complicity in structural injustice · elizabeth kahn university of york [email protected] 1 ... will...

Elizabeth Kahn University of York [email protected]

1

Complicity in Global Economic Injustice Elizabeth Kahn

August 2011(Draft)

Complicity is a complex concept. It implies culpability for assisting, supporting or failing to prevent

crimes committed by others. In this paper I will reject the idea that citizens of affluent countries are

guilty of complicity in the perpetuation of an unjust global institutional order. I will discuss why this

assessment means that Thomas Pogge’s analysis of duties to alleviate global injustice must be

rejected. I will then discuss what this assessment means for Iris Young’s analysis of such duties.

Finally I will briefly sketch the outlines of an alternative account of my own which builds on Young

and Pogge’s work but avoids implying accusations of complicity or entailing that agents can be

blamed for what they cannot avoid. I share with Pogge and Young a desire to create an account

which satisfies the intuition that playing a part in maintaining an institutional order grounds a duty

to take action to remove injustice from that order. However I believe it is vital that such an account

avoids entailing an accusation of complicity.

Thomas Pogge Thomas Pogge proposes that currently an unjust global institutional order is imposed by affluent

states. He suggests that citizens of affluent countries are complicit in the imposition of the unjust

global institutional order (Pogge, 2006, p.5). He argues that citizens of these countries are

'collaborating in'(29), 'contributing to'(28), 'facilitating'(29), 'supporting' (29)or upholding'(19) 'the

imposition of a human rights violating institutional order'(Pogge, 2010:19,28,29). He also argues

that citizens have some responsibility for the actions of their governments because they live under

democratic political regimes and therefore if they worked together they could prevent their

governments from continuing with the offending policies (Pogge, 2010, p.7). These are clear

accusation of complicity in the imposition of structural injustice.


2

Pogge goes on to recommend that citizens of affluent states compensate for their contribution to

imposing an unjust global institutional order. He argues they are only blameworthy if they make

‘uncompensated contributions’ to the imposition of an unjust global institutional order. Pogge does

not find agents blameworthy who work towards alleviating this injustice through reform or donate

to poverty alleviating charities. However, it is the connection between agents and the harmful act of

imposition which makes them liable for compensation. If agents were not at fault for assisting in the

imposition of an unjust global institutional order, compensation for this assistance could not be

demanded. We do not usually demand compensation from agents unless they have been at fault.

Pogge does not argue that this is a species of strict liability. He argues that he is describing a

negative duty to refrain from harming others. Therefore Pogge’s demand for compensation must be

based on an accusation of complicity in harm.

In this paper I will assume that Pogge is right that the current global institutional order is unjust. I

will also assume that he is correct that this order is imposed by the governments of affluent and

powerful states. What I wish to question is whether it is fair to hold the citizens of affluent nations

blameworthy as complicit in this imposition.

Complicity and Moral Responsibility In moral analysis agents can only be blamed or praised for acts and omissions for which they are

morally responsible. There are certain criteria which must be fulfilled for an agent to be found

morally responsible for a certain act or omission. If an agent can be held morally responsible for an

act, omission, consequence or state of affairs then they may be liable for compensation or

punishment as appropriate.

To accuse an agent of complicity is to blame them for either assisting in a wrong or failing to prevent

a wrong. It is blaming an agent for an association with a crime in which they are not the principle

actor. For an agent to be judged blameworthy for assisting in the imposition of institutional injustice

it must be the case that the agent is morally responsible for their assistance. Similarly for an agent


3

to be fairly blamed for failing to prevent the imposition of injustice it must be the case that they are

morally responsible for that omission.

I will now consider in turn whether citizens of affluent states can be found morally responsible for

either their assistance in imposing injustice or their failure to prevent their government’s imposition

of injustice.

Assistance in the imposition of Global Injustice and Moral Responsibility

Guilt as an accomplice in a crime only follows when an agent intentionally aids in the immoral act or

project. In all cases of aiding and abetting an agent must intend to assist or encourage the criminal

act. To be an accomplice under British or American law one must knowingly assist rather than

simply be negligent (Katz et al., 1999, pp.240-59). The motivation for this is that it is asking too

much of agents to insist that they are constantly vigilant in case they un-knowingly aiding a criminal

in their otherwise permissible actions. What is required is that the primary actor is guilty of causing

the harm and that the secondary agent knowingly and voluntarily aided, abetted or assisted in that

crime. If agent P sells agent R a gun knowing that it is likely to be planning a robbery, agent P is not

guilty of aiding and abetting in the robbery unless they intend to assist in that crime. The majority of

citizens of affluent countries do not intend to assist in the imposition of an unjust global institutional

order.

