COLOMBIA’S THREE WARS:U.S. STRATEGY AT THE CROSSROADS

Gabriel Marcella

Donald Schulz

March 5, 1999

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The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and donot necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department ofthe Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Thisreport is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

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The authors appreciate the constructive comments and insights ofAmbassador David Passage, Harry O’Harra, Richard Downes, CaesarSereseres, General (Retired) Fred Woerner, and Major General RobertScales.

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FOREWORD

Colombia is the most troubled country in the WesternHemisphere. Drug criminals, guerrillas, and paramilitary groupsare feeding a spiral of violence that makes “colombianization” ametaphor for a failing state. This monograph, by Dr. GabrielMarcella and Dr. Donald Schulz, addresses the strategic dimensionsof the crisis. It argues that Colombia’s future deeply affects regionalsecurity and U.S. interests. The country’s afflictions are spilling over its borders, threatening Venezuela, Panama, Ecuador, Brazil, Peru,Mexico, and the Caribbean. At the same time, Colombia is the originof most of the cocaine and heroin entering the United States. Thefear is that, if the situation continues to worsen, the country maybecome balkanized, with large areas under the de facto control ofguerrilla and paramilitary regimes based, in large part, on narco-economies.

U.S. policy is now at a critical juncture. A decision has been made to become more engaged in the war against narcotrafficking. Yet, the question remains: Can counternarcotics be separated fromcounterinsurgency? The authors believe that it cannot—thateverything is related to everything else—and that unless theColombian and U.S. governments address the problem through thecreation of a coherent, holistic strategy, the situation will becomemuch worse. In the latter half of their report, they discuss both themilitary and nonmilitary components of such a strategy. Amongother things, they contend that restrictions on U.S. police trainingand counterinsurgency assistance should be removed or revised inorder to enable the Colombian security forces to halt the momentumof the insurgents and paramilitaries and give them incentives tonegotiate seriously. They also argue that a respect for human rightsis of strategic importance.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish thismonograph as a contribution to the growing national security debate on this important issue.

LARRY M. WORTZELColonel, U.S. ArmyDirector, Strategic Studies Institute

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHESOF THE AUTHORS

GABRIEL MARCELLA is Professor of Third World Studieswith the Department of National Security and Strategy,U.S. Army War College. He served as International AffairsAdvisor to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. SouthernCommand, Panama, 1987-89. Dr. Marcella has writtenextensively on strategy, low-intensity conflict, and LatinAmerican policy. His writings have appeared in numerousjournals and in various edited volumes. His most recentworks include Warriors in Peacetime: The Military andDemocracy in Latin America; War and Peace in the Amazon:Strategic Implications for the United States and LatinAmerica of the 1995 Ecuador-Peru War ; and ThePresidential Advisory System and the Making of LatinAmerican Policy. He is coauthor/coeditor of the forthcomingbook, Security Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere:Resolving the Ecuador-Peru Conflict.

DONALD SCHULZ is the Strategic Studies Institute’sexpert on Latin American affairs. He has lived and traveledextensively in the region. Prior to joining SSI in 1991, hetaught at several colleges, most recently NortheasternIllinois University in Chicago. He has coauthored or editedseveral books including Mexico Faces the 21st Century; TheUnited States, Honduras, and the Crisis in Central America; Cuba and the Future; Revolution and Counterrevolution inCentral America and the Caribbean; and PoliticalParticipation in Communist Systems. He has also published many journal and newspaper articles on Latin Americanpolitics, and testified before the Senate on U.S. policy inHaiti. Dr. Schulz’s current research focuses on Mexico,Colombia, and Haiti. He holds a B.A. in Political Sciencefrom Wake Forest College and a Ph.D. in Political Sciencefrom Ohio State University.

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Map of Colombia.

COLOMBIA’S THREE WARS:U.S. STRATEGY AT THE CROSSROADS

The biblical holocaust that has been consuming Colombia formore than twenty years.

Gabriel García MárquezColombian novelist

Introduction.

Gabriel García Márquez’s version of the biblicalholocaust, Colombia’s bloody internal strife, deeply affectsthe United States and the regional community of nations.Colombia is the most troubled country in the Hemisphere.Law and order have broken down. Drug criminals,guerrillas, and paramilitary “self-defense” organizationsare feeding a spiral of violence and corruption that makes“colombianization” a metaphor for a failing state. Everyday, about 10 Colombians are killed in politically relatedstrife, while 85 percent of the 30,000 annual homicides arecaused by pervasive criminal violence.1 More than 1.3million people have been displaced by war. To some, thecountry appears beyond redemption. Mindful of thischallenge, the U.S. Army War College, on December 10-11,1998, conducted the international conference “Landpowerand Ambiguous Warfare: The Challenge of Colombia in the21st Century” to better define the problems and proposeconstructive measures to assist this democracy in distress.Some of this monograph is based on the conferenceproceedings.

Colombia’s problems are analyzed within the framework of U.S. national interests and policy. The authors believethat current policy, dominated by counternarcotics, is at adecisive juncture. The complexity and interrelatedness ofColombia’s three wars and the priority need ofreestablishing governmental authority and control over

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territory and population now under both narcotraffickerand insurgent influence argue for a more comprehensiveand visionary response. But a combination of prudence andtimidity, the product of ghosts from the past (counter-insurgency and police training in Latin America), aprogrammatic approach driven by scarce resources, and thefact that Colombia’s three wars are intimidatingly complex,inhibits American policy.

Colombia also presents to the United States thestrategic dilemma posed by ambiguous warfare: how toadapt its political, economic, and military instruments toassist a nation confronted by three interrelated forms ofinternal violence that have deep international implicationsand whose elimination will take a long time. Indeed,strategic adaptation of the kind that Colombia demands will be a challenge for the United States in the 21st century.Accordingly, greater clarity of purpose is in order as theUnited States and Colombia deepen a relationship whosefuture is uncertain. The purpose of this essay is to clarify the issues and generate a responsible dialogue on the strategicalternatives.

