From Eumir, Faye and Jez:What is domestic Arbitration?ADR Act: SEC. 32. Law Governing Domestic Arbitration. - Domestic arbitration shall continue to be governed by Republic Act No. 876, otherwise known as "The Arbitration Law" as amended by this Chapter. The term "domestic arbitration" as used herein shall mean an arbitration that is not international as defined in Article (3) of the Model Law.Model law:Article 1(3)(3) An arbitration is international if: (a) the parties to an arbitration agreement have, at the time of the conclusion of that agreement, their places of business in different States; or (b) one of the following places is situated outside the State in which the parties have their places of business: 1. (i) the place of arbitration if determined in, or pursuant to, the arbitration agreement; 2. (ii) any place where a substantial part of the obligations of the commercial relationship is to be performed or the place with which the subject-matter of the dispute is most closely connected; or (c) the parties have expressly agreed that the subject matter of the arbitration agreement relates to more than one country.

Nationality principleNationality Law TheoryThe Philippines adheres to the nationality law theory. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of persons are binding upon Filipino citizens, even though living abroad.It is for each State to determine who are its nationals (Hague Convention). Thus, the Philippine Constitution enumerates those who are citizens of the Philippines.

What are questions to be answered in choice of law problems?1. For better understanding of choice of law two questions must be answered. 1. 1) What legal system should govern the case? 2. 2) To what extend should it govern?

SuccessionKiobelKIOBEL v. ROYAL DUTCH Petitioners, Nigerian nationals residing in the United States, filed suit in federal court under the Alien Tort Statute, alleging that respondentscertain Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporationsaided and abetted the Nigerian Government in committing violations of the law of nations in Nigeria. The ATS provides that [t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. 28 U. S. C. 1350. The District Court dismissed several of petitioners claims, but on interlocutory appeal, the Second Circuit dismissed the entire complaint, reasoning that the law of nations does not recognize corporate liability. This Court granted certiorari, and ordered supplemental briefing on whether and under what circumstances courts may recognize a cause of action under the ATS, for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States. Held: The presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption. Pp. 314. (a) Passed as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the ATS is a jurisdictional statute that creates no causes of action. It permits federal courts to recognize private claims [for a modest number of international law violations] under federal common law. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U. S. 692 . In contending that a claim under the ATS does not reach conduct occurring in a foreign sovereigns territory, respondents rely on the presumption against extraterritorial application, which provides that [w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none, Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. ___, ___. The presumption serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244 . It is typically applied to discern whether an Act of Congress regulating conduct applies abroad, see, e.g., id., at 246, but its underlying principles similarly constrain courts when considering causes of action that may be brought under the ATS. Indeed, the danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy is magnified in this context, where the question is not what Congress has done but what courts may do. These foreign policy concerns are not diminished by the fact that Sosa limited federal courts to recognizing causes of action only for alleged violations of international law norms that are specific, universal, and obligatory, 542 U. S., at 732. Pp. 36. (b) The presumption is not rebutted by the text, history, or purposes of the ATS. Nothing in the ATSs text evinces a clear indication of extraterritorial reach. Violations of the law of nations affecting aliens can occur either within or outside the United States. And generic terms, like any in the phrase any civil action, do not rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality. See, e.g., Morrison, supra, at ___. Petitioners also rely on the common-law transitory torts doctrine, but that doctrine is inapposite here; as the Court has explained, the only justification for allowing a party to recover when the cause of action arose in another civilized jurisdiction is a well-founded belief that it was a cause of action in that place, Cuba R. Co. v. Crosby, 222 U. S. 473 . The question under Sosa is not whether a federal court has jurisdiction to entertain a cause of action provided by foreign or even international law. The question is instead whether the court has authority to recognize a cause of action under U. S. law to enforce a norm of international law. That question is not answered by the mere fact that the ATS mentions torts. The historical background against which the ATS was enacted also does not overcome the presumption. When the ATS was passed, three principal offenses against the law of nations had been identified by Blackstone: violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. Sosa, supra, at 723, 724. Prominent contemporary examples of the first two offensesimmediately before and after passage of the ATSprovide no support for the proposition that Congress expected causes of action to be brought under the statute for violations of the law of nations occurring abroad. And although the offense of piracy normally occurs on the high seas, beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States or any other country, applying U. S. law to pirates does not typically impose the sovereign will of the United States onto conduct occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of another sovereign, and therefore carries less direct foreign policy consequences. A 1795 opinion of Attorney General William Bradford regarding the conduct of U. S. citizens on both the high seas and a foreign shore is at best ambiguous about the ATSs extraterritorial application; it does not suffice to counter the weighty concerns underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality. Finally, there is no indication that the ATS was passed to make the United States a uniquely hospitable forum for the enforcement of international norms.