Christopher Kutz suggests that what can make an agent guilty of complicity is intent to participate in

a collective project which results in harm suffering or other wrong (Kutz, 2000, p.102). In cases

where intent is absent Kutz suggests there can be a ‘quasi participatory relationship’. Iris Young

rejects this way of finding agents complicit because agents do not intend to be part of a collective

project (Young, 2011, pp.101-03). In such circumstances it is wrong to assign complicity because we

cannot deem agents morally responsible for their contribution to the morally impermissible project.

Citizens of affluent states often intend to participate in the collective project of maintaining and


4

facilitating their government. However, very few intend to participate in the project of imposing and

unjust global economic order which benefits affluent elites. It is therefore unclear whether citizens

can be found complicit on the basis that they intend to participate in an impermissible collective

project. However there are other factors about citizens contributions to the imposition of injustice

that give us solid grounds to reject an assessment of complicity.

When an agent is coerced or constrained in to taking an action we do not usually hold them morally

responsible for that action. If it is the case that affluent citizens are coerced in to assisting their

governments in the imposition of an unjust institutional order then it is likely that they cannot be

blamed for doing so. Examples of assistance in the imposition include the paying of taxes and

obedience to law, both of which are coercively enforced. When an agent could have avoided being

in a situation where they are coerced and constrained in to performing or assisting in immoral acts

we sometimes hold them morally responsible. In the case of assistance in the imposition of an

unjust global institutional order it is extremely difficult for citizens of affluent countries to avoid

being in a position where they are coerced in to assistance. Their only option is to emigrate out of

the country. However, doing so is incredibly costly and arduous. Furthermore, there are very few

countries whose governments do not help impose the current global economic order. Many

countries lack the power to have significant influence. However, they often are minor partners in

enforcing the current order. Furthermore, not many countries accept immigrants who are not

refugees. Given these circumstances it would be unreasonable to blame citizens of affluent states

for remaining in states that coerce them in to assisting in the imposition of the current global

economic order.

It seems that the concept of complicity is inappropriate for considering the situation of citizens of

affluent countries contributing to the imposition of global economic injustice. In such cases

assistance or association in imposition is not a culpable offence because such assistance is neither


5

intentional nor voluntary. Therefore, contra Pogge, agents cannot be held liable for compensation

on the basis that they assist in the imposition of global injustice.

Moral Responsibility and Omitting to Prevent the Imposition of Global

Injustice Neither is it legitimate to find citizens of affluent states blameworthy on the basis that if they

worked together they could have prevented their governments’ aggressive economic policy. Citizens

of affluent states cannot be held morally responsible for omitting to prevent their countries

imposition of an unjust global economic order. Thomas Pogge argues that because a majority of

citizens could mobilise to effectively alter their state foreign policy, citizens of a democratic state can

be held responsible for that policy. Yet he admits that any individual citizen is powerless to alter

foreign policy given that other citizens are reluctant to support such efforts (Pogge, 2010, p.7).

Pogge argues that in such circumstances it would be absurd to find no citizens responsible for their

governments policy. He argues that citizens are only powerless if they do not work together. Pogge

is suggesting that because a majority of citizens acting together (in an affluent democratic state)

could alter the foreign policy of their government citizens within these countries share responsibility

for their government’s foreign policy.

The problem with this is that we cannot find individual citizens morally responsible for omitting to

alter their government’s foreign policy. This is because they lack the power to alter their

government’s policy. Perhaps we can find citizens collectively responsible for omitting to alter their

government’s policy. However, shared responsibility rather than collective responsibility implies

that each citizen gets a share of the blame. Collective responsibility implies that blame is present at

the level of the collective but says nothing about whether individuals can be blamed (May, 1992). It

may be legitimate to judge any individual citizen on the basis of whether they have taken any action

aimed at founding a collective to work towards a change in foreign policy. However, it cannot be

legitimate to blame any individual citizen on the basis that the citizenry omitted to alter their

government’s foreign policy. To do so is to blame an individual for what is beyond their control. It is


6

to find them morally responsible for omitting to do something that is beyond their abilities. It

violates the rule that ‘ought implies can’. This is a rule that establishes that to have an obligation to

do x an agent must be able to do x. It is unjustifiable to praise or blame an agent for what is beyond

their control.

