cons digest due processss

8/10/2019 Cons Digest Due Processss

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/cons-digest-due-processss 1/10

anzaldo

Due Process – Administrative Due Process

Dr Anzaldo, 55, had been working in the National Institute of Science and Technology for 28

years. She was holding the position Scientist Research Associate IV when she was appointed asScience Research Supervisor II. Her appointment was approved by the CSC in 1978. The position was previously held by Dr Kintanar who recommended Dr Venzon to his position. DrVenzon contested the position. Dr Afable, the one who appointed Anzaldo, averred thatAnzaldo’s appointment was approved by the NIST evaluation Committee which gave 88 points

to Anzalado and 66 points to Venzon. The issue was elevated to the Office of the president byVenzon. Clave was then the Presidential Executive Assistant. Pursuant to PD 807 or the CivilService Decree, Clave referred the issue to the CSC. Clave was also holding the chairmanship ofthe CSC. Clave issued Res 1178 appointing Venzon to the contested position. After the denial ofher motion for the reconsideration of that resolution, or on January 5, 1980, Anzaldo appealed tothe Office of the President of the Philippines. Since Clave was holding the office of PEA he just

affirmed his decision as the CSC chairman.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is due process in the case at bar.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Anzaldo. When PEA Clave said in his decision that he was“inclined to concur in the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission”, what he meant was that he was concurring with Chairman Clave’s recommendation: he was concurring with

himself. It is evident that Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential ExecutiveAssistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of (himself) Chairman Clave of the CivilService Commission. Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Anzaldothat PEA Clave should decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the CSC, as to

who between Anzaldo and Venzon should be appointed Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the Philippines.

singson

Due Process – Dismissal of Employees

Singson was an employee of PAL. On 7 Jun 1991, a Japanese national alleged that Singsonextorted money from her ($200.00) by accusing her of having excess baggage; and that to settlethe issue she needs to pay said amount to him. Singson was later investigated and theinvestigating committee found him guilty. PAL then dismissed Singson from employment.

Singson then filed a case bef ore NLRC against PAL for illegal dismissal, atty’s fees anddamages. Labor Arbiter Raul Aquino ruled in favor of Singson as he found PAL’s side

insufficient to dismiss Singson. PAL appealed to the NLRC. The 2nd Division, composed ofCalaycay, Rayala former Arbiter Raul Aquino, of the NLRC took cognizance of the case. NLRCreversed the decision of Aquino. Singson moved for reconsideration which was denied by NLRC, this time only Calaycay & Rayala voted.

ISSUE: Whether or not Singson was denied of due process.



HELD: The SC ruled that Singson was denied due process. The SC held that Singson wasdenied due process when Aquino participated, as presiding commissioner of the 2nd Division ofthe NLRC, in reviewing PAL’s appeal. He was reviewing his own decision as a former laborarbiter. Under Rule VII, Section 2 (b) of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, eachDivision shall consist of one member from the public sector who shall act as the Presiding

Commissioner and one member each from the workers and employers sectors, respectively. Thecomposition of the Division guarantees equal representation and impartiality among its members.Thus, litigants are entitled to a review of three (3) commissioners who are impartial right fromthe start of the process of review. Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered impartialsince he was the arbiter who decided the case under review. He should have inhibited himselffrom any participation in this case. The infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the fact thatthe motion for reconsideration of Singson was denied by two commissioners and without the participation of Aquino. The right of petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal starts fromthe time he filed his appeal. He is not only entitled to an impartial tribunal in the resolution of hismotion for reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an impartial review of three commissioners.The denial of Singson’s right to an impartial review of his appeal is not an innocuous error. It

negated his right to due process.

Alonte

Due Process in Criminal Proceedings – Waiver of Right to Due Process

Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn Punongbayan with accomplice BuenaventuraConcepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and had later lured her intoAlonete’s house who was then the mayor of Biňan, Laguna. The case was brought before RTC

Biňan. The counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a change of venue due to alleged

intimidation. While the change of venue was pending, Juvie executed an affidavit of desistance.

The prosecutor continued on with the case and the change of venue was done notwithstandingopposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila RTC under J Savellano. Savellanolater found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same beingdue to media pressure and that they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was thensubmitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellanocommented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not cross examine Juviewhen clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness ofher desistance.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.

HELD: The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the case dueto animosity between him and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. Thestandard of waiver requires that it “not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent,

and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and thecourts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Savellano has not shown



impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions filed by Alonte. The case isremanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.

Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste v. Land Bank of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No.

169913. June 8, 2011.

Post under Political Law at Sunday, October 16, 2011 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Administrative cases; due process. (J. Abad)

Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them that it is putting the subject property under the coverage of the agrarianreform program; hence, their right to due process of law wasviolated. The SC agreed. The importance of an actual notice in

subjecting a property under the agrarian reform program cannot be underrated, as non-compliance with it violates the essentialrequirements of administrative due process of law. If theillegality in the issuance of the CLTs is patent, the Court mustimmediately take action and declare the issuance as null andvoid. Accordingly, there being no question that the CLTs in theinstant case were “improperly issued, for which reason, their

cancellation is warranted.” The same holds true with respect tothe EPs and certificates of title issued by virtue of the voidCLTs, as there can be no valid transfer of title should the CLTson which they were grounded are void.

Hon. Waldo Q. Flores, et al v. Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor, G.R. No. 170146,

June 8, 2011.

Post under Remedial Law, villarama doctrines at Friday, December 02, 2011 Posted bySchizophrenic Mind

Administrative cases; res judicata. Dismissal of a criminalaction does not foreclose institution of an administrative proceeding against the same respondent, nor carry with it therelief from administrative liability. Res judicata did not set in

http://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2011/10/heirs-of-dr-jose-deleste-v-land-bank-of_16.html



http://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/search/label/Political%20Law






http://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2011/12/hon-waldo-q-flores-et-al-v-atty-antonio.html



http://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/search/label/Remedial%20Law



http://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/search/label/villarama%20doctrines

















because there is no identity of causes of action. Moreover, thedecision of the Ombudsman dismissing the criminal complaintcannot be considered a valid and final judgment. On the criminal

complaint, the Ombudsman only had the power to investigateand file the appropriate case before the Sandiganbayan.

Double jeopardy; elements. Double jeopardy attaches only (1)upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) afterarraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5)when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was

dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consentof the accused. None of these requisites applies where theOmbudsman only conducted a preliminary investigation of thesame criminal offense against the respondent public officer. Thedismissal of a case during preliminary investigation does notconstitute double jeopardy, preliminary investigation not being part of the trial. Hon. Waldo Q. Flores, et al v. Atty. Antonio

F. Montemayor, G.R. No. 170146, June 8, 2011.

erece

Due Process – Administrative Bodies

Atty Erece was the Regional Director CHR Region 1. Macalingay et al were Erece’s

subordinates. Macalingay et al were complaining that Erece had continuously denied them fromusing the company vehicle. That Erece had been receiving his Representation and TransportationAllowance yet he prioritizes himself in the use of the vehicle. The issue reached the CSc properwhich found Erece guilty as charged. Erece contends that he was denied due process as he wasnot afforded the right to cross-examine his accusers and their witnesses. He stated that at hisinstance, in order to prevent delay in the disposition of the case, he was allowed to presentevidence first to support the allegations in his Counter-Affidavit. After he rested his case,respondents did not present their evidence, but moved to submit their position paper and formaloffer of evidence, which motion was granted by the CSC over his objection. Macalingay et althen submitted their Position Paper and Formal Offer of Exhibits. Erece submits that although hewas allowed to present evidence first, it should not be construed as a waiver of his right to cross-examine the complainants. Although the order of presentation of evidence was not in conformity

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/june2011/170146.htm






with the procedure, still Erece should not be deemed to have lost his right to cross-examine hisaccusers and their witnesses. This may be allowed only if he expressly waived said right.

ISSUE: Whether or not Erece had been denied due process.

HELD: The SC agrees with the CA that petitioner was not denied due process when he failed tocross-examine the complainants and their witnesses since he was given the opportunity to beheard and present his evidence. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is

simply the opportunity to explain one’s side.

Judicial Due Process vs Administrative Due Process

Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with “judicial process” for a trial incourt is not always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different principles. The due process clause guarantees no particular form of procedure and its

requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character, the rightto a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law. The constitutional requirement ofdue process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly established administrative agency ortribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before the making of a determination if thereafter,there is available trial and tribunal before which all objections and defenses to the making ofsuch determination may be raised and considered. One adequate hearing is all that due processrequires. . . .

