contains - environmentclearance.nic.inenvironmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/online/... ·...

Contains

1) Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) QRA for IOCL Barauni Refinery was carried out by

by M/s Chilworth Technology (Pvt.) Ltd. QRA was carried out in June 2011. Next QRA due by June 2016.

2) Emergency Response and Disaster Management Plan (ERDMP)

ERDMP of IOCL Barauni Refinery is accredited by M/s Disaster Management Institute (DMI), Bhopal.

Accreditation in Nov 2012 and is valid till Nov 2015.

1

IOCL, Barauni Refinery

QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY

FOR


(Rev 1)

by Chilworth Technology (Pvt.) Ltd,

B-2, Plot-3, Muskaan Complex,

Vasant Kunj, New Delhi- 110 070

Tel: +91 11 26136979, Fax: +91 26135979

Email: [email protected]

NG C-1

2

CONTENTS

COVERING LETTER

REPORT APPROVAL FORM

ABBREVIATIONS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1 INTRODUCTION 1-1

1.1

FACILITY

1-2 1.2 WEATHER CONDITIONS 1-6 1.3 PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF THE ASSIGNMENT 1-8

2

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

2-1

2.1

ENUMERATION AND SELECTION OF INCIDENTS

2-1 2.2 SELECTION 2-2 2.3 CHARACTERISING THE FAILURES 2-3

3

RISK ANALYSIS CALCULATIONS

3-1

3.1

CONSEQUENCE CALCULATIONS

3-1 3.2 DAMAGE CRITERIA 3-1 3.3 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS CALCULATIONS 3-5 3.4 FIRE AND EXPLOSION MODELING 3-6

4

RISK ANALYSIS AND REDUCTION

4-1

4.1

FINDINGS

4-1 4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS: 4-10

5 RISK ASSESSMENT OF FIRE WATER TANK AND PUMP HOUSE5-1

6 REFERENCES 6-1

APPENDIX – A CONTOURS A-1

APPENDIX – B DEFINITIONS B-1

ANNEXURE – C STORAGE AND HANDLI

J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1

Our Ref: J0126-IOC/Barauni/RA/L-01

Date: June 6th, 2011

Indian Oil Corporation

Barauni Refinery

Dear Sir,

PROJECT: IOC BARAUNI REFINERY

SUBJECT: QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT REV 1

We are pleased to submit one softcopy of the Quantitative Risk Assessment Report

for the above captioned project. Should you have any questions or comments,

please contact the undersigned. If the report is to your complete satisfaction,

please sign and return a copy of the enclosed Report Approval Form.

We thank you for allowing us the opportunity to perform this study and if we can be of

any further assistance to you, please contact us.

Yours faithfully,

Chilworth Technology P Ltd.

Jitendra Kumar

Vice President

5

ABBREVIATIONS

ATF Aviation Turbine Fuel

AVU Atmospheric and Vacuum Distillation Unit

BLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion

CBFS Carbon Black Feed Stock

CO Carbon Monoxide

CO2 Carbon Dioxide

CTPL Chilworth Technology Pvt. Ltd.

DHDT Diesel Hydrotreater

FW Fire water

HC Hydrocarbon

H2S Hydrogen Sulphide

HGO Heavy Gas Oil

HSD High Speed Diesel

HVGO Heavy Vacuum Gas Oil

Kero Kerosene

LGO Light Gas Oil

LP Low Pressure

LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas

LSHS Low Sulphur Heav. Stock

LTU LPG Treating Unit

LVGO Light Vacuum Gas Oil

MS Motor Spirit

NHDT Naphtha Hydrotreater

OISD Oil Industry Safety Directorate

P&ID Piping And Instrumentation



RCO

Reduced Crude Oil

RFCCU

Resid Fluidised Catalytic Cracking Unit

SKO

Superior Kerosene Oil

SR

Short Residue

SRU

Sulphur Recovery Unit

VCE

Vapour Cloud Explosion


8

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Indian Oil Corporation Limited’s Vision is to be a world-class company known for

caring and delighting customers with quality products and innovative services. The

Corporation will be a model of excellence in meeting environmental, health and

safety norms.

Chilworth has been engaged by IOC, Barauni Refinery for carrying out Quantitative

Risk Assessment studies for the Refinery. This is the Quantitative Risk Assessment

report for the Barauni Refinery based on the design information and suitable

conservative assumptions.

Based on the Quantitative risk assessment, some recommendations are proposed

from the study and the site visit. These are listed in Section 4 of the report.

Barauni Refinery of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. at Barauni in Bihar desired to get

Comprehensive Risk Analysis (QRA) conducted for the entire refinery. The following

are the objectives of Risk Analysis study:

i) Identification of Risk and Risk Reduction Measures.

ii) To update the Onsite and Offsite Emergency Preparedness Plan with the risk

involved in new units.

iii) For acquainting and training the manpower to handle identified risk.

The computed risk is presented as:

ƒ Individual Risk ƒ F-N Curves (Societal or Group Risk) ƒ Dominant Release Scenarios

The following interpretations are derived from the Risk results of this study:

The study team identified 75 numbers of scenarios. Considering the risk contours

and FN curve for combination of all MCLS, DNV- PHAST software has been used for

the consequence calculations.

The societal risk (2.48E-05) curve is in the tolerable region of the HSE UK Societal

risk acceptance criteria (refer to fig 4.3). The contribution to societal risk due to offsite

populations is low.


rea.

9

In conclusion, the Individual risk (2.64 E-04) curve is in the tolerable region of the UK

HSE individual risk acceptance criteria (refer to appendix – E). The main contributors

to offsite risk are petroleum products from the tank farm areas e.g. LPG tankers,

Crude oil, LPG storage.

Jet fire:

Jet fires can arise from gas, two-phase, or liquid releases. The worst-case jet fires

are likely to be from the storage area and refining units and mainly from the LPG

Storage facility (Horton Spheres), Fuel Gas, Coker and HTU units.

The following jet fire results obtained from the DNV PHAST software are presented

below:

1. Leak / Line Rupture in Horton Sphere which results into jet fire flame radiation

intensity of 36.56 kW/m2 (42.9 meter).

2. Leak in Fuel gas storage tank outlet line results into jet fire flame radiation

intensity 36.56KW/m2 (39.3 meters).

3. Leak from Coker- B reactor overhead line scenario, which results into jet fire

flame radiation intensity of 36.56 kW/m2 (16.7 m).

4. Leak from main fractionator C-1 of coker unit scenario, which results into jet

fire flame radiation intensity of 36.56 kW/m2 (11.5 meter).

Vapor cloud explosion:

In general catastrophic gas explosions happen when considerable quantities of

flammable material are released and dispersed with air to form an explosive vapor

cloud before ignition takes place. A vapor cloud explosion (VCE) occurs if a cloud of

flammable gas burns sufficiently quickly to generate high overpressures.

The following vapor cloud explosion results obtained from the DNV PHAST software

are presented below:

5. Leak in LPG tanker results into dispersion of flammable material in the

atmosphere; it may generate overpressure (0.2608 bar) to the distance of

179.3 meter and affecting the Loading a


6. Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak) will lead in to dispersion of

flammable material in the atmosphere; it may generate overpressure (0.2608

bar) to the distance of 154.1 m

BLEVE:

BLEVE can be defined as a rapid failure of a container of flammable material under

pressure during fire engulfment. Failure is followed by a fireball or major fire which

produces a powerful radiant heat flux

The following BLEVE results obtained from the DNV PHAST software are presented

below:

7. Catastrophic failure of LPG Horton sphere and tanker is a worst case

scenario which results into dispersion of flammable material in the

atmosphere; it may generate fireball radiation intensity of 36.56 kW/m2 to the

distance of 83.7m and 98.3m.

Pool fire:

Pool fires can arise from any site that handles liquid hydrocarbons. The worst case is

likely to be in the tank farm. Mostly tank farm pool fire is contained within the tank

bund itself. Oil spills on ground from the pipelines handling hydrocarbons may results

into pool fire and may affect adjacent equipment resulting into domino effects

(BLEVE).

Toxic release:

Toxic releases are measured at 100 ppm hydrogen sulphide concentration. The

Hazard distances associated with a toxic release depend upon a number of factors,

such as time to detection and isolation of the release, and the prevailing wind

conditions.


1 INTRODUCTION

Barauni Refinery is the second Public Sector Refinery of Indian Oil Corporation built

in collaboration with erstwhile USSR and limited participation of Romania. It is

located near the northern bank of river Ganga at Begusarai district town of Bihar. The

refinery strategically located on the cross roads of two very important national

highways, NH30 & NH31 and two important railways, i.e. Eastern Railway and North

Eastern Railway.

The refinery was commissioned in the year 1964. It was formally dedicated to the

nation by Prof. Humayun Kabir the then Union Minister for Petroleum & Chemicals,

Govt. of India on 15th January 1965. It was originally designed for processing 3.0

MMTPA of Assam Crude. Processing capacity of the refinery was raised to 3.3

MMTPA in 1985 on debottle necking. The processing capacity was raised to 4.2

MMTPA with the help of modifications for improving the energy efficiency as well as

yield of products in 1991. Enhancement of the capacity to 6.0 MMTPA was done by

debottle necking/revamping of the existing primary distillation units and

simultaneously providing the matching secondary processing units/facility.During the

year 2007-2008, Barauni Refinery processed 5.6 MMTPA imported crude oil(88%

low sulpher and 12% high sulpher).

The Refinery processes Imported low sulphur & High sulphur crude oil to produce:

• LPG

• Naphtha

• Motor Spirit

• Superior Kerosene Oil

• High Speed Diesel

• Light Diesel Oil

• Low Sulphur Heavy Stock

• Raw Petroleum Coke

• Sulphur


1.1 FACILITY

Crude received from Haldia / Paradip port through PHBCPL is stored in storage

tanks in O&MS. These tanks are used for feeding the crude units. AVU’s Distillates

from crude units go as straight run products (e.g. LPG, SKO, Bitumen) or as blending

components (e.g. MS, HSD) or as feedstock to various downstream quality-

upgrading units like CRU, DHDT which in turn gives the upgraded rundown streams

for blending to various high-value products (e.g. MS, HSD). And the heavy ends from

AVU’s stored in intermediate storage tanks are used as feedstock to secondary units

like Coker and RFCCU. These secondary units are used to upgrade the heavy ends

to various high value products. Distillates from these units are either used as straight

run products (e.g. LPG, RPC) or as blending components (e.g. MS, HSD, LDO,

CBFS etc.). Blending of these materials is done in OM&S as to meet the IS

specifications or the specifications provided by the customer(s). The final products

are stored in various products storage tanks, and only after certification of these

tanks as per specifications, they are sold to end customers through marketing

terminals.

The petroleum products from the refinery are dispatched through Tank Trucks, Tank

Wagons (Rail) and Barauni-Kanpur pipeline (BKPL). The pipeline passes through

Patna, Mughalsarai and Allahabad where the products are tapped off by Marketing

Division for local distribution.

While LPG, Motor spirit, superior Kerosene and Diesel are dispatched for public

distribution through Marketing; other products are sold to the major valued customers

of Barauni Refinery.

The major process units of Barauni refinery are as follows:

ATMOSPHERIC & VACUUM UNITS (AVU-I, AVU-II & AVU-III)

This unit is termed as the mother unit of refinery. The feed to this unit is crude oil.

Barauni Refinery has three Atmospheric & Vacuum Distillation Units namely AVU-I,

AVU-II & AVU-III. The declared capacity of AVU-I/II is 1.75 MMTPA each & that of

AVU-III is 2.5 MMTPA. AVU-I/II were designed originally for processing Assam

crude. AVU-I & II are exactly similar in terms ofdesigned for processing both low ‘S’

(100% B (100% Arab Mix Crude, 50:50 Arab Heavy & Arab Light.


1-3

RESID FLUIDISED CATALYTIC CRACKING UNIT (RFCCU)

The FCC process Unit consists of a reactor / regenerator section, a main

fractionation section including gas concentration section.

The feed to FCC unit gets cracked in the reactor on meeting the hot regenerated

catalyst in the riser section. The cracked products are fractionated in a fractionated

in a fractionator. LPG and gasoline components are taken out from the overhead of

the fractionator and routed to gas concentration unit. Heavy Naphtha, Light Cycle Oil

(LCO) are withdrawn as side cut from main fractionating column heavy Cycle Oil

(HCO) is also withdrawn as a side cut but after exchanging its heat. It is returned to

the main column. Some HCO is recycled to the reactor. There is no net HCO

product.

DIESEL HYDRO-TREATMENT UNIT (DHDT)

DHDT is installed for upgradation of Coker Gas Oil as well as quality improvement of

few diesel components.

The feed is mixed with Hydrogen-rich recycle gas & make up Hydrogen after being

compressed in respective compressor and reheated by exchanging heat with hot

reactor effluent. The mixture is further heated to the desired reactor temperature in a

fired heater and is fed to the Hydrotreater reactor.

HYDROGEN GENERATION UNIT

To meet the make up requirement of Hydrogen for DHDT Unit, naphtha steam

reforming type Hydrogen unit has been considered where Hydrogen is produced by

steam reforming of Naphtha.

AMINE ABSORPTION UNIT (AAU)

Gases from the stripper of Hydrotreater Unit, being rich in hydrogen sulphide (formed

by reaction of hydrogen with sulphur compounds in Gas Oil), are scrubbed with

Diethanol Amine Solution (DEA) to absorb hydrogen sulphide.


Sour Gas containing H2S is passed through a filter for removal of liquid particies in

the gas. Sour Gas enters the bottom of the Amine Absorber Column while lean

Amine Solution is introduced from the top. As the gases move up the column, they

are washed off by a counter current stream of Amine solution which selectively

absorbs hydrogen sulphide from the upcoming gas stream. Sweet fuel gas leaves

the absorber from the top and goes to the fuel gas system through a absorber from

bottom and is then sent to Amine Regeneration Unit (ARU) after heat-exchanging

with incoming hot regenerated amine.

AMINE REGENERATION UNIT (ARU)

The Amine Regeneration Unit regenerates rich Amine Containing H2S to obtain lean

amine for reuse in AAU. Rich amine is introduced to a flash column top to remove

hydrocarbons by flashing. Hydrocarbons which get vaporized are washed with lean

amine to remove hydrogen sulphide. This gas and sweet gas will join fuel gas

system. Rich amine from the flash column bottom is fed to the Regenerator from the

top. Rich amine moves down the column and is stripped off H2S & CO2 by vapour

generated at reboiler. Overhead gases alongwith water vapour go to the overhead

condenser where water vapour condenses. Acid gases are drawn from the reflux

drum top and routed to the Sulphur Recovery Unit. Liquid from the reflux drum is

sent back to Amine Regenerator as reflux, Regenerated (lean) Amine solution is

drawn from the column bottom and recycled to the amine absorber.

SULPHUR RECOVERY UNIT (SRU)

In this Unit Sulphur is recovered from hydrogen sulphide rich gases obtained form

the Amine regeneration and sour water stripping units. Acid gases entering the unit

are measured and mixed with the required amount of air which is supplied by air

blowers. Air and gases are burnt in the main burner to convert one-third of the

hydrogen sulphide to sulphur dioxide which is then reacted with the reaining

hydrogen sulphide to produce sulphur. The unconverted gases from the thermal

oxidation stage are then processed in the Catalytic convertors for conversion of the

hydrogen sulphide and sulphur dioxide mixture to sulphur which is condensed and

drained off as molten sulphur. Unconverted gases from each stage are used as feed

to the next stage and off-gases from the last stage are sent to a tail gas treating

section in order to bring down SO2 emission. conversion efficiency of SRU shall

be 99%(min).


SOUR WATER STRIPPER

Sour water from Hydro-desulphurisation Unit contains ammonia and hydrogen

sulphide. Sour water is received in sour water surage drum where any flashed

vapour and hydrocarbon liquid carry-over are separated. The flashed vapour is sent

to hydrocarbons flare and hydrocarbon liquid is skimmed off and sent to OWS.

LPG Treating Unit (LTU)

The LPG obtained form secondary processing units like FCCU, Cokers contains H2S

and mercaptans. These undesirable sulphur compounds are removed in the Treating

unit which includes AAU in it’s battery limit. The Treating Unit mainly consists of an

Amine absorber, a caustic prewash column, an extractor, oxidizer and a sand filter.

Gasoline Treating Unit

In this Unit, the foul smelling mercaptans in gasoline are converted to less

objectionable disulphides. The oxidation is carried out in presence of an aqueous

alkaline solution generally sodium hydroxide and a Catalyst. The disulphide formed in

the process remains in the hydrocarbon and no net reduction in total sulphur content

takes place.

COKING UNITS (COKER-A & COKER-B)

There are tow delayed coking units namely Coker-A and Coker-B in Barauni

Refinery. The feed to these units are RCO, SR and DCO from AVUs and RFCCU

units.

Coker-A

The design capacity of the unit is 2000 MTPD. This unit consists of feed preheat

section, fractionating section, Coke Chamber (Coking Section), quenching section

and Kero, CGO & CFO strippers and MP & HP steam generation section and

furnaces. There are four coke chambers & two furnaces.

Coker-B

The design capacity of the unit is 1600 MTP


1-7

1.2 WEATHER CONDITIONS

The consequences arising out of the release of flammable chemicals are dependent

amongst other things on the prevailing meteorological conditions. This section

describes the influence of these. For this study weather conditions pertaining to

Barauni as provided by client have been considered.

1.2.1 Wind velocity

The annual mean wind velocity is taken as around 2.2 m/s. Usually, during January

to April and September to December (8 months) the wind velocity generally lies

between 1.7 to 2.1 m/s. During the four monsoon months June to September, the

average velocity is about 2.8 m/s.

1.2.2 Temperature

The annual mean temperature at Barauni is 25.3°C. The annual mean of maximum

and minimum mean daily temperature are 29.8°C and 20.8°C respectively. The

monthly mean daily maximum and mean daily minimum temperatures vary between

21-37.8°C and 10.4-28.4°C respectively.

Annual mean temperature taken for this study: 25°C

1.2.3 Stability class

Dispersion of gases or vapour largely depends upon the Stability Class. Various

stability classes that are defined as Pasquill classes are:

- A Very Unstable

- B Unstable

- C Slightly Unstable

- D Neutral

- E Stable

- F Very Stable

- Time of the Day (Day or Night)

- Cloud Cover

- Season

- Wind Speed


Six stability classes from A to F are defined while wind speed can take any one of

numerous values. It may thus appear that a large number of outcome cases can be

formulated by considering each one of very many resulting stability class-wind speed

combinations. However in fact the number of stability class - wind speed

combinations that needs to be considered for formulating outcome cases in any

analysis is very limited. This is because, in nature, only certain combinations of

stability class and wind speed occur. Thus, for instance combinations such as A-3

m/s or B-5 m/s or F-4 m/s do not occur in nature. As a result only one or two stability

class - wind speed combinations need to be considered to ensure reasonable

completeness of Risk Analysis study. Furthermore, though wind speeds less than 1

m/s may occur in practice, none of the available dispersion models, including state-

of-art ones, can handle wind speeds below 1 m/s. Fortunately, wind speed does not

influence consequences as much as stability class and for a given stability class, the

influence of wind speed is relatively less. On the other hand consequences vary

considerably with stability class for the same speed.

Except during the monsoon months little or no cloud cover alongwith the prevailing

low wind velocities results in unstable conditions during the day (C or D) and highly

stable conditions (E or F) at night. During the four months of monsoon the wind

velocities are generally higher and cloud cover generally present. This results in

stability class of D during the day and E or F during the night. The stability class

distribution over the year roughly works out as below:

A - B - C 17% D 50% E or F 33%

The following wind velocity/stability class combinations & frequencies are used for

Quantified Risk Analysis:

B - 3 m/s 50%

E – 1 m/s 50%


1-8

Annual mean air temperature is taken as about 25°C

Annual mean % humidity is taken as 65%.

1.3 PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF THE ASSIGNMENT

Chilworth were engaged to undertake Quantitative Risk Assessment of IOC, Barauni

Refinery. The initial effort involved site visit and data collection. This included visit &

discussions on Process and hazards with design personnel, data collection for the

purpose of the study. The visit, collection of data and information required provided

familiarity with the project to the team carrying out the Risk Analysis study. The next

part comprised of the Risk Analysis calculations based on the collected data. These

essentially involve release rate and source strength calculations, dispersion modeling

and explosion and fire modeling for the selected scenarios. In addition to calculation

of consequence effects, frequency of occurrence of individual scenarios is also

estimated. Consequence effect & frequency values are used to estimate risk values.


ion process. An appropriate set of

eeded to satisfy the requirements of

m of incidents enumerated.

2-1

2 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

2.1 ENUMERATION AND SELECTION OF INCIDENTS

Effective management of a Risk Analysis study requires enumeration and selection

of incidents, and a formal means for tracking the incidents & Incident outcomes.

Enumeration attempts to ensure that no significant incidents are overlooked;

selection tries to reduce the incident outcome cases studied to a manageable

number; and tracking ensures that no selected incident & incident outcome is lost in

the calculation procedure.

The starting point of the analysis is to identify all the incident scenarios that need to

be addressed. These incidents can be classified under either of two categories: loss

of containment of material or loss of containment of energy. Unfortunately, there is an

infinite number of ways (incidents) by which loss of containment can occur in either

category. For example, leaks of process materials can be of any size, from a pinhole

up to a severed pipeline or ruptured vessel. An explosion can occur in either a small

container or a large container and, in each case, can range from a small "puff" to a

catastrophic detonation.

A technique commonly used to generate an incident list is to consider potential leaks

and major releases from fractures of all process pipelines and vessels. This

compilation should include all pipe work and vessels in direct communication, as

these may share a significant inventory that cannot be isolated in an emergency. The

data generated is as shown below:

• Vessel number, description, and dimensions

• Materials present

• Vessel conditions (phase, temperature, pressure)

• Inventory

• Connecting piping and piping dimensions.

The goal of selection is to limit the total number of incident outcome cases to be

studied to a manageable size, without introducing bias or losing resolution through

overlooking significant incidents or incident outcomes. The purpose of incident

selection is to construct an appropriate set of incidents for the study from the Initial

List that has been generated by the enumerat

incidents is the minimum number of incidents n

the study and adequately represent the spectru

immediately ignited on release?


2.2 SELECTION

The goal of selection is to limit the total number of incident outcome cases to be

studied to a manageable size, without introducing bias or losing resolution through

overlooking significant incidents or incident outcomes. The purpose of incident

selection is to construct an appropriate set of incidents for the study from the Initial

List that has been generated by the enumeration process. An appropriate set of

incidents is the minimum number of incidents needed to satisfy the requirements of

the study and adequately represent the spectrum of incidents enumerated. One of

the risk analyst's jobs is to select a subset of the initial List for further analysis. This

involves several tasks, each resulting in a unique list. Throughout the selection

process, the risk analyst must exercise caution so that critical incidents, which might

substantially effect the risk estimate, are not overlooked or excluded from the study.

The Initial list of incidents is reviewed to identify those incidents that are too small to

be of concern. Removing these incidents from the Initial List produces a Revised List.

To be cost effective and to reduce the Risk Analysis calculation burden, it is essential

to compress this Revised List by combining redundant scenarios of very similar

incidents. This new list is termed the Condensed List. This list can and should be

reduced further by grouping similar incidents into subsets and where possible,

replacing each subset with a single equivalent incident. This grouping and

replacement can be accomplished by consideration of similar inventories,

compositions, discharge rates and discharge locations. Further ranking of individual

incidents within each incident class is possible. Various schemes can be devised to

rank incidents within each incident class (e.g. preliminary ranking criteria based on

the severity of hazard posed by released chemicals, release rate, and total quantity

released). A ranking procedure is important in selection of a Representative Set of

incidents if the study is to minimize bias or loss of resolution. The purpose of incident

outcome selection is to develop a set of incident outcomes that must be studied for

each incident included in the finalized incident study list. Each incident needs to be

considered separately. Using the list of incident outcomes the risk analyst needs to

determine which may result from each incident. This process is not necessarily

straightforward. While the analyst can decide whether an incident involving the loss

of a process chemical to the atmosphere needs to be examined using dispersion

analysis because of potential toxic gas effects, what happens if the same material is


influencing parameters are combined

2-3

2.3 CHARACTERISING THE FAILURES

Accidental release of flammable or toxic vapours can result in severe consequences.

Delayed ignition of flammable vapours can result in blast overpressures covering

large areas. This may lead to extensive loss of life and property. Toxic clouds may

cover yet larger distances due to the lower threshold values in relation to those in

case of explosive clouds (the lower explosive limits). In contrast, fires have localized

consequences. Fires can be put out or contained in most cases; there are few

mitigating actions one can take once a vapour cloud gets released. Major accident

hazards arise, therefore, consequent upon the release of flammable or toxic vapours

or BLEVE in case of pressurized liquefied gases.

In a refinery, main hazard arises due to storage and handling of hydrocarbons. To

formulate a structured approach to identification of hazards an understanding of

contributory factors is essential.

2.3.1 Blast Overpressures

Blast Overpressures depend upon the reactivity class of material and the amount of

gas between two explosive limits. The hydrocarbon that is expected to give rise to a

vapour cloud on release is pressurized gases.

2.3.2 Operating Parameters

Potential vapour release for the same material depends significantly on the operating

conditions. Propane and LPG are handled at the refinery, Propane / LPG being

handled at atmospheric temperature and in pressurized condition, these releases

have been considered for release scenario selection.

2.3.3 Inventory

Inventory Analysis is commonly used in understanding the relative hazards and short

listing of release scenarios. Inventory plays an important role in regard to the

potential hazard. Larger the inventory of a vessel or a system, larger the quantity of

potential release. A practice commonly used to generate an incident list is to consider

potential leaks and major releases from fractures of pipelines and vessels containing

sizable inventories. The potential vapour release (source strength) depends upon

the quantity of liquid release, the properties of the materials and the operating

conditions (pressure, temperature). If all these

into a matrix and vapour source strength computed for each release case, a ranking

should become a credible exercise.


2.3.4 Loss of Containment

Plant inventory can get discharged to Environment due to Loss of Containment.

Certain features of materials to be handled at the plant need to the clearly

understood to firstly list out all significant release cases and then to short list release

scenarios for a detailed examination. The chemicals presently under consideration

are hydrocarbons.

Liquid release can be either instantaneous or continuous. Failure of a vessel leading

to an instantaneous outflow assumes the sudden appearance of such a major crack

that practically all of the contents above the crack shall be released in a very short

time.

The more likely event is the case of liquid release from a hole in a pipe connected to

the vessel. The flow rate will depend on the size of the hole as well as on the

pressure in front of the hole, prior to the accident. Such pressure is basically

dependent on the pressure in the vessel.

The vaporization of released liquid depends on the vapour pressure and weather

conditions. Such consideration and others have been kept in mind both during the

initial listing as well as during the short listing procedure. Initial listing of all significant

inventories in the process plants was carried out. This ensured no omission through

inadvertence.

Based on the methodology discussed above a set of appropriate scenarios was

generated to carry out Risk Analysis calculations, as listed below:


SR .NO

SCENARIOS

1. Leak in Crude Oil Storage Tank-Dyke Pool Fire 2. Crude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire

3. Leak in Crude oil storage tank- Dyke Pool Fire (Comparison Case)

4. Crude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire (Comparison Case)

5. Leak in Crude oil storage tank 501- Dyke Pool Fire

6. Crude storage tank roof failure 501 – Tank Fire

7. Leak / Line Rupture in Horton Sphere – Jet Fire

8. Leak / Line Rupture in Horton Sphere – Flash Fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion

9. Failure of Horton Sphere – BLEVE

10. Leak / Line Rupture in Mounded bullet outlet line – Flash fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion

11. Leak in LPG Mounded bullets storage tanks outlet line – Jet Fire

12. Leak / Line Rupture in Fuel gas – Flash fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion

13. Leak in Fuel gas storage tank outlet line – Jet Fire

14. Leak in MS / SRN Storage tank – Pool Fire

15. MS / SRN storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire

16. MS / SRN storage tank roof fire – Flash fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion

17. Leak in Slope tank – Pool Fire

18. Slope tank roof fire – Tank Fire

19. Leak in SKO Storage tank – Pool Fire

20. SKO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire

21. Leak in Gas oil Storage tank – Pool Fire

22. Gas oil storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire

23. Leak in CBFS (Carbon Black Feed Stock)/ CLO (Clarified Oil) Storage tank – Pool Fire

24. CBFS (Carbon Black Feed Stock)/ CLO (Clarified Oil) storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire

25. Leak in CFO (Coker Furl Oil) IFO (Internal Fuel Oil)/ RFO (Residual Fuel Oil) Storage tank

– Pool Fire

26. CFO (Coker Fuel Oil) IFO (Internal Fuel Oil)/ RFO (Residual Fuel Oil) storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire

27. Leak in HVGO (Heavy Vacuum Gas Oil)

28. HVGO (Heavy Vacuum Gas Oil) storaget



inlet of pretopping column

2-6

SR .NO

SCENARIOS

29. Leak in LSHS (Low Sulphur Heav Stock) Storage tank – Pool Fire

30. LSHS (Low Sulphur Heav Stock) storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire

31. Leak in SR (Short Residue) Storage tank – Pool Fire

32. SR (Short Residue) storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire

33. Leak in Bitumen Storage tank – Pool Fire

34. Bitumen storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire

35. Leak from H2 Bullet outlet piping – Flash Fire/ VCE

Wagon Gantry Scenarios

36. Major Leak from MS Wagon – Pool Fire

37. Major Leak from MS Wagon – Flash Fire/ Vapour Cloud Explosion

38. Major Leak from HVGO (Black Oil) Wagon – Pool Fire

39. Major Leak from SKO (White Oil) Wagon – Flash Fire/ Vapour Cloud Explosion

Tanker Truck Gantry Scenarios

40. Loss of containment in CBFS tanker- Pool Fire

41. Loss of containment in HVGO (Black Oil) tanker- Pool Fire

42. Loss of containment in LPG tanker- BLEVE

43. Loss of containment in LPG tanker- Flash Fire/ Vapour Cloud Explosion

Pipelines

44. Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak size) – Pool fire

45. Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak size) – Flash Fire/ Vapour Cloud Explosion

CRUDE DISTILLATION UNIT-1

46. Leak from Crude Column (K-2) (AVU – 3)

47. Failure of Nozzle /Flange Joint in Crude Column (601-K-2) & crude starts coming out

48. 10mm leak from inlet flange of Stabilizer Column (601-K-4) – Pool Fire

49. Leak (10mm) from Furnace (F-101/F-102) tube inside the furnace /Nozzle of crude heater

& crude starts coming out (Data for tube/nozzle required)

50. Desalter overflows line Leak (10mm)

51. Nozzle / Flange joint leak (10mm) from the

VACUUM CLOUMN-1



SR .NO

SCENARIOS

52. Leak from Vacuum Column (K-5)

53. Failure of Stripper Column K-6(1) Nozzle & hydrocarbon starts coming out (AVU -1/2)

54. Rupture of Furnace (F-101/F-102) tube inside the furnace /Nozzle of crude heater & crude

starts coming out

LPG Treatment Unit

55. Leak from LPG-Amine Absorber (08-C-101)

56. Failure of LPG Surge Vessel (08-V-104)

Naphtha Hydrotreater Unit (HTU)

57. Failure of Naphtha Splitter (01-CC-00-001) Nozzle & naphtha starts coming out

58. Leak (10mm) from Hydrotreater Reactor (02-RB-00-001)

Catalytic Reformer Unit

59. Leak (10mm) from reformer reactor (03-RB-00-001)

60. Leak (10mm) from Stabilizer column (02-CC-00-001)

DHDT

61. Failure of reactor (702-R-01)

62. H2S Leak from Stripper Gas Amine Absorber (DHDT)

COKER-A/B

63. Leak (10mm) from main fractionator C-1

64. 10mm leak from Coker – B reactor overhead line

65. 10mm leak from Coker – B reactor bottom line

RFCCU

66. Leak (10mm) from Reactor (701-R-101) inlet – Jet Fire

67. Leak (10mm) from Main Fractionator (701-C-201) top – Jet Fire

LPG Recovery unit

68. Leak (10mm) from Debutaniser column (08-C-003) top – Jet Fire

69. Leak (10mm) from Stripper (08-C-002) top – Jet Fire

HYDROGEN PLANT

70. Leak (10mm) from inlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Prereformer) R-4 – Jet Fire

71. Leak (10mm) from outlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Reformer) R-5 – Jet Fire

72. Leak (10mm) from inlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Shift Converter) R-6 – Jet Fire

NHDT

73. Leak (10mm) from NHDT Reactor (R-01)




SR .NO

SCENARIOS

ISOM 74. Leak (10mm) from ISOM Reactor (R-01) – Jet Fire

PRIMEGPFD 75. Failure of PRIMEGPFD reactor (R-02)- Jet Fire



3 RISK ANALYSIS CALCULATIONS

3.1 CONSEQUENCE CALCULATIONS

Accidental release of flammable or toxic vapours can result in severe consequences.

Delayed ignition of flammable vapours can result in blast overpressures covering

large areas. This may lead to extensive loss of life and property. Toxic clouds may

cover yet a larger distance due to the lower threshold values in relation to those in

case of explosive clouds (the lower explosive limits). In contrast, fires have localized

consequences. Fires can be put out or contained in most cases; there are few

mitigating actions one can take once a vapour cloud gets released.

In a refinery handling hazardous chemical such as hydrocarbons, the main hazard

arises due to storage and handling of HCs. If LPG is released into the atmosphere,

they may cause damage due to resulting BLEVE, fires or vapour cloud explosion of

the evaporated LPG. To formulate a structured approach to identification of hazards

an understanding of contributory factors is essential. These factors have been

described in detail in chapter - 2.

3.2 DAMAGE CRITERIA

In consequence analysis, use is made of a number of calculation models to estimate

the physical effects of an accident (spill of hazardous material) and to predict the

damage (lethality, injury, material destruction) of the effects. The calculations can

roughly be divided in three major groups:

a) Determination of the source strength parameters;

b) Determination of the consequential effects;

c) Determination of the damage or damage distances.

The basic physical effect models consist of the following.

3.2.1 Source Strength Parameters

• Calculation of the outflow of liquid out of a tank or pipe, in case of rupture.

• Calculation, in case of liquid outflow, of the instantaneous flash evaporation and of the dimensions of the remaining liquid pool.

• Calculation of the evaporation rate, as a function of volatility of the material, pool dimensions and wind velocity.

• Source strength equals pump capacity



3.2.2 Consequential effects

• Dispersion of gaseous material in the atmosphere as a function of source strength, relative density of the gas, weather conditions and topographical

situation of the surrounding area.

• Intensity of heat radiation [in kW/ m2] due to a fire, as a function of the distance to the source.

• Energy of vapour cloud explosions [in N/m2], as a function of the distance to the distance of the exploding cloud.

• Concentration of gaseous material in the atmosphere, due to the dispersion of evaporated chemical. The latter can be either explosive or toxic.

It may be obvious, that the types of models that must be used in a specific risk study

strongly depend upon the type of material involved:

• Gas, vapour, liquid, solid?

• Inflammable, explosive, toxic, toxic combustion products?

• Stored at high/low temperatures or pressure?

• Controlled outflow (pump capacity) or catastrophic failure?

3.2.3 Selection of Damage Criteria

The damage criteria give the relation between extent of the physical effects

(exposure) and the percentage of the people that will be killed or injured due to those

effects. The knowledge about these relations depends strongly on the nature of the

exposure. For instance, much more is known about the damage caused by heat

radiation, than about the damage due to toxic exposure, and for these toxic effects,

the knowledge differs strongly between different materials. In Consequence Analysis

studies, in principle three types of exposure to hazardous effects are distinguished:

1. Heat radiation, from a jet, pool fire or flash fire.

2. Explosion

3. Toxic effects, from toxic materials or toxic combustion products.

Heat Radiation

The consequences caused by exposure to heat radiation is a function of:

• The radiation energy onto the human body [kW/m2];

• The exposure duration [sec];

• The protection of the skin tissue


.

3-3

The limits for 1% of the exposed people to be killed due to heat radiation, and for

second-degree burns are given in the table below:

Damages to Human Life Due to Heat Radiation

Exposure

Duration

Radiation

energy (1%

lethality, kW/m2

Radiation energy

for 2nd degree

burns, kW/m2

Radiation energy

for first degree

burns, kW/m2

10 Sec 21.2 16 12.5

30 Sec 9.3 7.0 4.0

Since in practical situations, only the people outside will be exposed to heat radiation

in case of a fire, it is reasonable to assume the protection by clothing. It can be

assumed that people would be able to find a cover or a shield against thermal

radiation in 10-sec. time. Furthermore, 100% lethality may be assumed for all people

suffering from direct contact with flames, such as the pool fire, a flash fire or a jet

flame. The effects due to relatively lesser incident radiation intensity are given below.

Effects Due To Incident Radiation Intensity

INCIDENT RADIATION

– kW/m2

TYPE OF DAMAGE

0.7 Equivalent to Solar Radiation

1.6 No discomfort for long exposure

4.0 Sufficient to cause pain within 20 sec.

Blistering of skin (first degree burns are likely)

9.5 Pain threshold reached after 8 sec. Second

degree burns after 20 sec.

12.5 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of

wood, melting plastic tubing etc.

18.47 Sufficient to cause damage.

37.50 Damage to process equipment or facility.

Source: Purple book from TNO, Netherlands




The actual results would be less severe due to the various assumptions made in the

models arising out of the flame geometry, emissivity, angle of incidence, view factor

and others. Upon ignition, a spilled liquid hydrocarbon would burn in the form of a

large turbulent diffusion flame. The size of the flame would depend upon the spill

surface and the thermo-chemical properties of the spilled liquid. In particular, the

diameter of the fire (if not confined to a dyke), the visible height of the flame, the tilt

and drag of the flame due to wind can be correlated to the burning velocity of the

liquid. The radiative output of the flame would be dependent upon the fire size, extent

of mixing with air and the flame temperature. Some fraction of the radiation is

absorbed by carbon dioxide and water vapour in the intervening atmosphere. In

addition, large hydrocarbon pool fires produce thick smoke, which can significantly

obscure flame radiation. Finally the incident flux at an observer location would

depend upon the radiation view factor, which is a function of the distance from the

flame surface, the observer’s orientation and the flame geometry. Estimation of the

thermal radiation hazards from pool fires essentially involves 3 steps;

characterization of flame geometry, approximation of the radiative properties of the

fire and calculation of safe separation distances to specified levels of thermal

radiation.

Explosion

In case of vapour cloud explosion, two physical effects may occur:

• flash fire over the whole length of the explosive gas cloud;

• a blast wave, with typical peak overpressures circular around ignition source. As explained above, 100% lethality is assumed for all people who are present within

the cloud proper.

For the blast wave, the lethality criterion is based on:

• peak overpressure of 0.1 bar will cause serious damage to 10% of the housing/structures.

• Falling fragments will kill one of each eight persons in the destroyed buildings. The following damage criteria may be distinguished with respect to the peak

overpressures resulting from a blast wave:



stic & conservative assumptions are

outcomes may look pessimistic, the

3-5

Damage Due To Overpressures

Peak Overpressure Damage Type Description

0.83 bar

0.20 bar

0.10 bar

0.03 bar

0.01 bar

Total Destruction

Heavy Damage

Moderate Damage

Significant Damage

Minor Damage

Total destruction of plant

equipment structure

Damage to plant

equipment structure

Reparable damage to

plant equipment structure

Shattering of glass

Crack in glass Source: Green book from TNO, Netherlands.

From this it may be concluded that p = 0.17 E+5 pa corresponds approximately with

1% lethality. Furthermore it is assumed that everyone inside an area in which the

peak overpressure is greater than 0.17 E+5 pa will be wounded by mechanical

damage. For the gas cloud explosion this will be inside a circle with the ignition

source as its center.

3.3 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS CALCULATIONS

This section documents the consequence-distance calculations, which have been re-

computed for the same accident release scenarios as in earlier report and some added

scenarios. A Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) can be characterized as the worst

credible accident. In other words: an accident in an activity, resulting in the maximum

consequence distance that is still believed to be possible. Another aspect, in which the

pessimistic approach of MCA studies appears, is the atmospheric condition that is

used for dispersion calculations. In general, a very stable

atmosphere (Pasquill class E) and a low wind speed (1 m/s) are assumed. These

conditions result in the lowest dispersion velocity & consequently in the highest

vapour concentrations and the largest damage distances. Less pessimistic

assumptions (e.g. unstable weather, wind speed 3 m/s), which are generally the

more average conditions, result in smaller damage distances.

In Risk Analysis studies contributions from low frequency - high outcome effect as

well as high frequency - low outcome events are distinguished)- the objective of the

study is emergency planning, hence only holi

used for obvious reasons. Hence though the


occurs within only portions of the vapor cloud

concentrations), rather than the entire cloud.


(where mixed with air in flammable

A flash fire may burn back to the

3-6

planning for emergency concept should be borne in mind whilst interpreting the

results. The Consequence Analysis has been done for selected scenarios. This has

been done for weather conditions B-3 m/s and for E-1 m/sec.

In Consequence Analysis, geographical location of the source of potential release

plays an important role. Consideration of a large number of scenarios in the same

geographical location serves little purpose once the dominant scenario has been

identified & duly considered.

3.4 FIRE AND EXPLOSION MODELING

3.4.1 Jet Fire

Jet fires are burning jets of gas or atomized liquid whose shape is dominated by the

momentum of the release. The consequence of the jet fire is directional depending

on the release orientation. Jet fires typically have flame temperature of 2200 deg F

and can produce high intensity thermal radiation. The jet flame stabilizes on or close

to the point of release and continues until the release is stopped. Jet fires could occur

during unloading or transfer operations when pressures are increased by

compressors. Such fires could cause severe damage but will generally affect only the

local area.

If compressed or liquefied gases are related from storage tanks or pipelines, the

materials discharging through the hole will form a gas jet that entrains and mixes with

the ambient air. If the material encounters an ignition sources while it is in the

flammable range, a jet fire may occur. Jet fires could occur during unloading

operations when pressures are increased by pumping. Such fires could cause severe

damage but will generally affect only the local area.

The effect of jet flame impingement is severe as it may cut through equipment,

pipeline or structure. The damage effect of thermal radiation is depended on both the

level of thermal radiation and duration of exposure.

3.4.2 Flash Fire

When a volatile, flammable material is released to the atmosphere, a vapor cloud

forms and disperses (mixes with air). If the resultant vapor cloud is ignited before the

cloud is diluted below its LFL, a flash fire may occur. The combustion normally


which can cause damage to buildings, breaking


which can be heard as a bang and

windows and ejecting missiles over

3-7

release point, resulting in a pool or jet fire but is unlikely to generate damaging

overpressures (explode) when unconfined

A flash fire occurs when a cloud of vapor/gas burns without generating any significant

overpressure. The cloud is typically ignited on its edge, remote from- the leak source.

The combustion zone moves through the cloud away from the ignition point. The

duration of the flash fire is relatively short but it may stabilize as a continuous jet fire

from the leak source. For flash fires, an approximate estimate for the extent of the

total effect zone is the area over which the cloud is above the LFL. It is assumed that

this area is not increased by cloud expansion during burning.

3.4.3 Fire Ball (BLEVE)

BLEVE stands for Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion. Sometimes referred to

as a fireball, a BLEVE is a combination of fire and explosion with an intense radiant

heat emission within a relatively short time interval. As implied by the term, the

phenomenon can occur within a vessel or tank in which a liquefied gas is kept above

its atmospheric boiling point.

It is the result of a liquid within a container reaching a temperature well above its

boiling point at atmospheric temperature, causing the vessel to rupture into two or

more pieces. BLEVE can be defined as a rapid failure of a container of flammable

material under pressure during fire engulfment. Failure is followed by a fireball or

major fire which produces a powerful radiant-heat flux.

BLEVE can occur when fire impinges on the tank shell at a point or points above the

liquid level of the contents of the tank. This impingement causes the metal to weaken

and fail from the internal pressure. A fireball is an intense spherical fire resulting from

a sudden release of pressurized gas which is immediately ignited, burning as it

expand forming a ball of fire, rising in the air. When this cloud is ignited, a fireball

occurs, causing enormous heat-radiation intensity within a few seconds. This heat

intensity is sufficient to cause severe skin burns and deaths at several hundred

meters from the vessel, depending on the quantity of the gas involved. When a

BLEVE occurs, debris may travel hundreds of feet, with tremendous force, and the

escaping fuel can ignite causing an expanding fireball.

3.4.4 Explosions

Explosions are characterized by a shock-wave



ge releases, this may happen much

3-8

distances of several hundred meters. The injuries and damage are in the first place

caused by the shock-wave of the explosion itself. People are blown over or knocked

down and buried under collapsed buildings or injured by flying glass. Although the

effects of over-pressure can directly result in deaths, this would be likely to involve

only those working in the direct vicinity of the explosion. The history of industrial

explosions shows that the indirect effects of collapsing buildings, flying glass and

debris cause far more loss of life and severe injuries.

3.4.5 Vapor Cloud Explosion

Generally catastrophic gas explosions happen when considerable quantities of

flammable material are released and dispersed with air to form an explosive vapor

cloud before ignition takes place.

A vapor cloud explosion (VCE) occurs if a cloud of flammable gas burns sufficiently

quickly to generate high overpressures (i.e. pressures in excess of ambient).

The following main types of explosion can be distinguished.

• Confined explosions where the burning gas is largely confined, typically inside a largely empty enclosed tank or building.

• Semi-confined explosions where the gas is partly confined, typically in an offshore process module therefore not considered for this study.

• Unconfined explosions where the gas cloud is largely unconfined, typically on an onshore installation, but there are sufficient obstacles to generate

turbulence and start the build-up of pressure.

3.4.6 Toxic gas release

In case of release of toxic gas, when a gas that is heavier than air is released, it

initially behaves very differently from a neutrally buoyant gas. The heavy gas will first

"slump," or sink, because it is heavier than the surrounding air. As the gas cloud

moves downwind, gravity makes it spread; this can cause some of the vapor to travel

upwind of its release point. Farther downwind, as the cloud becomes more diluted

and its density approaches that of air, it begins behaving like a neutrally buoyant gas.

This takes place when the concentration of heavy gas in the surrounding air drops

below about 1 percent (10,000 parts per million). For many small releases, this will

occur in the first few yards (meters). For lar

further downwind.



3-9

A gas that has a molecular weight greater than that of air will form a heavy gas cloud

if enough gas is released. Gases that are lighter than air at room temperature, but

that are stored in a cryogenic (low temperature) state, can also form heavy gas

clouds. Many substances that are gases under normal pressures and temperatures

are stored under pressures high enough to liquefy them. When a tank rupture or

broken valve causes a sudden pressure loss in a tank of liquefied gas, the liquid boils

violently and the tank contents foam up, filling the tank with a mixture of gas and fine

liquid droplets (called aerosol).

Flash boiling is the term for that sudden vaporization of a liquid caused by a loss of

pressure. When the liquid and gas phases of a chemical escape together from a

ruptured tank, the release is called a two-phase flow. When a two-phase mixture

escapes from storage, the release rate can be significantly greater than that for a

release of pure gas. The two-phase mixture that escapes into the atmosphere may

behave like a heavy gas cloud. The cloud is heavy in part because it is initially cold,

and therefore denser than it would be at ambient temperatures, and also because it

consists of a two-phase mixture. The tiny aerosol droplets mixed into the cloud act to

weigh the cloud down and make it denser than a pure gas cloud, and their

evaporation cools the cloud. Toxic materials that become airborne are carried by the

wind and transported away from the spill site. While being transported downwind, the

airborne chemical(s) mix with air and disperse.

Gases and two-phase liquid-vapor mixtures are divided into three general classes:

• Positively buoyant

• Neutrally buoyant

• Negatively buoyant. These classifications are based on the density difference between the released

material and its surrounding medium (air). The classifications are influenced by

release temperature, molecular weight, presence of aerosols, ambient temperature at

release, and relative humidity.



