communicave ac)on in groups and support...
TRANSCRIPT
Communica)veAc)oninGroupsandSupportNetworks
ToddDaviesSymbolicSystemsProgram&
CenterfortheStudyofLanguageandInforma)on
StanfordUniversity
SYMSYS275/BIO175April26,2017
Communica)veAc)on
Ajointac)oninwhichpar)cipantscommunicate,andinwhichtheac)onisthepurposetowhichthecommunica)onisdirectedTermisfromJürgenHabermas(1981),ATheoryofCommunica=veAc=on
Twotypesofconflict
BeliefsAssignmentsofTrueorFalse(orofprobabili)es)toproposi)ons,e.g.• “Ibelieveitwillraintomorrow.”• “IbelievethatifDeborahteachestheclass,students
willlikeit.”Preferences
Assignmentsofrela)vedesiretopossibleoutcomes,e.g.• “Iprefersunshineoverrain.”• “Ipreferea)ngindoorsoverapicnicintherain.”
FourFormsofCommunica)veAc)on
Rosenschein,S.J.,&Davies,T.(toappear).Coordina)ontechnologyforac)vesupportnetworks:Context,needfinding,anddesign.AI&Society.
UsualApproachestoPreferenceConflictsinDecisionTheory
Preferenceaggrega)on(socialchoicetheory)• Vo)ngmethods(choosing,ranking,approving)• Decisionrules(majority/condorcet,plurality,borda,instantrunoff)
Bargaining/nego)a)onRandomselec)on
Preferenceresolu)oncanbelesseffec)vethandelibera)on
Example:• Personcini)allyprefersac)ona• Persondini)allyprefersac)ona’• Bothini)allypreferoutcomexoverx’,anddonotcarewhich
ac)on(aora’)achievesthis• Butcknowsp(x|a)=1andp(x|a’)=0• Anddthinksp(x|a)=.4andp(x|a’)=.6• Bothcanddarera)onal• Therefore:Ifcandddiscusstheirbeliefspriortoafinalvote
oragreement,theywillconvergeonac)onabecausechasbederinforma)onaboutp(x|a)thanddoes.
• Afocusonpreferencesonly,withoutdelibera)on,missesthisinforma)onandmightleadtoaworseoutcome
FourFormsofCommunica)veAc)on
Howdotheseformsrelatetoconceptssuchas…?• “collec)veintelligence”• “smartci)es”and“civicintelligence”• “GlobalBrain”and“MassMind”(Bloom,2000)
Asomewhatcontroversialposi)on…
“Intelligence”isaconsensusconcept–itappliesonlywhen(most)peopleagreethatonesolu)on,ac)on,orplanisbederthanothers.Inmanysocialsitua)ons,especiallythoseinvolvinglargenumbersofpeople,thereisnogeneralagreementonwhatisthebederorbestcourseofac)on.Therefore…a“collec)velyintelligent”courseofac)onimpliesthatthestakeholderseither...• havelowinterpersonalgoalconflict,or• agreethatthecourseofac)onisagoodwaytoresolve
theirconflicts
Let’sdeepenthisabit...
3branchesofdecisionTheory• ExpectedU)lityTheory(singleagentin“gamesagainstnature”)–VonNeumann&Morgenstern,1944
• GameTheory(mul)pleagentscompe)ngforpayoffs)–Nashequilibrium,1951
• SocialChoiceTheory(mul)pleagentsthatmustagreeonasocialoutcome)–Arrow,1951
PreferenceProfiles
PreferenceProfiles
SocialChoiceTheory
DEFINITION:Preferencerela*onsR,P,andIrespec)velyexistbetweentwooutcomeswhenevertheoutcomescanbematchedwithlabelsxandysuchthat:• xRy,meaningxispreferredorindifferenttoy(weakpreference).
• xPy,meaningxispreferredtoy,andholdsiffnotyRx.(strictpreference).
• xIy,meaningxisindifferenttoy,andholdsiffxRyandyRx(indifference).
SocialChoiceTheory(con)nued)
DEFINITION:Apreferencerela)onRisweaklyorderediffforalloutcomesx,y,andz:inasetofoutcomesX:• xRyoryRx(completeness).• xRyandyRzimplyxRz(transi*vity).