ChromalloyCHROMALLOY AEROSERVICES, A DIVISION OF CHROMALLOY GAS TURBINE CORPORATION, Petitioner, And The ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, Respondent. Egypt argues that this Court should deny CAS' Petition to Recognize and Enforce the Arbitral Award out of deference to its court. (Response to Petitioner's Post-Hearing Brief at 2.) CAS argues that this Court should confirm the award because Egypt "does not present any serious argument that its court's nullification decision is consistent with the New York Convention or United States arbitration law." Issue/s & Held Jurisdiction This Court has original jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1330, et. seq. (1976), which provides in relevant part that: The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount in controversy of any non-jury civil action against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity ... under sections 1605-1607 of this title. CAS brings this action to confirm an arbitral award made pursuant to an agreement to arbitrate any and all disputes arising under a contract between itself and Egypt, a foreign state, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration under U.S. law. See 9 U.S.C. 1-14. Enforcement of the award falls under the Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, ("Convention"), 9 U.S.C. 202, which grants "[t]he district courts of the United States ... original jurisdiction over such an action or proceeding, regardless of the amount in controversy." 9 U.S.C. 203.[1] Chromalloy's Petition for Enforcement A party seeking enforcement of a foreign arbitral award must apply for an order confirming the award within three years after the award is made. 9 U.S.C. 207. The award in question was made on August 14, 1994. CAS filed a Petition to confirm the award with this Court on October 28, 1994, less than three months after the arbitral panel made the award. CAS's Petition includes a "duly certified copy" of the original award as required by Article IV(1)(a) of the Convention, translated by a duly sworn translator, as required by Article IV(2) of the Convention, as well as a duly certified copy of the original contract and arbitration clause, as required by Article IV(1)(b) of the Convention. 9 U.S.C. 201 note. CAS's Petition is properly before this Court. The Standard under the Convention This Court must grant CAS's Petition to Recognize and Enforce the arbitral "award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal ... of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the ... Convention." 9 U.S.C. 207. Under the Convention, "Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused" if Egypt furnishes to this Court "proof that ... [t]he award has ... been set aside ... by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made." Convention, Article V(1) & V(1)(e) (emphasis added), 9 U.S.C. 201 note. In the present case, the award was made in Egypt, under the laws of Egypt, and has been nullified by the court designated by Egypt to review arbitral awards. Thus, the Court may, at its discretion, decline to enforce the award.[2] While Article V provides a discretionary standard, Article VII of the Convention requires that, "The provisions of the present Convention shall not ... deprive any interested party of any right he may have to avail himself of an arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law ... of the count[r]y where such award is sought to be relied upon." 9 U.S.C. 201 note (emphasis *910 added). In other words, under the Convention, CAS maintains all rights to the enforcement of this Arbitral Award that it would have in the absence of the Convention. Accordingly, the Court finds that, if the Convention did not exist, the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") would provide CAS with a legitimate claim to enforcement of this arbitral award. See 9 U.S.C. 1-14. Jurisdiction over Egypt in such a suit would be available under 28 U.S.C. 1330 (granting jurisdiction over foreign states "as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity ... under sections 1605-1607 of this title") and 1605(a)(2) (withholding immunity of foreign states for "an act outside ... the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States"). See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 607, 112 S.Ct. at 2160. Venue for the action would lie with this Court under 28 U.S.C. 1391(f) & (f)(4) (granting venue in civil cases against foreign governments to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia). Examination of the Award under 9 U.S.C. 10 Under the laws of the United States, arbitration awards are presumed to be binding, and may only be vacated by a court under very limited circumstances: (a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration (1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means. (2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them. (3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced. (4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. 9 U.S.C. 10.[3] An arbitral award will also be set aside if the award was made in "`manifest disregard' of the law." First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995). "Manifest disregard of the law may be found if [the] arbitrator[s] understood and 949 F.2d 1175, 1179 (D.C.Cir.1991). Plainly, this non-statutory theory of vacatur cannot empower a District Court to conduct the same de novo review of questions of law that an appellate court exercises over lower court decisions. Indeed, we have in the past held that it is clear that [manifest disregard] means more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the law. Al-Harbi v. Citibank, 85 F.3d 680, 683 (D.C.Cir.1996) (internal citations omitted). In Al-Harbi, "The submission agreement under which the arbitrator decided the controversy mandated that the arbitrator apply `the procedural and substantive laws of the Southern District of New York, U.S.A.'" Id. at 684. The arbitrator in Al-Harbi ruled that a court applying the laws of New York would dismiss the case on forum non conveniens grounds. Id. Appellant argued on appeal that the arbitrator had manifestly disregarded the substantive laws of New York by disposing of the case on procedural grounds. Id. The D.C. Circuit emphatically rejected this argument, stating that: Appellant's argument then depends upon the proposition that where a tribunal is to render [a] decision based on procedural and substantive law that tribunal has not only erred, but acted in manifest disregard of the law if it finds that procedural factors are dispositive of the case without then *911 going on to consider substantive law rendered apparently moot by that procedural decision. To state that proposition is to reject it. We find no basis for vacatur. Id. In the present case, the language of the arbitral award that Egypt complains of reads: The Arbitral tribunal considers that it does not need to decide the legal nature of the contract. It appears that the Parties rely principally for their claims and defences, on the interpretation of the contract itself and on the facts presented. Furthermore, the Arbitral tribunal holds that the legal issues in dispute are not affected by the characterization of the contract. (Award at 30.) Like the arbitrator in Al-Harbi, the arbitrators in the present case made a procedural decision that allegedly led to a misapplication of substantive law. After considering Egypt's arguments that Egyptian administrative law should govern the contract, the majority of the arbitral panel held that it did not matter which substantive law they applied civil or administrative. Id. At worst, this decision constitutes a mistake of law, and thus is not subject to review by this Court.See Al-Harbi, 85 F.3d at 684. In the United States, "[W]e are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution."Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler- Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626-27, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 3354, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985). In Egypt, however, "[I]t is established that arbitration is an exceptional means for resolving disputes, requiring departure from the normal means of litigation before the courts, and the guarantees they afford." (Nullification Decision at 8.) Egypt's complaint that, "[T]he Arbitral Award is null under Arbitration Law, ... because it is not properly `grounded' under Egyptian law," reflects this suspicious view of arbitration, and is precisely the type of technical argument that U.S. courts are not to entertain when reviewing an arbitral award. See Montana Power Company v. Federal Power Commission, 445 F.2d 739, 755 (D.C.Cir.1970) (cert. den. 400 U.S. 1013, 91 S.Ct. 566, 27 L.Ed.2d 627 (1971)) (holding that, "Arbitrators do not have to give reasons") (citing United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1361-62, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960)). The Court's analysis thus far has addressed the arbitral award, and, as a matter of U.S. law, the award is proper. SeeSanders v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 819 F.2d 1151, 1157 (D.C.Cir.1987) (holding that, "When the parties have had a full and fair opportunity to present their evidence, the decisions of the arbitrator should be viewed as conclusive as to subsequent proceedings, absent some abuse of discretion by the arbitrator") (citing the Restatement (Second) of Judgments 84(3) (1982), Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352 (11th Cir.1985)). The Court now considers the question of whether the decision of the Egyptian court should be recognized as a valid foreign judgment. As the Court stated earlier, this is a case of first impression. There are no reported cases in which a court of the United States has faced a situation, under the Convention, in which the court of a foreign nation has nullified an otherwise valid arbitral award. This does not mean, however, that the Court is without guidance in this case. To the contrary, more than twenty years ago, in a case involving the enforcement of an arbitration clause under the FAA, the Supreme Court held that: An agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind of forum- selection clause.... The invalidation of such an agreement ... would not only allow the respondent to repudiate its solemn promise but would, as well, reflect a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519, 94 S.Ct. 2449, 2457, 41 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974) (reh. den., 419 U.S. 885, 95 S.Ct. 157, 42 L.Ed.2d 129 (1974)) (citations omitted). *912 In Scherk, the Court forced a U.S. corporation to arbitrate a dispute arising under an international contract containing an arbitration clause. Id. 417 U.S. at 518, 94 S.Ct. at 2456-57. In so doing, the Court relied upon the FAA, but took the opportunity to comment upon the purposes of the newly acceded-to Convention: The delegates to the Convention voiced frequent concern that courts of signatory countries in which an agreement to arbitrate is sought to be enforced should not be permitted to decline enforcement of such agreements on the basis of parochial views of their desirability or in a manner that would diminish the mutually binding nature of the agreements.... [W]e think that this country's adoption and ratification of the Convention and the passage of Chapter 2 of the United States Arbitration Act provide strongly persuasive evidence of congressional policy consistent with the decision we reach today. Id. at n. 15. The Court finds this argument equally persuasive in the present case, where Egypt seeks to repudiate its solemn promise to abide by the results of the arbitration.[4] The Decision of Egypt's Court of Appeal The Contract "The arbitration agreement is a contract and the court will not rewrite it for the parties." Williams v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 753 F.2d 117, 119 (D.C.Cir.1985) (citing Davis v. Chevy Chase Financial Ltd., 667 F.2d 160, 167 (D.C.Cir.1981)). The Court "begin[s] with the `cardinal principle of contract construction: that a document should be read to give effect to all its provisions and to render them consistent with each other.'" United States v. Insurance Co. of North America, 83 F.3d 1507, 1511 (D.C.Cir.1996) (quoting Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 115 S.Ct. 1212, 1219, 131 L.Ed.2d 76 (1995)). Article XII of the contract requires that the parties arbitrate all disputes that arise between them under the contract. Appendix E, which defines the terms of any arbitration, forms an integral part of the contract. The contract is unitary. Appendix E to the contract defines the "Applicable Law Court of Arbitration." The clause reads, in relevant part: It is ... understood that both parties have irrevocably agreed to apply Egypt (sic) Laws and to choose Cairo as seat of the court of arbitration. ****** The decision of the said court shall be final and binding and cannot be made subject to any appeal or other recourse. (Appendix E ("Appendix") to the Contract.) This Court may not assume that the parties intended these two sentences to contradict one another, and must preserve the meaning of both if possible. Insurance Co., 83 F.3d 1507, 1511 (D.C.Cir.1996). Egypt argues that the first quoted sentence supersedes the second, and allows an appeal to an Egyptian court. Such an interpretation, however, would vitiate the second sentence, and would ignore the plain language on the face of the contract. The Court concludes that the first sentence defines choice of law and choice of forum for the hearings of the arbitral panel. The Court further concludes that the second quoted sentence indicates the clear intent of the parties that any arbitration of a dispute arising under the contract is not to be appealed to any court. This interpretation, unlike that offered by Egypt, preserves the meaning of both sentences in a manner that is consistent with the plain language of the contract. The position of the latter sentence as the seventh and final paragraph, just before the signatures, lends credence to the view that this sentence is the final word on the arbitration question. In other words, the parties agreed to apply Egyptian Law to the arbitration, but, more important, they agreed that the arbitration ends with the decision of the arbitral panel. The Decision of the Egyptian Court of Appeal The Court has already found that the arbitral award is proper as a matter of U.S. law, and that the arbitration agreement between Egypt and CAS precluded an appeal in Egyptian courts. The Egyptian court has acted, however, and Egypt asks this Court to grant res judicata effect to that action. The "requirements for enforcement of a foreign judgment ... are that there be `due citation' [i.e., proper service of process] and that the original claim not violate U.S. public policy." Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 864 (D.C.Cir.1981) (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202, 16 S.Ct. 139, 158, 40 L.Ed. 95 (1895)). The Court uses the term `public policy' advisedly, with a full understanding that, "[J]udges have no license to impose their own brand of justice in determining applicable public policy." Northwest Airlines Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Association, Int'l, 808 F.2d 76, 78 (D.C.Cir.1987). Correctly understood, "[P]ublic policy emanates [only] from clear statutory or case law, `not from general considerations of supposed public interest.'" Id. (quoting American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 789 F.2d 1 (D.C.Cir.1986)). The U.S. public policy in favor of final and binding arbitration of commercial disputes is unmistakable, and supported by treaty, by statute, and by case law. The Federal Arbitration Act "and the implementation of the Convention in the same year by amendment of the Federal Arbitration Act," demonstrate that there is an "emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution," particularly "in the field of international commerce." Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 631, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 3356, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985) (internal citation omitted); cf. Revere Copper & Brass Inc., v. Overseas Private Investment Corporation, 628 F.2d 81, 82 (D.C.Cir.1980) (holding that, "There is a strong public policy behind judicial enforcement of binding arbitration clauses"). A decision by this Court to recognize the decision of the Egyptian court would violate this clear U.S. public policy.