3-10

3-11

3-12

CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS CALCULATIONS FOR IOCL BARAUNI REFINERY OPERATIONS

OIL Management & Storage System

Sc# 1 Major Leak in Crude oil storage tank – Pool Fire Parameters

Operating Temperature - 25°C

Operating Pressure - Atmospheric

Tank Diameter - 65m

Tank capacity - 40,000KL Heat Radiation Model

Released Quantity - 39200KL

Exposure duration - 30 sec

Pool Diameter - 122.37m

(100 % fatality within the pool area)

For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage

distances are as follows:

Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2) Effect Distance (m)

from centre of pool

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

154.0

81.5

68.7

68.7

-

ACCIDENT PROBABILITY

Base frequency - 5.0E –6 per year

No. of tanks handled - 7

Ignition Probability - 0.3

Accident Probability - 1.05E-6 per year

Personnel present in the section - 3



3-13

3-14

Sc# 2 Crude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire

Parameters



Tank Diameter - 65 m


Released Quantity - 39,500KL


Pool Diameter - 65 m




Percent Lethality Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

138.7

70.4

57.9

57.9

-









3-15

Sc# 3 Major Leak in Crude oil storage tank – Pool Fire (Comparison

Case)

Parameters



Tank Diameter - 65m

Tank capacity - 40,000KL

Heat Radiation Model







Percent Lethality

Thermal Load


from centre of pool

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

153.69

81.41

68.58

68.57

-



3-16

3-17







Sc# 4 Crude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire (Comparison Case)

Parameters












3-18

3-19



Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

138.7

70.4

58.0

57.9

-







Sc# 5 Major Leak in Crude oil storage tank 501 – Pool Fire

Parameters





Tank Diameter - 65m










from centre of pool

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

154.1

81.7

68.9

68.7

-









3-22

Sc# 6 Crude storage tank 501 roof failure – Tank Fire

Parameters












Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

138.8

70.4

58.1

57.9

-









3-23

Sc# 7 Leak / Line Rupture in LPG Horton Sphere – Jet Fire

Parameters


Operating Pressure - 8.15kg/cm2

Tank Capacity - 1500 KL

Tank Diameter - 14.5 m Dia


Released Quantity - 1470 KL

Exposure duration - 30sec

Jet Length - 41.86m

(100 % fatality within the jet area)



Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effective Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

73.4

59.1

55.2

50.6

42.9



3-24

3-25


Base frequency - 7.0 E –7 per year



Accident Probability - 8.4E - 7 per year


Sc# 8 Leak / Line Rupture in Horton Sphere – Flash Fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion

Parameters




Tank Diameter - 14.5 m

Dispersion Model

Weather Conditions

Cloud Dimensions Length (m) Width (m)

B – 3 m/sec 33.4 1.5 E – 1 m/sec 38.1 1.2



3-26

3-27

Vapour Cloud Explosion Model

Damage Type

B- 3 m/sec E – 1 m/sec Max (m) Max (m)

0.2 bar (Heavy) 90.5 91.7 0.1 bar (Moderate) 93.5 95.2

0.02 bar (Minor) 132.4 138.8



No. of tanks handled annually - 4




Sc# 9 Failure of Horton Sphere – BLEVE

Parameters




Tank Diameter - 14.5 m





3-28

3-29

Exposure Duration - 10sec

Fireball Diameter - 131.84m

(100 % fatality within the fireball area)



Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

513.9

323.3

266.2

202.1

83.7









Sc# 10 Leak / Line Rupture in LPG Mounded bullets – Flash Fire / Vapour Cloud

Explosion

Parameters




Tank Diameter - 6.0m

Dispersion Model

Weather Conditions


B – 3 m/sec 43.0 0.84 E – 1 m/sec 46.0 0.73


Damage Type



0.02 bar (Minor) 66.8 70.1


Base frequency - 1.0E-6 per year

No. of tanks - 6






3-30

3-31



3-32

Sc# 11 Leak in LPG Mounded bullets storage tanks outlet line – Jet Fire

Parameters








Jet Length - 33.91m

(100 % fatality within the Jet area)



Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

37.1

31.1

29.3

27.2

23.6



No. of tanks - 6






3-33

3-34

Sc# 12 Leak / Line Rupture in Fuel gas (Horton Sphere) – Flash Fire /


Parameters



Tank Diameter - 8.3m Dia


Dispersion Model

Weather Conditions


B – 3 m/sec 31.9 1.8 E – 1 m/sec 38.7 1.7


Damage Type




3-35


0.02 bar (Minor) 102.0 106.9



No. of tanks - 2




Sc# 13 Leak in Fuel gas storage tank (Horton spheres) – Jet Fire

Parameters



Tank Diameter - 8.3m Dia







3-37

Jet Length - 38.16m




Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

64.4

53.2

49.9

46.1

39.3



No. of tanks - 2






3-38

Sc# 14 Leak in MS / SRN Storage tank – Pool Fire

Parameters


Operating Pressure - atmospheric.


Tank Capacity - 5000KL








Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

54.1

30.6

23.3

17.7

-



No. of tanks - 18






3-39

3-40

Sc# 15 MS / SRN storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire

Parameters









(100 % fatality within the fire area)



Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

80.9

38.2

29.3

29.2

-



3-41

3-42



No. of tanks - 18




Sc# 16 MS / SRN storage tank roof fire – Flash fire / Vapour Cloud

Explosion

Parameters





Dispersion Model

Weather Conditions


B – 3 m/sec 28.5 28.9 E – 1 m/sec 110.5 110.3



3-43

3-44


Damage Type



0.02 bar (Minor) 50.2 188.9



No. of tanks - 18






3-45

Sc# 17 Leak in Slop tank – Pool Fire

Parameters



Tank Diameter - 22.7M









Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

77.9

40.5

32.2

31.8

-



No. of tanks - 3






3-46

Sc# 18 Slop tank roof fire – Tank Fire

Parameters



Tank Diameter - 22.7M









Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

81.9

43.6

35.3

34.9

-



3-47

3-48



No. of tanks - 3




Sc# 19 Leak in SKO Storage tank – Pool Fire

Parameters


Operating Pressure - atmospheric

Tank Diameter - 22.7m.











3-49

3-50

Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

85.0

40.3

31.3

31.2

-



No. of tanks - 7




Sc# 20 SKO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire

Parameters



Tank Diameter - 22.7m.







3-51





Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

93.5

47.1

38.2

38.1

-



No. of tanks - 7






3-52

3-53

Sc# 21 Leak in Gas oil Storage tank – Pool Fire

Parameters


Operating Pressure - atmosheric






Pool Diameter - 65m




Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

93.1

45.7

35.8

35.7

-



No. of tanks - 3






3-54

Sc# 22 Gas oil storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire

Parameters


Operating Pressure - atmosheric






Pool Diameter - 46m





(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

107.2

51.9

41.5

41.4

-



3-55

3-56



No. of tanks - 3




Sc# 23 Leak in CBFS (Carbon Black Feed Stock)/ CLO (Clarified Oil)

Storage tank – Pool Fire

Parameters














3-57

3-58


(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

53.0

27.4

20.2

17.1

-



No. of tanks - 3




Sc# 24 CBFS (Carbon Black Feed Stock)/ CLO (Clarified Oil) storage tank

roof fire – Tank Fire

Parameters







3-59

3-60








Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

60.8

35.2

27.9

24.9

-



No. of tanks - 3






3-61

Sc# 25 Leak in CFO (Coker Feed Oil) IFO (Internal Fuel Oil)/ RFO

(Residual Fuel Oil) Storage tank – Pool Fire

Parameters



Tank Dimensions - 22.7m









Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

81.9

40.3

31.3

31.2

-



No. of tanks - 3






3-62

Sc# 26 CFO (Coker Fuel Oil) IFO (Internal Fuel Oil)/ RFO (Residual Fuel

Oil) storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire

Parameters












Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

89.7

48.1

39.1

39.0

-



3-63

3-64



No. of tanks - 3




Sc# 27 Leak in HVGO (Heavy Vacuum Gas Oil) Storage tank – Pool Fire

Parameters



Tank Diameter - 50m





Pool Diameter - 56.4






3-65

3-66


(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

82.9

41.3

32.4

32.2

-



No. of tanks - 3




Sc# 28 HVGO (Heavy Vacuum Gas Oil) storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire

Parameters



Tank Diameter - 50m




3-67

3-68




Pool Diameter - 50m




Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

80.4

43.1

35.1

34.0

-



No. of tanks - 3






3-69

Sc# 29 Leak in LSHS (Low Sulphur Heav Stock) Storage tank – Pool Fire

Parameters












Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

81.9

40.3

31.3

31.2

-



No. of tanks - 3






3-70

Sc# 30 LSHS (Low Sulphur Heav Stock) storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire Parameters




Tank Capacity - 5000KL Heat Radiation Model







Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

80.4

42.9

34.0

33.1

-





3-71

3-72

No. of tanks - 3




Sc# 31 Leak in SR (Short Residue) Storage tank – Pool Fire

Parameters














3-73

3-74

Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

82.1

41.4

30.5

31.3

-



No. of tanks - 7




Sc# 32 SR (Short Residue) storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire

Parameters







3-75








Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

80.3

43.2

35.1

34.0

-



No. of Tanks - 7



Personnel Present In The Section - 4



3-76

Sc# 33 Leak in Bitumen Storage tank – Pool Fire

Parameters












Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

53.0

27.4

20.2

17.1

-



No. of tanks - 7






3-77

3-78

Sc# 34 Bitumen storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire

Parameters












Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)



3-79

3-80

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

51.4

30.2

20.5

19.1

-



No. of tanks - 7




Sc# 35 Leak / Line Rupture in Hydrogen bullet outlet piping – Flash Fire /


Parameters


Operating Pressure - 38 kg/cm2

Tank Capacity - 225 m3

Dispersion Model

Weather Conditions




3-81

B – 3 m/sec 17.0 17.0 E – 1 m/sec 21.4 21.3


Damage Type



0.02 bar (Minor) 28.0 43.5



No. of tanks - 5






3-82

WAGONS

Sc# 36 Major Leak from MS Wagon – Pool Fire

Parameters



Wagon Capacity - 68 KL


Released Quantity - 62.6KL






Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)



3-83

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

116.5

56.8

45.8

45.8

-


Base frequency - 1.4E-5 per tanker per year

Time required to fill one wagon - 40 min.

No. of wagons handled annually - 6500


Accident Probability - 2.30E-6




3-84

Sc# 37 Major Leak from MS Wagon – Flash Fire/ Vapour Cloud Explosion

Parameters




Dispersion Model

Weather Conditions


B – 3 m/sec 78.6 78.6 E – 1 m/sec 288.9 288.8


Damage Type



0.02 bar (Minor) 192.7 641.1



Time required to fill one wagon - 40 min







3-85

3-86

Sc# 38 Major Leak from SKO Wagon – Pool Fire

Parameters







Pool Diameter - 59m




Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)



3-87

3-88

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

90.0

42.1

33.1

32.9

-








Sc# 39 Major Leak from SKO Wagon – Flash Fire/ Vapour Cloud

Explosion

Parameters




Dispersion Model

Cloud Dimensions



3-89

Weather Conditions Length (m) Width (m)

B – 3 m/sec 98.0 98.1 E – 1 m/sec 312.4 312.3


Damage Type B- 3 m/sec E – 1 m/sec

Max (m) Max (m)


0.02 bar (Minor) 232.8 704.0










3-90

Sc# 40 Loss of containment in CBFS tanker- Pool Fire

Parameters



Tanker Capacity - 18 tons


Released Quantity - 12.6tons






Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

91.5

45.1

35.5

34.4

-










3-91

3-92

Sc# 41 Loss of containment in Black Oil tanker- Pool Fire

Parameters



Tank Capacity - 18tons








Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)



3-93

3-94

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

89.8

44.1

34.7

34.4

-




No. of tanks handled annually - 100(assumption)



Personnel present in the section - 4 (assumption)

Sc# 42 Loss of containment in LPG tanker- BLEVE

Parameters


Operating Pressure - 15kg/cm2

Tanker Capacity - 18tons



BLEVE duration - 30sec



3-95

Fireball Diameter - 156.5m

(100 % fatality within the fireball area)



Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

480.3

305.7

254.0

196.8

98.3










3-96

3-97

Sc# 43 Loss of containment in LPG tanker- Flash Fire/ Vapour Cloud Explosion

Parameters



Tanker Capacity - 18tons

Dispersion Model

Weather Conditions


B – 3 m/sec 228.2 228.2 E – 1 m/sec 138.5 138.4



Max (m) Max (m)


0.02 bar (Minor) 660.8 676.2



No. of tanks handled annually - 17000 tankers






3-98

PIPELINE

Sc# 44 Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak size) – Pool fire

Parameters



Flow Rate - 1300m3/hr

Pipeline Diameter - 18”

Crude Composition - Crude Oil


Released Quantity - 65m3






Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)



3-99

3-100

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

191.0

119.1

106.3

106.3

-


Base frequency - 1.0E-7 per meter per year


Accident Probability - 3.0 E-6 per year


Sc# 45 Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak size) – Flash Fire/ Vapour Cloud

Explosion

Parameters




Crude Composition - Crude Oil

Pipeline Diameter - 18”



3-101

Dispersion Model

Weather Conditions


B – 3 m/sec 148.8 148.5 E – 1 m/sec 121.2 121.0



Max (m) Max (m) 0.2 bar (Heavy) 154.1 132.7

0.1 bar (Moderate) 158.2 136.5 0.02 bar (Minor) 210.5 183.9


Base frequency - 1.0E-7 per meter per year






2

3-102

AVU

Sc# 46 Leak (100mm) from bottom of crude column (K-2)

Parameters


Operating Pressure - 0.8 kg/cm2

Expected Inventory in the section - approx 5.5 KL

Flow Rate - 440 m3/hr (maximum)

Composition - RCO








Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

64.4

40.9

34.0

29.7

-



No. of similar units - 3



Personnel present in the section -



3-103

3-104

Sc#47 Failure of Nozzle /Flange Joint in crude column (601-K-2) & crude starts

coming out

Parameters



Expected Inventory in the section - 5.5KL

Composition - Crude Oil








Percent Lethality

Thermal Load


from centre of pool



3-105

3-106

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

55.8

28.8

21.6

19.0

-






Sc#48 10mm leak from inlet flange of Stabilizer Column (601-K-4) – Pool Fire

Parameters



Expected Inventory in the section - 26.54 m3




Pool Diameter - 20.52 m



3-107




Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2) Effect Distance from

centre of pool (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

47.3

24.7

17.7

11.7

-









3-108

Sc#49 Leak (10mm) from Furnace (F-101/F-102) tube inside the furnace /Nozzle

of crude heater & crude starts coming out (Data for tube/nozzle required)

Parameters


Operating Pressure - 14.87 Kg/cm2

Expected Inventory in the section - 5.5KL

Composition - Crude

Dispersion Model

Weather Conditions


B – 3 m/sec 41.3 41.3 E – 1 m/sec 30.0 29.9


Damage Type



0.02 bar (Minor) 79.3 113.9


Base frequency - 6.0E-06







Sc#50 Desalter overflows line Leak (10mm)

Parameters


Operating Pressure - 8.5Kg/cm2

Expected Inventory in the section - 110 m3

Flow Rate - 400 MT/hr

Composition - Crude


Released Quantity - 102.3 m3








3-111

Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

61.1

28.9

21.4

20.3

-









3-112

Sc#51 Nozzle / Flange joint leak (10mm) from the inlet of pretopping column.

Parameters




Flow Rate - 400 MT/hr

Composition - crude




Jet Length - 3.6 m




Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

3.9

3.6

3.5

3.4

2.4









3-113

3-114

Sc# 52 Leak from Vacuum column (K-5)

Parameter


Operating Pressure - 700mm Hg.

Expected Inventory in the section - Approx 1.5 m3

Flow Rate - 127300 kg/hr

Composition - VR










3-115

Percent Lethality

Thermal Load


from centre of pool

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

42.7

31.1

25.6

19.3

14.0






Personnel present in the section - 2 (1 shift officer & 1 operator)



2

3-116

Sc# 53 Failure of Stripper Column K-6(1) Nozzle & hydrocarbon starts coming

out (AVU-1/2)

Parameters


Operating Pressure - 93 mm of Hg

Expected Inventory in the section - approx 0.5 m3

Flow Rate - 20.6 MT/hr

Composition - First Cut


Released Quantity - 0.4m3


Jet Length - 13.73m




Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

17.8

10.4

7.11

-

-









3-117

3-118

Sc# 54 Rupture of Furnace (F-103) tube inside the Vacuum furnace /Nozzle of

vacuum heater & VR starts coming out

Parameters



Expected Inventory in the section - 1.5m3

Flow Rate - 127,300 T’put Kg/hr

Composition - VR

Dispersion Model

Weather Conditions


B – 3 m/sec 31.4 31.4 E – 1 m/sec 42.0 42.0


Damage Type



0.02 bar (Minor) 57.1 78.0



3-119









3-120

LPG Treatment Unit

Sc# 55 Leak from LPG-Amine Absorber (08-C-101)

Parameters



Expected Inventory in the section - 35m3

Flow Rate - 28m3/hr (LPG)+14 m3/hr (amine)

Composition - LPG + Amine (MDEA)




Jet Length - 15.80m




Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

30.5

25.4

23.9

22.5

20.3








3-121



3-122

Sc# 56 Leak (10mm) from LPG Surge Vessel (08-V-104)

Parameters


Operating Pressure - 9 – 11kg/cm2a


Flow Rate - 28m3/hr

Composition - LPG

Dispersion Model

Weather Conditions


B – 3 m/sec 24.8 24.7 E – 1 m/sec 29.7 29.6


Damage Type



0.02 bar (Minor) 32.5 35.3








3-123

3-124

NAPHTHA HYDROTREATER UNIT (HTU)

Sc# 57 Failure of Naphtha Splitter (01-CC-00-001) inlet Nozzle & naphtha starts

coming out

Parameters



Expected Inventory in the section - approx. 57.20 KL

Flow Rate - 58,000kg/hr

Composition - Naphtha










3-125

Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

111.7

61.7

51.8

51.7

-








3-126

Sc# 58 Leak (10mm) from Hydrotreater Reactor (02-RB-00-001)

Parameters

Operating Temperature - 160 °C

Operating Pressure - 57.5 kg/cm2g





Jet Length - 18.36m




Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

39.9

32.5

30.5

28.3

25.3








3-127



2

3-128

Catalytic Reformer Unit

Sc# 59 Leak (10mm) from the inlet of reformer reactor (03-RB-00-001)

Parameters


Operating Pressure - 12.6 Kg/cm2g

Expected Inventory in the section - 4.27 KL

Flow Rate - 37,545 Kg/hr

Composition - Heavy Naphtha




Pool Diameter - 13.79 m




Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

from centre of the

pool

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

17.9

12.9

11.4

9.1

4.2




No. of reactors - 3





3-129

3-130

Sc# 60 Leak (10mm) from Stabilizer column (02-CC-00-001)

Parameters




Flow Rate - 36,429 kg/hr

Composition - Naphtha

Dispersion Model

Weather Conditions


B – 3 m/sec 57.2 57.2 E – 1 m/sec 103.2 103.1


Damage Type




3-131


0.02 bar (Minor) 91.8 177.6








3-132

DHDT

Sc# 61 Leak (10mm) from reactor DHDT (702-R-01)

Parameters


Operating Pressure - 105.2 kg/cm2g

Expected Inventory in the section - approx. 100 m3

Composition - Gas oil




Jet Length - 11.98 m




Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

15.9

13.9

13.2

12.1

7.5




No. of reactors - 3





3-133

3-134

Sc# 62 H2S Leak from LP Amine Absorber (702-C-04)

Parameters


Operating Pressure - 1bar


Composition - H2S + Amine

Toxic release Model



Percent Lethality

Dispersed Cloud – E1m/s Toxic Dose Distance (m)

0

7

42

84

97

4.57E+10

7.91E+11

1.44E+13

2.18E+14

1.54E+15

125

100

75

50

25



3-135

Percent Lethality

Dispersed Cloud – B3m/s Toxic Dose Distance (m)

0

24 7.09E+08

4.46E+12 50

25







3-136

COKER-A/B

Sc# 63 Leak (10mm) from main fractionator (C-1) top – Jet Fire

Parameters

Operating Temperature - 1150C

Operating Pressure - 3.3 kg/cm2a

Inventory in the section - 16 m3

Composition - Gas + LPG + Naphtha + Kero + LDO + CFO

+ RFO + Coke




Jet Length - 8.73 m




Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

18.3

14.9

14.0

13.0

11.5









3-137

12

3-138

Sc# 64 Leak (10mm) from Coker –B reactor overhead line

Parameters



Expected Inventory in the section - 5.4 m3 (assuming 3 min isolation time

&20% coke)

Flow Rate - 136 m3/hr

Composition - Gas+Naphtha+Kero+HGO+CFO

+RFO+Coke




Jet Fire - 12.58 m






3-139

Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

26.7

21.8

20.4

18.9

16.7









3.0E-6 per year

12

3-140

Sc# 65 Leak (10mm) from Coker –B reactor bottom – Pool Fire

Parameters



Expected Inventory in the section - 5.4 m3 (assuming 3 min isolation time

&20% coke)


Composition - Gas+Naphtha+Kero+HGO+CFO

+RFO+Coke




Pool Fire - 17.75 m




Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

from the centre of

pool

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

29.4

25.7

24.7

23.3

19.7





Accident Probability -




3-141

3-142

RFCCU

Sc# 66 Leak (10mm) from Reactor (701-R-101) inlet – Jet Fire

Parameters


Operating Pressure - 12.18kg/cm2g



Composition - Vacuum Gas Oil




Jet Fire - 13.09 m






3-143

Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

29.0

23.5

22.0

20.4

18.0




Accident Probability - 1.5 E-6 per year




3-144

Sc# 67 Leak (10mm) from Main Fractionator (701-C-201) top – Jet Fire

Parameters


Operating Pressure - 12.1Kg/cm2g





Jet Fire - 7.0 m




Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

8.2

6.6

5.8

-

-








3-145

3-146

LPG Recovery Unit

Sc# 68 Leak (10mm) from Debutaniser column (08-C-003) top – Jet Fire

Parameters

Operating Temperature - Top - 580C, Bottom – 1750C

Operating Pressure - 11 kg/cm2a


Flow Rate - 80m3/hr

Composition - LPG, SRN


Released Quantity - 20 m3


Jet Fire - 14.88 m






3-147


(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

30.5

25.1

23.5

21.9

19.5








3-148

Sc# 69 Leak (10mm) from Stripper (08-C-002) top – Jet Fire

Parameters

Operating Temperature - Top - 800C, Bottom – 1600C


Expected Inventory in the section - 25KL


Composition - LPG+ unstabilised naphtha+H2S


Released Quantity - 23.5 KL






Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

37.6

30.4

28.4

26.3

23.2








3-149

HYDROGEN PLANT

Sc# 70 Leak (10mm) from inlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Prereformer) R-4 –

Jet Fire

Parameters



Expected Inventory in the section - 2.53 Tonnes (Assuming 3 min

isolation time)

Flow Rate - 50678 Kg/hr

Composition - Light Naphtha, Hydrogen, Steam


Released Quantity - 1.9 KL


Jet Length - 8.68 m






3-151

Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

10.9

9.3

8.7

-

-








3-152

Sc# 71 Leak (10mm) from outlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Reformer) R-5 – Jet

Fire

Parameters




isolation time)

Flow Rate - 52416 Kg/hr

Composition - Methane, Hydrogen, Steam, CO, CO2


Released Quantity - 2.0 tonnes


Jet Length - 7.37 m




Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

7.9

6.1

-

-

-








3-153

3-154

Sc# 72 Leak (10mm) from inlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Shift Converter) R-6

– Jet Fire

Parameters




isolation time)

Flow Rate - 52350.96 Kg/hr

Composition - Hydrogen, Steam, CO, CO2, Methane


Released Quantity - 2.0 tonnes


Jet Length - 6.86 m






3-155

Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

7.6

5.7

-

-

-








3-156

NHDT (MSQ)

Sc# 73 Leak (10mm) from NHDT Reactor (R-01) – Jet Fire

Parameters



Expected Inventory in the section - 16.16m3

Composition - HC, H2








Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

39.7

32.3

30.3

28.2

25.0








3-157

3-158

ISOM

Sc# 74 Leak (10mm) from ISOM Reactor (R-01) – Jet Fire

Parameters


Operating Pressure - 37 Kg/cm2a












3-159

Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

41.4

33.6

31.4

29.1

25.7








3-160

PRIMEGPFD

Sc# 75 Failure of PRIMEGPFD reactor (R-02)- Jet Fire

Parameters








Jet Length - 7.69 m




Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

9.4

7.7

7.3

-

-








3-161


- 41.4 51.9 4.5E-6

- 17.1 27.4 4.5E-6

3-162

RELEASE CONSEQUENCE CALCULATIONS – SUMMARY

Table 3.1 Summary of consequence and frequency analysis

Sc# Description Damage Distance, m 99 % fatality 50% fatality 1% fatality

Probability,

per year

1. Leak in Crude oil storage tank- Dyke Pool Fire - 68.7 81.5 1.05E-6

2. Crude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire - 57.9 70.4 1.05E-6

3. Leak in Crude oil storage tank- Dyke Pool Fire

(Comparison case)

4. Crude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire(Comparison case)

- 68.7 81.4 1.05E-6 - 57.9 70.4 1.05E-6

5. Leak in Crude oil storage tank 501- Dyke Pool Fire - 68.7 81.7 1.5E-7

6. Crude storage tank roof failure 501 – Tank Fire - 57.9 70.4 1.5E-7

7. Leak / Line Rupture in Horton Sphere – Jet Fire 42.9 50.6 59.1 4.2E-7


90.5 93.5 132.4 2.1E-7

9. Failure of Horton Sphere – BLEVE 83.7 202.1 323.3 2.1E-7

10. Leak / Line Rupture in Mounded bullet outlet line – Flash

fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion


12. Leak / Line Rupture in Fuel gas– Flash fire / Vapour

Cloud Explosion

28.6 34.1 103.1 9.0E-7

- - 18.6 1.8E-6 38.4 40.8 52.0 2.1E-6

13. Leak in Fuel gas storage tank outlet line – Jet Fire 39.3 46.1 53.2 4.2E-6

14. Leak in MS / SRN Storage tank – Pool Fire - 17.7 30.6 2.7E-5

15. MS / SRN storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire - 29.2 38.2 2.7E-5

16. MS / SRN storage tank roof fire – Flash fire / Vapour

Cloud Explosion

26.0 27.8 50.2 1.35E-5

17. Leak in Slope tank – Pool Fire - 31.8 40.5 4.5E-6

18. Slope tank roof fire – Tank Fire - 36.5 43.6 4.5E-6

19. Leak in SKO Storage tank – Pool Fire - 31.2 40.3 1.05E-6

20. SKO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire - 38.1 47.1 1.05E-6

21. Leak in Gas oil Storage tank – Pool Fire - 35.7 45.7 4.5E-6


23. Leak in CBFS / CLO Storage tank – Pool Fire



of 2.4 3.4 3.6 4.5E-7

3-163

Sc# Description Damage Distance, m

99 % fatality 50% fatality 1% fatality

Probability,

per year

24. CBFS / CLO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire - 24.9 35.2 4.5E-6

25. Leak in CFO / IFO / RFO Storage tank – Pool Fire - 31.2 40.3 4.5E-6

26. CFO / IFO / RFO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire - 39.0 48.1 4.5E-6

27. Leak in HVGO Storage tank – Pool Fire - 32.2 41.3 4.5E-6

28. HVGO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire - 34.0 43.1 4.5E-6

29. Leak in LSHS Storage tank – Pool Fire - `31.2 40.3 4.5E-6

30. LSHS storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire - 33.1 42.9 4.5E-6

31. Leak in SR Storage tank – Pool Fire - 31.3 41.4 1.05E-6

32. SR storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire - 34.0 43.2 1.05E-6

33. Leak in Bitumen Storage tank – Pool Fire - 17.1 27.4 1.05E-6

34. Bitumen storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire - 19.1 30.2 1.05E-6

35. Leak from H2 Bullet outlet piping – Flash Fire/ VCE 13.6 14.6 28.0 7.5E-7

36. Major Leak from MS Wagon – Pool Fire - 45.8 56.8 2.3E-6

37. Major Leak from MS Wagon – Flash Fire/ VCE 94.5 101.7 192.7 1.15E-6

38. Major Leak from HVGO Wagon – Pool Fire - 32.9 42.1 2.3E-6

39. Major Leak from SKO Wagon – Flash Fire/ VCE 118.6 126.9 232.8 4.8E-7

40. Loss of containment in CBFS tanker- Pool Fire - 34.4 45.1 7.17E-8

41. Loss of containment in HVGO tanker- Pool Fire - 34.4 44.1 3.58E-8

42. Loss of containment in LPG tanker- BLEVE 98.3 196.8 305.7 3.05E-6

43. Leak in LPG tanker- Flash Fire/ VCE 179.3 214.2 660.8 3.05E-6

44. Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak) – Pool fire - 105.9 105.9 3.05E-6

45. Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak) – Flash Fire/ VCE

153.9 158.0 209.5 1.5E-6

46. Leak from Crude Column (601-K-2) - 29.7 40.9 4.5E-6

47. Failure of Nozzle /Flange Joint in Crude Column (601-K-

2) & crude starts coming out

48. 10mm leak from inlet flange of Stabilizer Column (601-K-

4) – Pool Fire

49. Leak (10mm) from Furnace (F-101/F-102) tube inside the furnace /Nozzle of crude heater & crude starts coming out

- 19.0 28.8 1.5E-6

- 11.7 24.7 4.5E-7 47.8 50.1 79.3 2.7E-06

50. Desalter overflows line Leak (10mm) - 20.3 28.9 4.5E-7

51. Nozzle / Flange joint leak (10mm) from the inlet pretopping column



- - 7.3 1.5E-6

3-164

Sc# Description Damage Distance, m

99 % fatality 50% fatality 1% fatality

Probability,

per year

52. Leak from Vacuum Column (K-5) 14.0 19.3 31.1 4.5E-7


54. Rupture of Furnace (F-101/F-102) tube inside the furnace

/Nozzle of crude heater & crude starts coming out

- - 10.4 3.0E-7

35.4 37.0 57.1 2.7E-06

55. Leak from LPG-Amine Absorber (08-C-101) 5.4 43.7 85.6 1.5E-6

56. Failure of LPG Surge Vessel (08-V-104) 22.5 23.2 32.5 7.5E-7

57. Failure of Naphtha Splitter (01-CC-00-001) Nozzle &

naphtha starts coming out

- 51.7 61.7 1.5E-7

58. Leak (10mm) from Hydrotreater Reactor (02-RB-00-001) 25.3 28.3 32.5 1.5E-6

59. Leak (10mm) from inlet of reformer reactor (03-RB-00-

001)

7.9 12.2 25.7 4.5E-6

60. Leak (10mm) from Stabilizer column (02-CC-00-001) 58.3 60.8 91.8 7.5E-8

61. Leak (10mm) from reactor DHDT (702-R-01) 7.5 12.1 13.9 4.5E-6

62. H2S Leak from Stripper Gas Amine Absorber (DHDT) 25 75 125 5.0E-06

63. Leak (10mm) from main fractionator C-1 top 11.5 13.0 14.9 3.0E-7

64. Leak (10mm) from reactor (Coker –B) overhead line 16.7 18.9 21.8 3.0E-6

65. Leak (10mm) from reactor (Coker- B)bottom flange 19.7 23.3 25.7 3.0E-6

66. Leak (10mm) from Reactor (701-R-101) inlet – Jet Fire 18.0 20.4 23.5 3.0E-6


68. Leak (10mm) from Debutaniser column (08-C-003) top –

Jet Fire

- - 6.6 7.5E-8

19.5 21.9 25.1 7.5E-8

69. Leak (10mm) from Stripper (08-C-002) top – Jet Fire 23.2 26.3 30.4 1.5E-7

70. Leak (10mm) from inlet of Hydrogenation Reactor

(Prereformer) R-4 – Jet Fire

71. Leak (10mm) from outlet of Hydrogenation Reactor

(Reformer) R-5 – Jet Fire

72. Leak (10mm) from inlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Shift

Converter) R-6 – Jet Fire

- - 9.2 1.5E-6 - - 6.1 1.5E-6 - - 5.7 1.5E-6

73. Leak (10mm) from NHDT Reactor (R-01) – Jet Fire 25.1 28.2 32.2 1.5E-6

74. Leak (10mm) from ISOM Reactor (R-01) – Jet Fire 25.7 29.1 33.6 1.5E-6

75. Failure of PRIMEGPFD reactor (R-02)- Jet Fire



4-1

4 RISK ANALYSIS AND REDUCTION

4.1 FINDINGS

4.1.1 Individual Risk

In the refinery, the summary of consequence analysis has been presented in the

summary table in section 3.4. Given below are the Individual risk levels as calculated

from the Quantitative risk assessment.

Fig 4.1 Individual Risk contribution from various release scenarios

Leak in C rude oil storage tank- Dy ke Pool Fire

IOC Barauni - IR per year C rude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire

Leak in C rude oil storage tank- Dy ke Pool Fire (C omparison case)

C rude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire(C omparison case)

Leak in C rude oil storage tank 501- Dy ke Pool Fire

C rude storage tank roof failure 501 – Tank Fire

Leak / Line Rupture in H orton S phere – Jet Fire

Leak / Line Rupture in H orton S phere – Flash Fire / V apour C loud Ex plosion

Failure of H orton Sphere – B LE VE

Leak / Line Rupture in M ounded bullet outlet line – Flash fire / Vapour C loud E x plosion

Leak in LPG M ounded bullets storage tanks outlet line – Jet Fire

Leak / Line Rupture in Fuel gas– Flash fire / Vapour C loud Ex plosion

Leak in Fuel gas storage tank outlet line – Jet Fire

Leak in M S / SRN Storage tank – Pool Fire

M S / S RN storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire

M S / S RN storage tank roof fire – Flash fire / V apour C loud Ex plosion

Leak in Slope tank – Pool Fire

Slope tank roof fire – Tank Fire

Leak in SK O Storage tank – Pool Fire

SK O storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire

Leak in Gas oil S torage tank – P ool Fire

Gas oil storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire

Leak in C B FS / C LO S torage tank – P ool Fire

C B FS / C LO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire

Leak in C FO / IFO / RFO S torage tank – P ool Fire



2.27E-05 0.62% 2.26E-05 0.61% 2.17E-05 0.59%

4-2

Table 4.1 Individual Risk contribution from various release scenarios

Scenario

Individual Risk

Contribution % IR per year

Failure of Horton Sphere – BLEVE 2.24E-04 6.07% Leak in LPG tanker- Flash Fire/ VCE 3.52E-04 9.53% Leak in Crude oil storage tank- Dyke Pool Fire 4.48E-05 1.21% Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak) – Flash Fire/ VCE 2.64E-04 7.17% Loss of containment in LPG tanker- BLEVE 2.35E-04 6.37% Major Leak from SKO Wagon – Flash Fire/ VCE 2.11E-04 5.73% Crude storage tank roof failure 501 – Tank Fire 3.79E-05 1.03% Leak / Line Rupture in Horton Sphere – Jet Fire 7.75E-05 2.10% Major Leak from MS Wagon – Flash Fire/ VCE 1.69E-04 4.58% Leak / Line Rupture in Horton Sphere – Flash Fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion 1.56E-04 4.24% Crude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire 3.79E-05 1.03% Leak (10mm) from Stabilizer column (02-CC-00-001) 1.01E-04 2.75% Rupture of Furnace (F-101/F-102) tube inside the furnace /Nozzle of crude heater & crude starts coming out 9.98E-05 2.71% Crude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire(Comparison case) 3.79E-05 1.03% Leak (10mm) from Furnace (F-101/F-102) tube inside the furnace /Nozzle of crude heater & crude starts coming out (Data for tube/nozzle required) 8.36E-05 2.27% H2S Leak from Stripper Gas Amine Absorber (DHDT) 7.72E-05 2.09% Leak in Crude oil storage tank 501- Dyke Pool Fire 4.48E-05 1.21% Leak in Fuel gas storage tank outlet line – Jet Fire 7.08E-05 1.92% Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak) – Pool fire 6.78E-05 1.84% Leak / Line Rupture in Fuel gas– Flash fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion 6.68E-05 1.81% Failure of LPG Surge Vessel (08-V-104) 6.16E-05 1.67% Leak / Line Rupture in Mounded bullet outlet line – Flash fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion 5.59E-05 1.52% MS / SRN storage tank roof fire – Flash fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion 4.62E-05 1.25% Leak (10mm) from ISOM Reactor (R-01) – Jet Fire 4.56E-05 1.24% Leak in Crude oil storage tank- Dyke Pool Fire (Comparison case) 4.48E-05 1.21% Leak (10mm) from Hydrotreater Reactor (02-RB-00-001) 4.47E-05 1.21% Leak (10mm) from NHDT Reactor (R-01) – Jet Fire 4.44E-05 1.20% Leak (10mm) from Stripper (08-C-002) top – Jet Fire 4.12E-05 1.12% Leak from Vacuum column (K-5) 3.87E-05 1.05% Leak from LPG-Amine Absorber (08-C-101) 3.62E-05 0.98% Leak (10mm) from reactor (Coker- B)bottom flange 3.56E-05 0.96% Leak (10mm) from Debutaniser column (08-C-003) top – Jet Fire 3.45E-05 0.94% Failure of Naphtha Splitter (01-CC-00-001) Nozzle & naphtha starts coming out 3.37E-05 0.91% Leak (10mm) from Reactor (701-R-101) inlet – Jet Fire 3.20E-05 0.87% Major Leak from MS Wagon – Pool Fire 3.00E-05 0.81% Leak (10mm) from reactor (Coker –B) overhead line 2.96E-05 0.80% Gas oil storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 2.72E-05 0.74% Leak from H2 Bullet outlet piping – Flash Fire/ VCE 2.43E-05 0.66% Leak in Gas oil Storage tank – Pool Fire 2.35E-05 0.64% Loss of containment in CBFS tanker- Pool Fire Loss of containment in HVGO tanker- Pool Fire Major Leak from HVGO Wagon – Pool Fire



4-3

Leak in HVGO Storage tank – Pool Fire 2.12E-05 0.57% Leak in Slope tank – Pool Fire 2.09E-05 0.57% Leak in SR Storage tank – Pool Fire 2.07E-05 0.56% Leak in SKO Storage tank – Pool Fire 2.06E-05 0.56% Leak in CFO / IFO / RFO Storage tank – Pool Fire 2.06E-05 0.56% Leak in LSHS Storage tank – Pool Fire 2.06E-05 0.56% Leak (10mm) from main fractionator C-1 top 2.04E-05 0.55% Leak from crude column (601-K-2) 1.97E-05 0.53% HVGO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.96E-05 0.53% CFO / IFO / RFO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.95E-05 0.53% LSHS storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.95E-05 0.53% SR storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.95E-05 0.53% SKO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.95E-05 0.53% MS / SRN storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.93E-05 0.52% Slope tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.80E-05 0.49% Leak (10mm) from inlet of reformer reactor (03-RB-00-001) 1.69E-05 0.46% Leak (10mm) from reactor DHDT (702-R-01) 1.57E-05 0.42% Desalter overflows line Leak (10mm) 1.35E-05 0.37% Failure of Nozzle /Flange Joint in crude column (601-K-2) & crude starts coming out 1.28E-05 0.35% Leak in MS / SRN Storage tank – Pool Fire 1.21E-05 0.33% Leak in CBFS / CLO Storage tank – Pool Fire 1.16E-05 0.31% Leak in Bitumen Storage tank – Pool Fire 1.16E-05 0.31% CBFS / CLO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.06E-05 0.29% Bitumen storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.05E-05 0.29% 10mm leak from inlet flange of Stabilizer Column (601-K-4) – Pool Fire 8.31E-06 0.23% Nozzle / Flange joint leak (10mm) from the inlet of pretopping column 4.69E-06 0.13% Leak in LPG Mounded bullets storage tanks outlet line – Jet Fire 1.17E-06 0.03% Failure of Stripper Column K-6(1) Nozzle & hydrocarbon starts coming out (AVU -1/2) 6.55E-07 0.02% Leak (10mm) from inlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Prereformer) R-4 – Jet Fire 5.80E-07 0.02% Failure of PRIMEGPFD reactor (R-02)- Jet Fire 4.60E-07 0.01% Leak (10mm) from Main Fractionator (701-C-201) top – Jet Fire 4.16E-07 0.01% Leak (10mm) from outlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Reformer) R-5 – Jet Fire 3.84E-07 0.01% Leak (10mm) from inlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Shift Converter) R-6 – Jet Fire 3.59E-07 0.01% Total 2.64E-04 100.00%

Based on the above, the major risk contributors to Individual risk are:

1. Leak in LPG tanker leading to vapour cloud explosion;


3. Loss of containment in LPG tanker leading to BLEVE;

.



INDIVIDUAL RISK CONTOUR:

J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1 4-3


3.79E-07 1.53% 3.71E-07 1.50% 3.55E-07 1.43%

4-4

4.1.2 Group Risk

Given below are the Group risk levels and contributions of various release scenarios

as calculated from the Quantitative risk assessment.

Fig 4.2 Group Risk contribution from various release scenarios

IOC Barauni - GR per year Leak in LPG tanker- Flash Fire/ VCE

Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak) – Flash Fire/ VCE

Loss of containment in LPG tanker- BLEVE

Failure of Horton Sphere – BLEVE

Major Leak from SKO Wagon – Flash Fire/ VCE

Major Leak from MS Wagon – Flash Fire/

Table 4.2 Group Risk contribution from various release scenarios

Scenario

Group Risk Contribution fatalities per % year

Failure of Horton Sphere – BLEVE 3.07E-06 12.38% Leak in LPG tanker- Flash Fire/ VCE 1.84E-06 7.44% Leak in Crude oil storage tank- Dyke Pool Fire 1.53E-06 6.18% Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak) – Flash Fire/ VCE 1.39E-06 5.59% Loss of containment in LPG tanker- BLEVE 1.23E-06 4.97% Major Leak from SKO Wagon – Flash Fire/ VCE 1.11E-06 4.47% Crude storage tank roof failure 501 – Tank Fire 1.09E-06 4.39% Leak / Line Rupture in Horton Sphere – Jet Fire 9.69E-07 3.91% Major Leak from MS Wagon – Flash Fire/ VCE 8.86E-07 3.58% Leak / Line Rupture in Horton Sphere – Flash Fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion 7.67E-07 3.10% Crude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire 6.67E-07 2.69% Leak (10mm) from Stabilizer column (02-CC-00-001) 5.32E-07 2.15% Rupture of Furnace (F-101/F-102) tube inside the furnace /Nozzle of crude heater & crude starts coming out 5.23E-07 2.11% Crude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire(Comparison case) 4.44E-07 1.79% Leak (10mm) from Furnace (F-101/F-102) tube inside the furnace /Nozzle of crude heater & crude starts coming out (Data for tube/nozzle required) 4.38E-07 1.77% H2S Leak from Stripper Gas Amine Absorber (DHDT) 4.04E-07 1.63% Leak in Crude oil storage tank 501- Dyke Pool Fire Leak in Fuel gas storage tank outlet line – Jet Fire Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak) – Pool fire



ool Fire 4.35E-08 0.18% olumn 2.45E-08 0.10% e 6.14E-09 0.02%

4-5

Leak / Line Rupture in Fuel gas– Flash fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion 3.50E-07 1.41% Failure of LPG Surge Vessel (08-V-104) 3.23E-07 1.30% Leak / Line Rupture in Mounded bullet outlet line – Flash fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion 2.93E-07 1.18% MS / SRN storage tank roof fire – Flash fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion 2.42E-07 0.98% Leak (10mm) from ISOM Reactor (R-01) – Jet Fire 2.39E-07 0.96% Leak in Crude oil storage tank- Dyke Pool Fire (Comparison case) 2.35E-07 0.95% Leak (10mm) from Hydrotreater Reactor (02-RB-00-001) 2.34E-07 0.94% Leak (10mm) from NHDT Reactor (R-01) – Jet Fire 2.33E-07 0.94% Leak (10mm) from Stripper (08-C-002) top – Jet Fire 2.16E-07 0.87% Leak from Vacuum column (K-5) 2.03E-07 0.82% Leak from LPG-Amine Absorber (08-C-101) 1.90E-07 0.77% Leak (10mm) from reactor (Coker- B)bottom flange 1.86E-07 0.75% Leak (10mm) from Debutaniser column (08-C-003) top – Jet Fire 1.81E-07 0.73% Failure of Naphtha Splitter (01-CC-00-001) Nozzle & naphtha starts coming out 1.77E-07 0.71% Leak (10mm) from Reactor (701-R-101) inlet – Jet Fire 1.67E-07 0.68% Major Leak from MS Wagon – Pool Fire 1.57E-07 0.63% Leak (10mm) from reactor (Coker –B) overhead line 1.55E-07 0.63% Gas oil storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.42E-07 0.57% Leak from H2 Bullet outlet piping – Flash Fire/ VCE 1.27E-07 0.51% Leak in Gas oil Storage tank – Pool Fire 1.23E-07 0.50% Loss of containment in CBFS tanker- Pool Fire 1.19E-07 0.48% Loss of containment in HVGO tanker- Pool Fire 1.19E-07 0.48% Major Leak from HVGO Wagon – Pool Fire 1.13E-07 0.46% Leak in HVGO Storage tank – Pool Fire 1.11E-07 0.45% Leak in Slope tank – Pool Fire 1.10E-07 0.44% Leak in SR Storage tank – Pool Fire 1.08E-07 0.44% Leak in SKO Storage tank – Pool Fire 1.08E-07 0.43% Leak in CFO / IFO / RFO Storage tank – Pool Fire 1.08E-07 0.43% Leak in LSHS Storage tank – Pool Fire 1.08E-07 0.43% Leak (10mm) from main fractionator C-1 top 1.07E-07 0.43% Leak from crude column (601-K-2) 1.03E-07 0.42% HVGO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.03E-07 0.41% CFO / IFO / RFO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.02E-07 0.41% LSHS storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.02E-07 0.41% SR storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.02E-07 0.41% SKO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.02E-07 0.41% MS / SRN storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.01E-07 0.41% Slope tank roof fire – Tank Fire 9.41E-08 0.38% Leak (10mm) from inlet of reformer reactor (03-RB-00-001) 8.84E-08 0.36% Leak (10mm) from reactor DHDT (702-R-01) 8.20E-08 0.33% Desalter overflows line Leak (10mm) 7.09E-08 0.29% Failure of Nozzle /Flange Joint in crude column (601-K-2) & crude starts coming out 6.70E-08 0.27% Leak in MS / SRN Storage tank – Pool Fire 6.36E-08 0.26% Leak in CBFS / CLO Storage tank – Pool Fire 6.08E-08 0.25% Leak in Bitumen Storage tank – Pool Fire 6.08E-08 0.25% CBFS / CLO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 5.54E-08 0.22% Bitumen storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 5.51E-08 0.22% 10mm leak from inlet flange of Stabilizer Column (601-K-4) – P Nozzle / Flange joint leak (10mm) from the inlet of pretopping c Leak in LPG Mounded bullets storage tanks outlet line – Jet Fir




4-6

Failure of Stripper Column K-6(1) Nozzle & hydrocarbon starts coming out (AVU -1/2) 3.43E-09 0.01% Leak (10mm) from inlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Prereformer) R-4 – Jet Fire 3.04E-09 0.01% Failure of PRIMEGPFD reactor (R-02)- Jet Fire 2.41E-09 0.01% Leak (10mm) from Main Fractionator (701-C-201) top – Jet Fire 2.18E-09 0.01% Leak (10mm) from outlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Reformer) R-5 – Jet Fire 2.01E-09 0.01% Leak (10mm) from inlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Shift Converter) R-6 – Jet Fire 1.88E-09 0.01% Total 2.48E-05 100.00%

Based on the above, the major risk contributors to Group risk are:

1. Loss of containment in LPG Horton sphere leading to BLEVE;

2. Leak in LPG tanker leading to Vapour cloud explosion;

3. Leak in crude oil tank.

GROUP RISK PRESENTATION:

The group risk or societal risk is presented in terms of F-N curve. FN curves are

frequency-fatality plots, showing the cumulative frequencies (F) of events involving N

or more fatalities. They are derived by sorting the frequency-fatality (FN) pairs from

each outcome of each accidental event, and summing them to form cumulative

frequency-fatality (FN) co-ordinates for the plot. The cumulative form is used to

ensure that monotonic (steadily declining) curves are obtained even when some

sizes of accident do not occur in the analysis.

FN curves are graphical measures of group risk that show the relationship between

frequency and size of the accident. Unlike the annual fatality rate, this allows a

judgment to be made on the relative importance of different sizes of event. Fig 4.3

shows typical UK HSE F-N curve.



4-7

PR

OBA

BIL

ITY

Fig: 4.3 Typical criteria for acceptable risk F-N curve

Intolerable offsite risk

Intolerable onsite risk

Negligible

The Calculated F-N curve for IOCL, Barauni refinery is shown in fig 4.4.

Fig 4.4 F-N Curve for IOC, Barauni Refinery

F - N CURVE FOR IOC, Barauni Refinery

2.00E-03 1.50E-03 1.00E-03 5.00E-04

0.00E+00

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

NO. OF FATALITIES (OFFSITE)



with air to form an explosive vapor

explosion (VCE) occurs if a cloud of

erate high overpressures.

4-8

CONCLUSION:

The study team identified 75 numbers of scenarios. Considering the risk contours

and FN curve for combination of all MCLS, DNV- PHAST software has been used for

the consequence calculations.

The societal risk curve is in the tolerable region of the HSE UK Societal risk

acceptance criteria (refer to fig 4.3). The contribution to societal risk due to offsite

populations is low.

In conclusion, the Individual risk curve is in the tolerable region of the UK HSE

individual risk acceptance criteria (refer to appendix – E). The main contributors to

offsite risk are petroleum products from the tank farm areas e.g. LPG tankers, Crude

oil, LPG storage.

Jet fire:

Jet fires can arise from gas, two-phase, or liquid releases. The worst-case jet fires

are likely to be from the storage area and refining units and mainly from the LPG

Storage facility (Horton Spheres), Fuel Gas, Coker and HTU units.

The following jet fire results obtained from the DNV PHAST software are presented

below:

8. Leak / Line Rupture in Horton Sphere which results into jet fire flame radiation

intensity of 36.56 kW/m2 (42.9 meter).

9. Leak in Fuel gas storage tank outlet line results into jet fire flame radiation

intensity 36.56KW/m2 (39.3 meters).

10. Leak from Coker- B reactor overhead line scenario, which results into jet fire

flame radiation intensity of 36.56 kW/m2 (16.7 m).

11. Leak from main fractionator C-1 of coker unit scenario, which results into jet

fire flame radiation intensity of 36.56 kW/m2 (11.5 meter).

