details)

Factor in risk benefit estimate Evacuationof own ship

PassengerVessel

Casualties

MerchantVessel

Casualties

Frequency of emergency evacuation from ships at seaper HLA.

1.8�10-2 1.8�10-2 2.6�10-3 �

51400/165

Probability of helicopter base ashore being within 50% 50% 30%




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Table 2: Risk Reduction Estimates Based on Historical Data (see Annex 3 for details)

Factor in risk benefit estimate Evacuationof own ship

PassengerVessel

Casualties

MerchantVessel

Casualties

operating range when emergency occurs.

Probability of wind and visibility being withinhelicopter operating limits.

97% 97% 90%

Probability of helicopters being able to reach ship intime to contribute to evacuation or rescue from the seabefore it is completed by other means.

22% � 20%�

80%31% � 55%

� 20%56% � 10% �

50% � 50%

Probability of HLA being available (either on the shipbeing evacuated or on nearby passenger ships).

10% 8% � 67% �50%

8% � 6% �50%

Expected number of fatalities averted, compared withevacuation without the HLA.

18 18 2.4

Risk Reduction 5.5�10-4 1.4�10-4 1.8�10-5

Combination of these elements allows an estimate of the annual number of fatalities avertedworld-wide by HLAs on passenger ships.

Risk Reduction Estimates Based on Geometrical Model

The category accidents investigated are the accidents in which, potentially, both helicopters andhelicopter landing areas at nearby passenger vessels are used during the rescue operation. It isassumed that the response time for the helicopter rescue is one hour.

The expected number of statistical fatalities averted per helicopter station per year is taken as:

� � � ��

�

��

1NNPNNE

where N is the number of people rescued in an accidentand P(N) is the probability per year and helicopter station that N people will be rescued.

The probability per year per helicopter station that N people are rescued is estimated as:

� � � � � � � ��

o

i

R

R

dxxPPxPNxPNP 4321 ,

where P1(x,N)dx is the probability per year that there will be an accident between x and(x + dx) from the helicopter station

P2(x) is the probability that there will be a passenger vessel within a radiusfrom the casualty that allows the helicopter rescue to use the HLA




15

on the passenger vesselP3 is the probability that the weather conditions allow the helicopter to

land at the passenger vesselP4(x) is the probability that nearby ships will not reach the casualty first and

conduct the rescue operation without aid from helicopters

P1(N,x) is estimated as:� �

xA

NcNfxNP

sea

ships��

��),(1

where f(N) is the frequency of ship accidents with N fatalities (per ship year),c=0.09 is the fraction of fatalities that potentially can be avoided by a rescue operation by

helicopter and helicopter landing areas (see discussion of assumptions),Nships is the number of ships (either passenger or merchant vessels) travelling on the sea

considered,Asea is the area of sea considered,

and x is the distance between the helicopter base and the casualty

In order for a helicopter to be able to use a HLA of a nearby passenger ship, the passenger shiphas to be wihin reach of the helicopter after the helicopter has performed a rescue operation atthe casualty scene. The passenger ship therefore has to be within a radius, Rs’, of the casualty. Ifon the other hand the passenger vessel is sufficiently close (i.e. within a radius Rs of the casualty)it may reach the casualty scene before the helicopter. In such cases, the helicopter will probablynot participate in the rescue operation.

Under a Poisson assumption of passenger ship occurrences over the considered sea, P2(x) isestimated as:

� � � ��

��

��

222 'exp1 passs

sea

pass RxRA

NxP �

where Npass is the number of passenger vessels of 130 m length or more,tresp is the response time of the helicopter, which is taken as one hour,

passrespheli

pass vtv

xR ��

��

�� is the radius for rescue by the passenger ship alone, with

vheli the speed of the helicoptervpass an average speed of passenger vesselstresp the response time of the helicopter after alert (taken as one hour)

and where




16

� �

passwinchheli

heli

s

RTiTNv

xTiv

R

��

��

�

�

��

loading offmax )1(12

HLA with shippassenger by travelledDistance tripsofNumber distance flying Available'

is the maximum allowed distance of the passenger vessel from the scene of the casualty at thetime of the casualty alert, for its HLA to be of use, as described above, with

Tmax the maximum time the helicopter can spend in the airi the number of trips the helicopter has to make in order to rescue N

peopleTwinch the time used to winch one person into the helicopter Toff loading the time used to load the people off to the passenger vessel.

P3 is assumed to be 0.9 (see Annex 7).

Based on Poisson assumptions of merchant and passenger vessel occurrences over theconsidered sea, P4(x) is taken as:

� � � � � � � ��

��

��

��

�

��

��

22

4

expexp

first shippassenger Not first shipmerchant Not firstcasualty reaches Helicopter

passsea

passtmerch

sea

merch RA

NR

AN

PPxP

��

where

merchrespheli

merchpass vt

vv

xR ��

and Npasst is the total number of passenger vessels.