Naturalization as a judicial adversarial proceedingCan there be a judicial declaration of Philippine Citzenship through an action for declaratory relief? NO Can there be a declaration if the action is for correction of entry in the Civil Registry? As a rule, no. *exceptions: it is allowed provided that all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified and represented and there is a full blown adversary proceeding. NOTE: follow the general rule, correction of entry in the Civil Registry is not adversarial.

Chevron caseChevron v. Dozinger SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT This case involves important international legal issues associated with the exercise of adjudicatory jurisdiction by the District Court in this case. The District Courts failure to consider and apply international legal obligation binding on the United States has resulted in reversible error. The preliminary injunction should be dissolved and the case dismissed. First, the preliminary injunction granted in this case is framed in such a way so as to violate the ancient customary international law principle of nonintervention. It does this by illegally intruding into Ecuadors external domestic affairs by, in essence, prohibiting any other state from independently ruling on the issue of recognition and enforcement of the Ecuadorian judgment against Chevron. Second, the assertion of jurisdiction by the District Court is prohibited by the customary international law limitation of reasonableness because the defendants in this case lack any internationally legally significant contact with the United States. Third, the District Courts preliminary injunction cannot stop Ecuadorian defendants from seeking to enforce the judgment outside the United States. It cannot compel any other state from assuming jurisdiction and deciding for itself the issues of recognition and enforcement. It is accordingly a futile order and should be dissolved as improvidently granted. Fourth, the District Courts injunctive relief offends basic standards of international comity because the preliminary injunction high handedly purports to stake out exclusive world-wide jurisdiction. Fifth, the exhaustion of local remedies by Chevron in Ecuador is required by international law. Because the judgment in Ecuador is not final, the District Court should not have accepted jurisdiction. ARGUMENTS I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF THAT ENJOINS ALL ACTION, IN ALL COURTS ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD OUTSIDE ECUADOR, BY THE ECUADORIAN DEFENDANTS IN RELATION TO AN ECUADORIAN JUDGMENT IN THEIR FAVOR The District Court framed the injunction in these terms: defendants . . . be and they hereby are enjoined and restrained, pending the final determination of this action, from directly or indirectly funding, commencing, prosecuting, advancing in any way, or receiving benefit from any action or proceeding, outside the Republic of Ecuador, for recognition or enforcement of the judgment . . . rendered in Maria Aguinda y Otros v. Chevron Corporation . . . . Several features of this formulation of the preliminary injunction warrant careful attention. First, the injunction is directed at Ecuadorian nationals who largely comprise indigenous peoples and remote, simple farmers. The defendants have had no legally meaningful contacts with or presence in the United States. Second, the injunction attempts to arrogate to the District Court world-wide exclusive jurisdiction to determine for the entire world, the issues of recognition and enforceability of an Ecuadorian judgment. Third, the Ecuadorian judgment relates, ultimately, to an Ecuadorian action for breaches of Ecuadorian law relating to damages to persons and property in Ecuador. Neither the District Court nor any other party to this proceeding of which we are aware has cited any statute, rule, case or treaty to support the District Courts authority to grant an injunction that, in essence, purports to preclude all courts, in any nation of the world outside of Ecuador from independently determining the issues of recognition and enforceability. A diligent search by amici failed to uncover any such authority. Instead, as this brief demonstrates, applicable international law requires that the District Courts preliminary injunction be dissolved and the case dismissed. A. The District Courts Order for Injunctive Relief Breaches the Fundamental International Legal Obligation of the United States not to intervene in the Domestic Affairs of Other States The international legal pillars of independence, autonomy, and equality of states are among the oldest legal norms of international law. In support of these important norms, customary international law has for centuries prohibited a state from intervening in the domestic affairs of another state. This principle of non- intervention has also long precluded interference by one state in the relations between two or more other states without consent. Article 8 of the Convention on Rights and Duties of States (the Montevideo Convention), to which both the United States and Ecuador are party, specifically provides that [n]o state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another. As regards the customary law of non-intervention, which governs the instant case along with Article 8 of the Montevideo Convention in which the United States expressly committed itself to non-intervention as a principle of positive law, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated in Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (the Nicaragua case) that: [t]he principle of non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign State to conduct its affairs without outside interference; though examples of trespass against this principle are not infrequent, the Court considers that it is part and parcel of customary international law. . . . The existence in the opinio juris of States of the principle of nonintervention is backed by established and substantial state practices In considering the relationships entailed in recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, it is certain that each state has exclusive jurisdiction over the decision. In other words, the decision to recognize a foreign judgment is a matter of domestic jurisdiction that international law protects from unwanted intrusion from outside . . . . Turning to the preliminary injunction granted by the District Court inthe instant case, it is clear that it constitutes an internationally unlawful attempt to intervene in the domestic legal affairs of Ecuador. First, it is important to remember the posture of this case. This is not an action by successful foreign litigants for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment in the United States. Rather, the unsuccessful foreign defendant, Chevron, has commenced a pre-emptive action against foreign nationals, over their objection, in a U.S. Court. It is in this context that the District Court has interposed itself and asserted what is in essence worldwide exclusive jurisdiction to determine for the whole world the issues of recognition and enforcement an undoubted unwanted intrusion into the internal administration of Ecuadorian justice. Second, in practical effect, the preliminary injunction directly intrudes into the external administration of Ecuadorian justice because recognition and enforcement of Ecuadorian judgments are issues each state is permitted to decide freely. Here, the District Courts preliminary injunction purports to interfere with Ecuadors relationship with every state in the world in which the judgment might be recognized and enforced, except the United States. It does this by seeking to prohibit every state in the world except the United States from determining the issues of recognition and enforcement. This sort of intrusion into the international relationship between Ecuador and other states puts the United States in violation of a key international obligation because each state is permitted to decide freely whether a foreign judgment should be recognized and enforced. For this reason this Court should reverse the District Court and dissolve the preliminary injunction. A failure to reverse and dissolve the preliminary injunction will place the United States in violation of the principle of non-intervention embodied in customary international law and Article 8 of the Montevideo Convention. B. The District Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction Over Ecuadorian Defendants Under International Law It is clear that under international law, the District Court has no jurisdiction over the Ecuadorian defendants in this case. These defendants lack any legally significant contacts at international law with the United States. It is recognized today that: [t]he exercise of jurisdiction by courts of one state that affects interests of other states is now generally considered as coming within the domain of customary international law and international agreement the exercise of adjudicatory jurisdiction must be reasonable in order to be lawful under both the United States law of foreign relations and, more importantly for present purposes, general