Colombia’s Three Wars.

Colombia is a large country, three times the size ofMontana and slightly less than France, Germany, and Italycombined. It fronts both the Pacific Ocean and theCaribbean. Seventy-five percent of its 37 million people livein urban areas. Population growth in 1997 was 1.9 percent.Its $89 billion gross domestic product places it in the middleof the major economies in Latin America, though like mostcountries in the region, income distribution is highlyskewed. About 50 percent of its people live in poverty, with20 percent in absolute poverty. Gross domestic productgrowth for the economy averaged 4.1 percent from 1990 to1997. In a nation of abundant resources and land, 10percent of the owners possess 90 percent of the cultivableland.

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The vast majority of the population occupies theone-third of the country framed by the Andean vertebrae.Its large eastern region, where guerrillas and narco-traffickers operate with impunity, is lightly populated andpoorly controlled by the central government. Indeed,integration of Colombia’s many regions into a coherentnation-state has been the principal challenge sinceindependence. It is even more so now. Preston James, theeminent geographer, has written: “It would be difficult toconceive of a geographic pattern of internal arrangementthat would appear to make the achievement of politicalunity and coherence more difficult than in Colombia.”2 Lackof government control makes large parts of the countryparticularly conducive to narcotrafficking and guerrillainsurgency.

Today Colombia is being torn apart by threesimultaneous wars: the violence and corruption generatedby drug traffickers, insurgents, and paramilitaryorganizations (which in 1998 accounted for more than 70percent of all political killings). Over 35,000 people havebeen killed in these conflicts during the last decade. Therate of killing in Colombia far exceeds the amount of ethniccleansing that went on after the breakup of Yugoslavia.Both the paramilitaries and the guerrillas take over areasand displace thousands of people. The nation’s capacity todeal with this turmoil has been sharply declining, due to theweakening of most state institutions and the fragmentationof the social fabric. One scholar, Nazih Richani, refers toColombia as a self-perpetuating “war system” that ispractically unbreakable.3 Similarly, Eduardo Pizarro of theNational Autonomous University of Colombia, refers to the“partial collapse of the state.”

Yet, there is hope. In October 1997, 10 millionColombians went to the polls for mayoral elections and anational referendum to reject violence and criminality. InAugust 1998 the Andrés Pastrana administration came into office, with renewed domestic and international legitimacyand support from the United States and the democratic

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community of nations. This was something thatWashington had been reluctant to give to the previousErnesto Samper government because the president hadreceived campaign money from drug traffickers.Washington’s distancing, which included denying him avisitor’s visa to enter the United States and decertifyingColombia twice for not meeting Clinton administrationcriteria in the fight against drugs, was counterproductivebecause it weakened the country’s institutional capacity inthe face of the three wars. The upshot was that the enemiesof democracy were emboldened, and Colombia fell furtherinto the abyss.

President Pastrana quickly opted to open a peaceprocess with the guerrillas, which commenced in January1999. His top priority is to end the 34-year guerrilla war.Proclaiming that “For peace I risk everything,” he agreed tothe demand of the Fuerzas Armadas RevolucionariasColombianas (FARC) to withdraw all government troopsfrom an area of 16,000 square miles (the size of Switzerlandand containing 96,000 people) controlled by the insurgents.The other insurgent group, the Ejército de LiberaciónNacional (ELN), would make a similar demand in February1999. This recalls a previous peace process between 1989and 1994, when some 5,300 guerrillas surrendered theirarms and were reintegrated into society. Pastrana’scontroversial measure was seen as a bold stroke tostrengthen the government’s credibility and legitimacy forthe peace negotiations ahead. Some observers, however,were worried that it would enhance the FARC’s position bylegitimating their de facto control of territory.

In November 1998, the U.S. Congress voted $165 millionin supplemental counternarcotics assistance which, addedto $124 million appropriated earlier, makes Colombia thethird largest recipient of annual U.S. aid in the world. Thefollowing month, Secretary of Defense William Cohen andhis counterpart Minister of Defense Rodrigo Lloreda signedan agreement in Cartagena for closer cooperation and U.S.military assistance to help the police and special army units

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in the effort to eradicate illicit crops and deter the drugtraffickers. In a significant development, Colombia willform an air mobile army battalion to assist in thecounternarcotics effort.

The Strategic Imperative: Why Colombia Matters.

Defining U.S. national interests in the WesternHemisphere in the post-Cold War era is doubly challenging.Gone are preoccupations about the threat to U.S. militarysecurity from the other superpower or its regionalaccomplices. The strategic environment is far more complexand variegated, and the threats are more systemic and longterm. The East-West framework has given way to a moredifferentiated and mutually satisfying global agenda, which stresses the common goals of democratic governance,judicial reform, free trade, economic modernization, thefight against terrorism and transnational crime, andprotection of the environment. The Miami Summit of 1994and the Santiago Summit of 1998 advanced a commonagenda, targeting the year 2005 for the establishment of aFree Trade Area of the Americas. Similarly, the President’s1998 National Security Strategy stresses the community ofinterests and convergence of values between the UnitedStates and the countries of the Western Hemisphere (except for Cuba).

