consolidation of comments and recomendations, special report, 1st mar div, korea

8/3/2019 Consolidation of Comments and Recomendations, Special Report, 1st Mar Div, Korea

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KOREAN WAR PROJECT

CONSOLIDATION OF COMMENTS ANDRECOMMENDATIONS MADE IN SPECIALACTION REPORT, 1ST PROVISIONALMARINE BRIGADE, FMFOPERATIONS WITH EIGHTH U.S. ARMY-KOREA


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. .CONSOLIDATIONOFCO MM EN TS A ND RE C0 I- 1H EN DAT IO NSMADE IN. .S PE CI AL 4 \C TI ON R EP OR T1ST PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE, FMF2 AUGUST-6 SEPTEMBER 1950OPERATIONS WITH EIGHTH U.S.ARMYKOREA


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SUMKARY OF COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BYTHE 1ST PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE, IlSEP50.

1. The report ot the Brigade is a record ot manymovements in a relativel y smal l area and in triendlyterritory. The Brigade was commi~ted several timesto a comparatively stabl e battl e l ine and only oncemade a counter attack that led it into enemy terri-tory. The recommendations are pertinent to thissituation.2. Most of the recommendat1ons emphasize the needof greater mob11ity: the need for lighter gear of al l ~sorts, the necessity for lightening the load carriedv'by the Marine into battle, and the requirements formore vehicl es of al l sorts in order to move men,equipment, weapons, and ammunition.3. The Brigade and its units are al l concerned withthe need for better means of transportation. The re-commendatio~s on transportation are of three sorts:

a. The need for more vehicles: al most every unitrecommended that more trucks be assigned to it.b. The need tor more flexibl e transportation:several recommendations urge small trucks in-stead of l arge oneS.c. The need for improved transportation: certaintypes of vehicles developed mechanical detects.

4. The Brigade and its units recommend that additionaltransportation be assigned in order, first, to move thebrigade more easily and quickl y and, second, to makethe intantry units more mobile in battl e. To servethis second purpose, it is recommended, tor exampl e,that trncks mounting gal l eys coul d serve hot meals totroops in the line or carry hot rations to them;other trucks coul d carry up to the troops n1ght bynight a standardized pack containing Sl eeping gear.6. Some of the recommendations are mutual l y contra-dictory: the recommended increase in numbers of trucksvs. the comments on bad roadS, the difficul ties ofrouting convoys, and the scarcity of off-road parkin~.or assembl y areas. .6. Of the three new weapons employed by the regiment


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there are reports on only two: the 4.2" mortar and the75 mm recoil l ess rifl e. Both proved satisfactory, thoughthe operating units note the need for extensive improve-ments in both TIE's and T/O's. The 4.~ unit requests alonger-ranged weapon for counter-mortar fire against anl naccurat~ NK mortar that outranges the 4.2". Thisunit reports that it uses "artil l er, fire direction pro-cedure exclusivel y in fire control . The Anti-Tank unitnotes the difficul ty of ammunition suppl y to its weapons--two rounds and packboard weigh 62 pounds. The 1stBattal ion, 5th Marines, states that the 3.5 " RocketLauncher and the M-26 can kil l tanks, and that l ithe 75 mmRR Gun 1s not quite so effective. 1 I7. Al l units praise the helicopter. Brigade statesthat it "util ized hel icopters for 11aison, reconnaissance,evacuation of wounded, rescue of M~rine flyers downedin enemy territory, observation, messenger service,guard mail at seag posting and suppl ying of out guardson dominant terrain features and the re-suppl ying ofSmal l units by air .. Brigade recommends that "atl east (8) liaison and two (2) transport type hel icop-ters be added to the observation squadron for empl oy-ment by Marine Divisions,," Brigade makes no recommen-dations for technical improvements on the machinesthemselves and does not report on the vulnerahtl ity ofthe machines to air and ground attack, the possibilityof arming them, or of experimentation with l arger orsmal l er sizes. The present importance of the machineindicates, at l east p that the possibilities of use mayoutrun its technical devel opment.8. Tactics and training proved sound. The 3rd Battal -ion, 5 th Marines, recommends that "t r oop e and uni ts re-ceive night training and night orientation prior tobeing sent into combat areas .... ~he traininE7 to in-cl ude night movements by foot and motor, and occupyingand preparing defense at night." The same battalionstates that patrol s can cover gaps in the l ine duringdayl ightg but that at night outposts should be empl oyedrather than patrol s.9. In the hil ls close air support and artill ery wereuSAd to cover gaps in the l ine and open fl anks. The~ ~eanB feared napal m bombs particul arl y.10. The tactical problem pecul iar to Korea was ap-parently that of advancing through mountainous countrywithout draining from the infantry units l arge 'numbersof troops to seize the hil ltops and protect the ad-

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,vance. On several occasions patrols were used to de-velop enemy action on the hil l s; artil l ery fires andair strikes were tHen cal l ed down on the enemy troopsthus forced to disclose their position. Helicopterscarried outposts to mountain summits.11. The units of the Brigade and the headquarters otthe Brigade made their recommendations separat~ly.The staft sections ot the Brigade have not total led therequests of the l ower echelons commented on them, orevaluated them. The recommendations ot the generalstaft sections are general; those of the lower eche-l ons, specific. Headquartersp Fleet Marine Force, hasmade no comment on the recommendations.

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PERSONNELThe onl y significant procedure recommended for adoptionby the Marine Oorps 1s the Army's method of personnel reporting.The forms utilized for this reporting are the Personnel Dail ySummary and the Periodic ReportoPersonnel Dail y Summary. (See Appendix 9) This form iscompl eted dail y as of an hour specified by each higher authorityin the chain of command and is reported by the most expeditiousmeans of communication availabl e, normal l y tel ephone, empl oyingthe methods described on the forms. G- l

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INTELLIGENCE

Insure al l service and supply people have pl enty of maps.All should be same scal e for anyone operation. This waS amost difficult probl em sinoe maps were very scarce and verypoor.We had elements lost sevPo1'"alours benAtl se they hadtaken wrong roads, inadeq~ate, or no maps

.'Recommend every officer who needs maps have:KOREA, 1:1,000,000 - (1 sheet)KOREA, 1:25 0,000 - (The several sheets of l ocal area)KOREA, 1:50,000 - (The several sheets of l ocal area)This was done 1n the latter parts of the oper-ation. G-4

When used as an observat10n post to protect an exposedflank, camouflage and concealment must be very thorough. Atno t1me should personnel expose themselves to enemy observa-tion.Reconnaissance Company

Lack of 1ntel11gence concerning assigned objectives, ter-rain over which the battal ion was to operate and opposing enemyforces, especially in view of the lack of proper maps, hinderedoperations since in most cases intel ligence situation had to bedeveloped from point zero. Recommendation: That greater use ofserial photographs vertical s and obl iques be made and tbat theybe provided to commanders down to Co level. That helicoptersbe provided for reconnaissance by Battalion Commanders and insome oaseS Company Commanders of assault echel ons. That utmostattention be given to making everyone intel ligence oonsoious.3rd Battalion, 5 th Marines

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OP ERA TIO NS A ND T RAI NIN GOrganization

There shoul d be a permanent tabl e of organization for forminga brigade organization for an emergency such as occurred. Had sucha Tabl e of Organization been avail abl e many of the difficul ties inorganizing the 1st Provisional ' Marine Brigade woul d have been el im-inated.Brigade /here is a definite and immediate requirement for two offi-cers in each battal ion Tactical Air Control ' Party to permit oneforward air control l er to observe from a forward position whil eone remains at the battal ion command post. This requirement

has l ong been recognized. Its ful fil l ment woul d contribute ma-terial l y to further imporving the effectiveness of the Marinea ir- gro und t eam . BrigadeDuring the period 3-31 August 195 0 this company operatedunder the K -I0 5 3 T/O. It was found unsatisfactory in the fol -l owing ways:Three observers are needed in each mortar pl atoon. A P l a-toon often has to cover a battal ion front. One man is not cap-abl e of observing on such a wide area effectivel y. Empl oymentof observers has been most effective. They are attached torifl e companies in the battal ion supported.The ammunition private in each pl atoon headquarters shoul dbe repl aced by a sergeant. This is an extremel y important andresponsibl e position. It is doubl y necessary when a pl atoon ison detached duty and operating away from company support.Liaison with regimental and battal ion headquarters is notcovered under this T/O. The company commander and pl atoonl eaders shoul d not be away from the company during criticalperiods of action. This can be taken care of by an extra l ia-ison officer to regimental headquarters. An officer has beenavail abl e to this company for such use during this operation.He shoul d work with the supporting arms section of the regiment.In this capacity he can coordinate al l activities of the mortarcompany with al l other Bupporting arms and regimental activities.

402 MortarWhen the Reconnaissance Company is used as a point for abattal ionp an air control officer and/or an artil l ery forward /~~observer shoul d be attached in order to empl oy the use of sup-porting arms as soon as the point makes contact with the enemy.

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When used as an observation post to protect an exposed'fl anki camoufl age and conceal ment must be very thorough. Atno time shoul d personnel expose themsel ves to enemy observation.Sand bagging decks of jeeps necessary due to enemy l andminds. Splinter shiel ds 3/4" considered necessary to repe1 enemysmal l arms fire and give troops an opportunity to depl oy.