international law. The mere presence of a link between a person and a forum does not in itself justify the exercise of adjudicatory power by a state. Instead, the requirement of reasonableness requires a process of analysis and assessment that considers: the relative importance of the link(s) between the state asserting jurisdiction and the individual; the legitimate expectations of those affected; the likelihood of conflict with other states The United States Supreme Court has expressly approved of this balancing test for considering exercise of international adjudicatory jurisdiction. Applying the Restatements reasonableness balancing test by weighing and evaluating all the relevant facts of the instant case clearly establishes the want of jurisdiction in this action. The Ecuadorian defendants are indigenous peoples and remote farmers living in the Amazonian rainforest and have absolutely no real or meaningful link with the United States on which jurisdiction could be established under international law. Most, if not all, of the Ecuadorian defendants have never been to the United States. There is no indication that the Ecuadorian defendants have property or other assets in the United States. The Ecuadorian defendants do no business in the United States in any real sense of the meaning of doing business. It is true that the Ecuadorian defendants initially sought the protection of law in the courts of the United States and retained a lawyer for that purpose, but that protection was denied in the Southern District of New York and the Ecuadorian defendants case was ultimately dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds. It may also be true that the Ecuadorian defendants have been involved in other litigation related to this matter in the U.S. because they have been unlucky enough to have such a dogged adversary as Chevron (as is its right). However, asserting, protecting or trying to determine valid legal rights in other litigation is a manifestly insufficient link by which to bootstrap international adjudicatory jurisdiction as the District Court has attempted to do in this case. C. The District Courts Order for Injunctive Relief Constitutes a Futile Act because the Injunction Cannot Preclude Other States From Exercising Jurisdiction Given that the District Courts preliminary injunction violates the principle of non-intervention and assumes adjudicatory jurisdiction when international law does not allow so, it is not surprising that the District Court anticipated that its injunction would not effectively constrain the defendants conduct. In contemplation of an ultimate declaration on Chevrons complaint that the Ecuadorian judgment is unenforceable, the District Court wrote that: Even if enforcement actions were to be filed abroad in violation of an injunction, a decision by this Court with respect to enforceability of the Ecuadorian judgment likely would be recognized as sufficiently persuasive authority if not binding on the parties to dispose of the question of enforceability in the foreign fora clear it is that no injunction, including the outstanding preliminary injunction, will preclude the courts of any other state from making an independent determination on their own willingness to recognize and enforce the Ecuadorian judgment. It is hoary international legal doctrine indeed that teaches that no state is bound to respect the judgments of the courts of another state absent agreement, especially when made in regard to non-residents. the decision of the District Court to grant an injunction as it has, world-wide in scope, is much more likely to antagonize the courts of other states than to be treated as sufficiently persuasive authority as is unrealistically hoped for by the District Court. Be that as it may, the fact remains that injunctive relief ordered by the District Court cannot prohibit non-resident Ecuadorians from seeking recognition and enforcement of the Ecuadorian judgment in any state but the United States -- in which Chevron may have assets. Likewise, the injunctive relief ordered by the District Court cannot, by the fiat of a judicial injunction by one country, preclude the courts in other states from making their own independent determinations about recognition and enforceability. All of this is not to say that states cannot agree, as they often have, to harmonize their legal systems and cooperate in the realm of adjudicatory jurisdiction. In this case, however, no treaty or agreement between the United States and other states requires or permits the result hoped for by the District Court. Indeed, as shown, the District Courts action directly violates the United States own obligations under the Montevideo Convention and under customary international law. Accordingly, the preliminary injunction ought to be dissolved. D. The Preliminary Injunction, to the Extent it Presumes to Arrogate an Exclusive World- wide Jurisdiction to Itself, Offends Basic Standards of International Comity In the instant case the District Court improperly disregarded these fundamental precepts. As discussed supra, Part I.C, the preliminary injunction issued by the District Court is breathtaking in its attempt to arrogate a world-wide and exclusive jurisdiction in this case. The action of a single American trial judge, essentially ordering the preclusion, in pre-emptive fashion, of all courts in the world outside of Ecuador from independently deciding the issues of recognition and enforcement is an extraordinary breach of comity. II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF BECAUSE PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM SEEKING RELIEF AGAINST THE ECUADORIAN JUDGMENT OUTSIDE ECUADOR UNTIL ALL ECUADORIAN REMEDIES ARE EXHAUSTED Under well-established customary international law, where a wrong is allegedly done to an alien that is imputable to a state, the alien must give the State the opportunity of redressing that wrong by seeking a remedy from the offending States own legal system. Until all local remedies have been exhausted by the injured alien, the aliens state of nationality is precluded from exercising diplomatic protection of its national or making international claims on the nationals behalf. The rule of exhaustion is a general principle of law recognized by civilized nations and has compulsory application in this case as such. General principles of law, as a source of international law, apply to the administration of justice in domestic settings. In transnational civil litigation involving the operation of transnational corporations and direct foreign investment it also ensures respect for the sovereignty of the host state. This aspect of the principle is reflected in Article 36 of the Charter of the Organization of American States: Transnational enterprises and foreign private investment shall be subject to the legislation of . . . host countries and to the jurisdiction of their competent courts and to the international treaties and agreements to which said countries are parties, and should conform to the development policies of the recipient countries. Under Article 36, it is clear that Chevron, as a transnational enterprise, was and is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of Ecuador for the acts and/or omissions that gave rise to the underlying action and resulted in the Ecuadorian judgment against Chevron. Indeed, in arguing forum non conveniens, Chevron itself indicated that Ecuador was the appropriate forum for resolving this dispute. Until the Ecuadorian appellate process is at an end and Ecuadorian remedies are exhausted, it is clear that Chevrons complaint should be dismissed under the applicable general principle of law as premature. The application of this general principle of international law in support of dismissal accords with recent treatment by the Supreme Court. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court highlighted that in Alien Tort Statute suits there is need to apply an element of judgment about the practical consequences of making federal courts readily available. In particular, the Court noted that basic principles of international law require that before asserting a claim in a foreign forum, the claimant must have exhausted any remedies available in the domestic legal system and that it would certainly consider this requirement in an appropriate case. Accordingly, the preliminary injunction should be dissolved and the case dismissed. However, should the Ecuadorian appellate process end unfavorably for Chevron, the District Court will still lack adjudicatory jurisdiction over the Ecuadorian defendants under international law. CONCLUSION The District Court failed to consider three applicable and binding norms of international law to this case. In particular, the District Court failed to consider and apply the fundamental rules pertaining to: i) the principle of nonintervention, ii) the international legal limits of the courts own jurisdiction, and iii) the requirement that Chevron exhaust local remedies in Ecuador. Proper consideration and application of these binding rules of international law requires that the preliminary injunction be dissolved and the plaintiffs complaint dismissed.