Some might argue that defining U.S. national intereststoo broadly and inclusively in the post-Cold War isunsustainable. Such a definition, they argue, would not becredible to the American people. By so doing, any difficulties that arise may be seen as threats to U.S. security. But anarrow definition would obscure the obvious long-termlinkages that exist between the core interests: nationaldefense, economic well-being, international order, thepromotion of democratic and humanitarian principles, andprotection of the environment. Colombia’s travails do notaffect the military defense of the United States. But theypowerfully influence the balance of values that makes the

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United States a healthy and vibrant society, and theindispensable power in a global environment fraught withnew threats to international order and human decency.They also deeply affect the security and well-being ofcountries in the region, many of which are far morevulnerable than the United States. With these caveats inmind, the authors believe that unless national interests arebroadly defined, the U.S. policy response, howeverintelligent and well thought out, will be at best insufficient.

The very weakness of Colombia as a nation-statethreatens international order in the region and thewell-being of any number of countries. Its turmoil spills over into Venezuela, Panama, Ecuador, Brazil, Peru, theCaribbean, Central America, and Mexico. The threat takesdifferent forms in different countries: extra-judicialkillings, paramilitary activity, displaced people fleeingviolence, drug trafficking, money laundering, kidnapping,illegal arms trafficking; corruption of government officials,policemen, military, the news media, judges, and otherofficers of the court; illegal immigration, ecological damage(from precursor chemicals and defoliants, oil spills fromsabotaged pipelines, and the cutting of the tropical forest),and economic distortions caused by quick and unaccountedmovements of capital. This melancholy brew weakens thesocietal will to resist the breakdown of order and security.Indeed, one of the cardinal objectives of the U.S. NationalSecurity Strategy, the strengthening of democracy, is underassault because of the corrosive influence of drug money.

The Stakes for the United States:Trade, Investment, and People.

In 1997 Colombia accounted for $11.6 billion in two-waytrade with the United States. The latter provided 47 percent of the country’s imports and is the top investor, accountingfor 44 percent of foreign direct investment. Colombia is thefifth largest market for U.S. goods in Latin America, with400 of the Fortune 500 companies doing business there.4 Itis already the fifth largest supplier of foreign oil, and has the

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potential to play a considerably larger role if it can free itselffrom the guerrilla violence that is inhibiting thedevelopment of the industry. Over a million Colombians arein the ethnic tapestry of the United States, as are some35,000 Americans who reside and work in Colombia.

The Impact of Drug Trafficking on AmericanSociety.

Seventy percent of the cocaine entering the UnitedStates originates from Colombia, amounting to 300 metrictons with a street value of $30 billion. In addition, 75percent of the heroin seized by U.S. authorities on the EastCoast is Colombian. The magnitude of the problem is suchthat drug consumption caused 100,000 deaths in the lastdecade. There are 13.9 million drug users and 3.6 millionaddicts in the United States. The total societal cost isestimated at $300 billion annually from lost productivity,crime, policing, incarceration, rehabilitation, insurance and hospital care.5 A large portion of the U.S. prison populationis accounted for by drug-related crimes. According to theDepartment of Justice, seven out of ten people in jail havebeen drug users.

Colombia produces 80 percent of the world’s cocaine andnow grows more coca than any other country, havingovertaken Peru and Bolivia. Coca production appears to beconsolidating in Colombia, since production in Peru is down56 percent since 1995 and in Bolivia 17 percent since 1997.6

According to Thomas J. Umberg and Allison Major from theOffice of National Drug Control Policy, most of the increasein cultivation in 1998 occurred in areas controlled byguerrillas. Such evidence confirms the existence of thenarco-guerrilla as well as the narco-paramilitary nexus. Aswill be seen later, narcotics now provides a major source ofincome for guerrilla military operations. (Incidentally,Colombia now grows the high-yield Peruvian coca variety.)The narcos create another distortion also. According toGustavo Gallón, Director of the Colombian Commission ofJurists, an estimated 40 percent of the land within the

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agricultural frontier of the country is in the hands oftraffickers converted into landowners.7

Democracy and Human Rights.

Colombia is one of the oldest democracies in theHemisphere. But it is not a strong participatory democracywith institutions that effectively mediate conflict andchannel citizen demands to the national government.8 TheLiberal and Conservative parties alternated in themonopoly of power from 1958 until 1974, each running thenational government for 4 years. This pragmaticaccommodation (the National Front) helped end thepost-1948 La Violencia , but it also closed “politicalparticipation to groups and sectors who did not feel theywere represented” by the two parties.9 From 1985 to 1990,states former Foreign Minister and presidential candidateNoemí Sanín, Colombia “experienced 5 years of systematicelimination of leaders, members and movements of thesetrends.”10 In the 1990 presidential campaign, threecandidates not representing the bipartisan system wereassassinated.

Defective democracy has many manifestations. Thejudicial system is weak, despite the fact that Colombiaallocates the second highest percentage (4.62) of thenational budget to the judicial system in Latin America andprobably employs the highest number of judges of anydemocracy, 17.1 per 100,000 people (in comparison: theUnited States has 2; Spain, 3).11 Corruption permeates thepolitical culture.12 In this environment, public officials,including judges, prosecutors, investigators, and lawyersare widely subjected to the temptations of dishonesty. Somemembers of Congress have been so corrupted or intimidatedby the narcotraffickers that they attempt to weaken ordefeat legislation aimed at strengthening the government’sability to deal with drug trafficking.