Vapor cloud explosion:

In general catastrophic gas explosions happen when considerable quantities of

flammable material are released and dispersed

cloud before ignition takes place. A vapor cloud

flammable gas burns sufficiently quickly to gen



4-9

The following vapor cloud explosion results obtained from the DNV PHAST software

are presented below:

12. Leak in LPG tanker results into dispersion of flammable material in the

atmosphere; it may generate overpressure (0.2608 bar) to the distance of

179.3 meter and affecting the Loading area.

13. Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak) will lead in to dispersion of

flammable material in the atmosphere; it may generate overpressure (0.2608

bar) to the distance of 154.1 m

BLEVE:

BLEVE can be defined as a rapid failure of a container of flammable material under

pressure during fire engulfment. Failure is followed by a fireball or major fire which

produces a powerful radiant heat flux

The following BLEVE results obtained from the DNV PHAST software are presented

below:

14. Catastrophic failure of LPG Horton sphere and tanker is a worst case

scenario which results into dispersion of flammable material in the

atmosphere; it may generate fireball radiation intensity of 36.56 kW/m2 to the

distance of 83.7m and 98.3m.

Pool fire:

Pool fires can arise from any site that handles liquid hydrocarbons. The worst case is

likely to be in the tank farm. Mostly tank farm pool fire is contained within the tank

bund itself. Oil spills on ground from the pipelines handling hydrocarbons may results

into pool fire and may affect adjacent equipment resulting into domino effects

(BLEVE).

Toxic release:

Toxic releases are measured at 100 ppm hydrogen sulphide concentration. The

Hazard distances associated with a toxic release depend upon a number of factors,

such as time to detection and isolation of the release, and the prevailing wind

conditions.



owever, such tanks may require

4-10

4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS:

The following recommendations are made to reduce risk from the dominant risk

contributors:

• BLEVE of LPG spheres also poses off-site risk. The new sphere is designed to the current best practices. Catastrophic failure frequency of the old sphere can

be reduced by incorporating some of the features as per the current design

philosophy. A checklist for storage and handling of pressurised liquefied gases

is annexed in Appendix - C. Feasibility of introducing the recommended

features not already present may be examined. Also, Barauni Refinery may

examine the reasonable practicality of alternate LPG Storage such as

Mounded Bullets in place of Horton spheres. For such storage, BLEVE is not a

credible scenario and can be ruled out.

4.2.1 Risk Reduction

The maximum damage distances are being caused due to LPG tankers. A number of

recommendations have been made for reduction of risk levels due to these release

scenarios and for proper handling of pressurized LPG tankers in refinery.

• An isolation in pump discharge lines, which should be automatically activated on low pressure detection in the pump discharge line need to be considered.

• LPG Gas detectors may be suitably placed at in the loading area.

• Proper inspection of small and bigger lines and tankers periodically.

• Ensure that combustible flammable material are not placed near the LPG tank.

• After loading static accumulating materials into large storage tanks, delay of upto 30 minutes have been suggested before hand gauging or sampling as

flammable atmosphere exist till that time period. These recommendations are

based on measurements taken in large tanks after loading which have shown

a slower decay of the field strength than would be expected by normal charge

relaxation. The slow decay probably resulted from further charge generation

due to slow settling of small charged particles of water, dirt or other materials.

• Metallic tanks not resting directly on the ground but connected to grounded piping system are usually have sufficient grounding to provide for safe

dissipation of lightening strokes. H



4-11

supplemental grounding to prevent foundation damage. This may be

considered.

• Small leaks could occur frequently in routine operations like pump seal failure, sample point valve or drain valve left open, flange leak etc. They should be

attended to immediately as they could escalate.

• All interlocks should be kept and maintained in working condition at all times.

• Emergency procedures should be well rehearsed and state of readiness to be achieved.

• Ventilation should be provided for pump houses and any enclosed area where hydrocarbon vapours may accumulate.

• All plant personnel should be trained in handling emergency situations and should be apprised of their role in handling emergency situation and to ensure

adequacy of the emergency procedures simulated exercise should be carried

out.

• By reducing the time required to stop the leak which in turn would reduce the quantity of spillage. The response time could be reduced by installing /

maintaining instruments, effective communication system, catch pit etc.

• All non-routine work such as gasket replacing welding etc. should be carried out under a permit system.

• Adequate number of caution boards highlighting the hazards of chemicals should be provided at critical locations. Adequate colour coding and labeling

of the pipelines should be provided for easy identification.

• Adequate number of portable fire extinguishers may be provided. These should be well maintained and easily accessible.

• In locations where flammable vapours may be present, precautions should be taken to prevent ignition by eliminating / containing source of ignition. Source

of ignition may include open flames, lightening, smoking, cutting and welding

operations, lighting / hot surfaces, frictional heat, sparks (static, electrical and

mechanical), spontaneous and radiant heat.

• The capacity of every above ground tank in the installation shall be conspicuously marked on the tank.

• Smoke thermal detectors will be placed in the false ceiling and false flooring of the Control Room.



5-1

5 RISK ASSESSMENT OF FIRE WATER TANK AND PUMP HOUSE

The fire water tanks and pump house are the critical items in the refinery. The

following scenario has been evaluated to see the impact on the fire water tanks and

pump house.

LRU

¾ Leak (10mm) from Stripper (08-C-002) top – Jet Fire (LRU)

COKER - B

¾ Leak (10mm) from main fractionator C-1

¾ 10mm leak from Coker – B reactor bottom line

AVU -1

¾ Leak (10mm) from Furnace (F-101/F-102) tube inside the furnace /Nozzle of

crude heater & crude starts coming out (Data for tube/nozzle required)

¾ Leak (10mm) from vacuum column

Pool Fire:

The leak (10mm) from vacuum column will result in to release of HC and that lead to

formation of hydrocarbon pool. The pool diameter is 13.2m (refer to sc#52). The

thermal radiations are reaching up to a distance of 14.0m. There will be no impact on

fire water tanks and pump house due to vacuum column pool fire.

Jet Fire:

The leak (10mm) from main fractionator of Coker unit lead to jet fire of 8.73m length

and generate thermal radiations of 36.56 Kw/m2 up to a distance of 11.5m (refer

Sc#63). Scenario # 64 leak from Coker unit reactor overhead line lead to jet fire of

12.58 m and thermal radiations 36.56 up to 16.7m. Jet fire due to leak from LPG

amine absorber reaches to 15.8 m and generates thermal radiation of 36.56 Kw/m2

up to 20.3m (refer to Sc# 55). None of the above scenario reaches to fire water tank

and pump house.



5-2

Flash Fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion: In case of flash fire /vapour cloud explosion

the overpressure generated due to leak from LPG surge vessel of 0.2bar is 22.5m

(refer to sc#56). Leak from furnace (F01/02) resulting in to VCE generating a

overpressure of 0.2 bar to a distance of 47.8m (refer to sc# 49). This is again not

impacting Fire water tanks and pump house.

After analysing all the above scenarios it has found that none of the above scenario

is impacting the fire water tanks and pump house. However it is suggested to have a

alternative pump house at a relatively safe location. The most suitable location as

identified by the assessment has found to be BTP area (ecological park) since there

is no off site effect due to any of the refinery facility.

It is proposed to use existing water reservoir (polishing lagoon) (capacity 56000m3)

as fire water reservoir and install a new fire water pump house there. This will provide

an additional layer of safety for BR in worst possible case of damage on the existing

fire water tanks & pump house.



6-1

6 REFERENCES

1. E&P Forum – Data base on leak frequencies for Oil and Gas equipment.

2. Standard operating procedures of all the units

3. CPR 18 E – Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment (Purple Book)

4. CPR 14 E – Methods for calculation of physical effects (Yellow Book)

5. CCPS - Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis (Second

edition)

6. Lees - Loss Prevention in the process Industry volume 2

7. Handbook of fire and explosion protection engineering principles for oil, gas,

chemical and related facilities

8. IS 15656: 2006

9. Guidelines for Process Equipment Reliability data by Center for Chemical

Process Safety

10. Layout Plan for BR- DRG.No.MTSC-AO-337.



A-1

APPENDIX – A CONTOURS


A-2



A-3



B-1

APPENDIX – B Definitions

temperature is extremely high and it causes an J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1

aerosol can ignite immediately. The

ion point and a fireball occurs. Its

mportant thermal radiation.

B-2

DEFINITIONS

Acceptance Criteria:

Expresses the level of health, safety and/or environmental performance deemed

acceptable for a given period or phase of activities. They may be defined both in

quantitative and qualitative terms.

Accident:

An event or chain of events which cause, or could have caused injury, illness and/or

damage (loss) to assets, the environment or third parties

As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP):

To reduce a risk to a level which is as low as reasonably practicable involves

balancing reduction in risk against the time, trouble, difficulty and cost of achieving it.

This level represents the point, objectively assessed, at which the time, trouble,

difficulty and cost of further reduction measures become unreasonably

disproportionate to the additional risk reduction obtained.

Assessment:

The process of analyzing and evaluating hazards, it involves both causal and

consequence analysis and requires determination of likelihood and risk.

Atmospheric storage:

Storage tanks working at ambient temperature and pressure and containing a

substance in a liquid state.

Atmospheric transport equipment:

Transport equipment working at ambient temperature and pressure and containing a

substance in a liquid state.

BLEVE and possible fireball:

The BLEVE (acronym for Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion) happens when a

vessel, containing a liquid highly superheated above its normal atmospheric boiling

point, fails catastrophically. The BLEVE concerns pressure liquefied gas storage or

pressurised liquids. The first consequence of a BLEVE is a blast effect due on the

one hand to vapour expansion when the vessel fails, and on the other hand to the

explosive vaporisation of the vessel liquid content. This effect is generally followed by

missiles ejection.

If the substance is flammable, the air-substance

flame front rapidly moves away from the ignit


B-3

The way to take into account the BLEVE is explained in the catastrophic rupture

entry.

Catastrophic rupture:

A catastrophic rupture is the complete failure of the equipment leading to the

complete and instantaneous release of the substance. A BLEVE is also a

catastrophic rupture in particular operating conditions. Depending on the

circumstances, the catastrophic rupture can lead to overpressure generation and

missiles ejection.

Consequence Analysis:

The study of the possible extent of harmful effects of potential incidents, e.g.

calculation of the size of the flammable region of a vapour cloud following a spill.

Consequence:

Adverse effects or harm which causes the quality of human health or the

environment to be impaired.

Emergency Response Plan:

Plan detailing the response to specific incident scenarios and explaining emergency

arrangements.

Environment:

The surroundings and conditions in which a company operates or which it may affect,

including living systems (human and other) therein. Surroundings in which an

organization operates, including air, water, land, natural resources, flora, fauna,

humans, and their interrelation.

Escalation:

An increase in the consequences of a hazardous event.

Escalation Control:

Measures put in place to block or mitigate the effects of escalation factors. Types

include guards or shields (coatings, inhibitors, shutdowns), separation (time and

space), reduction in inventory, control of energy release (lower speeds, safety valves,

different fuel source) and non-physical or administrative (procedures, warnings,

training, drills).


bate incidents (gas, fire, and smoke

B-4

Event:

An occurrence or situation represented as a node in event and fault trees (e.g. gas

leak, status of gas detection system, status of ESD system

Explosion:

It corresponds to a change of physical state of the substance by action of a

energy/heat source or by action of a chemical source (incompatible reagent). This

change of state implies a combustion of a solid with overpressure generation (or an

explosion) due to a violent and spontaneous reaction. This critical event concerns

only mass solid storage. In case of substance stored in a closed vessel, an explosion

(or an explosive decomposition of solid) is considered as a internal cause of

overpressure leading to a loss of containment (for example catastrophic rupture or

breach on the shell). In this case, the loss of containment is the critical event

considered in the bow-tie.

Frequency:

The number of occurrences of an event per unit time

Hazard:

Any substance, physical effect, or condition with the potential to cause harm

including ill health and injury, damage to property, products or the environment;

production losses or increased liabilities.

Inherent Safety:

Design philosophy that utilizes the laws of physics and chemistry to prevent and

control incidents rather than alarms, interlocks, process trips and similar systems.

Likelihood Analysis:

The process of estimating the likelihood of an event.

Major Accident:

Major accident means an ‘Uncontrolled Occurrence’ in the operation of a site which

leads to severe or catastrophic consequences to people, assets, the environment

and/or company reputation. The consequences may be immediate or delayed and

may occur outside as well as inside the site. There will also be a high potential for

escalation.

Mitigation:

Measures taken to reduce the consequences of a potential hazardous event.

Mitigation measures include:

• 'active' systems intended to detect and a alarms, shutdowns, deluge);


mbient temperature and at a pressure

e, eventually with an inert gas). The

B-5

• 'passive' systems intended to guarantee the primary functions (fire and blast walls, protective coatings, drain systems); and

• 'Operational' systems intended for emergency management (contingency plans, training, drills).

Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS):

Information sheet provided by the supplier of chemical product which details HSE

risks.

Risk:

Risk is the product of the measure of the likelihood of occurrence of an undesired

event and the potential adverse consequences which this event may have upon:

¾ People – injury or harm to physical or psychological health;

¾ Assets (or Revenue) – damage to property (assets) or loss of production;

¾ Environment – water, air, soil, animals, plants and social;

¾ Reputation – employees and third parties.

Risk = Frequency x Consequences.

Severity:

The degree to which an agent hazardous to health can cause harm

Tolerability Criteria:

Expresses the level of risk deemed tolerable for a given period or phase of activities.

May be expressed qualitatively or represented quantitatively on the Risk Matrix by

shaded areas.

Fire: The fire is a process of combustion characterised by heat or smoke or flame or

any combination of these.

Jet fire: The handling of pressurised flammable liquid or gas can lead to a jet fire in

case of a leak on a pipe or on a vessel. The fluid ignition lead to form a jet flame

characterised by a high radiant energy (largely higher than pool fire radiation) and by a

noticeable kinetic energy.

Overpressure generation: A rapidly propagating pressure or shock-wave in

atmosphere with high pressure, high density and high velocity.

Pool fire: The combustion of material evaporating from a layer of liquid (a pool). The

occurrence of the layer of liquid results from the failure of an equipment item

containing a flammable liquid.

Pressure storage: Storage tanks working at a

above 1 bar (pressure exerted by the substanc


B-6

substance stored can be a liquefied gas under pressure (two phase equilibrium) or a

gas under pressure (one phase).

Pressure transport equipment:

Transport equipment working at ambient temperature and at a pressure above 1 bar

(pressure exerted by the substance, eventually with an inert gas). The substance

stored can be a liquefied gas under pressure (two phase equilibrium) or a gas under

pressure (one phase).

Storage unit:

Unit used for the storage of raw materials, intermediate goods, manufactured

products or waste products.

Tank fire:

The tank fire is generally the consequence of the ignition of the gaseous phase in a

vessel containing a flammable liquid.

Toxic cloud:

Mixing and spreading of toxic gases in air, which causes clouds to grow. The mixing

is the result of turbulent energy exchange, which is a function of wind and

atmospheric temperature profile.

Unloading unit:

Unit used for inlet and outlet of substances in the establishment, involving transport

equipment.

Vessel collapse:

A vessel collapse is the complete failure of the equipment leading to the complete

and instantaneous release of the substance. It is due to a decrease of the internal

pressure in the vessel leading to the collapse of the vessel under the effect of

atmospheric pressure. The vessel collapse does not lead to overpressure generation

nor missiles ejection.


C-1

ANNEXURE – C STORAGE AND HANDLING


C-2

STORAGE AND HANDLING OF PRESSURISED LIQUEFIED GASES

GENERAL SAFETY FEATURES

Some of the general safety features for the storage and handling of pressurised

liquefied gases have been discussed below :

1. Layout :-

* Adequate spacing should be provided for maintenance, operations

and fire fighting.

* There should be adequate access ways for movement of fire engines.

* Storage tank to be down wind of ignition sources

* Storage installation should be as far away as possible from the plant

boundary, public roads and populated area.

* CONFINEMENT/GRADING : Kerb wall shall be provided around sides

of the storage vessel with concrete flooring of the ground under vessel

and extending upto minimum distance of D/2 or 5M whichever is

higher and atleast 5 M(min.) from the edge of the Hortonspheres with

a slope of 1:100 (Min.). Grading of the ground underneath should be

levelled so as to direct spillage from the fourth side to a shallow sump

away from the storage vessel and kerb wall height shall be minimum

30 cm but shall not exceed 60 cm otherwise evaporation of spilled

LPG may get affected.

* SPILLS AND LEAKS : Spillage collection shallow sump shall be

located at a distance where the flames from sump fire will not impinge

on the vessel. This distance shall not be less than the diameter of the

nearest vessel or 15 M whichever is higher.

* PIPING : Only piping associated with the storage vessels shall be

located within the storage areas or between the storage area and the

manifold system.

* SURFACE DRAINAGE : In order to prevent the escape of spillage into

the main drainage system, surface water from the storage area and

from the manifold area shall be directed to the main drainage through

a water seal to avoid the spread of hydrocarbon.


C-3

2. Relief System :

* Relief system should be adequately designed (major fire underneath

the tank). No credit shall be taken for fire proofing on the vessel.

* A minimum of two relief valves to be provided on each tank, each

relief valve having the required design relieving capacity.

* There should be a fool proof mechanical interlocking arrangement to

ensure inadvertent closing of both the isolation valves, thus rendering

the tank unprotected. One relief valve must always be open.

* If the relief valves are not connected to the flare i.e. if they relieve to

atmosphere, steam connection should be provided.

3. Draining :

* Water drain chamber should be provided and installed away from

shadow of the tank.

* Double block valves should be provided on water draining line (quick

shut off type near the chamber and other a globe valve). The drain

valve should be antifreeze type.

* Safety instructions for water draining operations should be prominently

displayed near the drain chamber

* Draining should be carried out only during the day shift and under

constant supervision.

* Sampling points should be provided with duplicate valves.

* The area under the horton sphere should have concrete pavement

with proper slope away from the tank.

4. Instrumentation :

* Two independent level instruments (of which one should be the servo

type) should be installed for counter checking.

* High/low level alarms must be provided

* Remote operated valves on liquid outlet/inlet should be provided close

to the tank

* Excess flow valve must be provided close to the horton sphere in

liquid outlet line (tank bottom)

initiate the following :


h on any one of the vessels shall

C-4

* Non-return valve should be provided close to the tank in liquid/vapour

inlet lines against reverse flow in case of transfer line rupture.

* The tank bottom outlet pumps must be protected against:

1. Potential dead - heading through low flow/no flow trip

2. Cavitation or running dry through horton sphere low tank level

trip.

5. Fire Proofing :

* Horton sphere legs must be adequately fire proofed

* All connecting lines upto 15 M (min) distance from Horton sphere must

be fire proofed.

6. Safety/Security System

The features of safety/security systems for the different areas shall be as

follows:

Automatic Fire Protection System

Automatic fire protection system based on heat detection through thermal

fuses/quartz bulbs/EP detectors shall be employed. Sensors shall be installed

at all critical places described below:

* Storage Area : In storage area these detectors shall be provided

encircling each vessel, equispaced with a maximum spacing of 1

meter at an elevation of about 1.5 to 2.0 meter from bottom of vessel.

Also minimum 2 nos. detectors shall be provided at the top of the

vessel and atleast one near the liquid line ROV to take care of failure

of flanges. In case of an automatic thermal fuse based fire protection

system the instrument air supply pressure to thermal fuses shall be

maintained through a pressure control valve and a restriction orifice.

The thermal fuses shall be designed to blow at 79 deg C temperature

(max.).Instrument air will start leaking as a result of thermal fuse

blowing. The capacity of the restriction orifice is such that the

discharge of air through even one thermal fuse will depressurise the

downstream side of the restriction orifice to below set point of the

pressure switch.

The actuation of pressure switc

- Human errors


tributors

C-5

* an audio visual alarm at the local/main control panel and fire water

station indicating the vessel on fire.

* the Remote Operated Valve (ROV) on liquid inlet/outlet line to the

affected vessel will close.

* the ROVs on vapour balance line and liquid return line of the affected

vessel will close.

* the ROV on recirculation line of the affected vessel will close.

* transfer pump in the storage area will trip.

* the deluge valves on fire water supply lines to that vessel will open.

Additionally push buttons for initiating all the above actions shall be provided

on remote operating panel and also in field at safe location for enabling

manual actuation of a trip by operator. In the field, manual bypass valves of

fire water deluge valves shall also be provided. Arrangement to routinely test

the security system shall also be provided.

7. Transfer Pumps :

* Bottom pump must be the double mechanical seal type

* The pump should trip automatically on

- low horton sphere level

- low flow/no flow

8. Operations :

* if there is any activity which has Catastrophic potential it is the storage

and handling of liquefied gases . Even though the operations are

simple compared to the operations with process plants, such

installations must be manned by operators with the highest skill,

experience and technical background.

* They must be especially trained in the safety aspects of storage and

handling of liquefied gases.

* Each such operator should be subjected to an annual refresher

training course lasting 1 or 2 days which should include -

- What can go wrong ?

- What will the consequences be if it happens?

- Ranking of critical risk con


s per CCE guidelines.

C-6

- The importance of considering root causes of accidents, and

not only the immediate "visible" causes

- Common-cause errors which may cause redundant safety

systems to fail

- The economic and legal implications of major accidents etc.

- Case histories

9. Miscellaneous :-

1. Sphere bottom ROV's should be the first break flange. They should be

located outside the shadow of the sphere and shall be fire safe. The

orientation of ROV's in piping layout should be such that in the event

of leak of its flange on the storage side with the possibility of fire, the

sphere does not come in the jetflame.

2. Process line ROV's should be oriented is such a way that in case of a

gas leak and subsequent fire the sphere should not come in the line of

the jet fire.

3. All ROV's shall be operable from the control room, open/close

indications on the panel.

4. The flange joints of ROV’s shall either have spiral wound metallic

gaskets or ring joints. Plain asbestos sheet gaskets shall not be used.

5. All drains and sample point first isolation valve shall be pressure

balance plug valve type and the sample point tapping shall be taken

from the top of the piping & the drain from the bottom.

6. All connections to flare header should be from the top. Safety valve

should be located above the flare header for free draining. The

discharge of the safety valves should be hooked up to a single header

including pump vents.

7. Provide utility hose stations near pumps & spheres area.

8. All gas detector indications shall be available in the control room.

9. Suitable gas detectors shall be placed at identified critical locations

e.g. near ROV’s, pumps, sampling points, water drain (where

relevant). Audio visual alarms showing the location of gas leakage

shall be provided on the control panel.

10 A curb wall (300 mm minimum and 600 mm maximum) around the

horton sphere shall be provided a


D-1

ANNEXURE – D LOSS OF CONTAINMENT

ƒ Hydrogen embrittlement


D-2

LOSS OF CONTAINMENT - CAUSES IN THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

Source: Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis, CCPS, AIChE, (pp. 491-494)

Plant Inventory Discharged to Environment Due to Loss of Containment

(Note: This cannot presume to be an exhaustive list of causes.)

CONTAINMENT LOSS VIA AN “OPEN-END” ROUTE TO ATMOSPHERE

ƒ Due to genuine process relief or dumping requirements ƒ Due to maloperation of equipment in service, e.g. spurious relief valve operation

of rupture disk failure, etc.

ƒ Due to operator error, e.g. drain or vent valve left open, misrouting of materials,

tank overfilled, unit opened up under pressure, etc.

CONTAINMENT FAILURE UNDER DESIGN OPERATING CONDITIONS DUE TO

IMPERFECTIONS IN THE EQUIPMENT

ƒ Imperfections arising prior to commissioning and not detected before start-up

(due to poor inspection or testing procedures) ƒ Equipment inadequately designed for proposed duty, e.g. wrong materials

specified, pressure ratings of vessel or piping inadequate, temperature ratings

inadequate etc.

ƒ Defects arising during manufacture, e.g. wrong materials used, poor

workmanship, poor quality control etc. ƒ Defects arising during construction, e.g. welding defects, misalignment, wrong

gaskets fitted, etc.

ƒ Imperfections due to equipment deterioration in service and not detected before

the effect becomes significant (due to inadequate monitoring procedures in those

cases where deterioration is gradual)

ƒ Normal wear and tear on pump or agitator seals, valve packing, flange gaskets,

etc. ƒ Internal and/or external corrosion, including stress corrosion cracking ƒ Erosion or thinning ƒ Metal fatigue or vibration effects ƒ Previous periods of gross maloperation, e.g. furnace operation at above the

design tube skin temperature (“creep”)


D-3

ƒ Imperfections arising from routine maintenance or minor modifications not carried

out correctly e.g. poor workmanship, wrong materials etc.

CONTAINMENT FAILURE UNDER DESIGN OPERATING CONDITIONS DUE

TO EXTERNAL AGENCIES

ƒ Impact damage, such as by cranes, road vehicles, excavators, machinery

associated with the process, etc. ƒ Damage by confined explosions due to accumulation and ignition of flammable

mixtures arising from small process leaks, e.g. flammable gas build-up in

analyser houses, in enclosed drains, around submerged tanks. etc.

ƒ Settlement of structural supports due to geological or climatic factors or failure of

structural supports due to corrosion, etc. ƒ Damage to tank trunks, rail cars, containers, etc., during transport of materials on

or off-site.

ƒ Fire exposure ƒ Blast effects from a nearby explosion (unconfined vapour cloud explosion,

bursting vessel, etc.), such as blast overpressure, projectiles, structural damage,

etc.

ƒ Natural events (acts of God) such as windstorms, earthquakes, floods, lightning,

etc.

CONTAINMENT FAILURE DUE TO DEVIATIONS IN PLANT CONDITIONS

BEYOND THE DESIGN LIMITS

ƒ Overpressurising of equipment ƒ Due to a connected pressure source

Gas pressure source: gas breakthrough into downstream low-pressure

equipment due to failure of a pressure or level controller, isolation valve opened

by error, etc. pressurised backflow into low-pressure equipment, e.g. due to

compressor failure.

Liquid pressure source: pumping up of blocked-in gas spaces hydraulic

overpressurisation due to block-in condition down-stream excessive surge or

hammer, such as by sudden valve closure on liquid transfer line

ƒ Due to rising process temperature

s pumping out of tanks or vessels

uipment under gravity

D-4

Loss of cooling: loss of coolant flow, e.g. to a reactor cooler, to a distillation

column, to a condenser, etc. elevated coolant temperature, e.g. loss of cooling

water fans, etc. fouling of coolers, condensers, or exchangers excessive heat

input (thermal) heater control faults, such as steam or hot oil heated systems

ingress of hot extraneous materials, e.g. slopover excessive heat generation

(chemical) reactor runway, e.g. due to loss of reaction diluent, high feed rate,

high molar ratio, accumulation of unreacted reactants due to inadequate mixing

or temporary loss of reaction subsequently leading to a runaway, etc. exothermic

reaction due to ingress of catalytic impurities, e.g. backflow from ethylene oxide

consumer unit into feed tank.

exothermic due to mixing of incompatible chemicals, e.g. H2SO4 with NaOH

exothermic decomposition of thermally unstable or explosive material such as

peroxides, e.g. due to temperature rise, over concentration, or deposition on hot

surfaces.

ƒ Due to an internal explosion arising from formation and ignition of flammable gas

mixtures, mists or dust ingress of air, e.g. due to inadequate purging of

equipment at plant start-up, due to loss of nitrogen purge on flare headers,

storage tanks, centrifuge systems, dryers, etc. loss of critical inert diluent, e.g.

loss of nitrogen padding on an ethylene oxide storage tank, loss of nitrogen to the

make-up section of nitrogen/air solids conveying system failure of explosion

suppressants flammable excursion in oxidation processes, e.g. due to high air or

oxygen rates, or loss of conversion

ƒ Due to physically or mechanically induced forces or stresses expansion upon

change of state, e.g. freezing of water in pipe runs thermal expansion of blocked-

in-liquids, e.g. in heat exchangers or long pipe runs ingress of extraneous

phases, e.g. gas compressor failure due to liquid carry-through to machine

suction, condensate hammer in steam line, etc.

ƒ Underpressurising of equipment (for equipment not capable of withstanding

vacuum) ƒ By direct connection to an ejector set or to equipment normally running under

vacuum due to equipment malfunction, e.g. loss of liquid seal due to failure of a level controller causing vacuum to be applied upstream, etc. due to operator

error, e.g. isolation valve left open, etc. ƒ Due to the movement of transfer or liquid


D-5

E-1

ƒ Due to cooling of gases or vapours

cooling of non condensable vapours, e.g. vessel blocked-in after steaming

cooling of non-condensable gases or vapours. e.g. storage tank by heavy rainfall

in summer.

ƒ Due to solubility effects, e.g. dissolution of gases in liquids ƒ High metal temperature (causing loss of strength) ƒ Overcooling by refrigeration units, e.g. due to control faults, wrong refrigerant,

etc.

ƒ Incomplete vaporisation and/or inadequate heating of Refrigerated material

before transfer into equipment of inadequate temperature rating, e.g. due to

control faults on a liquid of low boiling point.

ƒ Loss of system pressure on units handling liquids of low boiling point ƒ Wrong process materials or abnormal impurities (causing accelerated corrosion

chemical attack on seals or gaskets, stress corrosion cracking, embrittlement, etc.)

ƒ Variations in stream compositions outside design limits ƒ Abnormal impurities introduced with raw materials or wrong raw materials ƒ By-products or abnormal chemical reactions ƒ Oxygen, chlorides, or other impurities remaining in equipment at start-up due to

inadequate evacuation or decontamination.

ƒ Impurities entering process from atmosphere, service connections, tube leaks

etc., during operation.

INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD.

BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ORIGINAL JULY’12 (UPDATED AUGUST’14)

1 | P a g e

EEMMEERRGGEENNCCYY RREESSPPOONNSSEE

AANNDD

DDIISSAASSTTEERR MMAANNAAGGEEMMEENNTT PPLLAANN

Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (Refineries Division)

Barauni Refinery

BARAUNI REFINERY -In harmony with nature


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


2 | P a g e

Contents

(Reference: Section 5 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)

Chapter No Topic Page No.

Chapter -C

Foreword 9

Executive Summary


10-13

Definitions & List of Abbreviations


14-19

Industrial Description 20-24

Chapter -1

Classification of Emergencies

(Reference: Section 6 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010) 1-1 to 1-9

Implementation Schedule

(Reference: Section 7 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010) 1-10

Chapter –2

Consequences of Defaults Or Non-Compliance


Chapter –3 Requirements under Other Statutes


Chapter –4

Pre-Emergency Planning


4-1 to 4-27

Hazard Identification 4-2

Flora & Fauna 4-2 to 4-6

Barauni Refinery and its Neighboring Details 4-7 to 4-9

Meteorological Conditions 4-10 to 4-13

Chapter%20-1.doc

Chapter%20-2.doc

Chapter%20-3.doc

Chapter%20-%204.doc


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


3 | P a g e


Socio- Economic Aspects of the Villages & Population Data

4-14

Checklist-1: Hazard Identification 4-15 to 4-17

Risk analysis & Risk assessment 4-18 to 4-27

Causes of Disaster 4-27

Chapter –5

Emergency Mitigation Measures


5-1 to 5-16

Basic requirements of ERDMP (Schedule-III) 5-2

Resource Mobilization (Schedule-IV) 5-3 to 5-5

Incident Preventing Measures & Procedures 5-6 to 5-14

Check List – 2: Incident Prevention Measures 5-15 to 5-16

Chapter–6

Emergency Preparedness Measures


6-1 to 6-10

Emergency Drills & Mock Exercises 6-2 to 6-5

Check List-3: Mutual Aid / Mock Drills 6-6 to 6-7

Training 6-7 to 6-8

Mutual Aid 6-8

Photographs on Various Safety Training Programmes Conducted at BR

6-9 to 6-10

Chapter -7

Response Procedure & Measures


7-1 to 7-31

Zoning and MAPS 7-2

Layout / Flow Diagram / Manpower 7-3

Disaster Scenarios 7-4 to 7-29

Chapter%20-%205.doc

Chapter%20-%206.doc

Chapter%20-%207.doc


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


4 | P a g e


Check-List-4: ERDMP Response Measures / Infrastructure

7-30 to 7-31

Chapter -8

Emergency Organization and Responsibilities


8-1 to 8-31

Organogram Chart 8.2 to 8-10

Organogram for Communication of Disaster 8-11

Roles & Responsibilities 8-12 to 8-27

Siren Codes 8-28

Check List-5: Review and Updation of ERDMP 8-29

Communication Flow Charts 8-30 to 8-31

Chapter –9

Infrastructure


9-1 to 9-3

Emergency control centers 9-2

Assembly Points 9-2 to 9-3

Chapter –10 Declaration of On-site & Off-site Emergencies


10-1 to 10-3

Chapter –11

Resource for Controlling Emergency


11-1 to 11-9

Fire Fighting Systems 11-2 to 11-4

Fire Fighting Appliances/ Equipment/ Chemicals / PPEs Available With BR

Communication Facilities 11-6

Evacuation & Sheltering Facilities 11-6

Chapter%20-%208%20(Double%20Contingency).doc

Chapter%20-%209.doc

Chapter%20-%2010.doc



BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


5 | P a g e


In Built Facilities And Other Emergency Safety Interlock Facilities

11-6 to 11-7

Sources of Local Assistance 11-7

Check List-6: Availability of resources (internal / external)

11-8 to 11-9

Chapter –12

Demographic Information


12-1 to 12-6

Barauni Refinery: Location & Configuration 12-2 to 12-3

Meteorological Conditions 12-4 to 12-5

Neighboring Population, Flora & Fauna 12-6

Chapter –13 Medical Facilities


13-1 to 13-4

Chapter –14 Evacuation


14-1 to 14-11

Chapter –15 Information to Public


15-1 to 15-3

Chapter –16 Roles & Responsibilities of External Agency


16-1 to 16-3

Chapter –17 Reporting of the Incident


17-1 to 17-6

Chapter –18 Action after Reporting of Incident


18-1 to 18-2

Chapter –19 Termination of Emergency


19-1 to 19-2










BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


6 | P a g e


Chapter –20

Emergency Recovery Procedure


20-1 to 20-6

Check List-5: ERDMP - Recovery Measures 20-3 to 20-6

Chapter –21 ERDMP for Pipelines Carrying Petroleum Products


21-1 to 21-3

Chapter –22 ERDMP for Tank Trucks Carrying Petroleum Products


22-1 to 22-7

Chapter –23 Integration of the ERDMP with National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA)


23-1 to 23-4

Chapter –24

Security Threat Plan


24-1 to 24-36

Preventive Measures 24-3 to 24-4

Bomb Threat Assessment Committee & Responsibilities

24-5 to 24-7

Search Team 24-7 to 24-11

Evacuation of Area 24-11 to 24-13

Evaluation of the Bomb Threat 24-14 to 24-18

Procedure after Identification of Suspected Object 24-19 to 24-20

All Clear / Completion Certificate 24-20

Type of Homemade Bombs 24-21 to 24-23

Procedure for Dealing with a Bomb 24-24 to 24-25

Annexure

24-26 to 24-36







BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


10 | P a g e

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Petroleum industry plays a crucial role in meeting the daily needs of the common

man, but also contributes significantly towards industrial and economic growth of the

nation. While working towards disaster/accident free systems, we need to understand

the characteristics of the particular process or system, so that appropriate safety

principles can be adopted. Analysis of accidents in past and corrective actions taken

could become an input for hazard mitigation plan.

OBJECTIVE

Keeping the development in view, an attempt has been made in this Emergency

Response Disaster Management Plan (ERDMP) Manual as per Emergency

Response Disaster management Plan (ERDMP) Regulation - 2010 as per PNGRB

(Petroleum & Natural Gas Regulatory Board), to explore and select factors that could

provide the means to the Barauni Refinery for enhancing the mitigation practices in

hazardous scenarios in various sects of refining activities.

SCOPE (Reference: Section 4 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)

The scope covers –

(i) the identification of emergencies;

(ii) the mitigation measures that attempt to reduce and eliminate the risk or

disaster;

(iii) the preparedness that to develop plans for actions when disaster or

emergencies occur;

(iv) the responses that mobilize the necessary emergency services including

responders like fire service, police service, medical service including

ambulance, government as well as non-governmental agencies;

(v) the post disaster recovery with aim to restore the affected area to its original

conditions;

http://www.pngrb.gov.in/


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


11 | P a g e

INTENT

(Reference: Section 4.2 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)

ERDMP is made concise and informative so that members of the emergency

control organization should be able to quickly refer to the action plan to determine

important functions to be carried out;

to manage an emergency and not to use ERDMP just as reference material

for training and shall be made applicable

to prevent casualties - both on-site and off-site;

to reduce damage to property, machinery, public and environment;

to develop a state of readiness for a prompt and orderly response to an

emergency and to establish a high order of preparedness (equipment,

personnel) commensurate with the risk

to provide an incident management organogram with clear missions and

lines of authority (incident command system, field supervision, unified

command);

to ensure an orderly and timely decision-making and response process

(notification, standard operating procedures)

to maintain good public relations;

In the ERDMP prepared, following are readily available for reference

concerning handling of disaster or emergency scenarios

Material Safety Datasheets of hazardous chemicals used in BR

Flora and fauna

Plantation details carried out by BR in the surrounding for the preservation

of natural resources and environment, list of plant species for development

of green belt ,ECO PARK.

Demographic details

Location of BR, population data in close vicinity of the installation & within the 5 Km

range, meteorological conditions like temperature, pressure, relative humidity, wind

speed & direction are available.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


12 | P a g e

Hazard identification & risk assessments

Identification of various risk scenarios with consequences (with contours), threats

of terrorism like bomb threat and handling procedure of such emergencies. The

mitigation measures for the identified hazard and risk scenarios like resource

mobilization (e.g. manpower available, fire fighting appliances, resources for

communication, transport, emergency drugs available etc).

Preventive and risk mitigation measures.

Safety management system for preventive measures including Safety Policy,

various committees, safety audits, work permit system & work procedure

In-built facilities like interlocks, availability of gas detectors.

Fire protection systems comprising of fire water storage, pumps, fire water network

with hydrant system details, foam system, cooling system, protection of storage

tanks, loading gantry & process units including power generation unit.

Emergency preparedness measures

Mock drills of various scenarios, schedules of testing/calibration of detectors and

automatic actuated fire fighting systems, testing of various communication modes,

training details.

Response procedure

Response procedure available for various types of risk scenarios like HC leaks,

catastrophic failure, poisonous gas leaks, fire and explosion, flood, large oil spill,

earthquake and flood scenario etc.

Graphical representation of Emergency Control center (ECC) & assembly points

inside the refinery, process layouts, fire water network and individual process flow

diagrams (PFDs) are available.

Emergency Organization

To follow the response procedure for effective mitigation of disasters well defined

Emergency Organogram with roles and responsibilities is available.

Infrastructure for emergency response


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


13 | P a g e

Details of Amenities in Emergency Control Center and Assembly

Points

Resources for Control of emergency

Details of mobile and static fire fighting appliances, fire extinguishers, ambulance

facility, first aid center, PPEs available, communication facilities like fire bell, siren,

phones, walkie talkies, PA systems etc.

Contact details of external agencies for fire fighting, police administration, civil

administration, medical hospitals and doctors etc.

Evacuation procedures

Evacuation procedures for inside and outside the installation, instruction for

general public, transport facility for evacuation etc are available

Procedure for recovery

Procedure for salvage of product, record of affected manpower, information to

outside bodies, investigation, damage assessment etc are detailed.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


14 | P a g e

DEFINITIONS



BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


15 | P a g e

List of Abbreviations A&W : Administration & Welfare BLEVE : Boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion CCE : Chief Controller of Explosives CDU : Crude Distillation Unit CIC : Chief Incident Controller CM : Chief Manager CPCB : Central Pollution Control Board DGM : Deputy General Manager DHDT : Diesel Hydro treating Unit DMP : Disaster Management Plan ED : Executive Director EIA : Environment Impact Assessment ERV : Emergency Response Vehicle FCCU : Fluidized Catalytic Cracking Unit GM : General Manager HGU : Hydrogen Generation Unit HR : Human Resources HSD : High Speed Diesel HSE : Health, Safety & Environment IDLH : Immediate Danger to Life & Health LEL : Lower Explosive Limit LPG : Liquefied Petroleum Gas MN : Maintenance MS : Motor Spirit MSDS : Material Safety Data Sheet MSQU : Motor Spirit Quality Upgradation Unit NDMA : National Disaster Management Plan NDRF : National Disaster Response Force NG : Natural gas NHDT : Naphtha Hydro-Treater Unit OISD : Oil Industries Safety Directorate P&U : Power and Utility QRA : Quantitative Risk Analysis RC : Refinery Co-ordination SDRF : State Disaster Response Force SIC : Site Incident Controller SKO : Superior Kerosene Oil SRU : Sulfur Recovery Unit STEL : Short term exposure limit SWS : Sour Water Stripper Unit TLV : Threshold Limiting value TREM card: Transport Emergency card


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


16 | P a g e

TS : Technical Services UEL : Upper Explosive limit BSPCB : Bihar State Pollution Control Board UVCE : Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion VDU : Vacuum Distillation Unit

Abbreviations for NDMA:

DDMA : District Disaster Management Authority DM : Disaster Management NCC : National Cadet Corps NCDM : National Committee on Disaster Management NDMA : National Disaster Management Authority NDMRCs : National Disaster Mitigation Resource Centers NDRF : National Disaster Response Force NEC : National Executive Committee NGOs : Non-Governmental Organizations NSS : National Service Schème NYK : Nehru Yuva Kendra SDMA : State Disaster Management Authority SEC : State Executive Committee

(1) Definitions as per ERDMP regulation 3 2010-clause, unless the context otherwise requires,-

a) “Act” means the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act, 2006;

b) ‘‘Board” means the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board established under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Act;

c) “boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE)” means the violent rupture of a pressure vessel containing saturated liquid or vapor at a temperature well above its atmospheric boiling point and the resulting flash evaporation of a large fraction of the superheated liquid which produces a large vapor cloud which burns in the form of a large rising fireball due to ignition;

d) “Chief incident controller” means the person who assumes absolute control of the unit and determines action necessary to control the emergency;

e) “codes of practice” means the codes of practice for emergency response and disaster management plan notified by the Board;

f) “disaster” means an occurrence of such magnitude as to create a situation in which the normal patterns of life within an industrial complex are suddenly disrupted and in certain cases affecting the neighborhood seriously with the result that the people are plunged into helplessness and suffering and may need


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


17 | P a g e

food, shelter, clothing, medical attention protection and other life sustaining requirements;

g) “disaster management plan“ means a well coordinated, comprehensive response plan to contain loss of life, property, environment and provide speedy and effective recovery by making the most effective use of available resources in case of a disaster and is known as On-site Emergency & Off-site Emergency Management Plan.

h) “emergency” means a situation or scenario which has the potential to cause serious danger to persons, environment or damage to property and which tends to cause disruption inside or outside the premises and may require the help of outside resources;

i) “emergency response vehicle (ERV)” means a vehicle for handling emergencies having necessary equipment meant for rescue and relief operations and ERV can be put to use within installation, outside of installation including road incident;

j) “hazard” means an event related to the property of substance or chemicals with a potential for human injury, damage to property, damage to the environment, or some combination thereof;

k) “incident” means an unplanned or unintended or intended event having potential to cause damage to life, property and environment;

l) “incident record register” means a register containing complete information pertaining to all incidents covering near miss, and all other incidents leading to Level-I, Level-II and Level-III emergencies;

m) “installation” means facilities, namely, gaseous product pipeline, liquid Product pipeline, hydrocarbons processing installation, oil and natural gas terminals and commercial storage and transportation, hydrocarbons gas bottling Installations including CNG, city gas distribution facilities and retail outlets;

n) “leak” means release or discharge of a dangerous chemicals or substances or material into the environment;

o) “Level-I emergency” means an emergency as defined under sub-ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 6 (a); (Refer Chapter – 1)

p) “Level-II emergency” means an emergency as defined under sub-ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 6 (b); (Refer Chapter – 1)

q) “Level-III emergency” means an emergency as defined under sub-ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 6 (c); (Refer Chapter – 1)

r) “Mutual aid association” means an industrial mutual aid association in which participating industries as a community shall assist each other in case of emergency. Mutual aid associations supplement a site’s emergency control plan. Services of member industries shall be requested


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


18 | P a g e

only when the emergency threatens to exceed the capability of otherwise available resources;

s) "occupier” of an installation means the person who has ultimate control over the affairs of the installation;

t) “Off site emergency” means an emergency that takes place in an installation and the effects of emergency extends beyond the premises or the emergency created due to an incident, catastrophic incidents, natural calamities, etc. It no longer remains the concern of the installation management alone but also becomes a concern for the general public living outside and to deal with such eventualities shall be the responsibilities of district administration;

u) “Off site emergency plan” means a response plan to control and mitigate the effects of catastrophic incidents in above ground installation (AGI) or underground installations (UGI) or road transportation. This plan shall be prepared by the district administration based on the data provided by the installation(s), to make the most effective use of combined resources, i.e. internal as well as external to minimize loss of life, property, environment and to restore facilities at the earliest;

v) “On site emergency” means an emergency that takes place in an installation and the effects are confined to the Installation premise’s involving only the people working inside the plants and to deal with such eventualities is the responsibility of the occupier and is mandatory. It may also require help of outside resources;

w) “on site emergency plan” means a response plan to contain and minimize the effects due to emergencies within the installations which have a potential to cause damage to people and facilities within the installation premises; It is also known as Emergency Response & Disaster Management Plan (ERDMP).

x) “risk” means the chance of a specific undesired event occurring within a specified period or in specified circumstances and it may be either a frequency or a probability of a specific undesired event taking place;

y) “risk analysis” means the identification of undesired events that lead to the materialization of a hazard, the analysis of the mechanisms by which these undesired events could occur and, usually, the estimation of the extent, magnitude, and likelihood of any harmful effects;

z) “risk assessment” means the quantitative evaluation of the likelihood of undesired events and the likelihood of harm or damage being caused by them, together with the value judgments made concerning the significance of the results;

aa) “Risk management” means the programme that embraces all administrative and operational programmes that are designed to reduce the


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


19 | P a g e

risk of emergencies involving acutely hazardous materials. Such programmes include, but are not limited to, ensuring the design safety of new and existing equipment, standard operating procedures, preventive maintenance, operator training, incident investigation procedures, risk assessment for unit operations, emergency planning, and internal and external procedures to ensure that these programmes are being executed as planned;

bb) “Site incident controller” means the person who goes to the scene of the emergency and supervises the actions necessary to overcome the emergency at the site of the incident;

cc) ‘Spill” means an unintended release or discharge of hydrocarbon or any other dangerous liquid into the environment;

dd) “Transport emergency (TREM) card” means a card containing details about the nature of hazards, protective devices, telephone numbers and actions related to spillage, fire, first aid and other details of national and international (UN) numbers or signage which is common in India and abroad;

ee) “Unconfined vapor cloud explosion (UVCE)” means the formation of vapor cloud due to release of significant quantity of liquefied hydrocarbons into the atmosphere and its explosion due to ignition which may cause high over pressure and low pressure that cause very heavy damage.

(2) Words and expressions used and not defined in these ERDMP regulation 2010-clause s, but defined in the Act or rules or ERDMP regulation 2010-clause s made thereunder, shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in this Act or in the rules or ERDMP regulation 2010-clause, as the case may be.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


20 | P a g e

PROCESS DESCRIPTION OF FACILITIES

INTRODUCTION

Barauni Refinery is the second Public Sector Refinery of Indian Oil

Corporation built in collaboration with erstwhile USSR and limited

participation of Romania. It is located near the northern bank of river

Ganga at Begusarai district town of Bihar. The refinery strategically located

on the cross roads of two very important national highways, NH30 &

NH31 and two important railways, i.e. Eastern Railway and North Eastern

Railway.

The refinery was commissioned in the year 1964. It was formally dedicated

to the nation by Prof. Humayun Kabir, the then Union Minister for Petroleum

& Chemicals, Govt. of India on 15th January 1965. It was originally

designed for processing 3.0 MMTPA of Assam Crude. Processing

capacity of the refinery was raised to 3.3MMTPA in 1985 on debottle

necking. The processing capacity was raised to 4.2MMTPA with the help of

modifications for improving the energy efficiency as well as yield of products

in 1991. Enhancement of the capacity to 6.0 MMTPA was done by

debottlenecking / revamping of the existing primary distillation units and

simultaneously providing the matching secondary processing units/facility.

Barauni Refinery (BR) has earned ISO-9001 as well as prestigious ISO-

14001 & OSHAS-18001 certification, which is a manifestation of its

commitment towards promoting environmental & occupational health &

safety considerations with simultaneous emphasis on qualitative

improvement in its product pattern.

The Refinery processes Imported low sulphur & High sulphur crude oil

The refined products fulfil the requirement of the eastern region by road, rail

and also a product pipeline going upto Kanpur, UP via Patna, Mughalsarai,

& Allahabad. A branch pipe line from Gowria (Near Kanpur) also supplies

product to Lucknow. The imported crude oil from Nigeria, Malaysia and

Middle East Countries is supplied to Barauni Refinery through a Paradip

,Haldia — Barauni crude oil pipeline.