Yauguaje Case010 (Lifted from the net)Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation: enforcing an Ecuadorian judgment against a U.S. company in Ontario

InYaiguaje v. Chevron Corp, 2013 ONCA 758, the Ontario Court of Appeal affirmed that an Ontario court has the power to recognize and enforce a judgment for approximately US $9.51 billion rendered by Ecuadors National Court of Justice against Chevron Corporation (Chevron), and its Canadian subsidiary, Chevron Canada Limited (Chevron Canada), which was not a party to the Ecuadorian action. In doing so, the Ontario Court of Appeal also lifted the stay on the proceeding which had been granted by the motions judge, rendering the enforcement win theoretical only. Soon after this decision, however, Chevron and Chevron Canada inYaiguaje v. Chevron Corp, 2014 ONCA 40 successfully brought a motion to stay the order pending its appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Factual HistoryBetween 1972 and 1990, the lands, waterways, livelihoods and way of life of over 30,000 residents of the Sucumbos province were allegedly harmed by environmental pollution. On behalf of the 30,000 residents, 47 indigenous Ecuadorian villagers sued Chevron in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and alleged that Texaco, which subsequently merged with Chevron, polluted the Lago Ario region of Ecuador for 18 years.The action was dismissed at the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on the condition that Texaco submit to the jurisdiction of the Ecuadorian court. A final judgment now exists in Ecuador against Chevron for US$9.51 billion and the plaintiffs seek to have the Ecuadorian order recognized and enforced in Ontario against Chevron and Chevron Canada. Chevron disputes the Ecuadorian judgment and contends that it was the result of fabricated evidence, judicial coercion and bribery. The U.S. civil suit in that respect, where it appears that evidence of fraud has been filed, is ongoing, and recently went to trial.On December 17, 2013, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice found that an Ontario court has the jurisdiction to enforce the Ecuadorian judgment but stayed the action since Chevron has no assets in Ontario and therefore, no prospect for recovery by the plaintiffs in Ontario. Both decisions were appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal.

The DecisionsWith respect to the jurisdictional issue, the Ontario Court of Appeal affirmed the lower courts decision and reiterated the Supreme Court of Canadas decision inBeals v. Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72, which stated that in recognition and enforcement actions relating to foreign judgments in Canadian jurisdictions, the exclusive focus is whether there is a real and substantial connection between the subject matter of the litigation and the foreign court that rendered the judgment. An inquiry into the relationship between the legal dispute in the foreign country and the Canadian court being asked to recognize and enforce the judgment is unnecessary and irrelevant. The Ontario Court of Appeal further noted that there is no comity concern in an action to enforce the judgment because the Ontario court is not intruding into matters within the jurisdiction of the foreign court as would be the case in an action of first instance. Accordingly, the test was satisfied in this case. However, this reasoning applied only to Chevron since Chevron Canada was not a party to the original action in Ecuador. To assume jurisdiction over Chevron Canada, the Ontario Court of Appeal agreed with the lower court that Chevron and Chevron Canada maintain an economically significant relationship and that Chevron Canada has a non-transitory place of business in Ontario.With respect to the stay, the Ontario Court of Appeal disagreed with the lower courts decision mainly because no party had actually requested a stay. Although a court may grant a stay on its own motion, it can do so only in very rare circumstances and would at least require evidence that continuance of the action would work an injustice. No such evidence was submitted. Chevron argued that it was precluded from requesting a discretionary stay on any basis other than jurisdiction; however, the Ontario Court of Appeal found that it was Chevron and Chevron Canadas decision not to attorn to Ontario and defend the action using Ontario procedural and substantive law. By choosing not to attorn, both companies understood that they could rely only on a jurisdictional objection.Not surprisingly, Chevron and Chevron Canada requested a stay of the Ontario Court of Appeals decision pending its appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. On January 16, 2014, MacPherson J.A. of the Ontario Court of Appeal held that a stay was justified in the interests of justice. To arrive at this decision, she applied the three-part test for obtaining a stay of a judgment pending appeal: (1) is there a serious question to be tried; (2) will the moving party suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not granted; and (3) does the balance of convenience favor granting the stay?Justice MacPherson found that the proposed appeal raised at least three serious questions: (i) the proper test to determine the jurisdiction of a provincial superior court to hear and determine such an action; (ii) the proper test in such an action when faced with a non-party to the foreign judgment; and (iii) the role of a corporate veil piercing analysis with respect to a related corporation in such an action. Given that the appeal was to the Supreme Court of Canada, MacPherson J.A. also concluded that these three questions are legal issues of public importance.Chevron and Chevron Canada, however, had difficulty proving irreparable harm. They contended that without a stay, they would risk either attornment to Ontario by filing a defense, which was ordered by the Ontario Court of Appeal to be completed by January 16, 2014, or being noted in default. This submission was rejected because Ontario appellate case law states that compliance with a court order that requires a party to file a defense does not constitute attornment in an ongoing jurisdictional challenge. They also argued that without a stay, the $100,000 in costs ordered by the Ontario Court of Appeal to be paid to the plaintiffs may not be returned if the appeal succeeds. Although an unlikely scenario given the magnitude of the litigation, MacPherson J.A. found that permanently losing the costs awarded by the Ontario Court of Appeal after succeeding on appeal may reflect an irreparable harm.As Chevron and Chevron Canada were quick to file their leave application to the Supreme Court of Canada, they were able to tilt the balance of convenience scale in their favor. Justice MacPherson noted that the leave application would likely be disposed of in approximately 3 to 4 months, resulting in little prejudice to the plaintiffs. Given this timeline, it was in the interests of justice to grant a stay.It remains to be seen whether the litigation will continue in Ontario. In the event that leave is granted, however, this long running legal battle will no doubt contribute to the development of Canadian law with respect to comity and the enforcement of foreign judgments against foreign defendants.