Pogge refuses to concede to this argument because it would absurdly absolve all citizens of

responsibility as no individual citizen has the power to alter their government’s policy. He claims

that such an assessment is absurd. However, there are other ways of making demands of citizens

and appraising their actions and omissions which avoid blaming them for what they cannot fairly be

held morally responsible for. The solution to this problem is to look beyond complicity and shared

responsibility for a solution to this problem.

Considered as individuals, citizens of democratic states lack the ability to alter their government’s

foreign policy. Therefore, an individual citizen cannot be blamed for omitting to prevent the

imposition of the current global institutional order. It is deeply problematic to find individual

citizens morally responsible for their government when such individuals cannot control the actions

of their government. Agents can be blamed for not attempting to alter their government’s policy but

not for failing to alter it. Individual citizens cannot be held liable for compensation on the basis that

the majority of people do not oppose their government’s foreign policy.

Therefore, I conclude that agents cannot be blamed for complicity because their ability to prevent

the imposition of injustice is severely limited. What agents can be held responsible for is working

towards the reform of the order that they are a part of.

The Rejection of Complicity and Pogge’s Account It is unfair to declare citizens of affluent nations complicit in the exploitative trade relations their

governments impose. This is to hold citizens morally blameworthy for what they cannot avoid

doing. Pogge realising this finds blameworthy only those citizens who make ‘uncompensated

contributions to the imposition of an unjust global institutional order’. Pogge is right that citizens


7

are blameworthy if they fail to take action when they are part of an unjust institutional order.

However, claiming they owe compensation implies that they are morally responsible for contributing

towards a harm or morally responsible for failing to prevent harm. When reallyccitizens are

blameworthy not because they contribute to harm but because they do not fulfil their political

obligation to engage with the institutional orders which they are part of. It is not that they are

blameworthy for being part of a group which harms others. It is that they shirk the political

responsibilities that come with participation in an institutional order. Conceiving of the obligation to

take action to alter the injustice as compensation is wrongheaded. Compensation is only demanded

from those who are morally blameworthy for contributing to harm or otherwise liable for that harm.

This is not the case with individual citizens of affluent countries because they cannot avoid

contributing to that harm. Instead it would be better to conceive of this obligation to take action to

alter the institutional order as a political obligation deriving from their participation in the

institutional order.

Iris Young In her final book ‘Responsibility for Justice’ Iris Young argues for a notion of shared forward-looking

responsibility to remove structural injustice. The concept of structural injustice that Young outlines

describes how various human institutions (both formal and informal), along with past actions that

have permanently altered the physical environment, serve to create a social structure which places

agents in positions (Young, 2011, pp.52-64). When that structure places agents in positions where

they are vulnerable to domination and deprivation structural injustice can be identified (Young,

2011, p.64). Young outlines a way of identifying agents charged with duties to alleviate structural

injustice on the basis of their social connection to that injustice. Young argues that participating in

institutional processes that produce structural injustice is the basis on which an agent can be

identified as sharing in responsibility for remedying injustice (Young, 2011, p.205). However Young

makes explicit that agents are not blameworthy for the connection to injustice which makes them

eligible for responsibility. Hence Young argues for a conception of responsibility that shares more


8

with a role based notion of responsibility rather than classic causal responsibility (Young, 2011,

pp.104-06).

This forward looking responsibility is ‘essentially shared’ in that individuals bear responsibility in the

awareness that others bear it with them (Young, 2011, p.110). It also so happens that this forward

looking shared responsibility, to transform structural processes to reduce and eliminate the injustice

they cause, can only be discharged by joining with others in collective action (Young, 2011, pp.110-

13).

Young’s account unlike Pogge’s explicitly denies that agents are guilty of complicity. Instead it looks

to assign responsibility to take action rather than responsibility for harm. Pogge’s account accuses

citizens of rich countries of being complicit in the imposition of an unjust global institutional order.

Young’s account argues that all those who participate in the social processes (operations of

institutions) that create an unjust social structure share a responsibility to work together to

eliminate injustice within that structure. Young’s account gives obligations to citizens of poor

nations and rich nations alike. Both accounts argue that obligations arise for those who are causally

connected to injustice. The key difference between the accounts is that Young’s account does not

base obligations to alleviate injustice on a duty to compensate for one’s complicity.