• LPG

• Naphtha

• Motor Spirit

• Superior Kerosene Oil


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


21 | P a g e

• High Speed Diesel

• Light Diesel Oil

• Low Sulphur Heavy Stock

• Raw Petroleum Coke

• Sulphur

1.1 FACILITY Crude received from Haldia / Paradip port through PHBCPL is stored in storage tanks in O&MS. These tanks are used for feeding the crude units. AVU’s Distillates from crude units go as straight run products (e.g. LPG, SKO, Bitumen) or as blending components (e.g. MS, HSD) or as feedstock to various downstream quality- upgrading units like CRU, DHDT which in turn gives the upgraded rundown streams for blending to various high-value products (e.g. MS, HSD). And the heavy ends from AVU’s stored in intermediate storage tanks are used as feedstock to secondary units like Coker and RFCCU. These secondary units are used to upgrade the heavy ends to various high value products. Distillates from these units are either used as straight run products (e.g. LPG, RPC) or as blending components (e.g. MS, HSD, LDO, CBFS etc.). Blending of these materials is done in OM&S as to meet the IS specifications or the specifications provided by the customer(s). The final products are stored in various products storage tanks, and only after certification of these tanks as per specifications, they are sold to end customers through marketing terminals. The petroleum products from the refinery are dispatched through Tank Trucks, Tank Wagons (Rail) and Barauni-Kanpur pipeline (BKPL). The pipeline passes through Patna, Mughalsarai and Allahabad where the products are tapped off by Marketing Division for local distribution. While LPG, Motor spirit, superior Kerosene and Diesel are dispatched for public distribution through Marketing; other products are sold to the major valued customers of Barauni Refinery.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


22 | P a g e

The major process units of Barauni refinery are as follows

UNITS OF BARAUNI REFINERY (OTHER THAN BXP UNITS)

SN UNITS CAPACITY (MMTPA)

1 AVU-I 1.75

2 AVU-II 1.75

3 AVU-III 2.5

4 COKER-A 0.60

5 COKER-B 0.50

6 CRU 0.30

BARAUNI EXPANSION UNITS (BXP UNITS)

SN UNITS CAPACITY (TPA)

1 Fluid Catalytic Cracking 1.4MMTPA

2 LPG Treating Unit 1,70,000

3 Gasoline Treating Unit 2,45,000

4 Diesel Hydro Treating Unit 2.2 MMTPA

5 Hydrogen Generation Unit 34,000

6 Sour Water Stripper Unit 1 X 60 TPH

7 Amine Absorption / Regeneration Unit / Sulphur Recovery Unit (ARU/ SRU)

2X40 TPD

MSQ UNITS

SN UNITS CAPACITY (TMTPA)

1 Naphtha Splitter unit 464

2 Hydrotreater unit 20

3 Catalytic Reformer Unit 300

4 Reformate Splitter unit 274

5 Naphtha Hydro treating unit 183

6 C5-C6 Isomerization unit 126


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


23 | P a g e

7 Prime G+ 322

8 HDS 224

(Storage tank schedule) Details of chemical / products / raw material

SERVICE TANK NO NO OF NOM. CAP

TANKS (KL)

CRUDE

236 1 40000

235,237,239 2 40000

240 1 40000

238 1 40000

501 1 45000

LPG

V-3, V-4 2 1500

V-101, V-102, V-103, V-104, V-105, V-106 5 1500

SRN 1,2,3,4 4 5000

85,87 1 5000

86 1 5000

MS 75,76,90 3 1000

77,78,79,80,81,83,84 7 5000

82 1 5000

92,93 2 5000

254 1 10000

255 1 15000

SK 94,95,96,97,110,111 5 5000

241 0 5000

HSD 9,10 2 5000

220,221 2 10000

226,227,228,229,230 4 10000

231, 233 1 10000

234 1 20000

LDO CUTTER 104,105 2 5000

FO 88,89,243 2 5000

112,113 2 5000

CBFS 193,194 2 1000

289,290,291 3 2000


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


24 | P a g e

BITUMEN 185,186 2 2000

187, 188, 189, 190,191, 192 5 1000

CRU FEED

242 1 5000

250,251,252,253 3 3000

DHDT FEED 401, 402,403 2 20000

232 1 10000

RFCCU FEED 801,802,803 3 33000

RCO 15,17,18, 19,20,101,102,103 8 5,000

CLO 14,16 2 5,000

IFO 98,99,100 3 5,000

THIRD PARTY ACCREDITATION HISTORY

SN Edition Accreditation Agency

Date of Accreditation

Accreditation Valid up to

1 2nd Edition, Rev 0 DMI, Bhopal Nov 22, 2012 Nov 21, 2015

REVISION HISTORY

SN Edition No. Rev No. Rev. Date Remarks 1 1 16 June 2010 Organogram updated.

2 1 17 August 2011 DMP updated as per PNGRB ERDMP regulations 2010

Organogram updated.

3 2 0 July 2012 DMP thoroughly restructured and updated as per PNGRB ERDMP regulations 2010.

DMP renamed as ERDMP.

Organogram updated.

4 3 1 August 2014 Organogram Updated.

ERDMP DISTRIBUTION LIST

Hard Copies

COPY NO. DESIGNATION OF HOLDER

1. ED

2. GM(TS)

3. GM (T)

6. CTSM (HSE)

7. CFSM

8. Crisis Control Room

Soft Copy

Available on “BRINTRANET”


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No. 1-1


CHAPTER – 1

CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES

(Reference: Section 6 & 7 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No. 1-2


Emergencies can be categorized into three broad levels on the basis of seriousness and response requirements, namely: –

(a) Level 1 : This is an emergency or an incident which

(i) can be effectively and safely managed, and contained within the site, location or installation by the available resources;

(ii) Has no impact outside the site, location or installation.

(b) Level 2 : This is an emergency or an incident which –

(i) cannot be effectively and safely managed or contained at the location or installation by available resource and additional support is alerted or required;

(ii) is having or has the potential to have an effect beyond the site, location or installation and where external support of mutual aid partner may be involved;

(iii) is likely to be danger to life, the environment or to industrial assets or reputation.

(c) Level 3: This is an emergency or an incident with off-site impact which could be catastrophic and is likely to affect the population, property and environment inside and outside the installation, and management and control is done by district administration. Although the Level-III emergency falls under the purview of District Authority but till they step in, it should be responsibility of the unit to manage the emergency.

Note: Level-I has been considered for fire drill followed with onsite emergency However Level-II shall normally be considered as onsite emergency and Level-III as off-site emergency.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No. 1-3


Hazard Identification and Classification of Emergencies

A set of appropriate scenarios, likely to create emergency in Barauni Refinery, was

generated through Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) study carried out in 2011.

The identified scenarios along with consequence and frequency analysis, considered

for finalising detail action plan on any on site emergency situation, are listed below

and have been classified into 3 levels of emergencies on the basis of the guidelines as

discussed above. The risk contours of critical scenarios have also been shown

on plot plan of Barauni Refinery for quick reference of the likely impact on the

surroundings.

Identified Scenarios Along With Consequence And Frequency Analysis

Sc#

Description of scenarios Damage Distance (meter)

Probability (per year)

Level of Emerge

ncy

Plot plan ref no. for risk

contours 99 % fatality

50% fatality

1% fatality

1. Leak in Crude oil storage tank- Dyke Pool Fire

- 68.7 81.5 1.05E-6 LEVEL 3 1

2. Crude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire

- 57.9 70.4 1.05E-6 LEVEL 3 2

3. Leak in Crude oil storage tank 501- Dyke Pool Fire

- 68.7 81.7 1.5E-7 LEVEL 2 1

4. Leak / Line Rupture in Horton Sphere – Jet Fire

42.9 50.6 59.1 4.2E-7 LEVEL 2 1


90.5 93.5 132.4 2.1E-7 LEVEL 3 3

6. Failure of Horton Sphere – BLEVE

83.7 202.1 323.3 2.1E-7 LEVEL 3 4

7. Loss of containment in LPG tanker- BLEVE

98.3 196.8 305.7 3.05E-6 LEVEL 3 2

8. H2S Leak from Stripper Gas Amine Absorber (SRU)

25 75 125 5.0E-06 LEVEL 3 3


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No. 1-4


Storage Tanks

9. Leak in Crude oil storage tank Dyke Pool Fire (Comparison case)

- 68.7 81.4 1.05E-6 LEVEL3

10. Crude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire(Comparison case)

- 57.9 70.4 1.05E-6 LEVEL 1

11. Crude storage tank roof failure 501 – Tank Fire

- 57.9 70.4 1.5E-7 LEVEL 2

12. Leak / Line Rupture in Mounded bullet outlet line – Flash fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion

28.6 34.1 103.1 9.0E-7 LEVEL 1


- - 18.6 1.8E-6 LEVEL 1

14. Leak / Line Rupture in Fuel gas– Flash fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion

38.4 40.8 52.0 2.1E-6 LEVEL 2

15. Leak in Fuel gas storage tank outlet line – Jet Fire

39.3 46.1 53.2 4.2E-6 LEVEL 2

16. Leak in MS / SRN Storage tank – Pool Fire

- 17.7 30.6 2.7E-5 LEVEL 1

17. MS / SRN storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire

- 29.2 38.2 2.7E-5 LEVEL 2

18. MS / SRN storage tank roof fire – Flash fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion

26.0 27.8 50.2 1.35E-5 LEVEL 2

19. Leak in Slope tank – Pool Fire - 31.8 40.5 4.5E-6 LEVEL 2

20. Slope tank roof fire – Tank Fire - 36.5 43.6 4.5E-6 LEVEL2

21. Leak in SKO Storage tank – Pool Fire

- 31.2 40.3 1.05E-6 LEVEL 1

22. SKO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire

- 38.1 47.1 1.05E-6 LEVEL 2

23. Leak in Gas oil Storage tank – Pool Fire

- 35.7 45.7 4.5E-6 LEVEL 2


- 41.4 51.9 4.5E-6 LEVEL 2


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No. 1-5


25. Leak in CBFS / CLO Storage tank – Pool Fire

- 17.1 27.4 4.5E-6 LEVEL 1

26. CBFS / CLO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire

- 24.9 35.2 4.5E-6 LEVEL 1

27. Leak in CFO / IFO / RFO Storage tank – Pool Fire

- 31.2 40.3 4.5E-6 LEVEL 1

28. CFO / IFO / RFO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire

- 39.0 48.1 4.5E-6 LEVEL 2

29. Leak in HVGO Storage tank – Pool Fire

- 32.2 41.3 4.5E-6 LEVEL 2

30. HVGO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire

- 34.0 43.1 4.5E-6 LEVEL 2

31. Leak in LSHS Storage tank – Pool Fire

- `31.2 40.3 4.5E-6 LEVEL2

32. LSHS storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire

- 33.1 42.9 4.5E-6 LEVEL 1

33. Leak in SR Storage tank – Pool Fire

- 31.3 41.4 1.05E-6 LEVEL 2

34. SR storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire

- 34.0 43.2 1.05E-6 LEVEL 1

35. Leak in Bitumen Storage tank – Pool Fire

- 17.1 27.4 1.05E-6 LEVEL 2

36. Bitumen storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire

- 19.1 30.2 1.05E-6 LEVEL1

37. Leak from H2 Bullet outlet piping – Flash Fire/ VCE

13.6 14.6 28.0 7.5E-7 LEVEL 1

Wagon Gantry

38. Major Leak from MS Wagon – Pool Fire

- 45.8 56.8 2.3E-6 LEVEL 2

39. Major Leak from MS Wagon – Flash Fire/ VCE

94.5 101.7 192.7 1.15E-6 LEVEL 2

40. Major Leak from HVGO Wagon – Pool Fire

- 32.9 42.1 2.3E-6 LEVEL 2

41. Major Leak from SKO Wagon – Flash Fire/ VCE

118.6 126.9 232.8 4.8E-7 LEVEL 1


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No. 1-6


Tanker Truck Gantry

42. Loss of containment in CBFS tanker- Pool Fire

- 34.4 45.1 7.17E-8 LEVEL 1

43. Loss of containment in HVGO tanker- Pool Fire

- 34.4 44.1 3.58E-8 LEVEL 2

44. Leak in LPG tanker-Flash Fire/ VCE

179.3 214.2 660.8 3.05E-6 LEVEL 3

Pipelines

45. Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak) – Pool fire

- 105.9 105.9 3.05E-6 LEVEL 1


153.9 158.0 209.5 1.5E-6 LEVEL 2

Atmospheric Vacuum Distillation Unit (AVU) Crude Distillation Unit-1

47. Leak from Crude Column (601-K-2)

- 29.7 40.9 4.5E-6 LEVEL 1

48. Failure of Nozzle /Flange Joint in Crude Column (601-K-2) & crude starts coming out

- 19.0 28.8 1.5E-6 LEVEL 2

49. 10mm leak from inlet flange of Stabilizer Column (601-K-4) – Pool Fire

- 11.7 24.7 4.5E-7 LEVEL 2

50. Leak (10mm) from Furnace (F-101/F-102) tube inside the furnace /Nozzle of crude heater & crude starts coming out

47.8 50.1 79.3 2.7E-06 LEVEL 2

51. Desalter overflows line Leak (10mm)

- 20.3 28.9 4.5E-7 LEVEL 2

52. Nozzle / Flange joint leak (10mm) from the inlet of pretopping column

2.4 3.4 3.6 4.5E-7 LEVEL 1

53. Leak from Vacuum Column (K-5) 14.0 19.3 31.1 4.5E-7 LEVEL 1


- - 10.4 3.0E-7 LEVEL 2


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No. 1-7


55. Rupture of Furnace (F-101/F-102) tube inside the furnace /Nozzle of crude heater & crude starts coming out

35.4 37.0 57.1 2.7E-06 LEVEL 2

LPG Treatment Unit (LTU) LPG Treatment Unit

56. Leak from LPG-Amine Absorber (08-C-101)

5.4 43.7 85.6 1.5E-6 LEVEL3

57. Failure of LPG Surge Vessel (08-V-104)

22.5 23.2 32.5 7.5E-7 LEVEL 1

Hydrotreater Unit (HTU)

58. Failure of Naphtha Splitter (01-CC-00-001) Nozzle & naphtha starts coming out

- 51.7 61.7 1.5E-7 LEVEL 2

59. Leak (10mm) from Hydrotreater Reactor (02-RB-00-001)

25.3 28.3 32.5 1.5E-6 LEVEL 2

Catalytic Reformer Unit (CRU) Catalytic Reformer Unit

60. Leak (10mm) from inlet of reformer reactor (03-RB-00-001)

7.9 12.2 25.7 4.5E-6 LEVEL 1

61. Leak (10mm) from Stabilizer column (02-CC-00-001)

58.3 60.8 91.8 7.5E-8 LEVEL 1

Diesel Hydrotreater Unit (DHDT) DHDT

62. Leak (10mm) from reactor DHDT (702-R-01)

7.5 12.1 13.9 4.5E-6 LEVEL 2

COKER-A/B COKER-A/B

63. Leak (10mm) from main fractionator C-1 Top

11.5 13.0 14.9 3.0E-7 LEVEL 2

64. Leak (10mm) from reactor (Coker –B) overhead line

16.7 18.9 21.8 3.0E-6 LEVEL 1

65. Leak (10mm) from reactor (Coker- B)bottom flange

19.7 23.3 25.7 3.0E-6 LEVEL 2

Resid Fluidized Catalytic Cracking Unit (RFCCU) RFCCU

66. Leak (10mm) from Reactor (701-R-101) inlet – Jet Fire

18.0 20.4 23.5 3.0E-6 LEVEL 2


- - 6.6 7.5E-8 LEVEL2


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No. 1-8


LPG Recovery unit (LRU) LPG Recovery unit

68. Leak (10mm) from Debutaniser column (08-C-003) top – Jet Fire

19.5 21.9 25.1 7.5E-8 LEVEL 2

69. Leak (10mm) from Stripper (08-C-002) top – Jet Fire

23.2 26.3 30.4 1.5E-7 LEVEL 2

Hydrogen Generation Unit (HGU) Hydrogen Plant

70. Leak (10mm) from inlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Prereformer) R-4 – Jet Fire

- - 9.2 1.5E-6 LEVEL 2

71. Leak (10mm) from outlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Reformer) R-5 – Jet Fire

- - 6.1 1.5E-6 LEVEL 1

72. Leak (10mm) from inlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Shift Converter) R-6 – Jet Fire

- - 5.7 1.5E-6 LEVEL 1

Naphtha Hydrotreater Unit (NHDT) NHDT

73. Leak (10mm) from NHDT Reactor (R-01) – Jet Fire

25.1 28.2 32.2 1.5E-6 LEVEL 2

ISOM ISOM

74. Leak (10mm) from ISOM Reactor (R-01) – Jet Fire

25.7 29.1 33.6 1.5E-6 LEVEL 1

PRIME G PRIMEG

75. Failure of PRIMEGPFD reactor (R-02)- Jet Fire

- - 7.3 1.5E-6 LEVEL 1


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No. 1-9


IDENTIFIED DISASTER SCENARIOS

(Reference: Section 4.1 (i) of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)

S.N SCENERIO LEVEL

1. LPG FIRE LEVEL 3

2. TANK FIRE LEVEL 2

3. TOXIC GAS RELEASE (H2S) LEVEL3

4. OIL SPILLAGE LEVEL 1

5. NATURAL CALAMITY LEVEL 2

6. SECURITY THREAT LEVEL 2

7. FIRE / EXPLOSION IN UNIT AREA LEVEL 2

8. DOUBLE FIRE CONTIGENCY LEVEL 2

9. CO GAS LEAKAGE LEVEL 1

10. HYDROGEN GAS LEAKAGE LEVEL 1

11. PIPELINE RUPTURE LEVEL 1

12. TRANSPORTATION INCIDENT LEVEL 2

13. CYCLONE LEVEL 2

14. EARTHQUAKE LEVEL 1

15. BOILER EXPLOSION IN THERMAL POWER STATION

LEVEL 2

16. NAPHTHA LEAK IN COOLING WATER SYSTEM

LEVEL 1

17. UN-NOTICED CONTINUOUS LEAK OF LPG FROM SAMPLING / DRAINING POINTS IN THE PROCESS UNITS

LEVEL 2

*Please refer Chapter 7 for detailed action plan to manage and mitigate disaster scenarios.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No. 1-10


SCHEDULE – I Schedule of implementation of Code of Practice for ERDMP (Reference: Section 7 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)

S. No.

Activity

Implementation Time (from the

notification date of Codes of Practices

for ERDMP)

Status

1. On-site Emergency Plan 3 months Implemented in March 2011.

Last Updated in July 2012.

2. Off-site Emergency Plan (Submission of information to District Authority)

3 months Updated and submitted to District Authority in Oct 2010.

3, Resources in position 6 months * Complied

4. Accredited Third Party Certification of ERDMP

1 year In progress

5. Testing and Mock Drills (On-site)

3 months Conducted regularly once in a quarter.

Last conducted in Sept 2012.

6. Testing and Mock Drills (Off-site)

** 12 months Conducted regularly once in a year.

Last conducted in Sept 2012.

Note: * Long Delivery Items should be tied up with mutual aid organizations upto 12 months. ** To be coordinated with District Authority.

For ERDMP accreditation of Barauni Refinery, an offsite mock drill was conducted on 12th Sept’12 in presence of third party observer Sri Rakesh Dubey, Director, DMI, Bhopal. DM, Begusarai, Sri Manoj Kumar, IAS was the

Chief Offsite Emergency Coordinator for the occasion.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No. 2-1


CHAPTER – 2

CONSEQUENCES OF DEFAULT OR

NON-COMPLIANCE



BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No. 2-2


(1) There shall be a system for ensuring compliance to the provision of these regulations through developing a well defined Emergency Response and Disaster Management Plan and conduction of mock drill and safety audits during the construction, commissioning and operation phase, as well as on an on-going basis. There shall also be a system of do’s and don’ts regarding safety, mock drills or real emergencies for the visitors before entering an establishment. This should be supported by written instruction sheet for the visitor and ensured that visitor is accompanied by plant representative on forward visit and return gate. - Complied

Following emergency drills being conducted in BR: i. Off site disaster drill – Yearly. ii. On site disaster drill – Quarterly. iii. Fire drill / emergency handling drill – Monthly. iv. Safety Briefing is compulsory for contract personnel at BR and gate pass is

stamped by F&S and then entry inside battery area is permitted. For visitors, Safety Information sheet is given while issuing gate pass.

(2) In case of any deviation or shortfall, in achieving the recommended standards the entities are liable to penal provisions under the provisions of the technical standards, specifications including safety standards.- Agreed

(3) Mutual Aid Association not responding as per Memorandum of

Understanding (MoU) or written agreement on request of assistance shall attract penalty under these regulations as under:-

a. for first default in response, the defaulting entity with the application and its

management shall have to submit written explanation to affected mutual aid members.- Not applicable

b. for the second and successive failure, the defaulting entity shall have to pay the double of the billed amount of expenses incurred by affected mutual aid members in case of any eventuality occurs in the premises of affected mutual aid members.

Not applicable


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

3-1 | P a g e


CHAPTER – 3

REQUIREMENTS UNDER OTHER

STATUTES



BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

3-2 | P a g e


Schedule – II (Reference: Section 9 (1) of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)

Relevant Statutes on Management of Hazardous Substances

Compliance of Barauni Refinery

The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (amended

1991) and Rules thereunder.

The Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986

(amended 2008)

Complied. All the legislative requirements are being met except some parameters under “Revised Emission and Effluent Standards for Petroleum Refinery (MoEF gazette notification dated 18th March, 2008). “Partly Complied” ETP modernization is in advanced stage of construction for compliance.

The Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous

Chemicals Rules, 1989 (amended, 1994 and 2004)

Complied.

The Hazardous Wastes (Management and Handling)

Rules, 2008

Complied. Authorization valid up to January 2014.

The Environment Prior Clearance Notification, 2006

Complied. EC obtained for MS Quality Upgradation, HSD Quality Up-gradation and High Sulphur Crude Maximization Project in March 2008. EC obtained for Expansion of Barauni Refinery to 6.0MMTPA with Matching Secondary Processing Facilities.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

3-3 | P a g e


The Chemical Accidents (Emergency Planning,

Preparedness and Response) Rules, 1996

Followed Information forwarded to District Authorities from time to time.

Bio-medical Wastes (Management and Handling)

Rules. 1989

Complied. Authorization valid up to August 2015.

The Factories Act, 1948 (amended 1987)

State Factory Rules

Complied. Factory Licence No.: 12401/BSR has been renewed upto Dec.,2015

The Inflammable Substances Act, 1952.

Complied.

The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (amended 2001) Complied.

The Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989

(Amended 2005).

Complied.

The Public Liability Insurance Rules, 1991

(Amended 1992).

Complied.

The Public Liability Insurance Rules, 1991

(Amended 1993).

Complied.

The Petroleum Act, 1934

The Petroleum Rules, 2002

Complied.

Complied.

The Insecticide Rules, 1968 (amended 2000)

The Insecticide Rules, 1971 (amended 1999)

Complied.

Not Applicable

The National Environment Tribunal Act, 1995 Complied.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

3-4 | P a g e


The Explosives Act, 1884 (amended till 1983)

The Gas Cylinder Rules, 2004

Complied. License: 1. Cl2 Cylinder Storage

License No. GC (OG) S-88/BI Dated 16/03/84.

2. UPTO 30.9.2012 3. NH3 & DA Storage

Shed License No. GC (OG) S-110/BI Dated 02/08/93 UPTO 30.9.2014

The Static and Mobile Pressure Vessels (Unfired)

Rules, 1981

(Amended 2002)

Complied. License

LPG Bulk storage license (PV (EC) S-5 /Bi dated 22/06/83: UPTO 31.3.2013

H2 storage license No. PV (EC) S-87/BI dated 21/02/97 :

UPTO 31.3.2013

N2 storage license under BXP No. PV (EC) S-143/BI/A dated 5/03/02: UPTO 31.3.2013

LPG Mounded Bullet Storage License No. PV (EC) S-5/BI dated 22/06/83. UPTO 31.3.2013

The Explosives Rules, 1983 (amended 2002) Not Applicable


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 4-1


CHAPTER – 4

PRE-EMERGENCY PLANNING (Reference: Section 10 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 4-2


PRE-EMERGENCY PLANNING

4.1 Hazard identification (Reference: Section 10.1 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)

The list of hazardous substances being handled in the Barauni Refinery is given in Annexure-5.

Information on toxological, physical & chemical properties of the substances being handled in the format of Material Safety Data Sheet is attached as Annexure-6.

The identification of potential impact on downwind air quality or downstream water quality from an incidental release and possible danger to human, flora and fauna and animal health. Flora (Reference: Section 10.1 (b) of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010) VEGETATION AND CROPS The sandy alluvial soils of the study area favor wheat, maize, millets, oilseeds and pulses besides a variety of vegetables and fruits. The area, particularly Northern upland tracts has had prosperous agriculture and fruit orchards for centuries. With a shift in the course of Ganga southwards and building up of embankments, even the Southern "Diara" lands grow rich wheat, maize, oilseeds and padwal and other vegetables. TERRESTRIAL FLORA AND FAUNA

There is no natural forest in the area, however there are plantations developed by the forest department along road sides. Also there are self growing plants, vegetation and grasses. The bio-diversity of the self-growing and unprotected plant species would indicate environmental quality and hence were surveyed intensively. A survey conducted to assess the impact of pollution because of industrial/urban activities on the terrestrial fauna reveals that there is hardly any adverse effect of the pollution on the terrestrial fauna. CULTIVATED TREES In addition to the study conducted on self-growing and unprotected plants and vegetation, detailed studies were conducted on cultivated trees and agricultural crops to assess the extent of impact, if any, caused by industrial activities. Considering the economic value, species of Mango, Lichi, Banana, Guava, Lemon, Bamboo, Shisham, Palm and Jackfruit were selected for this study. List


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 4-3


of fruit trees and other cultivated trees are given in Tables-3.9.1. The selected locations studied for this purpose AGRICULTURAL CROPS The land in the study area is well suited for different types of crops. In Kharif maize, Jawar, Paddy are main crops and pulses are grown at few pockets of the study area. In Rabi wheat, maize, oilseeds such as mustard, caster oil are cultivated. Besides these main crops different types of vegetables are grown. Fish Fauna Fish fauna was collected and surveyed at the fish landing centre in and around Barauni Area. List of fishes observed are depicted in Table— 3.9.5. It was observed that the maximum number was that of cat fishes, which feeds upon the carcasses and dead bodies. The aquatic organism may often serve as better indicators for subtle effects of pollution in the water body and also may provide early warning. The abundance or absence of certain organisms thus often serves as the indicator of a healthy or polluted aquatic environment. The nature and quality of such biological species in a particular environment depend on various physico-chemical characteristics of water such as pH, conductivity, nutrients, BOD etc. Bio-Productivity of River Ganga Several hydro-biological factors such as cloudy weather, current velocity, turbidity, intensity of light penetration, density of phytoplankton have significant effect on productivity. The incidence of long hours of sunshines and the higher temperature of the tropics favour the conversion of solar energy into organic matter. The primary productivity is thus the basis of whole metabolic cycle in aquatic ecosystems.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 4-7


Barauni Refinery and its Neighboring Details

Name of the factory : Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Barauni Refinery, Barauni, Bihar, 851114

Address: : Barauni Refinery, District: Begusarai, Bihar, 851114

Location: Situated 125 kilometers from Patna, about 8 kilometers away from the northern or left bank of Ganges.

Sitemap: Attached as Annexure-1.

Total Population of community within 10 kms radius: As per 2001 census, the population of the total villages within a circle of 10 kms radius with the refinery as the centre is 6,04,478 (About 6.04 Lakh).

Nature of process: Continuous (Petroleum Refining)

Brief Description of the Refinery (Site, Location, Vicinity)

Barauni Refinery (BR) is located in development block, Barauni, of District Begusarai of the state of Bihar which is about 8kms away from the northern or left bank of Ganges. It is situated 125 kilometers away from Patna. The latitude and longitude at the BR site is 25o26’N and 86o04’ E respectively. The district Headquarter town of Begusarai is about 5 km from the refinery Barauni Refinery was built in collaboration with Russia and Romania. It was commissioned in 1964 with a refining capacity of 1 Million Metric Tons per Annum (MMTPA) and it was dedicated to the Nation by the then Union Minister for Petroleum, Prof. Humayun Kabir in January 1965. After de-bottlenecking, revamping and expansion project, its capacity today is 6 MMTPA. Matching secondary processing facilities such Resid Fluidized Catalytic Cracker (RFCC), Diesel Hydrotreating (DHDT), Sulphur Recovery Unit (SRU) have been added. Theses state of the art eco-friendly technologies have enabled the refinery to produce environment- friendly green fuels complying with international standards.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 4-8


Barauni Refinery was initially designed to process low sulphur crude oil (sweet crude) of Assam. After establishment of other refineries in the Northeast, Assam crude is unavailable for Barauni. Hence, sweet crude is being sourced from African, South East Asian and Middle East countries like Nigeria, Iraq &Malaysia. The refinery receives crude oil by pipeline from Paradip on the east coast via Haldia. With various revamps and expansion projects at Barauni Refinery, capability for processing high-sulphur crude has been added — high-sulphur crude oil (sour crude) is cheaper than low-sulphur crudes — thereby increasing not only the capacity but also the profitability of the refinery.

A vicinity map indicating the Barauni Refinery site has been enclosed in

Annexure-1.

The Layout plan and block flow diagram of the Barauni Refinery are enclosed as

Annexure-3 & 4 respectively.



1 AVU-I 1.75

2 AVU-II 1.75

3 AVU-III 2.5

4 COKER-A 0.60

5 COKER-B 0.50

6 CRU 0.30


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 4-9










7 Amine Absorption / Regeneration Unit /

Sulphur Recovery Unit (ARU/ SRU)

2X40 TPD

MSQ UNITS








7 Prime G+ 322

8 HDS 224


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 4-10


Meteorological Conditions (Reference: Section 10.1 (b) of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)

The consequences of released toxic or flammable material are largely dependent on the prevailing weather conditions. For the assessment of major scenarios involving release of toxic or flammable materials, the most important meteorological parameters are those that affect the atmospheric dispersion of the escaping material. The crucial variables are wind direction, wind speed, atmospheric stability and temperature. Rainfall does not have any direct bearing on the results of the risk analysis; however, it can have beneficial effects by absorption / washout of released materials. Actual behavior of any release would largely depend on prevailing weather condition at the time of release.

Climate

The climate in the area is variable. From the angle of human comfort, the best seasons are during October- November and February-March. During April to May the weather changes and becomes hot while June to September experiences frequent rains. Weather becomes cold during December-January. The annual rainfall received in the area is about 1,110 mm. Of this, about 85% rainfall takes place during the months June to September. Temperature varies from a mean minimum of 11°C in January during winter to a mean maximum of 39°C in May during summer. Relative humidity is high, mean monthly RH being in the range of 43-83% for most part of the year.

Atmospheric Parameters

The Climatological data based on EIA study is summarized below in the Table:

Parameter Avg. value

Ambient temperature ,degC 31.7

Atmospheric pressure,(mmHg) 758

Relative Humidity (%) 67

*REF. EIA for MSQ project 1997,BR,TABLE 3.6.7


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 4-11


Wind Speed and Wind Direction

Wind for most of the period blows either from NE-E-SE sector (during summer and monsoon) or from SW-W-NW sector (during post monsoon and winter). The average wind speed is about 6.8 km/hr. The nearest Indian Meteorological Dept (IMD) stations from Barauni Refinery are at Patna and Bhagalpur. Patna is about 125 km West of Barauni and Bhagalpur is about 150 km East of Barauni. The latitudes and altitudes for both these are very close to those for Barauni. During the period from March 2007 to June 2007, the overall (average) windspeed was 7.05km/hr.The WINDROSE DIAGRAM indicates that the most predominant wind direction for the summer season was from East/ North East.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 4-12


WIND ROSE DIAGRAM

N

Period: 1996-1997 JAN-DEC

STATION : BARAUNI REFINERY


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 4-13


Water Resources and Drainage

(Reference: Section 10.1 (b) of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)

With the mighty Ganga forming its Southern boundary, the Ganga flood-plains (or

"diaras") constituting at least 25% of the geographical area and a reasonable

annual rainfall averaging over 1110 mm, the area is not subject to water scarcity. In

fact sub-surface water in the alluvial strata is so copious that no thought has had to

be given to collection, storage and transport of surface water for any beneficial

uses, whether irrigation, industrial, municipal or anything else. Ground water table

in the study area varies from 1-5 m below GL in monsoons to 3-10 m below GL in

peak summers. Drainage wise, the entire study area drains to the Ganga through a

number of drains. Due to the embankments built for flood protection, often

drainage channels have to flow parallel to the river course in a south-easterly

direction before they can empty into the river.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 4-14


Socio- Economic Aspects of the Villages

(Reference: Section 10.1 (b) of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)

IOC Barauni falls in Begusarai district of Bihar. The total 10 KM radius area from

the center of Barauni Refinery falls under the study area. The four blocks namely,

Teghra, Barauni, Matihani and Begusarai which cover 15.67, 44.92, 17.43 and

21.92% of the study area respectively. The study area includes either partly or

entirely 129 villages and 3 urban areas namely Barauni, Begusarai and IOC

Township.

Distribution of Population

As per 2001 census, the population of the total villages within a circle of 10 kms

radius with the refinery as the centre is 6, 04,478.

Socio- economic aspects of the villages falling in total corridor

IOC Barauni falls in Begusarai district of Bihar. The total 10 KM radius area from

the center of Barauni Refinery falls under the study area. The four blocks namely,

Teghra, Barauni, Matihani and Begusarai which cover 15.67, 44.92, 17.43 and

21.92% of the study area respectively. The study area includes either partly or

entirely 129 villages and 3 urban areas namely Barauni, Begusarai and IOC

Township.

TABLE - 3.10.1: DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION IN TOTAL STUDY AREA

4.1.c Hazards to the installation as Natural calamities like

Flood

Earthquake


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 4-15


4.1.d Check points for hazard identification are given as per the checklist (Reference: Section 10.1 (d) of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)

Checklist-1

Hazard Identification

S N Check point Yes No Remark

1 Which of the following procedures or techniques for hazard identification has been used in terminal/installation

√

Hazop/Hazan √

Incident consequences & analysis √

Event tree analysis √

Fault tree analysis √

Failure modes, Effects, and Criticality analysis

√

Risk Assessment √

What if Analysis √

Other accredited practices √

Hazard identification

2 Is the terminal /installation covered under the definition of “Major incident Hazard Installation” as per the Manufacture Storage & Impart of Hazardous Chemical Rules 1989 (Amended 1994 and 2004. If yes, please specify the site notification and Safety Reports)

√

3 If yes, whether major incident hazards identified and steps taken for their prevention

√

4 Whether design deficiencies, failures or errors which can contribute to hazards and cause abnormalities leading to an incident are identified.

√

5 What are the measures undertaken to counter above deficiencies or, errors

The countermeasures as suggested by the Hazop analysis are implemented to counter the deficiencies

6 Consequences of a major incident on the workers, people on the neighbourhood and the environment are considered

√


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 4-16


7 Steps envisaged for mitigation of the consequences of such incident

i. Warning ii. Impact

evaluation iii. Rescue iv. Relief v. Rehabilitation vi.

8 Does the installtion produce /handle/ use/ import/ store any hazardous chemicals as defined under MSIHC Rules 1989(Amended 1994 & 2004)

Yes

9 If Yes, whether a list of these chemicals, preferably in alphabetical order with their maximum licensed storage quantities displayed

Annexure 05

10 Are material safety data sheet (MSDS) of these chemicals are prepared /obtained in the prescribed format as per MSIHC rules and State Factory rules

Yes

11 Whether a system for disseminating information about these MSDS to concerned are existing

Displayed at the consumption site and available in the Intranet

12 Are there a system of labeling of containers / storage tanks for the chemicals / hazardous substances

Yes

13 Whether estimation of maximum possible quantity of each hazardous substances are considered including any vehicle (TT/TW) on site or within 500 mtrs of the site.

Yes

14 Whether locations, configuration and condition under which the hazardous substances are stored and handled are clearly declared

Yes

Vulnerability Analysis

15 Whether zones of influence or vulnerable zones are estimated by considering the maximum single storage of hazardous substance and maximum loss scenario

Yes


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 4-17


16 Whether effects of influence on the vulnerable zones are made after considering the population , facilities and environment encompassed inside that zone

Yes

Risk Analysis

17 Whether a relative measure of probability and consequences of various possible hazardous events including worst case scenario are taken into account

Yes

18 Whether risks are calculated by multiplying the probability of occurrence of each event by the consequences of that event and then summing up the results

Yes

19 Whether all types of events possible in petroleum installations are considered including i) Storage tanks on fire ii) pool fire [burning pool of liquid fuel] iii) Flange joint leakages in pipeline iv) Fire in TT/TW gantry and v) Rupture of hoses

Yes

Risk reduction measures

20 Whether measures for reduction of identified high risks are included by reducing the consequences through hazard mitigation measures

Yes

21 Whether steps have been considered to reduce risks to the exposed population by increasing safe distances by acquiring property around the facility

Yes

Hazop Study

22 Whether the above method is applied if the location handles more than specified storage and/ or critical operations

Yes

23 Whether the study systematically identify all possible deviations from normal operations

Yes

24 Whether risk levels are established for each deviation after considering the probability and consequences of each such events

Yes

25 Whether potential means for detection of such events and preventive measures are recommended by the study

Yes


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 4-18


4.2 Risk Analysis & Risk Assessment


a) Identification of potential failures or incidents (Including frequency).

Identification of potential failures or incidents (Major) – Please refer Risk Analysis report for detail risk scenarios, description & effect diagrams

Consequence Analysis Calculations of Likely Failure Cases for

IOCL Barauni Refinery Operations

(Reference: Section 10.1 (d) of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)

Sc# 1 Major Leak in Crude oil storage tank – Pool Fire

Sc# 2 Crude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire

Sc#3 Major Leak in Crude oil storage tank 501 – Pool Fire


Sc# 5 Leak / Line Rupture in Horton Sphere – Flash Fire / Vapor Cloud

Sc# 6 Failure of Horton Sphere – BLEVE

Sc#7 Loss of containment in LPG tanker- BLEVE

Sc# 8 H2S Leak from LP Amine Absorber (702-C-04)

Sc# 1 Major Leak in Crude oil storage tank – Pool Fire Parameters Value

Operating Temperature 25°C

Operating Pressure Atmospheric

Tank Diameter 65m

Tank capacity 40,000KL

Released Quantity 39200KL

Exposure duration 30 sec

Pool diameter 122.37m

Base frequency 5.0E –6 per year

No. of tanks handled 7

Ignition Probability 0.3

Accident Probability 1.05E-6 per year

Personnel present in the section 3


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 4-19


Percent Lethality Thermal

Load

kw/m2

Effect Distance (m)

from centre of pool

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

154.0

81.5

68.7

68.7

-

Sc# 2 Crude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire Parameters Value



Tank Diameter 65m




Pool diameter 65m







BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 4-20


Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance

(m)

from centre of pool

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

138.7

70.4

57.9

57.9

-

Sc#3 Major Leak in Crude oil storage tank 501 – Pool Fire Parameters Value



Tank Diameter 65m




Pool diameter 122.73m







BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 4-21


Percent Lethality Thermal

Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance (m)

from centre of pool

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

154.1

81.7

68.9

68.7

-


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 4-22



Parameters Value


Operating Pressure (kg/cm2g) 8.15

Tank Diameter 14.5m

Tank capacity 1500KL



Jet length 41.86m

Base frequency 7.0 E –7 per year





Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance

(m)

from centre of pool

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

73.4

59.1

55.2

50.6

42.9


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 4-23


3-24

Sc# 5 Leak / Line Rupture in Horton Sphere – Flash Fire / Vapor Cloud

Parameters

Value



Tank Diameter 14.5m


Released Quantity


Jet length 41.86m






Dispersion Model

Weather

Conditions

Cloud Dimensions

Length (m) Width (m)

B – 3 m/sec 33.4 1.5

E – 1 m/sec 38.1 1.2


Damage Type

B- 3 m/sec E – 1 m/sec

Max (m) Max (m)

0.2 bar (Heavy) 90.5 91.7

0.1 bar (Moderate) 93.5 95.2

0.02 bar (Minor) 132.4 138.8


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 4-24


Sc# 6 Failure of Horton Sphere – BLEVE Parameters

Value



Tank Diameter 14.5m


Released Quantity 1470kl


Fireball Diameter 131.84m







BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 4-25


Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m)

Effect Distance

(m)

from centre of pool

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

513.9

323.3

266.2

202.1

83.7

Sc#7 Loss of containment in LPG tanker- BLEVE Parameters

Value


Operating Pressure (kg/cm2g) 15

Tanker Capacity 18tons

Released Quantity 17.1tons

BLEVE duration 30secs

Fireball Diameter 156.5m

Base frequency 1.4E-5 per tanker per year

No. of tanks handled annually 17000





BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 4-26


Percent Lethality

Thermal Load

(kw/m2)

Effect Distance

(m)

from centre of pool

First Degree Burns

1

10

50

99

4.0

9.33

12.70

18.47

36.56

480.3

305.7

254.0

196.8

98.3

Sc# 8 H2S Leak from LP Amine Absorber (702-C-04) Parameters

Value


Operating Pressure (kg/cm2g) 1BAR

Expected Inventory in the section 5m3

Composition H2S + Amine

Released Quantity 4m3

Exposure duration 180sec

Base frequency 5.0E-6 per year




BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 4-27


Percent Lethality

Dispersed Cloud: E-1m/s

Toxic Dose Distance (m)

0

7

42

84

97

4.57E+10

7.91E+11

1.44E+13

2.18E+14

1.54E+15

125

100

75

50

25

Percent Lethality Dispersed Cloud: B-3m/s

Toxic Dose Distance (m)

0

24

7.09E+08

4.46E+12

50

25 Since the scenario leads to a major disaster, a proper Disaster Management Plan (DMP) should be available to implement as soon as the disaster happens to mitigate the consequence.

CAUSES OF DISASTER


The common causes for the above events are tabulated below for reference and the ERDMP prepared by the installation to deal with the following emergencies.

Man made Natural Calamities Extraneous

Heavy Leakage

Fire

Explosion

Failure of Critical Control system

Design deficiency

Unsafe acts

In-adequate maintenance

Flood

Earth Quake

Cyclone

Outbreak of Disease

Excessive Rains

Tsunami

Riots/Civil Disorder/ Mob Attack

Terrorism

Sabotage

Bomb Threat

War / Hit by missiles

Abduction

Food Poisoning/ Water Poisoning

For consequences of disasters, please refer quantitative risk analysis (QRA) report.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 5-1


CHAPTER – 5

EMERGENCY MITIGATION MEASURES



BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 5-2


Schedule-III

Basic Requirements of ERDMP


5.1 Basic Requirements of ERDMP are addressed and incorporated as mentioned below:

1. Location Plan of the Installation indicating site of the installation at neighboring details up to a distance of 2 kms from the installation in each direction: Please refer Annexure-1.

2. Site plan of the installation showing a complete layout of the installation indicating boundary walls, exit and entry gates and location of various facilities: Please refer Annexure-3.

3. Layout of Fire Water Systems and Fire Fighting Equipment details: Please refer Annexure- 24.

4. Line block diagram of manufacturing process and Process Flow Diagram (PFD) of each unit: Please refer Annexure-4.

5. Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) for all hazardous chemicals stored, handled, produced and transported in the installation: Please refer Annexure-6.

6. Internal and External Emergency contact numbers and addresses of police, fire station, hospitals, mutual aid industry, factory inspectors, Board, State Pollution Control Board, Petroleum and Explosive Safety Organization (PESO), etc.: Please refer Annexure-12 to 17.

7. Pipeline route map and details of various facilities such as sectionalizing Valve (SV), intermediate Pigging (IP) stations, intermediate pumping stations (IPS) across pipeline route: Not Applicable.

8. Addresses and Telephone Directory of Technical Support Services such as Environmental Laboratories, fire fighting chemical suppliers, public and private consultant associated with emergency handling and Aviation Medical Services, if any: Please refer Annexure-11.

9. Security threat plan is described in Chapter - 24 in detail.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 5-3


SCHEDULE – IV

Resource Mobilization (Men and Equipment)


5.2 Resource mobilization shall include manpower requirement, fire fighting materials, appliances or equipment, safety equipment, communication facilities, transport, list of emergency drugs and appliances, etc.

Sl. # Total Requirement Available with Installation

1 MANPOWER

Regular employees – shift-wise 1282

Security staff 297

2 FIRE FIGHTING APPLIANCES/ EQUIPMENT/ CHEMICALS

Fire Tenders/ Fire fighting engines 6

Water storage capacity 20000 KL

Fire Hoses 200

Jet/Fog/Spray Nozzles 125

Foam Branch 17

Jumbo Jet Nozzles 7

Foam Compound ( KL ) 96

3 SAFETY EQUIPMENTS

PVC Suit 115

Compressed air B.A. Set 30

Refill Cylinders for B.A. Set 35

Cascade B.A Set 2 (BA set trolley) WITH FOUR CYLINDERS IN EACH.

Fire Proximity Suit 8

4 COMMUNICATION

Walkie-Talkie AVAILABLE

Pager System with Group Paging Facility

AVAILABLE

Group SMS Facility AVAILABLE

Inter Com System AVAILABLE

Public Address System AVAILABLE

Megaphone AVAILABLE

5 TRANSPORT Jeeps

68 Cars Ambulance 02


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 5-4


Trucks AVAILABLE Buses 06 Tractors AVAILABLE Mobile Cranes AVAILABLE

6 MISCELLANEOUS

Ropes AVAILABLE

Empty drums AVAILABLE

Buckets AVAILABLE

Sand bags AVAILABLE

Dewatering pump AVAILABLE

Pneumatic pump AVAILABLE

Photo Camera AVAILABLE

Video Camera AVAILABLE

7 EQUIPMENTS FOR CORPS DISPOSAL

Light Metal Stretchers AVAILABLE

Tarpauline AVAILABLE

Rope fibre AVAILABLE

Bucket AVAILABLE

Rubber gloves AVAILABLE

8 LIST OF EMERGENCY DRUGS and APPLIANCES

Canvas Stretcher AVAILABLE

Oxygen Cylinder AVAILABLE

Sterlite Bandages AVAILABLE

Cotton Sterilised AVAILABLE

Antibiotics AVAILABLE

Analgesties AVAILABLE

Sedatives AVAILABLE

Tetanus Toxoid AVAILABLE

Dressing Instruments AVAILABLE

Sterilisers AVAILABLE

Autoclave for sterlising Instruments, dressing

AVAILABLE

B.P. Apparatus AVAILABLE

Suction Apparatus AVAILABLE

I.V.Set AVAILABLE

Antishock drugs AVAILABLE

Gluco Saline Set AVAILABLE

Gluco Saline Bottle AVAILABLE


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 5-5


SHIFTWISE EMPLOYEES(APPROX) NOs.

MORNING 175

EVENING 176

NIGHT 174

FIRE & SAFETY ITEMS AVAILABLE WITH BR

SN Item Qty(Nos.)

1 Foam Tenders 03

2 Foam Nurser 01

3 DCP Tender 01

4 Fire fighting hose 50

5 Fire fighting Branches 20

6 Water curtain 05

7 Suction hose 10

8 DCP Fire extinguisher 1000

9 Mega phone 01

10 Safety hand lamp 10

11 Ceiling hook 02

12 Fire proximity suit 02

13 Foam generator 03

14 Fireman axe 02

15 Safety helmet 50

16 Ear plug 50

17 Dust mask 50

18 Chemical Respirator 20

19 Splash proof goggles 50

20 PVC suit 10

21 B A SET 10

22 Gas detectors 05

23 Oil sorbent 10

24 Retractable fall arrestor (5 M & 10 M) 05

25 Portable Cutter / Spreader 02


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 5-6


Incident Preventing Measures And Procedure


The incident prevention measures and procedures at installation or other locations shall include the following:-

- HSE policy of BR lays strong emphasis on safety implementation

- BR is having a well established Safety Management System

- Safety awareness is propagated through structured programs and various procedures are implemented to prevent incidents as mentioned below


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 5-8


III. Safety Committees

A. Management Safety and Health Committee (MSHC): The Management Safety Committee has been constituted to review the performance and lapses in the safety affairs of the company. The meeting is done monthly and chaired by the Executive Director of BR. This meeting is attended by all GMs, all DGMs, all Deptt. Heads, Fire and Safety officers, and officers from HSE Department as members. The loss control action points are discussed. Mode of implementation of the recommendation is finalized. The status of previous points is reviewed.

B. Sectional Safety & Health Committee (SSHC) Sectional Safety & Health Committee Meeting conducted monthly at 09 work locations with practical demonstration of PPE and Fire Extinguisher. The SSHCM is chaired by the senior officer (HOD/ Area Manager / Sectional head) of the section, who by his position in the organization can contribute effectively to the functioning of the committee. Apart from Safety Officer, Health officer and working department, the meeting is attended by at least one representative from allied service department e.g. mechanical maint., instrumentation, civil maint., electrical maint., administration department. Equal numbers of representatives of workers are present in the meeting.

IV. Safety Audits and Inspections Safety audit through systematic checks and critical appraisal of potential hazards involving operating personnel / process plant / offsite areas etc. are very helpful in assessing effectiveness of existing safety measures in these areas. To meet this requirement, BR has established a multi-disciplinary safety audit team to assess the safety requirement specially covering the following areas:

Fire Protection system

Accident prevention / safety practices

Operating procedure

Maintenance & Inspection practices The plant safety inspection is carried out as per a checklist by senior

executives of the refinery. The recommendations are implemented and monitored by top management. Apart from correcting unsafe conditions, the use of PPEs has been ensured with this. Following different types of inspection are undertaken at Barauni Refinery so as to cover a good proportion of all unsafe actions and conditions.

Periodic inspection

Intermittent inspection


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 5-9


Continuous inspection

Special inspection.