From Dann-For MCQ & True or false re-read the midterm MCQ/T&F questions- What makes an Arbitration domestic?- Explain the Nationality Principle, How it is applied and interpreted in the Philippine context.- Explain how the court ruled on renvoi in Aznar v. Garcia.Philippine law should be applied. The State of California prescribes two sets of laws for its citizens residing therein and a conflict of law rules for its citizens domiciled in other jurisdictions. Art. 946 of the California Civil Code states that If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile. Edward, a citizen of the State of California, is considered to have his domicile in the Philippines. The court of domicile cannot and should not refer the case back to the California, as such action would leave the issue incapable of determination, because the case would then be tossed back and forth between the states(doctrine of renvoi). The validity of the provisions of Edwards will depriving his acknowledged natural child of latters legacy, should be governed by the Philippine law. - Read Roehr, Bayot, Fujiki, Sto. Tomas Cases.Roehr v. RodriguezPetitioner(German) filed for divorce in germany granting him custody of his children with respondent(Filipina). The court recognized the divorce decree but took cognizance of the issue on who has custody. Was the trial court correct?Ruling: Yes.As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction. But the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to Wolfgang by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of Wolfgang to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of Carmens participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear.Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children.

Bayot v. CAVicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen born in Agaa, Guam, USA. On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by counsel.

DECISION OF COURTS:(1) Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic - ordering the dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving them to remarry after completing the legal requirements," but giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.(2) RTC: denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting Rebecca's application for support pendente liteFollowing the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.(3) CA: issued the desired TRO.

ISSUES:(1) Whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and (2) Whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?

RULING:(1) Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case. When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One. From the foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.(2) The Divorce is valid. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other.As the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free to remarry after completing the legal requirements."The Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996.In determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before the RTC, Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of a marriage.

Fujiki v. Marinay(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.Ruling: YESRecognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court. There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Corpuz v. Sto. TomasWhether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants aliens like Corpuz the right to institute a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree.Ruling: The alien spouse cannot claim under the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code because the substantive right it establishes is in favour of the Filipino spouse. Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second par of Art 26 of the Family Code.The unavailability of the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip the petitioner of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The petitioner, being a naturalized Canadian citizen now, is clothed by the presumptive evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree with conformity to aliens national law.The Pasig City Civil Registry acted out of line when it registered the foreign decree of divorce on the petitioner and respondents marriage certificate without judicial order recognizing the said decree. The registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is void.Remedy Available to Alien SpouseThe availability under Art 26(2) of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip the alien spouse of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decreeThe foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien's national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence in favor of the alien spouse, pursuant to Sec. 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgment (Please see pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Sec. 48, Rule 39 and Sec. 24 Rule 132)

- Insular Govt v. FrankInsular Government vs. Frank 13 Phil 236, G.R.No.2935. March 23, 1909.FACTS: In 1903 in the state of Illinois, Mr. Frank, a US citizen and a representative of the Insular Government of the Philippines entered into a contract whereby the former shall serve as stenographer in the Philippines for a period of 2 years. The contract contained a provision that in case of violation of its terms, Mr. Frank shall be liable for the amount incurred by the Philippine Government for his travel from Chicago to Manila and one-half salary paid during such period. After serving for 6 months, defendant left the service and refused to make further compliance with the terms of the contract, therefore the Government sued him to recover the amount of $269.23 plus damages. The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, hence the defendant appealed presenting minority as his special defense. By reason of the fact that under the laws of the Philippines, contracts made by person who did not reach majority age of 23 are unenforceable. Defendant claim that he is an adult when he left Chicago but was a minor when he arrived in Manila and at the time the plaintiff attempted to enforce the contract.ISSUE: Whether or not the contract is valid.RULING: Mr. Frank being fully qualified to enter into a contract at the place and time the contract was made, he cannot therefore plead infancy as a defense at the place where the contract is being enforced. Although Mr. Frank was still a minor under Philippine laws, he was nevertheless considered an adult under the laws of the state of Illinois,the place where the contract was made. No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are determined by the law of the place where the contract is made. Matters connected to its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of its performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as bringing of a suit, admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought.Although generally, capacity of the parties to enter into a contract is governed by national law. This is one case not involving real property which was decided by our Supreme Court, where instead of national law, what should determine capacity to enter into a contract is the lex loci celebrationis. According to Conflict of Laws writer Edgardo Paras, Franks capacity should be judged by his national law and not by the law of the place where the contract was entered into. In the instant case whether it is the place where the contract was made or Franks nationality, the result would be the same. However,as suggested by the mentioned author, for the conflicts rule in capacity in general, national law of the parties is controlling.

- Judicial Notice of foreign laws, PCIB v. Escolin.Notice and proof of foreign laws1. By pleading and proof a. Written lawi. By official publicationii. Copy attested by officer having legal custody plus a certificate with seal from secretary of embassy, legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, consular agent or any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country to the effect that said officer has custody (Section 24 Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court)b. Unwritten law by testimony of experts or writings of jurists2. Judicial Notice (when the laws are already within the actual knowledge of the court, such as when they are well and generally known or they have been actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the parties concerned claim otherwise PCIB vs. Escolin 56SCRA266)3. To conclude that the parties who fail to introduce proof as to the content of a foreign law acquiesce to the application of the forum law.*proceeds from the theory that the basic law is the law of the forum and when the claimed applicable foreign law is not proved, then the court has no reason to displace the basic law4. Presumption that the foreign law is the same as the law of the forum (Doctrine of Processual Presumption)

PCIB v. EscolinThe parties were in disagreement as to how Article 16 of the Civil Code should be applied. On the one hand, PCIB claimed that inasmuch as Linnie was a resident of the Philippines at the time of her death, under said Article 16, construed in relation to the pertinent laws of Texas and the principle of renvoi, what should be applied here should be the rules of succession under the Civil Code, and, therefore, her estate could consist of no more than one-fourth of the said conjugal properties, the other fourth being, as already explained, the legitime of her husband (Art. 900) which she could not have disposed of nor burdened with any condition (Art. 872). On the other hand, Avelina denied that Linnie died a resident of the Philippines, since allegedly she never changed nor intended to change her original residence of birth in Texas, United States of America, and contends that, anyway, regardless of the question of her residence, she being indisputably a citizen of Texas, under said Article 16 of the Civil Code, the distribution of her estate is subject to the laws of said State which, according to her, do not provide for any legitime, hence, Linnies brothers and sisters are entitled to the remainder of the whole of her share of the conjugal partnership properties consisting of one-half thereof. Avelina further maintained that, in any event, Charles had renounced his rights under the will in favor of his co-heirs, as allegedly proven by the documents touching on the point already mentioned earlier, the genuineness and legal significance of which PCIB questioned.The Court cannot decide on the claims, though, for neither the evidence submitted by the parties appeared to be adequate enough for it to render an intelligent comprehensive and just resolution. No clear and reliable proof of what in fact the possibly applicable laws of Texas are, was presented (Remember judicial notice in case of foreign laws?). Then also, the genuineness of documents relied upon by Avelina is disputed. In Justice, therefore, to all the parties concerned, these and all other relevant matters should first be threshed out fully in the trial court in the proceedings thereafter to be held for the purpose of ascertaining and adjudicating and/or distributing the estate of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in accordance with her duly probated will.It is necessary that the Texas law be ascertained. Here it must be proven whether a renvoi will happen or whether Texas law makes the testamentary provisions valid. In line with Texas law, that which should be proven is the law enforced during the death of Hodges and not in any other time.The Supreme Court held that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisters could be more than just stated, but this would depend on (1) whether upon the proper application of the principle of renvoi in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear that Hodges had no legitime as contended by Magno, and (2) whether or not it can be held that Hodges had legally and effectively renounced his inheritance from his wife. The Court is not in a position to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of these two issuesLinnies estate is the remainder of 1/4 of the conjugal partnership properties, considering that even PCIB did not maintain that the application of the laws of Texas would result in the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges not inheriting anything under her will. And since PCIB's representations in regard to the laws of Texas virtually constitute admissions of fact which the other parties and the Court are being made to rely and act upon, PCIB is not permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a position contradictory to or inconsistent with them.The only question that remains to be settled in the remand to the court below are: (A) whether or not the applicable laws of Texas do provide in effect for more, such as, when there is no legitime provided therein and (B) whether or not Hodges has validly waived his whole inheritance from Mrs. Hodges.

