companentes conscientes y no-conscientes de las creencias supersticiosas en el juicio y la toma de...

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Conscious and Nonconscious Components of Superstitious Beliefs in Judgment and Decision Making Author(s): Thomas Kramer and Lauren Block Source: Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 34, No. 6 (April 2008), pp. 783-793Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/523288Accessed: 25-02-2016 13:23 UTC

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2007 by JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH, Inc. Vol. 34 April 2008All rights reserved. 0093-5301/2008/3406-0006$10.00

Conscious and Nonconscious Components ofSuperstitious Beliefs in Judgmentand Decision MakingTHOMAS KRAMERLAUREN BLOCK*

Despite the large impact that superstitious beliefs have on the marketplace, wecurrently know very little about their implications for consumer judgment and de-cision making. We document the existence of the influence of superstitious beliefson consumer behavior and specify their conscious and nonconscious underlyingproperties. In particular, we show that superstitious beliefs have a robust influenceon product satisfaction and decision making under risk. However, these effectsare only observed when superstitious beliefs are allowed to work nonconsciously.Using a process-dissociation task, we further demonstrate the distinct consciousversus nonconscious components of the effect of superstition on decision makingunder risk.

$888 to Beijing. Lucky You.

This recent Continental Airlines ad, prominently featur-ing a number that is perceived to be lucky in Chinesecultures, exemplifies the use of cultural superstitious beliefsin marketing practice. Although academic research has rec-ognized the importance of other various elements of thesocial and cultural environments in marketing, such as val-ues (Han and Shavitt 1994), goals (Aaker and Lee 2001),or language (Luna and Peracchio 2005), individuals su-perstitious beliefs and their impact on consumer judgmentsand decision making have received surprisingly little atten-tion. This lack of investigation into superstitious beliefs isall the more surprising given their strong impact on themarketplace. For example, between $800 and $900 millionis lost in business in the United States each Friday the thir-teenth because people do not want to go to work or tend to

*Thomas Kramer ([email protected]) is assistant pro-fessor of marketing and Lauren Block ([email protected]) isprofessor of marketing at the Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College,CUNY, 1 Bernard Baruch Way, New York, NY 10010. Correspondence:Thomas Kramer. Both authors contributed equally and are listed in reversealphabetical order. The authors wish to thank David Luna and Sankar Senfor their helpful comments on earlier drafts. The manuscript benefitedgreatly from the insightful comments and suggestions received from theeditor, associate editor, and three reviewers.

John Deighton served as editor and Mary Frances Luce served as associateeditor for this article.Electronically published October 9, 2007

business in general that day (Palazzolo 2005). Furthermore,a recent newspaper article noted that a young businessmanin Guangzhou, China, bid 54,000 yuan (almost seven timesthe countrys per capita annual income) for lucky licenseplate APY888; a man in Hangzhou offered to sell his licenseplate A88888 on the Internet for 1.12 million yuan; and aChinese airline paid 2.4 million yuan for the telephone num-ber 8888 8888 (Yardley 2006). It is hardly surprising thatthe Beijing Summer Olympics are scheduled to open onAugust 8, 2008, at 8 p.m.

In addition, an increasing number of U.S. companies areadopting the principles of feng shui, often hiring feng shuiexperts who apply these superstitious Chinese practices tooffices in esteemed companies such as Smith Barney andMorgan Stanley (Tsang 2004). Consider the following pas-sage describing a corporate executive reported in Fortune(Gunn 1997, 64): Twelve softball-sized stones sit on hiswindowsill to guard against negative forces from surround-ing buildings. Another 69 small pieces run along the ledgeof an internal window to deflect the heat and bad energyfrom computers and fax machines on the other side.

It is therefore surprising that academic research providessuch little empirical evidence on the effect of superstitionon business decision making, and we currently know evenless about the implications of superstitious beliefs for con-sumers. Furthermore, the degree to which superstitionseffects are based on a conscious versus nonconscious pro-cess has remained unexamined. The current study seeks toaddress these shortcomings by not only documenting theexistence and robustness of the influence of superstitious


784 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH

beliefs on consumer behavior but also specifying their con-scious versus nonconscious underlying properties.

We begin with the impact of superstitious beliefs onconsumer satisfaction following product failure by show-ing that consumers are less (more) satisfied with a productfor which they hold positive (negative) superstitious as-sociations based on its color, the product quantity, or thedigits used in its price. However, we find that these effectsare only observed when superstitious beliefs are allowedto work nonconsciously. Next, we demonstrate that theeffects of superstitious beliefs are not limited to Asianconsumers, showing that participants from the UnitedStates make significantly more risk-averse choices whena negative (vs. neutral) superstition is made salient. Finally,we provide evidence that even though the effect of su-perstitious beliefs on decision making has both consciousand nonconscious components, the contribution of non-conscious processing to the effect is three times the relativesize of the conscious effect we observe. Next, we reviewliterature on superstition and describe three studies thattested our hypotheses. We then discuss the theoretical andpractical implications of this research.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Belief in SuperstitionSuperstitions are beliefs that are inconsistent with the

known laws of nature or with what is generally consideredrational in a society (American Heritage Dictionary 1985).Belief in superstition dates back thousands of years andcontinues to the present (Jahoda 1969; Vyse 1997). Super-stitions may be invoked to fend off bad luck, as MichaelJordan did when he changed the number on his uniform tochange his luck after several inferior performances (USAToday, reported in Darke and Freedman [1997b]). Super-stitions are also invoked to bring about good luck, as deep-sea fishermen in New Guinea often do when they performelaborate magical rituals to ensure a successful fishing trip(Malinowski 1954).