Internal safety audit is carried out at all the facilities as per a schedule by a multidisciplinary team as per as per OISD-145. All the facilities in Barauni Refinery are covered minimum once every year for the purpose of internal safety audit. The recommendations are implemented and monitored by top management.

In addition, External Safety Audits (ESA) and Surprise Safety Check (SSC)

are carried out on regular intervals by a high level multidisciplinary team constituted by the OISD / Ministry. The recommendations are liquidated and monitored up to board and ministry level. The schedule of last two ESAs and SSCs of Barauni Refinery in the following table:

Sl.No EXTERNAL AUDIT

1. ESA-7 was conducted during 4th to 8th Feb. 2008;

2. SSC-7 was conducted during 22nd to 23rd Feb. 2010

3. SSC -8 was conducted during May,2011

4. ESA -8 was conducted during 3RD to 7TH Sept 2012

The safety audit cell of Head Quarter monitors and keeps a close follow up on

the implementation of the recommendations.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 5-10


V. Work Permit System

The refinery follows a very elaborate Work Permit System as described below. This system is strictly as per OISD-105. Following work permits exist at BR:

01. Fire permit Any work, which can produce sufficient heat to ignite the combustible/ inflammable mixture in atmosphere.

02. Excavation permit For digging, cutting of the road

03. Electric Isolation and de-energisation permit

To work on any electrical line / equipment or associated facilities.

04. Vessel entry permit To entry of a man into a vessel or for any Maintenance job in a pressure vessel.

05. Vehicle entry permit For the entry of vehicles inside the battery area (Hazardous zone).

06 “Working at Height” permit To work at height

07 Radiation Permit To work with ionization radiations such as radiography.

VI. Early Warning Alarm System Following early warning alarm systems are available in the Barauni Refinery in the process units and in the vicinity of storage tanks, filling station, delivery points and along with periphery with the indication in the central control room:

a. High level / low level alarms b. High pressure / low pressure alarms c. High temp / low temp alarms d. Heat detection system e. Hydrocarbon detectors f. Hydrogen detectors g. H2S ground level monitors h. CO monitors i. CCTV cameras


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 5-11


VII. Safety through Design (In Built Facilities And Other Emergency Safety Interlock Systems)

The design of process units and connected facilities has been done in accordance with National / International Codes and sound engineering practices. The process design and detailed engineering takes care of various safety aspects of plant and other equipment consideration. The layout of the plant is confirming to wind direction, wind velocity and other Meteorological parameters. The equipment layout confirms not only the design standards, but also takes scare of safety aspects like easy passage for movement for operating and maintenance personnel. The provision of Safety release valves connected to a well designed flare system confirms to design codes / standards. For safety in operation, all process units of the refinery have been provided with 100% automatic control system proven in the field of process industries. This enhances the safety aspects further. Microprocessor based Distributed Digital Control System (DDCS) has been installed in the all process units and tank farm area, replacing the conventional Pneumatic Control System. This system has inherent advantages over the earlier system as it has got analytical capability as well. The facility exists for the plant safety, in case any operating parameters go out of control, in the event of system failure. Adequate shutdown valves, trips have been provided to bring down the unit operation safely to take care of emergency situations. To take care of safety through design and in built facilities there is a well qualified group of safety engineers and process engineers in the process section. The main activities of the group are to review the existing facilities. Risk analysis study, Disaster Management Planning, Preparation of scheme, suggesting and taking measures for adoption of new technology in the field of safety. In order to avoid breakdown of the equipment leading the potential risk situation, an effective maintenance schedule covering both static and rotary equipment have been adopted in the refinery. A well defined and elaborate maintenance manual exists. All the procedures and practices and safety precaution to be observed during any maintenance are clearly laid down in the manual. During any maintenance job, work permit system is strictly adhered to, and is being closely monitored by concerned supervisor and fire & safety division. The use of necessary personal protective equipment like safety belt for working at height, face shield and hand gloves for welding, cutting, grinding, breathing apparatus set for any confined place entry etc. is strictly complied with. Advanced control system available at the time of project implementation for automatic operation of process units had been adopted in the plant. Unit wise trip system also exists for safety of the equipments.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 5-12


VIII. Fire Protection and HSE Management system

The IOCL, Barauni refinery has the following fire fighting facilities:

Fire water reservoir

Fire Pump House

Fire Hydrant and Water Monitor system

Auto water spray / deluge system

Semi Fixed Foam Pourer System

Auto Foam System

Fire Water Storage

Fire water is provided in three above ground reservoirs of capacity 7500 m3 (2

tanks) and 5000 m3 (1 tank). These tanks receive water either from fresh water

header or bio-treated water pumps. All 3 tanks are interconnected and having

suction line to all pumps. Total capacity of fire water storage tank is 20,000M3.

Fire Pump house

Fire pump house has 11 nos. of fire water pumps of 700 m3/hr capacities at a

discharge pressure of 10.8 Kg/cm2 each and two Jockey pumps of 250 m3/hr

at 12 Kg/cm2.

The main fire pump house has 6 diesel drives and 5 electrical drives.

Fire hydrant and Water Monitor system

Total refinery area has been covered with around 32 Kms long fire water

network. The main features of the fire water network include:

DH fire hydrant = 712 nos

Water monitors = 250 nos

Water cum foam monitors = 10nos

High Volume Long Range Monitor = 40 nos

Dry / Wet Riser system at Coker – A, Coker –B, TPS, ADMN building,

HGU, DHDT, RFCCU, SRU.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 5-13


.


Quartzoid bulb type automatic water sprinkler system has been installed in the

following areas,

L.P.G Bottling shed, Cylinder evacuation shed, Cylinder repair shed,

Storage vessels, Pump

House of LPG bottling plant.

LPG bulk dispatch facilities

LPG Pumps

LPG Horton spheres & LPG Mounded bullets & LPG MB P/House

H2 storage bullets in CRU

TPS Transformer area

All hydrocarbon tanks containing Class-A & Class-B petroleum are provided with

Semi fixed foam pourer system as per OISD Std.-116. Foam pourers are

provided on top of the tank shell and the foam –water solution lines are

extended up to road side for introducing foam from road side with help of Foam

Tenders.

Auto Foam System

These systems are provided for auto fire fighting in case of crude tank (238,239

& 240) fire & RFCCU feed tank (801,802,803) fire.

Adequacy of Fire Water Storage

As per OISD-116, sec 5.4.1, the effective capacity of the fire water reservoir

above the level of suction point shall be minimum 4 hours aggregate working

capacity of main pumps (excluding standby pumps).

At present, the maximum fire water demand for the plant is 3736 m3/hr and

6 main pumps with total flow rate of 4200 m3/hr are sufficient to meet the

demand. As per above guidelines, the water storage capacity should be

16800 m3 and the present capacity is 20000 m3.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 5-14


IX. Do’s and Don’ts Written Instructions for Visitors

Available and given before entry.

X. Safety MIS System and Sending Exception Reports:

It is prepared by Fire & Safety Department / HSE department and forwarded to top management and Head Quarter.

XI. Inspection And Operation Of All Standby Equipments

All standby equipments are tried and operated periodically and recorded. Similarly back up power for safety equipment and instrument is also checked periodically and observations are recorded.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 5-15


CHECK LIST - 2

(Reference: Section 11.3(xii) of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)

Incident Prevention Measures

Sr. # Check-point

Remarks

1 Whether Safety, Health and Environment Policy of the location is displayed

Yes

2 Whether the Safety Policy is documented and duly approved by the top management

Yes

3 Whether the Safety Policy is well structured to cover all elements of Safety, Health and Environment protection

Yes

4 Whether the layout is convenient from operation and safety aspects and meets minimum distance norms as per OISD-118

Yes

5 Whether a duly constituted Safety Committee is functioning in the location with representation from workmen/staff

Yes

8 Whether all unsafe developments and likely risks are deliberated in the meetings and appropriate steps are recommended for eliminating such risks

Yes

9 Whether compliance status of recommendations of earlier Safety Committee meetings are discussed before taking up new issues.

Yes

10 Whether performance and shortcomings observed during recent mock disaster drills form part of the discussions in safety committee meetings

Yes

11 Is the safety committee minutes are recorded and signed by all the attending members

Yes

13 Whether periodical safety audits and inspections by internal and external audit teams are conducted in defined intervals

Yes

14 Whether a system of regular monitoring of such audit compliances by controlling offices / HO are in place

Yes

15 What is the composition of external audit teams to ensure impartiality of audit findings

Multidisciplinary teams

16 Whether Work Permit System in line with OISD-105 have been implemented

Yes


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

P a g e | 5-16


17 Whether work permits are issued for hot work, cold work, electrical work and vessel entry jobs

Yes

18 Whether the location-in-charge or his authorized nominee remain the issuer for all hot work and vessel entry permits for enhanced safety and control.

Yes

19 Whether work permits are duly closed at completion of the stipulated jobs, duly certified by the supervising officer

Yes

20 Whether heat detectors in tank sprinkler systems, high level alarms of tank farm management system are provided and checked for regular functioning

Yes

21 Whether in-built safety interlocks provided in the design of the terminal are adequately specified and checked for regular functioning

Yes


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No. 6-1


CHAPTER – 6

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MEASURES



BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No. 6-2


6.1. Emergency Drills and Mock Exercises


A. Mock Drill / Table Top Exercises

Fire mock drills are carried out fortnightly. Performance of each individual connected or affected with the exercise is observed. In-addition, observations of person present at site at that time is also recorded. A report is prepared on the exercise including the observations for information and corrective actions, if any. Disaster Drills:

On-site Disaster drill shall be conducted once in every three month on different emergency scenarios to check the preparedness and know the shortcomings, if any. These are to be addressed for rectification in time bound manner. The records shall be maintained by “Fire & Safety Department”. Objectives:

After detail discussion following objectives of mock fire drills and training were established - 1. To evaluate the response time of emergency teams like fire, medical, search &

Rescue etc. It should be minimum possible as per site condition. 2. Action taken at site by emergency teams as per situation. 3. Effectiveness of emergency systems like fire fighting system, communication

system etc. 4. Response of On Site Emergency Plan Co-ordinators in case of On site

emergency drill. 5. Response of water block 6. Response of Security department - CISF 7. Training and awareness of personnel. Observers:

Observers shall be appointed prior to the mock drill. The observers shall be well experienced and knowledgeable persons of the field. They shall be briefed about the scenario of mock drill and objectives of the mock drill. They will be deputed at different locations. After completion of mock drill they will submit their observations to GM (T).


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No. 6-3


B. Emergency Scenarios Identified Through Risk Analysis

Based on the Risk Analysis done for BR, based on the various accidents as detailed above and also Significant Risks Identified during Risks Identification activity done at departmental level as per the requirement of Occupational Health and Safety Management System (OHSAS-18001:2007), the following scenarios likely to occur in BR, have been considered for finalising detail action plan on any on site emergency situation:

First Aid:

First Aid Training is imparted to cover all the employees.

Identified Disaster Scenarios:

S.N SCENERIO LEVEL

1. LPG FIRE LEVEL 3

2. TANK FIRE LEVEL 2

3. TOXIC GAS RELEASE (H2S) LEVEL3

4. OIL SPILLAGE LEVEL 1

5. NATURAL CALAMITY LEVEL 2

6. SECURITY THREAT) LEVEL 2

7. FIRE / EXPLOSION IN UNIT AREA LEVEL 2

8. DOUBLE FIRE CONTIGENCY LEVEL 2

9. CO GAS LEAKAGE LEVEL 1

10. HYDROGEN GAS LEAKAGE LEVEL 1

11. PIPELINE RUPTURE LEVEL 1

12. TRANSPORTATION INCIDENT LEVEL 2

13. CYCLONE LEVEL 3

14. EARTHQUAKE LEVEL 1

15. BOILER EXPLOSION IN THERMAL POWER STATION

LEVEL 2

16. NAPHTHA LEAK IN COOLING WATER SYSTEM

LEVEL 1

17. UN-NOTICED CONTINUOUS LEAK OF LPG FROM SAMPLING / DRAINING POINTS IN THE PROCESS UNITS

LEVEL 2


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No. 6-4


C. Schedule of Checking & calibration

S. No.

Activities Reference Frequency Status

1

DETECTORS : 1. Operability of

detectors 2. Calibration of

detectors by using test gas

OISD STD-116

1. Once in 3 month

2. Once in 6 month

Done as per schedule

2

Communication system: 1. Testing of fire

siren 2. Testing of Pill box 3. Testing of walkie-

talkie

OISD STD.- 116

1. Daily

2. Once in a month 3. Once in a week

Done as per

schedule

D. Participation of Outside Groups and Agencies in Disaster Drills

Annually Off-site Disaster Drill is conducted with participation of District Administration, Fire services, Police Deptt., Medical Services, Transport Deptt., Civil Defense, near by industries and other voluntary organizations.

E. Disaster Drills & Frequency

Testing and mock drills for onsite emergency plan are carried once in three months and for offsite emergency plan twelve months.

Sr No. Activities Reference Frequency Status

1 Fire Mock Drill OISD-STD- 116 Once in a month Being followed.

2 On-Site Disaster Drill MSIHC Rules 1989

Once in 6 month Being followed.

Internal Advice Once in 3 month Being followed

3 Off-Site Disaster Drill MSIHC rules 1989

Once in a year Being followed.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No. 6-5


F. De-Briefing Session

After, “All clear siren”, all the co-ordinators and concerned officials assemble at Crisis Control Room to obtain feedback on the effectiveness of the response, mobilization of resources etc.

In case of drills, observers are posted at key locations to register their observations and their observations are discussed during the debriefing session.

The recommendations of the observers are further discussed in the Management Safety and Health Committee meetings and remedial actions are taken.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No. 6-6


CHECK LIST-3

[(Reference: Section 12.1(i) of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)

MUTUAL AID / MOCK DRILLS

Sr.# Check-point Remarks

1 Whether mock fire / emergency response drills are held Mock drills are conducted each month

2 If yes, periodicity of emergency response drills Fire Mock Drill - Once in a month

On-Site Disaster Drill- Once in 3 month

Off-Site Disaster Drill- Once in a year

3 Mock drills cover all types of probable emergencies Yes

4 Does the location have Mutual Aid Plan No

5 If yes, the details of other members including names and contact nos. of concerned officials

NA

6 List of fire fighting equipments available with each Mutual Aid members including District Fire Service

NA

7 Compatibility of safety equipment of all Mutual Aid members including District Fire Services with said location has been tested and documented in the DMP

NA

8 Details of water storage available with Mutual Aid member including District Fire Service and mechanism to utilize the same in the said location well documented in the DMP

NA

9 Details of fire fighting foams concentrate/chemicals available with Mutual Aid members including nearest Fire Service has been incorporated

NA

10 Details of lead time for response of Mutual Aid members including District Fire Service has been documented in the DMP

NA

11 Periodicity of safety training for officers, staff, contractor workers, TT crew and security personnel mentioned in the ERDMP.

12 Mutual Aid Plans

Does the location have established Mutual Aid Plans

No


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No. 6-7


13 Which are the Mutual Aid Team members and the assistance offered

NA

14 Does the plan clearly indicate types of possible hazards and fire fighting measures required.

Yes

15 Does the plan include expected assistance from each members

NA

16 Does the Plan spell out the communication protocol and the channels in times of emergency

Yes.

17 Periodic joint exercise and meetings for practice, familiarization and identifying and resolving compatibility issues.

NA

Strategies with other organizations for obtaining raw materials

In order to facilitate quick supply of required equipment/materials for restoration, other IOC refineries (Mathura / Haldia / Panipat / Guwahati / AOD) will be contacted.

6.2 TRAINING


(1) Training material and general philosophy on emergency prevention and control are kept separate from the working plan.

(2) Training is imparted to all the personnel likely to be involved directly or indirectly to the emergencies including employees, contract workers, transport crew and security personnel.

(3) Contract personnel and contract labourer is allowed to start work only after clearance of attending and passing safety training.

(4) Refresher training is conducted at regular intervals. TRAINING TO CONTRACT WORKERS:

Training to all contractor workers is mandatory before entering inside Refinery and to achieve the goal daily training is organized.

Training to contract supervisors is given as per OISD Standard - 154. The course content includes knowledge of petroleum product and their hazardous property, prevention of fire / accident and safety precaution etc.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No. 6-8


In addition, fire fighting safety training to contractor supervisor and workers is given at fire station and at work locations regularly.

The contractors’ work force is also given training / safety talk at work location during M&I shutdown.

In addition, fire & safety gives safety talk / demonstration of use of Personnel Protective Equipment (PPEs) before commencement of critical nature of job viz. man entry to a vessel, tank, sewage manhole etc.

TRAINING TO CISF PERSONNEL:

All CISF personnel are trained on fire and safety regularly. FIRE TRAINING GROUND:

The fire training ground is used for the training of plant personnel and others.

6.3 Mutual Aid Scheme


No mutual aid scheme is available.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-1

CHAPTER – 7

RESPONSE PROCEDURE AND MEASURES



BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-2

a) Zoning And Maps

(Reference: Section 13(a) of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)

The zones and maps have been prepared highlighting the Incident prone areas of the unit so that in case of an emergency it serves as a basis for taking the action. This indicates the size of the area within which human life is seriously endangered by the consequences of incident. This also indicate the location of assembly points

1. Different zones as per the risk scenarios based on the risk analysis are already mentioned in Chapter 4 and also refer Quantitative Risk Analysis Report of BR 2011.

2. Location of assembly point is shown in the figure below:

Barauni Refinery-in harmony with nature 19

Barauni Refinery

Assembly

Points

HIGH RISK ZONES & ASSEMBLY POINTS - BR

LPG Area

SRU

CRUDE TANK Farm

N

3. Wind speed and direction is mentioned in Chapter – 4.

4. Nearby areas and living populace is given in Chapter 4.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-3

b) Layout / Flow Diagram

(Reference: Section 13(b) of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)

Detailed lay out and flow diagram for different activities/process is attached as Annexure – 3 & 4.

c) MANPOWER

(Reference: Section 13(c) of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)

MANPOWER

Regular employees 1282

Security staff 297

Shiftwise**

Morning 175(approx)

Evening 176(approx)

Night 175(approx)

**Based on time office record


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-4

MAJOR DISASTER SCENARIOS

1. LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS (LPG) FIRE

LPG Assumed Scenario CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF LPG HORTON SPHERE

a) LPG Storage facility for Barauni Refinery:

Horton Sphere Capacity V-3 1500 M3 V-4 1500 M3

Both the vessels are provided with following safety facilities as listed here under:

Automatic Water Sprinkler system for cooling.

Outside insulation to eliminate direct exposure to heat.

Fire hydrants and water monitors for cooling purpose surrounding the Horton Spheres.

Access way around the Horton Spheres.

Each Horton Sphere has two safety relief valves to prevent over pressurization.

ROVS to isolate the vessels as and when required from Control Room.

Each Horton Sphere is inspected and tested periodically as per SMPV rules.

Safety Relief valves are inspected yearly.

HC gas detectors for early detection of leakage, if any.

b) Disaster Scenario

The consequence of catastrophic failure of LPG Horton sphere will be explosion and subsequent fire. The damage effect of wind pressure waves will be felt up to 1.28 KM in the prevailing wind direction causing property damage and personal injury due to flying splinters.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-5

c) For Fire Fighting At LPG HS Area:

On getting the information, the 1st turn out fire tender along with fire crew immediately rushes to LPG HS area via Road No. 2, 7 or 2, 5, 8 as per the wind direction.

At fire station control room 2nd T/out operator sounds the fire bell, Operate ARP & instructs water block to start firewater pumps.

Parking of the FT on road no. 7, 8 & 7B according the wind direction away from the incident site.

Start Fire fighting by spraying water through water monitors and fire vehicle over the fire to extinguish and disperse the LPG.

Manual operation of water sprinkler if auto system fails.

If required, operation of DCP extinguishers to extinguish the fire.

Operations of ground water monitors to cool the affected facilities.

Operation of elevated water monitors to cool the facilities.

Operations of water sprinkler system of nearby tank

Suspension of Filling / loading operations at bulk loading area by Production personnel.

Barricading of the road by CISF.

Evacuation of the area & Rescue operation.

Calling of 2nd turn out fire tender or DCP tender as per the need.

Blowing of major fire/disaster siren.

Activation of on –site disaster management plan.

S&EP to verify various environment effects under Environment Protection Act guide lines and to coordinate with SPCB.

Ambient air monitoring at the site by SPCB –included in DMP


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-6

2. TANK FIRE (CRUDE OIL STORAGE TANK FIRE)

a) DESCRIPTION AND LOCATION OF THE FACILITY:

Barauni Refinery processes imported crude oil. The crude oil is received by HBCPL and stored in tanks no. TK No. 501 of 45,000 KL nominal capacity having diameter of 65 meters & tank no. 235 to 240 of 40,000 KL each.The crude oil tank from is situated in the eastern part of the refinery premises.The crude tank farms are surrounded by Road No. IVA in the southern side. VIA in the northern side, XI in the eastern side, IXA in the western side and IX in between the two tank farms.

b) AVAILABLE FIRE FIGHTING FACILITIES:

The crude tanks have been provided with Semi Fixed Foam pourers. Fire hydrants have been provided along the roads in the periphery of the tank farms.

c) INCIDENT

The operator from OM&S (R) while on his routine round for tank gauging notices a thick black smoke coming out from Tank No. 237 (crude tank). On seeing the fire, the operator makes the fire call and then informs PNE OM&S (R), who in turn informs RSM. The Tank 237 is a floating roof tank and is having about 9,000 KL of freshly received crude. The tank is of 65 meters dia, and 14 meters height. Tank 235, 236 & 237 are located in the same dyke. These are situated towards the eastern boundary wall. The distance of tank 237 from Road No. VII is 387 meters and from Road No. IV-A is 37 meters. Tank 237 is 237 meters from Road No. IX-A. hydrants are located on all the above roads and spaced every 30 meters.

d) ACTION PLAN:

OBJECTIVES:

To contain and control the fire in tank no. 237 and any subsequent fire in the adjoining tanks.

To cool down the nearby storage tank.

To rescue injured persons and to arrange necessary medical aid.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-7

Rehabilitation of affected persons

ACTIVITY:

Water spray system on affected tank is activated.

Central foam pourer facility is activated.

Water spray system on nearby tanks is activated.

HVLRs are charged to direct foam in the tank 237.

Foam nurser/foam tenders are manured to replenish foam in the auto foam house & foam monitor facility.

The Chief coordinator reports in the spot after assessing the situation, declared “DISASTER”. (1st major fire then disaster)

The disaster siren is blown in the refinery and the Township.

The Crisis Control Room is made activate.

Disaster Management plan is activated.

CISF personnel are deployed for fighting fire and hoses drawn from hydrant.

BFS fire tenders are directed to fight fire.

OM&S suspended Crude receipt in tank no. 240 by Atmospheric Units are cut-off and units are put on hot circulation.

Injured Personnel from inside and outside the Refinery are transported to Site Dispensary/Hospital.

S&EP to verify various environment effects under Environment Protection Act guide lines and to coordinate with SPCB.

Ambient air monitoring at the site by SPCB


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-8

3. TOXIC GAS RELEASE (H2S):

a) ARU, SWS AND SRU UNIT

ARU and SWS top line mainly contains H2S rich gas. This gas is sent to SRU for sulphur recovery through 8” / 6” line.

b) SCENARIO

The area / system operator on his routine checkup observed gasket failure of the 6”-ARU / SWS top line leading to SRU Feed Drum 705 V-01. Outcome: Toxic Vapor Cloud

c) ACTION PLAN:

Release of H2S from the failure site will affect large area in and around the refinery. He immediately rushes to Control Room and informs RSM and Fire Station about the leak alerted and people are advised not to leave their units. Emergency stop button for ARU / SWS feed pump in the control room is operated to cut off feed to ARU / SWS as early as possible. PNE / SPNE and other area operators initiate necessary actions to mitigate the hazardous consequence of such failure. Depressurize system to Flare (H2S) .CPNM to isolate the ARU unit at B/L and at individual feed product tank On-site Disaster Manual Plan is put into action. Meanwhile CISF personal are deputed for cordoning and guarding the area where gas accumulated, CISF patrol also alerted the people in the surrounding area through Megaphone about the hazard of Gas Release. District Authority is informed about the incident and they are requested to provide necessary Police/Home guard help. To stop any vehicle movement (except Fire Tender), Roadblocks are made on approaching roads to SRU.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-9

4. OIL SPILLAGE (OIL SPILLAGE FROM HSD TANK NO. 220)

a) LOCATION OF TANK NO. 220

HSD Tank no. 220 is situated at the southern side of road no. 6& LPG mounded bullets. Two HSD tanks, Tank no. 220 and 221 are located in the same dyke. The tank farm area containing tank no. 220 & 221 is surrounded by LPG Mounded Bullets on the north, HSD tanks nos. 226 & 228 on the south, road no. 7 on the west and road no. 9 on the east. The tank no. 220 is a fixed roof tank of capacity 10,000 M3. The tank is full with freshly received HSD. The tank-dyke is surrounded by surface drain going towards southern and western side.

b) INCIDENT

ASSUMED SCENARIO: HUGE OIL SPILL

RSM on his routine round in morning shift finds lot of oil over flowing through the oil catch pit near bioremediation site of oily sludge. Immediately he made Fire call and with the help of employees and CISF personnel, sand bags are put to block the outflow from catch pit. Meanwhile OM&S and all process unit in charges are alerted.

After about ½ an hour, the source could be identified in one of the HSD tank dyke. HSD is coming out from Tank no.220 due to rupture of gasket of outlet valve and accumulated in the dyke. Oil comes out of the dyke and led to surface drain.

On checking the tank dip, it is ascertained that about 2.000 KL of oil has been drained out of the tank and found its way into open channel, outside low lying area and burrow pit posing threat of fire hazard. Ambient air monitoring at the site by SPCB

c) SITUATION IN THE REFINERY:

All the processing units are running normal. Loading of tank wagon, LPG bulk trucks had just started. Crude tank no. 240 is receiving crude oil from HBCPL.

Crude tank no. 236 & 238 are feeding to crude distillation units.

BKPL Pipeline is in operation. In thermal power station one TG and two GT in line along with 2 nos. of boilers were generating around 37 MW Power and 170 MT /Hr steam respectively.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-10

On that day, there are 200 persons in the shift and 40 CISF personal on duty. Due to continuous heavy rain, arrangement for sand bags is made and kept ready near bioremediation site.

d) ACTION PLAN:

On hearing the Fire call, fire tenders rushes towards bioremediation site. Meanwhile CISF are directed to close the gate of the surface drain and block with sand bags. RSM sends a group of CISF people with a vehicle to survey the surrounding area affected by oil spill. Alarm is raised through the P.A. system to identify and isolate the source of oil spill.

Meanwhile, RSM contacted CPNM, DGM (PN), and GM (T) to appraise the situation.

GM (T) reported at site and after assessment of the situation, declares “DISASTER”.

Siren is blown accordingly and crisis control room is put into service.

On-site disaster Management Plan is put into action.

Within ½ an hour, the source is identified at tank no. 220. The tank dyke outlet is closed. Another fire tender is instructed to proceed near Tank no. 220.

On seeing the profuse leakage from outlet valve, the OM&S operators are told to pump out HSD from tank no. 220 to tank no. 221, which is having sufficient ullage.

Meanwhile CISF personal are deputed for cordoning and guarding the area where oil accumulated, CISF patrol also alerted the people in the surrounding area through Megaphone about the hazard of oil spill. To stop any vehicle movement (except Fire Tender). Roadblocks are made on road no. 7, 8 and 9. Fire Tender at bioremediation site is instructed to be stationed at burrow pit area.

e) OIL RECOVERY:

To drain oil from dyke to OWS into emergency guard basin.

To salvage oil from drains and catch pits.

To recover oil from borrow pit.

Lined up Emergency guard Basin for receiving oil from tank dyke.

With the help of contract laborers, the oil is skimmed-off from catch pit near bioremediation site and transported to nearest OWS and


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-11

drained for recovery. The oil hold up in the open channel was also washed away and collected in the catch pit near bioremediation site

Contractor laborers are engaged for collecting the oil spill in borrow pit. (The oil is scooped in buckets and stores in empty oil drums. These drums are subsequently transported to Refinery for recovery).

Meanwhile, mobile pneumatic pump is mobilized from BKPL for recovery of oil from borrow pit.

The entire operation of recovery takes 3 days (working from morning to evening). However, round the clock patrolling is continued till the entire operation was over.

HSE to verify various environment effects under Environment Protection Act guide lines and to coordinate with SPCB.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-12

5. FLOOD

a) INCIDENT

ASSUMED SCENARIO: FLOOD SITUATION IN BARAUNI

REFINERY

There is incessant rain in Begusarai industrial belt. At times the rainfall was 40mm/Hr. and continued for about 2 days. The meteorological weather bulletin anticipated further rainfall during 48 hours in the Begusarai and adjoining catchment area. It is also informed that the rainfall will be accompanied by cyclone at a wind velocity of 80-100 Km/Hr. Flood control authority also raises an alarm as the level in the nearby rivers Burhi Gandak and Ganga were rising at an alarming rate.

Design rainfall intensity of Barauni Refinery is 366 mm/day (max.). Average grade level of Barauni Refinery is 42.5 M (above sea level). Storm water drains criss cross the entire refinery premises.

On the 3rd day of the rain, in the night, information is received about a breach in Gupta Bandh near Saboura village. Attempt to seal the breach with the help of District Authority is not totally successful. Meanwhile units are on emergency shutdown and arrangement for power supply from Bihar State Electricity Board is sought but within 2-3 hours the entire industrial belt plunged into darkness due to flooding at BTPS. Total communication system also fails. Due to gales and flood water, trees and light posts are uprooted at various places in and outside Refinery. The insulation sheets on Horton Sphere V-3, V-4, TK244, TK245 are ripped open due to high velocity of wind and were seen hanging precariously at different heights. Some sheets are flying off at different direction posing danger to personals.

Within 3-4 hours there is 3-4 feet of water inside the Refinery area. A thin sheet of oil was floating atop the water level in and around the Refinery posing danger of fire. Flood water also entered the site colony where rescue and evacuation start immediately.

b) SITUATION IN THE REFINERY:

All the processing units are running normal except AU-III which is under M&I shutdown. There is no activity in LPG bottling plant and tank truck loading gantry. Loading activity in Tank Wagon Loading gantry is in progress.

Crude Tank no. 236 is receiving crude oil from HBCPL and crude tank no. 227 and 228 are feeding to the Atmospheric Units.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-13

In the Thermal Power Station, two TGs were generating 18 MW Power. Two boilers steam generation is 170 MT/Hr. There are 300 persons in the night shift and 40 CISF personnel on duty.

c) OBJECTIVES:

Safe running of the plants with minimum manpower.

Safe emergency shutdown at appropriate time.

Catering to the basic needs of manpower in the Refinery and people in the Site Colony.

Preventing damages to the storage tanks.

Pumping out of water as the flood recedes.

Prevention of epidemics.

d) ACTIVITY:

As soon as flood control authority raised an alarm as the level in the nearby rivers (Burhi Gandak and Ganga) is rising at an alarming rate, arrangement for adequate number of Sand bags was made.

A surveillance party formed to patrol the Gupta Bandh area from Refinery to Township. Sand bags are kept at vulnerable locations along the bandh. The team kept in constant touch with the District Authorities. Flags with reflectors are posted on either sides of the approach road from the National Highway side as the Refinery Road is expected to be inundated.

All pumps in Sector-VI (ETP) are kept in serviceable condition, spare hot water and cold water motors are kept ready in a safe location. Diesel driven dewatering pumps serviced and are kept in readiness.

All operational units are prepared to take any emergency safe shutdown. Information through Public Address System is also given to the truck drivers to meet any situation arising out of flood. In OM&S tank farm, actions are taken not to keep any tank empty as a safeguard against heavy winds. Temporary scaffoldings are removed and all construction jobs are suspended. All crane booms are lowered down. Arrangement for drinking water in earther pitcher, chamois leather and military canvas bags are made. Adequate stock of food and canteen for about 400 people. Action plan chalked out for deployment of minimum number of


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-14

people required for operational purposes during flood. Adequate number of drycell torches and portable diesel generators are kept ready to take care of emergency illumination. District Authority contacted for providing adequate nos. of boats.

As soon as information is received about the breach of

Gupta Bandh near Sabaura village, people are rushed to seal the breach with the help of District Authority but this is not totally successful. The situation is assessed by GM (T) and disaster is declared.Alarm has been raised through megaphone to alert the people in and around the refinery premises and township.Units are emergently shutdown and arrangement for power supply for Bihar State Electricity Board is made. When the entire industrial belt plunged into darkness, due to flooding at BTPS. All portable diesel generators pressed into service for illumination of vital locations (drinking water supply, Fire Station, Hospital etc.). District Authority could be contacted through wireless sets, for rendering all help.

Oil films atop the water level in hazardous areas are blanketed by foam/oil dispersant-Metaclean agent. Cranes are used to move the uprooted trees to clean the approach road. Existing First Aid centre is reinforced with more manpower, emergency drugs, and vaccines.

HSE to verify various environment effects under Environment Protection Act guide lines and to coordinate with SPCB.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-15

6. MAJOR FIRE / EXPLOSION IN UNIT AREA

a) INCIDENT

ASSUMED SCENARIO: FIRE / EXPLOSION in COKER A

Coker A is running normal. Operator of pump house area noticed smoke coming from 604-P-6A/B (main frac .C-1 Bottom Pump) area. He observed a jet of hot oil coming from the mechanical seal of 604-P-6A.He immediately ran to PA system to inform COKER A shift I/C. By the time he informed the SIC, a fire took place in the area which was spreading very fast in entire unit.

b) ACTION PLAN:

Actions to be taken by Plant Personnel

Shift in Charge:

To inform Fire Station and instruct Console Officer for taking Emergency Shut-Down of the Unit.

Inform Electrical Operation and de-energize P-6 from Sub-Station

Console officer:

Put emergency steam in the secondary coil of furnace and displace the coil materials into coke chamber.

Bring down COT to 350 Oc, Establish hot circulation ,Furnace operator:Isolate BFW at battery limit and individual lines to furnace.Cut off burners in coordination with console officer. Isolate and flush FO burners that were in service.Chamber operator: Depressurize the on line coke chamber to R-1/3 in a controlled rate, after isolating from the system.

Pump house operator:

Close discharge valve of P-6 whichever was in service.

Line up P-01B and establish hot circulation in coordination with console officer.

LE operator:

Stop off-gas compressor

Close suction and discharge valves.

Start nitrogen purging.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-16

ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN FOR FIRE FIGHTING

Coker A Shift I/C informs Fire Station through over phone that there is fire in Coker A

Fire station shift in charge rushed to the site

Fire station shift in charge shall raise the alarm to call the laboratory shift in charge and alert CISF personnel at main gate.

At main gate, CISF will display the message “Major Fire at Coker A”

Laboratory shift in charge take the charge of Fire Station.

Within 1 minute after getting information, one Foam Tender arrives at site with Fire Station Shift I/C and fire crew. Fire Station Shift I/C orders to throw foam in the affected area and instruct fire station control room to blow Major Fire Siren.

Accordingly, the Laboratory shift in charge present in fire station blow the Major Fire Siren.

2nd Foam tender reports at site.

Cooling of other tanks in the tank farm.

CISF reports at site to SIC.

CISF to cordon off the road

Laboratory shift in charge displays the message “Major Fire at Coker A on the black board at Fire station .

IC assesses the wind direction declare the danger zone.

SIC advises to keep cool the nearby Crude Oil Tanks.

Incident control coordinator assesses the wind direction and stays in cross wind direction at a safe distance and advises all the undesired personnel to leave the site immediately.

Requisition of ambulance for shifting one fire fighter and one PH operator to First aid centre.

Ambulance driver to report to SIC

Affected area in-charge arranges to close the valve from tank farm to storm water channel.

SIC informs CIC to send 100 sand bags, hey filters and one dewatering pump at site.

SIC informs CIC for emergency light

SIC requisitions additional foam for fire fighting


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-17

Arranging diesel for fire tenders

SIC demands drinking water & refreshment at site

Transport, Welfare & Media coordinator arranges tea for manpower mobilization group and employees assembled at Refinery Club

Running DG set for back-up power

Isolation of power in MS Tank farm area

CIC asks Transport Welfare and Media coordinator to mobilize vehicles for evacuation of affected area personnel.

Blowing of all clear siren for return to normalcy

CIC advises Think Tank coordinator to inspect the area and assess the loss.

All coordinators to assemble at DCC for review.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-18

7. DOUBLE FIRE CONTINGENCY

a) INCIDENT

ASSUMED SCENARIO:

1. Leakage of LPG followed by vapour cloud explosion and BLEVE of a partially filled Horton Sphere causing major fires / explosions in the LPG and surrounding areas

2. Fire & Explosion in Crude Oil Tank.

b) FIRE FIGHTING AT LPG HS AREA:

Fire on LPG Horton Sphere

1. Stop all operation in the area.

2. Actuate the deluge valve or open the manual valve of the affected Sphere and also the adjacent sphere.

3. Area to be cordon off with the help of CISF

4. Inform Fire & Safety Deptt. For fury the help.

5. On getting the information, the 1st turn out fire tender along with fire crew immediately rushes to LPG HS area via Road as per the win direction.

6. At fire station control room 2nd T/out operator sounds the fire bell, Operate ARP & instructs water block to start firewater pumps.

7. Parking of the Foam tenders on road according the wind direction away from the incident site.

8. Start Fire fighting by spraying water through water monitors and fire vehicle over the fire to extinguish and disperse the LPG.

9. Manual operation of water sprinkler if auto system fails.

10. If required, operation of DCP extinguishers to extinguish the fire.

11. Operations of ground water monitors to cool the affected facilities.

12. Operation of elevated water monitors to cool the facilities.

13. Operations of water sprinkler system of nearby tank

14. Suspension of Filling / loading operations at bulk loading area by Production personnel.

15. Barricading of the road by CISF.

16. Evacuation of the area & Rescue operation.

17. Calling of 2nd turn out fire tender or DCP tender as per the need.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-19

c) FIRE FIGHTING AT TANK FIRE: CRUDE OIL TANK FIRE

The Scenario:

The Tk No235 (Capacity: 20000 m3, Floating roof) in the refinery was filled approximately with 20000 m3 of crude oil. The tank farm operator stationed at BR, had checked the automatic level indicator to take down the level reading at 0700 hrs in the morning. The tank was not leaking at that time.

A few hours later at about 1100 hrs, the tank farm operator noticed the huge pool of oil in the dyke. He immediately rushed to the control room and informed to the SIC in control room, who in turn informed SPNM and immediately rushed to site. By the time SIC & SPNM reached the site about 6" depth of oil had accumulated in the dyke. Fire station was informed of the huge oil accumulation in the dyke and SIC / SPNM observed that tank got overflow.

DPNM was informed of the oil accumulation and actions being taken to combat the overflow. Preparations were made to install portable pumps\ Gully sucker and temporary flexible piping to pump oil from inside the tank dyke into the nearby crude oil tank.

At about 11.30 Hr. suddenly a small vapour cloud explosion took place. The explosion made the flame to travel back to the pool of oil in the dyke. Immediately the entire oil content in the dyke caught fire and started burning. The cloud of smoke had started rising high in the sky. On hearing the sound of explosion and seeing the fire, all contract labourers a /cleaners in nearby area ran in the direction away from fire.

SIC(R) phoned fire station and told the fire station shift in-charge about an explosion and a big fire in the tank dyke area . Meanwhile, the maintenance crew in and around AVU &COKER unit rushed to the site. SIC (OMS) got the sprinklers of the neighboring tanks started, and also that of the tank No.235.

Action Plan:

On receiving the fire call from SIC, the fire station control room operator sounded the fire alarm for turn out. All HODs were informed of the fire. They rushed to the site of fire.

By that time, one foam fire tenders of BR had arrived. The crew started fighting the fire with foam spray on the pool fire. Assessing the gravity of the situation at site, CPNM (OMS) and SPNM (OMS ) informed DGM


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-20

(PN) who in turn informed about the gravity of fire to ED, and initiated actions to set up/activate the Disaster Control Room & First Aid Centre for controlling the disaster situation. Two people received severe bums. They were shifted to BR Hospital in the ambulance, which had arrived at site. Some other minor injured people were shifted to First Aid Centre.

Meanwhile, 2nd foam fire tender from FS also arrived and joined in the fire fighting operations. At this juncture, the fire could be brought under slight control, but still some minor fire kept on occurring.

The ground surrounding the other tanks in the adjacent dyke was blanketed with foam thus preventing other tanks from becoming involved in the fire. Help from CISF Jawans were also taken active part in fire fighting. Water was used to protect and cool the tanks not immediately involved.

The fire was brought under control within 1 hour and was completely extinguished 1/2 hr. later. In all 2 foam fire tenders were used. Help, from CISF Jawans was also taken for fire fighting, traffic regulating and cordoning operations. Although AVU and COKER were asked to be ready for shutting down the units at any moment as a safety measure, the damage was confined to the tank field area of 235 only.

The damage was confined to the tank 235 only. Two people received severe burns and about 6 people received first degree burns. At about 12.30 hrs all clear sirens were sounded.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-21

8. CARBON MONO OXIDE GAS (CO) LEAKAGE FROM FCC UNIT

a) THE HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH CO

PROPERTIES OF CO

Carbon Monoxide (CO) is produced in the process of combustion of carbon or hydrocarbons when the supply of Oxygen / air is limited. CO is a colourless, odorless and tasteless gas. Hence, its presence in case of a leak cannot be readily detected. It is a chemical asphyxiant. At a concentration of 1.3% by vol. in air it causes unconsciousness after a few breaths. It is a powerful poison. Its reaction with chlorine produces highly poisonous phosgene gas.

2 CO + 2 Cl2 - - - - - - - 2 COCl 2 (Phosgene)

CO is slightly soluble in water, but readily soluble in HCl or concentrated ammonia caloride solution of cuprous chloride, soluble in organic solvents such as ethyl acetate, chloroform or acetic acid. Physical properties of CO are listed in Annexure 4.4.1 A.

CO is an important industrial fuel and reducing agent. It is one of the chief constituents of synthesis gas. It is an important raw material in the production of methanol and other alcohol. It is also used as an agent for oxoreaction and for making di-isocyanate and ethyl acrylate. CO released to atmosphere as a gas is nearly as dense as air. Hence, in case of a leak it spreads in air easily and homogeneously through diffusion.

Release of large quantity of CO from FCC regenerator, could lead to the following phenomena, which can result in large loss.

1. Gas Cloud Explosion 2. Release of CO with immediate ignition 3. Intoxication

GAS CLOUD EXPLOSION (DELAYED IGNITION)

In case the release of CO from regenerator continues without fire a thick CO gas cloud can gather in the area. Upon finding a source of ignition gas cloud explosion would take place. The damage due to unconfined gas cloud explosion would be by fire to people/materials inside the cloud. People inside such a cloud will have little chance of surviving. Some materials in the cloud can catch fire but the flame front will pass off quickly. A substantial part of the well ventilated structure inside the gas cloud may remain undamaged. Outside the gas cloud in unconfined


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-22

space, no one will be killed or injured as a direct consequence of a pressure wave caused by the explosion. Explosion of a gas cloud in confined/semi-confined spaces will lead to development of a blast wave due to the effect of over pressure.

RELEASE OF CO WITH IMMEDIATE IGNITION

This is by far the least dangerous if there is no vessel nearby containing hydrocarbons. Otherwise impingement of the flame on the nearby vessel may cause damage to the vessel. Fire and explosive properties of CO are listed in Annexure 4.4.1 B.

INTOXICATION

When carbon monoxide is released and remains unburnt, toxic effects also can be expected. CO is a chemical asphyxiant. It is highly toxic by inhalation. Carbon monoxide has an affinity for hemoglobin 10 times more than that of oxygen and combining with the haemoglobin, renders the latter incapable of carrying oxygen to the tissues. The effect on the body is therefore predominantly one of asphyxia.

In addition to this action, the presence of CO in haemoglobin in the blood Interfere with the dissociation of the remaining oxyhaemoglobin, so that the tissues are further deprived of oxygen. Many fatalities from CO occur in confined spaces where ventilation is inadequate. Carbon monoxide is eliminated through the lungs when air free from CO is inhaled. Over half the CO is eliminated in the first hour, when the exposure has been moderate. Repeated exposure to low concentrations of the gas up to 100 ppm in air is generally believed to cause no signs of poisoning or permanent damage.

The toxicological properties of CO are listed in Annexure 4.4.1C.

b) RISK ANALYSIS FOR CO LEAK SCENARIO

FCC UNIT DESCRIPTION

Vacuum Gas Oils are used as feed stock for Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit for cracking into Gas, LPG and other distillate products like gasoline, diesel and around 15% remains as heavy stock called clarified oil which is blended into LSHS or Furnace Oil. The feed is heated to around 370 0 C in a process furnace and injected into the reactor riser along with hot catalyst coming from regenerator. Cracking of heavier molecules into smaller molecules takes place in the riser which operates under moderate


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-23

pressure (2.0 kg/cm2) and temperature of around 490 0 C. Coke lay down takes place on the catalyst and spent catalyst is returned to the regenerator where the carbon deposited on the catalyst is burnt off. The regenerated catalyst is recycled with fresh feed. The hydrocarbon vapours from the riser, stripper and reactor pass on to a fractionator for separation into various distillate products. Cracked gas from the fractionators overhead is routed to Gas Concentration Unit for separation of LPG components and fuel gas. The gasoline is used for manufacture of petrol and light cycle oil for diesel.

It is in the process of regeneration of catalysts with limited quantity of air, that Carbon Monoxide is produced due to partial combustion of COKE. These CO containing flue gases from regenerator are burnt in the CO-Boiler where CO gets converted to C02.

RISK ANALYSIS

Under very stable conditions, a rupture of the regenerator gas line may give rise to lethal damage up to a considerable distance. Due to the fact that carbon monoxide is odourless, special precautions should be taken for evacuation of workers who are present downwind from the point of release. Based on the risk analysis report for Barauni Refinery by TNO, Netherlands, the toxicity distances have been worked out,

c) SCENARIO

LOCATION OF FCC UNIT

FCC unit is located in the EAST side of the Refinery Battery Area

SITUATION IN FCC UNIT

FCC unit was in operation and CO Boiler was in operation with steam generation

The weather was generally calm with the wind direction West to East. The ambient temperature was 40 deg C. The PNM (FCC) was attending the daily meeting at RSM's office. The DMPN (FCC) was in his office, the SPNE (FCC) was also in his office. Both the ‘ A’ Operators were taking readings in Control Room. The PNE (FCC) was on his routine plant round. One 'B' Operator was near furnace and another near .the caustic tank. The 'C’ Operator was in pump house topping-up the lube oil in a pump bearing housing.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-24

The 'CO’ Boiler Engineer along with the panel operator of ‘CO’ Boiler and MAB / WGC operator were in 'CO' Boiler control-room. The other ‘CO’ Boiler Operator was near feed water pumps.

There were two electricians in sub station. Also there were 6 technicians of Electrical & Mechanical wing working in the pump-house; 3 Instrument technicians were doing control valve repairs at Battery limit; 3 contractor labourers were topping up lube oil in WGC reservoir; 5 contractor labourers were loading catalyst; and 6 contractor labourers were below the Riser doing area-cleaning jobs.

SCENARIO (DISASTER)

All of a sudden, a loud explosion sound was heard from Reactor / Regenerator Area in FCC Unit. A big fire was noticed in the main column/exchanger area. Some small objects (like broken glass and insulation material) were also seen flying in the air. Catalyst was seen spreading all over. The cloud of smoke had started rising high in the sky.

d) Action Plan

The PNE phoned Fire station and told fire station shift in charge about an explosion and a big fire in the FCC unit. As 'CO' gas would be present in the unit and the surroundings, fire fighting crew were advised to come to FCC unit with 10 numbers each of MASKS and Breathing Appartus Sets.

The Fire Station Control Room Operator sounded the Fire Alarm On hearing the hissing sound, PNE (FCC) rushed to control room and tripped the FD fan of CO-boiler and rotated the knob for by passing the feed from the Reactor Riser.

The 'A' Operator closed both the slide valves of the stand-pipes of Regenerator and Reactor from the panel and also diverted the Regenerator flue gases to the stack by passing the CO-boiler from the panel itself.

The PNE( FCC) phoned MAB / WGC operator to trip both machines (MAB / WGC) and also phoned to sub station electrician to stop the power supply to all FCC motors.

The PNE (FCC), who was in the pump house near CO Boiler heard the explosion followed by the jet like hissing coming from the expansion bellow on the flue gas duct to ‘CO’ Boiler. He came running to the control room. He briefed the DMPN (FCC) about his observations. The DMPN (FCC) rushed from his office to the control room. He advised Shift-in-


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-25

charge, Fire Station for arranging to rescue of the trapped persons in the plant.

The PNE (FCC) informed RSM regarding fire, explosion and expected 'CO' gas poisoning from the FCC Unit. The PNE requested RSM to arrange for stopping of feed-stock supplies to FCC , and for closing of all FCC product run down line valves at different location (i.e. LPG, OM&S, etc). The IFO and Fuel gas to and fro lines of FCC were isolated.

At the time of explosion one ' B' operator, who was near furnace , cut off gas supply to burners and rushed towards control room.

The 'CO' Boiler Engineer along with his panel operator rushed out through emergency escape stairs from behind the panel. The MAB / WGC operator tripped both machines (MAB / WGC) and followed the 'CO' Boiler Engineer. They all rushed towards main control room.