The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process. Nor is an actualhearing always essential. . . .

manngudadatu

Due Process – Administrative Bodies – HRET – Service of Summons

Datu Pax and Montilla were rivals in the Congressional elections in 2007. Datu Pax won theelections. Montilla contested the results of the elections before the HRET. The Secretary ofHRET the issued the summons to Datu Pax to his quite remote residence in Sultan Kudarat. DatuPax was required to file a reply within ten days from receipt. The summons was received by acertain Aileen Baldenas. 43 days past and no answer was received from Datu Pax as he wasunaware of the summons. HRET then considered such inaction as a general denial to the protest.Datu Pax later learned about the protest against him and he coordinated with his lawyers to

appear on behalf of him and to present the answer as well as to file counter protest. He allegedthat he does not know of a Baldenas nor was she a part of the household. HRET denied hismotion and had proceeded to the recount as prayed for by Montilla.

ISSUE: Whether or not Datu Pax was denied due process by reason that he did not receive thesummons personally.



HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Datu Pax. The summons to Datu Pax should not have beendelivered via registered mail as the same is susceptible to fraud. The HRET should have madeuse of its own servers to make sure that the summons is personally received by Datu Pax. The1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (which is in one way or the other adopted by the 2004 HRETrules on summons) provides that:

SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant . – Whenever practicable, the summons shall be servedhandling a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it,by tendering it to him.

SEC. 7. Substituted service. – If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within areasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving

copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and

discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving copies at defendant’s office or regular

place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

Indeed, if in ordinary civil cases (which involve only private and proprietary interests) personalservice of summons is preferred and service by registered mail is not allowed on jurisdictionaland due process grounds, with more reason should election cases (which involve public interestand the will of the electorate) strictly follow the hierarchy of modes of service of summons underthe Rules of Court.

Deped cunanan

Due Process – Certiorari – Service of Summons

In 1996, Cuanan, while being a school principal in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, was charged for

sexual harassment. DECS Region III created an investigating committee and the latter foundCuanan guilty as charged. Regional Director Labrador the forced resignation of Cuanan. In 2000,then Sec Gonzales affirmed the decision of Labrador and had denied Cuanan’s Motion for

Reconsideration. CUanan appealed to the CSC which reversed Gonzales’ decision in Jan 2003and CSC issued a copy of the resolution to Cuanan and Dep Ed, however, it seems that Dep Edwas not able to receive the copy as it requested a copy thereof again. The next month, Cuananrequested to be reinstated which was indorsed by the Superintendent. In Mar 2003, now Dep EdSec de Jesus received a copy of the resolution. In April, de Jesus filed a motion forreconsideration w/o furnishing a copy to Cuanan. In July 2003, de Jesus filed a supplementalmotion for reconsideration; no copy was furnished to Cuanan again. In Oct 2004, CSC reversedits decision and found Cuanan guilty of sexual harassment. Cuanan filed a certiorari before the

CA. He averred that the CSC decision in Jan 2003 had already become final and executory. TheCA reversed the decision of the CSC. DepEd averred that the proper remedy should have been a petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is due process in the case at bar.

HELD: The SC affirmed the ruling of the CA. It noted that DepEd has the power to file a motionfor reconsideration in the case at bar. The SC maintained that the disciplining authority qualifies



as a party adversely affected by the judgment, who can file an appeal of a judgment ofexoneration in an administrative case. CSC Resolution 021600 provides: Section 2. Coverage

and Definition of Terms. – x x x (l) PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondentagainst whom a decision in a disciplinary case has been rendered or to the disciplining

authority in an appeal from a decision exonerating the said employee.

The remedy of an aggrieved party from a resolution issued by the CSC is to file a petition forreview thereof under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court within fifteen days from notice of theresolution. Recourse to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 renders the petition dismissible for being the wrong remedy. Nonetheless, there are exceptions to this rule, to wit: (a) when publicwelfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice sorequires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned order amountsto an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. As will be shown forthwith, exception (c) appliesto the present case.

Furthermore, while a motion for reconsideration is a condition precedent to the filing of a

petition for certiorari, immediate recourse to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is warrantedwhere the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; where petitionerwas deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; where the proceedings in thelower court are a nullity for lack of due process; where the proceeding was ex parte or one inwhich the petitioner had no opportunity to object. These exceptions find application to Cuanan’s

petition for certiorari in the CA.

At any rate, Cuanan’s petition for certiorari before the CA could be treated as a petition forreview, the petition having been filed on November 22, 2004, or thirteen (13) days from receipton November 9, 2004 of CSC Resolution No. 041147, clearly within the 15-day reglementary period for the filing of a petition for review. Such move would be in accordance with the liberal

spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice.