In addition, Colombia is one of the most violent countries in the world. It is the leader in kidnappings, registering

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1,678 in 1998.13 The antikidnapping police and militaryrescued 451 victims in 1998, preventing total ransompayments of $52.2 million. Among those targeted formurder are human rights activists, leftists, formerguerrillas who were “reinserted” into society (some 3,000were murdered from the period 1989 to 1994), and formerpublic figures. Between 1987 and 1992 there were 77homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, by far the highest ratein the world. Prominent victims killed in the last decadehave included:

• Presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galán

• Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla

• Diane Turbay, daughter of former President JulioCésar Turbay and director of a major Colombiantelevison news show

• Carlos Pizarro, leader of the M-19 former guerrillamovement

• Guillermo Cano, editor of El Espectador newspaper

• Colonel Jaime Ramírez, first Director of theColombian Anti-Narcotics Police

• Bernardo Jaramillo, of the Patriotic Union, amovement close to the Communist Party

• Dozens of judges and prosecutors

• At least 2,000 labor union members since 1991

In short, the human rights situation is appalling. Theannual U.S. Department of State Human Rights Reports,which are mostly based on reporting by Colombianorganizations, paint a pessimistic picture.14 For the period1993-98, the Colombian Commission of Jurists and humanrights groups indicated that security forces, paramilitarygroups, and the guerrillas were involved in political killings

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(in addition to forced disappearances, and social cleansingagainst drug addicts, prostitutes, beggars, transvestites,and street children) according to the following percentages:

Security Forces Paramilitary Guerrillas

1993 54 18 28

1995 16 46 38

1996 18 46 36

1997* 7.5 69 23.5

1998* 2.7 (21) 76 (573) 21.3 (160)

* First nine months. Figures not available for 1994. These statisticsmay contain serious imprecisions because it is difficult to separatepolitical from non-political killing.

In May 1998, the Army’s 20th Military Intelligence Brigadewas disbanded because personnel had been involved inhuman rights violations. The State Department also reports that the paramilitaries engage in active depopulationmeasures that force people to move to safer areas. TheColombian Commission of Jurists estimates that the rate ofimpunity for violations by the military, guerrillas, andparamilitaries is virtually 100 percent.15

The Guerrillas.

The guerrillas number about 20,000 and comprise theFARC, the ELN (reputed to have 5,000 fighters), and themuch smaller EPL (Popular Liberation Army). Theyoperate in more than 100 separate “fronts” (upwards of 67for the FARC, and 35 or so for the ELN) and exercisesignificant influence over 50 percent of the nation’s 1,071municipalities. On the eve of the 1997 election, theytargeted political office holders, candidates, and electionworkers as valid military targets.16 Their purpose was todiscourage participatory democracy, destabilize thecountry, and delegitimate the government. In the process,they killed more than 200 candidates and elected officialsand forced more than 2,000 candidates to withdraw. Duringthe first nine months of 1997, guerrillas committed 23.5

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percent of all politically motivated killings and more than50 percent of reported kidnappings.

Founded in the mid-1960s, the Marxist-Leninist FARCand ELN expanded significantly in the 1980s. The mostimportant reason for the FARC’s growth was thedevelopment of a stable and lucrative source of financing itsactivities—the drug trade—by extracting protection moneyfrom coca growers and the operators of clandestine landingfields and laboratories, along with kidnapping. The ELNreceived new life by extorting money from oil companiesoperating the Caño Limón-Coveñas pipeline connectingArauca province to the Caribbean. From 1986 to 1997 therewere nearly 79 million barrels of crude oil spilled in pipelineattacks. Damage and lost revenue were estimated at $1.5billion, while the oil spills seriously damaged the ecology.Between 55 to 70 percent of the guerrilla war chest comesfrom extortion and protection of drug activities, according to former Defense Minister Rafael Pardo.17 He argues furtherthat extortion has changed the nature of the guerrillas,making them more like large criminal enterprises.Moreover,

While their leaders and declared political platforms continueto be superficially revolutionary, their purposes are changing.From their declared objective in the 1960s, which was theseizure of national political power by arms, they have evolvedtoward less lofty goals: local power for the ELN, coalitiongovernment for the FARC.18

In early 1999, however, the FARC vowed to return to thebattlefield if the peace talks do not bring them to power anda socialist state.

While their political support has been declining in thelast decade, the insurgents constitute a formidable militarythreat. Though they cannot now take power, they haveoperational momentum. They can feed the “war system”and maintain a costly stalemate indefinitely. In 1998, theydisplayed their growing military capability. For example, inearly March the FARC decisively defeated troops of the

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army’s elite mobile counterinsurgency brigade at the battleof El Billar. David Spencer, a respected analyst of theColombian Army, called this the most humiliating defeat todate because, for the first time, the guerrillas had defeated a large unit in maneuver warfare. The FARC militarystrategy appears to be to attack troops and police in remoteand vulnerable positions, a pattern repeated at the brutalOctober 1998 attack on the police garrison at Mitú (a targetthat had no strategic significance to the FARC other than its psychological impact), deep in the Amazon Basin near theBrazilian border. These were serious defeats for thegovernment, which does not have the forces, intelligence,and quick reaction mobility to respond across the vastdistances of Colombia.

What cannot yet be determined is whether the guerrillas are serious about the peace process that began in January1999. Some observers believe they are not. They argue thatthe insurgents have a vested interest in the continuation ofthe “war system”: after all, it provides them with anenormous source of revenue through the protection of cocagrowers and drug traffickers, something they wouldpresumably have to surrender in the event of a peacesettlement. Skeptics also contend that the insurgents arewinning the war, and consequently have no reason tocompromise. If these arguments are correct, negotiationswill be little more than a convenient tactical ploy. They willprovide the rebels with a cloak of legitimacy and enablethem to garner international support while consolidatingcontrol over territories and preparing for the option ofintensifying the fighting in the future.

Current estimates are that neither side can win amilitary victory, and there are substantial costs and risksinvolved in a prolongation and escalation of the conflict.Such a scenario could well draw the United States into amore direct security assistance role for counterinsurgency(such as equipment and training), much as it was pulled into the Central American conflicts in the 1980s. If thathappens, the likely result would be a strengthening of the

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Colombian military and the creation of a hurting stalemate,where neither side could beat the other. Thus it might be inthe guerrillas’ interest to negotiate now, while they are in arelatively strong bargaining position, rather than laterwhen the balance of military power has been redressed. Bythe same token, one should not dismiss the factor of fatigue.The war has been going on for decades. The insurgents arepaying an increasingly heavy price, especially from theattacks launched by the growing paramilitaryorganizations. Finally, it is not really known how much theFARC and ELN would be hurt from a loss of drug revenues.Some observers believe their intake is much less than theColombian military contends. If they are correct, the rebelsmight be willing to come to a peace agreement, particularlyif the government were willing to address some of theirpolitical, social, and economic demands, such as agrarianreform and rural development.

