constellations volume 21 issue 1 2014 [doi 10.1111%2f1467-8675.12070] mark, d.clifton -- recognition...

doi: 10.1111/1467-8675.12070

Recognition and Honor: A Critique of Axel Honneth’sand Charles Taylor’s Histories of Recognition

D.Clifton Mark

Recognition has a history, and its two most prominent contemporary theorists agree, inthe main, on what it is. Charles Taylor’s and Axel Honneth’s theories of recognition arestructured around a three-phase historical narrative beginning with honor, the characteristicform of recognition in pre-modern hierarchical societies. In the age of honor, Honneth andTaylor tell us, recognition was reliably granted and rarely, if ever, gave rise to conflict.Still, honor is problematic because, inegalitarian and group-based, it does not allow for theequal and individualized recognition which are normatively imperative in the modern world.The shift into the present era of recognition comprises two major changes to the normsgoverning recognition: equalization and individualization. In order to develop and maintainnon-distorted identities, modern individuals require recognition of their equal status, as wellas recognition of their particular value, and modern norms of recognition dictate that theyought to have both of these. According to Taylor and Honneth, this change represents agreat moral improvement, yet our present era is nonetheless a fallen one. Differing as tothe precise causes, both agree that modern norms of recognition are frequently not met inpractice, and that these failures of recognition give rise to social conflict. The normativedirection of both Honneth’s and Taylor’s theories of recognition is provided by the aim ofachieving ‘full-recognition’ for all members of society. If followed, they hope their politicalprescriptions will lead us into the third phase of their stylized histories: a future in which theobstacles to recognition are overcome, and all individuals may receive recognition both oftheir equal status, and of their particular value.

This paper provides a critique of Honneth and Taylor through the concept that stands atthe beginning of their historical vision, and which has been almost entirely neglected in theliterature on recognition: honor. Historical scholarship on honor as well as a bourgeoningtheoretical literature stand at odds with the account provided by Taylor and Honneth.1

The first part of this paper will introduce a new conceptual framework for thinking abouthonor. Honor does not, as Taylor and Honneth argue, consist in a single form of (group-based, hierarchical) recognition, but instead in two conceptually distinct types of recognition:categorial recognition based on the social category or group to which an individual belongs,and therefore possessed equally by all members of the group; and comparative recognition,which sorts members of a group into an intra-group hierarchy based on their relative merits.Because honor is comparative, it puts members of the same group into competition withone another, making recognition conflicts endemic to honor societies. Honneth and Tayloraccount only for categorial honor, completely ignoring its comparative form.

It is unsurprising that this neglect should lead them to mischaracterize relations of recog-nition in honor-based societies, which are a good deal more insecure and conflictual thaneither Honneth or Taylor make them out to be. However, the criticism of their account ofhonor also has implications for both of their interpretations of the transition from honor-based recognition to modern recognition, as well as the normative theories they devise toguide us through present recognition struggles. Honneth and Taylor do not see the presentstate of recognition as sui generis but rather as the result of the historical transformation of

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Recognition and Honor: D.Clifton Mark 17

earlier honor-systems. If they misconstrue their starting point, then they can give neither anadequate account of the modernization of recognition, nor an adequate interpretation of thepresent state of recognition relations. Without purporting to provide an exhaustive history ofrecognition, the bipartite analysis of honor presented here recommends an alternate accountof the shift from honor to modern recognition. According to this alternate, admittedly styl-ized, narrative, the great equalization cited by Honneth and Taylor should be understood to bean equalization specifically of categorial recognition, whereas the competition for compara-tive recognition, formerly contained within the distinct social strata of hierarchical societies,comes to encompass all members of society. This narrative implies that particular recognitioncontinues to depend on comparisons with others and therefore is in principle not attainable forall members of society. If this is the case, then the guiding normative aim of full recognitionis unattainable, and therefore cannot justify Honneth’s and Taylor’s political prescriptions.

I. Honor: Categorial and Comparative

It is not difficult to see why those interested in recognition should also be interested in honor.The key premise of recognition theory concerns the deep intersubjectivity of human nature.Recognition from others is important because it is constitutive of what we are and what wemay become. For Taylor, ‘We define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes instruggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us.’2 Honneth too arguesthat undistorted identity-formation and ‘self-realization’ are impossible in the absence ofproper recognition. This same link between recognition and identity is implicit in the idea ofhonor. For example, ‘honor’ often refers to internal aspects of identity: ‘honor was the coreof a man’s identity, his sense of self, his manhood.’ It has been interpreted as a quality ofcharacter, a sense of one’s own worth and identity, and as an associated inclination to abideby a certain code of behavior. Yet these internal notions of honor are inextricably linked toexternal recognition, leading other authors to define honor as ‘esteem, respect, prestige, orsome combination of these attributes.’3 In a classic definition capturing both aspects, JulianPitt-Rivers writes that honor is ‘the value of a person in his own eyes, but also in the eyes ofhis society. It is his estimation of his own worth, his claim to pride, but it is also the acknowl-edgement of that claim, his excellence recognized by society, his right to pride.’4 Bourdieudraws the two even more closely together, telling us that, in honor societies, ‘the individuallearns the truth about himself through the intermediary of others; and . . . the being and thetruth about a person are identical with the being and truth that others acknowledge in him.’5

The kind of honor under discussion here is principally that which Taylor and Honnethare interested in. It is honor as akin to a right that entitles an individual to a certain kind ofrespect or recognition, as well as that respect itself. Honor implies of two types of recognitionwhich differ in both their basis (what kind of thing is recognized), and their distribution (whoreceives it, and to what degree). The first is categorial honor, which entitles an individual to acertain level of respect or treatment based on the position they occupy in society, their socialrole, their rank. Honor in hierarchical societies is most often associated with aristocraticclasses, but all social groups had their own distinct kind of categorial honor. While it ispossible to lose one’s honor in this sense, for example, through egregiously dishonorablebehavior, it does not admit of degree. Thus, unless it is forfeited, it is present in the samedegree in all members of the same social category. In societies organized into hierarchicalsocial classes, categorial honor grounds one kind of inequality of recognition. Not only arethe different categories owed different kinds of respect, they are also arranged into a kind ofsocial pyramid in which those at the bottom levels are expected to defer to those on top.