- Questions asked in choice of law problems.- Essay, Hypothetical questions.- Study Art 15,16,17- NY ConventionArticle V1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made; or(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or(e) The award has not yet become binding, on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.

- Succession Cases- Venue on ArbitrationADR LawSEC. 42.Application of the New York Convention.- The New York Convention shall govern the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards covered by the said Convention.The recognition and enforcement of such arbitral awards shall be filled with regional trial court in accordance with the rules of procedure to be promulgated by the Supreme Court. Said procedural rules shall provide that the party relying on the award or applying for its enforcement shall file with the court the original or authenticated copy of the award and the arbitration agreement. If the award or agreement is not made in any of the official languages, the party shall supply a duly certified translation thereof into any of such languages.The applicant shall establish that the country in which foreign arbitration award was made is a party to the New York Convention.If the application for rejection or suspension of enforcement of an award has been made, the regional trial court may, if it considers it proper, vacate its decision and may also, on the application of the party claiming recognition or enforcement of the award, order the party to provide appropriate security.

Special ADR RulesRule 13.3.Venue. - The petition to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award shall be filed, at the option of the petitioner, with the Regional Trial Court (a) where the assets to be attached or levied upon is located, (b) where the act to be enjoined is being performed, (c) in the principal place of business in the Philippines of any of the parties, (d) if any of the parties is an individual, where any of those individuals resides, or (e) in the National Capital Judicial Region.

- Cases on Divorce decree- Tuna processing v. CA G.R. No. 185582 February 29, 2012TUNA PROCESSING, INC., vs. PHILIPPINE KINGFORD, INC., FactsJanuary 14, 2003: Kanemitsu Yamaoka ("licensor"), co-patentee of U.S. Patent, Philippine Letters Patent, and Indonesian Patent ("Yamaoka Patent"), and five Philippine tuna processors, namely, Angel Seafood Corporation, East Asia Fish Co., Inc., Mommy Gina Tuna Resources, Santa Cruz Seafoods, Inc., and respondent Kingford ("sponsors"/"licensees") entered into a Memorandum of Agreement January 15, 2003 The parties likewise executed a Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement.July 14, 2003: Agreement to Amend Memorandum of Agreement.Due to a series of events not mentioned in the petition, the licensees, including respondent Kingford, withdrew from petitioner TPI and correspondingly reneged on their obligations.Petitioner submitted the dispute for arbitration before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution in the State of California, United States WON!October 10, 2007: To enforce the award, petitioner TPI filed on a Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before the RTC of Makati City. Respondent Kingford filed a Motion to Dismiss. DISMISSED. Judge Alameda inhibited himself. Re-Raffled. Judge Ruiz, in turn, GRANTED the MOT and dismissed the petition. GROUND: Petitioners lack of legal capacity to sue in the PH.IssueCan a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines, but which collects royalties from entities in the Philippines, sue here to enforce a foreign arbitral award?RulingSec. 133. Doing business without a license. - No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws. (CORPO CODE)There is no doubt, therefore, that TPI has been doing business in the Philippines, but sans a license to do so issued by the concerned government agency of the Philippines, when it collected royalties from five Philippine tuna processors. This being the real situation, TPI cannot be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceedings in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines." A priori, the "Petition, etc." extant of the plaintiff TPI should be dismissed for it does not have the legal personality to sue in the Philippines.HOWEVER, petitioner counters, that it is entitled to seek for the recognition and enforcement of the subject foreign arbitral award in accordance with Republic Act No. 9285 (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004), the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards drafted during the United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration in 1958 (New York Convention), and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law), as none of these specifically requires that the party seeking for the enforcement should have legal capacity to sue. It anchors its argument on the following:Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, this Court held:Without doubt, the Corporation Code is the general law providing for the formation, organization and regulation of private corporations. On the other hand, RA 6657 is the special law on agrarian reform. As between a general and special law, the latter shall prevailgeneralia specialibus non derogant.Following the same principle, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 shall apply in this case as the Act, as its title - An Act to Institutionalize the Use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System in the Philippines and to Establish the Office for Alternative Dispute Resolution, and for Other Purposes - would suggest, is a law especially enacted "to actively promote party autonomy in the resolution of disputes or the freedom of the party to make their own arrangements to resolve their disputes." It specifically provides exclusive grounds available to the party opposing an application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award.Inasmuch as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, a municipal law, applies in the instant petition, we do not see the need to discuss compliance with international obligations under the New York Convention and the Model Law. After all, both already form part of the law.Not one of these exclusive grounds (Article V of the New York Convention) touched on the capacity to sue of the party seeking the recognition and enforcement of the award.Pertinent provisions of the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution, which was promulgated by the Supreme Court, likewise support this position.Rule 13.1 of the Special Rules provides that "any party to a foreign arbitration may petition the court to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award." Capacity to sue is not included. Oppositely, in the Rule on local arbitral awards or arbitrations in instances where "the place of arbitration is in the Philippines," it is specifically required that a petition "to determine any question concerning the existence, validity and enforceability of such arbitration agreement" available to the parties before the commencement of arbitration and/or a petition for "judicial relief from the ruling of the arbitral tribunal on a preliminary question upholding or declining its jurisdiction" after arbitration has already commenced should state "[t]he facts showing that the persons named as petitioner or respondent have legal capacity to sue or be sued."Indeed, it is in the best interest of justice that in the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, we deny availment by the losing party of the rule that bars foreign corporations not licensed to do business in the Philippines from maintaining a suit in our courts. When a party enters into a contract containing a foreign arbitration clause and, as in this case, in fact submits itself to arbitration, it becomes bound by the contract, by the arbitration and by the result of arbitration, conceding thereby the capacity of the other party to enter into the contract, participate in the arbitration and cause the implementation of the result. Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals, xxx Arbitration, as an alternative mode of settlement, is gaining adherents in legal and judicial circles here and abroad. If its tested mechanism can simply be ignored by an aggrieved party, one who, it must be stressed, voluntarily and actively participated in the arbitration proceedings from the very beginning, it will destroy the very essence of mutuality inherent in consensual contracts.Clearly, on the matter of capacity to sue, a foreign arbitral award should be respected not because it is favored over domestic laws and procedures, but because Republic Act No. 9285 has certainly erased any conflict of law question.Finally, even assuming, only for the sake of argument, that the court a quo correctly observed that the Model Law, not the New York Convention, governs the subject arbitral award, petitioner may still seek recognition and enforcement of the award in Philippine court, since the Model Law prescribes substantially identical exclusive grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement.Premises considered, petitioner TPI, although not licensed to do business in the Philippines, may seek recognition and enforcement of the foreign arbitral award in accordance with the provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004.DISPOSITIVE PORTIOIN: WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated 21 November 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati City in Special Proceedings No. M-6533 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to Branch 61 for further proceedings.