Although superstitions can be found the world over, su-perstitious beliefs are most often culturally specific. For ex-ample, Chinese individuals often seek to deflect bad luckby putting up mirrors in their homes (Simmons and Schin-dler 2003). The color red and the number 8 are associatedwith prosperity and good luck; therefore, the Bank of Chinaopened its doors in Hong Kong on August 8, 1988con-sidered to be the luckiest day of the century (Lip 1992).During Chinese New Year, older relatives give childrenlucky red envelopes with money inside. Colors and numbers(e.g., the number 4 and the color black) are also associatedwith unlucky consequences (Wiseman and Watt 2004).Some buildings in China have no fourth floor, and someparents refuse to let their children travel in unlucky taxison the day of their college entrance exam (Yardley 2006).Examples of common superstitious beliefs in the UnitedStates include horseshoes and knocking on wood for good

luck, and the number 13, walking under a ladder, or breakinga mirror for bad luck.

Although many superstitions are culturally shared andsocially transmitted from generation to generation, othersconsist of relatively more idiosyncratic beliefs or rituals. Forexample, students can often be seen bringing lucky charmsor lucky pens to an exam; an athlete may not change socksduring a tournament; and a job applicant may wear a luckyoutfit for a job interview. Each of these superstitious beliefsand behaviors is associated with desired positive outcomes;that is, people expect to do well on a subsequent task. En-gaging in ritualistic behavior of this sort is consistent withDarke and Freedmans (1997b) empirical work on luck.They demonstrated that peoples associations of luck withone performance create expectations about luck that extendbeyond this single event to other independent and unrelatedevents.

Research also suggests that people are motivated to relyon superstitious beliefs when their control over an event isundermined or threatened. Case et al. (2004) conducted aseries of studies investigating the relationship between theuse of superstitious strategies and perceived control. Theconsistent finding across these studies was that as the like-lihood of failure increased, so did the use of superstitiousbeliefs. Case et al. concluded that the more salient the failureis, the more people use superstitious strategies to explainthe failed outcome. However, to date, this research has beenlimited to studies of personal failure.

The current research therefore starts with a focus on theuse of superstitious explanations for nonpersonal or in-animate object failure, such as product failures. Moralesand Fitzsimons (2007) recently demonstrated the transfer-ence of irrational beliefs onto inanimate objects (i.e., prod-ucts). Though their study did not explore superstitious be-liefs, Morales and Fitzsimons showed that irrational beliefsabout one product can be contagious and affect other prod-ucts. The question remains whether superstitious beliefsare transferred to inanimate objects in the case of productfailures. In addition, we still do not know the degree towhich consumers use superstitious beliefs, either con-sciously or nonconsciously, in their decision making underuncertainty. Given the importance placed on rationality andassociated norms against relying on superstition in manymodern societies (Vyse 1997), the degree to which theeffects of superstition operate nonconsciously is an inter-esting open question.

Superstitions in the MarketplaceDespite the prevalence of superstitious beliefs, system-

atic study of such effects on managerial and consumerdecision making is just beginning to enter the marketingliterature. For example, investigating Chinese consumersperceptions of alphanumeric brand names, Ang (1997)found that those containing lucky numbers and letters (e.g.,A8) were perceived more favorably than those containingunlucky letters and numbers (e.g., F4). A content analysisof Chinese advertising showed that unlucky number 4 was


SUPERSTITION AND DECISION MAKING 785

underrepresented and lucky number 8 was overrepresentedin advertised prices in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan(Simmons and Schindler 2003). Next, in an exploration ofthe consumer-behavior-related consequences of supersti-tion, Mowen and Carlson (2003) studied the possible traitantecedents of superstition. They found that many of theantecedents one might expect to correlate with supersti-tious beliefssuch as education level, and agein fact donot. It is interesting to note that they also found that ahigher need for material possessions led to greater super-stitious beliefs (Mowen and Carlson 2003). This body ofwork is a beginning to creating a literature on superstitionsin the marketplace.

With this article, we add to this nascent body of knowl-edge by examining how superstitious beliefs influence prod-uct satisfaction and consumers risk-taking behavior. Wesuggest that the superstitious associations that individualshold concerning an objects attributes (e.g., color) will in-fluence how well they believe the object itself should per-form. For example, since red is a lucky color, Chinese con-sumers might expect a red rice cooker to perform better thana green one. More generally, superstitious beliefs may be asource of information relied upon in evaluation and satis-faction judgments.

Satisfaction is one of the most researched constructs inmarketing (Oliver 1999) because of its influence on con-sumers postpurchase behaviors. These include profitablebehaviors following satisfactory product performance,such as repurchase, positive word of mouth, and recom-mendation of products or firms to other consumers, as wellas harmful behaviors following dissatisfactory product per-formance, such as negative word of mouth, warnings (i.e.,telling others not to buy the brand), and complaints to firms(Swan and Oliver 1989). Satisfaction is inextricably linkedto customer loyalty, which is a major driver of purchase(Oliver 1999).

As discussed above, individuals rely on superstition orsuperstitious rituals in the hope that these behaviors willbring them luck and help them perform better. Analogously,we predict that superstitious associations with product at-tributes will also influence expected product performanceand, as we investigate, consumers satisfaction followingproduct failure. Differences in expectations, in turn, mayinfluence how satisfied consumers will be (Oliver 1980;Oliver and Bearden 1985; van Raaij 1991). Accordingly,we hypothesize the following:

H1a: Following product failure, consumers will beless satisfied with a product for which they holdpositive (vs. neutral) superstitious associations.

H1b: Following product failure, consumers will bemore satisfied with a product for which theyhold negative (vs. neutral) superstitious asso-ciations.

Conscious and Nonconscious Componentsof Superstition

Clearly, many individuals subscribe to and rely on su-perstitions in a conscious manner. That is, students whocome to class with their lucky pen, and consumers whoread their horoscope or do not want to close on their mort-gage on Friday the thirteenth, make a conscious decisionbased on superstitious associations with the object or date.However, other research from the current authors finds thatsuperstitious beliefs can lead to behavior contrary to fi-nancial common sense (e.g., paying more money for fewerunits of a product or a greater willingness to purchase aproduct at a relatively higher price). Such reversals of ra-tionality suggest that superstitious beliefs may also workon a nonconscious level. Support for the nonconsciousnature of processing stems from the conceptually similarwork on the processing of stereotypes. Like stereotypes,superstitious beliefs represent a set of cultural associationsthat are learned through socialization processes and aresocially transmitted (Devine 1989). Research shows thatthese sets of associations are automatically or uninten-tionally activated by the presence of a cue in the environ-ment (Devine 1989), but can be adjusted through consciousthought. Similarly, when faced with a superstitious cue,like a Friday the thirteenth calendar date, cultural super-stitions are likely to be automatically activated but cansubsequently be controlled consciously.