The Paramilitaries.

Many paramilitaries originated as self-defense organ-izations because of the need to provide security against theguerrillas in the absence of law and order. Paramilitaries (of which the largest group is the Autodefensas Campesinas ofCórdoba and Urabá, the Peasant Self-Defense of Córdobaand Urabá) now constitute a serious threat to both the ruleof law and the guerrillas, often engaging in tit-for-tatreprisal strikes, with increasingly brutal consequences fornoncombatants.19 In fact, in this war without quarter, boththe paramilitaries and guerrillas share a disquietingtendency to consider “legitimate military targets” peoplenormally defined by the international laws of armed combat as hors de combat, noncombatants. The paramilitariesoperate locally, regionally, and nationally under variouscommands. In 1997-98, they inflicted serious losses on theguerrillas and sympathizers, especially in the MagdalenaMedio region. Some organizations also derive income fromthe drug trade in order to fund operations. The extent ofsuch involvement is not certain, but it points out the

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complex linkages that drug money can generate betweenpolitical-ideological motivation and the need to fundsubstantial military operations on the part of both theguerrillas and the paramilitaries.

During the first 9 months of 1998, the paramilitariescommitted an estimated 76 percent of all politicallymotivated extrajudicial killings, according to Colombiansources cited earlier. Some Colombian authorities, such asGeneral Fernando Tapias, Commanding General of theArmed Forces, and General Rosso José Serrano, Director ofthe National Police, profess to see no difference between theparamilitaries and the guerrillas, regarding each as athreat to state authority. Others, such as some militarycommanders, take a live and let live attitude. Some regardthe paramilitaries as allies in the war against theinsurgents. Daniel García-Peña, the chief negotiator in thePeace Commission under the Samper administration,states that though it would be “barbaric” to grant politicalrecognition to them, they must be included in the peaceprocess via separate negotiations.20 A minority of analysts,such as David Spencer, go further, regarding them as apotentially constructive element.21 While criticizing theirhuman rights violations, they argue that these groups are areality that cannot be ignored. They have become a politicalforce that the government must bring into the peaceprocess.

The Narco Nexus.

No discussion of Colombia’s accelerating nationaldisintegration would be complete without an appreciation of the role of narcotrafficking. Violence and corruption havealways been a problem in Colombia, of course, as has theweakness of the state—its inability to command an effective presence—in rural areas. But the narcorevolution of the1980s served as a catalyst for worsening these afflictions bychanneling new resources (both financial and military) toold foes and creating new social sectors, which transformed

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a polarized armed conflict between two sides into one inwhich multiple groups and sectors are armed.22

Thus, one of the root causes of paramilitary violence was a decade-and-a-half investment boom in agricultural landsby nouveau riche drug traffickers seeking to launder profits, accumulate wealth, and acquire social standing.Throughout the 1980s, these traffickers made hugeinvestments in traditional areas of the Colombiancountryside, largely in cattle ranches in the north andAtlantic coast regions and the central Magdalena Rivervalley. There rural elites were abandoning their holdings inlarge numbers both because of the extortionary taxationand violence of the guerrillas and the willingness of thetraffickers to pay in cash for choice but overvalued land. The upshot was that in the 1980s and early 1990s an estimated5-6 million hectares fell into the hands of the drug lords.23

This was, in effect, an agrarian counterreform, whichaggravated all of the traditional problems of ruralinequality, land concentration and land poverty, and theclass conflicts that accompany them. To consolidate theirholdings in the face of the threats posed by disgruntledpeasants and revolutionary guerrillas, the narcotraffickersallied themselves with local political bosses, other largelandowners, and the armed forces. Most important, theysought to augment security by organizing their own privateparamilitary units, which they used to cleanse their areas of the insurgents and their supporters. In this, they found awilling ally in the Colombian Armed Forces which, withlittle civilian government oversight, supported and trainedthese groups or acquiesced in their formation under theassumption that the paramilitaries were their naturalallies in the war against the guerrillas. By the time itbecame clear that the paramilitaries could pose as great athreat to the state as the guerrillas, it was too late. Thegenie was out of the bottle.24

But the narcorevolution not only fueled paramilitaryviolence; it also fueled the insurgencies. Out in the

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colonization zones east of the Andes, the guerrillas wereworking closely with the small and medium-sized farmerswho provided the raw coca for processing into cocaine. Aswith other businesses in areas under their control, theyimposed revolutionary taxes on the growers, while chargingtraffickers fees for the protection of landing strips, crops,and processing facilities. When the heroin boom of the early1990s hit, the insurgents benefitted from that also.Similarly, with the recent shift of coca farming from Peruand Bolivia to Colombia, the potential for revenue increased once again. Estimates of the guerrilla revenues from thedrug business go as high as $500-600 million annually.Table 1 depicts the nature of the guerrilla-narcorelationship via the taxes imposed by the guerrillas.