By now, fire tenders arrived in the FCC Unit near Control room, along withCap masks and Breathing apparatus. The DMPN (FCC) and the 'CO' Boiler Engineer collected 'CO' gas monitor from control room and went out with cap masks and Breathing Apparatus and checked for 'CO' gas presence in the Unit. 'The CO' Concentration was found to be high at the North East side of CO-Boiler.

The PNE (FCC) along with two 'B' operators with B.A Apparatus rushed to FCC battery limit from the side of charge heater and closed all the battery limit valves of the Unit. Thus the FCC Unit hydrocarbon piping were isolated from the rest of the refinery. There after, they opened the two block-valves of sprinklers of pump house and main column over-head fin coolers.

On hearing the sound of explosion, all the maintenance technicians and contractor labourers ran in the direction away from the unit.

The ambulance and the rescue party with breathing apparatus arrived in the unit. They entered the affected areas to search for persons trapped in the unit. The rescue party was guided by the PNE (FCC). Two firemen also followed there with a stretcher. They found one contractor labourer lying unconscious. He removed to the ambulance and then to the hospital.

The PNM (FCC) arrived in the Unit near control room along with and CPNM. They supervised and guided the fire fighting operations. The fire crew fought the fire from western and eastern side of the Unit, supported by the operating and maintenance personnel. Two fire tenders arrived from RIL and GSFC and joined in fire fighting operations.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-26

The Sr Manager (F&S) arranged for creating a water screen between the FCC Unit under fire and the neighbouring unit.

When hydrocarbon supply to the FCC Unit was completly stopped, the fire was brought under control and it was finally put-off. The spraying of water in the Unit was continued to cool the surrounding area and equipments. On checking by 'CO' monitor, the 'CO' gas concentration was found to be within safe limits in the FCC Unit .

One more rescue party found a contractor labourer dead near catalyst storage area. He was removed to the hospital. Some injured people were given prompt first-aid at site and others were shifted to hospital for further treatment. The relatives of two dead labourers were informed. The Police were given the identification of 2 dead and 25 injured.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-27

9. HYDROGEN GAS LEAK SCENARIO

a) HYDROGEN GENERATION UNIT AT BARAUNI REFINERY

There are two Hydrogen Generation Units at Barauni Refinery.

The process involves the following four steps:

Sulphur removal

Steam reforming

High temperature shift conversion

PSA purification

b) STORAGE OF HYDROGEN

The hydrogen produced in Hydrogen Generation Unit is stored in TWO hydrogen bullets . Hydrogen is stored in these bullets at ambient temperature and at a pressure of 45 Kg/cm2.

c) RISK ANALYSIS FOR HYDROGEN LEAK SCENARIOS:

Leak of pure hydrogen gas can take place from the Hydrogen Generation Unit or hydrogen storage bullets. However, in case of an accidental release of hydrogen or hydrogen bearing mixture/due to very high buoyancy the cloud will rise very fast and will either get dispersed or an immediate ignition will occur due to reverse Joule-Thomson effect/high operating temperature. No vapour cloud formation is possible and hence no vapour cloud explosion is anticipated. Hence hydrogen leak from Hydrogen Unit does not create a disaster scenario.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-28

10. TRANSPORTATION INCIDENT SCENARIO One oil tanker after loading Motor Spirit (MS) from BR, while driving inside parking place located in front of BR-IOCL gate, collides with another tanker coming from opposite side. Tanker containing MS overturns and MS starts gushing out of the tanker due to damage of tanker shell.

MS in large quantity flowing” catches fire. Other tankers parked in the vicinity also engulf into fire due to back flash

ACTIVATING ON-SITE DISASTER PLAN

11. PIPELINE RUPTURE

UNCONTROLLABLE HYDROCARBON LEAKAGES FROM CRITICAL LINES OF HIGH PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE

There are so many critical lines of high pressure and temperature where Fire hazard may occur because of leakages. The uncontrollable Hydrocarbon leakages may be because of – (a) Sudden Gasket rapture of flanges or valves’ bonnet (b) Welding joint failure (c) Coming out of cap from vent line of PSV because of PSV failure.

In this case it will be difficult to control the leak.

Following will be actions plan-

1. Immediately inform at control room/Fire department regarding the incident

2. Stop all activities and remove all people to safe location.

3. If it is rotary pump immediately stop the pump and isolate it.

4. If the leak from fractionating bottom pump or it’s discharge line, stop the pump immediately either from Console or Field depending on situation and follow the procedure as mentioned in Failure of bottom pump procedure.

5. If leakages from Compressor discharge area immediately stop the compressor and isolate it from other equipments as far as possible.

6. If leakages are from the Rectified absorber or De-butanizer areas immediately isolate the heating media in reboilers ,isolate the column from feed and rundown and de-pressurize it by releasing the gas to Flare .

7. If situation can not be controlled within short period go for emergency shut down as per procedure.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-29

12. NATURAL CALAMITIES

HIGH WINDS / STORMS / CYCLONES

All structures/buildings have been designed to withstand the cyclonic storms and hence not much of damage is anticipated. Moreover with the present meteorological forecasting facilities it is possible to get warning about Such cyclonic storms well ahead of their happenings and therefore huge losses of men and material is a remote possibility.

Action Llan

Inform GMs/DGMs/CMTM/CMO/CMFS SHRM regarding expected time of cyclone storm

Keep constant touch with local Authorities SHRM (SDO) / DM , Begusarai for latest information.

Announce the message on loud speaker regarding expected time of Cyclone etc in battery area and township,

Stop all hot jobs and heavy equipments.

Evacuate persons from damaged, unfinished buildings / structure,

In case of half constructed structures,if not properly supported, bring them down.

Stop Hydrocarbon loading operations .

EARTH QUAKES

All equipments are designed to withstand earthquakes as stipulated in IS-875. In case of any disaster due to earthquake, it can lead to:

Fall of structures / buildings - Subsequent fires / explosions – Toxic gas / chemical leaks

These can be handled as per the action plan already described


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-30

CHECK LIST-4 (Reference: Section 13 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)

ERDMP Response Measures/Infrastructure


Zones, maps and layouts

1 Does the Location have Emergency Zones clearly identified for Incident prone areas

Yes.

An emergency zone based on risk analysis is attached.

2 Do the Maps indicate location of Emergency Assembly Points and Emergency Control Rooms

Yes. Map locating assembly points attached.

3 Is the process Lay-out prominently displayed Yes. Lay out plan attached.

4 Does the Piping and instrument Diagram include emergency control valves, shutdown system, isolation valves, important control valves etc.

Yes. Available in DCR.

5 Does the Fire Hydrant Layout conspicuously displayed.

Yes. Fire hydrant layout attached.

Manpower

1 Is the ERDMP Organogram clearly displayed. Yes. ERDMP organ gram displayed.

2 Does the Organogram include all duties to be attended in connection with an emergency.

Yes

3 Is the organogram include key personnel by their names or, work position

Yes. Included by work position.

4 Does it have the alternate coverage to take care of the absence of a particular person [ in cases where organogram is developed basis names]

Yes. Alternate persons are nominated.

5 Does it include assignment of all key coordinators viz. the Incident Controller, Administration and Communication Controller and Safety Coordinator?

Yes


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 7-31

Emergency Control Centre (ECC)

1 Is the ECC well defined and clearly marked on the displayed layout

Yes

2 Is it strategically positioned to be outside the periphery of immediate affected area.

Yes.

3 Is the centre have adequate communication channels including internal and external telephone connections, PA, paging and VHF systems

Yes. Equipped with internal & external telephones including WLL system, PA and wireless messaging system.

4 Is list of key personnel and essential telephone nos. are prominently displayed.

Yes

5 The layouts of fire fighting system, different hazardous zones, Assembly Points are prominently displayed.

Yes. Provided in the DCR.

Emergency Assembly Points

1 Are the EAPs well defined and clearly marked on the displayed layout

Yes

2 The EAPs have pre-defined in-charges during emergencies who keep in touch with the Emergency Control Centre and Administrative Controllers and updates on the roll call on people reporting.

Yes


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-1

CHAPTER – 8

EMERGENCY ORGANISATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES



BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-2

(1) The ERDMP identifies the safe transition from normal operation to emergency operations and systematic shut down, if any, and the delegation of authority from operations personnel to emergency response personnel. For this purpose, the plan has identified an emergency response organization with appropriate lines of authority with succession planning and actuating the response management. Responsibilities for decision making are shown in an emergency organization chart. The plan has identified each responder's position, mission, duties and reporting relationship.

(2) Overall objectives of IOCL,BR is:

(a) To promptly control problems as they develop at the scene.

(b) To prevent or limit the impact on other areas and off-site.

(c) To provide emergency personnel, selecting them for duties compatible with their normal work functions wherever feasible. The duties and functions assigned to various people shall include making full use of existing organizations and service groups such as fire, safety, occupational health, medical, transportation, personnel, maintenance, and security.

(d) Employees will assume additional responsibilities as per laid down procedure of ERDMP whenever an emergency alarm sounds.

(e) In setting up the organization, the need for round-the-clock coverage shall be essential. Shift personnel must be prepared to take charge of the emergency control functions or emergency shutdown of system, if need be, until responsible personnel arrive at the site of emergency. The organization has an alternate arrangement for each function.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-3

Typical Organogram for Control of Emergency (Reference: Section 14.1 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)

Medical Services

and Ambulance

Fire Brigade

Services

Police

Services

Off-Site Incident

Commander

(District

Magistrate) Medical Services

and Ambulance

Fire Brigade

Services

Off-Site Incident

Commander

(District

Magistrate) Medical Services

and Ambulance

Fire Brigade

Services

Off-Site Incident

Commander

(District

Magistrate)

CHIEF INCIDENT

CONTROLLER

Medical Services

and Ambulance

Fire Brigade

Services

Affected Stake

Holders and

Government

Authorities

Off-Site Incident

CONTROLLER (District

Magistrate/District

Authority)

SITE INCIDENT

CONTROLLER

Mutual Aid

Municipal transport

rescue and

rehabilitation team

Support

Services * Administration and Communication

Coordinator

Fire Safety and Fire

Team /HSE

Coordinator

Operation Team,

Technical Team,

Etc.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-4

* During odd hours, the Refinery Shift Manager (RSM) shall act as Incident Coordinator till Site Incident Coordinator [DGM (PN)] / Alternate Incident Coordinator (CPNM) arrives at the site.

8.1. Organogram of Barauni Refinery for Control of Emergency


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-5

Notes:

1. The Alternate Coordinator will function as the Coordinator in absence of designated main coordinator.

2. All Coordinators / Alternate Coordinators shall report at their designated place as shown in the organogram above.

3. In case of declaration of Off-site Disaster by Chief coordinator, GM (HR) will act as Industry Coordinator for liaison with District Authorities.

4. Role and responsibilities mentioned above are applicable in case of single contingency at a time.

5. In case of two contingencies simultaneously, GM (TS & HSE) will act as chief incident controller for second contingency and alternate site coordinators shall respond for second contingency. Disaster control room and chief main coordination group shall be common for both the contingencies. In the absence of main co-coordinators, successor shall respond to first contingency and second contingency shall be attended by second line of successors as mentioned below.

6. List of Assembly Points & Escape route to be followed in case of Evacuation is tabulated below:


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-6

8.2. Organizational Structure During On-Site Disaster

a) GM (T) will be Chief Coordinator (Chief Incident Controller) for mitigation of the emergency. In his absence, GM (TS & HSE) shall be the Chief Coordinator (Chief Incident Controller). If both are absent, officiating GM (T) shall be the Chief Coordinator.

b) GM (T) who is also designated as the Chief Co-coordinator will declare the

Disaster.

c) DGM (PN) will be Chief Coordinator (Site Incident Controller) for mitigation of the emergency. In his absence, CPNM shall be the Incident Coordinator. If both are absent, the officer who is officiating as DGM (PN) shall be the Incident Coordinator. In case the disaster occurs during odd hours, the Refinery Shift Manager (RSM) shall act as Incident Coordinator till DGM (PN) / Incident Coordinator arrives at the site.

d) The Incident Co-coordinator of the disaster will be assisted by a number of

functional Co-coordinators listed in the organization chart.

Sl. No. Assembly Point In charge

(S/Shri)

Alternate

(S/Shri)

Escape Route

1. In front of OM&S building

H. C. Verma

CMNM (CL)

H. S. Rukhaiyar

SMNMML

Through

Gate no. 10

2. Southern Side of Canteen

K. K. Majumdar

CTRM

M. Chakraborty

CMIS

Through

Gate No. 1

3. South West corner of Rd. No. 1 x 2

R. S. Prasad

SITM

Ashok Kumar

SMTM

Through

Gate no. 2

4. In front of BXP Control Room

B. K. Muduli

IPM

B.P. Sahu

MNM (CL)

Through

Gate no. 2

5. In front of RSM building

V. Nagrajan

CITM

R. C. P. Singh

MNMEL

Through

Gate no. 2


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-7

e) In view of the possibility that when disaster strikes, the Incident Co-coordinator or the Functional Co-coordinator may get injured, or may not be able to report for work on account of sickness etc. or be out of station, a succession chart (Alternate Co-coordinators) has been prepared so that the organizational plan remains continuously effective. When the function Co-coordinator or one of the successors is performing the Co-coordinating duties, the successors down the line will be assisting him.

Common Organizational Structure

A single organizational structure has been created and the same will be applicable in case a disaster strikes during normal working hours.

Designated chief Coordinator, GM (T) / GM (TS & HSE) shall take position in Crisis Control Room after assessment of situation at site and declaring the disaster. He will co-ordinate from Crisis Control Room (CCR) as per the requirements to mitigate the disaster.

Coordination during general shift hours

The officer present at the site of occurrence will initiate necessary action for remedial measures and also communicate to RSM, Incident and Chief Coordinators.

Coordinator beyond general shift hours/Holiday/Off day

The Officer present at the site of occurrence will initiate necessary action for remedial measures and inform RSM who will function as Incident Coordinator till designated Incident Coordinator arrives at Site.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-8

8.3. ORGANOGRAM CHART WITH PHONE NUMBERS (Main cum Successor Coordinator for On Site Emergency Preparedness Plan)

ADVISERS TO CHIEF COORDINATOR

Refinery operation related issues

Repair, modification & maintenance issues

Environment & safety related issues

Deputy General Manager (TS) Tel (O): 5401 240279 (BSNL) (R): 4401

240265 (BSNL)

Alternate

Deputy General Manager (TS) Tel (O): 5216 240116 (BSNL) (R): 4216 240216 (BSNL)

Chief Inspection Manager Tel (O): 5931 240143 (BSNL) (R): 4931 240243 (BSNL)

Alternate

Chief Engineering Services Manager Tel (O): 5431 240119 (BSNL) (R): 5431 240219 (BSNL)

Deputy General Manager (HSE) Tel (O): 5212 240112 (BSNL) (R): 4212

240212 (BSNL)

Alternate

Chief Manager (HSE) Tel (O): 5402 240128 (BSNL) (R): 4402 240228 (BSNL )

DISASTER CONTROL ROOM Intercom Ph. No.: 345/5979/5997

BSNL Land Line No.: 240127

CHIEF INCIDENT CONTROLLER (CHIEF COORDINATOR)

GM (Technical) Tel: (O) 5202 / 240102 (BSNL) Tel: (R) 4202 / 240202 (BSNL)

Alternate: General Manager (Tech. Services & HSE)

Tel: (O) 5203 / 240103 (BSNL) Tel: (R) 4203 / 240203 (BSNL)


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-9

Main Coordinators of On Site Emergency Preparedness Plan

Site Incident Controller

(Plant Coordinator) Fire & Safety Coordinator

Dy General Manager (PN)

Tel : (O) 5213, 240113 (BSNL)

(R) 4213, 240223 (BSNL)

Alternate

CPNM

Tel : (O) 5501, 240123 (BSNL)

(R) 4501, 240223 (BSNL)

Senior Fire & Safety Manager

Tel : (O) 5981, 240146 (BSNL)

(R) 4981, 240246 (BSNL)

Alternate

Manager (Fire & Safety)

Tel : (O) 5982

(R) 4982

Repair & Maint. Coordinator Power & Utilities Coordinator

Dy General Manager (MN)

Tel : (O) 5208, 240108 (BSNL)

(R) 4208, 240208 (BSNL)

Alternate

Chief Maintenance Manager

Tel : (O) 5601, 240125 (BSNL)

(R) 4601, 240225 (BSNL)

Chief Power & Utility Manager

Tel : (O) 5741, 240129 (BSNL)

(R) 4741, 240229 (BSNL)

Alternate

Power & Utility Manager

Tel : (O) 5746

(R) 4746, 245804 (BSNL)

Communication & Elect. Maint. Coordinator

Security & Traffic Control Coordinator

Chief Electrical Maintenance Manager

Tel : (O) 5701, 240149 (BSNL)

(R) 4701, 240249 (BSNL)

Alternate

Senior Electrical Maint. Manager

Tel : (O) 5702

(R) 4702

Dy. Commandant - CISF

Tel : (O) 5851, 240158 (BSNL)

(R) 4851, 240258 (BSNL)

Alternate

Asst. Commandant - CISF

Tel: (O) 5852

(R) 4852


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-10

Rescue & Evacuation Coordinator Human Resource, Welfare & Media

Coordinator

Dy General Manager (PJ)

(Shri A D Prasad)

Tel : (O) 5204, 240104 (BSNL)

(R) 4204, 240204 (BSNL)

Alternate

Dy General Manager (PJ)

(Shri R S Yadav)

Tel : (O) 5212, 240112 (BSNL)

(R) 4212, 240212 (BSNL)

General Manager (HR)

Tel : (O) 5210, 240110 (BSNL)

(R) 4210, 240210 (BSNL)

Alternate

Chief Human Resource Manager

Tel : (O) 5222, 240151 (BSNL)

(R) 4222, 2402219 (BSNL)

Materials Coordinator Finance Coordinator

Dy. General Manager (Materials)

Tel : (O) 5215, 240115 (BSNL)

(R) 4215, 240215 (BSNL)

Alternate

Senior Materials Manager

Tel : (O) 5384, 240145 (BSNL)

(R) 4384

Dy. General Manager (Finance)

Tel : (O) 7218, 240122 (BSNL)

(R) 4218, 240222 (BSNL)

Alternate

Senior Finance Manager (I/C)

Tel: (O) 5301, 240157

(R) 4301

Transport Coordinator Medical Coordinator

Chief Manager (A&W)

Tel : (O) 5220, 240135 (BSNL)

(R) 4220, 240235 (BSNL)

Alternate

Senior Manager (A&W)

Tel : (O) 5223, 240172 (BSNL)

(R) 4223

ACMO (I/C) (Medical)

Tel: (O) 4351, 240138 (BSNL)

(R) 4352

Alternate

JCMO

Tel: (O) 4353

(R) 4354


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-11

8.4. ORGANOGRAM FOR COMMUNICATION OF DISASTER (ROLE OF UNIT HEAD)

Notes: 1. Above communication will be done over telephone.

2. Scenario of drill is to be indicated in the communication.

3. Apart from above, DGM (HSE) / CM (HSE) will also communicate about the disaster to the following:

Name & Designation Phone No.

Rakesh Kumar, Member Secretary, BSPCB, Patna

0612-2281250 0612-2282265

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Tel (O): 5201,

240101(BSNL)

Tel (R): 4201,

240201 (BSNL)

Director (Refineries)

Tel (O): 011-26260001/ 26260002

Tel (R): 011-24361364 / 26361938

ED (HSE), RHQ

Tel (O): 011-24364661 / 24365336

Tel (R): 011-26261250

GM (HSE), RHQ

Tel (O): 011- 24362574

Tel (R): 0120-2400430

Chief Secretary, Govt. of Bihar, Patna

Tel (O): 0612-2215804

Mobile: 94731-91193

CHIEF INCIDENT CONTROLLER

(CHIEF COORDINATOR)

GM (T) / GM (TS & HSE)

TOP EXECUTIVES

of HQ &

OISD

DM (BEGUSARAI)

Tel (O): 06243-222285

Tel (R): 06234-230584

Mobile: 94731-91412

NODAL OFFICER OF

MoPNG

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

GROUP


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-12

8.5. Objectives of an Emergency Control Organization

Overall objectives of an emergency control organization shall be:

To promptly control problems as they develop at the scene.

To prevent or limit the impact on other areas and off-site.

To provide emergency personnel, selecting them for duties compatible with their normal work functions wherever feasible. The duties and functions assigned to various people shall include making full use of existing organizations and service groups such as fire, safety, occupational health, medical, transportation, personnel, maintenance, and security.

To assume additional responsibilities by the employees as per laid down procedure of ERDMP whenever an emergency alarm sounds.

In setting up the organization, the need for round-the-clock coverage shall be essential. Shift personnel must be prepared to take charge of the emergency control functions or emergency shutdown of system, if need be, until responsible personnel arrive at the site of emergency. The organization should have an alternate arrangement for each function.

8.6. Roles & Responsibilities of Various Coordinators


On-site Emergency plan of refinery involves all the disciplines required for effective control of the situation. Petroleum Refinery is a complex and multi-departmental organization. Accordingly, the activities like control of the incidence at site, plan of co-ordination with external authorities and other neighboring agencies, rescue and relief operations, making the emergency known to internal and external public have been developed Coordinator-wise, and the action plan of various Coordinators have been detailed. There is an alternate Coordinator for each function to ensure uninterrupted implementation of the plan in the event, if first line of command is absent or not available due to other engagements


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-13

8.6.1. Unit Head (Executive Director)

Unit Head in refineries will perform the advisory role during any Onsite disaster as per necessity as given below.

1. Decision of declaring Onsite disaster by Chief Coordinator should be intimated to Unit Head.

2. Unit Head will receive necessary inputs from Chief Coordinator / Disaster Control Room from time to time and guide Chief Coordinator, as desired.

3. In addition to normal communication channels, Unit Head will communicate with Top level Management at Head Quarters of Refinery, Pipeline & Marketing as necessary.

4. Unit Head will facilitate co-coordinating with Higher Government authorities for seeking any help required.

5. Unit head will inform the DM, Chief Secretary, Director (Refineries) / CEO of the company as per the modified Crisis Management Plan in respect of MoPNG vides Clause no.5 (111) in the event of fire, natural calamity or terrorist attack. Director (Refineries) / CEO shall communicate the same `to the nodal officer of the Ministry who will pass on this information to the Crisis Management Group.

6. Any information to Press or, to any outside Agency should be cleared by Unit Head.

7. Unit Head will facilitate getting assistance from Mutual aid Partners.

8. Unit Head should be kept informed about casualties and he will ensure that necessary medical attention is given to casualties in time.

9. In case disaster is beyond control and which may convert to Offsite disaster, Unit Head should be consulted by the Chief Coordinator before communicating District Authority.

10. Unit Head will conduct Close out meeting with all Coordinators after control of disaster.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-14

8.6.2. Chief Incident Controller (Chief Coordinator)

General Manager (T) / Alternate: General Manager (TS & HSE)

The Chief Incident Controller (CIC) shall have overall responsibility to protect personnel, site facilities, and the public before, during, and after an emergency or disaster. The CIC shall be present at the main emergency control centre for counsel and overall guidance. Responsibilities of the Chief Incident Controller shall include the following:-

1. Ensure that ERDMP is prepared, reviewed and updated as per Check List-5 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010 (Filled Checklist is given in the last of this Chapter on page no. 8-29).

2. Maintain and establish emergency control center, organize and equip the organization with ERDMP and ensure the training of the personnel.

3. Assess the situation and declare onsite emergency.

4. Activate Emergency Control Centre (Disaster Control Room). Mobilize the main coordinators and key personnel.

5. Ensure that appropriate local and national government authorities are notified.

6. Ensure the preparation of media statements, obtaining approval from the CIC and releasing such statements once approval received.

7. Ensure that the response to the incidents or the emergencies, as the case may be, is in line with established procedures. Coordinate process continuity or recovery plan from the incident.

8. Coordinate if any specialist support is required for the above purpose. Take decision on seeking assistance from mutual aid members and external agencies like Police, Fire Brigade, and Hospitals etc.

9. Review continuously of situation and decide on appropriate response strategy.

10. Take stock of casualties and ensure timely medical attention.

11. Ensure correct accounting and position of personnel after the emergency.

12. Ensure the proper communication about the emergency in the neighboring village / public to avoid panic.

13. Order evacuation of personnel as and when necessary.

14. Take decision in consultation with District Magistrate when an Off-site emergency is to be declared.

15. Declare state of normalcy. In case of Off-site emergency, clearance from District Magistrate is to be taken before declaring state of normalcy.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-15

8.6.3. Site Incident Controller (Incident Coordinator)

Dy General Manager (PN) / Alternate: Chief Production Manger (Units)

Refinery Shift Manager (RSM) takes the charge of Site Incident Controller (SIC) at the scene of the incident till the arrival of SIC.

The Site Incident Controller (SIC) shall report directly to the Chief Incident Controller and be the in-charge of the situation at site. He shall be present at the main emergency site. Responsibilities of the SIC shall include the following:

1. Overall in-charge of the emergency situation at site and positions himself at site.

2. Establish communication with Disaster Control Room (DCR) and emergency site so that CIC can coordinate activities among groups / other functional disaster coordinators.

3. Take commands & control of functionaries reported at site. Liaise with the Functional Co-coordinators / DCR regarding resources required at site for mitigation of emergency / disaster situation or for the relief of personnel and casualties.

4. Take priority and quick decisions on:

a) Isolation of facilities / equipments

b) Shutdown of plants, equipments as per requirement.

c) Strategy for deployment of resources of fire fighting/rescue inside the refinery

d) Evacuation of personnel from affected zone to a safer area

e) Through put (Feed) regulation / product routings

f) Product storage and dispatch operations

g) Crude oil receipts

5. Assess periodically of actual disaster zone & resources requirement / deployment and communicates accordingly to Disaster Control Room.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-16

8.6.4. Technical Advisors to Chief Incident Controller (CIC)

Refinery operation related issues: DGM (TS) / Alternate: CTSM (Process)

Repair, modification & maintenance issues: CMNM (Civil) / Alternate: CESM

Environment & safety related issues: DGM (HSE) / Alternate: CM (HSE)

Technical advisors shall report to Chief Incident Controller (CIC) at Disaster Control Room (DCR). Responsibilities of the Technical advisors shall include the following:

1. Activate the Disaster Control Room (DCR) immediately after declaration of On-site Disaster.

2. Prepare the incident report.

3. Keep records related to the incident site ready, namely Operating Manuals, P&IDS, MSDS, and Plot Plan etc.

4. Send information to HO after approval of Chief Coordinator.

5. Deploy officer from QC Laboratory to report at Main Fire Station Control Room for additional manning / extending help in communication & co-ordination activities during disaster.

6. Deploy additional manpower required for manning of Disaster Control Room on round the-clock basis, in case of prolonged operation of DCR.

7. Liaise with all the functional coordinators & update status of incident as well as refinery operations, inventory of products/crude.

8. Technical Advisors to Chief Incident Controller on “Refinery operation related issues” will also be responsible for the role of Recorder as described below:

(a) To maintain a log book for keeping an accurate time record of key information received from the incident or emergency location and of the actions initiated by the CIC.

(b) To record key incident events/actions on incident status board/display.

(c) To maintain essential equipment checklist status.

(d) To ensure all status and information is up to date and correctly displayed.

(e) To ensure the shifting of all necessary recorded material to the alternate Disaster Control Room (DCR) in the event of emergency in main DCR.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-17

8.6.5. Fire & Safety Coordinator

Senior Fire & Safety Manager / Alternate: Manager (Fire & Safety)

Fire & Safety Coordinator shall report to Chief Incident Controller (CIC) and be present at the main emergency site. Responsibilities of the Fire and Safety Coordinator shall include the following:

1. Activate emergency sirens as per the practiced codes. The disaster siren for declaring onsite emergency is to be blown after receiving the directive from Chief Incident Controller (CIC).

2. Take charge of all fire fighting and rescue operations and safety matters.

3. Ensure that key personnel are called in and to release crew of fire fighting operations as per emergency procedure.

4. Assess functioning of his team and communicate with the CIC and or administrative controller for any replenishment or, replacement of manpower or firefighting equipment.

5. Direct the fire brigade personnel and mutual aid members to their desired roles as also proper positioning of the manpower and equipment.

6. Decide the requirement of mutual aid and instruct fire station, who, in turn will contact mutual aid members.

7. Coordinate with outside fire brigades for properly coordinated fire fighting operation.

8. Ensure that casualties are promptly sent to first aid centre / hospital.

9. Arrange requirement of additional fire fighting resources including help from mutual aid partners.

10. Ensure empty and loaded trucks are removed to safer area to the extent possible so as not to affect emergency handling operations.

11. Continually liaise with the SIC and CIC and implement the emergency combat strategies as communicated by him.

12. Ensure adequate hydrant pressure in the mains and monitor water level in the reservoir.

Note: Fire chief shall wear identification jackets at the site of disaster so that he is clearly distinguished among fire fighting personnel and is visible from a distance.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-18

8.6.6. Repair & Maint. Coordinator

Dy General Manager (Maint.) / Alternate: Chief Maintenance Manager

Repair & Maint. Coordinator shall report to Chief Incident Controller (CIC) and be present at the main emergency site. He shall ensure deployment of sub Coordinators to report to Site Incident Controller (SIC) at emergency site to arrange resources and meet requirements. Responsibilities of the Repair & Maint. Coordinator shall include the following:

1. Ensure mobilization of teams from all disciplines of Maintenance (excluding electrical maintenance) and provide all Engineering Services as required by plants or other Coordinators. The Engineering Services include :

a) Workshops

b) Instrument jobs

c) Mechanical jobs

d) Civil Jobs

e) Urgent fabrication.

f) Use of gas cutting for rescue work.

g) Operation of cranes, hydras, towing services etc., and all other Engineering equipment & services.

2. Ensure promptly arrangement for renting / hiring equipment and men to meet emergency requirement.

3. Arrange to keep a liaison with power & utilities coordinator for smooth running of fire pumps.

4. Provide all engineering and maintenance help (excluding electrical maintenance) needed by fire & safety section, civil defense and other civic / govt. Agencies on the request of CIC / SIC / other coordinators.

5. Ensure arrangement of urgent fabrication jobs from outside agencies if the need arises.

6. Apprise promptly the CIC about the issues requiring his attention.

7. Liaise with SIC and other coordinators for their engineering and maintenance needs.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-19

8.6.7. Power And Utilities Coordinator

Dy. General Manager (P&U) Alternate: Chief Power & Utilities Manager

Power And Utilities Coordinator shall report to Chief Incident Controller (CIC) at Disaster Control Room (DCR). Responsibilities of the Power and Utilities Coordinator shall include the following:

1. Ensure smooth operation of Captive Power Plant and supply of Utilities.

2. Ensure uninterrupted water supply and smooth operation of fire water pump in order to maintain required fire water header pressure in assistance with Repair & Maint. Coordinator.

3. Ensure that diesel tanks of individual fire pumps are kept topped during the running of the pumps in assistance with Materials Coordinator.

4. Liaise with other coordinators for their power and utilities needs.

5. Apprise promptly the CIC and Repair & Maint. Coordinator about the issues requiring their attention.

6. Ensure that TPS air supply does not get any interruption.

7. Arrange power from State Electricity Board if refinery captive power plant fails.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-20

8.6.8. Communication & Electrical Maintenance Coordinator

Chief Electrical Maintenance Manager

Alternate: Senior Electrical Maintenance Manager

Communication & Electrical Maintenance Coordinator shall report to Chief Incident Controller (CIC) at Disaster Control Room (DCR). Responsibilities of the Communication & Electrical Maintenance Coordinator shall include the following:

1. Keep the entire communication system alive and functional.

2. Ensure mobilization of the team from electrical maintenance department and provide all Electrical Maintenance / Engineering Services as required by plants or other Coordinators. The Electrical Maintenance / Engineering Services include :

a) Electrical Jobs

b) Electrical Workshop

c) Electrical isolation of equipment

d) Provision of temporary lighting, temporary connection etc.

3. Ensure promptly arrangement for renting / hiring equipment and men to meet emergency requirement for Communication & Electrical Maintenance / Engineering jobs.

4. Provide all electrical maintenance and engineering help needed by fire & safety section, civil defense and other civic / govt. Agencies on the request of CIC / SIC / other coordinators

5. Apprise promptly the CIC about the issues requiring his attention.

6. Liaise with SIC and other coordinators for their communication and electrical maintenance / engineering needs.

7. Liaise / Coordination with BSNL, Begusarai to meet any communication need.

8. Ensure the availability of Communications Systems as following:

(a) Ensure that the Disaster Control Room (DCR) communication equipments and systems are maintained to a high standard and remain functional throughout the emergency.

(b) Ensure that a back-up communication system is available in the event of the Disaster Control Room (DCR) is not available.

(c) Provide quality and diverse communication systems for use in routine and emergency situations.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-21

8.6.9. Security & Traffic Control Coordinator

Dy. Commandant – CISF / Alternate: Asst. Commandant - CISF

Security & Traffic Control Coordinator shall report to Chief Incident Controller (CIC) and be present at the main emergency site. He shall be responsible for security of the installation during any incident or emergency situation. Responsibilities of the Security & Traffic Control Coordinator shall include the following:

1. Ensure arrangement of strict security at refinery gates to prevent entry of unauthorized personnel. Regulate traffic and restrict the movement of persons at Gate.

2. Ensure traffic control at the incident site. Cordon the emergency site and to facilitate movement of the fire brigade, ambulances, rescue vehicles, and staff on emergency duty etc.

3. Keep the refinery gates and roads within the refinery / around the refinery clear of traffic & crowd for easy movement of fire brigade, ambulances, rescue vehicles, and staff on emergency duty etc.

4. Allow the vehicles to go out of the refinery gate if required for safety and security of the transport.

5. Arrange CISF assistance for fire fighting, rescue and other operations at emergency site in consultation with SIC / Fire & Safety coordinator.

6. Mobilize CISF personnel from CISF Township / Refinery Township to refinery main gate for further instructions / deployment.

7. Maintain security of the office in the event of an office evacuation.

8. Provide office security and assist authorities in the event of civil unrest or when required organize additional security at the emergency site.

9. Obtain an approved visitor list from the security department or reception for ensuring that personnel on the list are escorted to reception by security staff.

10. Obtain initial briefing from Chief Incident Controller and provide security information / status reports to CIC & SIC during the emergency.

11. Assume responsibility for any task delegated by Chief Incident Controller. Assess the emergency, identify security specific problems and recommend solutions to Chief Incident Controller.

12. Maintain close liaison with local Police and Intelligence.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-22

8.6.10. Rescue & Evacuation Coordinator

Dy. General Manager (PJ) / Alternate: Chief Manager (CPJM)

Rescue & Evacuation Coordinator shall report to Chief Incident Controller (CIC) and be present at the main emergency site. Responsibilities of the Rescue & Evacuation Coordinator shall include the following:

1. Coordinate with area in-charge, fire-fighting crew, SIC and CISF personnel for the rescue of the trapped personnel, if any.

2. Carry out search & rescue.

3. Liaise / Coordinate with Medical Coordinator for the evacuation of the injured rescued persons to First Aid Centre / Refinery Hospital / Other Hospitals.

4. Apprise the CIC about the stock of casualties and other issues requiring his attention.

5. Ensure the evacuation of personnel in case of a major emergency from affected area and as a precautionary measure to the “Assembly Points”.

6. Ensure head counts at assembly points.

7. Carry out the evacuation operation as directed by the CIC and in coordination with the civil authorities.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-23

8.6.11. Human Resource, Welfare and Media Coordinator

General Manager (HR) Alternate: Chief Human Resource Manager

Human Resource, Welfare and Media Coordinator shall report to Chief Incident Controller (CIC) at Disaster Control Room (DCR). He shall be overall responsible for welfare of employees & disaster control crew, establishing interface with media and other administrative activities during any incident or emergency. Responsibilities of the Human Resource, Welfare and Media Coordinator shall include the following:

1. Overall responsible for community relation.

2. Liaise / coordinate with public bodies like Govt. bodies, District Administration, Police, Civil authorities, Civil Defense and Hospitals etc.

3. Liaise with various Press Medias and handle media interviews. Prepare media / press statements in consultation with CIC and ensure their release after approval of Unit Head.

4. Arrange drinking water, soft drinks, snacks and food etc. as required at the site of emergency and at Disaster Control Room for firefighting crew, medical teams, personnel on plant emergency duties etc. The requirement of food would depend on the situation. However, arrangement shall be made in advance to have enough provisions and manpower in canteen to provide additional meals, if required.

5. Assess and provide linen, bedding, clothing etc. as needed in the refinery during and after the emergency.

6. Liaise with transport coordinator for transporting of the victims to hospitals.

7. Arrange to inform the families of staff who are injured.

8. Arrange, in consultation with CIC, for the proper communication about the emergency in the township and neighboring villages / public to avoid panic

9. Ensure distribution of Dos’ and Don’ts’ for nearby community.

10. Ensure that employees are well informed about the incident and what is expected from them.

11. Ensure arrangement for photography / videography of the incident.

12. Liaise with CISF for gate entry of outsiders, VIPs and make arrangements of their visits.

13. Direct external agencies on their arrival to respective coordinators at desired locations.

14. Apprise CIC about the visit of outsiders and other issues requiring his attention.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-24

8.6.12. Material Coordinator

Dy General Manager (Materials) / Alternate: Chief Materials Manager

Material Coordinator shall report to Chief Incident Controller (CIC) at Disaster Control Room (DCR) and ensure deployment of sub Coordinators to report to SIC at emergency site to meet requirements. He shall be the overall in-charge for procurement, receipt and issue of urgent materials during the emergency. Responsibilities of the Material Coordinator shall include the following:

1. Ensure positioning of staff at Central stores and purchase office for emergency issue, receipt or procurement of materials.

2. Procure any equipment, chemical, medicine, safety related or any other item as required by CIC, SIC or other disaster coordinators.

3. Review the stock of Diesel available at Stores and make arrangement for augmentation of stock.

4. Apprise CIC regarding material procurement and other issues requiring his attention.

5. Liaise with SIC and other coordinators for their materials and purchase needs.

6. Coordinate material procurement from other refineries.

7. Ensure assistance from Head Quarters in connection with material procurement or any other requirements.

8. Liaise / coordinate with contact surrounding agencies and nearby markets for assistance regarding material procurement.

8.6.13. Finance Coordinator

Dy. General Manager (Finance) Alternate: Chief Finance Manager

Finance Coordinator shall report to Chief Incident Controller (CIC) at Disaster Control Room (DCR). He shall be the overall in-charge for arrangement of required finance during the emergency. Responsibilities of the Finance Coordinator shall include the following:

1. Ensure arrangement of finance for the Coordinators for emergency purchase.

2. Ensure care of insurance formalities.

3. Provide other financial help if any required.

4. Liaise with SIC and other coordinators for their financial needs.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-25

8.6.14. Transport Coordinator

Chief Manager (A&W) / Alternate: Senior Manager (Admin & Welfare)

Transport Coordinator shall report to Chief Incident Controller (CIC) at Disaster Control Room (DCR). He shall be the overall in-charge for arrangement of required transportation services during the emergency. Responsibilities of the Transport Coordinator shall include the following:

1. Ensure mobilization of all available vehicles and transport for emergency use, including renting of vehicles as needed.

2. Ensure transport to medical Coordinator for transporting the victims to the hospital.

3. Liaise with local transport authorities.

4. Liaise with the Coordinators of ‘Assembly Points’ for mobilization of vehicles for evacuation of personnel gathered at Assembly Points.

5. Apprise CIC regarding issues requiring his attention.

6. Liaise with SIC and other coordinators for their transport needs.

8.6.15. Medical Coordinator

Asst. Chief Medical Officer (I/C) / Alternate: Joint Chief Medical Officer

Medical Coordinator shall report to Chief Incident Controller (CIC) and be present at the Township Hospital. He shall be the overall in-charge for providing medical aid & casualty management during the emergency. Responsibilities of the Medical Coordinator shall include the following:

1. Activate First Aid Centre and Township hospital. Mobilize medical and Para medical team internally for prompt medical attention to casualties.

2. Mobilize ambulances to transfer casualties to First Aid Centre & Hospital.

3. Maintain casualties register, type of injury, number, hospitalization etc.

4. Liaise with external hospitals for assistance and treatment, as needed.

5. Liaise with Material Coordinator for procurement of required drugs / medical equipments.

6. Liaise with Transport Coordinator for arrangement of additional vehicles, as needed, for transportation of the casualties.

7. Apprise CIC regarding issues requiring his attention.

8. Coordinate with police for completing the formalities in case of fatalities.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-26

8.6.16. Maintenance of ERDMP Records

ERDMP records shall be maintained for all kind of emergencies covering near Miss, Level-I, Level-II and Level-III. An Incident Record Register Organization shall be maintained for the above purpose and post–disaster documentation like resources deployed, relief, rehabilitation measures and lesson learned to avoid re-occurrence of any such emergency. Head of Fire & Safety Department shall be responsible for maintenance of such records.

8.6.17. Public Relations and Media Program

A good public relations program is extremely important in an emergency situation. Inquiries will normally be received from the media, government agencies, local organizations and the general public during the emergency.

Human Resource, Welfare and Media Coordinator shall identify and deploy a sub Coordinator (a Communication Officer) that is well-equipped and trained in media relations for implementation of a public relations or media plan, as needed, during the emergency.

Local media and television stations will also be utilized for periodic announcements during an emergency in order to assist in reducing rumours and speculation.

Initial releases shall be restricted to statements of facts such as the name of the installation involved, type and quantity of spill, time of spill, and countermeasure actions being taken. All facts must be stated clearly and consistently to everyone.

8.6.18. Recorder

The Recorder responsibility will be to maintain an accurate time record of key information received from the incident or emergency location and to record the actions initiated by the CIC and for implementing the emergency response actions below:

(f) To record key incident events/actions on incident status board/display.

(g) To maintain essential equipment checklist status.

(h) To ensure all status and information is up to date and correctly displayed.

(i) To ensure the shifting of all necessary recorded material to the alternate Disaster Control Room (DCR) in the event of emergency in main DCR.

(j) To maintain a log book.

Technical Advisors to Chief Incident Controller on “Refinery operation related issues” [DGM (TS) / Alternate: CTSM (Process)] will be responsible for the role of Recorder during the emergency.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-27

8.6.19. Communications Services

The Communication & Elect. Maint. Coordinator shall ensure the following actions:

(d) Ensure that the Disaster Control Room (DCR) communication equipments and systems are maintained to a high standard and remain functional throughout the emergency.

(e) Ensure that a back-up communication system is available in the event of the Disaster Control Room (DCR) is not available.

(f) Provide quality and diverse communication systems for use in routine and emergency situations.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-28

8.6.20. Fire Siren

9 nos. of 5 H.P. (range 8 Km) fire sirens have been installed. 7 Nos. fire sirens are installed in refinery area and 2 nos. in township. The locations of fire siren are as follows:

1. Fire Station

2. Administrative Building

3. OM&S Old building

4. Sector – 6

5. Crude tank area

6. HBCPL

7. Substation no. 27

8. Guest House (Township)

9. Water Tank(Township)

In case of fire, these sirens are sounded as per the siren codes as given below. Every day testing of all these sirens is carried out at 07.00 AM by blowing the siren for one minute.

8.6.21. Fire Siren Codes

For Small Fires No siren will be sounded.

For Major Fires Walling type continuously for two minutes.

For Disaster Repetition of major fire siren 3 times with a gap of 2minutes in each major fire siren

For All Clear Signal Straight sound for two minutes.

For Simultaneous Fire No siren unless it is a major fire.

Testing of Fire Sirens Straight sound for one minute. It is tested every day at 07.00 Hrs. from Fire Station.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-29

CHECK LIST-5

[Refer Regulation 14.2.1 (a)]

Review and Updation of ERDMP

Sr.# Check-point

1 Frequency of mock-drills for practice, refinement and updation

Onsite Disaster Mock Drill: Once in every quarter

Offsite Disaster Mock Drill: Once in every Year

2 Are the records for periodic Mock drills maintained in a well defined format.

Yes

3 After each drill, whether assembly meetings involving all staff and contract personnel are conducted to share experience of the event as also to identify the shortcomings and scopes for further improvement in procedures. Whether the issues are discussed and the plan modified suitably.

Yes

4 Does the review ensures efficiency of the plan particularly w.r.t. response, communication and coordination aspects.

Yes

5 Do the Mutual Aid members participate in the drills and based on the actual response and difficulties experienced, corrective actions initiated for refinement of the plan.

No Mutual Aid Members

6 Does a procedure exist in incorporating the findings/ learnings of the actual disaster management handling, if any so that the plan can be revised accordingly.

Yes


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-30

Communication Flow Chart for Notification Of Emergency

Note: Wherever communication exists for any level of emergency, it automatically implies that the communication exists for all higher levels of emergencies.

EMERGENCY CONTROL

CENTRE


Executive Director

Employee/

Security

Fire safety / HSE Coordinator and fire

team

CRISIS MGMT

GROUP

Mutual Aid

Members Info. to Fire

Brigade, Police, Medical and Government

Authorities

First Responder

Fire and gas detection system /

SCADA System

Police

Public

District Administration

and Central Govt. agencies

Note: Level I Level II

Level III

Site Incidence Controller and

Others Disaster Coordinators


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 8-31

Chief Incident Controller

Chairman of Fire Control

Committee

Chairman of Health & Welfare

Committee

Chairman of Transportation

& Traffic Arrangement Committee

Chairman of Communication

Committee

Chairman of Law & Order

Committee

Off-Site Incident Controller

District Magistrate Begusarai

FIRE & Safety Coordinator


(Incident Coordinator)

Medical Coordinator

Engineering Services

Repair & Maint. Coordinator

Power & Utilities Coordinator


Support & Auxiliary Services

Hr, Welfare And Media Coordinator

Transport Coordinator

Security Coordinator

Finance Coordinator

Materials Coordinator

Communication Flow Chart for Control of Emergency

Rescue & Evacuation

Coordinator


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 9-1

CHAPTER – 9

INFRASTRUCTURE



BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 9-2

9.1. CRISIS CONTROL ROOM (DISASTER CONTROL ROOM)

(Reference: Section 15.1 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010):

All communication related to emergency shall be routed to crisis control room which is situated on first floor of Fire Station Building.

The Crisis Control Room is equipped with communication systems (Telephones, Walki-Talkies, ), Operating Manuals, Disaster Management Plans (On-Site/Off-Site), Refinery Lay out Plan, Display of names & telephone nos. of all coordinators etc. Organogram of On-Site Disaster Management Plan is also displayed. The crisis control room shall be activated when the disaster siren is sounded and shall be headed by GM (T) and in his absence by GM (TS)

9.2. ASSEMBLY POINTS


The people working in refinery battery area will assemble in the following area during any emergency:

Sl. No. Area / Location

1. In front of DCS-III (OM&S) Control Room



4. Around smoking booth near DHDT Field control room

5. Near old Maintenance Planning Building.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 9-3

9.3. EVACUATION OF PEOPLE

The evacuation of people shall be decided by incident coordinator based on situation at site. This may include partial evacuation or total evacuation from the site of incident or from the nearby areas of the Refinery.

The communication about evacuation shall be announced on Central P.A. System or P. A. System of Process Unit area or through hand held Megaphones.

Route of evacuation will be through main roads across the wind and specifically depending upon the individual case.

No short cut will be adopted unless communicated so by Fire Chief depending upon the situation.

All available modes at site shall be used for evacuation of persons from the site of incident to assembly/ Muster points at safe location.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 10-1

CHAPTER – 10

DECLARATION OF ON-SITE AND OFF-SITE EMERGENCIES



BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 10-2

(1) An emergency starts as a small incident which may become a major incident with passage of time. At the initial stages, the emergency organisation chart shall be put into action. If the incident goes beyond control, the on-site emergency plan will be actuated by the Chief Incident Controller at the appropriate stage as considered necessary.

(2) During idle shift or holidays, the security & Fire & Safety personnel will combat

the incident as per the ERDMP organization chart and at the same time inform various emergency coordinators for guidance and control of the situation.

(3) When emergency becomes catastrophic and evacuation beyond the plant

premises is considered necessary by the Chief Incident Controller, the situation will be handed over to district authority for implementing the off-site emergency plan.

(4) The management of emergency henceforth has to be controlled by the district

crisis management group under the supervision of the District Collector/DDMA. (5) In addition to preparation of on-site emergency plan, relevant information to the

district authorities for the preparation of off-site emergency plan has been furnished as a part of the statutory responsibilities of the occupier of every industry handling hazardous substance.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 10-3

Communication Flow Chart for Notification Of Emergency

Note: Wherever communication exists for any level of emergency, it automatically implies that the communication exists for all higher levels of emergencies.

EMERGENCY CONTROL

CENTRE


Executive Director

Employee/

Security

Fire safety / HSE Coordinator and fire

team

CRISIS MGMT

GROUP

Mutual Aid

Members Info. to Fire

Brigade, Police, Medical and Government

Authorities

First Responder

Fire and gas detection system /

SCADA System

Police

Public

District Administration

and Central Govt. agencies

Note: Level I Level II

Level III

Site Incidence Controller and

Others Disaster

Coordinators


Committee




Committee



BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 10-4

Chief Incident Controller


Committee


Committee




Medical Coordinator









Finance Coordinator


Rescue & Evacuation

Coordinator


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e |11-1

CHAPTER – 11

RESOURCE FOR CONTROLLING EMERGENCY



BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e |11-2

Fire Fighting Facilities IOCL, Barauni refinery has the following fire fighting facilities:

Fire water reservoir

Fire Pump House

Fire Hydrant and Water Monitor system

HVLRM’s


Semi Fixed Foam Pourer System

Auto Foam System 11.1. Fire Water

Fire water is provided in three above ground reservoirs of capacity 7500 m3 – 2 tanks and 5000 m3 – 1 tank. These tanks receive water either from fresh water header or bio-treated water pumps. All 3 tanks are interconnected and having suction line to all pumps. Total capacity of fire water storage tank is 20,000 M3.