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Despite its association with aristocratic social orders, categorial honor does not alwaysimply a hierarchical relationship. Between groups, categorial honor is often hierarchical, butwithin groups the norm is one of equality. Alexander Welsh defines honor as ‘the respectthat motivates and constrains members of a peer group,’6 emphasizing throughout his bookthat ‘the status of the individuals concerned is . . . fundamentally that of equals.’7 FrankHenderson Stewart also provides two definitions of honor that underscore the importanceof equality. The first describes it as a right to the kind of respect that is due to an equal,and the second defines the honor right as ‘the right to be treated as a full or equal memberof the honor group.’8 Since the basis of categorial honor is just membership in a group,it is enjoyed equally by all group members. Even though there were internal hierarchieswithin noble classes – a duke was clearly ‘greater’ than a baron – they were also peersin an important sense through their shared nobility. Categorial honor, then, can be bothinegalitarian or egalitarian depending on one’s point of view. If one is interested primarily inthe relationships between different societal groups, then honor will often appear inegalitarian.However, intra-group recognition is governed by powerful egalitarian norms of respect.

In addition to categorial recognition based on group-membership, ‘honor’ also refersto a kind of comparative recognition which must be won through achievement or merit.Comparative honor serves to distinguish individuals both in the sense that it differentiatesthem, and in the sense of ‘distinction’ by which some might stand out from and above others.It is in this sense that one might be an ‘honors student,’ or in which winning a nobel prize is‘an honor.’ It is the desire for this kind of honor that motivated the well-known aristocraticinterest in glory or renown. I call it comparative honor rather than, say, meritocratic honorto underscore the fact that this kind of honor was always understood in relative, rather thanabsolute, terms.

It is an important feature of comparative honor that it does not usually cross categorialdivisions. The comparisons that matter here are between members of the same honor group orsocial category; aristocrats might vie to outdo one another in honorable deeds, but would neverthink to compare their exploits and virtues to those of non-nobles. Because of its comparativenature, the distribution of this kind of honor is necessarily inegalitarian, but this time it is aninequality among equals. Comparative honor generates a hierarchy within honor groups thathas the structure of a pecking-order rather than a pyramid, where individual comparisonsreveal a unique standing vis-a-vis others members of the group. Because one competes withmembers of the same social category, categorial equality was not antithetical to honor com-petition, but rather was a precondition for it. If we read ‘categorial’ where he writes ‘rough,’Miller puts the point succinctly: ‘the whole point of honor is to distinguish oneself from othersat the same time that one accepts the basic rule upholding the roughly egalitarian assumptionsof the honor game. No distinction, no honor. And no rough egalitarianism, no game.’9

The comparative character of honor is a formal, rather than substantive property. Whatkind of qualities or achievements should count as honorable varies greatly across time andplace, and the question of what is honorable is contested to a greater or lesser extent withinany given historical context. In his excellent essay on honor in England in the 15th to the17th centuries, Mervyn James documents how conceptions of what was honorable shiftedfrom a principally martial ethic, to Christian virtue, and even to academic accomplishment.Yet even as the substantive values comprising honor change, honor is always understood asa comparative rather than absolute quality.10

In light of these two kinds of honor, we can see two ways in which recognition, or lackthereof, might give rise to conflict. The first is a failure to grant categorial recognition, whichdenies an individual’s standing as a member of the honor-group to which he or she belongs.



While this kind of conflict may be very serious, insofar as the overall social hierarchyis generally accepted, categorial inequalities between groups give rise to few conflicts. Ifeveryone knows where each group stands in the social hierarchy, and treats members ofthose groups with the appropriate deference or condescension, then few conflicts shouldarise. Conversely, where underlying social distinctions are changing, as when members ofthe rising middle classes began to demand recognition as equals, this type of dispute becomesmore common.11

A second kind of recognition conflict, rooted in comparative honor and occurring betweenmembers of the same honor groups, is endemic to societies in which honor is an importantfeature. Because categorial honor in historical honor societies was determined by the positionone holds in virtue of birth or occupation, the hierarchies generated by categorial honor wererelatively stable. Conversely, the comparative standing of individuals within the same groupwas highly unstable because intra-group hierarchies were not officially institutionalized,and were always open to revision through assertions of precedence or displays of weakness.This structure of relationships led to relations between equals that are usually describedas tense, anxiety-ridden and verging perpetually on open conflict. James tells us that ‘inthe company of his equals the man of honor was expected to assert his “pre-eminence,”a requirement which imparted a note of tension even to ordinary social intercourse anddaily conversation.’12 Among categorial equals, comparative honor was always at stakeand jockeying for position often led to conflict, whereas ‘conflict was least likely to arisewhere honor positions were clearly defined in terms of those entitled to deference andthose required to accord it.’13 Because of this, one 16th century expositor of honor advisesthe gentleman to seek relaxation among his inferiors, because his equals ‘will looke for asmuch prehemminence every way as himselfe.’14

The categorial/comparative analysis of honor is unique to this paper, but almost everyauthor who has taken a serious theoretical interest in the topic sees the need for some similardistinction. Kwame Anthony Appiah distinguishes peer-honor from competitive honor; andStewart draws a slightly different distinction between horizontal honor, which is the right torespect due to an equal, and which can be lost but not increased, and vertical honor, whichis ‘the right to special respect enjoyed by those who are superior, whether by virtue of theirabilities, their rank . . . their office, or anything else.’15 There is a tendency, however, in someauthors to associate honor exclusively with its categorial type. Welsh, for example, contrasts“honor,” which is shared by all members of the group and is egalitarian, to “fame,” whichcorresponds to my notion of comparative honor. All authors recognize that the word ‘honor’ isused to cover both concepts, and that both kinds have served as powerful ethical and politicalmotivations, but they choose, for various reasons, to define their terms differently. If one isprimarily interested, as is Welsh, in the difference between moralities deriving from respectamong equals and those deriving from notions of obedience to authority, then it makes senseto focus primarily on categorial honor. However, if one is concerned with isolating the kindsof recognition that can motivate action and especially conflict in a certain kind of society, thenit is necessary to take both forms into account. I prefer the categorial/comparative distinctionto Stewart’s horizontal/vertical distinction for at least two reasons. First is that his distinctionruns together the inequalities between classes and within classes so that comparisons of gloryor renown between nobles and distinctions between nobles and commoners both fall into the‘vertical’ category. These two kinds of inequalities ought to be kept separate because theyare experienced in different ways, with comparisons within classes giving rise to differentpsychological and social consequences than those between classes. A second reason is thatthe horizontal/vertical distinction tends to dissociate equal categorial recognition (horizontal



among members of the same class) from comparative recognition between categorial equals(vertical), whereas I argue that the two go hand in hand. In any case, Stewart’s own distinctionsserve him well for the case he is making, and he concedes that his definitions are imperfectand perhaps not appropriate to all analyses of honor.