Nevertheless, the precise nature of the rebels’relationship with the traffickers remains the subject ofheated debate. The Colombian military has patented theterm “narcoguerrilla” to suggest that the insurgents havebecome an international drug mafia. The claim is that theguerrillas now receive the bulk of their financing from thedrug business. Other observers, however, believe thesecharges are exaggerated. Some argue that the military hasa vested interest in magnifying the rebel involvement inorder to lure the United States into expanding its militaryinvolvement. They point out that the guerrillas’ drugrevenues come largely from taxation on the least profitablesector of the business—farming; that apparently few rebelunits are engaged in the actual cultivation of illegal crops;and that there is little, if any, involvement in the sale ofthese narcotics abroad (which is where most of the profitscome from). Indeed, even some U.S. and Colombiangovernment estimates suggest that only about 20 percent ofthe guerrillas are providing protection for drug processingfacilities and farms. (Then again, illicit crops are notcultivated everywhere. But wherever the insurgents arepresent in drug-producing areas, they take advantage of the opportunity.) Recent reports that the FARC is still largelyusing old and improvised weapons and is increasingly

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relying on forced conscription suggest that it is not as flushwith drug money as is often claimed.25

Beyond this, it seems clear that the relationship between the FARC and the drug traffickers varies widely in differentparts of the country. At the risk of oversimplification, itappears that where the guerrillas are strong, the narcostend to acquiesce to their demands for taxes and protectionmoney, rather than try to confront them. In contrast, where

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Concept Quantity

Coca crops production Col $100,000 monthly per hectare, U.S. $100

Coca leaf production Col $1,000 per kilo, U.S. $1

Coca leaf harvesting Col $500 per kilo, U.S. $.50

Lab security Col $50,000 per kilo of coca base, U.S. $50Col $100,000 per kilo, pure cocaine, U.S. $100

Clandestine airstrip Col $18,000,000 per flight,control U.S. $18,000

Aircraft security Col $5,000,000, U.S. $5,000

Chemical riverine 20 percent of shipment valuetransport

Poppy crop protection 40 percent of production

Morphine production Col $4,000,000 per processed kilo, U.S. $4,000

Poppy harvesting Col $8,000,000 per processed kilo, U.S. $8,000

*Source: U.S. Department of State, “Narcotrafficking and GuerrillaAlliance, Colombia 1997,” www.usia.gov/abtusia/posts/COL/wwwgng97.gif

Table 1.Narcotrafficking And Guerrilla Income, 1997*.

the FARC is weaker, the traffickers are more inclined toresist, supporting paramilitary forces to attack theinsurgents.26

Finally, it must be noted that the paramilitaries and theguerrillas are not the only groups with ties to the traffickers. The latter have penetrated all branches of government,from the national level to the local. The case of ErnestoSamper (in which the former president accepted drugmoney for his presidential campaign) may be the mostnotorious instance, but it should not obscure the fact thatdozens of congressmen have also accepted drug money inreturn for providing political protection for the mafias.Similarly, countless judges have released traffickersbecause of bribery or intimidation. Nor have militaryofficers been exempt from such temptations. And as for thetraffickers’ economic connections, suffice it to say that theirmoney goes everywhere. The Colombian economy is farmore dependent on narcotrafficking than, for instance,Mexico’s is.27

None of this suggests that the traffickers control thepolitical system, any more than they can control theguerrillas or the paramilitaries (which are hardlymonolithic in their origins or agendas). The wars theColombian government waged and won against theMedellín and Cali cartels suggest the continuingambivalent relationship that the traffickers have with allthese political actors. They also suggest the difficulty indefeating the traffickers. Following the destruction of thegiant cartels, the industry decentralized. Today, more cocais grown in Colombia than ever before, and at least as muchcocaine, and increasingly heroin, is flowing to the UnitedStates. Which suggests that while mafias and theirhenchmen may come and go, the basic problem remainsunresolved.

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International Order and Regional Security.

Colombia’s agony deeply affects other societies, mostnotably Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Panama, Mexico, and the Caribbean. The microstates of the Caribbean areespecially vulnerable. In the words of the West IndianCommission:

Nothing poses greater threats to the civil society . . . than thedrug problem, and nothing exemplifies the powerlessness ofregional governments more. That is the magnitude of thedamage that drug abuse and trafficking hold for ourcommunity. It is a many-layered danger. At base is the humandestruction implicit in drug addiction; but implicit also is thecorruption of individuals and systems by the sheer enormity ofthe inducements of the illegal drug trade in relatively poorsocieties. On top of all of this lie the implications forgovernance itself—at the hands of both external agenciesengaged in international interdiction, and the drug baronsthemselves—the “dons” of the modern Caribbean—whothreaten government from within.28

Neighboring Venezuela has a population of 3 millionColombians, the vast majority of whom came for jobs, whileothers are agents of corruption and violence. According toretired Venezuelan Air Force General Boris Saavedra, theFARC operates in an area along 2,100 kilometers of theborder and engages in drug trafficking, kidnapping,extortion, bribery, contraband, money laundering, cattlerustling, and auto theft. In addition, guerrillas attack andharass Venezuelan police and military units.29 Venezuelanpolice and military officials have developed extensivecoordination with their Colombian counterparts to dealwith these threats. The binational security agenda includes: fighting off the insurgents, denying them control of theborder areas, checking continuing actions of drug mafiasassociated with them, dealing with the large number ofundocumented immigrants, and mitigating rapidlyprogressive environmental degradation.

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Ecuador, a transit country for cocaine, is haven to some350,000 illegal Colombians. Some contribute to crime, suchas kidnapping members of the business community forransom. In 1995, the FARC attacked military and policeunits. Ecuadoran officials are concerned that anintensification of Colombia’s internal wars, coupled withthe failure of the peace process, could create a more seriousthreat because the Colombian Army might be forced towithdraw troops from border control missions.30 ThePutumayo region, which is adjacent to Ecuador, is a FARCstronghold. Ecuadorean authorities, therefore, also conduct extensive coordination with their Colombian counterparts.