Cuanan undoubtedly was denied procedural due process. He had no opportunity to participate inthe proceedings for the petition for review/ reconsideration filed by the DepEd, since no copy ofthe pleadings filed by the DepEd were served upon him or his counsel; nor was he even required by the CSC to file his comments thereon. Considering that pleadings filed by the DepEd werenot served upon Cuanan, they may be treated as mere scraps of paper which should not havemerited the attention or consideration of the CSC.

CERTIORARI defined

When any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excessof its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal, nor any plain,speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may filea verified petition for certiorari in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and prayingthat judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings, as the law requires, of suchtribunal, board or officer.

Tibay



Due Process – Admin Bodies – CIR

TeodoroToribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company which supplies the PhilippineArmy. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of members of NationalLabor Union Inc. NLU averred that Toribio’s act is not valid as it is not within the CBA. That

there are two labor unions in Ang Tibay; NLU and National Worker’s Brotherhood. That NWBis dominated by Toribio hence he favors it over NLU. That NLU wishes for a new trial as theywere able to come up with new evidence/documents that they were not able to obtain before asthey were inaccessible and they were not able to present it before in the CIR.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law.

HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. The SC ruled that alladministrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements ofdue process. They are;

(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to presenthis own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidencetending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply anecessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision.A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidencemust be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at leastcontained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his ownindependent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept theviews of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decisionin such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved, and thereasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from theauthority conferred upon it.

American tobacco

Due Process



ATC et al filed before the Philippine Patent Office concerning the use of trade mark and tradename. ATC et al challenged the validity of Rule 168 of the “Revised Rules of Practice before the

Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases” as amended, authorizing the Director of Patents todesignate any ranking official of said office to hear “inter partes” proceedings. Said Rule

likewise provides that “all judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and

directly prepared by the Director and signed by him.” These proceedings refer to the hearing ofopposition to the registration of a mark or trade name, interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining the question of priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade nameor service-mark, and cancellation of registration of a trade-mark or trade name pending at thePatent Office. Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of the hearing officers to heartheir cases, alleging that the amendment of the Rule is illegal and void because under the law theDirector must personally hear and decide inter partes case. Said objections were overruled by theDirector of Patents, hence, the present petition for mandamus, to compel the Director of Patentsto personally hear the cases of petitioners, in lieu of the hearing officers.

ISSUE: Whether or not the hearing done by hearing officers are within due process.

HELD: The SC ruled that the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of whichthe decision of the administrative agency will be made. The rule that requires an administrativeofficer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as amatter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report tohim the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. Neither doesdue process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision in the case. As long as a party is notdeprived of his right to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and thedecision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question that the requirements ofdue process and fair trial are fully met. In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer. Itis, however, required that to “give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of makingdeterminations upon evidence the officer who makes the determinations must consider andappraise the evidence which justifies them.”

Mec nlrc

Due Process

Signo was employed in Meralco as supervisor-leadman since Jan 1963.In 1981, he supervisedthe installation of electricity in de Lara’s house in Antipolo. De Lara’s house was not yet within

the required 30-meter distance from the Meralco facility hence he is not yet within the servicescope of Meralco. As a workaround, Signo had it be declared that a certain sarisari store nearerthe facility be declared as de Lara’s so as to facilitate the installation. Evertything would have

been smooth thereafter but due to fault of the Power Sales Division of Meralco, de Lara was not



billed for a year. Investigation was conducted and Meralco found out the irregularity in Signo’s

work on de Lara’s electricity installation. Signo was dismissed on May 18, 1983. Signo filed a

case for illegal dismissal and for backwages. The Lanor Arbiter ruled that though there is a breach of trust in the actuations of Signo dismissal is a harsh penalty as Signo has beenemployed for more than 20 years by Meralco and has been commended twice before for honesty.

The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter. Meralco appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been due process in the dismissal of Signo.

HELD: The SC sustained the decision of the NLRC. Well-established is the principle thatfindings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction isconfined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. Judicialreview by this Court on labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of theevidence upon which the proper labor officer or office based his or its determination but islimited to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.Notwithstanding the existence of avalid cause for dismissal, such as breach of trust by an employee, nevertheless, dismissal should

not be imposed, as it is too severe a penalty if the latter has been employed for a considerablelength of time in the service of his employer. Reinstatement of respondent Signo is proper in theinstant case, but without the award of backwages, considering the good faith of the employer indismissing the respondent.

cons digest due processss

Documents