R ec on na is sa nce C om pa nyThis Detachment was composed onl y of Maintenance (TrackedVehicl e and Motor Transport)p and Support (cargo handl ing) per-sonnel , pl us Organic Suppl y section and normal Detachment Head-quarters personnelg It is strongl y recommended that a Suppl yPl atoon, to include Accountable Officers for Ordnance, MotorTransport, Engineer General Suppl y and Signal , together withappropriate cl erical and stockman personnel be incl uded inany future Detachment, Oombat Service Group. This organizationwas repeatedl y cal l ed upon to perform duties of such a Suppl yPl atoon in liaison with U.S. Army suppl y activities, particul arlyfor identification of Marine Corps suppl ies and equipment p andto reconcil e Marine Corps and Army nomencl ature and suppl y pro-cedure. 1st Combat Service GroupThere is a definite need for two forward air controll ersper battal ion and regimental tactical air control partieS. Itbecame standard procedure to empl oy the naval gunfire spotteras the second control l er whil e the forward air control l ers withportabl e equipment and wire Cl imbed to the Battal ion OoP. wherehe coul d visual ly control strikes. Information waS rel ayed overthis direct wire l ine to the spotter who handl ed either the TARnet or the TAD net, whichever was requiredo During the firstattack on the Yongsan Bul ge, a forward air control l er and aradio jeep was fl borrowed" on a vol unteer basis from the airsupport section and was aSSigned to the regimental forward aircontrol l er who in turn sent him to the battal ion l eading theattack. Air SectionRecommendedg That personnel be famil iar with infantrytactics. !hat it remain as an integral part of the group butbe empl oyed within the defensive area of the Division CPo

Air SectionComment - The Detachment was organizer and embark~d without a Head-quarters Section and thus does not have cl erical .or administra-t iv e p ers on ne l.

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Recommendation - That the Detachment be authorized an ExecutiveOfficer, 1st Sergeant administrative, two cl erk typists, onemail cl erk, one motor transport driver, two motor mechanics,two additional cooks g and five messmen.Comment - In practical ly al l cases where conferences were hel dconcerning displacement or commitment of the Brigade, theCommanding Officer, Detachment, 1st Service Battalion, wasnot included. This resulted in the organization receivinginformation and orders vital l y concerning it second or thirdhand.Recommendation - That the Commanding Offioer p Detachment, 1st Ser-vice Battalion be included in al l conferences where the unit1 s o on ce rn ed . 1st Service Battal ion

The present al lowances of one (1) vehicl e operator foreach organic vehicl e was found to be entirely inadequate due tothe around the cl ock operations required during this operation.It is therefore reoommended that the T l o al l owance of vehioleoperators be increased to two (2) operators for eaoh vehicle of2i-tons or l arger o Motor Transport SectionComment - This organization did not have sufficient officers andcl erioal personnel to handl e administrative matters. We wereinformed that Headquarters and Service Battalion would handl eal l matters of administration g thereforep most of this organ-izationis office equipment was left behind. The amount ofoffice work necessary was much greater than had been anticipatedand presented a hardship.Recommendation - It is recommended that for future organizationsof this type, that a tabl e of organization be Drepared andthat they be al l owed sufficient officers and cl erical personnelto handle al l matters of administration.

1st Ordnanoe Battal ionIt is reoommended that the composite squadron be composedof l O~ enl isted men and 25 officers. Of the 25 officers, 3 shouldbe ground officers in the special ties of engineering l material,a nd i nt el l ig en ce . Marine Air Squadron 6The fol lowing reoommendations are bel ieved to be pertinentto future operations as concerns the Marine Corps Exchange ac-tivities operating as a supply element in the field.

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(A) Composition The Exchange Section shoul d be divided intothree parts as fol l ows:1. Forward Echel on

1 Officer in charge1 Staff N CO (Steward)3 PfcDs or Cpl is (Cl erks)2. Rear Echel on1 Offic~~ (Administrative)1 Staff NC O (Steward)5 PfC's or NC O's (C l erks)3. Bookkeeping & Suppl y Echel on1 Officer (Administrative)1 Staff N CO (Steward)1 Staff N CO (Bookkeeper)

1 Sgt (Warehouseman)1 Sgt (Liaison)4 PfC's or Cpl 's (C l erk)It is contended that the B&S echel on #3 woul d be responsibl efor the procurement of suppl ies, working directl y with ServiceBattal ion or Combat Service, at a port of debarkation establ ishedby Command Decision.The el ements of the echel on woul d be required to receivean account for al l PX suppl ies and forward to the rear echel onal l requested items in stock al l owing sufficient manifests to beforwarded prior to the arrival of stock shipment. Thus the totalamount of items received, issued ana expended, woul d be accounted

for by normal PX bookkeeping methoas.The rear echp,l on woul d make requests ot stock dependent ona normal suppl y for ten day issue based on the ration strength toral l el ements of the Brigade or Division. They woul d check al lsuppl ies covered by manifests received and the Oine woul d have thesteward pick up al l items through normal PX methods. Requests ofthe forward echel on woul d be fil l ed and a method of forwardingmanifests shoul d be establ ished to arrive prior to stock shipment.The forward echel on shoul d work directl y with the rearechelon ot the Service Battal ion. The dail y strength reportscoul d thus be the basis on which equal distribution of al l PXitems coul d be issued al l owing suppl y officers of al l el ements tonot more than two day issue on hand for distribution at convenienttimes. Since this echel on woul d be the final stage of suppl ieswere LSi! actual l y del ivered into the hands of the troops, itwoul d thus be necessary that issues be made onl y to representat1vesof the el ements authorized to receive them. Issue woul d thus b.made by 734 , the signed receipts becoming part ot the Oine monthl yreport of activity. 1st Service Battal ion

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C o mm an d R el a ti on sh ip sOne of the most serious probl ema of confronting the Brigadefor movement to and conduct of the attack was the general ly late

receipt of orders. Verbal tel ephonic orders frequentl y late atn1ght, became almost habitual and many times appeared to be givenwithout due consideration for time and space factors. As a resultthere was often no time for reconnaissance by Brigade, or bysubordinate commanders prior to issuance of orders for a coordinatedattack. Without the hel icopter to use for messengerp l iaison andreconnaissance purposes some of the assigned tasks and movement!coul d not have been accomplished.Brigade

One of the most difficul t probl ems confronting the BrigadeG-3 Section was the necessity for preparing plans for rapid over-land movement of the Brigade by rail and motor and the extremel yl imited notice the Brigade was given as to its proposed empl oyment.Almost every move was urgent and immediate. Almost al l ordersissued to the Brigade were verbal orders which required al mostimmediate execution. This made it impOSsibl e to formalize oper-ations orders or pl ans in the compl ete form desired for del iberatecoordinated attacks or movements. However habitual warningorders, issuance of fragmentary orders and the use of dispatchorders bridged the gap without confusion. The Brigade moved somany times that procedure became standardized and expeditious.~el ephone~ radio, messenger, conferences, and personal staff visitswere used to the ful l est in insuring that instructions receivedwere passed on. The hel icopter proved indispensabl e for staffvisits to obtain orders 9 issue orders and reconnoiter. Formal izedorders were issued on those occasions when there was sufficienttime. In al l cases written orders were issued to confirm verbalorders in order to improve coordination o

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Comment ~ The chain of command for suppl y and service functionsand the rel ationship between the Brigade G-4v Brigade Suppl yOfficer the Commanding Officer Shore Party Battal ion, andthe Commanding Officer, Detachment 1st Service Battal ion~ave not been clearl y defined. Also there hae been no clea~definition of duties in regard to the functioning of the ShoreParty organization and the Service Battal ion organization.This has on numerous occasions resulted in the lower echel onsof this unit receiving contradictory and conflicting ordereconcerning the issuing of supplies or rendering of eerviceB.~ecommendation - That a cl ear cutg definite standing 'operating pro-cedure be promulgated which wil l outl ine the suppl y and eerviceschain of command and which wil l define the rel ationship betweenthe Brigade G-4 p Brigade Suppl y Officerp Command~~ ...q:i-Te~.)J

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S hore Party Battal ion and Commanding Officer, Detachment, 1stS er vi ce B at ta li on o 1st Service Battal ionLiaison

Liaison was al ways maintained with the higher echel on and isa requirement for any operationo Liaison officers shoul d havemeans of communication and transportation and when these facil i-ties are not provided by existing means it shoul d be arranged ifl iaison is to be effectl ve o Subordinates shoul d maintain l iaisonwhen required-=particul arl y when in contact and when communicationsare not goodo In this connection p the G-3 Section must al wayshave adequate space and means to take care of briefing of obser-vers, l iaison personnel D visiting dignitaries and other personnelvisiting the G-3 officeo

Comment - This organization 1n its three fiel ds of Maintenance,Suppl y and Ammunition was on several occasions separated anddid not al ways know the l ocation of each of its sections,Lin~ therefore coul d not properl y coordinate or sufficientl ysupport its activities or personnel gRecommendation - It is recommend~d that for future operations thatthe Detachment Commander v be better informed and the organiza-tion be al l owed to coordinate its activities so a8 to be incontact with each section as much as the situation wil l permit.1st Ordnance Battal ion