Brazil shares a long and unpopulated border withColombia. On November 1, 1998, 800 FARC guerrillasattacked the Colombian police garrison of Mitú (population15,000), the capital of Vaupés state, located some 20 milesfrom the Brazilian border. Using homemade missilesconstructed from modified gas cylinders, they killed some60 policemen and seized the town and airport.31

Government airborne reinforcements were forced to landinside Brazil, doing so without diplomatic clearance fromthe government of Brazil, in order to relieve the garrisonand retake the city. Though there is informal localcoordination between Colombian and Brazilian authoritieson security matters, Brazil recalled its ambassador fromBogotá for consultations, a relatively timid measure thatdid little to secure the vast open spaces of the AmazonBasin.

This is merely one aspect of the impact on Brazil.Colombian traffickers are also developing ties withBrazilian criminal gangs. The brutal and indiscriminateattack on Mitú, which had stunning psychological impactnationally and internationally, was preceded by similarassaults in remote areas where the guerrillas have theoperational advantage. Moreover, the vast unpopulatedAmazon Basin, which is shared with five countries,facilitates the movement of drugs, contraband, andguerrillas. These countries have yet to work out a system of

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bilateral and multilateral cooperation to deal with thesesecurity problems.

On February 7, President Alberto Fujimori of Peruannounced that Peru would shift military forces formerlydeployed along the Ecuadorian Border and build three airfields along the 1600 kilometers-long border with Colombiain order to stop the FARC and the drug traffickers fromusing the vast open Peruvian territory. Colombianauthorities welcomed this assistance from their neighbor asan important step that would help remove sanctuaries forthe guerrillas and traffickers. Days earlier in Washington,Fujimori had publicly criticized the Colombian governmentfor giving legitimacy to the FARC via concession of thedemilitarized zone and the negotiation process.

Panama’s remote and jungle-covered Darién province isa case where the government exercises laissez-faireauthority, according to Bertha Ramona Thayer.32 FARCguerrillas and paramilitaries regularly cross over from theChocó-Urabá region, conduct kidnappings, deal incontraband, and acquire arms and provisions to return toColombia. It is doubtful that Panama can restore controlover its eastern province. Drug money from Colombiadeeply affects Panamanian life, from money laundering, toprostitution, large purchases of goods in the Colón FreeZone, illicit contributions to political campaigns, andsmall-time drug trafficking and associated crime.

Finally, Mexico is experiencing the complex process of“colombianization.” This is defined by Raúl BenítezManaut, of the National Autonomous University of Mexico,as:

The decisive influence on the economy of the profits made from cocaine sales, the penetration of the drug cartels in thepolitical and judicial systems, the creation of a social base ofsupport for the narcotrafficking, the permanent presence ofarmed groups of the left in control of rural areas, and finallythe establishment of alliances between the guerrillas of theleft and the traffickers. In sum, “colombianization” is the loss

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of state sovereignty with respect to the control of territory, theeconomy, the social base of support, and the presence of armiesautonomous from the state and with great firepower.33

Mexico is a transit area for Colombian drugs, and there is atacit alliance between trafficker organizations of bothcountries.

The Reconstruction of Colombia:A Strategy for Generating Legitimate Power.

Colombia faces an imposing set of challenges. Toparaphrase U.S. Ambassador Myles R. Frechette, some ofthese only Colombia can deal with. For others, the UnitedStates and other countries can provide advice, specializedtraining, some of the material means, and internationalpolitical support. But only Colombians can achieve thepolitical will to make the necessary commitments,sacrifices, and reforms. The will to win is simply notexportable. A coherent national strategy is essential, onethat establishes continuity and has broad political support.Strategy is the calculated relationship between ends andmeans. The ends are political objectives which are achievedby the intelligent application of programs and resources.Ends must be prioritized, synchronized, and articulated tothe nation. The objectives of a national strategy forColombia are formidable: reassert control over nationalterritory, end the violence and corruption, and build aneffective democracy.

Any strategy must establish legitimate and responsiblegovernmental authority over territory and population.Legitimacy is defined as belief by the governed that thegovernment has the right to govern. It is achieved throughparticipatory elections and then sustained by effectivegovernance. It is defended, when necessary, through thestate’s monopoly of force, but always ethically and inconstrained manner. Colombia’s very divisions are at theroot of the failure to achieve a national consensus onstrategy. What Colombia must do is daunting: it is nothing

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less than the reconstruction of the nation. To do this, it must generate sufficient legitimate power and apply it effectivelyto establish public security, deter the criminality, and bringthe guerrillas to the peace table for serious negotiations toend the fighting and rebuild the nation.

When societies reach rock bottom during internal war,there often emerges a general realization that commitments and sacrifices must be made. In recent years, Nicaragua,Argentina, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Peru have beenthrough this process. At some point, the decisional elitesdevelop the will to mobilize the ministries of governmentand generate the popular support to take on the challenges.At times, the armed forces have taken the leadership in this, though this is not the best way to proceed.

Caesar Sereseres, a leading authority on the lessonsgleaned from internal wars, suggests that the experiences of other countries contain important lessons for Colombia.34

Basing his argument on the experiences of Central America, Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines, he notes thatsuccessful cases possess similar strategic and operationalcharacteristics:

• Civil authority took control and, in every case, thegovernment went to war by mobilizing itself, not justthe military;

• Counterinsurgency was not cheap; vast resources inpeople, money, equipment, and time were required;

• The military was reformed and restructured; in everycase the army was reorganized; institutional reformswere critical, and in each case special operationsforces were the cutting edge of the military effort;

• A national campaign plan was developed, with astrategy to separate the guerrillas from thepopulation, defend the infrastructure, and attrit theinsurgents;

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• For the end game, what happens on the battlefieldmatters. If the army is not successful on thebattlefield, it will affect the final result. In every case,the guerrillas had an end game. In most cases wherethe government defined that game in purely militaryterms, the government lost.