To transfer the estimated number of fatalities averted per SAR station to an estimate for thenumber of fatalities averted per helicopter landing area, the number of averted fatalities per SARstation is divided by the average number of passenger vessels with a helicopter landing area inthe SAR region per year. The average number of passenger vessels with a helicopter landing areain the SAR region is estimated as:

� � � ��

� ��

� �

��

Nf

NRNf

AN

No

sea

passav

2

2�

In Table 3, the general input into the model is given.

Table 3: General InputNmerch 83 400 (Lloyd’s, 1996)vmerch 30 km/h (assumed)




17

Npass>130m 645 (extracted from Fairplay)Npasst 2700 (Lloyd’s, 1996)vpass 50 km/h (assumed)Asea 3.4�108 km2 or 1.2�108 km2

Twinch 0.04 h/personToff loading 0.04 h/off load operation

In Table 4, the data used in the analyses are given for a number of different helicopter types. Theresults are valid under the assumption that if the number of people to be rescued is less than thepassenger capacity of the helicopter, and the accident is out of the normal range of the helicopter,then the helicopter will not come to rescue.

Table 4: Helicopter data (see also Annex 8)Helicopter type #passengers Tmax (h) vmax (km/h)Aerospatiale 365N 4 3 222Sikorsky HH-60J 6 6 185Westland Sea King 12 5 203Sikorsky S-61 14 6 154Super Puma 18 4.5 247

In Table 5, the number of fatalities averted per helicopter station per year for merchant shipaccidents, provided that helicopters can use helicopter landing areas at passenger ships, is given.




18

Table 5: Number of Averted Fatalities per SAR stationAsea(km2)

Aerospatiale SikorskyHH-60J

WestlandSea King

SikorskyS-61

Super Puma

Merchant shipaccidents

3.4�108 1.59�10-4 2.09�10-4 1.80�10-4 1.79�10-4 1.39�10-4

1.2�108 2.40�10-5 2.01�10-5 1.07�10-5 9.21�10-6 4.21�10-6

Passengership accidents

3.4�108 3.24�10-6 8.17�10-6 8.09�10-6 9.28�10-6 8.11�10-6

1.2�108 5.91�10-7 1.36�10-6 1.20�10-6 1.47�10-6 1.07�10-6

In Table 6, the estimated number of passenger vessels with helicopter landing areas in SARregions is given.

Table 6: Number of passenger vessels with helicopter landing area in SAR regionsAsea(km2)

Aerospatiale SikorskyHH-60J

WestlandSea King

SikorskyS-61

Super Puma


3.4�108 1.1 3.3 2.8 2.3 3.3

1.2�108 3.1 9.5 7.9 6.6 9.3Passengership accidents

3.4�108 1.0 2.6 2.1 1.8 2.5

1.2�108 2.7 7.2 5.9 5.1 7.0

In Table 7, the results from Table 5 have been transformed to estimated number of avertedfatalities per helicopter landing area on passenger ships.

Table 7: Number of Averted Fatalities per helicopter landing area per yearAsea(km2)

Aerospatiale

SikorskyHH-60J

WestlandSea King

SikorskyS-61

Super Puma


3.4�108 1.4�10-4 6.3�10-5 6.4�10-5 7.8�10-5 4.2�10-5

1.2�108 7.7�10-6 2.1�10-6 1.4�10-6 1.4�10-6 4.5�10-7

Passengership accidents

3.4�108 3.2�10-6 3.1�10-6 3.8�10-6 5.2�10-6 3.2�10-6

1.2�108 2.2�10-7 1.9�10-7 2.0�10-7 2.9�10-7 1.5�10-7

Total 3.4�108 1.4�10-4 6.6�10-5 6.8�10-5 8.3�10-5 4.5�10-5

1.2�108 7.9�10-6 2.3�10-6 1.6�10-7 1.7�10-6 6.0�10-7




19

5.4.2 Assumptions Made and their Effect on the Results

Assumptions Regarding Asea

Two different cases have been investigated. In the first (extreme) case, Asea was assumed to be2/3 of the earth’s surface giving an area of 3.4�108 km2, which is the approximate area coveredby the sea. In the second case, areas around the North pole and the part of the southernhemisphere south of South Africa were neglected, and the remaining sea area was reduced by 50%, giving an estimated sea area with ship traffic of 1.2�108 km2.

When a smaller sea area is used in the model, then the density of ships (number of ships per unitarea) will increase. This will further increase the probability P1 that there will be a ship casualtyin an area with ship traffic. Similarly, the probability P2 that there will be a passenger vessel of130 m and upwards in length relatively close to a casualty will also increase.