SocialChoiceTheory(con)nued)DEFINITION:Asocialwelfarefunc*onisafunc)onfsuchthatif• Xisthesetofallconceivablesocialoutcomesorstates(|X|≥3),
• Nisasetofindividuals(2≤⏐N⏐=n),and• DisadomainofpreferenceprofilesRN=<R1,R2,…Rn>,suchthat
• foralliinN,Riisaweaklyorderedpreferencerela)onforindividualioverX(individualra*onality),
thenfmapsDintoarangeRofpossiblesocialpreferencerela)onsRNonXforgroupN.
SocialChoiceTheory(con)nued)
DEFINITION:Asocialwelfarefunc)onfisanArrowsocialwelfarefunc*onif• thedomainDoffcontainsallpossiblepreferenceprofilesRN(universaldomain),
and• therangeRoffisthesetofweaklyorderedsocialpreferencerela)onsRN(collec*vera*onality).
SocialChoiceTheory(con)nued)THEOREM:Arrow'sImpossibilityTheorem(Arrow,1951/1963).TherecanbenoArrowsocialwelfarefunc)onfsa)sfyingallofthefollowing:• forallsocialoutcomesxandyinX,ifapreferenceprofileRNobeys
xPiyforeachindividualiinN,thenf(RN)yieldsxRNy(weakParetoefficiency);
• forallpreferenceprofilesRNandRN'inD,andallsocialoutcomesxandyinX,ifRNandRN'obeyxRiyiffxRi'yforallindividualsiinN,thenf(RN)andf(RN')yieldxRNyiffxRN'y(independenceofirrelevantalterna*ves);
and• thereisnoindividualdinNsuchthatforallpreferenceprofilesRN
inD,andallsocialoutcomesxandyinX,ifxPdythenf(RN)yieldsxPNy(non-dictatorship).
SocialChoiceTheory(con)nued)DEFINITION:AsocialchoiceruleCmapsthedomainDofpreferenceprofiles,togetherwithenvironmentsS⊆X,intosubsetsofS.SIDENOTE:Theabovedefini)ondoesnotassumethatCobeysanordering.Arrowdidassumethis,however:DEFINITION:AsocialchoiceruleCisanArrowsocialchoicefunc*onifitisdeterminedbyanArrowsocialwelfarefunc)onfandforallenvironmentsS⊆X,C(S,f(RN))={x⏐xisinSand,forallyinS,f(RN)yieldsxRNy}.
RevealedSocialPreferences(Davies&Shah2004)
DEFINITION:GivenasetXofsocialoutcomes,apreferenceprofileRN,andasocialchoiceruleC,xRN*y(meaningthereisarevealedsocialpreferenceforxinrela)ontoy)iffthereissomeenvironmentS⊆X,suchthatxandyareinSandxisinC(S,RN).
RevealedSocialPreferences(Davies&Shah2004,con)nued)
DEFINITION:Weakaxiomofrevealedsocialpreference.GivenasetXofsocialoutcomes,apreferenceprofileRN,andasocialchoiceruleC,asocialpreferencerela)onRNsa)sfiesinter-menuconsistency(IMC)*iffitisarevealedsocialpreferencerela)onunderCforallpairsofsocialoutcomesinX,andthefollowingcondi)onholds:ForallenvironmentsS⊆X,ifxandyareinSandxisinC(S,RN),thenforallenvironmentsS'⊆XsuchthatxandyareinS',ifyisinC(S',RN),thenxisinC(S',RN).*ThistermisfromSen(1993).