Further support for an automatic component of supersti-tion dates back to Freuds suggestion that superstition isassociated with ones projection of fears and wishes in apersons unconscious (Tsang 2004). In fact, the literature onsuperstition repeatedly speculates that superstitious beliefsare automatically activated. Despite these assertions, thereis no empirical evidence on the process by which supersti-tions influence decisions. Providing support for the relativeimpact of conscious versus nonconscious elements of su-perstitions would therefore help fill a large gap in the theoryand understanding of such belief systems.

We used priming manipulations to test for conscious ver-sus nonconscious processing in our studies. In particular,research suggests that primes can affect subsequent judg-ments in one of two ways: in the predicted direction of theprime when individuals are unaware of the prime, and con-trasting away from the prime when individuals are awareof the prime (Bargh 1994). Therefore, we sought to examinethe processing underlying the impact of superstition withpriming tasks that varied in how obviously the primes wererelated to the subsequent dependent measures.

Specifically, priming can influence subsequent judgmentsthrough a nonconscious process when the priming task isseemingly unrelated to the main task (Bargh 1994; Barghand Chartrand 1999; Bargh, Chen, and Burrows 1996;Strack et al. 1993). In other words, nonconscious (vs. con-scious) processing can be detected (1) when the primingtask makes superstitious beliefs salient but the main taskdoes not, and (2) when the main task makes superstitious



beliefs salient but the priming task does not. Alternatively,when the priming task is obviously related to the main task,prior research suggests that subsequent judgments are de-rived through a conscious processing of the activated beliefs(Bargh 1994).

We test for conscious versus nonconscious processing instudy 1 by priming superstition so as to make such beliefssalient to the individual versus a control condition in whichno priming of superstition occurs. If superstitious beliefsactivated in the primary task (e.g., lucky color red) non-consciously influence subsequent judgments (e.g., lower sat-isfaction), then the effects hypothesized in hypotheses 1aand 1b should be obtained only in the control condition, butnot when superstitious beliefs are also activated via a prim-ing task.

We reverse this in studies 2 and 3, where it is the primeconditionunrelated to the main taskthat drives the non-conscious processing. If superstitious beliefs are made sa-lient via a priming task, their effects should be observedonly when the main task appears to be unrelated to theseprimed beliefs. In sum, evidence of nonconscious processingis detected with judgments consistent with superstitious be-liefs in the control condition in study 1 and the primingcondition in studies 2 and 3. Finally, we seek direct evidenceof the relative nonconscious and conscious contribution tothe effect of superstition in study 3.

STUDY 1We begin to test our hypotheses in a study with Taiwanese

subjects, because individuals of Chinese backgrounds havebeen reported to be among the most superstitious in theworld (Simmons and Schindler 2003; Tsang 2004). Beforethe main study, a separate sample of 24 Taiwanese individ-uals were asked (open-ended) in a pretest which numbersand colors represented the most good luck and bad luck.Supporting prior findings in the literature (Ang 1997), themajority of participants had the most positive superstitiousbeliefs concerning the color red and the number 8. Con-versely, most participants had the most negative supersti-tious beliefs concerning the color black and the number 4.No participant mentioned the numbers 5 and 10, or the colorgreen, which were consequently chosen as the neutral at-tribute-related superstitions. Three subjects mentioned thenumber 6 as a lucky number, which is consistent with Lip(1992), who described this number as an auspicious numberbecause it sounds like wealth in Cantonese. Although thenative language of our subjects was Mandarin, knowledgeof Cantonese may have resulted in the three subjects per-ceiving the number 6 to be lucky.

It is important to point out that our questionnaires wereprepared and completed in English. Since research hasshown that cultural values can be made temporarily acces-sible through language (Hong et al. 2000), use of English(vs. Mandarin) in our studies provides a more stringent testof our hypotheses with this sample because our materialsmay have primed a Western worldview and thereby reducedreliance on superstitions grounded in Chinese culture.

Method: Participants and ProcedureForty-eight students from a Taiwanese university partic-

ipated in a study on consumer preferences for class creditand were randomly assigned to the superstition-salient ver-sus control condition. In the superstition-salient condition,subjects read a short essay that discussed the importance ofcultural awareness for international marketers. Part of theessay highlighted the impact of superstitions on consumerbehavior. In the control condition, subjects read about theimportance of political awareness for international market-ers. The two essays were matched in terms of number ofwords and reading difficulty. Next, participants indicatedtheir agreement that cultural awareness (political awareness)was important for marketers.

After finishing the first study, subjects were told to com-plete the second questionnaire on consumer preferences,which was attached to the first (priming) task. Here, subjectsread three scenarios in which they were told to imagine thatthey were going to buy a product; one choice was describedin terms of neutral attributes and one choice had an attributewith superstitious associations. In particular, in the first prob-lem, subjects were told to imagine that they needed to buya rice cooker and had found one that was described in termsof capacity, presence of a timer, length of keep-warm time,and color. The first three attributes were kept constant be-tween conditions, while the color of the rice cooker waseither red or green, depending on the randomly assignedcondition. As we discussed, Chinese cultures tend to holdpositive superstitious beliefs concerning the color red, butno superstitious beliefs concerning the color green. Subjectswere then instructed to assume that they had purchased therice cooker but when they used it for the first time, it burntthe rice.