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TacticsThis battal ion experienced considerabl e difficul ty in l o-

cating areas containing sufficient gun position space, motorpark space~ etc., with any enfil ade or defil ade protection.Temporary roads otten had to be cut by our dozers and the gunswere dug in, as wel l as the F DC p CP v and Aid Station. Dryriver beds or semi-sol id bean patches invariabl y constitutedthe chosen position. For security reasons vil l ages wereavoided. 1!! Battal ion, 11th MarinesLack of conformity of suppl y pl an with tactical situationhindered operations and caused unnecessary heat prostration andexhaustion. Laok of advance warning of taotical operations con-

templ ated gave insufficient time for suppl y pl anning, and exeou-tiona This faotor was intensified by the crowded M SR and diffi-cul t travel and mountainous terrain. In nearl y al l oases itwas impossibl e to make proper issue of water g ratione and ammu-nition prior to attack. By the time these items coul d be del iv-ered to troops on positions g the troops were on the move again.R .commendation~ That commanders insure that suppl y pl an wil lsupport tactica~ pl an.3rd Battal ion 5 th Marines

Overhead mach1ne gun fire in the attack shoul d be util izedto a maximum degree because of the suitabil ity of the terrain.Engineer demol ition detaohments shoul d be used to aid in thepreparation of detense pO Sitions at night. Barbed wire of al ltypes shoul d be used in the night defense positions.1st Battal ion 5 th Marines

As yet, the exposed fl anks of this battal ion have not beensubjeoted to attack by day. The high ground hel d by the bat-tal ion has been attaoked during the hours of darknesso The CPhaa been tied ol osel y in with front l ine units during the nightand hae not suffered attacks as re.ported by army unite o!!!Battal ion 5 th MarinesTanks and 75 mm R R can be effectivel y empl oyed in an approachmarch formation, and shoul d be pl aced wel l forward in the advanceparty.

1st Battal ion, 5 th Marines

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In executing a passage of l ines of a unit engaged with theenemy difficul ties arise in failure to coordinate the maneuver,coordinate the supporting fires and attaining enemy situationand front l ine l ocations from the Battal ion Commander of the re-l ieved unit. This was due to lack of information concerning 10-catfon of unit to be passed through and whereabouts of the Com-mand Post. Recommendation: That sufficient time pe al l owed onreceipt of orders to execute a passage of l ines and to permital l coordinating detail s to be made between unit commanders andsubordinate unit l eaders o That a passage of lines not be madeunder such circumstance unless the urgency of the situation ab-sol utel y demands it.Defensive situations found that U o S o Army defense methodsare entirel y different from Marine Corps defense methods, par-ticul arl y 1n empl oyment of automatic weapons o No final pro-tectiff~ l ine was empl oyed by Army units rel ieved by this battal -ion. tis presented great difficulties in night relief of armyunite. Company Commanders were unable to make dayl ight recon-naissance of pOSitions to be occupied and to plan adequate nightdefense. Reccommendation: That when army unit s are to be relieved iat night or whenever a night relief is pl anned, that unit com- imanders be sent forward to reconnoiter pOSitions and plan de- ;fense for night to facil itate rel ief and quick establishment ofadequate defenS ive pOSitions.Upon Seizure of objective and preparing defense thereofprior to darkness it was found advisable and necessary to pre-pare primary and alternate positions and occupy one pOSitionprior to darkness and after darkness move to the prepared posi-tions for the night to deceive the enemy and prevent him know-l edge of our exact pOSitions. This is especial l y true of posi-tions for automatic weapons. The enemy has a keen sense of lo-cating our automatic weapon positions and goes for them to thee xc lu al Ql 't _Qf. ~l l el s8. R e c om me nd a' tf on t That this procedure befol l owed by al l""units establ ishing night defense while in con-tact with enemyo That dummy positions be established wheretime permits to further deceive the enemy.Whil e in defenSive positions p co mbat and re conn ais sanc epatrol s have resul ted in capture of val uabl e enemy eqUipment,capture of enemy straggl ers l ett by rapidl y w1t.hdrawing enemy,and l arge areas have been secured which could not have beenphysioal l y ocoupied. Continuous day and night patrol s de-prive the enemy of use of such groundo Patrol s between gapsbetween units 1n defense 1s necessary to prevent enemy infil -tration, in dayl ight; however night patrols to cover gapsproved hazardous because of noise of movement and narrow routesto which patrol s must be confinedo Outposts in gaps provedval uabl e to cover area during darknes80 R eco mme ndat ion : T ha tpatrol s be empl oyed to ..ecure l arge ar-ea.a,which cannot be

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p hy ~i ca ll y o cc up ie dp or covered by fires; however, that outpo~tsbe empl oyed at night to cover l arge gaps in l ines rather thanpatrols. 3rd B attal ion, 5 th MarinesExcl uSive zones of action pl ace a greater emphasi~ on max-imum empl oyment ot supporting arms. fhese fires must be usedto cover l arge gaps in defense l ines and avenue~ ot approachthereto. Recommendation~ That al l round defenSive tires of sup-porting arms be empl oyed to the maximum to cover wide gap~ indet ensive l ines g and that such defenSive fires be registered assoon as possibl e after establ ishment of defensive.

3 rd B at ta l io ni {@ t h M ar in esfraining

The shore party organization shoul d be trained not onl y intheir primary function of establ ishing suppl y and evacuationtrom the beachhead, but shoul d al so be famil iar with the pro-bl ems and procedures of establ ishing a rail head. The Brigade f l lShore Party was assigned the mission of e~tabl ishing Brigaderail heads and required coordinating al l service el ement~ withinthe rail head. This consisted of contacting the Army R ail Trans-portation Officer and making arrangements for rail road car~p es-tabl ishing an information and records center, and checking inand del ivering to cognizant suppl y agencies al l material shipped. to the rail head.. A final step in organizing' the rail head con-sisted of providing Medical Company which mal ntained mobil e hos-pital service on rail cars throughout most of the BrigadeO s oper-ations.. BrigadeEarl y after arrival in Korea troops who had never been incombat fired promiscuousl y at noiaes g animal s, etc. , during thenight. During combat operations excessive ammunition was ex=pended by many individual s firing at one enemy rifl emen. Re-commendation: That combat reaction courses be reestabl ished intraining areas to accustom troops to night noises and to teachcompl ete fire discipl ine and methods of observation during il lum- iination at night. . That isol ated or scattered enemy rifl eman beassigned to certain individual s or to a tire team or el ementsot one (1 ) Fire team the responsibil ity of reducing iSol atede ne my r if le me n. 3rd Battal ion 5 th Marines


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The battalion throughout the operation eeized obJectiveeat duek, rel ieved units on lineD and moved by motor from oneassembly area to another during darkness. Lack of night trainingand orientation hindered establishment of defense movement intoassembl y areas and convoy movement on narrow roads. Recommenda-tion: The troops and units receive night training and night orien-tation prior to being sent into combat areas. That the emphasisbe on night training to include night movements by foot and motor,and occupying and preparing defense at night.Trip fl ares and mines have proved inval uable in the defense.Inetruction in employment and inetal l ation of trip flares andmines was inadequate prior to action in Korea. It was neceesaryto instruct personnel whenever possible between engagements withthe enemy. Recommendation: That al l troop!! b e given adequatein!!truction in the inetal l ation, arming, and tactical empl oymentof mines, trip fl ares, and demol ition prior to being assignedduty in Korea. Purther, troops shoul d be instructed to empl oystakes instead of bu!!hes and trees to instal l trip flare!!.

3rd Battalion, 5th MarinesCommunications

Another difficul t probl em confronted in Korea ie the effectof high terrain on communications o It was extremely difficult fort,he Operation Section to keep abreast of the situation at the frontsince telephonic communicat~onB were continual l y being disruptedby movement of vehicl es and tanks; or the wire coul d not be laidfast enough on occasions to keep up with the advance of the troops . Ae a result, the Commanding General and the G-3 epent most of theirtime forward to obtain desired information. The uee of the Weaseland helioopter for laying of wire can improve the situation some.Aleo, when the rice paddies have beoome hardened, the restrictionto roads wil l not be so great.Placing telephone oal ls through a eeriee of Army unit switch-boards in attempting to contact units of the Brigade was extremel ydifficul t. Cl earing al l circuits for a cal l was al most impol !eibl eand purel y a matter of coincidence. Radio communications was gen-eral l y uneatiefactoryfrom the I!Itandpointof the G-3 Section as a

rel!lultof poor operating conditions.