II. Honneth and Taylor on Honor

For Honneth and Taylor, ‘honor’ refers to recognition in the hierarchical societies fromwhich our modern democratic societies sprang, and its role in their theories is twofold. Itis a conceptual foil to modern recognition, helping to clarify (egalitarian, individualized)modern recognition by giving an example of its (inegalitarian, group-based) opposite. Buthonor is also the historical matrix that gave rise to modern recognition which still bears itsmark in important ways. Honneth and Taylor address honor because they believe it can helpto clarify modern recognition both through its contrasts and its continuities.

However, the account of honor provided by Honneth and Taylor is only able to play the rolethey want it to play because it is incomplete: they notice only categorial honor, completelyignoring its comparative aspect. Obviously they do not make use of that language, but theirdescription of what they take to be honor’s two defining features show that it is categorialhonor that they have in mind. The first feature is that honor is entirely group-based. ForTaylor and Honneth, to know what social group a person belongs to in an honor-society,is to know everything worth knowing about them: who they are, and where they stand.Taylor writes: ‘In those earlier societies, what we would now call identity was largely fixedby one’s social position. That is, the background that explained what people recognizedas important to themselves was to a great extent determined by their place in society, andwhatever roles or activities attached to this position.’16 Honneth also believes that honor wasbased on group membership, but his conceptualization is slightly different. For him, honorwas a compound of two elements that are now distinct: legal recognition and social-esteem.Legal status was differentiated along group lines, and the esteem granted to individuals wasbased on perceived value of their group’s collective, rather than their own personal, worth.The only ‘honor’ available to the individual was that which he shared with his group, and toachieve it, he merely had to live up to group standards.

The second feature of honor that they pick out is an inherent inegalitarianism. If anydiscussion of comparative honor were forthcoming from Taylor or Honneth, one wouldexpect it to come under this head. Honneth, however, is quite clear that it is inter-groupinequality that he has in mind, contrasting the hierarchical relationship between groupsto relations within groups, which he sees as being egalitarian and solidaristic. Forms ofrecognition in honor societies ‘take on the character of internally symmetrical yet externallyasymmetrical relationships between culturally typified members of an estate.’ Recognitionis unequal between groups, but ‘In the internal relations of such groups, forms of interactionnormally take on the character of relationships of solidarity, since each member knowshimself or herself to be esteemed by all others to the same degree.’17

Taylor sometimes seems ambivalent about which type of honor he means. To makehis case that honor is ‘intrinsically linked to inequalities,’ Taylor draws on Rousseau andMontesquieu. From Montesquieu, he takes the point that ‘the nature of honor is to demandpreferences and distinctions . . . ’ concluding that therefore, ‘For some to have honor in thissense, it is essential that not everyone have it.’18 From Rousseau, he takes the scene in theDiscourse on Inequality where early humans first gather together. At the dawn of sociallife, ‘Each started to look at the others and wanted to be looked at themselves, and public



esteem had a price. He who sang or danced the best; the most beautiful, the strongest, themost adroit or the most eloquent became the most considered, and this was the first steptowards inequality, and at the same time towards vice.’19 From his reference to distinctions,and the fact that Rousseau’s singing savages were hardly part of a hierarchical class system,one might infer that Taylor is concerned with comparative honor. However, he never comesback to the idea of intra-group comparison, and in both sections, the textual context makesit clear that he has inter-group differences in mind. For Taylor, the relevant contrast to honoris always the modern concept of dignity with an accompanying ‘politics of universalism,’which dictates that ‘What is to be avoided at all costs is the existence of “first-class” and“second-class” citizens.’20 Though Taylor sometimes seems to argue for comparative honor,he ends up conflating it with categorial inequality.

Honneth and Taylor’s exclusive focus on categorial forms of honor leads them both to(mis)identify a third characteristic of recognition in honor societies: stability. Taylor tells usthat ‘in the earlier age recognition never arose as a problem. General recognition was built intothe socially derived identity by virtue of the very fact that it was based on social categoriesthat everyone took for granted. . . . In premodern times, people didn’t speak of “identity”and “recognition” – not because people didn’t have (what we call) identities, or becausethey didn’t depend on recognition, but rather because these were then too unproblematicto be thematized as such.’21 For Honneth too, recognition in honor societies is stable withrare recognition conflicts arising only from the gate-keeping operations of some groups.22

Because honor for Taylor and Honneth is exclusively categorial, and because they areconcerned only with the relations between different groups, the only recognition conflictsthey identify are those in which the meaning of social categories or membership in suchcategories is in dispute. Since, by hypothesis, the hierarchies that structured social relationsin honor-societies were generally accepted, both authors conclude that recognition rarelyarose as an issue.

By ignoring comparative honor, Honneth and Taylor mischaracterize relations of recog-nition in honor societies in two important ways. First, they see recognition and identity asentirely group-based; individuals are nothing more than tokens of their social type. However,a full account of honor includes both the group-based categorial recognition as well as indi-vidualizing comparative recognition. People living in honor societies could have both a rankattached to their categorial status, and a name for which they could win comparative glory.The second major error–seeing recognition under honor as unproblematic and relativelyconflict-free–is related to the first. Historical investigations of honor, such as that of James,give the lie to this portrayal, showing that efforts to achieve individualized recognition werea major source of conflict. Under honor, to be categorial equals is also to be competitorsengaged in an anxious struggle for distinction in which the only respite is to remain amongone’s (categorial) inferiors. It is only by completely ignoring honor’s comparative aspect thatHonneth is able to characterize intra-group relations under honor as relations of solidarityand equal esteem.