The second problem concerned the purchase of tennisballs, and subjects were instructed to imagine that they hadcome across a package by Gamma Championship that con-tained either 8 (i.e., a lucky number) or 10 (i.e., a neutralnumber) tennis balls per pack, depending on the randomlyassigned condition. Subjects were told to assume that theyhad purchased the tennis balls but that they had fallen apartafter a few matches. In the third problem, subjects were toldto imagine that they were going to buy a digital camera andhad found one that was described in terms of three features(5 megapixels, 5X zoom, built-in flash) that were kept con-stant between conditions, and price (TW$6,444.44 vs.TW$6,555.55, depending on the randomly assigned con-dition). As mentioned, Chinese cultures tend to hold neg-ative superstitious associations with the number 4, but nosuperstitious beliefs concerning the number 5. Subjects werethen asked to imagine that they had purchased the camerabut that it broke a few weeks later and could not be repaired.

After each scenario, subjects rated their expected satis-faction with the product described in the problem on thefollowing scales (where 1 p strongly disagree and 7 pstrongly agree): I am satisfied with my decision to buy the[product], I think it was the wrong thing when I decidedto buy the [product] (reverse-scored), My choice to buy



TABLE 1

THE EFFECTS OF SUPERSTITION SALIENCE AND SUPERSTITIOUS ASSOCIATIONS ON PRODUCT SATISFACTION

Tennis balls Rice cooker Digital camera

Control prime:Superstitious associations present 2.06a 2.60a 3.89bSuperstitious associations absent 3.84b 4.25b 1.73a

Superstitious prime:Superstitious associations present 3.78c 3.73c 2.28aSuperstitious associations absent 2.75c 2.89c 3.69b

NOTE. Means within a prime condition with different superscripts are different at . Superstitious beliefs for the tennis balls and ricep ! .05cooker were positive; superstitious beliefs for the digital camera were negative.

the [product] was a wise one, and I am not happy that Ibought the [product] (reverse-scored); , .83, andap .86.87 for the rice cooker, tennis balls, and digital camera,respectively. Next, subjects indicated the extent of theirknowledge of spoken and written English (where 1 p notat all and 7 p very much so). As manipulation checks,subjects indicated their agreement (where 1p strongly dis-agree and 7p strongly agree) on the following scales: redis a lucky color, green is a lucky color, 8 is a luckynumber, 10 is a lucky number, 4 is a lucky number,and 5 is a lucky number.

ResultsManipulation Checks. Three subjects rated their

knowledge of English as lower than the scale midpoint andwere hence eliminated, leaving a final sample size of 45Taiwanese. As expected, participants differed in their pos-itive associations with the numbers 8 versus 10 (Mp

vs. 3.73; , ) and the colors red4.67 t(44)p 4.62 p ! .001versus green ( vs. 3.67; , ).Mp 4.44 t(44)p 3.61 p ! .001Participants also differed in their negative associations withthe numbers 4 versus 5 ( vs. 4.07; ,Mp 3.07 t(44)p 3.71

).p ! .001Product Satisfaction. To establish the generalizability

of the effect across different product categories and super-stitious beliefs within a single study, we employed a re-peated-measures design. Superstitious associations (presentvs. absent) and superstition salience (high vs. low) werebetween-subject variables, and product category (tennisballs, rice cooker, digital camera) was a repeated measure.An ANOVA on the satisfaction index across the three prod-uct categories yielded only the expected superstitious as-sociation by superstition salience interaction (F(1, 41)p

, ).7.15 p ! .02In particular, and as shown in table 1, when superstitions

were not salient (control prime), participants expected to besignificantly less satisfied following product failure of thetennis balls containing the attribute with which they hadpositive (vs. neutral) associations ( ,F(1, 41)p 9.29 p !

), supporting hypothesis 1a. It is interesting to note that.01when superstitions were made salient, participants were mar-ginally more satisfied following product failure of the tennis

balls containing the attribute with which they had positive(vs. neutral) associations ( , ). Simi-F(1, 41)p 3.65 p ! .07larly, when superstitions were not salient, participants ex-pected to be significantly less satisfied following productfailure of the rice cooker containing the attribute with whichthey had positive (vs. neutral) associations (F(1, 41)p

, ), again supporting hypothesis 1a. As expected,5.54 p ! .05when superstitions were made salient, participants wereequally satisfied following product failure of the rice cooker( ). Note however that, directionally, participantsp 1 .10were more satisfied following product failure of the luckyred (vs. neutral green) cooker ( vs. 2.89). Finally,Mp 3.73when superstitions were not salient, participants expectedto be significantly more satisfied following product failureof the digital camera containing the attribute with whichthey had negative (vs. neutral) associations (F(1, 41)p

, ), confirming hypothesis 1b. However, when11.66 p ! .01superstitions were made salient, participants were less sat-isfied following product failure of the digital camera con-taining the attribute with which they had negative (vs. neu-tral) associations ( , ).F(1, 41)p 4.36 p ! .05

DiscussionStudy 1 demonstrated how positive superstitious beliefs

concerning colors and numbers affect product satisfactionjudgments, showing that product failure results in lowersatisfaction for products for which positive superstitious as-sociations with an attribute exist. In addition, we showedthat product failure leads to higher satisfaction for productswith associated negative superstitions. To test our proposi-tion that superstitious effects are at least partially driven bya nonconscious process, separate experimental conditionsmade the association between the activation task and thedependent measure obvious. We found that the effect ofsuperstition on satisfaction was attenuated with the salienceof superstitious beliefs. It is interesting to note that we ob-tained preliminary evidence that when superstitious beliefswere made salient, the effect may even reverse when par-ticipants are aware that the priming and evaluation tasks arerelated. In particular, participants were marginally more sat-isfied with 8 versus 10 tennis balls, directionally more sat-isfied with the red versus green rice cooker, but less satisfiedwith the digital camera ending with the digit 4 versus 5.