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A IR O PER AT IO NS2I O bs er va ti on A ir cr af t:

It is considerp" necessary to increase the total number ofO Y observation aircraft to 10 to provide for al l essential ob-servation functions. O Y aircraft performed with outstanding re-sul ts in spotting artil l ery and observing the enemy. It has beenestimated that at l east one hal f of al l intel l igence reportsfl owing into the G-2 and G-3 sections came from either Marinecombat air or O Y aircraft. BrigadeThere is a need for observation type aircraft to be equippedwith VH F radio equipment. This is necessary to enabl e the O Y typeaircraft to contact Marine fighter aircraft, to assist them inl ocating targets and to permit detail ed briefing of fighter air-craft regarding the enemy and observed targets. BrigadeIt is recommended that Marine Observation Squadrons be pro-vided with equipment for taking, devel opin~, and reproducingl imited numbers of aerial photos. Fast moving operations requiremeans for taking and reproducing photos on the spot. Extensivefacil ities are not contempl ated. It is desirabl e to have a smal lmobil e, compact unit for l imited service Which can be readil y movedas required. Missions requiring extensive photos can be requestedin the usual manner. Brigade

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C omposition of Squadron:'As a resul t of experience gained from the past three opera-tions, the fol l owing recommendations are submitted. These re-

commendations are based on a composite squadron conSisting of 8liaison type hel icopters, 10 OY type l iaison aircraft and two trans-port type hel icopters. The recommendations for the above aircraftare contained in the l etter from Commanding Officer, Marine Ob-servation Squadron 6 to Commander, Air Force, Pacific Fl eet, serial291-5 0 of 29 Aug 195 0:a. A composite squadron composed of l ight OY type liaisonaircraft and l iaison type helicopters is considered both desirabl eand necessary. The incl usion of hel icopters within an observationsquadron has increased the capabilities of the squadron tremendousl y.The hel icopter has not, and present types cannot, completely re-pl ace the l iaison aircraft. However, the helicopter, due to its

versatility has placed an observation squadron into so many newfields that helicopters must be considered as additional aircraft.b. It is recommended that the composite squadron be composedof 100 enlisted men and 25 officers. Of the 25 officers, 3shoul d be ground officers in the speCialties of engineering,material , and intel ligence.c. The incl usion of the hel icopter has al so greatl y increasedthe need for additional motor transport. The intricacy andmaintenance probl ems of the hel icopters require that more spareparts and tool s be carried than for other types of aircraft.Due to the fact that observation squadrons often work independentl y,a fire truck or some type of mobil e fire fighting equipment is con-sidered absolutely essential . In addition g one more water trail ersis r eq ui re d.d. It is considered desirable to have VHF radio gear instal l edin al l OY type aircraft. If the OY's coul d communicate withthe fighter aircraft, it would greatl y facilitate their leadingin air strikes. Conversel Ya the helicopters shOUl d be equippedwith MHF radio gear in order for them to communicate with certainground units. It is necessary that the squadron be equippedwith an SCR 399 and an AN/VRC-l . As previously stated, the squadronusual ly operates independently and during this time communications

are sometimes totaly tacking. Marine Observation Squadron 6

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Helicopter:Marine helicopters have proven invaluable during the campaign.They have been ~sed for every conceivabl e type of mission. The

Brigade utilized helicopters for liaison, reconnaissance, evacua-tion of wounded, rescue of Marine flyers downed in enemy terri-tory, observation, mesanger service, guard mail at sea, postingand supplying of outguards on domin~ terrain features and there-supply of smal l units by air. It is recommended that atleast eight (8) liaison and two (2) transport type hel icoptersbe added to the observation squadron for employment by MarineDivisions. BrigadeThe mountainous terrain of Korea presents a difficult probl emfor security of flanks and rear and of bivouac areas. The troopcarrier type helicopter woul ~ be ideal for use in Korea to postpatrol s and outguards on highD dominating terrain which it wouldtake hours to cl imb and Which quickly exhaust the troops. Thereare many miSSions, both combatant and non-combatant which theBehelicopters could perform. It is bel ieved their use would material -ly contribute to the effectiveness and security of our operations andinsure the earl ier defeat of the enemy. They shoul d be made availabl efor use at the earliest pOSSible date. BrigadeThe hel icopter does not repl ace the liaison type aircraft.Both types are needed by ground forces. One of the major usesof the hel icopter is for emergency evacuation. No figuresare yet availabl e on the lives saved by the hel icopters assignedto VMO-6. Suffice to say that by arrangement with the attached

medical officers onl y those cases requiring life saving treatment wereto be evacuated by helicopter and an average of three evacuationsper day during each day of combat was accompl ished by H03S. TheWindow on the starboard side of three H03S was removed and a woodenframe inserted to permit a stretcher patient to be carried, albeiteight inches of l eg remained outside the fuselage.At approximately 1800, 4 September p a Corsair was hit byenemy ground fire forward of front lines and the pil ot was.forced to parachute. Before his chute opened an H03S stationedat Brigade CP was airborne and was ready to pick the pil ot up ..al most by the time his feet touched the ground o The fighter pil otestimated that he remained on the ground three minutes before being

picked up.On moving to a new CP the helicopters would move in and postoutposts on surrounding hil l S, enabl ing security to be postedaround the CP area in ten minutes and eliminating the normalhour and a half climb. Unless the helicopter was busy,el sewhere,these outposts were fed hot meals three times a day.

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In some instances the hel icopter was the Brigade's onl y meansof communication. With al l wire l ines out and radio unreliabl e,personnel contact via the hel icopter was the only answer. Inother instances the Brigade Commander or hie staff were ordered toattend conferences that woul d have been impossible to attend butfor the hel icopter. Logistical sol utions which woul d require a unitwithout such service several days to accompl ish could be solvedand filed away in few hours time by a visit to the docks at Pusan.

It has been remarked and it can be reported, We coul d nothave done without them.MAir Section

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LOGISTICSControl of SuppliesAdministrative P lanIn a rapidly moving situation an administrative planshould be issued daily or more often if needed. This to insurethat al l concerned know where and when to draw supplies and ob-tain logistic support.Unit Liaison Officers

Beet means for coordinating logistic support in a rapidl yshifting situation is to have l iaison officers report at a specialhour daily with ful l detail s of their uni~s location, situation,operations and probl ems in connection wl tn logistic support.At the same time pl ane and orders for the fol lowing day canbe issued and discussed and questions answered. Liaison officersshould bring maps and overl ays of their own situation.

Channels For Suppl yVarious individual s went, without authority, directl y to Armysuppl y sources to draw supplies. This caused confusion and coul dnot be tolerated. Al l supplies must be obtained trom Marine Corpssources to the l imit of capabil ities. Thereafter, onl y authorizedrepresentative such as G-4, MfO, SupO, OrdO, EngrO were authorizedto deal with Army supply sources. G-4. . . . . . . . . . .

S upp ly P oi nt sArmy policy general l y pl aces Suppl y Points 6-12 miles torear. We do not have transportation to accomplish this l ength

of haul . Our supply point was up close, from 3-5 miles from frontl ines. We concentrated service and suppl y el ements and providedal l around security by Shore Party. G-4L og is ti cs R epo rts

Were general ly neither compl ete nor on time from subordinateunits.Brigade therefore made reports to higher authority based onreports of urgent shortages from untts, estimates and personal ob-servations. G-4

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Recommendation~ That the statistics gathered for supply thisoperation be used as a guide for future operations.1st Ordnance Battal ion

That with the incl usion of hel icopters within the operationalcognizance of Division headquarters more study be given to thesupply problems of the VMO squadron. Air SectionTypes of Suppl y, required items ~

Experience of the past thirty days has shown that in most casesreported the troops on the line have had littl e or no desire tocarry anything with them other than required items of arms andammunition. The daily ration of beerp candy and cigarettes does notconcern them except as items to be had when rel ieved from the l ine.These particul ar items, except beer, have been in stock and areavailabl e. Critical items such as tooth brushes tooth paste,razors and bl ades towels and matches have been much in demand andit is bel ieved that where troops are required to l eave theirpacks and personnal equipment in rear areas, these items bestocked in a much l arger ratio than has heretofore been al lowed.Distribution of Suppl ies~

The final distribution of suppl ies into the hands of personnelshoul d not and cannot be the responsibil ity of the Exchange Officer.It is strongl y recommended that suppl y officers or mess officersbe required to procure sufficient suppl ies as availabl e daily andthat proper distribution be their responsibility. Reports havebeen received that certain units did not receive rations. In al linstances reported records reveal that rations were issued andduly signed for by members of said command. ConSiderabl e delayand mixup was due to the several types of orders given on howdistribution shoul d be made. This can and shoul d be el iminated bykeeping the forward PX echel on under direction of S er vi ce B at ta li onand making distribution to the suppl y or mess officers based onstrength reports. 1st Service Battalion

Lack of conformity of supply pl an with tactical situationhindered operations and caused unnecessary heat prostration andexhaustion. Lack of adVance warning of tactical operations contem-plated gave insufficient time for supply pl anning, and execution.This factor was intensified by the crowded MSR and difficul t traveland mountainous terrain. In nearl y al l cases it was impossibl eto make proper issue of water rations and ammunition prior to a~-tack. By the time theBe items coul d be del ivered to troops on po-sitions D the troops were on the move again. Recommendation: Thatcommanders insure that suppl y pl an wil l support tactical pl an.~ Battalion 5 th Marines


25/51

Class 1Water:

In August the drinking water probl em was very acute.Men must have a l ot of water and a l ot of sal t tabl ets.Water pOints must be opened by engineers very earl y andvery cl ose to rear of troops l ine. ~his was done.There are many streams in Korea. Good watp,r pOints are easyto find.Pool s and stagnant water are to be and were avoided. Therewas reported to be danger of poisoning by enemy.Adequate chemical s for water purification must be hel d onhand. Al ways keep 10 days suppl y ahead with the purificationunits.

H ea t P ro st r at io n:More casual ties occurred from heat prostration in Augustthan any thing el se. Pl enty of sal t tabl ets, about four per amnper day, were required. Ampl e water is needed. Al l watertrail ers shoul d be kept fil l ed and as far forward as circumstancespermit.Every opportunity must be taken to move up 5 - gal tins ofwater to men 1n the front. This can be and was done by a team o~Korean l aborers attached to each battal ion.

W at er D is ci pl in e~This one probl em wil l be as important as enemy gunfire.Local water is contaminated. Those who drink untreated l ocalwater get dysentery. Many cases existed in B rigade.It w~necessary to be strict in preventing men from drinkinguntreated l ocal water. The best sol ution is al ways to have drinkingwater forward and avail abl e.