III. The Shift from Honor to Modernity

While neither Honneth nor Taylor goes into any great detail regarding the concrete processesdriving the shift from honor to modern recognition, the most salient historical fact is thedisintegration of the social categories upon which hierarchical honor was based. This changeis accompanied by a twofold reversal in the norms governing recognition. The first reversal isthe move from inegalitarian to egalitarian recognition. Under modernity, all individuals mustbe recognized as ‘full members of society.’23 Taylor writes in terms of a shift from hierarchical



honor to universal dignity, ‘the only concept compatible with a democratic society.’24 Hon-neth also speaks of ‘the universalization of “honor” into “dignity,”25 developing the point interms of legal recognition. Formerly based on one’s rank or standing, legal recognition is nowpremised on the assumption of the moral autonomy of all humans, and is therefore governedby a norm of equality: ‘With the uncoupling of individual rights-claims from the ascriptionof social status, a general principle of equality emerges for the first time, which hence-forth requires of every legal order that it allow no exceptions and privileges.’ Under honor,recognition was governed by an inegalitarian norm based on group-membership, but now allindividuals have a right to an equal level of respect in virtue of their humanity or citizenship.26

The second reversal that Taylor and Honneth cite is that where honor was group-based,modern recognition is individualized. Under honor, individuals were recognized only asinstances of whatever group identity they shared with other members of their social category,whereas modern individuals are entitled to some kind of recognition of their particular valuethat differentiates them from others.27 Taylor develops this point in reference to the valueof authenticity, saying that in modernity we ‘speak of an individualized identity, one thatis particular to me, and that I discover in myself. This notion arises along with an ideal,that of being true to myself and my own particular way of being.’ Since identity is nowindividualized, so must be recognition. In “The Politics of Recognition,” Taylor does notgo into great detail regarding what this individualized identity consists in, but he thinksthat cultural identity is an important aspect of it, and he develops his arguments regardingindividualized recognition only in terms of cultural recognition. For example, he argues thatbecause the unique identities of individuals are grounded in distinct cultural identities, thevalue of authenticity can sometimes justify claims for recognition of cultural particularity.

Honneth’s conception of the individualization of recognition is slightly different. Equal-ization occurs in the sphere of legal recognition, which is now governed by a principle ofequality. The individualization of modern recognition occurs in the sphere of social-esteem:‘Unlike modern legal recognition, social esteem is directed . . . at the personal qualities thatcharacterize people in their difference.’28 In honor-societies, social esteem, along with legalrecognition, was based on group-membership. By contrast, modern esteem is governed bya meritocratic achievement principle according to which each individual is to be esteemedaccording to their own achievements, understood as contributions to society’s collectivegoals. For Honneth, the primary sphere for social esteem is the societal division of labor inwhich esteem is ‘intermeshed’ with pay.29 Both authors agree then that modern recognitionconsists of a universal categorial kind of recognition by which all are equally recognized inthe same way, and a second type, which differentiates each from the others.

The account of modern norms of recognition is not simply a description; it also opens ontothe normative dimension of both Honneth’s and Taylor’s theories. They believe that the normsgoverning modern recognition are the right ones, and that it is morally imperative that theyare realized. Because the formation of identity depends on the kind of recognition we receivein our interactions with others, recognition is an important element of any good human life,‘a vital human need,’ according to Taylor. Conversely, ‘nonrecognition or misrecognitioncan inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, andreduced mode of being.’30 For Honneth, each kind of recognition provides the basis for adistinct aspect of our personalities by underpinning an important kind of self-relation. Loveprovides the basis for a self-relation of basic self-confidence, which is a precondition for allfurther relations of self-respect.31 Legal equality, most importantly manifested in universalrights, grounds self-respect whereby individuals can see themselves as morally autonomousbeings. Finally, social esteem underpins self-esteem, which allows individuals to see theirown achievements and contributions as valuable. All three of these self-relations, and thus



forms of recognition, are necessary for self-realization and for integrity of identity. Becausethese different forms of recognition are so important, it is the aim of assuring that they areavailable to all members of society that provides the normative direction of both Honneth’sand Taylor’s theories.

IV. The Woes of Modern Recognition

Taylor and Honneth see modern recognition as a great moral improvement, because equaluniversal recognition and individualized particular recognition together enable better identityformation for all individuals than did honor. Nonetheless, our present era suffers becausemodern norms of recognition are frequently not realized in practice, and the lack of recog-nition or misrecognition that results is an obstacle to identity-formation and self-realization,as well as the cause of suffering and social conflict.

Each of these authors gives their own account of the obstacles facing ‘full’ recognition.Taylor, who is most interested in recognition within multicultural societies, sees culturalopacity as the main culprit. The problem here is that authenticity demands that each culturemust be evaluated in terms of values that it sees as its own. However, members of differentcultures do not necessarily share the same value standards, so when evaluating other cultures,they run the risk of imposing a value standard that is alien to the culture being evaluated.Taylor sees this as a case of unfair misrecognition. On the other hand, it is also unacceptablesimply to assert the equality or value of other cultures prior to evaluation. In some casesdoing so may seem like a generous act of solidarity with beleaguered minority cultures,but in fact it is ‘an act of breathtaking condescension’ which can only result in hollowand therefore worthless recognition. Demands for appropriate recognition, both universaland particular, are a frequent source of social conflict. Taylor’s solution is to encourageinter-cultural dialogue with a ‘presumption of value.’ He hopes that, through dialogue, aGadamerian ‘fusion of horizons’ may occur between members of different cultures who maycome to share a new standard of values which results from their interactions. This shouldallow members of different cultures within a society to recognize each others’ particularvalue, while maintaining a norm of universal respect.

For Honneth, the norms of recognition already generally accepted in society could, inprinciple, deliver full-recognition to all, but they fail to do so in practice. This happensbecause although societies possess the right norms in the abstract, their particular conceptionsof what these principles entail are too narrow. For example, the principle of legal equality wasgenerally accepted in the abstract long before equal rights were extended to all individuals insociety. Similarly, the sphere of esteem ‘was hierarchically organized in an unambiguouslyideological way from the start. For the extent to which something counts as “achievement,”as a cooperative contribution, is defined against a value standard whose normative referencepoint is the economic activity of the independent, middle-class, male bourgeois.’32 The resultis that many individual efforts that in fact constituted a real social contribution, but did notfit the ‘ideological’ conception of achievement, such as women’s reproductive labor, werenot properly recognized. Overly narrow conceptions of the norms of recognition result inthe exclusion of many from their ambit, leaving those excluded without the recognition thatthey need and deserve.

Fortunately, Honneth believes, these failures of recognition carry the seeds of their ownremedy. When individuals feel that the generally accepted norms of recognition are not beingapplied fairly in their own case, this is experienced as disrespect which provokes shameand anger which in turn may motivate them to engage in social struggle. ‘What motivates



individuals or social groups to engage in practical resistance is the moral conviction that,with respect to their own situations or particularities, the recognition principles consideredlegitimate are incorrectly or inadequately applied.’ And while not all instances of disrespectgive rise to social struggles, some ‘experience that can be meaningfully described as oneof “disrespect” must be regarded as the motivational basis of all social conflicts.’33 Theeffect of successful social struggle is to change the conception of the norms in question.Excluded groups may win equal rights by arguing that they too are autonomous human beings.Denigrated groups struggle to show that their achievements or ‘styles of self-realization’are also contributions to social goals, and therefore ought to be esteemed. So failures ofrecognition provoke social struggles aimed at remedying those failures.