This finding is in line with prior research on priming,reactance, and bias correction. In particular, Strack et al.(1993) showed that when participants were made aware ofthe priming task, a positive (vs. negative) prime resulted inmore negative likeability ratings. More recently, Kray et al.(2004), in their work on stereotype reactance, have alsodemonstrated that awareness of a prime can lead to reac-tance, a motivation to restore a threatened freedom and anincreased attractiveness of the constrained behavior (Brehm1966). In particular, Kray et al. (2004) found that blatantlyactivating gender stereotypes (i.e., explicitly linking mas-culine traits to negotiator effectiveness) actually results inwomen outperforming men in negotiations. Conversely, fol-lowing a subtle, implicit prime, men outperform women.Apparently, the blatant (vs. subtle) prime caused women toreact against the negative stereotype. Petty and WegenersFlexible Correction Model provides an interesting expla-nation for these results, as well as for the results we find instudy 1. Specifically, Petty and Wegener posit that whenjudges are motivated and able to identify potential sourcesof bias arising from their naive theories of how the contex-tual influence operates, they correct their judgment in a di-rection opposite to that of the perceived bias and in anamount commensurate with the perceived amount of bias(Petty and Wegener 1993; Wegener and Petty 1995).

In study 1, we thus found support for a nonconsciouscomponent to the process of superstitious beliefs on con-sumer behavior. However, as mentioned earlier, even stron-ger support for a nonconscious process would be obtainedif we could corroborate these findings in our next study ina priming condition in which activation of superstitions onsubsequent judgments is followed by an unrelated choicetask. Furthermore, while the first study has shown that su-perstitious beliefs have a robust effect on the consumer be-havior of Taiwanese participants, in our next study we in-vestigate if culturally relevant superstitions affect Americanindividuals as well. As we discussed, one of the most prom-inent superstitions held by Americans is that Friday the thir-teenth brings bad luck. It is estimated that as many as 9%of Americans are paraskevidekatriaphobics: afflicted with afear of Friday the thirteenth (Vyse 1997). In fact, para-skevidekatriaphobia influences a wide variety of decisions,from architecture to personal risk aversion: 90% of Otiselevators have no thirteenth-floor button, the U.S. Navy willnot launch a ship on Friday the thirteenth, and many Amer-icans will not fly, get married, start a new job, or close ona house on this date (Brockenbrough 2006; Harris 2006).

Therefore, in addition to seeking further evidence for anonconscious component of the effect of superstition, ournext study tested how salience of Friday the thirteenth affectsdecision making under risk. We expected that priming par-ticipants with Friday the thirteenth and its associated po-tential for bad luck (vs. a neutral prime: Tuesday the nine-teenth) would result in their making more risk-aversechoices. That is, since priming Friday the thirteenth makesthe possibility of bad luck accessible, we predict that sub-jects would avoid taking risks (i.e., choose a sure win of a

smaller amount over a gamble to win a larger amount) insubsequent choices.

Findings in the affect and consumer behavior literatureprovide support for our proposition. In particular, Raghun-athan and Pham (1999; see also Raghunathan, Pham, andCorfman 2006) demonstrated that consumers who were in-duced with feelings of anxiety, uncertainty, and potentialbad luck chose safer options that provided more control (i.e.,they exhibited risk-averse behavior). These induced statesare consistent with the activation of superstitious beliefsassociated with Friday the thirteenth. Further support for theinfluence of superstitious beliefs on risk-taking behaviorcomes from the literature on gambling and the illusion ofcontrol (Langer 1975). For example, gamblers bet moremoney and were more confident of winning when throwingthe dice themselves than when someone else threw the dicefor them, even though in both cases the probability of win-ning was the same (Strickland, Lewicki, and Katz 1966).

H2: Consumers make more risk-averse choices whennegative superstitions are salient (vs. not salient).

STUDY 2Method: Participants and Procedure

Ninety-five students from an East Coast university par-ticipated in a study on consumer preferences in exchangefor $5. Subjects were told that they would participate intwo unrelated studies. In reality, the first study consistedof the prime, disguised as a life inventory survey. In par-ticular, subjects were told that we were compiling a list ofthings that come to mind when thinking about Friday thethirteenth or Tuesday the nineteenth, depending on the ran-domly assigned condition. Following the life inventorystudy, subjects completed an ostensibly unrelated ques-tionnaire in which they were asked to indicate their pref-erences for two different bets, each of which consisted ofa sure win of a small amount and a gamble to win eithera large amount or nothing. Specifically, in the first betproblem, subjects were told to imagine choosing betweenreceiving $18 for sure versus a 20% chance to win $240and an 80% chance to win nothing. Next, in bet 2, subjectswere told to imagine that in exchange for participating ina study, they could choose between the option to receive$12 for sure or the option to have a 25% chance to receive$175 and a 75% chance to receive nothing. After indicatingtheir preferences in the two bets, subjects were thanked,debriefed, and dismissed.

ResultsManipulation Check. The total number of items listed

did not differ by condition ( vs. 4.77 for FridayMp 5.67the thirteenth vs. Tuesday the nineteenth, respectively;

, NS). Next, two independent raters cate-F(1, 93)p 1.76gorized subjects thoughts as negative or reflecting bad luck.Inter-rater agreement was 94%; disagreements were resolved



through discussion. As expected, subjects listed significantlymore items with negative associations (e.g., horrible, death,or unfortunate events) in the Friday the thirteenth than inthe Tuesday the nineteenth condition ( versus .17;Mp 2.27

, ). Subjects also mentioned badF(1, 93)p 48.70 p ! .001luck significantly more often following the Friday the thir-teenth prime ( vs. .06; ,Mp .75 F(1, 93)p 47.68 p !

)..001

Choice of Safe Option. We conducted an overall testof our hypothesis across the two bet problems using a logitmodel. The dependent variable was a 01 dummy variable,where 1 denotes choice of the safe option. The independentvariables included (1) a dummy variable that had a valueof 1 in the superstitious prime condition and (2) the two-way interaction between the prime manipulation and the betproblems. The overall model was significant ( 2x (2)p

, ). As expected, superstition salience was a14.90 p ! .01significant predictor of the mean choice of the safe option( , Walds , ). That is, across the2Bp 1.44 x p 11.58 p ! .01two bets, 50% of subjects in the superstition-salient con-dition, but only 24% of subjects in the control condition,chose the safe option.