11.2. Fire Pump house

Fire pump house has 11 nos. of fire water pumps of 700 m3/hr capacities at a discharge pressure of 10.8 Kg/cm2 each and two Jockey pumps of 250 m3/hr at 12 Kg/cm2.

The main fire pump house has 6 diesel drives and 5 electrical drives.

11.3. Fire hydrant and Water Monitor system

Total refinery area has been covered with around 32 Kms long fire water network. The main features of the fire water network include:


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e |11-3

DH fire hydrant = 712 nos

Water monitors = 250 nos

High Volume Long Range Monitor = 45 nos

Dry / Wet Riser system at Coker – A, Coker –B, TPS, ADMN building, HGU, DHDT, RFCCU, SRU.

11.4. Auto water spray / deluge system

Quartzoid bulb type automatic water sprinkler system has been installed in the following areas,

Storage vessels,

LPG bulk dispatch facilities

LPG Pumps

LPG Horton spheres & LPG Mounded bullets & LPG MB P/House

H2 storage bullets in CRU

TPS Transformer area

11.5. Semi fixed foam pourer

All hydrocarbon tanks containing Class-A & Class-B petroleum are provided with Semi fixed foam pourer system as per OISD Std.-116. Foam pourers are provided on top of the tank shell and the foam –water solution lines are extended up to road side for introducing foam from road side with help of Foam Tenders.

11.6. Auto Foam System

These systems are provided for auto fire fighting in case of crude tank (238,239 & 240) fire & RFCCU feed tank (801,802,803) fire.

FIRE FIGHTING APPLIANCES/ EQUIPMENT/ CHEMICALS / PPEs AVAILABLE WITH BR

SN Item Qty (Nos.)

1 Foam Tenders 04


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e |11-4

2 Foam Nurser 01

3 DCP Tender 01

4 Hydraulic Platform 01

5 Fire fighting hose 50

6 Fire fighting Branches 20

7 Water curtain 05

8 Suction hose 10

9 DCP Fire extinguisher 1000

10 Mega phone 02

11 Safety hand lamp 10

12 Ceiling hook 05

13 Fire proximity suit 08

14 Foam generator 03

15 Fireman axe 05

16 Safety helmet 50

17 Ear plug 100

18 Dust mask 100

19 Chemical Respirator 20

20 Splash proof goggles 100

21 PVC suit 10

22 B A SET 10

23 Gas detectors 10

24 Oil sorbent 10

25 Retractable fall arrestor (5 M & 10 M) 05

26 Portable Cutter / Spreader 02


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e |11-5

Fire and Gas Detection System

Latest gas detection equipment is available in the refinery to monitor the environment on continuous basis as well as on grab sampling method. We are also planning to install Hydrocarbon gas detectors in the various operating areas.

Hydrocarbon detectors

AVU-1, AVU-2, AVU-3, CRU, TPS, DHDT, HGU-1, HGU-2, RFCCU,SRU, MSQ, OM&S Offsite, Coker A & B, LRU

Hydrogen detectors

HGU-1, HGU-2

H2S ground level detectors

SRU, DHDT

Smoke detectors All Control Rooms of Process Units, OM&S, Sub Stations, TPS, Cable Gallery, QC lab, Admn. Building, Project Building

CO Analyzers RFCCU

Dragger tube for H2S, CO & SO2

Tubes for taking sample of confined space / area. These have been kept at different locations.

Environmental Monitoring

Monitoring of the environment is being done on regular basis through an external agency and a record of the same is kept by HSE department.

Medical Facilities Medical facilities available at Barauni Refinery are described in details in chapter-13 and in Annexure- 7 & 8. Medical Facilities Available Outside, Please refer Annexure- 12, 13 & 14.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e |11-6

Communication Facilities

Communication Facilities Available at BR

SN Item Qty (Nos.)

1 Walkie-Talkie AVAILABLE

2 Pager System with Group Paging Facility AVAILABLE

3 Group SMS Facility AVAILABLE

4 Inter Com System AVAILABLE

5 Public Address System AVAILABLE

6 Megaphone AVAILABLE

7 Intercom AVAILABLE

8 Pager System with Group Paging Facility AVAILABLE

Evacuation & Sheltering Facilities Please refer Chapter- 14.

In Built Facilities And Other Emergency Safety Interlock Facilities The design of process units and connected facilities has been done in accordance with National / International Codes and sound engineering practices. The process design and detailed engineering takes care of various safety aspects of plant and other equipment consideration. The layout of the plant is confirming to wind direction, wind velocity and other Meteorological parameters. The equipment layout confirms not only the design standards, but also takes scare of safety aspects like easy passage for movement for operating and maintenance personnel. The provision of Safety release valves connected to a well designed flare system confirms to design codes / standards. For safety in operation, all process units of the refinery have been provided with 100% automatic control system proven in the field of process industries. This enhances the safety aspects further. Microprocessor based Distributed Digital Control System (DDCS) has been installed in the all process units and tank farm area, replacing the conventional Pneumatic Control System. This system has inherent advantages over the earlier system as it has got analytical capability as well. The facility exists for the plant safety, in case any operating parameters go out of control, in the event of system failure. Adequate


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e |11-7

shutdown valves, trips have been provided to bring down the unit operation safely to take care of emergency situations. To take care of safety through design and in built facilities there is a well qualified group of safety engineers and process engineers in the process section. The main activities of the group are to review the existing facilities. Risk analysis study, Disaster Management Planning, Preparation of scheme, suggesting and taking measures for adoption of new technology in the field of safety. In order to avoid breakdown of the equipment leading the potential risk situation, an effective maintenance schedule covering both static and rotary equipment have been adopted in the refinery. A well defined and elaborate maintenance manual exists. All the procedures and practices and safety precaution to be observed during any maintenance are clearly laid down in the manual. During any maintenance job, work permit system is strictly adhered to, and is being closely monitored by concerned supervisor and fire & safety division. The use of necessary personal protective equipment like safety belt for working at height, face shield and hand gloves for welding, cutting, grinding, breathing apparatus set for any confined place entry etc. is strictly complied with. Advanced control system available at the time of project implementation for automatic operation of process units had been adopted in the plant. Unit wise trip system also exists for safety of the equipments.

Sources of Local Assistance Please refer Annexure- 12 to 17.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e |11-8

CHECK LIST-6

[Refer Regulation 17.0 (5)]

Availability of resources [ internal / external ]


1 Details of firefighting equipment of the location is incorporated in the DMP

Yes

2 Information on critical resources like no. of fire hydrants, water monitors, fire fighting pumps, static water storage, portable firefighting equipment and foam systems are included

Yes

3 Available resources as per Schedule-IV Yes

4 Location has storage of water for 4 hours fire fighting. In case water availability is less, a plan for replacement from nearby sources

Yes

5 Details of drainage system including Oil Water Separator is available in DMP, wherever applicable.

Yes

6 Requirement and availability of Personal Protective Equipment

Yes

7 Whether manpower available during regular as well as idle shift hours including security personnel clearly indicated in the plan.

Yes

External and Internal Resources for combating Emergency

8 Does the plan enumerate the following resources available internally with the location as also from external agencies including Mutual Aid Members and

Yes


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e |11-9

govt agencies like fire brigade, police, municipal authorities etc. :

a. Water – from static reservoir as also mobile water tankers

b. Fire Hoses

c. Specialized nozzles e.g. fog, jet, triple purpose etc.

d. Mobile water monitors

e. Fire Extinguishers – type and capacity

f. Water Gel Blankets

g. Foam Compounds

h. First Aid material, Medicines, Stretchers

i. Mobile / fixed ladders

j. Vehicles available

Trained manpower for combating emergency

Yes

9. Any other resources considered necessary No


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 12-1

CHAPTER – 12

DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION



BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 12-2

12.1. Brief Description Of The Refinery (Site, Location, Vicinity)

Barauni Refinery (BR) is located in Development block, Barauni, of District Begusarai of the state of Bihar about 8kms away from the northern or left bank of Ganges. Situated 125 kilometers from Patna, the latitude and longitude at the BR site is 25o26’N and 86o04’ E respectively. The district Headquarter town of Begusarai is about 5 km from the refinery

The refinery was built in collaboration with Russia and Romania. it was commissioned in 1964 with a refining capacity of 1 Million Metric Tons per Annum (MMTPA) and it was dedicated to the Nation by the then Union Minister for Petroleum, Prof. Humayun Kabir in January 1965. After de-bottlenecking, revamping and expansion project, its capacity today is 6 MMTPA. Matching secondary processing facilities such Resid Fluidized Catalytic Cracker (RFCC), Diesel Hydrotreating (DHDT), Sulphur Recovery Unit (SRU) have been added. Theses state of the art eco-friendly technologies have enabled the refinery to produce environment- friendly green fuels complying with international standards. Barauni Refinery was initially designed to process low sulphur crude oil (sweet crude) of Assam. After establishment of other refineries in the Northeast, Assam crude is unavailable for Barauni. Hence, sweet crude is being sourced from African, South East Asian and Middle East countries like Nigeria, Iraq&Malaysia. The refinery receives crude oil by pipeline from Paradip on the east coast via Haldia. With various revamps and expansion projects at Barauni Refinery, capability for processing high-sulphur crude has been added — high-sulphur crude oil (sour crude) is cheaper than low-sulphur crudes — thereby increasing not only the capacity but also the profitability of the refinery.

The plant is located in Begusarai district of Bihar. The site is located about 8 km of the river Ganga.

A vicinity map indicating the refinery site has been enclosed in Annexure-1.

12.2. Configuration of Barauni Refinery

The block flow diagram and Layout plan of the refinery are enclosed as Annexure-3 and Annexure-4.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 12-3



1 AVU-I 1.75

2 AVU-II 1.75

3 AVU-III 2.5

4 COKER-A 0.60

5 COKER-B 0.50

6 CRU 0.30









7 Amine Absorption / Regeneration Unit / Sulphur Recovery Unit (ARU/ SRU)

2X40 TPD

MSQ UNITS








7 Prime G+ 322

8 HDS 224


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 12-4

12.3. Meteorological Conditions

The consequences of released toxic or flammable material are largely dependent on the prevailing weather conditions. For the assessment of major scenarios involving release of toxic or flammable materials, the most important meteorological parameters are those that affect the atmospheric dispersion of the escaping material. The crucial variables are wind direction, wind speed, atmospheric stability and temperature. Rainfall does not have any direct bearing on the results of the risk analysis; however, it can have beneficial effects by absorption / washout of released materials. Actual behavior of any release would largely depend on prevailing weather condition at the time of release.

ATMOSPHERIC PARAMETERS The Climatological data based on EIA study is summarized below in the Table:

Parameter Avg. value

Ambient temperature ,degC 31.7

Atmospheric pressure,(mmHg) 758

Relative Humidity (%) 67

*REF. EIA for MSQ project 1997,BR,TABLE 3.6.7 WIND SPEED AND WIND DIRECTION During the period from March 2007 to June 2007, the overall (average) windspeed was 7.05km/hr.The WINDROSE DIAGRAM indicates that the most predominant wind direction for the summer season was from East/ North East.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 12-5

WIND ROSE DIAGRAM

N

Period:1996-1997 JAN-DEC

STATION : BARAUNI REFINERY

*Please refer Chapter-4 for further details.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 12-6

12.4. Neighboring Population

Please refer Chapter-4 for further details.

12.5. Flora And Fauna

12.6. Please refer Chapter-4 for further details.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 13-1

CHAPTER – 13

MEDICAL FACILITIES



BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 13-2

Details of The Medical Facilities

Provided at Barauni Refinery

(A) First Aid Centre:

There is a fully fledged round the clock manned First Aid Centre inside the refinery near the main gate. The location of First Aid Centre is prominent and known to all.

(B) Arrangement and Facilities

i) At First Aid Centre

a) Equipments

Oxygen Cylinder

Suction apparatus

Ambu resuscitator

Stretcher

Dressing materials

2 bed observation room

b) Emergency medicine

Emergency life saving drugs for treatment of minor Injuries

Comprehensive medicines for Disaster Management are available at Refinery Hospital.

c) Decontamination facilities

Decontamination facilities are available with Civil Maintenance Department.

d) Ambulance Vans

There is one Ambulance Van, which remains available round the clock.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 13-3

ii) At Township Hospital (6 km from the refinery)

A full fledged 49 bed hospital is in the refinery township which is about 7 km away from refinery site.

a) Equipments

Stretcher and wheel chair

Oxygen cylinder/ concentrator

ECG machine

Defibrillator

Pulse oxymeter

Ambu bag

Endotracheal intubation set

b) Emergency Medicines

All the required medicines to deal with any emergency are available

c) Ambulance Vans

There is one ambulance van, which remain available round the clock.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 13-4

(C) Hospital Facilities

1. Refinery Hospital

Main Township Hospital : Capacity 49 Beds and 10 Doctors (04 Nos. Regular & 06 Nos. Adhoc CDMO)

Site Hospital (For Emergency) : Capacity 2 Beds

2. Hospitals in The Vicinity

Sl. No.

Name Of The Hospital Distance From Refinery

1. NAZERATH 25 KMS.

2. BEGUSARAI CIVIL HOSPITAL 12 KMS.

4. RAILWAY HOSPITAL, GARHARA 20 KMS.

3. Private Nursing Homes / Medical Specialists

SL. NO.

NURSING HOMES TELEPHONE NUMBERS

1. DR. A.K.ARORA 243013

2. DR. A.K.JAISWAL 222617

3. DR. A.K.JHA 222476

4. DR. A. RAI 220242

5. DR. A.P.SAH 224164


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 14-1

CHAPTER – 14

EVACUATION



BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 14-2

14.1. Evacuation Of People

The evacuation of people shall be decided by incident coordinator based on situation at site. This may include partial evacuation or total evacuation from the site of incident or from the nearby areas of the Refinery.

The communication about evacuation shall be announced on Central P.A. System or P. A. System of Process Unit area or through hand held Megaphones.

Route of evacuation will be through main roads across the wind and specifically depending upon the individual case.

No short cut will be adopted unless communicated so by Fire Chief depending upon the situation.

All available modes at site shall be used for evacuation of persons from the site of incident to assembly/ Muster points at safe location.

14.2. Assembly Points

The people working in refinery battery area will assemble in the following area

during any emergency:

Note: On assembly, the respective HOD’s shall ensure that all the employees working in his department have assembled by Head counts.

Sl. No. Area / Location

1. In front of DCS-III (OM&S) Control Room



4. Around smoking booth near DHDT Field control room

5. Near Maintenance Planning Building.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 14-3

14.3. Shutdown & Emergency Procedure And Access Control:

Please refer the Work Instruction Manual of various departments.

14.4. Facilities For Protection From Hazardous Materials

The facilities for protection from hazardous materials such as crude oil, petroleum products, fuels, chemicals and gases in the event of an emergency are provided:

Provisions of foam pourer and water sprinkler.

A well knit network of pressurized fire water line with requisite no. of hydrants and monitors.

Insulation of the Spheres from outside to eliminate direct exposure to heat.

Provision of Safety relief valves.

Adherence to SMPV and other statutory rules for periodic inspection & testing.

Provision of Hydrocarbon gas detector/H2S gas detector /H2 detector

Round the clock coverage of fire fighting crew well equipped with latest fire fighting equipments.

Dyke in all storage tanks.

The Procedure to be followed during emergencies is enclosed as Annexure –12.

14.5. Protection Of Vital Equipments And Materials

Vital materials like crude oil and product tanks, LPG & Hydrogen storage vessels are protected by providing appropriate fire protection system as per OSID standard-116. This includes: automatic detection and water spray system for LPG storage, Hydrogen, Semi fixed foam system for crude / product tanks.

Vital equipments like turbo generators & GTs in CPP is protected by means of automatic fixed carbon dioxide system.

CPP cable gallery is totally protected by means of automatic smoke detection and water spray system.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 14-4

Generating transformers are protected by means of automatic high velocity water spray system.

Inside the units all light hydrocarbon and hot pumps have been protected by means of manually operated water spray system.

Hydrocarbon gas detectors have been provided at strategic locations to detect hydrocarbon release at its incipient stage so that corrective action can be taken before hand.

Vital equipment/places like process control room and substations have been provided with automatic heat / smoke detectors for early detection of any fire situation and its alarm has been provided in the local control rooms.

Vital documents of HR deptt. have been protected by means of keeping the documents inside the fire proof cabinet.

In the information system deptt. the computer room being a vital room has been provided with smoke detectors.

All the files in servers of IS deptt. is protected by means of duplicate system.

For early communication of emergency situation 244 nos. of manual call points have been provided inside old refinery area. An intelligent addressable fire alarm system has been provided in BXP area.

In addition CCTV has been installed inside the plant to monitor critical units/area especially during odd hours.

Vitals light hydrocarbon pumps have been provided with double seal to prevent leakage.

Special firefighting equipment like Imported Fire Proximity suit has been kept at fire station, which can be used to rescue or for isolation of critical valves during emergency.

High volume long-range monitors have been provided around crude oil tanks and on the top of fire tenders as special firefighting equipment.

Firewater monitors have been provided at elevated strategic locations, which are normally difficult to approach for effective control of fire.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 14-5

14.6. Crisis Control Room (Disaster Control Room)

All communication related to emergency shall be routed to Crisis Control Room which is situated on first floor of Fire Station Building.

The Crisis Control Room is equipped with communication systems (Telephones, Walki-Talkies, ), Operating Manuals, Disater Management Plans (On-Site/Off-Site), Refinery Lay out Plan, Display of names & telephone nos. of all co-coordinators etc. Organogram of On-Site Disaster Management Plan is also displayed. The crisis control room shall be activated when the disaster siren is sounded and shall be headed by GM (T) and in his absence by GM (TS)

14.7. Search & Rescue Plan

Overall in charge: Site Incident Controller (Incident Coordinator)

DGM (PN) / Alt: CPNM (Units)

Rescue & Evacuation Coordinator

DGM (PJ), Shri A. D. Prasad / Alt: DGM (PJ), Shri R. S. Yadav

During on site emergency / disaster situation search & rescue will be carried out by the rescue team under the control of Rescue & Evacuation Coordinator. He in turn will give feed back to the Chief Incident Controller (CIC).

Team Members of Search & Rescue Team

Search & Rescue coordinator will coordinate with CMNM in case of requirement for heavy equipment. CPUM will be contacted for arranging temporary lights, if required during search / rescue operation. After rescue the victims may be sent to First Aid Center / Hospital for medical treatment, if required.

Knowledge on Special Risk

SFSM will guide the team regarding the presence of special risk from hazardous chemicals during rescue operation. Accordingly the team will use suitable protective equipment.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 14-6

Control of Non-Essential Personnel during Search & Rescue Operation

In order to ensure smooth and effective search and rescue operation during emergency control of non-essential personnel also plays a vital part.

CISF will ensure removal of non-essential personnel from the site for the above job.

Search and Rescue Operation During Off Site Emergency

During off site disaster, rescue and search operation will be carried out under the

guidance of Dy. Superintendent of Police, Begusarai as per off site emergency plan

approved by DM.

14.8. Control of Visitors and Contractors

During major emergency / disaster refinery, main gate will be kept closed and entry will be controlled by CISF.

No visitors will be allowed to enter in the refinery during the emergency time. Only the mutual aid partners / govt. agencies will be allowed to come inside for rendering assistance.

On hearing disaster sirens all visitors and contractors workers will come out of the affected areas and will assemble at the Assembly point for evacuation.

14.9. Safety Of Visitors

Visitors & vendors etc. shall follow the safety guidelines printed at the back of visitor’s Gate Pass. No visitors/contractors shall be allowed to enter the refinery premises during the emergency.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 14-7

14.10. All Clear & Re-Entry Procedure

The Chief Incident Controller (CIC) of Onsite Disaster Management Plan is authorized to initiate the “All Clear” siren after satisfying himself that the emergency is kept under control (such as source of fire/leak is checked or stopped) and affected person(s), if any, are shifted for medical aid.

14.11. Display of Contact Nos. of Essential Services

The telephone Nos./Contact Nos. of all essential services like First Aid Centre, Fire & Safety, CISF and RSM are prominently displayed at all control rooms and also in the following areas:

Crisis Control Room.

First Aid Centre.

CISF Control Room.

Administration Building

These numbers are updated as and when there is a change.

14.12. Evacuation & Rehabilitation

If a major industrial accident does occur, the general public in surrounding areas will have very little time to react and save themselves. The local population will have to be warned in a very short period.

Time available to population for a safe escape and threatened by the accident will depend on the nature of accident.

A fire will give more time to escape and generally area affected will be small. Effects of a fire on population will be injuries due to thermal radiation.

An explosion will give little time to warn population and area affected may be much larger than that in case of a fire. Effects of an explosion on the


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 14-8

population will be injuries caused by shock wave, flying debris collapsing structures as well as exposure to thermal radiation.

A toxic gas release will generally threaten a much larger area and people will be exposed to drifting cloud of toxic gas / vapours. Time available for warning population will depend on the point of release, air direction and air velocity.

14.13. Periodic Assessment Inside Battery Area

Chief Incident Controller (CIC) will carry out periodic assessment of the actual disaster zone and resources deployment and status report of the same will be given to ED. This has already been covered under the function of Chief Incident Controller (CIC).

14.14. Actions By General Population

On being warned of a major industrial accident of gas leak general public should take the following actions:

Immediately go indoors

Shut all doors, windows, and ventilators. Block all the gaps with wet cloth and draw curtains.

Switch off fans, exhaust fans, air conditioners

Extinguish all flames

Keep torches handy. Store water for emergency use

Do not jam emergency phone lines by calling emergency services.

Covering nose / mouth with wet cloth will help

Wait for further instructions from emergency services before moving out.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 14-9

14.15. Evacuation

In major disaster, it may become necessary to evacuate people from and around the area likely to be affected by accident. Sometimes, the evacuation may have to be made to safe places within the complex area itself. At other times, however, especially in cases of catastrophic disaster, it will be necessary to shift the entire population outside the complex area to certain pre-designated places fixed in advance. The task may be difficult as there will be no notice or very short notice of a calamity, there may be failure of electricity, there may be shortage of manpower resources etc.

1.0 The entire area to be evacuated should be divided into convenient sectors and each sector should be placed in charge of a senior officer, whose duty it would be to ensure that all persons from this sector are compulsorily shifted. Help of security / police staff should also be taken in achieving this task, if considered necessary.

Repeated announcements should be made over mobile-vans, fined with mikes, directing people to evacuate immediately and board buses / trucks at pick – up points. Staff who would be employed for supervising arrangements at pick – up points should be earmarked in advance. The routes by which evacuation will be made from different areas will be fixed in advance. The drivers of buses / trucks will be informed about their routes and also about their destinations where the residents are to be off-loaded. In the case of shifting to Barauni city, the Chairman of Barauni Municipality should be informed for keeping the places of accommodation ready to receive evacuated persons and also to make other arrangements.

2.0 In case of power failure, which is quite likely, the evacuation work, will be totally disorganized unless battery of diesel-operated flood-lights are fixed at strategic points to enable people to move from their houses to pick up points. A large number of torches etc. will also be required.

3.0 In addition, the following requirements will also be taken care of:

(a) Monitoring the shelter camps and villages till such a time that normalcy is restored.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 14-10

(b) Ensure proper care of the evacuated people in shelter relief camps and provide them adequate facilities such as food, drinking water and medical services.

(c) Ensure security arrangement for protection of the evacuated people’s property in their areas till such time they are safely brought back to their villages from the shelter camps.

14.16. EDUCATION

Educating general public about the potential hazards associated with refinery and actions to be taken in case of accident, will one of the key areas of disaster management plan. For this purpose, the following actions are proposed:

Pamphlets / booklets regarding industrial hazards will be prepared and distributed to general public of the concerned area.

Notice boards will be put up in strategic places giving the above information.

Help of voluntary organizations and local schools will be taken to conduct educational sessions to make people aware of the actions that the general public should take in case of any major emergency.

Periodic meetings with the village heads to educate them.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 14-11

Chief Incident

Controller


Committee


Committee




Committee


Committee

Off-Site Incident Controller

District magistrate

Begusarai




Medical Coordinator









Finance Coordinator



Rescue & Evacuation

Coordinator


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 15-1

CHAPTER – 15

INFORMATION TO PUBLIC



BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 15-2

15.1. Assessing the Situation at Site & Making Emergency Known to People

Whosoever will notice any situation as per the scenarios discussed in Chapter-2, he will immediately inform to Fire Station Control Room / nearest Control Room / supervisor by means of telephone or nearest alarm point or personally. Officer of Fire Station, after seeing the magnitude of the situation, will instruct Fire Station Control Room operator to blow Major Fire Siren. Accordingly a Wailing Siren for Two minutes will be blown by Fire Station Control Room operator and turnouts will be taken by Fire Fighting Crew along with officers of Fire & Safety Department to combat the situation.

If the turnouts taken by Fire Fighting crew are not capable of controlling the situation, after assessing the situation, the General Manager (Technical) of the refinery will declare the disaster. The information about declaring the disaster will be conveyed to Fire Station Control Room by any Officer of Fire & Safety Division.

Fire Station Control Room operator will blow Three wailing sirens of 2 minutes each with a time lag of 10 seconds between each siren to make the disaster known to the key personnel and employees of the refinery as well.

The information about the disaster to key personnel will also be given on telephone by Fire Station Control Room operator and also by PA system.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 15-3

15.2. External Public: Public Awareness System

For disclosure of information to the public the refinery has developed ‘Meet the people’ programme through our Public Relations Department, where the ‘MUKHIYAS’ of nearby villages are called and the informations related to refinery are given to them. They are briefed about our preparedness and measures taken to face any disaster situation. They are also explained about the Disaster Warning Signals and measures to be taken by the nearby villagers in case of any disaster in the refinery like toxic gas released and any possible chemical emergency. The same is being given to them in the form of a brief write up for further propagation in their villages. A visit to refinery is also being conducted for them. Villagers of nearby villages are also being given information about the same during any of our HRD activity like family planning Camp, Medical Camp etc.

Apart from the above, various competitions are also organized by the refinery for the safety awareness among the family members of the employees and nearby villagers, and good prizes are also being given.

For disclosure of the information, particularly during the disaster situation, the Public announcements are being done by MR Corporate Communication Department. To avoid any panic, it is been considered that the necessary announcement will be made in nearby villages releasing the information to the tune of requirement only.

The Welfare & Media Coordinator of the refinery is the only authorized person for giving the information to public & to serve as the Laision Officer.

The Use Of Electronic Media

For bringing the awareness among the external public at large, the use of electronic media like TV, Air & Press coverage is used. The Welfare & Media Coordinator of the refinery prepares the Press release to the issued for the local press & other important dailies.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 16-1

CHAPTER – 16

ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES OF STAKEHOLDERS

INCLUDING EXTERNAL AGENCIES



BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 16-2

Schedule – V (Refer Regulation 22.0)

The important Roles and Responsibilities of Various Stakeholders

a) Oil and Gas Installations and Areas (Mentioned in Regulation 3)

Barauni Refinery as mentioned Installation in Regulation 3 should provide necessary information to Mutual Aid Association, District Authority, Police and Fire Services.

a) List of Hazardous Chemical and Systems which have potential to

cause danger to Human, Environment and Property.

b) On-Site Emergency Plan and Periodic Mock Drill.

Barauni Refinery will support authorities in mitigation, rescue and rehabilitation, with resources identified and agreed with the authorities in advance as included in Off-Site Emergency Plan.

b) The district authority is responsible for the Off-Site emergency plan and it

shall be equipped with up-to-date Major Accident Hazard units, website,

control room etc., with provisions for monitoring the level of preparedness at

all times. Regular meetings of various stakeholders of Chemical Disaster

Management will be conducted by district administration/District Disaster

Management Authority to review the preparedness of Chemical Disaster

Management.

c) The police will be an important component of all disaster management plans

as they will be associated with investigation of incident s/disasters. Police

take overall charge of the Off-Site situation until the arrival of the district

collector or its representative at the scene.

d) The fire services are one of the first responders and shall be adequately

trained and equipped to handle chemical emergencies. Fire services are to

acquire a thorough knowledge of likely hazards at the incident site and the

emergency control measures required to contain it.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 16-3

e) In a chemical emergency, the revenue department shall coordinate with

other agencies for evacuation, establishment of shelters and provision of

food, etc.

f) When required for evacuation purposes in a chemical emergency, the

department of transport should made transport promptly available.

g) The role of civil society and private sector in the Off-Site plan shall be

defined.

h) The health department needs to assure that all victims get immediate

medical attention on the site as well as at the hospitals/health-care facility

where they are shifted. In addition, the department needs to network all the

health-care facilities available in the vicinity for effective management and also

take effective measures to prevent the occurrence of any epidemic.

i) Pollution control boards need to ascertain the developing severity of the

emergency in accordance with responsive measures by constant monitoring of

the environment. If and when an area is fit for entry will depend upon the

results of the monitoring. A decontamination operation would be required to be

carried out with the help of other agencies and industries.

j) The NDRF and SDRF are the specialised forces to manage these disasters in

a longer run according to the severity and nature of the disaster. Their

specialised training is an effective measure that needs to be built up and

maintained with time for achieving a higher standard of preparedness. They

need to coordinate with other local agencies such as the Central Industrial

Security Force that may be responsible for security at the industrial site.

* Role of above External Agencies have been defined in Annexure – E of National Disaster Management Guidelines Chemical Disasters, April, 2007

NDRF: National Disaster Response Force SDRF: State Disaster Response Force


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 17-1

CHAPTER – 17

REPORTING OF THE INCIDENT



BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 17-2

1) All incidents covered under Level-I should be maintained by the entity for inspection whenever called for inspection and Level-II and Level-III shall be reported to the Board in the format specified and placed at Schedule-VI including near miss incident. The above report should be submitted within 48 hours after occurrence of the incidents or any other reason triggering major incident.

2) Investigation report of all major incidents shall be submitted to the Board. An incident shall be treated as Major if any of the following occurs:

(a) fire for more than 15 minutes

(b) explosion / blowout

(c) Fatal incident.

(d) loss above Rs. 10.0 Lac

(e) Cumulative man hours lost more than 500 hrs.

(f) plant shutdown / outage due to the incident

(g) Level-III incident


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 17-3

SCHEDULE – VI (Reference: Section 23 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)

INCIDENT REPORTING FORMAT

1. Organization 2. Sector

3. Location 4. Incident Sr. No.

5. Date of Incident

6. Time of Incident

7. Major / Minor / Near miss

8. Report - Preliminary / Final

9. Fire / Incident 10. Duration of fire - Hrs / Min

11. Type of Incident with loss of life / injury, Fire, Explosion, Blowout, Electrocution, Fall from Height, Inhalation of Gas, Driving, Slip / Trip, Others, NA

12. Location of Incident ( Name of Plant / Unit / Area / Facility / Tank farm / Gantry / Road / Parking area etc )

13. Whether plant shutdown / caused outage of the facility? Yes / No

14. Fatalities nos.

a) Employees = b) Contractor = c) Others =

15. Injuries nos. a) Employees = b) Contractor = c) Others =

16. Man - hours Lost

a) Employees = b) Contractor = c) Others =

17. Direct Loss due to the incident (Rs. In Lac). Loss to equipment / Machinery as per Insurance claim etc.

18. Indirect Losses: Through put / Production Loss, etc.

19. Status of the Facility: Construction / Commissioning / Operation / Shutting down / Turn around, Maintenance / Start up / Any other.

20. Brief Description of the Incident including post incident measures. ( Attach details in separate sheet )

21. Whether similar Incident has occurred in past at the same location, If yes, give brief description of the incident


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 17-4

and attach details in separate sheet.

22. Whether Internal Investigation has been completed. If no, likely date by which it will be completed.

23. Whether internal investigation report (Major Incident) has been submitted to PNGRB. If no, likely date by which it will be submitted.

24. Cause of the Incident ( Tick the most relevant cause preferably one, maximum two )

A) Deviation from Procedure I) Not using the PPE

B) Lack of Job Knowledge J) Equipment failure

C) Lack of supervision K) Poor design / Layout etc.

D) Improper Inspection L) Inadequate facility

E) Improper Maintenance. ( Mech. / Elec. / Inst )

M) Poor House Keeping

F) Improper material handling N) Natural Calamity

G) Negligent Driving O) Pilferage / Sabotage

H) Careless walking / climbing etc. P) Any other (give details)

25. Cause of leakage - Oil, Gas or Chemical ( Tick one only )

A) Weld leak from equipment / lines E) Leakage due to improper operation

B) Leak from flange, gland etc. F) Leak due to improper maintenance

C) Leak from rotary equipment G) Normal operation - Venting / draining

D) Metallurgical failure H) Any other

26. Cause of Ignition leading to fire ( Tick only one cause )

A) Near to hot work F) Static Electricity

B) Near to Furnace / Flare etc. G) Hammering / Fall of object

C) Auto - ignition H) Heat due to Friction

D) Loose electrical connection I) Lightning

E) Near to hot surface J) Any other ( pyrophoric etc )

27. Was the incident Avoidable? ( Yes / No


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 17-5

)

28. The incident could have been avoided by the use of / or by ; ( Tick the most relevant point preferably one, maximum two )

A) Better supervision F) Personal Protective Equipment

B) Adhering to specified operating procedure

G) Better equipment

C) Imparting Training H) Management Control

D) Giving adequate time to do the activity through proper planning.

I) Adhering to specified maintenance procedure

E) Adhering to the work permit system

J) Adhering to specified Inspection / Testing procedures.

K) Any other information;


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 17-6

Guidelines for Filling the Incident Report 1. All Major, Minor and Near miss incidents shall be reported in the quarterly report.

2. Incident Reporting form shall be filled up for all Major, Minor and Near miss Incidents.

3. Summary report shall be enclosed with every quarterly report.

4. Investigations shall be carried out for all Major, Minor and Near miss Incidents.

5. Investigation report of all Major incidents shall be submitted to PNGRB. An incident shall be treated as Major if any of the following occurs;

- Fire for more than 15 minutes

- Explosion / Blowout

- Fatal Incident.

- Loss above Rs. 5.0 Lac.

- Cumulative man hours lost more than 500 hrs.

- Plant Shutdown / Outage due to the incident

6. Loss time Incident shall be monitored till the affected person joins duty. In case the affected person is yet to join the duty, then the status of report submitted will be preliminary. Final report against the same incident shall be sent once he joins duty and the man - hours lost are known.

7. All columns must be filled up.

8. For any additional information use separate sheets as required.

9. Quarterly report shall be sent to PNGRB within 15 to 30 days of end of quarter.

10. Immediate reporting of incident through fax/telephone shall continue as per the prevailing system.

Signature Name

Designation of the Occupier/Manager


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 18-1

CHAPTER – 18

ACTION AFTER REPORTING OF THE INCIDENT BY THE

ENTITY



BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 18-2

After reporting of the incidents to Board, Nodal officer of the Board (head of

Technical Standards the specifications and safety group) shall have

responsibility of informing all the Members of the Board and shall coordinate

with appropriate level in National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) till

normalization of the situation.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 19-1

CHAPTER – 19

TERMINATION OF EMERGENCY



BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 19-2

Termination of Emergency

The General Manager (Technical) after assessing the situation will declare the cessation of emergency.

Accordingly SFSM will give All Clear signal to the Fire Station Control Room.

After receiving All Signal from SFSM, A continuous Siren for Two Minutes will be blown by Fire Station Control Room operator for termination of emergency.

Corporate Communication (CC)

CC Deptt. will make the announcement to the nearby villages to avoid any panic. CC Deptt. will also release press note, information to media like T.V. radio with the approval of Chief Incident Coordinator (CIC).

CC Deptt. will co-ordinate for plant visit of visiting teams / authorities.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 20-1

CHAPTER – 20

EMERGENCY RECOVERY PROCEDURES



BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 20-2

(1) After the emergency, the following activities need to be carried out in detail.

a) Information to statutory authorities.

b) Incident investigation.

c) Damage assessment.

d) Salvage of products, de-contamination, clean-up and restoration.

e) A detailed report shall be prepared based on the entire experience of the incident, including restorations, limitations and lessons learnt.

f) Ambient air monitoring at the site as well as 5 km radius of the installation by state pollution control board to determine the contamination level affecting health.

g) Check points on ERDMP recovery measures are given below at Check list-7.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 20-3

CHECK LIST-7 (Reference: Section 26(2) of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)

ERDMP - Recovery Measures


Post Emergency Recovery

Salvage of product

1 Check that spilled / accumulated product contents are transferred to the OWS or collected in drums.

COMPLIED

2 Check whether the quality and quantity estimation of the product extracted from OWS has been done for further disposal in line with standing QC guidelines by either transferring to service tanks or to nearest refinery for blending / reprocessing or not.

COMPLIED

3 Check that correct stock accounting of spilled product as loss has been completed in accounting system.

COMPLIED

4 Check that affected area has been completely cleaned and dried after evacuation of spilled product.

COMPLIED

5 Declare that affected area after salvage operations is fully clean and safe for movement of the working personnel.

COMPLIED

6 Check that all drains are not having any residual oil and are thoroughly cleaned and dried.

COMPLIED

7 Check that all control valves on product lines and OWS lines outside dyke area and drains are completely closed after removal of the spilled product.

COMPLIED

8 Check that interlocking system of tanks / gantry has been re-activated for normal operations.

COMPLIED


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 20-4

9 Check whether the soil testing of the affected area, if required, has been done to assess the soil contamination level to meet the Environmental – SPCB norms / requirements.

COMPLIED

Taking care of affected manpower

10 Whether physical accounting of all personnel on duty during and after the incident are ascertained by the Site Incident Controller and reconciled immediately

COMPLIED

11 Whether the first-aid treatment and post-incident health check of the affected personnel has been undertaken in time

COMPLIED

12 Whether these personnel are declared fully physically fit before allowing them to resume their normal duties

COMPLIED

13 Whether the records for such first aid and treatment of the affected personnel are maintained in a well defined format

COMPLIED

Addressing media and outside bodies

17 Whether the incident was appropriately informed to the local media in line with the respective company’s Press and Media Policy

COMPLIED

18 Whether the role of neighbouring population during the drill / disaster is suitably informed to the population during subsequent meetings with local administration / panchayat etc. for necessary improvements

COMPLIED

19 Whether the awareness and preparedness on disaster is regularly assimilated / shared with nearby public / societies and stake holders.

COMPLIED

Reporting

20 Check whether that disaster incident report was communicated to respective controlling office / HQ promptly in a standard format.

COMPLIED


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 20-5

21 Whether the incident reports are also sent to concerned State Level Industry Coordinator on time.

COMPLIED

22 Check that detailed report on disaster in proper format was communicated to PNGRB/ Factory inspector / Labour inspector / SPCB / District Magistrate /PESO.

COMPLIED

Investigation

23 Whether investigation teams are constituted as per respective company policies COMPLIED

24 Whether RCA (Root Cause Analysis) of the disaster is conducted by the investigating team

COMPLIED

25 Whether detailed investigation into effective functioning of interlocks, detection devices, automation controls and applicable norms are carried out to find out possible improvements in design / construction / operations / maintenance and training aspects etc.

COMPLIED

26 Whether a system of initiating appropriate corrective measures including suitable revisions to the Disaster Management Plan are adopted based on findings of the investigation

COMPLIED

Damage Assessment – Monetary and Physical

27 Check the valuation / cost of product loss / down gradation on account of contamination, if any / Property / Structures / damaged assets – equipments.

COMPLIED

28 Whether repairs and maintenance cost of property, assets and equipment are assessed.

COMPLIED

29 Whether any penalty by statutory authorities like SPCB / Factory Inspector and Labour Commissioner are assessed.

COMPLIED

30 Whether possible impact on environment are also assessed and appropriate measures are taken

COMPLIED


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 20-6

31 Whether damage assessment also include potential erosion of reputation – from company, industry and national perspectives

COMPLIED

Clean up and Restoration

32 Whether the affected area has been fully cleaned and cleared after due clearance from investigation team

COMPLIED

33 Check whether heat detectors, high level alarms, in built safety systems (NRV, TSV etc.) are fully functional after the disaster incident.

COMPLIED

34 Check whether all fire fighting equipments like – hoses / nozzles / Fire Extinguishers etc. have been put back at designated places and are fully ready for reuse

COMPLIED

35 Whether clear procedures are in place to allow resumption of normal operations

COMPLIED


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 21-1

CHAPTER – 21

ERDMP FOR PIPELINES CARRYING PETROLEUM PRODUCTS AND RETAIL

OUTLETS


Not Applicable to Refineries


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 21-2

1) ERDMP for pipelines carrying petroleum products should follow modern methods of surveillance of Pipeline and take guidance from all the aspects of Disaster Management Plan mentioned in the ERDMP. Schedule–VII should be referred, which is in line with Chemical Disaster by National Disaster Management Authority.

2) ERDMP for retail outlets should take care of all aspects mentioned in ERDMP

and shall also refer to OISD STD– 225.

Schedule –VII (Reference: Section 26 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)

ERDMP for pipelines carrying petroleum products

Pipelines are assuming importance as a means of transport of hazardous substances. Crude oil, its derivatives and natural gas are among the main substances transported by pipelines. The Guidelines, therefore, comprise: i) Creation and maintaining an administrative framework to facilitate the

development of a safe and environmentally sound transportation infrastructure, including pipelines for hazardous substances.

ii) The pipeline operator has the primary responsibility for the safety of the systems and for taking measures to prevent incident s and to limit their consequences for human health and the environment.

iii) Pipelines for the transport of hazardous substances will be designed and operated so as to prevent any uncontrolled release into the environment.

iv) Risk assessment methods should be used in evaluating pipeline integrity and impact on human health and the environment.

v) Land-use planning considerations will be taken into account both in the routing of new pipelines (e.g. to limit proximity to populated areas and water catchment areas to the extent possible), and in decisions concerning proposals for new developments/building in the vicinity of existing pipelines.

vi) Pipeline operators and the authorities responsible for pipelines shall review and, if necessary, develop and implement systems to reduce third-party interference, which is a cause of incident including their effects.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 21-3

vii) National legislation shall be clear, enforceable and consistent to facilitate safe transport and international cooperation.

viii) Competent authorities should ensure that pipeline operators:

(a) Draw up emergency plans.

(b) Provide the authorities designated for that purpose with the necessary information to enable them to draw up Off-Site emergency plans.

(c) Emergency plans shall be coordinated between pipeline operators and competent authorities, as well as with fire brigades and other disaster control units.

ix) Pipelines shall be designed, constructed and operated in accordance with recognized national and international codes, standards and guidelines, notified by the Board.

x) Consideration will be given to the impact on the safety of a pipeline such as design and stress factors, quality of material, wall thickness, and depth of burial, external impact protection, markings, route selection and monitoring.

xi) The safety of the pipelines shall be demonstrated through a suitable risk assessment procedure including the worst case scenario and including breakdowns and external additional loads.

xii) The pipeline operator shall draw up a Pipeline Management System (PMS) to ensure that it is properly implemented. The PMS shall be designed to guarantee a high level of protection of human health and the environment. The following issues shall be addressed by the safety management system.

(a) The pipeline will be inspected and maintained regularly. Only reliable trained staff or qualified contractors may carry our maintenance work on a pipeline. Third party conformatory assessment bodies should inspect the pipeline at regular intervals as far as required by the Board. These inspections are to cover in particular the proper condition of the pipeline and the functioning of the equipment ensuring pipeline safety.

(b) Organization ability, roles and responsibilities, identification and evaluation of hazards, operational control, and management of change, planning for emergencies, monitoring performance, audit and review shall be duly addressed in the Pipeline Management System.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 22-1

CHAPTER – 22

ERDMP FOR ROAD TRANSPORTATION



BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 22-2

The road transport of Petroleum product has significant presence and needs special attention. Complete details of treatment for handling emergency arising out of road transportations have been provided below:

22.1. Resource Mobilization for Road Transport Emergency (Reference: Section 28.1 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010) Resource mobilization for road transport emergency shall be as per the Schedule-VIII as given below.

(a) In order to handle Emergencies, which may arise due to incident involving Petroleum Product Transportation, it is required that a comprehensive Emergency Management Plan is readily available with the industry as well as with other related authorities all along the routes. The ERDMP should be clearly understood by its users so that the emergencies can be handled in a systematic manner with minimum response time in accordance with the prescribed procedure.

(b) Copies of the ERDMP shall be made available by the Industry to all the field

locations i.e. Installations, POL Depots, Terminals / Installations, Refineries, Gas Processing Plants, Dispatch units of etc., the concerned District Administration, Police Stations and Fire Brigades en-route and within vicinity of specified tank truck routes, oil industry sales personnel of concerned area as may be required.

(c) Location specific availability of Emergency Response Vehicle shall be

mentioned in the ERDMP.

Note: ERDMP for Road Transportation is not applicable to Barauni Refinery as Barauni Refinery is not in the business of the road transport of Petroleum products.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 22-3

Schedule –VII (Reference: Section 28.1 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)

Resource Mobilization for Road Transportation Emergencies

A. In-Plant Resources Following items should be available at the Plant in adequate quantity / nos. Mechanical Equipment: 1. Gaskets (Carbon Asbestos Filled) 2. Studs and bolts. 3. Teflon tapes. 4. ½” / ¾” crowbar (1 m long) 5. Spade / blind flange 6. Rope (Manila / Jute) 7. Spark arrestors. 8. 1” tapered wooden pegs. 9. Chopper 10. Spare fan belt for tank lorry with P.T.O. unit 11. Wind sock 12. M-Seal / epoxy-base cold-welding compound. 13. Wooden slippers 14. Teflon-taped spanners, wrenches 15. Spark-proof wrenches, hammer and tools. 16. Barricading masts and ropes / tapes 17. hoses 18. Chain pulley blocks and stay pipes 19. Small valve keys for operating valves in the tank truck Electrical Equipment : 1. Gas Explosi-meter 2. Flame-proof torches 3. Earthing wires (10 m long) with crocodile clips


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 22-4

Personnel Protective Equipment: 1. Gloves: i) Rubber gloves ii) Low Temperature Gloves iii) Industrial gloves (with leather lining) iv) Canvas gloves 2. Face shields 3. Ear muff / ear plugs Other Safety Items: 1. 1 roll of gunny / hessian cloth (about 10 mts. long) 2. First aid box (containing water gel compounds) 3. Soap 4. Blanket. 5. Water Gel Blanket 6. Breathing Apparatus (With spare filled cylinder and Canister gas masks) 7. Fire proximity suit

Fire Fighting Equipment : 1. Portable Dry Chemical Powder Fire Extinguishers 2. Fire-water Hoses 3. Triple Purpose diffuser nozzle for use with fire hoses. Communication Equipment : 1. Hand operated sirens 2. Whistles 3. Megaphone, Mobile Phones, VHF sets. Traffic Control Equipment : 1. Red lights (Battery operated) - for traffic diversion 2. Area maps 3. Diversion Boards


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 22-5

External Resources:

Particulars Name Address

Ph. No. Any Other Info.

1. Fire Station

2. Ambulance

3. Hospitals

4. Police Station

5. Drug Stores

6.District Administration / Collector

7. Availability of Cranes

8. Local PWD / CPWD water supplies, sand, morum, vehicles etc.

9. Local Army, Navy, Air Force authorities

10. Any major industry nearby

C. Identification of Communication Resources: Particulars

Name Address Ph. No. Any Other

Info.

1.Public Address System

2. Retail Outlets

3. Railway Station

4. Power Houses

5. Civil Authorities

6. Voluntary Agencies

7. Local All India Radio / Doordarshan/ other channels


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 22-6

22.2. Truck / Vehicle Dispersal Plan

1 Introduction

The Truck / Vehicle dispersal plan has been developed for quick and safe dispersal of Truck / Vehicle for effective control of emergencies. While developing this plan the following points have been taken into consideration:

Maximum numbers of Truck / Vehicle available at a time inside refinery,

Safe route of Truck / Vehicle for dispersal,

Adequate parking space in safe areas,

Route for Fire tenders and imaginary emergency scenarios, which may necessitate the dispersal of Truck / Vehicle etc.

2 General Procedure for Truck / Vehicles Dispersal

1. No loaded/ unloaded truck will be allowed to move outside refinery premises in

case of any emergency, unless specifically directed by Chief Coordinator, On-site disaster plan in special circumstances.

2. All Trucks / Vehicles shall move during above emergency scenarios as per

Trucks / Vehicles dispersal plan. In case of above emergency scenarios the drivers will not wait for any siren and start dispersing Trucks / Vehicles as per plan.

3. In case of major fire siren/ disaster siren raised due to above emergency

scenarios the dispersal of Trucks / Vehicles will automatically start on hearing the siren. However the dispersal will not take place in case of any other major fire/ disaster inside refinery, unless specifically instructed by area in-charge to do so. Such instruction may be passed to area in-charges by Plant Coordinator or Fire & Safety coordinator or Marketing coordinator (as referred in On-site emergency preparedness Plan).

4. The route of Trucks / Vehicles dispersal and parking shall be categorically

marked on road sides for guidance and mock rehearsal shall be carried out time to time to make the drivers and others conversant with the plan.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 22-7

5. The CISF at those spots shall regulate the traffic and ensure the smooth dispersal of Trucks / Vehicles.

6. The Trucks / Vehicles will be back to work places on “All Clear” siren. When no siren is blown and Trucks / Vehicles were disperse because of emergency at unloading site, the area in-charge will inform the Trucks / Vehicles drivers for return to work place when emergency is over.