Honneth is aware that, because the principles of recognition are so abstract, plausibleinterpretations of them may conflict. What should count as an achievement, for example, isespecially susceptible to contestation. Since all parties to conflict may frame their positionsin terms of the recognition principles accepted by all, Honneth requires a further step toprovide the basis for normative evaluation of struggles. It is the idea of ‘full’ recognitionfor all that provides Honneth’s normative criterion: ‘The justice or well-being of a societyis proportionate to its ability to secure conditions of mutual recognition under which per-sonal identity-formation, hence individual self-realization, can proceed adequately.’34 Andthe conditions for individual self-realization are only met ‘when subjects can experienceintersubjective recognition not only of their personal autonomy, but of their specific needsand particular capacities as well.’35 Progress towards this goal ‘takes place along the twodimensions of individualization and social inclusion: either new parts of the personalityare opened up to mutual recognition, so that the extent of socially confirmed individualityrises; or more persons are included into existing recognition relations.’36 Inclusion is a fairlystraightforward criterion, with gains being achieved both as more individuals are includedunder the rubric of legal equality, and when the previously unrecognized types of socialcontributions become esteemed as achievements. By ‘individualization,’ Honneth meansthat an individual’s personal characteristics become susceptible to recognition. So the greathistorical gain in individualization occurred when esteem became uncoupled from groupmembership and was indexed to personal achievement. However, within modernity there aregains in ‘individualization’ whenever recognition can be referred back to the individual inhis or her particularity. In the sphere of love, this might mean the ‘elimination of role-cliches,stereotypes, and cultural ascriptions that impede adaptation to others’ needs.’37 So Honnethargues that, when it comes to judging particular social struggles normatively, ‘what cancount as a rational or legitimate demand emerges from the possibility of understanding theconsequences of implementing it as a gain in individuality or inclusion,’38 and thus as amove towards ‘full’ recognition for all.

Even if neither author believes that there is a permanent and precise way to fix recogni-tion, both are optimistic. If their normative prescriptions are followed, they believe we canrecapture a positive element of recognition as it was in honor-societies, while also achievingthe distinctively modern goal of securing equal categorial recognition as well as particularrecognition for all. For Taylor, it is the transparent or unproblematic nature of recognitioncharacteristic of honor societies that he hopes to recover for modernity. Though the processof inter-cultural dialogue and recognition may never end, Taylor believes that through fusinghorizons we can reduce or eliminate the obstacles that stand in the way of recognition.Similarly, Honneth admits that levels of esteem can never be settled permanently, and there-fore will be a continuing source of struggle. Still, his is a “teleological liberalism,”39 and hethinks that if we support social struggles that are progressive in the sense of providing gains in



inclusion and individualization of recognition, their success can gradually bring about a ‘stateof social solidarity’40 in which ‘every subject . . . is given the chance to experience oneself tobe recognized, in light of one’s own accomplishments and abilities, as valuable for society’and that ‘for the first time, the horizon within which individual competition for social esteemcan then acquire a form free from pain.’41 Thus, Honneth hopes that progressive strugglesfor recognition will eventually re-establish the relationship of solidarity that once obtainedwithin differential honor groups at the level of society as a whole.42

V. Re-Introducing Comparative Recognition

We have now covered the basic contours of the historical narratives that structure Honneth’sand Taylor’s theories of recognition: inegalitarian and group-based, yet stable, honor givesway to a present characterized by imperfectly realized egalitarian and individualized norms ofrecognition. Honneth’s and Taylor’s different diagnoses of the present failures of recognitionground their normative prescriptions: either open dialogue with a presumption of value, orthe progressive expansion of notions of achievement, both of which lead toward a futurein which all individuals may enjoy both equal recognition as well as recognition of theirown particular value. We have already seen how, by missing out on honor’s comparativedimension, Honneth and Taylor both provide a misleading account of recognition relationsin past honor-based societies. But this error with regard to the past also has implication forthe present and future. How then must the history of recognition offered by Honneth andTaylor be revised in light of a bipartite view of honor?

An account of honor including both categorial and comparative aspects should changeour interpretation of the shift to modernity. Where Taylor and Honneth rightly see a generalprocess of equalization, we can now see this as specifically a change in categorial recognition.Earlier societies made up of many hierarchically arranged categories requiring differentialrecognition gave way to modern societies comprising a single universal category includingall individuals. In his recent work on dignity, Jeremy Waldron argues that contemporarynotions of universal dignity and respect for persons are derived from earlier conceptions ofdignity that then applied exclusively to the noble classes. Waldron observes that dignity hasalways denoted rank and that the association with rank or inequality persists in contemporaryusage, with the OED giving as its second meaning for the term ‘dignity’ as ‘honorable orhigh estate, position, or estimation; honor; degree of estimation, rank’ and as its third ‘Anhonorable office, rank, or title; a high official or titular position.’43 Under this usage, peoplewould talk about the dignity of a monarch, which differed from the various dignities of thenobility, or of the clergy, or even of that conferred by a doctorate. In this older sense tracedby Waldron, “dignity” is used in the same way “honor” is used today by Taylor and Honneth:it denotes the status and entitlements of respect of a particular group in society. Waldron’sthesis is that modern dignity is of a piece with older hierarchical notions of dignity and thatit represents not so much an entirely new concept but rather a generalization of the dignitythat used to be the exclusive domain of the noble classes: ‘the modern notion of humandignity involves an upwards equalization of rank, so that we now try to accord to everyhuman being something of the dignity, rank, and expectation of respect that was formerlyaccorded to nobility.’44 Though Waldron’s broad thesis is an historical one, his argumentsare largely analytical, pointing up conceptual similarities between earlier and contemporarynotions of dignity, and adducing advantages of adopting his interpretation. Even if it is notgiven by Waldron himself, recent historical scholarship on early modern Europe providesmuch finer-grained accounts of the change in notions of honor and dignity. Some authors,



such as James Q. Whitman, argue that present-day dignitarian culture is the result of amore or less wholesale adoption of aristocratic notions of honor.45 Ann Goldberg’s workon honor in Imperial Germany usefully qualifies this thesis. Goldberg argues that moderndignity is not an exclusively aristocratic inheritance, but the result of process combiningvarious notions of honor from different sectors of society under the growing influence ofliberalism and democracy.46 Several authors have illustrated how the spread of practices suchas dueling, once the preserve of the aristocracy, through the social classes in early modernEuropean societies was an important vector for the democratization of honor.47 Though noneof these authors claim that that present-day dignity is identical to earlier conceptions ofaristocratic honor, and while they differ regarding the precise degree of influence, all of themargue that modern notions of dignity were derived from and continue to bear the mark ofaristocratic ideas of honor. All of this supports the contention that the historical equalizationof recognition theorized by Honneth and Taylor consisted in the expansion and transformationof a particular social category (the noble one) to include all individuals in society.48