Discussion

Study 2 found that superstitions also affect the behaviorof U.S. consumers. In particular, participants became sig-nificantly more risk-averse in their choices after thinkingabout Friday the thirteenth, as compared to a day that is notassociated with bad luck. In addition, this studys findingthat the effect of superstitious beliefs is obtained when theiractivation and the main dependent variable task are unrelated(but not when they are clearly related) further supports ourproposition that there is a nonconscious component to theeffect of superstitious beliefs.

Further evidence for nonconscious processing comesfrom a series of regressions that test for the mediationalrole of the conscious thoughts that subjects expressed inthe priming manipulation. In particular, as we discussed,priming had a significant effect on choice of safe optionand number of negative-valenced thoughts and thoughtsrelated to bad luck. Further, negatively valenced thoughts( , Walds , ) and thoughts re-2Bp .249 x p 8.83 p ! .01lated to bad luck ( , Walds , )2Bp .628 x p 6.06 p ! .05were each significant predictors of choice of the safe op-tion. However, when both priming and negatively valencedthoughts were entered into the regression, prime remaineda significant predictor ( , Walds ,2Bp .96 x p 4.91 p !

). Similar results were obtained when we entered both.05priming and thoughts related to bad luck into the regression(priming , Walds , ). In other2Bp 1.11 x p 6.68 p ! .01words, when conscious thoughts are included as a potentialmediator, the effect of prime was diminished but still sig-nificant. This suggests that conscious thoughts only par-tially mediate the choice of the safe option. Thus, althoughconscious thoughts are present and affect decision making,

they seem to represent a smaller proportion of the effectthan the nonconscious component.

In the next study, we seek to more fully understand therelative contribution of the conscious versus nonconsciouscomponents of superstition-driven decision making. Spe-cifically, we use an experimental methodology designed toestimate the distinct contributions of conscious and non-conscious processing to a single cognitive task.

STUDY 3

ObjectiveThe main objective of study 3 is to estimate the unique

conscious and nonconscious influences of superstition onrisky decision making. Following Fitzsimons and Williams(2000), we use a decompositional technique that allows forcalculation of the conscious and nonconscious processingcomponents by solving a set of simultaneous equations (seeFitzsimons and Williams [2000] for a full exposition of thetechnique and background literature). It is important to notethat the two simultaneous equations are derived throughsetting up experimental scenarios such that in one scenariothe conscious and nonconscious processes work in concert(magnification condition) and in another they act in oppo-sition (reduction condition). Thus, following the procedureset forth in Jacoby (1991) and Fitzsimons and Williams(2000), in addition to the superstitious prime manipulation,we employed a second manipulation (level of uncertainty)that would either magnify or reduce the effect of supersti-tion. As described in detail below, the design of the studywas a 2 (prime: superstitious vs. control) # 2 (cognitiveload: high vs. low)# 2 (uncertainty: high vs. low) between-subject design, which allows us to calculate the effect ofsuperstition in four key conditions: low cognitive load, highuncertainty (LM); low cognitive load, low uncertainty (LR);high cognitive load, high uncertainty (HM); and high cog-nitive load, low uncertainty (HR).

In particular, in addition to the superstitious prime ma-nipulation used in study 2, we chose a second manipulationthat would either magnify or reduce the effect of super-stition. Based on prior research that shows that reliance onsuperstitions tends to increase in times of greater uncer-tainty (Keinan 2002; Malinowski 1954), subjects were ran-domly assigned to gambles that differ in their level ofoutcome uncertainty. We expected that following the su-perstitious (vs. control) prime, subjects in the high-uncer-tainty (magnification) condition would be more likely tochoose a safe option than subjects in the low-uncertainty(reduction) condition. Finally, as was done in previousresearch using decompositional techniques (Fitzsimonsand Williams 2000; Jacoby 1991), subjects completed thestudy under high versus low cognitive load, such that theability to engage in effortful, conscious processing wasimpaired for subjects in the former conditions, but not forsubjects in the latter conditions.



Method: Participants and ProcedureOne hundred and forty-six students from an East Coast

university participated in the study on consumer preferencesin exchange for class credit in a 2 (prime: superstitious vs.control)# 2 (cognitive load: high vs. low)# 2 (uncertainty:high vs. low) between-subject design. The procedure wasidentical to the one used in the previous study, except wherenoted below.

After the Friday the thirteenth versus Tuesday the nine-teenth prime, subjects in the high cognitive load conditionreceived an ostensibly unrelated study on comparing prod-ucts that asked them to study a list of 20 features on whichproducts can differ, for 2 minutes, and memorize as manyof them as possible. Subjects were also told that this was avery hard task but that some people in prior studies hadbeen able to recall all of the features. After studying thelist, subjects in the cognitive load condition turned the pageand completed the main study on risk-taking behavior. Sub-jects in the no-load condition completed the main studyimmediately after the priming manipulation.

Next, subjects indicated the choices they would make intwo bet problems in which the level of uncertainty wasmanipulated by changing the odds of winning in the gambleoption. In the first problem, subjects were asked to chooseeither between receiving $18 for sure versus a 50% chanceto win $96 and a 50% chance to win nothing (high uncer-tainty, magnification condition) or between receiving $18for sure versus a 20% chance to win $240 and an 80%chance to win nothing (low uncertainty, reduction condi-tion). Following completion of the first bet problem, subjectsin the high cognitive load conditions were reminded of thesubsequent product feature recall task. In the second prob-lem, subjects were asked to choose either between receiving$12 for sure versus a 45% chance to win $97 and a 55%chance to win nothing (high uncertainty, magnification con-dition) or between receiving $12 for sure versus a 25%chance to win $175 and a 75% chance to win nothing (lowuncertainty, reduction condition). After indicating their pref-erences in the second bet problem, subjects in the high cog-nitive load task were asked to recall as many of the productfeatures as they could, were thanked, debriefed, and dis-missed. Subjects in the low cognitive load condition werethanked, debriefed, and dismissed after completion of thesecond bet problem. The uncertainty manipulation had beenpretested with a separate sample of 18 undergraduate stu-dents. Results indicated that, overall, the uncertain condi-tions were rated as containing more uncertainty than thecertain conditions ( , ).tp 2.43 p ! .05