The cases investigated here have revealed that the estimated number of fatalities averted byhelicopters using landing areas decrease as the ship densities increase, because the probability P4that a helicopter will reach the casualty before other ships will decrease more than P1 and P2 willincrease. The reason for this is that the increased density of ships gives a larger probability thatother ships will reach the casualty and conduct the rescue operations before the helicoptersarrive.

Time Dependence of Fatality Rates

On average 50% of the fatalities at sea are associated with foundering accidents, 15% with firesor explosions, 10% due to ships stranding, 10% due to collisions, 5% due to missing ships, and10% due to other causes, like machinery accidents, hostile actions etc.

It is assumed that for fatalities due to ships stranding or missing, and fatalities owing to othercauses, helicopters and helicopter landing areas on nearby passenger vessels will not be capableto prevent any of the fatalities. For example if a ships strands, it is usually close to the shore.Rescue could be assisted by helicopters, but it is more likely that the helicopters will find asuitable landing area on shore rather than on a nearby passenger vessel.

For fatalities associated with foundering, fire or explosions, and collisions, it is believed thathelicopters and helicopter landing areas on passenger vessels can be beneficial in rescueoperations. However, the response time for helicopters is assumed to be one hour, which meansthat it will take at least one hour before the helicopter reaches the scene of the casualty (one hourin the case that the casualty occurs right next to a SAR station). It is assumed that 50% of thefatalities will occur rapidly, e.g. because people are obstructed from escaping and evacuating dueto fire or smoke, or because of capsizing of the ship. During the next one to four hours, whichwould be the time for helicopters to arrive, it is assumed that 75% of the remaining fatalities willoccur. The fraction of the fatalities that potentially can be saved by helicopters using landingareas on passenger vessels then becomes:




20

This is the estimated fraction of fatalities that occur in the time window when helicopter rescuetakes place.

Helicopter Rescue Operations will also Take Place Outside Normal RangeIt is assumed that if there is a passenger vessel with a helicopter landing area near the casualty(but not close enough for the passenger vessel to arrive at the scene first), then the helicopter willconduct a rescue operation, if the weather allows for it to land on the passenger vessel.

This assumption will probably also cause the number of averted fatalities due to the introductionof helicopter landing areas on passenger vessels of 130m or more to be overestimated.

Helicopter Rescue not Initiated if Ship at Casualty Scene FirstThis assumption is supposed to be reasonable for accidents with a low number of potentialfatalities. These are the ones that give the major contribution to the estimated number of fatalitiesaverted (model and historical data). For catastrophes involving a large number of people (like the‘Estonia’ catastrophe in 1994), this assumption is not valid. However, the contribution from suchaccidents to the estimated number of fatalities averted is negligible, and the estimated number offatalities averted would not be significantly changed if it was assumed that helicopter rescuewould be initiated for catastrophes even if ships arrived at the scene first.

Helicopter Rescue by One Helicopter OnlyIt is assumed that only one helicopter is used in each rescue operation. This assumption is validfor accidents with a low number of potential fatalities, which gives the major contribution to theestimated number of fatalities averted. For catastrophes involving a large number of people (likethe ‘Estonia’ catastrophe), this assumption is not valid. However, the contribution from suchaccidents to the estimated number of averted fatalities is negligible, and the estimated number ofaverted fatalities would not be significantly changed if it was assumed that helicopter rescuewould involve several helicopters for catastrophes.

5.4.3 Costs of Passenger Vessel Helicopter Landing AreasThe costs of building helicopter landing areas, training people to use them etc. are given in Table8. It is assumed that no revenue is lost due to the introduction of the helicopter landing areas, andthe additional costs of fire insulation have also been disregarded.

� ��

09.025.05.075.0 arrives rescue when occurrednot have that fatalities offraction

instantly occurringnot fatalities offraction collisions explosion,or fire,foundering todue fatalities offraction the

��

�

��c




21

Table 8: Costs of introducing helicopter landing areas on passenger vessels of 130 m andupwards in length.

Cost Element Costs (USD)Construction Added steel to deck

plating, longitudinalstiffeners and girders

20 tons at 6000USD/tonne steelincluding purchase ofsteel, man hours etc.

120 000

Added maintenancecosts (15 years)

50 000

Training andqualification

(15 years) 245 070

Administration (15 years) 84 507Inspection (15 years) 245 070Total Added Costs (15 years) 744 650

Assumptions:Inspections: takes 1 person, a minimum of 4 man-hours each time per person and occur every quarter, half year oryearlyAdministration: Tasks include update of procedures/manuals, arranging for training, preparing duty roosters,making the crew aware of helicopter operations, etc.Training: takes 4 persons (to ensure assigned crew know what to do, does not include ship officer training), 4 man-hours each time per person, mainly every 6 months.Construction Cost: Additional material and labour cost estimated by calculating additional steel required to addhelicopter deck at a total cost of 6000 USD per ton. Estimated added steel to be 20 tons.Maintenance Cost: Additional cost for maintaining the deck and area (includes upkeep of paint/markings, lights,nets, radios, fire equipment, etc.)