To account for how individuals in this great category of equals might tell the differencebetween one another, Taylor and Honneth propose new forms of individualizing recognitionbased on authenticity or individual achievement that come into existence with the disap-pearance of honor. According to the bipartite view of honor, comparative recognition orhonor already provided a means of distinguishing individuals who shared the same socialcategory. The question thus changes from ‘whence individual recognition?’ to ‘what happensto comparative honor when the categorial differences that served as barriers to comparisonare eliminated?’ One relatively intuitive answer is that universal categorial equality wouldsimply aggravate and generalize the conflict over precedence that was previously wagedwithin the different orders of society. It is exactly this kind of scenario that Michael Walzersketches in this insightful passage from Spheres of Justice:

‘the struggle for honor that raged among aristocrats, and that played such a large role inearly modern literature, is now entered by everyman . . . . Since he has no fixed rank, sinceno one knows where he belongs, he must establish his own worth, and he can do that onlyby winning the recognition of his fellows. Each of his fellows is trying to do the same thing.Hence the competition has no social boundaries . . . it just goes on and on.’ Individualsengage in a perpetual struggle for comparative recognition ‘reading their daily gains andlosses in the eyes of their fellows, like a stockbroker with his morning paper.’49

If Walzer is right, and modern recognition does retain an important comparative dimension,this would not preclude significant change regarding the standards by which people arecompared. It is possible that Honneth and Taylor are right to say that individuals desire andbenefit from recognition of their authentic identities or their personal achievements, but thatthese values are relativized with regard to others’ achievements in the same vein. Underthis interpretation modern recognition would retain the same basic categorial/comparativedistinction, with the important differences occurring in the structure of social categories andin the standards of value by which comparisons take place.

If the particular values for which individuals seek recognition are understood compara-tively, contemporary recognition struggles take on a significantly different complexion. OnHonneth’s model, modern struggles for esteem are struggles over the appropriate applicationof the meritocratic ‘achievement principle’ i.e. over what kinds of activities should count ascontributions to shared societal aims. These conflicts consist mainly in attempts by groupswhose activities are ignored to expand the notion of what counts as an achievement. Thestruggle for recognition, for Honneth, is a process whereby ignored groups educate the



wider public regarding how the general norms accepted by all apply to their particular cases.Without further elaboration, it is difficult to see why such attempts should meet with anyresistance, because it provides no account of what other groups would stand to lose fromthe recognition of previously ignored kinds of achievements. Honneth allows that there willbe no conclusive end to the efforts of groups to raise the social value of their abilities andachievements just because there is ‘no adequate way of anchoring [the valuation of activities]in something like a value-neutral, purely “technical” functional order.’50 Yet this prospectdoes not seem to worry Honneth too much as he never develops the point. This is because,without a comparative view of esteem, those who already enjoy at least some esteem a) haveno clear motivation to engage social struggle; b) provide no grounds for normative worriesthat their self-realization is in danger.

If esteem is comparative, then the degree of esteem enjoyed by any individual or groupin society is inversely related to the esteem enjoyed by others, and it becomes clear whyattempts at valorizing different types of contribution might give rise to acrimonious conflictin which both sides have something at stake. This is true at the group level at which differentsocial groups struggle over what types of contributions or virtues ought to be recognized asvaluable. But it is also true at the level of everyday competition between individuals overwhose personal contributions are the greatest, which Honneth fails utterly to notice. Addinga comparative dimension to particular recognition explains how it could continue to be animportant motivation for individuals who already enjoy it: it is always possible move up ordown the ladder. Under this interpretation, we should not look for recognition struggles onlyin the form of ‘new social movements’ and the struggles of oppressed groups. Comparativerecognition points to general status anxiety, the struggles for prestige among the upper classesexamined by Veblen, and even to interpretations of international relations, such as those ofLebow and O’Neill in which honor or recognition plays an important role.51

The interpretive challenge posed by comparative recognition to Honneth and Taylorleads into a normative challenge. Both are guided in their normative theories by the ideaof ‘full recognition’ for all. Equal recognition as well as recognition of particular value(and in Honneth’s case, the third category of love) remain necessary for the formation andmaintenance of identity. Comparative recognition poses a problem to full recognition becauseit is a necessarily scarce good. If particular recognition is based on comparison, then esteemfor some implies disesteem for others. It therefore cannot be universally enjoyed, whichimplies that full recognition for all is in principle unrealizable.

Because Taylor provides little discussion of necessary kinds of particular recognition otherthan cultural recognition and their relation to identity, it is not easy to evaluate the exactimpact that comparative recognition would have on his theory. But one of his normative aimsthat is quite clear is to mediate the disputes over cultural recognition that were so prominentin the 1990s. His solution, broadly speaking, is to begin with the assumption that everyculture that has sustained a great number of people over many generations has somethingvaluable to offer. Through engagement with other cultures, and a fusion of values, we cancome to recognize these values. So his hope is that people will eventually see ‘something ofvalue’ in other cultures. However, if recognition is comparative, then just seeing ‘somethingof value’ is not enough. Members of a culture, which is seen as valuable, but less valuable thanother cultures, would still have cause to struggle. To take an example that is close to Taylor’sheart, we might imagine that the Quebecois win recognition from the “Rest of Canada,” whoacknowledge their culture is distinct and valuable, but inferior to that of English-speakingCanada. On Taylor’s theory, the recognition of some value must be enough to mediate theconflict. Comparative recognition, however, predicts that any such recognition would merelyfuel cultural antagonisms.