D ai ly T el egram :The dail y tel egram for Cl ass I and III Shoul d be and habitual l ywas sent a ful l 72 hours in advance of need. It shoul d be paral l el edby phone to the Rear Echel on in Pusan. Even then there is no cer-tainty of obtaining food and fuel , unl ess there had previousl y beenstock-pil ed, a two= or three~day l evel at the rail head. G -4

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Comment - Considerabl e difficul ty is encountered when Detachment,1st Service Battal ion personnel , are attached to a Shore PartyTeam at a Supply Point. Designation and cl arification of res-ponsibilities has not been made for this arrangement.Recommendation - It is recommended that Detachment, 1st ServiceBattal ion peraonnel be al l oweru to administer the suppl ies,cLa.s s 19 lID III and IV p within the Suppl y Po I rrt, and be respon-sibl e to their respective unit accountabl e officers for main-taining a stock level o and providing an issue basis. TheShore Party Team to provide transportation to forward suppl iesto the using el ements and to furnish additional personnel toaugment the work l oad of the respective dumps. Shore Party, tofurnish the personnel necessary for a perimiter defense.

l!1 S er vi ce B at ta li onComment - Individual units of the Brigade request issues of emergencyrations when that type of rations is being utilized.Recommendation - That only major unit Suppl y Officers be authorized torequisition ~~d receive ooC- rations from the suppl y pOint. Such majorunits could make issues to their subordinate units.Comment - Throughout the operation considerable difficulty has arisenbecause of the type and number of nB~ rations ordered and received,and the incorrectness of invoices on rations.Recommendation - That the Commissary Officer be authorized to preparethe daily requisition for rations p such a requisition to enumeratethe type and breakdown of food" and that a se~+'lon of the RationPl atoon be attached to the unit that is furnishing ratione forthe Brigade p or like unit to coordinate ordering and shipping.Comment = This section has had difficulty in determining the rationstrength of the various units in order to form a basis for dail yissues.Recommendation - That When ooA~ or "B" rations are utilized, unitsdrawing from the suppl y point or being del ivered rations by theration aectron , shoul d furnish the Commissary Section with aration statement Signed by the Commanding Officer p E xe cu ti ve O ff ic er ,or Adjutant for the number of men being fed in that unit gal ley.When "C" rations are being used p the major unit supply officerto furnish the Commissary Section with a breakdown of strength foreach of his supporting units.

1!1 S er vi ce B at ta li on

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Class i l l .Insure enough additional fuel is carried in order to top offal l vehicle tanks prior to entry into combat. Eepecial l y M-26tanks.Insure a1rplane gas is carried forward for hel icopter - 91cctane ,Insure white gas is avail able for Coleman l anterns.


28/51

EquipmentTroop~

A boot similar in d.esign to the Army boot shoul d be adoptedby the Marine Corpe. The l egging is not comfortabl e and is un-sat+sfactory in muddy weather. The boot gives good leg protection,is comfortable, and is easy to put on and take off. BrigadeAir mattresses of a l ight and durabl e design such as thoseissued by the Army for cold weather operations should be con-sidered for adoption. It woul d be preferabl e if the mattress couldbe made an integral part of a waterproof sl eeping bag. BrigadeToo much personal gear was carried by al l hands initial l y. ~Let each man carry onl y the cl othes on hie back his weapon,'

ammunition, bel t hel met change of ao c k s , /l ,/Let remainder personal clothing and equipment be in his com- 0pany or battery transportation. Possibl y 2 I-ton trailers per (,company ts enough. When time permits men can have access to their ' ( > , 1cl othing for changes.The present entrenching shovel is inadequate in Koreaterrain g and the use of heaVier engineer hand tool s is a necessityunl eRs other entrenching tool s are provided. RecommendationgThat the smal l combat type pick. m attox be issued to every.,__other.man in rifle companies .--At l east one per fire team'1sconsidered a minimum.

g Battalion ! h Marines.Hand carrying of boxed machine gun ammunition retards rateof advance of ammunition carriers in rugged Korean terrain. Rec-ommendationg That M-2 ammunition bags be issued ammunitioncarriers to permit more free use of hands while negotating terrain.

3d Battalion 5 th Marines(e) That the Army type dust goggles be adopted as an itemof issue for al l vehicl e operators. Several accidents occurredduring this operation due to the operator8s vision being impairedby the heavy fog of dust which was preval ent on al l roads in Korea.

Motor Transport Section

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29/51

_ _z ..,....rno", /t - r-

The need of a standard pack which individuals could drop inorganization dumps and be reissued at appropriate times withoutreference to name became apparent during the operation. In thepack should be placed common items of use such as a bl anket andsl eeping bag. The individual shoul d carry hie own toil et and per-sonal articl es in a light pack which he wears at al l times. Duringextremel y hot weathers which causes fatigue on ~ong marches orcl imbing hil l s, men wil l discard any equipment which is considereda burden to the accomplishment of their combat mission with re-sultant l oss of the eqUipment 0

Brigade

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General:There is an important requirement for the redesign of MarineCorps gal l ey equipment to make it much l ighter and more compact.The present design is not practicabl e durl ng combat. A smal lportabl e gal l ey capabl e of bel ng transported in a one ton trail ershoul d be designed for U Se down to company l evel . Larger messesare impracticabl e as wel l as tactical l y unsound during combat. Theequipment shoul d consist mainl y of a coffee urn and a l arge boil erin which '~CI U ations coul d be dumped in hot water to be heated.Hot It etC rat ions coul d then be taken forward in sand bags and hotcoffee in containerse The boil er coul d be used for cooking stewsand simil ar preparations when the situation permitted the use of"B" rations. BrigadeProviding food in a fast moving situation is a serious pro-bl em. Recommend obtain additional 2t-ton trucks and l ~n trail ers,

80 that when they come into area they merel y turn on fuel cookhot meal for company without l ong hand=carry or del ay. Truckshoul d hol d 2 days l iB"rations. Hot food shoul d be taken forward,if necessarY9 in Marnite cans. G-4The present command post tent is one of the most bul ky and \difficul t pieces of tentage to erect. When erectedtts space is \'l imited and inadequate for the proper function of staff sectionsdown to regimental l evel . A new type of l ightp durabl e commandpost tent shoul d be designed. It shoul d be easy to erect, suppl ysufficient space for staff sections to workp and have some means

of ventil ation when bl acked out. BrigadeThat the water tral l er p 300 gal l on now a standard item ofissue by the Marine Corps be repl aced by the US A rmy 25 0 gal l onwater trail er. This type trail er is 1n uSe extensivel y in theKorean theatre and has proven to be excel l ent 1n every respect.Motor Transport B attal ionPresent O P equipment such as bul ky and heavy fiel d desks gfiel d safesp l ighting eqUipment which 1s easil y broken p draft1ngs up pl ie s t en ta ge p and especial ly fiel d reproduction facil itiesneed great improvement. Methods and means of improving such equip-ment shoul d be thoroughl y expl ored with the aim of making themlight 1 compact p and practicabl e under severe fiel d conditions, yet

with sufficient durabil ity to withstand the rough treatment whichit wil l receive. A simpl ep rapid~ and easy yet rel iabl e means orquickl y reproducing orders and instructions under fiel d conditionsis badl y needed. Brigade

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31/51

C omment - The l aundry trail er tongues are not constructed ofsturdy enough material to withstand the strain of movementover the rough roads in this sector. Constant breakageof tongues and resul ting damage to the mounted l aundryeqUipment occurred each time the trail ers were towed byp rim e m ove rs.

Recommendation - That the tongues be constructed of heaviermaterial.C omment - Considerabl e del ay was often encountered by the l aundrysection in trying to move after orders to displ ace were receivedby the unit. This was due to l ack of organic prime movers,capabl e of haul ing the pereonnel g and al eo towing the trail ers,and suppl ies b such as soap tabl es and baskets organic to thesection.Recommendation - That organic transportation capabl e of moving thetrailers D peraonnel o and suppl ies of the l aundry unit be perm-anentl y assigned to the section.Comment - The l aundry unit consiste of two trail ers D one of whichmounts the washer and extractor and the other the dryer andthe generator. Thie generator is the source of operating powerfor both units. Therefore the 108s of either trail er resul ts inthe 1088 of the services of the l aundry unit.Recommendation - That both unitBp now mounted on individual trail ersbe mounted on one traI1er v such as the athey trail er. This typeof tracked traIl er using a tractor as a prIme mover woul denabl e the l aundry unit to be better suited for movement to themuddyu marshy ground often encountered near water sources.Comment- Where it i8 necessary to pump water to the machines froma water sourceD the water pumps provided as TiC eqU ipm ent arenot ad equ ate .Recommendation - That pumps with sufficient power to continual l ysuppl y the l aundry with al l the water necessary for theiroperation be provided.

l!1 S er vi ce B at ta li onComment - The present eqUipment is too bul ky and heavy for fastmovement.Recommendation - That a bakery unit be designed and mounted on acl osed-in portabl e trail er containing an automat~c rol l machine,

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proof box, and mixerp powered by electricity, which wil l suppl ya Brigade with hot rol ls in the fiel d. If such a bakery unitcould be designed p the personnel strength coul d be reduced to15 Bakers. Or if the present type equipment be retained for use,that it be permanently mounted on l ow bed trail ers instead ofthe present Athey type trailers.