Iris Young and Complicity It looks as though Young’s account has triumphed over Thomas Pogge’s because it avoids appealing

to a false notion of complicity. However, a closer examination reveals that Young’s account is not

immune from criticism. Her account is problematic because it must in fact lead to blame on the

basis of complicity. Martha Nussbaum has criticised Iris Young’s approach on the basis that agents

currently sharing a forward looking responsibility to alleviate injustice should as time passes become

agents guilty of failing to remove injustice (Nussbaum, 2009, p.142). Nussbaum argues that Young

should not insist that responsibility to reform unjust institutional orders must not entail


9

blameworthiness if one fails to fulfil those responsibilities. Nussbaum argues that to do so does not

have the pragmatic benefits that Young claims (Nussbaum, 2009, pp.142-44).

It is very heterodox to insist that agents have a forward looking shared responsibility to reform

unjust institutional orders but that they are not blameworthy if they fail in this task. The practice of

asserting that an agent has a certain responsibility functions so as to make demands of agents which

they can be blamed for failing to fulfil. When we claim that parents, police men or managers have

role base responsibilities we are claiming that these roles entail certain obligations. These

obligations may include acting in a particular way or seeing that certain outcomes obtain (Young,

2011, p.104)1. If agents fail to fulfil these obligations they are at fault and liable for blame. What

would it mean to have a responsibility that one can never be blamed for failing to fulfil? Claiming

that someone has a certain responsibility to x is stating that they are morally obliged to x. This

entails that they are morally at fault and liable for blame if they fail to do so. This must mean that

agents who fail to eliminate injustice when they have a shared responsibility to do so are guilty of

failing to fulfil their shared responsibility.

Nussbaum suggests that Young’s account could admit that those who fail to fulfil their

responsibilities to reform structural injustice can be blamed. However such a move is deeply

problematic because it holds agents blameworthy for failing to prevent continuing injustice. This

looks very much like an accusation of complicity. It is a scenario in which individual agents can be

blamed for failing to prevent injustice. It is a case in which individual agents are liable for blame for

what it is not in the power to guarantee.

Young is right that all those who participate in structural processes are alike in having obligations to

work towards the removal of structural injustice. She is also right that these obligations will require

agents to work together. What is wrong with her account is that she argues for a responsibility

1 Young references Henry s Richardson “institutional divided moral responsibility” in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D

Miller jr and Jeffrey pauls eds. Responsibility Cambridge university press 1999 218-249


10

which is ‘essentially shared’ rather than for each agent having an individual responsibility to make

reasonable efforts to remove injustice. Young, by describing the responsibility as ‘essentially

shared’, implies that it is a responsibility that the group achieves or fails together. By appealing to a

responsibility to eliminate structural injustice Young also implies that anything short of justice

constitutes failure. This means that over time the group may share blame for failing to eliminate

injustice. Presumably this blame will distribute down in the same way responsibility does. This

means that agents will bear blame in the awareness that others bear it with them. Such sharing of

blame is not fair for the same reason that an accusation of complicity on the basis of failing to

prevent injustice is unfair. It holds individual agents blameworthy on the basis of outcomes it is not

in their power to guarantee.

Like Pogge, Young is trying to construct an account that assigns duties to reform an unjust global

regime on the basis of connection to the continuance of that regime. Both theorists try to connect

agents to such duties without making accusations of complicity. However, both theorists utilise

moral duties that entail accusations of complicity. It is my contention that what is needed is a

different approach which links social connection to obligations to reform, but which avoids invoking

complicity.

Building on Young and Pogge’s accounts I will now briefly offer my own account of the duties that fall on agents who participate in unjust

institutional orders. I will utilise a concept of political obligation to explain the intuition that agent’s

participation in an unjust global institutional order entails obligations. Pogge and Young both

encourage a campaigning response to injustice over unilateral attempts to compensate through

charitable donation. I also argue that in cases where any agent participates in and contributes to an

unjust institutional order what is morally required is political action which attempts to alter the

institutional order that reproduces this injustice.


11

As discussed above, a participator in an unjust institutional order cannot be found guilty of

complicity even if they are a member of a democratic state which acts to impose unjust global

economic relations. However, such an agent’s relationship to the institutional order is pregnant with

political obligation. I propose that there is a general duty to politically engage with institutional

orders that one participates in.