Honneth’s theory is more fully elaborated, and so the reasons he cannot accept that esteemis comparative are clearer. Ultimately, Honneth’s aim is to provide normative grounds forsocial critique, and he thinks that he has found a way to do so through the concept of fullrecognition. According to Honneth, we ought to support social struggles insofar as they willprovide gains in individualization and inclusion just because these two subordinate aimsfurther the ultimate aim of full recognition. However, if esteem is comparative, then the linkbetween the aims of inclusion and individualization on the one hand and full recognition onthe other will be severed. As Smith notes, the individualization of achievement, which is oneof Honneth’s indices of progress, implies the individualization of failure.52 That recognitionis aimed squarely at the individual, rather than simply at the group of which he or she is amember, does not obviously further the aim of full recognition for all if some recognitionis, of necessity, negative. It might be better for an individual’s self-esteem if they can refernegative recognition back to the group to which they belong rather than assume personalresponsibility for it. Nor is it exactly clear how inclusion represents progress with regard toesteem. One of the effects of systems of differential social categories in honor societies wasto prevent honor-comparisons between members of different groups. Breaking down thesebarriers broadens the scope of comparison, but will not necessarily deliver esteem to moreindividuals, especially if the standards of comparison are geared towards the achievementsof particular groups. If recognition is comparative, then Honneth’s two criteria of progresscannot deliver the ‘full recognition’ that justifies them, and his theory loses its criticalpurchase.

VI. Conclusion

Honneth and Taylor begin their histories of recognition with a serious error. Captivated by theview of a great hierarchical class-system and its differential categories of recognition, theylose sight of the sharply competitive nature of recognition between equals. This blind-spotallows them to mischaracterize recognition in honor-societies as stable and unproblematicwhere historical research on honor shows a social situation rife with recognition-relatedtension, insecurity, and conflict. Moreover, their error is not confined only to their accountof the past: the bipartite model of honor suggests another interpretation of recognition’smodernization whereby all individuals are made categorial equals and therefore candidatesfor comparison when it comes to particular or individualizing recognition. If this alternativenarrative is true, then it should significantly change not only Honneth’s and Taylor’s inter-pretation of modern recognition conflicts, but it will also challenge their normative theories.Only by conceiving of new forms of particular recognition that are not comparative areTaylor and Honneth able to underwrite their normative recommendations.

The main argument of this paper is an historical one concerning honor, which Taylor andHonneth, I think, would take seriously. For Taylor, the articulation of modern ethical outlooksmust be an historical enterprise. This is not only because past positions serve as ‘models andfoils,’ but because present positions are defined in relation to the past and ‘the very fact ofthis self-definition in relation to the past induces us to re-examine this past and the way ithas been assimilated or repudiated.’53 Similarly, Honneth’s theory as it is presented in TheStruggle for Recognition is explicitly teleological and therefore historical, and much of itspersuasive power stems from his description of how honor was transformed into our moredifferentiated modern regime of recognition. For both Taylor and Honneth, interpreting thepresent requires historical interpretation; if they can be shown to have made significant errorsat some stage of their historical narratives, then this inevitably calls the subsequent stages oftheir narratives into question.



However, it is not difficult to imagine an attempt to found something like their norma-tive theories of recognition on non-historical grounds. One might argue, for example, thatHonneth’s account of present recognition relations is largely correct, even if his story aboutits genesis is mistaken, and that the demands for love, equal respect, and esteem can bejustified independent of historical argument. Certainly, much of the theoretical literature onrecognition has paid the historical dimension relatively little attention, and even some ofHonneth’s more recent work proceeds in a more or less ahistorical fashion.54

Critics of recognition have often also proceeded independent of any historical narrative.James Tully and Patchen Markell both argue, for different reasons, that achieving any kindof satisfactory end-state with regards to recognition is impossible, and that struggles forrecognition should therefore approached normatively as a permanent feature of human life.Tully recommends viewing recognition as an activity, rather than a goal to be achieved, andMarkell advises that the politics of recognition be replaced by a politics of acknowledgementof what he calls ‘the ontological conditions of action.’55

Likewise, the argument that Honneth’s and Taylor’s theories are undermined by thecomparative nature of recognition could be reconstructed in non-historical terms. Such areconstruction would require a demonstration of the comparative character of recognitiontoday that would take us far into the disciplines of sociology and social-psychology, andwill not be attempted here. Still, it is worth briefly observing that both Taylor and Honnethdraw heavily on sources that themselves argue for the central importance of comparison torecognition in non-hierarchical societies. Rousseau’s critique of amour-propre is not directedexclusively at the class-divisions of the Ancien Regime. The early men vying for attention withsong and dance in his Discourse on the Origins of Inequality were hardly part of a hierarchicalclass-system, and it is within the broadly equal republic of letters that he saw vanity run mostrampant. G.H. Mead, who is an important inspiration for both of these thinkers, maintainsthat a ‘sense of superiority’ is a crucial part of normal psychology, and that to distinguishourselves from others as an individual we always come back to ‘something in which we standout above people.’56 Sennett and Cobb, another source for Honneth’s account of modernrecognition, find that individuals constantly struggle to distinguish themselves from othersthrough ‘badges of ability,’ which demonstrate their greater worth.57

However, even if those who are broadly supportive of normative theories of recognitionsuch as Honneth’s and Taylor’s are able to detach them from the historical interpretationswhich those authors provide, and even if the above reconstruction were to be successfullyarticulated, the historical critique is still worth making. And this is not only because a correctinterpretation of honor would likely prevent the kind of misreading of historical sourcesprovided by Honneth and Taylor. It is also worth making because Honneth and Taylor wereright to take a historical approach in the first place. Even if they get their interpretationswrong, they succeed in demonstrating that an adequate understanding of contemporaryrecognition depends on an understanding of earlier modes of recognition. An accurate viewof honor is important because it is necessary to any attempt to give an account of the historical‘assimilations and repudiations’ from which our present orientations and normative intuitionsregarding recognition are constructed.

NOTES

1. Taylor and Honneth, of course, do not neglect honor, but it receives scant mention in the discussionthat has sprung up around their writings.

2. Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics ofRecognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 33.



3. Joanne B. Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic (New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 2001), xvi. Alexander Welsh, What is Honor? A Question of Moral Imperatives (NewHaven: Yale University Press, 2008), 3, 71, 190.;Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Honor,” in A Dictionary of the Social Sciences (London: Tavistock Publications, 1964),505.Frank Henderson Stewart, Honor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 13.

4. J.G. Peristiany, “Introduction,” in Honor and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society(London: Ebenezer Baylis and Son Ltd., 1965), 21.