Comment - A considerabl e amount of troubl e has resulted from the useof the present pot type burner due to the ehortage of 62 Octanegasoline.Recommendation - That the present pot type burners be repl aced withthe converted 1942 Star Burners. The Star type burners wil lburn to a greater a.dvantage on 72 or 80 O cta ne ga so li ne .Comment - No transportation wae authorized for use of the BakeryPlatoon.Recommendation - It i8 recommended that a vehicle capabl e of pul linga water trail er and hauling Bread Components be permanentl yassigned to the Bakery Pl atoon.Comment - Considerabl e difficul ty was encountered in distribution otbread products. This was caused by lack of suitabl e containersbe in g pr ov id ed .Recommendation - It is recommended that bread boxes be constructedot l ig ht p or ta bl e p sanitary nature that wil l provide protectionto the finiShed bread products. These boxes to be issued andcarried by al l units as standard mees equipment.

l!1e rv ic e B at ta li onComment - It was exceedingl y hard for Optical Instrument men todo any repair work in the field due to l ack of equipment.Recommendation - It is recommended that this organization have anoptical instrument repair truck in~B maintenance section.!his truck can also handl e machine work for the section, as ~,.it has a l athe aboard.

1st Ordnance Battal ion

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Medical SectiongLack of medical suppl ies for treatment of patients sufferingusual war diseases such as diarrhea, infections, stomach ail ments,

etc., was noted earl y in the Korean operation. Recommendation:~ Thatadequate medical suppl ies for usual sicknesses as wel l as woundsbe carried initial l y by medical units at battalion level .Evacuation of personnel with serious wounds in rough Koreanterrain is extremely difficul t and dangerous for the patient.Deaths have resul ted from normal rough handling whil e evacuatingcasual ties by l itter or hand carry. Recommendation: That hel icoptersbe used more extensively in evacuation of seriousl y wounded personnelfrom front l ine positions. Protected areas immediatel y to reaf offront lines may be used for hel icopter pickup areas.~ Battal ion p Q1h Marines

Comments ~ Recommendations~The number of cases that can be handl ed in the OR trailer isl imited due to itas size. Hence onl y the non-evacuable cases shoul dbe operated. During periods of heavy casualties hopeless casesshould be abandoned and l ife-saving procedures empl oyed on thosethat are operable.Two additional portable operating tables with adequate lightingand supplies should be set up in tents to handl e minor cases, de-bridements p orthopedics etc. To the present we have done only ab-dominal and brain surgery in the trail er.The patient shoul d be completely prepared outside the trailer.Spinal anesthesia shoul d be administered outside the trail er andthe patient placed on a cut down l itter which sets on the OR tabl eand does not have to be removed. As a general rul e the patientsshould receive atropine as pentothal is usual ly used as suppl e-mentary anesthesia. IV fluids shoul d be started prior to entry inthe OR, arm board secured and maintained adequately. Do not try toadminister blood thru a plasma set-up. Use a filter preferably onewith visibl e drops. Bl ood pressure cuff and stethescope shoul d beput in pl ace on the right arm. The IV shoul d be started in the leftarm and the arm propped against the side of the trailer. The patient

shoul d be pl aced in a good position on the tabl e before the scrubcorpsman sets up hie steril e field.In general , the medical officers assigned shoul d have a generalsurgical background. One orthopedist is SUfficient at this echel onlevel.~The report also contains a l ist of minimum requirements foran OR Trailer and a pl an of operation of a mobil e surgical unit~1st Medical Battal ion

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TRANSPORTATIONFor simil ar operations in the tuture, when shipping space isnot initial l y avail able to l ift organic vehicl es ot M arine units,

the vehicl es shoul d be shipped to the port of destination by fol l owup shipping as soon as possibl e. When a Marine unit is to be em-pl oyed in the same manner as an Army unit in the prosecution of al and campaign, it must be provided With greatl y increased amountsof transportation. BrigadeScreening missions, road and fl ank reconnaissance, and simil arvital tasks cannot be performed adequatel y unl ess reconnaissancecompanies are properl y equipped with vehicl es. Seven t ton trucks,4x4, armed with 5 0 cal . MGos were acquired from the Army to motorizethe Brigade reconnaissance detachment so that it coul d carry outits essential and critical reconnaissance missions. BrigadeConsiderabl e difficul ty was real ized in motor movements dueto the narrow unimproved roads. Strict tre,ffic control and estab-l ishment of one way traffic on narrow sections is mandatory. Often,time and space factors appeared poorl y coordinated at the next higherechel on, undoubtedly due to time l imitations, and unit col umnssometimes met on narrow roads travel ing in an oppos1te d1rectionw1th reeul tant del ay and dangerous congestion. It is highl y des-irabl e that motor movements, particul arl y at night, be careful l ycoordinated and control l ed. Al l drivers must be careful l y in-structed in and required to observe strict convoy discipl ine.BrigadeRapId moves of 10 to 100 mil es require much more transporta-tion than is avail abl e in organic transportation of a MarineBrigade. Due to shipping l imitations we were unabl e to bringeven full organic transportation. We received 42 trucks, 2i-ton,6x6 initial l y and empl oyed them throughout all operations.For l ong moves we general l y had the use of one additionaltruck company, contain1ng 5 0 trUcks, 2i-tona 6x6, from the unitproviding l ogistic support.Roads were narrows rough, very poor.Traffic was conjested. Traffic probl ems were chronic .I t is m an da to ry :

Vehicl es keep 25 yards distance.Vehicl es stop on extreme right side of road.Dozer fol low immediatel y after tanks to make-bypassesover broken bridge. G-4


35/51

S pare T ires:T ires in Korea are cut to ribbons fast. Especial l y when heavil yl oaded and roads are steep. Additional spare tires and tubes are re-

quired. Many tires are punctured rapidl y. Recommend puncture-prooftires o n al l combat vehicl es. G-4Spare Part s:

We had good resul ts with our l evel spare parts and spare partstrail ers. Since we acquired 42 Army trucks we had to obtain spareparts from Army sources. Army ordnance facil ities are cooperativeand cordial and have given us al most anything we needed which theyhad. G-4Train movements are sl ow. It took as much as 24 hours to move60 mil es. It is necessary al ways to have two days of rations and

water accompany troops moving by train. Their basic l oad of ammuni-tion shoul d of course al so be taken. ~As mentioned previousl y, no one breakdown was common to eitherthe twenty-two (22) 2* ton 6x6 IHC trucks or the eighteen (18) 2*ton 6x6 GMC trucks. However as fiel d operations progressed, an in-creasing amount of tire repair was required. A sol ution was soughtthrough reduction of road speeds and in l oads where practicabl e;neither sol ution served as a remedy since the roads were extremel yrough, and the roadbed consisted of l arge rock fragmentsi a decisionwas made whereby air pressure was reduced from sixty (60) pounds toforty-five (45 ) pounds in the tires mounted on both the (}Megs andthe IRC's trucks. As a resul t the dail y amount of tire repair re-quired was greatl y reduced.Dusty roads proved hazardous to both drivers and equipment.This same hazard existed during l ater days of the operation whenrain saturated the roads and caused them to become very sl ick.Recommendations~ That al l units be issued their compl ete TIE al -l owances so that overhaul reconditioning, crating, and markingcoul d be accompl ished progressivel y rather than after embarkationorder is issued. That whil e operating in the Korean area, pressurein 8.25 x20 and 7.25 x20 tires be reduced from sixty (60) to forty-five (45 ) pounds. That dust goggl es be issued as part of organiCeqUipment for reissue to al l drivers. That the water trail ers cur-rentl y used by the Marine Corps, both in the States and in Korean

theatre be repl aced by a model of l ess capacity and more substantialframe and chassis. A ttention is invited to Brigade Motor T ransportOfficer report on water trail ers. !A! Battalion, l ! 1 b Marines

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Vehicl es al l otted to this company for transportation duringthe period 3=31 August 1950 included :3 trucks 2i ton 6x6 3 trucksi ton 4x4 with 2* ton trail ers. This amount of transportation wasnot enough to move the equipment and ammunition of the company in asatisfactory manner. The Basic Load of ammunition carried by thecompany was 300 rounds of ammunition weight 10p500 pounds. Themortars and equipment of two mortar pl atoons weigh approximatel y4,000 pounds. One, ton trail er was l oaded with communicationequipment and the other with fire direction center equipment.Due to the need for rapid displ acement and very short period of beingout of action in a fast moving attack situation it was absol utel ynecessary to al l ow a minimum number of mortar crewmen to ride onthe overl oad on al l vehicl es which showed up in rapid truck wear.It is recommended that this company be al l otted vehicl es ofa smal l er capacity than 2i ton 6x6. This l arge a vehicl e makesrapid l oading and unl oading of al l needed equipment impossibl e.However the capacity of the company vehicl es must be at l east 12tons. A very important hindrance to 8* ton vehicl es for this companycomes in amphibious operations. It is undesirabl e to send a 2iton truck into the beach as soon as the 4.2 0 Mortar Company wil lusual l y be needed. One such truck 2~ ton shoul d be retained for areserve ammunition suppl y however al l others shoul d be exchanged fora greater number of smal l er vehicl es.Incl uded in the above recommendations shoul d be 5 trucks i tonwith 4 1 ton trail ers. A suggested use for these vehicl es woul d beas fol lows~1 Truck t ton 4x4 for use as Company Commanderos reconnaissanceI Truck t ton 4x4 with i ton trail er for use of RegimentalLiaison Party

1 Truck i ton 4x4 with i ton trail er for use of CommunicationSection Wire l aying vehicl e1 Truck i ton 4x4 with 1ton trail er for use 1st P l atoon Leaders'Liaison and Reconnaissance1ruck i ton 4x4 with t ton trail er for use 2d P l atoon Leaders'L iaison and R econnaissance. 4.2 MortarEach successive l ong motor march took a tol l of vehicl es andtrail ers. On this datev 22 August the battal ion had but two (2)water trail ers in operating conditione. Communications materialal so Buffered from exhaustive use and exposure. The heat duringdayl ight hours the dampness at night and the heavy dust androughness of the roads pl us frequent l oadings proved to be hardon any equipment not specifical l y designed for very rough usage.The shortage of transport~tion was al l eviated to some extent bythe assignment of five (5 ) US Army 2-1 t on 6x6 trucks withdrivers p to the battal ion.