- Kogies v. PSMCDIGEST + ANALYSIS FROM THE ATENEO LAW JOURNAL ARTICLE: Moving Forward: Developments in Arbitration Jurisprudence by Bernard Joseph MabiliranA. The Facts Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. (KOGIES) is a Korean corporation engaged in the supply and installation of Liquefied Petroleum Gasoline (LPG) Cylinder manufacturing plants.9 It entered into a contract with the private respondent Pacific General Steel Manufacturing Corp. (PGSMC), a domestic corporation desiring to establish a LPG Cylinder manufacturing plant in Carmona at the province of Cavite.10 The parties executed the contract on 5 March 1997 in the Philippines, and an amendment on 7 April 1997 in Korea. The contract and its amendment provided that KOGIES is to ship machineries and other facilities necessary for manufacturing LPG Cylinders in exchange for U.S.$1,224,000. In addition, for the installation and initiation of the plant and upon the production of 11-kilogram LPG cylinder samples, PGSMC is to pay U.S.$306,000. Thus, the total contract price stood at U.S.$1,530,000.11 All went well initially, and the machineries, equipment, and facilities promised by KOGIES were delivered and installed in Carmona. Thus, PGSMC paid the initial U.S.$1,224,000.12 However, after the installation of the plant, the initial operation thereof could not be conducted as PGSMC encountered financial difficulties, affecting the supply of materials. This forced the parties to agree that KOGIES would be deemed to have completely complied with the terms and conditions of the 5 March 1997 contract.13 Two postdated checks were issued by PGSMC to cover the remaining U.S.$306,000. These were dishonored, however, for the reason that payment has been stopped. While KOGIES sent a demand letter to PGSMC, PGSMC replied with a letter complaining that KOGIES delivered a different brand of hydraulic press from that agreed upon and that it had failed to deliver several equipment parts already paid for. PGSMC further informed KOGIES on 1 June 1998 that it was cancelling their contract because of the altered quantity and lowered quality of the machineries, and that it would dismantle and transfer the machineries already installed from the Carmona plant. Finally, PGSMC filed before the Office of the Prosecutor a Complaint-Affidavit for estafa against Mr. Dae Hyun Kang, President of KOGIES.14 On 15 June 1998, KOGIES informed PGSMC that it could not unilaterally rescind the contract. Of greater importance to the present article, KOGIES also insisted that their dispute be settled by arbitration as provided by Article 15 of their contract the arbitration clause.15 Thus, on 1 July 1998, KOGIES instituted an Application for Arbitration before the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board in Seoul, Korea.16 At almost the same time, it filed a complaint for Specific Performance on 3 July 1998 against PGSMC before the Muntinlupa Regional Trial Court (RTC), with a prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). It averred, among others, that PGSMC violated Article 15 of their contract by unilaterally rescinding it without resorting to arbitration. PGSMC opposed the TRO, arguing that the arbitration clause, was null and void for being against public policy as it ousts the local courts of jurisdiction over the instant controversy.17 The RTC held that Article 15 of the contract was invalid as it tended to oust the trial court or any other court jurisdiction over any dispute that may arise between the parties18 a ruling long abandoned by the Supreme Court in various decisions.19 KOGIES filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order of the court. In the meantime, however, PGSMC filed a Motion for the Inspection of Things to determine whether there was indeed alteration of the quantity and lowering of the quality of the machineries and equipment. KOGIES opposed the motion, stating that the matters in the Motion for Inspection should fall under the coverage of the arbitration clause. The RTC, nevertheless, granted the Motion for Inspection of Things.20 KOGIES filed an urgent Motion for Reconsideration, and without waiting for the resolution of the said Motion, filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, claiming that the Sheriff was ill-trained to determine matters as to whether there was indeed an alteration or lowering of quantity or quality, and that such issues would better be determined by an arbitration panel knowledgeable with the machineries and equipment at hand.21 This Petition for Certiorari, however, was denied by the Court of Appeals.22 The said appellate court agreed with the RTC that an arbitration clause providing for a final determination of the legal rights of the parties to the contract by arbitration was against public policy.23 It was then that KOGIES filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari to the Supreme Court via Rule 45.

Ruling: The relevant ruling of the Supreme Court was on the issue of the declaration as null and void of Article 15 the arbitration clause of the contract between the parties for being contrary to public policy since they oust the courts of jurisdiction. The High Court sided with KOGIES on this issue and reversed the rulings both of the RTC and the Court of Appeals. Citing the cases of Gonzales v. Climax Mining Ltd.25 and Del Monte Corporation-USA v. Court of Appeals,26 the High Court reiterated that an agreement to arbitrate any dispute is itself a contract, and at the same time part of a contract the container contract. Absent any showing that the contract was not mutually and voluntarily agreed upon, the Court said that it should be respected and complied with by the parties.27 More importantly, the High Court here categorically stated that an arbitration clause even though it provides that an arbitral award made pursuant thereto is final and binding is not contrary to public policy. This Court has sanctioned the validity of arbitration clauses in a catena of cases.28 The Court then cited cases since 1957, including Eastboard Navigation Ltd. v. Juan Ysmael and Co., Inc.,29 BF Corporation v. Court of Appeals,30 and LM Power Engineering Corporation v. Capitol Industrial Construction Groups, Inc.31 Being an inexpensive, speedy, and amicable method of settling disputes, arbitration along with mediation, conciliation and negotiation is encouraged by the Supreme Court. Aside from unclogging judicial dockets, arbitration also hastens the resolution of disputes, especially of the commercial kind.32 The succeeding part of the decision of the Supreme Court is the more interesting, and perhaps more controversial one. Having found that the arbitration clause is not contrary to public policy, the High Court raised the question of what governs an arbitration clause. It held:In case a foreign arbitral body is chosen by the parties, the arbitration rulesof our domestic arbitration bodies would not be applied. As signatory to theArbitration Rules of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International CommercialArbitration of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law(UNCITRAL) in the New York Convention on June 21, 1985, the Philippinescommitted itself to be bound by the Model Law.33 The decision then highlights pertinent features of R.A. [No.] 9285 applying and incorporating the UNCITRAL Model Law,34 including Sections 24,35 42,36 43,37 44,38 47, and 48. In the same breath, however, the decision also cited Section 35 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, the Section dealing with the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award. It finally stated that the final foreign arbitral awards are situated in that they need first to be confirmed by the RTC.39 The Highest Court of the land seemed to have been confused on the application of these various provisions. This will be explained further in the next Section. Next, the Supreme Court proclaimed that the RTC has jurisdiction to review foreign arbitral awards with specific authority and jurisdiction to set aside, reject, or vacate a foreign arbitral award,40 citing Section 42 in relation to Section 45 of the ADR Act o