5. Pierre Bourdieu, “The Sentiment of Honor in Kabyle Society,” in Honor and Shame: The Valuesof Mediterranean Society (London: Ebenezer Baylis and Son Ltd., 1965), 211–212.

6. Welsh, What is Honor? A Question of Moral Imperatives.7. Ibid., 9.

Sharon Krause, Liberalism with Honor (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002)., seems to stand apartin her insistence that honor is ‘irreducibly aristocratic’ (181). However, by this she means simply thatindividuals are unevenly motivated by honor and that only a few will take exceptional actions needed forthe defence of liberal rights. Otherwise, she insists that honor is compatible with equal dignity and ‘neednot challenge the the ideal of equality as it applies to basic political liberties.’ (185) She also says thather natural aristocrats of liberal honor have egalitarian aims, and ultimately disavow recognition or theirsuperiority. (22)

8. Frank Henderson Stewart, Honor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 54.9. William Ian Miller, Humiliation: And Other Essays on Honor, Social Discomfort, and Violence

(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 129. See also William Ian Miller, Bloodtaking and Peacemaking:Feud, Law, and Society in Saga Iceland (London: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 31.; Julian Pitt-Rivers,“Honor and Social Status,” in Honor and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society (London: EbenezerBaylis and Son Ltd., 1965), 31.; and Bourdieu, “The Sentiment of Honor in Kabyle Society,” 204.

10. James is not alone in documenting historical debates over the content of honor. For the Englishcontext see Markku Peltonen, The duel in early modern England: civility, politeness and honor, Ideas incontext; 65 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).; for the German context see Ute Frevert, Menof honor: a social and cultural history of the duel, trans. Anthony Williams (Cambridge: Polity, 1995). andAnn Goldberg, Honor, politics and the law in imperial Germany, 1871–1914, New studies in Europeanhistory. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).; and for France, Robert A. Nye, Masculinity andMale Codes of Honor in Modern France (University of California Press, 1998). is an excellent resource.

11. There are good reasons to believe that categorial recognition gives rise to far more conflictbetween members of the same social category than it does between members of different and unequal socialcategories. The duel of honor, for example, was seen as appropriate only for social equals, and as the onlyway to settle quarrels beginning with a violation of categorial honor. Duelling’s popularity and prominencein many parts of Europe up until the first world war is but one indicator of how conflictual categorial equalitymay be. Unfortunately, further exploration of this point is beyond the scope of this article. Here the focuswill remain the implications of specifically comparative recognition for the theories of Honneth and Taylor.

12. Mervyn James, English Politics and the Concept of Honor 1485–1642 (Oxford: Past and PresentSociety, 1978), 5.

13. Ibid., 6.14. Stefano Guazzo is cited in Ibid., 5.15. Stewart, Honor, 59.16. Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” 31.17. Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition (Oxford: Polity Press, 1995), 128.18. Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” 27. translation mine.19. Ibid., 35.20. Ibid., 37.21. Ibid., 34–35. Also Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 123. calls this system of recognition

‘relatively stable’.22. Ibid., 123–124. Honneth sometimes uses ‘conventional societies’ to refer to those societies

governed by honor.23. Ibid., 115.24. Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” 27.25. Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 126. Both Taylor and Honneth cite the influential Peter

Berger, “On the Obsolescence of the Concept of Honor,” in Liberalism and its Critics (New York: NewYork University Press, 1984).

26. Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 114.



27. Honneth also believes that we need a third kind of recognition, ‘love’, which is provided inprimary relationships. Though love is the basis of basic self-confidence, and the precondition for benefitingfrom other kinds of recognition, it is also the least politically relevant. Because it is confined to primaryrelationships, and because, according to Honneth, it has remained for the most part unchanged across thehistorical shift we are discussing, it is not crucial to the argument contained in this essay. Ibid., 133.

28. Ibid., 122.29. Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition (London: Verso, 2003), 143.30. Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” 25.31. Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 107.32. Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 141.33. Ibid., 157.34. Ibid., 174.35. Ibid., 180.36. Ibid., 186.37. Ibid., 189.38. Ibid., 187.39. Ibid., 178.40. Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 129.41. Ibid., 130.42. Ibid., 128.43. Jeremy Waldron, “Tanner Lectures: Dignity, Rank, and Rights,” Public & Legal Theory Research

Paper Series, 2009, 22. See also, Jeremy Waldron, “Dignity and Rank,” European Journal of Sociology 48(2007): 201–237.Jeremy Waldron, “Dignity and Rank,” European Journal of Sociology 48 (2007): 201–237.

44. Waldron, “Tanner Lectures: Dignity, Rank, and Rights,” 29.45. James Whitman, “Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies,” Yale Law Journal 109 (2000):

1279–1398.46. Goldberg, Honor, politics and the law in imperial Germany, 1871–1914.47. For the German context, see Frevert, Men of honor. and Mika LaVaque-Manty, “Dueling for

Equality: Masculine Honor and the Modern Politics of Dignity,” Political Theory 34 (2006): 715–740. Forthe French and English contexts see Nye, Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor in Modern France. andPeltonen, The duel in early modern England. respecively. For honor among the patrician class in earlyAmerican history, see Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic.

48. Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation (Cambridge University Press, 1999)., likeHonneth, The Struggle for Recognition. relates this to modern legal claims.

49. Michael Walzer, Sphere of Justice (Oxford: Martin Robinson, 1983), 252–253.50. Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 155.51. Barry O’Neill, Honor, Symbols, and War (Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press, 1999).

Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2008).Thorstein Veblen, The theory of the leisure class, Dover thrift editions (New York: Dover Publications,1994).

52. Nicholas H. Smith, “Work and the Struggle for Recognition,” European Journal of PoliticalTheory 8, no. 1 (January 1, 2009): 57.

53. Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 103.54. Axel Honneth, The pathologies of individual freedom: Hegel’s social theory, trans. Ladislaus Lob

(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010).55. Patchen Markell, Bound by Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

J. Tully, “Struggles over Recognition and Distribution,” Constellations 7 (2000): 469–482.56. George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and Society: from the standpoint of a social behaviourist

(Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1967).57. Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb, The Hidden Injuries of Class (London: Cambridge University

Press, 1972), 67.

D.Clifton Mark is interested in political theories of respect and dignity. He wrote this articleat Trinity Hall, Cambridge.


constellations volume 21 issue 1 2014 [doi 10.1111%2f1467-8675.12070] mark, d.clifton -- recognition...

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