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(a) That the water traiIer~ 300 ga l l on now a standard itemof issue by the Marine Corps be repl aced by the U S Army 25 0 gal l onwater trail er. This type trai l er is in use extensive l y in theKorean theatre and has proven to be excel l ent in every respect.(b) That the tire pressure of al l 8g25 x20 and 7~ 5 0x20 tiresbe reduced to forty~five (4 5 ) l bs.~ for al l operations in Korea.(0) That the US A rmy parts trucks and machine shop truckSbe adopted by the Marine Corps for fU rther operations in theKorean theatre of operation. T he present Marine Corps trail ermounted machine shops and spare parts trail ers were found to betoo top heavy and unwiel dy to hand l e on the rough narrowwinding roads of Korea. Motor Transport Sectionc. The incl usion of the hel icopter has a l so greatl y increasedthe need for additional motor transport. T he intricacy and main-tenance probl ems of the hel icopters require that more spare parts

and too l s be carried than for other types of aircraft. Due to thetact that observation squadrons often work l ndependentl y~ a firetruck or some type of mobil e fire fighting eqUipment is consideredabsol utel y essential . In addition, one more water trail er isrequired. Marine Air S quadron 6(b) That the Mil itary Pol ice Company shoul d be provided with, inview of the road net and distances invol ved in the present operation,vehicl es as enumerated bel owg1. One truck 4x4 i ton for each 3 men in the trafficpl atoons and po l ice pl atoon.20 One motorcyc l e for each traffic squad.3. Company H eadquarters to haYe 6 trucks 4x49 iton and two trucks 6x6 2i ton or 6x6 Ii tonfor transportIng personne l (straggl ers andprisoner8~~MP8 when necessary) and al l organicequipment.)4. Each squad pl atoon headquarters and companyheadquarters shou l d have one (1) of the vehicl esaSS igned equipped with a radio.During this operation weasel s were used very effective l y inaugmenting the Batta l ion S uppl y Train. This Battal ion being theintermost from the M SR had the probl em of' resuppl y over hi l l yterrain and 1n rainy weather. Neither jeeps nor trucks coul d ac-

compl ish this task and the distance was auch that hand carryingby civil ian l aborers was too s l ow and tedious. Therefore it issuggested that such vehicl es be made avail abl e on cal l for theB atta l ions to use in future operations shoul d the aam e terrainand weather conditIons be met. 3d Battal ion 5 th Marines (1-6 Sep)

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Reconnoitering routes of advance MSRoe and al ternatesmade it necessary to compl etel y motorize the reconnaissancedetachment, seven (7) jeeps and four (4) trail ers (for or-ganic eqUipment, kept in rear echel on) were furnished us bythe Army. Three . 5 0 cal iber machine guns were mountedon the jeeps; a good moral e factor but we did not receive anopportunity to empl oy them against the enemy.

R ec on na is sa nc e C om pa nyComment - The operation of al l sections of the Detachment wasconstantl y hindered by the 8hortage~ or compl ete l ack, oftransportation v and in Bome instances sections were compl etel yinoperative due to this shortage.Recommendation - That each section be equipped with enough organictransportation to effectivel y carry out their particul ar serviceor suppl y function v particul arl y so if a system of unit suppl yis to be empl oyed. Further p that this organic transportationbe SUfficient to move the personnel , suppl ies a and eqU ipmentof each section when displ acement is ordered.

1st Service Battal ionComment - Numerous times throughout the campaign the Detachment, 1stService Battal ion Bakery haa been far removed from the Ration P l a-toon.Recommendation - That the Detachment p 1st Service Battal ion Bakery bel ocated in the immediate vicinity of the Ration P l atoon to facil itatthe suppl ying of Bakery ingredient B to the bakery D and iSBU e ofbread to the using el ements at the time rations are received or de-l ivered by the Ration Pl atoon.Comment - This organization has had transportation difficul ties through-out the operation. Frequentl y when unit distribution was necessaryand desirabl e this organization was unabl e to provide same.Recommendation - That this unit be authorized sufficient transportationfor unit distribution of rations and bakery products and usethroughout the dump a.nd between the other facil ities within a de-tachment bivouac. Unit transportation is al so necessary forl iaison within the supported unit and the issuing facil ity.

1 st S ervice Battal ionThat the a1~ support section of the Marine Tactical Air Con-trol Group be mobil e with eqUipment adaptabl e to rough roads andr ou gh t re at me nt .

Air Section

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Comment - Insufficient transportation was on hand to support the (Ordnance mission. This waS augmented by use of rail road trans- \portation and vehicl es from Brigade Motor Transport for the Am- )munition section. If a movement ovpr area without the aid of \rail road is anticipated the suppl y mission woul d be greatl y ham- Ipered and del ayed. I

\R ecommendation - It is recommended that sufficient trail ers, primemovers be furnished this Detachment to keep adequate suppl y ofessential major items and spare parts prepared to move forwardwith the maintenance section.1st Ordnance Battal ion

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ORDNANCEN apal m bombs, 500 and 1000 Ibs bombs with instantaneousfuzes, large numbers of hand and rifl e grenades, and flame

throwers are weapons that can be effectivel y used against theenemy because of his apparent herd instincts.1st Battal ion, 5 th Marines

75mm Recoil less Rifl es, ~.5" Rocket Launchers and M-26 Tankshave proven successful against the Russian built T-34 medium tanks.Each of the above weapons can immobilize a tank, but the 3.5" RocketLauncher and the M-26 Tank can kil l them, where the 75 mm RR Gunis not quite as effective.The 75mm RR has proven to be a good supporting weapon duringthe period when supporting fires are lifted and before friendly

forces can gain the tops of ridges or hil ls.1st Battalion, 5 th MarinesThe' "ENERGA" AT grenade, al though not fired by the Brigadeagainst enemy vehicles, was tested on an M4A3 tank and is be-lieved capabl e of penetrating the enemyl s armor. Launchers forthe rifl e shoul d be provided on a basis of two (2) per rifl e squad.The grenade when fired from the rifl e has a much flatter trajectorythan from the carbine with resul tant greater accuracy. It isbel ieved this grenade wil l give the infantry a suitable anti-tankweapon immediatel y availabl e for close-in warfare. It should alsobe valuabl e for use against fortified pOSitions if encountered.

Brigade


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T he 4.2" Mortar has proved itsel f a powerful and accurateweapon. It is fel t that there is a great need for 360 degreetraverse without a l ong process of shifting a wel l seated basepl ate. Al so an additional 300 0 yarde of range woul d give theregiment much better counter mortar fire. Enemy mortars ofcomparabl e size have been encountered. They are very inaccuratebut capabl e of firing at much l onger ranges than our own. It isunderstood that there is such a mortar with the above capabil itiesin an expermental stage. If this is the caseD it is recommendedthe Marine Corps adopt it as soon as possibl e

. i . : _ g MortarSand bagging decks of jeeps L I J 7 necessary due to enemy l andminds. Spl inter shiel ds 3/4" considered necessary to repel enemysmal l -arms fire and give troops an opportunity to depl oy.

R eco nnl ssa nce C ompa nyComment - The Ammunition Section operated with Shore Party by main-taining a forward echel on to establ ish a forward dump and a rearechel on to Suppl y forward from Army Division ASpos l ocated at railheads. This system kept a continuous suppl y of ammunition immed-iatel y behind the using arms. Due to tel ephone l ines being outand the many S Witch boards between the forward and rear echel onscommunications was poor and orders were hard to maintain. Therewere al so confl icting reqUisitions from the Ammunition Officer,Shore Party OffIces and in some cas e s from the Ordnance Officer,5 th Marines. This caused dupl ications of orders being sent for-ward in some instances.Recommendation - That the Marine Corps maintain its own main ASP andSuppl y to a forward A SP to stock 1 unit of fire for the 1st Pro-visional Marine Brigade. That a direct l ine of communication bemaintained between the rear and forward AS P. That the Regimentsturn in dail y a requisition for their requirements. Emergencyissues be made at any time. That the using arms maintain a basicl oad at al l timeso That the Battal ion S- 4 and Regiments S-4 main-tain a bal anced l oad within their capabil ities.

1st Ordnance Battal ionGeorge M . A l exander, Jr.A mm uni tio n S ect ionPoint detonating rifl e grenades are necessary in attack ofenemy pO Sitions in rocky and rugged terrain of hil l tops. Rec-cmmendat acnr. That point detonat ing rifl e grenades be Ls sued ;

3 d B at tal ion 21b Xarines-35- l'f, .1;", ,


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tJni'tsof Fire:In the rugged, mountainous terrain of Korea it becomes Inecessary to ut1lize supporting arms to the maximum possibl e extent I

in order to reduce or neutral ize enemy pOSitions. This results 1nthe expenditure of unusual l y large amounts of artil lery, mortar,and 90mm tank ammunition. The present unit of fire for theseclasses of ammunition shOUl d be doubled in this theatre. i~Brigade .~ ""/

A.m..u.ni't1on:Every unit tends to want to carry too much. When time comesto displace they cannot move it. Therefore they have the cho1ce:(a) In the advance - 1. Move it by shuttle run of theirtransportation.