5.4.4 Implied Cost of Averting a FatalityThe accumulated costs of introducing helicopter landing areas accumulated over the lifetime of aship is estimated to USD 744 650 as resulting from Table 8.

Case 1: Simple Model Based on Historical DataIn Table 9 a summary of the estimates based on historical data is given.




22

Table 9: Risk Reduction Estimates Based on Historical DataEstimated number of fatalitiesaverted due to HLA

Comments

Evacuation of own ship 5.5�10-4

Evacuation frompassenger vessel topassenger vessel withHLA

1.4�10-4 Data from 1973 to 1997. If only theperiod from 1992 to 1997 isconsidered, then the estimated numberof fatalities averted per year is 1.8�10-5

Evacuations frommerchant ship

1.8�10-5

Total 7.1�10-4

Total number of fatalities averted per HLA in 15 years:

The implied cost of averting a fatality thus becomes:

Case 2: Model Data for Westland Sea King Helicopter and Asea =3.4�108 km2

The number of fatalities averted, also accumulated over the lifetime of a ship with a helicopterlanding area, is (estimates for Westland Sea King helicopters are used and 15 years design lifefor a passenger ship):


Case 3: Model Data for Westland Sea King Helicopter and Asea = 1.2�108 km2

The number of fatalities averted, also accumulated over the lifetime of a ship with a helicopterlanding area, is (estimates for Westland Sea King helicopters are used and 15 years design lifefor a passenger ship):


3-5 1002.115106.8vesselpassenger of timelifeover fatalities averted ofNumber ��

000 000 7301002.1

744650fatalities averted ofNumber

measure ofcost Net 3 USDICAF �

�

��

5-6 104.215106.1vesselpassenger of timelifeover fatalities averted ofNumber �

��

000 000 000 31104.2



�

��

2-4 1007.11510.17vesselpassenger of timelifeover fatalities averted ofNumber ��

000 000 071007.1



�

��




23

5.5 STEP 5 - RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DECISION-MAKINGThe FSA presented in this report has addressed the issue of introducing Helicopter LandingAreas on passenger ships of 130 m and upwards in length. The quantification has been donebased on two very different models: one theoretical model and one statistical model based onhistoric data from evacuations. The modelling assumptions are not generally valid for passengership traffic along fixed routes. For such traffic, the effect of HLAs may be quantified moreprecisely by studying the specific routes.

For non Ro-Ro passenger ships that mainly operate outside fixed routes, the modellingassumptions are valid, although large uncertainties in the final results still remain. Withrelatively optimistic assumptions regarding the contribution of HLA to the rescuing capabilitiesof helicopters it is clear that and Implied Cost of Averting a statistical Fatality (ICAF) is

07 USD millionICAF �

This result and the other results presented in the report indicate that HLA as a safety measure ismore than one order of magnitude, maybe two orders of magnitude, less cost efficient than safetymeasures that would normally be implemented in an OECD member country, where figures inthe order of USD 2-4 million are common. It is therefore quite likely that many other riskreduction measures, which could potentially save more lives for the same budget, may beidentified by a more comprehensive FSA. This has been outside the scope of this study, and wecan only recommend that the regulation requiring ‘HLA on passenger ships constructed on orafter 1 July 1999 of 130 m and upwards in length’ is not implemented for non Ro-Ro passengerships.

6. FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DECISION MAKING

This FSA has provided a lot of information that could be useful in preparing a morecomprehensive review of the life saving capabilities of alternative measures. It is believed thatthe full benefits of FSA will appear in cases where a large number of risk control options arecompared and ranked. Only measures that have effects in areas where the risks are high or arecost effective should be recommended for implementation as international regulations. It istherefore recommended that other member governments and non-governmental organisationscarry out trial applications of FSA on alternative life saving measures, including alternative useof helicopters.




24

7. REFERENCES

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 as amended by the June 1996SOLAS Amendments.

DNV Rules for Classification of Ships.

Spouge, J. et al. (1996): Safety assessment of Passenger/Ro-Ro Vessels. Summary Report for theNorth West European Project on Passenger Ro/Ro Safety. Doc. No. REP-T09-002, DNVLondon 1996.10.28.

Mathiesen, T.Chr. et al. (1997): Cost Benefit Analysis of Existing Bulk Carriers. DNV PaperSeries No. 97-P008.

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