columbia case analysis_group 3

7/29/2019 Columbia Case Analysis_Group 3

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Columbias Final Mission

By Group 3

Abhishek Singhvi12P182

Aditya Gautam 12P184

Aneesha Chandra12P186

Arpit Jain 12P189

Arunabh Thakur

12P190Kartik K 12P204


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NASA

High Interactive complexity or tightcoupling Multiple Interdependencies

Lot of focus on Research with largeamount of uncertainties

Excessive focus onefficiency(deadlines) rather thancollaboration and communication

Subtle change in working environmentfrom organic to mechanistic


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Technical

Cognition

Group Level

Organizational

What caused the disaster?


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Foam Issue

Crater software not up to date

Cameras not sufficient

Technical


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Confirmatory bias

Overconfidence on initial assessments

Assumption that only TPS tiles

affected, no effect on RCC tiles

Cognitive


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Poor team designAd-hoc group with poorly defined lines of

authority

Limited access to resources

No tiger team implying that Foam issue is notvery serious

Other teams not co-located

Team climate Interpersonal climate was not conducive to

dissent or questioning especially when powerdistance was high

Group Level


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Organization Structure

Strict reporting relationships

Information flow is not rapid/Rigid

Communication protocols Organization Culture

Lots of hard data needed as culture

was of proving something does notwork rather than vice versa

Organizational


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xes e oam pro em,would this be effective in

preventing future accidents?

Why not? NO

Complex and Unstable Environment

requires

Hierarchy

Formalization

Specialization:

Centralization:

OrganicStructure


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Reasons that led to downplay of

foam strikes

Environment attributes leading todownplay

Budget cuts

Aggressive competition with otherspace agencies

Deadlines

Schedules


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foam strikes

Debris Assessment Team (DAT) was formed with

people from diversified background to work together

and give an answer in 3 days

No definite structure defined in DAT forreporting/working

DATs requests were all shutdown by managers of

SSP (Space shuttle program)

No support given to DATs request for imagery fromthe management

Led to DATs flawed and uncertain analysis submitted

within deadline


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foam strikesManagement Level Issues

Preoccupied with success and Arrogance of Optimism Management tended to wait for dissent rather than seek it, which is likely to shut off

reports of failure and other tendencies to speak up

Reluctance to Change The Columbia disaster is an unfortunate illustration of how NASAs strong cultural

bias and optimistic organizational thinking undermined effective decision-making.Over the course of 22 years, foam insulation strikes were normalized to the pointthat they were simply a maintenance issue - a concern that did not threaten amissions success

Resilience To bounce back from the ambiguity of blurred images, NASA could, for example,

have expanded data collection to include asking astronauts to download all of theirfilm of the launch and to see if they could improvise some means to get an in-flightview of the damaged area. Although both actions were suggested, neither was

done.


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Recommendations to avoid

future mistakes

High Technical Complexity

High Flexibility

Low Efficiency

Need High Responsiveness Organic Structure


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Recommendations to avoid

future mistakes Focus on schedules and deadlines is

incorrect approach in a research

environment

Structure: Direct teams in problem-solving efforts with clear reporting

lines, responsibilities and authority

DAT Structure with SSP & Mgt. shouldhave been Pooled Interdependence

R d ti h


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Recommendations on how

NASA can avoid such mistakes

in future Culture: Challenging and testingexisting assumptions andexperimenting with new behaviors and

possibilities. Exaggerate threats

Acting rather than waiting

A mindset of openness

Promoting Experimentation

Encouraging constructive conflict anddissent


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Thank youGroup 3

columbia case analysis_group 3

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