2. Leave it to Ordnance Battal ion topick up and move.(b) In withdrawal - 1. Destroy it.

~. Destroy something el se in orderto carry ammunition.In withdrawal from (OBORG several units destroyed theirgal ley gear. Th1s was a difficul t decision by the unit commandersand its effects were sl ow to be corrected.

G-4-Hand grenades of al l types are considered one of the best wea-pons for destroying enemy in defensive positions atop hil ls and 1nvil lages. Percussion and WP hand grenades have not been availabl eto date. Recommendationg That percussion and WP hand grenades beissued and that three (3) grenades be issued per man in the assaul tcompany onl y. Extra grenades should be carried in Company andBatta110n suppl y for issue at night for defense. That Marinesoccupying pos1tions on the perimeter shoul d have at l east 5 handgrenades.Trip tl ares and mines have proved invaluable in the defense.Instruction in employment and instal l at10n of trip flares andmines was inadequate prior to action in Korea. It was necessaryto instruct personnel whenever possible between engagements withthe enemy. Recommendation~ That al l troops be given adequateinstruction in the instal lation, armlngg and tactical empl oyment ofmines, trip tl ares, and demolitions prior to being asstgned dutyin Korea. Further, troops shoul d be instructed to employ stakes

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instead ot bushes and trees to instal l trip fl ares.3d Battal ion, 5 th Marines

Procurement of weapons:Up to date emergency pl ans shoul d be avail abl e for the auto-m ati c e qu ipp ing of units with the latest armament when directedto execute emergency operations. The Korean situation material -ized so rapidl y that until equipment was requisitional no actionwas taken to provide units of the Brigade with such new and neces~sary items as M-26 tanks, 3".5 rocket l aunchers, 90mm HVAP tank am-munition, M-6 l and mines, and other critical items required forcombat operations against a determined enemy. Brigade

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ENGINEERSThe many bridges and narrow roads of Korea make it imperativethat Marine units bring sufficient bridging equipment to span smal l

bridges. In some cases there are no fords which can be used andbridging material s wil l be required to croes streams. OtherWise,a damaged bridge may stop the movement of troops and vehicles indef-initely and seriously interrupt the chain of supply.Br1gadeOn 10 August, Company "A~ used the fol lowing methods ofgiving Engineer support to the Advance.A. One platoon was pl aced in the advance party withtrucks loaded with demol itions, fortification, mine laying,mine detecting bridging and carpenter eqUipment and material s.Two (2) tractors, w/angl e dozer, were placed with the point ofadvance to make by-passes for the tanks to cross stream beds.

A mine detection team of four (4) men with a detector was pl acedon the third tank of the pOint. An Engineer ReconnaissanceOfficer moving with the point would inspect bridges and culvertsto insure the safety of the tanks crossing them, if the bridgeor cul vert wouldn1t hol d the 46 ton load the Reconnaissance Officerwould hal t the tanks and cal l a dozer forward to construct a by-pass The Reconnaissance Officer and the Pl atoon l eader of the forwardplatoon would spot engineer tasks al ong the route of march (suchas reinforcing culverts, buil ding up shoul ders, etc.) and theforward pl atoon woul d perform this work as they came to them in thecol umn. The mine detection team was cal l ed forward by the EngineerReconnaissance Officer or the Tank Officer whenever a mine field wasl ikely or suspected. This same team was equipped with expl osives(carried in the Reconnaissance Officeros vehicle behind the forwardtank pl atoon) for quickl y removing mines or road blocks.It is felt that by empl oying Engineers in this manner,Company "An was able to give maximum engineer support to the 1stProvisional Marine Brigade. The method described above insuredrapid engineer support at any point in a very fast moving situation.B. Due to the extreme heat and rugged terrain over which the1st Provisional Marine Brigade was moving on 10 August 195 0, themen 1n the Brigade required


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operation and fil l ing canteens and water cans with potable waterwhen the Main Body reached that point).It is felt that by empl oying Water Supply equipment andpersonnel in this manner, Company M A " suppl ied adequate amountsof sorel y needed drinking water to the Brigade. The safety ofthis valuable equipment was not endangered to any large extent inthis manner because of the rear area activities. It is fel tthat the forward water pOinte were wel l protected by virtueof being close to the infantry. For security purposes the forwardpl atoon, mentioned in A above, bivouacked at the water point nightl y.

l et Engineer Battal ion


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S IGNA L SEC TIONDuring the l ast operation this company had to operate bothbatteries firing missions pl us al l company administrative radiotraffic over one SCR 30 0 frequency. T his proved compl etel y un-satisfactory. It kept vital l y needed fire from front l ine com-panies in the assaul t because two simul taneous fire missions coul dnot be processed on the same frequency.It shoul d be pointed out al so that on these same T/O's el evenwiremen 1s the maximum authorized to keep the batteries connectedto th~ FDO a the F DC to the two battal ion CP's and then from thebattal ion Cpos to the forward observation posts. This makesradio a primary instead of a secondary means of communication mostof the time in an attack situation.It is recommended that there be three observers authorized foreach mortar pl atoon so that each front l ine rifl e company coul dhave one observer to accompany it and thus give compl ete coverageto the regimental fronteIt is al so recommended that this company be authorized 16SO R 300 Bs with the necessary additional radio operators to manthem. To fU rnish wire to 4 additional observation posts it wil lrequire 4 additional wire teams of 3 men each. There must be twoSCR 30 0 frequencies aseigned to the company for proper radio com-munication.

~ M ortarSO R 5 36 raqios have proved inadequate for intra-company com-munications due to mountainous terrain. Recommendation~ That ad-'ditional SCR 300 radios and add ttLona.l frequencies be assigned tobattal ions to permit more satisfactory intra-company communications.

~ Battal ion g 5 th M ar inesThat an additional net be establ ished ~or each TAD C or airsupport section cal l ed the T ACPadministratl ve net! for the pur-pose of reducing traffic on the TAR net and for conducting l iaisonbetween the control parties and the control station.T hat an additional radio be suppl ied per TA CP to handl e the' TA OP a dm in is tr at iv e n et .That a TACP airborne be empl oyed per division sector capabl eof both V HF and MHF communications and carrying a qual ified TA O.!!t Sectiond. It is considered desirabl e to have VHF radio gear instal l edin al l OY type aircraft. If the OyDs coul d communicate with thefighter aircraft, it woul d greatl y facil itate their l eadfng in airstrikes. C onversel y, the hel icopters shoul d be equipped with MEF


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radio gear in order for them to communicate with certain groundunits. It is necessary that the squadron be equipped With an SOR399 and an AN/VRC-l . As previousl y stated, the squadron usual l yoperated 1ndependentl y and during this time communications aresometimes total ly l acking. Marine Observation Squadron 6

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ARTILLERYDuring 'his phase, great difficul ty was experienced in cl osesupport missions due to the exceedingly steep sl opes. Targetswere mostly mortar positions and mortar OP's.

1st Bat'al ion, 11th Marines

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SPECIA L SERVI CESLaundry:

Laundry shoul d exchange cl ean cl othes for dirty with troops.D1sadvantages l ie in rank chevron discrepancies. Advantage l ies1speed and convenience. Exchange should be made when opportunitypresents promptl y after engagement with the enemy.I nd igenous L abor:

Not very effective unl ess skil l ful l y used.They run when first shot is fired unl ess guarded.However, the +--.nfantryanted 100 men _ _ p _ g r . .l?.allil-!.QJl andengineers wanted about 100 to work on roads and air strips. These

were provided by Brigade Labor Officer

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MI LIT ARY PO LIC ESigns:

MP must have ampl e signs made and used to mark new or strangeand different routes. Signs are needed for each unit, staff sec-tion, service and suppl y facil ity. They shoul d be made uniform forthe division. Certain sections who displ aced frequentl y shoul d havetwo sets of signs, one to be used by reconnoitering party forward.Brigade

The fol lowing recommendations are respectful l y Bubmitted~(a) That the Mil itary Pol ice Company shoul d be a separate andindependent company within the Headquarters and Service Battal ionand have its own bivouac area, gal l ey, and motor transport section.

The Provost Marshal shoul d be l ocated in a central position withinthe Division Command Post so as to have immediate l iaison and noti-fication of al l movements and orders in order to be abl e to promptl ynotify the Mil itary Pol ice Company of such so that the Company canestabl ish immediate traffic control to facil itate the orderl y move-ment of motor serial s. .(b) That the Mil itary Pol ice Company shoul d be provided with,in view of the road net and distances invol ved in the present opera-tion, vehicl es as enumerated bel ow~1. One truck 4x4 i ton for each 3 men in the trafficpl atoons and pol ice pl atoon.2. One motorcycl e for each traffic squad.3. Company Headquarters to have 6 trucks 4x4, 1ton and two trucks 6x6, 2i ton or 6x6 , l i tonfor transporting personnel (straggl ers andprisoners--M Ps when necessary) and al

consolidation of comments and recomendations, special report, 1st mar div, korea

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