ResultsManipulation Check. A 2 (prime)# 2 (cognitive load)# 2 (level of uncertainty) ANOVA on the total number ofitems listed yielded a significant effect for prime (Mp

vs. 5.97 for Friday the thirteenth vs. Tuesday the nine-7.05teenth, respectively; , ). Next, twoF(1, 138)p 5.02 p ! .05independent raters categorized subjects thoughts as nega-

tive or reflecting bad luck. Inter-rater agreement was 92%;disagreements were resolved through discussion. As ex-pected, subjects listed significantly more items with negativeassociations in the Friday the thirteenth condition than inthe Tuesday the nineteenth condition ( versus .06;Mp 2.06

, ). Subjects also mentioned badF(1, 138)p 290.72 p ! .001luck significantly more often following the Friday the thir-teenth prime ( vs. .02; ,Mp .64 F(1, 138)p 281.08 p !

). Finally, subjects in the high cognitive load condition.001correctly recalled on average 8.29 of the 20 product features.

Choice of Safe Option. We conducted an overall testof our hypothesis across the two bet problems using a logitmodel. The dependent variable was a 01 dummy variable,where 1 denotes choice of the safe option. The independentvariables included (1) a dummy variable that had a valueof 1 in the superstitious prime condition and (2) the two-way interaction between the prime manipulation and the betproblems. The overall model was significant ( 2x (2)p

, ). As expected, superstition salience was a sig-6.25 p ! .05nificant predictor of the mean choice of the safe option( , Walds , ). In particular, across2Bp .805 x p 6.16 p ! .02the two bets, 49% of subjects in the superstition-salient con-dition, but only 35% of subjects in the control condition,chose the safe option. These results replicate our findingsfrom study 2.

Conscious versus Nonconscious Components of Su-perstitious Beliefs. A logit model was used to test for theunique conscious versus nonconscious components of theeffect of superstition on risk aversion. The dependent var-iable was a 01 dummy variable, where 1 denotes choiceof the safe option. The independent variables included (1)a dummy variable that had a value of 1 in the superstitiousprime condition; (2) a dummy variable that had a value of1 in the high uncertainty condition; (3) a dummy variablethat had a value of 1 in the low cognitive load condition;(4) the two-way interaction between the prime and uncer-tainty manipulations; (5) the two-way interaction betweenthe prime and cognitive load manipulations; (6) the two-way interaction between the cognitive load and uncertaintymanipulations; (7) the three-way interaction between theprime, cognitive load, and uncertainty manipulations; and(8) the interactions between the bet problems and the prime,cognitive load, and uncertainty conditions. The overallmodel was significant ( , ).2x (8)p 24.94 p ! .01

Results showed that our magnification-reduction manip-ulation worked as intended, as demonstrated by a significantsuperstition salience by uncertainty interaction ( ,Bp 1.64Walds , ). In particular, the effect of the2x p 5.06 p ! .05superstitious prime was larger for subjects in the high-un-certainty (magnification) condition (40% vs. 22%; Bp

, Walds , ) than for subjects in the20.86 x p 5.65 p ! .05low-uncertainty (reduction) condition (49% vs. 47%; Bp

, Walds , NS). Next, following Fitzsimons and2.09 x p .07Williams (2000), we estimated the individual contributionsof nonconscious versus conscious processing to the increase



TABLE 2

CHOICE SHARE OF THE SAFE OPTION BY CONDITION

ConditionSuperstitious

primeControlprime

Impact ofsuperstition

salience

Low cognitive load, magnified (LM) 45 20 +25Low cognitive load, reduced (LR) 50 31 +19High cognitive load, magnified (HM) 42 27 +15High cognitive load, reduced (HR) 59 63 4

in the choice share of the safe option following the super-stitious prime (see table 2).

After we obtained the impact of superstition salience onthe choice share of the safe option under the four key con-ditions (LM, LR, HM, and HR), we calculated the conscious(CSh and CSl) versus nonconscious (NC) components of theeffect according to the following equations developed byFitzsimons and Williams (2000):

1 LM + LR HM HRNCp HM + HR ,{ [ ]}2 LM LR

1( )HM HR(1)

HM HRCS p , (2)h 2

LM LRCS p . (3)l 2

Our results show that the nonconscious component of theeffect of superstition leads to an increase of nearly 30% inthe share of the safe option (NC), compared to an increaseof 9.5% in choice share due to the conscious component ofthe superstition effect under high cognitive load (CSh) anda slight increase of 3% under low cognitive load (CSl).

DiscussionStudy 3 once again showed the impact of negative su-

perstitious beliefs on decision making under risk. In par-ticular, we found that when primed with Friday the thir-teenth, subjects made significantly more risk-aversechoices (i.e., chose the sure-thing option). It is importantto note that by using a process dissociation technique ad-vanced by Fitzsimons and Williams (2000), we were ableto separate the effect of superstition on decision makinginto its distinct conscious and nonconscious components.As suggested by the results of the first two studies, wefound evidence of the role of nonconscious processing inthe effect of superstition. As a matter of fact, the noncon-

scious component in this study was greater than the con-scious one by a factor of three. The relative magnitude ofthe nonconscious to the conscious component demonstratesthe significant effect that specific culture-bound beliefs canhave on consumer behavior.