Social institutions are simply collections of people engaged in a practice governed by a set of public

rules. Institutional normative analysis applies to the way social institutions considered together as

an institutional order affect the opportunities, powers and capabilities of persons (Pogge, 1989,

pp.14-18). Sharing an institutional order is grounds for taking an interest in the way that order

treats others because that order is constituted by the continued obedience of many agents to

various institutional practices and that order can have a pervasive effect on the lives of those who

share it.

The proposed political obligation requires agents to critically evaluate their institutional orders and

take political action to work towards the reform of any injustice within those orders. This duty is

one which all citizens can fulfil. Individual citizens can be commended if they fulfil it and are

blameworthy if the fail to fulfil it. This way of conceiving of the problem avoids blaming citizens for

what is beyond their control. Therefore, it is better than a notion of shared responsibility which can

find individual agents liable for blame even when they do all they can to remove injustice and yet

injustice remains because others do not join them in the campaign.

This small modification of Young’s account can allow us to identify the political obligations that come

with participation in an institutional order. If these obligations are fulfilled by a sufficient amount of

participators injustice can be eliminated over time. Each agent can be fairly judged not on the basis

of whether attempts to overcome injustice succeed but on the basis of whether they fulfil their

political obligation to identify injustice and work towards its eradication. Although such a duty will

require agents to seek to work with others it cannot be conceived of as a shared responsibility. It is


12

an individual responsibility to do what can be reasonably expected to work towards eliminating

injustice in the institutions one shares with others. It requires agents to try to establish working

relationships with others in order to find collective solutions to structural injustice.

The demandingness of the proposed obligation will depend on what can be reasonably expected of

those who participate in the current global institutional order. Factors that will determine what can

be expected include how unjust the institutional order is and the position of the agent within the

order. The agent’s position will determine both the opportunities for and the costs of political

action. Those in positions of relative power within an institutional order have more opportunities to

alter the order and those in positions of relative weakness are more vulnerable to the costs that can

follow from political intervention. Citizens of affluent democratic states have ample opportunity to

engage politically with their government’s global economic policy without fear of reprisal. This

means that more can be reasonably expected of such individuals compares to those who toil in the

sweatshops of developing nations with less open systems of government.2 The demandingness of

an agent’s obligation to engage politically will depend on the seriousness of structural injustice.

What can be expected of an agent charged with an obligation to engage politically will depend on

the power the agent has to affect the institutional order (which will depend on the abilities of the

agent, the structural position of the agent, and the availability of others willing to collaborate in this

project) and the costs and risks associated with political engagement for the agent (which will

depend on the political system in which the agent lives and their position within that system).

2 Young argues that considerations of power, priviledge, interest and collective ability should be utilised in

assessing what can reasonably be expected of agents who share in forward looking responsibility (Young, 2011, pp.142-47).


13

Bibliography Katz, L., Sanford, H.K. & Fletcher, G., 1999. Accomplice Liability. In Katz, L., Moore, M.S. & Morse, S.J.

Criminal Law. New York: Foundation Press. pp.240-59.

Kutz, C., 2000. Complicity: Ethics in a Global Age. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

May, L., 1992. Sharing Responsibility. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Nussbaum, M.C., 2009. Iris Young's Last Thoughts on Responsibility for Justice. In A. Ferguson & M.

Nagel, eds. Dancing With Iris: The Philosophy of Iris Marion Young. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

pp.133-45.

Pogge, T., 1989. Realizing Rawls. Ithica: Cornell University Press.

Pogge, T., 2006. World Poverty and Human Rights. Ethics and International Relations, 119(1).

Pogge, T., 2008. World poverty and human rights: cosmopolitan responsibilities and reforms.

Cambridge: Polity Press.

Pogge, T., 2010. Politics as Usual. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Rawls, J., 1971. A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Young, I.M., 2003. The Lindley Lectures: Political Responsibility and Structural Injustice. Kansas:

University of Kansas.

Young, I.M., 2004. Responsibility and Global Labour Justice. The Journal of Political Philosophy, 12(4),

pp.365-88.

Young, I.M., 2006. Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model. Social Philosophy

and Policy Foundation, pp.102-30.

Young, I., 2011. Responsibility for Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

complicity in structural injustice · elizabeth kahn university of york [email protected] 1 ... will...

Documents