7. This plan shall be reviewed at least once in a year or whenever there are major changes at site, which may affect the existing plan.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 23-1

CHAPTER – 23

INTEGRATION OF THE ERDMP WITH THE NATIONAL

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN (NDMP)



BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 23-2

23.1 NATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN (NDMP)

(1) On 23 December 2005, the Government of India took a definite step towards NDMP by enacting the NDMP ACT, 2005. The NDMP Act, 2005 is a Paradigm Shift from a response and relief-centric approach to a proactive and comprehensive mindset towards NDMP covering all aspects from prevention, mitigation, preparedness to rehabilitation, reconstruction and recovery.

(2) Similar to National Authority at the Centre, the State Government is to

establish a State Disaster Management Authority for the State. The State Authority is to be headed by the Chief Minister of the State as the Chairperson. Every State Government, in turn, is to establish a District Disaster Management Authority for every district in the State with the District Collector as the Chairperson.

(3) The Central Government is empowered to take further measures as it

deems fit for the purpose of disaster management like deployment of naval, military and air forces, other armed forces of the Union or any other civilian personnel as may be required for the purposes of this NDMP Act. Government of India is empowered to establish institutions for research, training, and developmental programmes in the field of disaster management as per this Act.

(4) The national vision is to build a safer and disaster resilient India by

developing a holistic, proactive, multi-disaster and technology driven strategy for NDMP. This will be achieved through a culture of prevention, mitigation and preparedness to reduce the impact of disasters on people. The entire process will centre stage the community and will be provided momentum and sustenance through the collective efforts of all government agencies supported by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).

(5) National Disaster management Structure showing the interactive linkage among various agencies for synergised management of disaster is given below;


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 23-3


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 23-4

Note: Since PNGRB has been constituted by PNGRB Act, 2006, it should be identified under Ministries / Departments of Govt. of India.

Abbreviations for NDMA:

NDMA : National Disaster Management Authority NEC : National Executive Committee DM : Disaster Management NCC : National Cadet Corps NCDM : National Committee on Disaster Management NDMRCs : National Disaster Mitigation Resource Centres NDRF : National Disaster Response Force NSS : National Service Scheme NYK : Nehru Yuva Kendra NGOs : Non-Governmental Organisations SDMA : State Disaster Management Authority SEC : State Executive Committee DDMA : District Disaster Management Authority 23.2 Integration of ERDMP with NDMP This ERDMP document has been developed taking into account all possible inputs on the subjects from various stake holders. Efforts have also been made to synergize this with the document on National Disaster Management Guide (Chemical Disasters) Industrial brought out by National Disaster Management Authority.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No 24 -1


CHAPTER - 24

SECURITY THREAT PLAN



BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN JULY’12

P a g e | 24-2


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-3

CONTINGENCY PLAN TO DEAL WITH BOMB THREAT

1. Introduction:

Security is a continuous commitment for the safety of the Refinery and its utilities and the people working therein, both from external and internal threats. Of late, militant activities have increased manifold. The vital oil sector is a tempting target for terrorist groups. With the addition of modern weapons and explosives to the terrorist arsenal, the threat has increased manifold. A contingency plan to deal with such threat to our company’s assets is given below.

2. Objective:

The objective of this plan is to prevent, detect and neutralize any attempt to blast its installation by planting any explosive device in the Plant premises.

3. Preventive Measures:

For security of Refinery, we have CISF personnel (covering all the shifts round the clock) equipped with sniffer dog squad, Handheld metal detectors, door frame metal detectors and under carriage trolley mirror for preventive checking of explosive from entering the plant.

i. All employees are required to wear and display their identity cards inside the installation premises.

ii. Good housekeeping in and around Installation is ensured to reduce the opportunity for planting of any device.

iii. Only authorized vehicles (cars, scooters/motor-cycles, etc.) are allowed to park at the designated parking place.

iv. Intelligence Cell of CISF & in-house intelligence cell keeps a watch over undesirable activities/behavior of employees and contractors’ workers.

v. Perimeter security receives special attention.

vi. Gate number one (Main Gate) is monitored by CISF round the clock


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-4

vii. Staff members will be advised to keep close watch on unusual activity or suspicious items. The staff will be encouraged to report matters of security concern.

Training will be provided at regular intervals to all concerned to execute the BTCP successfully. The same will be rehearsed through mock-drills. The above guidelines are general in nature. The management may issue additional guidelines to meet any eventuality.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-5

4. Bomb Threat Assessment Committee (BTAC): The following Committee will start functioning in the event of receipt of any bomb threat, either in the form of verbal or written communication:

S. No Committee Members

1. General Manager (Tech), Barauni Refinery Coordinator

2. General Manager (TS) Barauni Refinery

Alternate Coordinator

3. Dy General Manager (HSE) Barauni Refinery Member

4. Dy General Manager(HR), Barauni Refinery

Member

5. Dy. General Manager (Prod.), Barauni Refinery

Member

6. Dy. Commandant, C.I.S.F., Barauni Refinery

Member

7. Senior Manager (Fire & Safety) Barauni Refinery

Member

8. District Magistrate, Begusarai Member

9. Sr. Supdt. Of Police, Begusarai Member

10. Police Control Room, Begusarai Member

11. Bomb Disposal Squad, Begusarai

Immediately on receipt of Bomb Threat, the above committee members shall assemble in Disaster Control Room The BTAC shall act immediately without waiting for any specific member or all members because evaluation of the threat and taking of appropriate action cannot be delayed.

5. Responsibilities:

Coordinator :

As soon as the message is received, the same shall be conveyed to the members. Further, the Coordinator will –

(a) Inform the Police Control Room, medical officer, fire station, Bomb Squad, concerned State/Regional office and Corporate Security.

(b) Inform all the members of BTAC and other External Agencies.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-6

(c) Start of arrivals of all the members of the BTAC.

(d) Collect ‘Information Form’ (Annexure-A) from the receiver of the bomb threat call. Analyze the call as per Annexure-B. If receiver is available at the unit, ask him to remain present to assist the BTAC in analyzing the call.

(e) Request the concerned to be on duty even after dismissal time, to maintain continuity.

(f) Keep adequate number of sand bags ready.

(g) Submit report to RHQ & Corporate Security.

(h) Bomb Threat Drill Procedure to be followed as per Annexure-A.

Alternate Coordinator:

In the absence of the Coordinator, the Alternative Coordinator will function as the Coordinator. When the coordinator is available in station, he will be assisted by Alternate coordinator.

Members:

They will assemble immediately and help the Coordinator to take appropriate action in respect of the crisis.

Role of Shift-in-Charge / RSM:

He will assist the Coordinator in evacuating the area

Close down the facility/Concerned unit (if required) to avoid damage

Help the search team in searching the suspected area(s)

Assist Security personnel/Police Personnel.

Ensure minimum movement of personal vehicle / support vehicles near the threatened site.

Cordon off the area with unit security.

Assist local police.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-7

Role of CISF:

CISF will:

Cordon off the affected area

Arrange evacuation of premises in consultation with co-ordinator.

Restrict movement of vehicles

Assist search team in searching the area and later on help the explosive experts.

Collect intelligence through local contacts.

6. Search Team:

The following will be the members of search team:

M(A&W) - Security

AC, CISF

INSPECTOR, CISF

RSM/LOCATION INCHARGE OF AREA TO ASSIST THE TEAM

The Committee will mobilize the following equipment:

A. Bomb Detector.

B. Bomb Separation Blanket, Bomb Circle.

C. Hook and line set.

D. Metal Detector.

E. Search Mirror.

F. Emergency Lights.

G. Flash Lights.

H. Stethoscopes.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-8

I. Metallic & Non-Metallic probe.

J. Screwdriver set.

K. Chalks or Lime powder for marking searched areas.

All other implements required will be brought by the BDDS team.

The team will not make a move to handle the suspicious object or attempt to dispose it. If possible the object will be covered by bomb blanket or sand bags would be kept around it. The basic idea is to find the suspicious object and isolate the area till experts arrive to take charge.

7. Search Rules:

The search team will follow the following search rules.

(a) Never use more searchers then absolutely necessary.

(b) Use searchers in alternate rooms to minimize injuries.

(c) Never assume that only one device has been planted. Continue the search till the whole area is cleared.

(d) Clearly mark the area, which is searched to avoid duplication.

(e) Trust nothing and assume nothing is safe.

(f) Do not accept anything on face value

(g) Take rest during search process if needed.

(h) Clearly mark areas, which are suspected to be hazardous and inform the coordinator of Bomb Threat Committee immediately.

(i) Mark the area in bold letters “DANGER – BOMB”.

(j) Detonation of an explosive device may be caused by alteration of the changing environment i.e., temperature variations, the presence of an electric current, etc. Therefore, those who conduct the search should never cause any change in the environment. They should not put on electric lights in dark rooms and should not change the settings of thermostats, etc. In dark rooms, flashlight should not be used.

(k) Medical personnel should be kept close at hand during the search.

(l) Fire brigade personnel should remain on the alert.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-9

8. What to Look for:

The search team should look for the items listed below:

(a) Ground appearing to have been recently disturbed.

(b) Tin foil

(c) Disturbed carpet

(d) Scratch mark or new paint

(e) Fresh plaster or cement

(f) Greasy paper wrapping

(g) Brick dust/sand dust

(h) Partly opened windows/doors / drawers

(i) Unusual or out of place objects.

(j) Loose switch board, floor boards and paneling

(k) Loose electrical fittings

(l) Packing / wrapping material

(m) Disturbed vegetation

(n) Safety fuses

(o) Dirty rope

(p) Batteries

(q) Loose wires or pieces of insulation

(r) New brick work

The Above list is only indicative, not exhaustive.

The search team will examine all suspicious objects.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-10

9. Where to Look: Depending upon the location, the following area may also be looked.

(a) Rest rooms for workers

(b) Under stair cases, if any.

(c) Waste baskets- in each room.

(d) Flower pots- in open spaces and in buildings

(e) Bushes/ shrubs-in parking area and nursery in front of store

(f) Vehicle parking area

(g) Drains, sewage, manholes, etc.

(h) Telephones, air– conditioners, coolers

(i) Store room

(j) Toilets, water supply systems

(k) False Ceilings

(l) Public addressing system

10. Search Techniques:

(a) Open area: The open area will be visually scanned from a safe distance for any suspected objects: (i) In case, no suspicious object is found on visual search then

equipment like explosive detector, metal detector, etc. shall be used.

(ii) Sniffer dogs will also be used. (b) Room/Area Search: The entire room/area will be divided into four levels for the convenience

of searching.

(a) First Level - up to waist level (b) Second level - from waist level to head level


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-11

(c) Third level - from head level to ceiling level (d) Forth level - false ceiling area/roof

Before starting the search, the team comprising two persons will stand attentively near the door and try to pick up any ticking sound of a timing mechanism. The members thereafter will stand back to back at a particular place and simultaneously start searching the room starting from up to waist level stage. After completion of search, the team will mark clearly with chalk that the room has been searched.

11. Evacuation of Area:

The BTAC after considering all pros and cons shall decide on evacuation and search. Executive Director will be the in charge for Communication. The exit route and assembly area shall be decided and communicated as soon as the decision for evacuation is taken. The Location In-Charge and Shift In-Charge shall guide the people with the help of the Fire and Safety In-Charge. CM(F&S) shall make an announcement over the public address system about the threat and advise the employees to vacate the area peacefully via the prescribed evacuation route and assemble at the specified holding area. During evacuation, all safety and security measures shall be observed. For effective and smooth evacuation (a) The holding area should be earmarked in advance. (b) An evacuation signal and evacuation route should be pre-arranged. (c) The entire evacuation shall be supervised by the in-charge.

12. Evacuation:

The main purpose of evacuation is to move people to a safe area from the danger area. The bomb threat assessment committee after considering all pros and cons may take any of the following decisions:

a. Search without evacuation.

b. Evacuate partially and search.

c. Evacuate and search simultaneously.

d. Evacuate fully and then search.

e. Evacuate fully but desist from searching search.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-12

13. Evacuation Plan:

(a) Executive Director will be responsible for effective communication.

(b) Wireless / Walkie – talkie, Public Address System, Page Phone, Land line Telephone will be used for uninterrupted communication.

(c) Apart from the main gate, the Emergency Gate is the other designated route for emergency exit.

(d) Training to the employees, with particular responsibilities mentioned above, will be imparted from time to time.

(e) CISF personnel will work as guides during evacuation.

(f) Board reading “Assembly Point” has been displayed at various locations.

SPOT SPECIFIC EVACUATION ROUTE Area being substantially large, evacuation route would very as per the spot. Evacuation route for assembly point vis-a- vis the spots are as under:

ASSEMBLY POINTS

(a) Time Office

(b) Project / Admn. Building

(c) Ecological Park

(d) MJPL Pipeline Office

14. Evacuation Procedures:

Once the Bomb Threat Assessment Committee recommends evacuation, the designated member would announce the decision over the public address system in a manner calculated to cause minimum panic and confusion. The announcer should keep his calm and should not show any anxiety. He should specify the evacuation route and names of officials who would guide the employees to the assembly area. He would also state the importance of remaining in the assembly area till further instruction.

During evacuation the employees should follow the guidelines stated below:-


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-13

(a) Remain calm.

(b) Walk out of the building quietly and orderly manner.

(c) Avoid running or jostling.

(d) Follow the evacuation route.

(e) Follow instruction from guides regarding the route to be followed.

(f) Do not indulge in speculation about the nature of the emergency, thereby causing loss of time.

(g) Do not obstruct the evacuation process in any way.

(h) Do not leave behind any personal belongings.

(i) Switch off the plant machinery and power supply, if required before leaving the area.

(j) Help ladies and old people to reach the safe area.

(k) Remain quietly in the assembly area until further instruction.

(l) Do not spread rumours.

(m) Check if all the employees have reached the assembly area. If anybody is missing, the matter should be immediately reported to the coordinator of the Bomb Threat Committee.

(n) Follow the rule “DO NOT TAKE THE BOMB AWAY FROM THE PUBLIC. TAKE THE PEOPLE AWAY FROM THE BOMB.

15. Signal for Evacuation:

Walkie -Talkie sets will be used to direct the employees in the affected area to evacuate. The specific code signal for evacuation will be “ALL EMLOYEES SHOULD COME NEAR CONTROL ROOM FOR MEETING CALLED BY ED, ALL OTHER PERSONS like contractor workers, visitors if any, SHALL ALSO BE BROUGHT THERE.”


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-14

16. Evaluation of the Bomb Threat:

BOMB THREAT: The bomb threat may be received either on telephone or through written message. The threat may be genuine or false. Evaluating the bomb threat message correctly is an important task of the Bomb Threat Assessment Committee. Even a seemingly hoax call would have to be properly assessed before reaching a conclusion.

GENUINE MESSAGE It is possible to form an idea as to whether a bomb threat call is genuine or not from the way the caller talks and gives information about the bomb. A genuine bomb threat caller would be able to describe the bomb in detail, as also the location of the bomb, time set for explosion, type of bomb, reason for planting the bomb, who is responsible for planting bomb, etc. Genuine bomb threat caller is

(a) The person who planted the bomb

(b) Who knows about the placement of bomb

The genuine bomb threat caller would be very confident in passing on the message and replying to queries about the bomb.

HOAX MESSAGE The hoax calls can be identified from the following:

(a) The caller’s voice shakes while giving details about the bomb.

(b) He is unable to give full details of the bomb.

(c) On being questioned the caller drops the telephone abruptly

ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN ON RECEIPT OF A BOMB THREAT

Whenever a bomb threat is received the message receiver must remain calm and try to extract as much information as possible so that the genuineness of the threat can be assessed.

A set of questions that may be posed to the caller, are given below: (a) What is your name?


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-15

(b) What is your address?

(c) What is your telephone number?

(d) Where are you speaking from?

(e) Where is the bomb right now?

(f) When is it going to explode?

(g) What kind of bomb is it ?

(h) What does it look like?

(i) How to get rid of the bomb ?

(j) What will cause it to explode?

(k) Who placed the bomb? How do you know about it?

(l) Why has the bomb been placed ?

ADDITIONAL DATA:

During the conversation with the bomb threat caller, the receiver of the call should also note:

(a) The language of the caller

(b) Mix of languages if any

(c) Manner (calm, emotional, angry, vulgar, threatening, laughing, serious, jovial, etc.)

(d) Voice (soft, loud, intoxicated, etc.)

(e) Speech (slow, fast, nasal, etc.)

(f) Whether the voice sounds familiar?

(g) Background noises, like street sounds, house noises, animal noises, crockery, motor, music, train, factory machinery, office machinery, aircraft, traffic, etc.

The additional information will help to identify the genuineness of the threat and trace the caller.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-16

17. Evaluation of Bomb Threat Message:

Once the bomb threat call is received and the conversation is over, the person receiving the message will complete the “bomb threat information from” and forward it to the Coordinator of the bomb threat assessment committee.

The Bomb Threat Assessment Committee will immediately assemble at the designated control room. While evaluating the bomb threat the committee will consider the exact message received, number of hoax calls received in last 3-4 months, recent incidents of bomb explosion in and around the plant in last one year, loss of production if the operation is discontinued, dangers involved to public, employees, properties and installation.

The Committee should be very careful in evaluating the bomb threat message because of its serious implications.

Bomb Threat Message Evaluation Method:

As soon as the Coordinator of the Assessment Committee is informed of the bomb threat evaluation, he should convene a meeting of the committee in the designated control room. It will not be desirable to wait for all the members to assemble to evaluate the bomb threat message for further necessary action. The Committee will start functioning on the arrival of two or three members.

The Part-A (Bomb Warning Assessment Form – BWAF) will be completed in all respect by the Coordinator immediately. Part – A, will help to fix the details of bomb and its location.

From the detailed report submitted by the bomb threat message receiver the Part-B will be filled, which will be helpful in identifying the exact place or location where the bomb has been planted.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-17

Part-C of the evaluation form indicates the exact type of device, likely time of explosion, the person or organization responsible, technical description of the device, etc.

One or more ticks in Part B and Part C of the evaluation form will lead to the bomb threat call as “RED” or SPECIFIC”. In that case, the following actions should be considered.

(a) Whole Area of Unit to be evacuated.

(b) Thorough search by Search Team of whole unit, starting with suspect area, till the bomb detection and disposal squad arrives. The bomb detection and disposal squad will thereafter search the whole area, with the assistance of employees of the organization.

(c) All safety measures will be adopted. Station firefighting equipment should be moved near the threatened area.

(d) Hospital to be alerted.

(e) Local police to be informed for cordoning the unit from outside, moving people away and dispatching bomb squad to the site.

(f) Vehicular traffic to be diverted away from roads adjoining the unit.

(g) Power supply to threatened unit to be cut off.

In case the Part B or C of the evaluation form does not have sufficient information to categorize the bomb threat call as “RED” or “ SPECIFIC”, the information provided in Part-D of the evaluation form should be analyzed. Part D contains back ground data, such as history of bomb warnings and state of internal security, status of industrial relations at the time, etc. The details of part D will suggest the nature of precautionary measures to be adopted.

In case part B and Part C do not have sufficient information to merit classification of the message as “RED” or “SPECIFIC” but part D has information which indicates need for taking certain precautionary measures, the call will be classified as “Amber”. In the case of “Amber” threats following steps are indicated:


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-18

1. Police Control Room, Bomb Detection and Disposal Squad, Superintendent of Police and District Magistrate to be informed.

2. Security arrangements to be augmented in the area.

3. Search team to start searching without affecting normal functioning of unit.

4. Station Firefighting equipment be put on alert.

5. Specific area threatened to be evacuated and declared out-of-control for everyone.

If Part-A, Part B, Part C and Part D contain no information indicating that the call is genuine, it will be termed as “Green”, in which case normal functioning will be continue, while the target area is searched for suspicious objects. Hence, the bomb threat call will be labeled “RED” or “SPECIFIC” “AMBER” OR “GREEN” as per information available in Part A, Part B, Part C and Part-D. Note: In case of difference of opinion amongst the members about the nature of the threat, it would be advisable to err on the side of caution.

The decision of the committee will be recorded in the bomb threat evaluation proforma and signed by all the members.

The evaluation of bomb threat will be done as quickly as possible as time lost may prove costly.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-19

18. Procedure to Be Followed after Identification of Suspected Object:

Actions to be taken:

A. In case, any suspicious object is located during search, the area is to be

cordoned off and a sign reading “DANGER - BOMB” is displayed in the Area.

B. The Coordinator of the Bomb Threat Assessment Committee is to be informed about the finding of the suspicious object.

C. The Coordinator in turn will inform all the members of the Committee, Bomb Disposal Squad, Police, Fire Brigade, Medical Authorities and Civil Authorities.

D. The BTAC considering all the factors shall decide the extent of the evacuation required.

E. The designated officer shall order the evacuation of the area. The safe distance for evacuation shall also depend on the size, nature and location of the explosive device.

F. It is advisable to evacuate the employees to an assembly area, which is at least 300 meter away from the suspected object.

G. The evacuation route and the assembly area should be checked for any bombs or IEDs.

H. The object should be delicately covered with bomb blanket and then a 3 ft. high wall of sand bags should be built around it. A minimum of 100/200 sandbags may be kept at each location for this purpose.

I. In the absence of Bomb blankets, mattresses or cushions can be used to reduce the blast effect.

J. The bomb separation ring consisting of a pre-cast concrete structure with adequate wall thickness can also be used in place of sandbags. An efficient method for quickly transporting the concrete structure should be worked out.

K. If the suspected object is found in a office building or in any room, the windows and doors should be opened to minimize the extent of the bomb blast damage.

L. In case, the suspected object is located adjacent to very important rooms like control room, MCR and Power House Control room or compressor and


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-20

generator room, etc., wall buttressing can be done by stacking sandbags along the wall of the adjacent room to minimize the damage from blast and shock effect.

M. In a confined room the bomb blast wave will travel all round in case the room is big enough. But if there are any outlets, the blast wave will try to escape first through these outlets. This will lead to severe damage around the outlets. Therefore, no employee should be allowed to move or assemble in such areas.

N. The evacuated employees should not be permitted to re-enter the building, or the affected area, until the bomb squad clear the bomb, declare the area safe and final clearance certificate is issued by the Bomb Threat Assessment Committee.

19. All clear/Completion Certificate: The all clear signal/message is to be communicated to the employees and people of the affected area after the bomb threat search procedure is completed. We have decided to announce over PA/PAGING and Walkie Talkie“MEETING WITH ED IS OVER, ALL ARE REQUESTED TO GO TO THEIR RESPECTIVE WORK PLACES”. The Bomb Threat Committee coordinator shall prepare the Bomb Threat Search Completion Certificate which will be signed by all the members. Copies of the certificate will be forwarded to the higher authorities for information and record. If the bomb Search has been carried out by Army/Police Bomb Disposal Squad then they shall issue a clearance certificate and same will be counter signed either by the SP or his representative available at the Command Centre/Control Room. After completion of all the above exercises the BATC will ensure that normalcy is restored and all the agencies are informed accordingly. The PR Section (Corporate Communication) will ensure that the press releases are issued only in consultation with the Unit Head. 20. Important:

The list of DO’s and DON’Ts (Annexure-D) for handling suspicious objects shall be circulated to all the Employees and displayed prominently at some place where it will receive maximum exposure.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-21

21. Damage Caused by a Bomb: A bomb causes damage both by blast effect and by flying shrapnel, which are scattered over a fairly wide area but cause damage only to points, struck with sufficient force. 22. Appearance and Size Of Home-Made Bomb: Homemade bombs are not manufactured to any fixed standards. Therefore, their materials of construction, shape, size explosive charge, finish and workmanship vary widely. A homemade bomb may look like anything from a ball of jute yarn to well-finished service type ammunition. Bamboo tubes, cigarette, tins, glass bottles, coconut shells, earthen capsules, metal pipes and shells of various types have been and are used in making homemade bombs. 23. Apparent Difference between Service (Military Bombs) and Home Made

Bombs: All service bombs have very good finish of a manufactured article and bear markings in the form of letters, figures or monograms. Homemade bombs generally have a crude finish and do not bear markings, even if the finish is good. 24. Different Types of Home Made Bombs: Homemade bombs may be classified as under: -

(a) Bomb, which explodes at a preset time.

(b) Bomb, which explodes when its position is disturbed.

(c) Bomb, which explodes on impact.

(d) Bomb initiated by the action of sulfuric acid.

(e) Bomb initiated mechanically.

(f) Bomb fitted with fuse, which has to be lighted.

(g) Booby trap bomb.

(h) Letter bomb.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-22

Time Bomb :

A time bomb may have one of the following timing arrangements:-

(a) A time piece or watch acting as a time switching device in an electrical circuit consisting of a flash light battery with a filament of resistance (torch light bulb with its glass globe broken).

(b) Corrosive acid or chemical in a corrodible capsule.

(c) A special alloy which fatigues at a specified rate when under tension.

(d) A long length of safety fuse or a slow burning fuse.

(e) A time pencil which triggers the explosion at a preset time.

WARNING:

The timing device is usually concealed in the bomb. It is rarely possible to identify a Time Bomb or to ascertain the set time. There is therefore a measure of risk in dealing with a Time Bomb.

Letter Bomb: All letter bombs contain a charge of explosive and a suitable initiating device. The weight of explosive in a letter bomb is not very great. Neither need a letter bomb be too bulky. A LETTER BOMB CAN KILL A PERSON WHO OPENS IT. Letter bombs can also be made with explosive charge which is sufficiently sensitive to rough handling and does not need any special initiating arrangement. Such a bomb may be expected to be delivered only through a messenger and not by post as it may result in premature explosion. However, such sensitive letter bombs may also be sent by post as in the Patiala Post Office blast case. Pocket / Parcel / Book Bomb: A packet/parcel/book bomb contains a charge of explosive with a suitable initiating device. The weight of a bomb of this type will be much more than that of a letter bomb. In general, the effects of explosion of this type of bomb will be far more serious than that of a letter bomb.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-23

In the case of packet/parcel/book bomb delivered through messenger, the initiating device may be modified to make it work when the packet/parcel/book is upturned.

DOS AND DON’TS FOR EXAMINING LETTERS/PACKET/ PARCELS/ BOOKS

Don’t bend or press hard. Don’t open a closed cover, which is more than 3 mm thick until you have examined it according to the instructions given. Don’t hastily pull out contents of closed cover without examination. Don’t pull out contents of a closed cover if it does not come out smoothly. Don’t invert suspicious parcels delivered by messengers.

Do examine all closed covers, thin or bulky, against a source of a strong light, if cover is not uniformly translucent, suspect, mischief.

Do handle object gently, carefully and cautiously. Do be particularly careful about letters over 3mm in thickness and closed packets/parcels which are marked, “Personal and Confidential” or are dispatched from Post offices in the European continent Do seek assistance in case of doubt.

Detection of Letter Bombs, Packet /Parcel/Book Bombs:

The following pointers should be looked for in determining a suspected letter/packet/parcel/book bomb.

i Over stamped but unregistered

ii Unevenly balanced

iii It has a bulge

iv Too heavy for its size

v There is a small pinhole in one corner

vi Thin wire protrudes out of it

vii It has grease marks

viii It gives off odour of almond

ix It has springiness on top, bottom or sides. Don’t press or bend.

x If shaken gently, there is noise of loose metal inside

xi It gives the feeling of containing a cardboard or a stiff liner.

xii NOTE : A letter bomb may, be marked “Personal” or “Confidential” to make sure that it gets to the intended victim.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-24

Procedure for Dealing With A Bomb

1. EQUIPMENT/ MATERIALS REQUIRED FOR DEALING BOMBS

The following materials should be kept ready at all times as a kit for dealing with bombs:

a) Strong, smooth string of well twisted cotton yarn or plastic yarn approximately, 3mm in diameter and 30 meter long.

b) 2 meters long pole of bamboo or wood (long police lathi)

c) A bucket or tin can with its top open

d) A sharp knife or a pair of scissors

2. PRECAUTIONS WHICH MUST BE FOLLOWED IN ALL CASES :

a) Be careful about entering into a room in which or next to which an explosion has occurred to bring you there. It may be a ruse to trap you.

b) Do not open a closed room / door /window / almirah / cupboard/ box in the normal way, open with a long pole or in any other improvised manner.

c) Do not switch on any electric line if the room is dark use hand torch for illumination.

d) Do not touch, lift, drag, kick, hit or move the suspected object,

e) Do not try to defuse a suspected bomb. Leave the task to experts.

f) Isolate or cover with bomb blanket, if available.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-25

Procedure for Dealing with Suspected Objects / Bombs –

Brief description And Method of handling the suspected object

S.No. Description Method Of Handling

a. It has a Metal shell of GOOD FINISH AND BEARS MARKINGS OF letters figures or monogram. It is not fitted with a wick of fuse.

Possibly service ammunition. Leave it at site and surround with sand bags. Request Inspector of Explosives concerned to come and examine object on site. If possible, contact nearest military establishment for help in identification and removal of object.

b. It HAS A METAL SHELL of good or bad finish and is FITTED externally WITH A SPRING LOADED HAMMER or PLUNGER; secured by a pin or string (spring may not be visible).

Possibly a mechanically operated grenade. DO NOT meddle with the spring-loaded hammer/ plunger mechanism.

c. Object looks like a BALL of JUTE YARN OR COTTON YARN OR STRIPS OF CLOTH. It is NOT fitted with a wick or fuse. Size less than 50 mm in diameter.

Take a bucket GENTLY place object in the bucket. DOES NOT press object between fingers while picking it up.

d. Object looks like BALL OF JUTE YARN. It is fitted WITH A WICK. Diameter not more than 25 mm. It may or may not have attractive finish.

Possibly a cracker. Send in a padded box or carton to the concerned Inspector of Explosives.

e. Object looks like a bulky Book. Could be a book-bomb, DON’T OPEN DON’T UPTURN OR TILT.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-26

ANNEXURES A. - BOMB THREAT MESSAGE FORM

B. - BOMB WARNING ASSESSMENT FORM

C. - BOMB THREAT DRILL PROCEDURE

D. - LIST OF DO’S AND DON’TS


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-27

ANNEXURE-A

BOMB THREAT MESSAGE FORM UNIT LOCATION TIME DATE Forwarded to --------------------------------------------------------------- Exact wording of the threat: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Where is the bomb right now? ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. When is it going to explode? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3. What does it look like? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4. What kind of bomb is it? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5. What will cause it to explode? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6. Did you place the bomb? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7. Why are you doing this? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8. Who are you?


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-28

--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9. What is your name? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10. What is your address? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11.What is your telephone number? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12.Where are you now? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13. Origin of call. Public phone Private phone Internal Long call 14.Specific number dialed by the caller --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15. Sex -------------------------------------------------------------- 16. Approximate age --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 17. Call received: Time--------Completed----------Duration-------- 18. Nationality ---------------------------------------------------------- 19. Threat Language: A. Well Spoken B. Irrational C. Taped D. Foul E. Incoherent F. Message read by threat maker 20. Voice characteristics: A. Loud B. Pitched C. Rasping D. Intoxicated E. Soft F. Deep

G. Pleasant


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-29

21. Callers voice:

A. Calm B. Crying C. Excited D. Stutter E. Rapid F. Deep G. Disguised H. Familiar I. Clearing throat J. Angry K. Slow L. Fast M. Laughter N. Nasal O. Lisp P. Hoarse Q. Slowered 22. Accent: Local Not local Foreigner Regional Language used by the caller ---------------------------------- 23. Back ground sound: Quite Mixed Street Noises Music Crockery House Noises Motor Voice Animal Noises PA system Booth Factory Machinery Children Traffic Office Machinery Train Buses Airport Activities Party Atmosphere Others 24. Did the caller appear familiar with the area by his description of the bomb location ? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 25. If the voice sound familiar, whose did at sound like? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 26. Command of language: Excellent Good Fair Poor Remarks:


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-30

Name of the person who received the bomb threat: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Designation Department Phone Message passed on to (Name) Designation Department Phone

Date Time Signature


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-31

ANNEXURE-B

BOMB WARNING ASSESSMENT FORM

Indian Oil Corporation Limited

PART-A

Message received by: Name

Designation Telephone no. Time of receipt

Exact wording of threat call: --------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------- Additional information: Location of bomb: Anticipated time of Explosion: Description of bomb: Name & Organisation of the caller: Telephone no. of the caller: Whether the message is taped: Yes/No Any other information:


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-32

PART-B Caller specified the name of the building? Caller specified any room no.? Where the bomb is kept? Caller informed any specific location?

PART-C

Exact construction of device specified. Detailed technical description of device specified. Means of concealment of bomb explained. Extortion or political demand made. Identification of a person with his address and description. The type of bomb or device. Expected time of explosion Terrorist or other organisation made or code word given. Any other information

PART-D Background data: History of bomb warning and state of internal security: History of activities of terrorist in last three months:


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-33

Any term used indicating call to be genuine or spurious: Influence of current events: Additional security measures taken recently: State of industrial relation: Anti social elements activities: Intention to disrupt / create tension or violence in the locality: Any other information to decide the call as Genuine or false:


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-34

ANNEXURE - C

BOMB THREAT DRILL PROCEDURE

1. Receipt of bomb threat. 2. Immediately inform Co-ordinator and Police control room. 3. Inform Local Civil authorities and Police authorities and apprise them of bomb

threat. 4. Also inform Fire services of threat received at Terminal. 5. Evaluation of the repercussions of the bomb explosion based on the threats

received. 6. Decision to search or evacuate the area. 7. In case of evacuation, premises are cleared off in order to minimise the loss of

bomb explosion. 8. Search the bomb:

a. Bomb located - i. Fire fighting system checked for readiness. ii. All precautionary actions to minimise or making the

bomb inactive. iii. Disposal of bomb with the help of local authorities and

bomb disposal squad. iv. Investigate the bomb threat thoroughly. v. Declaration that area is safe. vi. Order re entry of employee.

b. Bomb not located -

i. Call off all the activities of the Terminal. ii. Declaration that area is safe. iii. Order re entry of employee.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-35

ANNEXURE-D

DO’S AND DON’T

a) Do not touch or remove the suspected object unless you are duty bound to do so.

b) Do not open the package with hand or other materials.

c) Do not puncture the package, object or device.

d) Do not submerge the suspected object in water, as there are some bombs,

which get activated in water.

e) Do not cut the strings or wire attached to the object. Some bombs designed to get activated once the string or wire is cut.

f) Do not accept the identification marks on the package on its face value.

g) Do not pass any metallic object over the package, as some bombs are

designed metal sensitive.

h) Do not attempt to open the baggage by hand or any other unapproved methods. Use always-remote entry technique only.

i) Do not focus any flashlight directly over the suspected object as some bombs

explode on exposure to light source.

j) Do not allow anybody to re-entry in the affected area until the danger is cleared for safe and advised for re-entry.

k) Do not take bomb away from public. Take public away from bomb.

l) Do not bring suspected object in the control room.

m) Do not transport the suspected object through congested area.

n) Once the bomb is located evacuate the employees immediately to the

assembly area, which is notified at a safer distance.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01


P a g e | 24-36

o) Open all the doors and windows to minimize the extent of damage due to

blast or shock effect. p) Inform the Bomb Threat Committee Co-ordinator.

q) Inform bomb disposal squad.

r) Inform civil authorities, police, fire brigade, hospital and ambulance.

s) Handle the suspected item only if you are trained and duty bound to handle

it.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No 25 -1


CHAPTER - 25

ANNEXURES


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No 25 -2


LOCATION OF MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARD UNITS, DISTRICT CRISIS CONTROL ROOM AND DISTRICT FIRE STATION

Keshawe

Rachiyahi

Annexure-1

(Barauni Refinery Layout)

District

Crisis C/R

District Fire

Station


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No 25 -4


Annexure – 03 PLOT PLAN


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No 25 -5


Annexure - 4


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No 25 -6


CR

UD

E

AVU

I /

II /

III

Fuel Gas

LPG

CRU Motor

Sprit

Naphtha

KeroseneH2

PLANT

DHDT

COKER

– A /B

FCCU

HSD (High

Speed

Diesel)

LRU

LSHS

Petroleum

Coke

ARU/SRU SULPHUR

LPG MERICHEM

GASOLINE MERICHEM

BLOCK FLOW DIAGRAM OF BARAUNI REFINERY

MSQ

Barauni Refinery BLOCK FLOW DIAGRAM

Annexure - 5

List Of Hazardous Chemicals Under the Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical Rules, 1989.

SR. NO. NAME OF CHEMICAL


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No 25 -16


Chief Co-Ordinator

DM, Begusarai

Security S P ,Begusarai

Fire Service DFO,Begusarai

Medical Services Civil Surgeon

Transport DTO, Begusarai

Media & Welfare Director Accts,Begusarai

Communication TDM, Begusarai

Chief Co-Ordinator

ADM,Begusarai

Security Dy. SP, Begusarai

Fire Service A/c AFO. Begusarai

Medical Service ACMO . Begusarai

Transport NDC,Begusarai

Media & Welfare DPRO,Begusarai

Communication DET. Begusarai


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No 25 -18


Annexure-19

GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR THE PEOPLE RESIDING SURROUDNINGS OF REFINERY IN CASE OF EMERGENCY SITUATION AT BARAUNI REFINERY.

DO’S

Don’t be panic, keep cool.

If any gas leakage is reported, move either side perpendicular to wind direction towards a safe place.

Keep wet cloth on the nose and breathe normally.

Immediately extinguish the fire in chulah with water in and around the house.

Immediately put off any open flame like candle, lantern, heater etc.

If evacuation is called for, lock the house and be ready.

Free the domestic animals.

Help Fire Fighting team and emergency staff to keep the situation under control.

Listen carefully the announcements in your area and follow the instructions.

DON’T’S Do not put ‘ON’ or ‘OFF’ any electric switch. If any electric switch is ‘ON’,

keep it in ‘ON’ position only.

Do not smoke and do not allow anybody to smoke.

Do not pay any attention towards rumors and do no spread any rumor also.

Do not use any personal vehicle.

Do not block any public road.

During any emergency situation, do not unnecessarily talk on phone


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No 25 -19


Annexure-20

DISASTER TALK BACK CONSOLE OPERATING PROCEDURE

Before using the system, kindly ensure that on main console “Power Led” is ON

1. TO TALK WITH F&S CONTROL ROOM

2.TO TALK WITH DISASTER CONTROL ROOM

DISASTER ANNOUNCEMENT SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE AT F&S CONTROL ROOM

TO COMMUNICATE WITH – 1. F&S Control Room(MFS) :

2. Plant Talk Back Console ( Unit Control Rooms)

3. For Conference Mode

4. For All Call Mode

5. For Entire Plant Announcement


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No 25 -20


Annexure-21

Role of SDRF

While the NDRF is being trained, re-trained and equipped as a specialist force for level three disasters, it is equally important to ensure capacity building of state police personnel who are invariably the first responders in any natural or man-made disasters. To ensure this, a two-pronged strategy is being suggested to the states: firstly, to train state police personnel in the basics of disaster management and secondly, to train at least one battalion equivalent out of their state armed police units as State Disaster Response Force (SDRF) on lines of the NDRF. In addition to police personnel, the SDRFs may be constituted from existing resources of the Fire Services, Home Guards and Civil Defence. NDRF Bns and their training institutions will assist the States/UTs in this effort. The State/ UTs will also be encouraged to set up DM training facilities in their respective Police Training Colleges and include this subject in their basic and in-service courses.

FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF THE STATE DISASTER MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY

(i) All the duties, powers, function and rights, what so ever, consequent and incidental to the carrying of the objectives of the Society shall only be exercised or performed by the Governing Body.

(ii) In particular and without prejudge to the generality of the foregoing provision, the Governing Body of SDMA may:

(a) make, amend, or repeal any bye laws or rules relating to administration and management of the affairs of the Society subject to the observance of the provisions contained in the Act and the Uttar Pradesh Disaster Management Act, 2005;

(b) consider the annual budget and the annual action plan, its subsequent alternations placed before it by the Secretary/Convener from time to time and to pass it with such modification as the Governing Body may think fit;

(c) accept donations and endowments or give grants upon such terms as it thinks fit;

(d) delegate its powers, other than those of making rules to the Chairman, Secretary/Convener or other authorities as it may deem fit;

(e) appoint committee, sub-committees and Boards etc. for such purpose and on such terms as it may deem fit, and to remove any of them;

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_hazard

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-made_hazards

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-made_hazards


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No 25 -21


(f) recruit and appoint all the key administrative and technical staff of the

Society;

(g) set policy for the Secretariat of the Society;

(h) monitor the financial position of the Secretariat of the Society in order to ensure smooth income flow and to review annual audited accounts;

(i) do generally all such acts and things as may be necessary or incidental to carrying out the objectives of the Society or any of them.

Provided that nothing herein contained shall authorise the Governing Body to do any act or to pass any byelaws which may be repugnant to the provisions hereof, to the powers hereby conferred on the Governing Body and other authorities, or which may be inconsistent with the objectives of the Society.

Role of NDRF

The Concept. The Disaster Management Act has mandated the constitution of a Specialist Response Force to a threatening disaster situation or a disaster. This Force will function under the National Disaster Management Authority which has been vested with its control, direction and general superintendence. This will be a multi-disciplinary, multi-skilled, high-tech force for all types of disasters capable of insertion by air, sea and land. All the eight battalions are to be equipped and trained for all natural disasters including four battalions in combating nuclear, biological and chemical disasters.

Present Organization. Presently this Force is constituted of eight battalions, two each from the BSF, CRPF, CISF and ITBP. Each battalion will provide 18 self-contained specialist search and rescue teams of 45 personnel each including engineers, technicians, electricians, dog squads and medical/paramedics. The total strength of each battalion will be approximately 1,158.

Deployment. These NDRF battalions are located at nine different locations in the country based on the vulnerability profile to cut down the response time for their deployment. During the preparedness period/in a threatening disaster situation, proactive deployment of these forces will be carried out by the NDMA in consultation with state authorities.

Functional Parameters - Regular and intensive training, familiarization with the area of responsibility, carrying out mock drills and joint exercises with the various stakeholders will form the key functional parameter of this Force. Four training centres will be set up in Kolkata, Latur, Bhanu and NISA (Hyderabad) by respective paramilitary forces to train personnel from NDRF battalions of respective forces. The NDRF units will impart basic training to the State Disaster Response Forces (SDRF) in their respective locations. Further, one national-level Disaster Management Academy will be set up at Nagpur to provide training for trainers and to meet other national and international commitments.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No 25 -22


FUNCTIONS OF THE (NDRF) AUTHORITY

(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Authority shall be primarily responsible for promoting an integrated and coordinated system ofdisaster management including prevention or mitigation of disaster by the State, local authorities, stake holders and communities,

(2) The Authority shall-

(a) act as the central planning, coordinating and monitoring body for disaster management and post-disaster reconstruction, rehabilitation, evaluation, and assessment;

(b) assist the State Government in formulation of policy relating to emergency relief notwithstanding that the implementation of emergency relief shall be the responsibility of the Revenue Department and other departments of the Government;

(c) inform the State Government and departments of Government on progress and problems in disaster management;

(d) promote general education and awareness on disaster management, emergency planning and response;

(e) and matters incidental thereto.


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No 25 -23


Contact Details Of NDRF Officers

NDRF Head Quarter

Name Designation Address Tele. Fax. Mobile E-mail.

Shri Rajiv ,IPS

DG Directorate General , National Disaster

Response Force (NDRF) Sector-1 R K

Puram, New Delhi -66

011-26712851

011-26161442

011-26105912.

09818916161 [email protected]

Shri Mukul Goel

IG Directorate General , National Disaster



011-26160252

011-26113014

011-26105912.

09871115726 -

Shri Rakesh Ranjan

Dy Commandant

(Proc)

Directorate General , National Disaster


Puram,

011-26107921

011-26105912.



BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No 25 -24


New Delhi -66

Shri Om Parkash

Inspector Control Room

Directorate General , National Disaster



011-26107953

011-26105912.

08010072169


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No 25 -25


NDRF BNS

Name Designation Address Tele. Fax. Mobile E-mail.

Sh. A.K.Singh Commandant 1st BN NDRF, Patgaon PO-

Azara,Guwahati

0361-2840027

0361-2840284

09435545951 [email protected] [email protected]

Sh. Sukhdev Raj

Commandant 2nd BN NDRF Digberia Camp, PO-Badu Road,

Madhyamgram,Barasat Kolkata-700128

033-25264302,

033-25264394

033-25263077

09434742836 [email protected], [email protected],

[email protected]

Sh. Arun Kumar

Sr.Commandant 3rd BN NDRF, PO-Mundali,

Cuttack-Odisha

09437964571 09937186222

0671-2879710

09868744560 [email protected], [email protected]

Sh.S.Neduc Hezhian

Sr.Commandant 4th Bn NDRF, PO-Suraksha Campus,

Arrakonam,Distt. Vellore,

Tamilnadu

04177-246269

04177-246594

09442105069, 09442105169

[email protected]

Sh.Alok Avasthy

Commandant 5th Bn NDRF, PO-

Vishnupuri,Telegaon, Pune(Maharashtra)

02114-231245

02114-231509


Sh.R.S Joon Commandant 6th Bn NDRF, Chilora Road, Gandhinagar, Pin-382042

079-23202540

079-23201551


Sh.R.K.Verma Commandant 7th Bn NDRF, Bibiwala Road,

Bhatinda(Punjab)

0164-2246030

0164-2246570


Sh.Jaipal Yadav

Commandant 8th Bn NDRF, Greater

Noida,Distt.G.B.Nagar, UP

0120-2351101,

0120-2351087

0120-2351105


Sh.S.S.Guleria Commandant 9th Bn NDRF, Bihata Patna,

Bihar

06115-253942

06115-253939

08986909490 [email protected], ndrfpatna@yah

oo.com


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No 25 -26


Sh.Parshant Dhar

Commandant 10th Bn NDRF, Malkangiri,

Vijaywara(AP)

09419217790 01955-252646



BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No 25 -27


Annexure-22

OFF-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN OF BARAUNI

1.1 PREAMBLE History has shown, for many times that several small and large industrial accidents in lack of proper planning and control measures have transformed in major losses and destruction and thus causing the disaster. Many times losses rise exponentially just because of improper planning and coordination among various facilities available with industries and government/ administration for control and mitigation, besides this lack of improper coordination have drastic repercussions on past accident scenario.

To establish proper co-ordination between industrial facilities and facilities available with the local administration and government setup for control and abatement of emergency arising out of industrial accident, Ministry of environment has laid down provisions for preparation of an OFF- SITE EMERGENCY PLAN, under Rule -14 of “The Manufacture, storage and import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989” (as amended to date). According to the rule preparation of an OFF SITE - EMERGENCY PLAN, by district administration having “Major Accidents Hazard units” (MAH Units) [as defined under Rule 2j (a) of “The Manufacture, Storage and import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989”] in its jurisdiction.

The District Magistrate, Administration BARAUNI has prepared ‘OFF SITE EMERGENCY PLAN’ of Dist. BARAUNI.

1.2 CHEMICAL EMERGENCY

Chemical emergency in industry may be defined as one or emergencies which can affect several or all plants/ departments can cause serious injury to personnel and can result in extensive damage to property and loss of life and disruption of whole working scenario. It requires the effective handling of the resources.

Emergencies, which can be encountered in any industry, are of two types- A .Manmade:

1. Fire

2. Gas leak/gas cloud ,(flammable)

3. Poisoning

4. Explosion

5. Those arising out of abnormalities in operation, maintenance, shutdown, failure

of equipment and use of substandard or wrong materials.

6. Civil commotion and armed conflicts , liquid and/or chemical poisoning

B. Natural:


BARAUNI REFINERY

BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01

PAGE No 25 -28


1. Flood, drought

2. Lightning

3. Cyclone

4. Earthquake

5. Falling of meteor etc.

Fire, explosion and the release of toxic gases can cause death and injuries to workers and the evacuation of communities and adversely affect the environment as a whole. Chemical emergencies that have come to be known as “Basel” , “Bhopal” , “Flixborough” , “Mexico city” and “Seveso” gave rise to terms “Major Hazards” and “Major Hazard Control” the prevention and control of major hazards have subsequently become a pressing issue in all parts of the world.

The rapid growth in the use of hazardous chemicals in industry and trade has brought about a very significant increase in the number of people, both workers and members of the general public, whose life could be endangered at any one time by an accident involving these chemicals. The rapid pace of progress in modern technology allows no scope for learning by trial and error, making it increasingly necessary to get design and operating procedure right the first time. However, safeguards in the chemical industry are not limited to factory floor alone. Public concern at multiple injuries and deaths from spectacular events such as major explosion invariably leads to calls for additional controls at national and international levels. It is therefore important, particularly for projects involving the storage and use of hazardous chemicals, to address both on-site and off-site safety when deciding on the safety measures to be applied.

1.3 Legal-Backup and need for off-site emergency plan

In India “Off-site Emergency Planning and preparedness” at District level and frame work for emergency planning and preparedness along with their related aspects are covered by two acts viz.:-

(i) The Environment Protection Act, 1986 through

Manufacture Storage & Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989

-Under Rule – 13 for on-site emergency planning at industry level - Under Rule – 14 for off-site emergency Planning at District level

Chemical accidents (emergency planning , preparedness and response) rules , 1996

- Under rule – 8,9,10 &13(for district &local crisis group)

contains - environmentclearance.nic.inenvironmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/online/... ·...

Documents