RevealedSocialPreferences(Davies&Shah2004,con)nued)
THEOREM:IfRN*isarevealedsocialpreferencerela)onassociatedwithasetXofsocialoutcomes,apreferenceprofileRN,andasocialchoiceruleC,andRN*violatesinter-menuconsistency,thenitviolatescollec)vera)onality.TDavies,T.&Shah,R(2004).Intui)vepreferenceaggrega)on:Testsofindependenceandconsistency.hdp://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2213600
Intui)vePreferenceAggrega)on(5voters)
Intui)vePreferenceAggrega)on(3voters)
PreferenceAggrega)on:ConclusionsArrow’sTheoremshowsthatinthegeneralcaseofacollec)onofagents,thereisnowaytoaggregatetheirpreferencesthatleadsto“consistent”choicesacrossdifferentpreferenceprofilesSingle-agentdecisiontheory(i.e.ExpectedU)lityTheory)assumesconsistentchoicesacrossvaryingmenusarepossibleforindividuals,atleastintheoryTherefore…Arrow’stheoremprovidesanargumentthatcollec)vedecisionmakingcannotbera)onalinthesamesenseasindividualdecisionmaking.Humanintui)onsaboutfairpreferenceaggrega)onrobustlyviolateArrow’scondi)ons.Buthumansdonotagreeonwhatisthefairestsocialchoicerule.Sowhatdoesthismeanfor“collec)veintelligence”?
Animportantques)onfacinghumanity…
Ifweassumethata“collec)velyintelligent”solu)ontoasocialproblemorissueisonethatmostpeoplewouldagreeisbederthanothersolu)ons…Arethesocialproblemsorissueswefacesuscep)bletocollec)velyintelligentsolu)ons?
Examplesofresearch:Coordina)on(Rosenschein&Davies,toappear)
Coordina)onlevelsandsublevels:• Individualsengageinbehaviorthatrequirescoordina)onbetweentasks,
eveniftheindividualisviewedas– isolatedfromothers,andthatrequirescoordina)onwithotherswhenthat
individualis– connectedtothem;
• Networksofindividuals,whoareconnectedtoeachotherbutwhoretainautonomytodecideontheirownac)ons,maycoordinatefor– informa=on-sharing,e.g.incommuni)esofprac)ce(Wenger,1998),orto
providemore– directsupportforeachother;and
• Teams,whosemembersareconsciouslyworkingtogethertoachievethesamegoal(s),andmusttypicallycoordinatewitheachotherwhethertheycometogetheronan– ad-hocbasisorasmembersofan– organiza=on.
Examplesofresearch:Coordina)on
Fourapplica)onareasforimprovingcoordina)oninac)vesupportnetworks:(i)academiccoaching,(ii)voca)onaltraining,(iii)earlylearninginterven)on,and(iv)volunteercoordina)on
Examplesofresearch:Coordina)on
Wearguethatthetoolsneededtosupportcoordina)oninac)vesupportnetworksaredifferentfromthosethatworkbestinteams,becausethoseinasupportnetworkare• lessobligatedtodoneededtasks• morelikelytobefocusedonothertasksandjobsasprimary(moredistractable)
• morelikelytoengageintermidentlyoronlywhentheyhaveextra)me
Rosenschein,S.J.,&Davies,T.(toappear).Coordina)ontechnologyforac)vesupportnetworks:Context,needfinding,anddesign.AI&Society.
Examplesofresearch:Delibera)onCommunityplanningprocessesovenleaveoutkeystakeholdersbecausetheyrelyonfacetofacemee)ngsthatnoteveryonecanmake–needonlinetoolsforjoiningthedelibera)on.
Davies,T.,Sywulka,B.,Saffold,R.,&Jhaveri,R.(2002).Communitydemocracyonline:ApreliminaryreportfromEastPaloAlto.
Differentmaindelibera)onmethodsallleadtosubstan)alchangesinknowledgeand/orawtudesoverandabovebackgroundinforma)on
Carman,K.L.,etal.(2015).Effec)venessofpublicdelibera)onmethodsforgatheringinputonissuesinhealthcare:Resultsfromarandomizedtrial.SocialScience&Medicine,133,11-20..
Onlinedelibera)onmethodsdonotappeartonega)velyaffectequalityofpar)cipa)onrela)vetofacetofacemethods,exceptforasmalleffectonracialdisparity(African-AmericanversusWhite).
Showers,E.,Tindall,N.,&Davies,T.(2015,August).EqualityofPar)cipa)onOnlineVersusFacetoFace:CondensedAnalysisoftheCommunityForumDelibera)veMethodsDemonstra)on.InInterna=onalConferenceonElectronicPar=cipa=on(pp.53-67).SpringerInterna)onalPublishing.