In addition, our final study found support for anotherprevalent speculative assertion in the superstition literature,namely, that reliance on superstitions tends to increase intimes of uncertainty (Keinan 2002; Malinowski 1954).Based on anthropological work he conducted in the early1900s, Malinowski posited that superstitions function to re-duce anxiety arising from unknown or uncertain situations.Since that early work, there had been much anecdotal evi-dence to support this popular psychological theory of su-perstition (see Tsang [2004] for a review). Tsang (2004)provided such anecdotal evidence, along with qualitativeinformant quotes to suggest that Chinese executives invokesuperstitions as a coping mechanism to deal with uncertainbusiness decisions. The results of our current magnification/reduction manipulation provided empirical evidence, in aconsumer domain, that the effects of superstitious beliefsare greater under conditions of high uncertaintythat is,for gambles with more uncertain outcomes.

GENERAL DISCUSSIONThis research is one of the first to investigate the impact

of irrational beliefs on consumer behavior in the marketplace(see also Morales and Fitzsimons 2007). A series of studiesfound a robust effect of superstitious beliefs on consumerssatisfaction judgments and risk-taking behavior. Notably, wefurthermore extended prior research on superstition by pro-viding important evidence of the nonconscious nature ofsuperstitious beliefs. Note, however, that the nonconsciousprocess of superstitious beliefs is not likely to generalize tosuperstitious rituals, such as carrying a rabbits foot for goodluck (Darke and Freedman 1997b). For example, studentsconsciously bring lucky pens to class, and Chinese parentsconsciously give red envelopes for the New Year. Finally,we also found evidence for the moderating role of the levelof uncertainty in the relationship between superstitious be-liefs and risk-taking behavior.

In order to demonstrate the culturally relevant effects ofsuperstitious beliefs, we limited this study to judgments ofproduct satisfaction (Taiwanese participants) and decisionmaking (U.S. participants). Related research by the current



authors shows how strong an impact superstitious beliefscan have not only on product satisfaction but, importantly,on purchase likelihood (details can be obtained from theauthors). Counter to economic rationality, Taiwanese con-sumers were more likely to purchase a portable radio whenit was priced at a higher but lucky TW$888 than when thesame radio was priced at a lower but neutral TW$777. Inother words, participants were willing to spend nearly 15%more money for the same radio because of positive super-stitious beliefs they had with the number 8 (vs. 7). In aseparate study, we found that negative associations withthe number 4 (vs. 5) caused Taiwanese participants to bemore likely to purchase a digital camera when it was pricedat a higher but neutral TW$6,555.55 than when they werepriced at a lower but unlucky TW$6,444.44, thereby for-going a discount. These effects of superstitious beliefs onpurchase likelihood were independent of inferred price/quality differences. The findings of this combined researchstream have important implications for marketing man-agers in that marketers may be able to strategically managesatisfaction and purchase likelihood through consumersperformance expectations with relatively easy-to-imple-ment attribute changes in color or price.

Given that this research is one of the first to investigatethe effect of superstition on consumer behavior, it has lim-itations that need to be acknowledged. First, we proposethat superstitious beliefs set up product performance ex-pectations that drive the differential levels of satisfactiondemonstrated in study 1. However, we did not measure per-formance expectations in that study, so we do not haveevidence for the hypothesized process. Yet, related work bythe current authors demonstrates that differences in productsatisfaction due to superstitious associations are greater forconsumers who are more (vs. less) sensitive to the discon-firmation of expectations.

Next, although we show that the effect of superstitiontends to be based on nonconscious processing to a greatdegree, we did not test for the more specific process un-derlying the effect. For example, thinking about Friday thethirteenth may have raised levels of anxiety for the partic-ipants in studies 2 and 3. As we did not measure the levelof anxiety, we cannot make claims as to whether this isindeed the underlying affective driver of our results. Futureresearch building on the current studies that attempt to un-derstand the affective processes underlying superstitions isundoubtedly needed. It is possible that priming superstitiousbeliefs may be accompanied with an increase/decrease ofappropriate emotions, both negative and positive. While Fri-day the thirteenth may raise levels of anxiety for Americans,thinking about the color red may increase perceived hap-piness among some Chinese. In addition, more research isneeded to shed light on the specific consequences of su-perstitious beliefs. For example, one might investigate theproposition that superstitious beliefs result in biased infor-mation processing.

The current research also opens the door to many worth-while avenues of future research. Findings that superstitious

beliefs can cause consumers to violate economic rationalityprovide supportive evidence that superstitions work at anonconscious level. Arguably, consumers would not con-sciously be willing to pay more for a product. In the currentstudies we show that indeed it is mostly through noncon-scious processing that superstitious beliefs influence actions.In addition, it would be interesting to take this researchfurther by investigating the consequences of these findings.For example, it is likely that attributions of product failuremay differ across conditions according to superstitious be-liefs. Therefore, future research could investigate the mod-erating role of internal versus external locus of control onthe effect of superstitious beliefs on consumer judgments.Similarly, attributions of blame for product failure, and as-sociated repurchase intentions, may differ with superstitiousbeliefs. That is, consumers may attribute failure of a productwith positive superstitious associations on themselves, whileattributing failure of a product without superstitious asso-ciations to the product itself.

In addition, the results of the current research are basedon hypothetical choice scenarios. It is therefore importantto replicate and extend research on the impact of supersti-tious beliefs on consumer behavior in field studies. Riskaversion based on superstitious beliefs can involve realcostsas exemplified by the fact that nearly $1 billion islost in business in the United States each Friday the thir-teenth (Palazzolo 2005).

Finally, the effect of superstitious beliefs on risk-takingbehavior is not likely to be the same for all consumers. Onestable personality trait worthy of future investigation, whichis likely to moderate the effect, is an individuals beliefsabout the causal properties of luck, as measured by Darkeand Freedmans (1997a) Belief in Good Luck (BIGL) scale,for example. In particular, the BIGL scale assesses the de-gree to which individuals believe that luck is a stable qualitythat they possess (i.e., high belief in good luck) versus justrandom and beyond their control (i.e., low belief in goodluck). It would be interesting to test how this stable traitinfluences chronically or temporarily accessible culturallyshared superstitious beliefs.

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