But Colombia is no ordinary country. There are fewanalogies to its three simultaneous wars, the level ofcorruption, institutional weaknesses, and to its formidablegeography. Its insurgents, paramilitaries, and drugtraffickers generate their own resources; there are fewexternal supporters; geographic enclaves within thecountry afford the guerrillas and paramilitaries practicalautonomy; and the United States exercises less leverage onthe strategic balance and the government than it did in, say, Central America. Clearly, these problems must be resolvedthrough the integrated application of all the instruments ofnational power. While military power is essential, it is notsufficient. Indeed, militarizing the effort may be a goodindicator of continued failure.

Most of the policy relevant academic research oncomparative lessons that might apply to Colombia havemore to do with discrete parts, such as how to win thecounterinsurgency, how to conduct peace negotiations withinternal power contenders, and the reform of the militaryand the judicial system. There is little academic writing onhow nations can be reconstructed after they begin fallingapart (such as Colombia) or have failed altogether. Anexception is the work of I. William Zartman. He maintainsthat the keys to reconstituting legitimate government andauthority are: power, participation, resources, externalassistance, and leadership.35

Colombia is nowhere near the failed state syndrome, butthe five variables shed light on the task ahead. With respectto power, the 200,000 plus armed forces and police are dulyconstituted. Their task is to restore public security andgovernmental presence and control in the national

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territory. It must include institutionalized participation bybroad sectors of society, including constructive engagementby civil society, in order to legitimize the political systembeing restored. Resources need to be made available forreconstruction, to pay for the implementation of reforms, for the expanding personnel costs, for the expensivecounterinsurgency, and the gamut of nation-buildingactivities that reach the citizenry in order to restoreconfidence in the legitimacy of the government.

But power, participation, resources, and externalassistance are irrelevant without the catalyst of leadership.It takes leadership to mobilize the finite resources, people,ministries, and organizations to sustain the effort for thelong term. Zartman sums up the challenge:

Power, participation, resources are the ingredients behindthis leadership process; unfortunately, there is no order ofpriority among them to prescribe. Elementary security mustbe restored, most basically through ceasefire; the nationalreconciliation must be begun, through informal negotiationsand institutionalizing fora; resources must be secured andmobilized. . . . All of this must be done at once and at the sametime, and the steps kept apace of each other as the processmoves along. It must also be done with an end in view, as aprocess that combines order, legitimacy, and authority withpolicy, production, and extraction, rather than a series ofdiscrete steps taken one . . . at a time. In addition, it must bedone looking backward as well as forward, preparing theintroduction of mechanisms that will prevent the new effortsfrom falling back. . . . It must be done with a keen sense ofindigenous . . . ways of doing things, which can be the strongest allies of reconstruction efforts. . . . state restoration is an uphill challenge, not an automatic process. . . . It takes time. . . .36

The United States and Colombia:Ambiguous Warfare and Strategic Dilemmas.

Uncertain of domestic support and skeptical about theColombian government’s capabilities and intentions,American officials are clearly anxious to draw limits on U.S.support and involvement. The country’s ambiguous warfare

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is exceedingly complex and difficult to understand. Thoughthere seems to be more consensus in Washington on thethreat, there are differences on the solutions, and whetherthe priority focus should be the counternarcotics effort, thecounterinsurgency, or both simultaneously. Thus, it is notsurprising that Phil Chicola, the State Department’sDirector of Andean Affairs, recently affirmed: “We arecommitted to maintaining a line between counternarcoticsand counterinsurgency.”37 Similarly, Defense SecretaryCohen told his Colombian counterpart Rodrigo Lloreda thatU.S. policy is driven by “self interest.” In the same vein,Assistant Secretary of State for International NarcoticsMatters and Legal Affairs R. Rand Beers stated that the“current consensus is to support a counternarcotics effortfirst.”38 Defense Minister Lloreda concurred that Colombianeeds no help with the counterinsurgency.

According to Beers, the goals of U.S. counternarcoticspolicy are:

• Enhancement of the Government of Colombia’sintelligence capability;

• Eradication of coca, amapola, and heroin, anddevelopment of alternative crops;

• Interdiction;

• Strengthening Colombian law enforcement agenciesand the administration of justice.

Beers added that the policy represented a consensus withinthe U.S. Government that would be placed at risk if theUnited States were to attempt a counterinsurgency role.Chicola stated that the policy is one of enhancedengagement, with counternarcotics as the centerpiece,supplemented by support for the peace process with theinsurgents, human rights, humanitarian relief andassistance, support for economic reforms, investments, andenvironmental concerns.

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The credibility of the U.S. counternarcotics strategydepends on how it balances the effort to reduce supply in thecountries of origin with the reduction of demand at home.Because it is the major consumer of illegal drugs, the United States accepts co-responsibility for the problem.Accordingly, the 1999 National Drug Control Strategy (andits annual predecessors) provides a comprehensiveapproach to stem domestic use, such as: greater publiceducation, reducing the number of addicts, drug testing,treatment of prisoners, and securing the borders of theUnited States against drugs. Of course, demand reductionis a long-term generational effort.

There is agreement between Bogotá and officialWashington that the primary threat is drugs, though someanalysts believe that the guerrillas are the greater danger.Yet, the guerrillas challenge, if not supplant, governmentallegitimacy, authority, and presence in large sections of thecountryside. In short, the guerrillas feed on thegovernment’s military and institutional debilities to sustain war for the long term. Unless Colombia brings theinsurgents to a negotiated end of the war, it may sink intothe abyss of civil war. President Pastrana apparentlybelieves that the guerrillas are a potential ally in the waragainst the narcos. On January 5, 1999, he stated that the“first enemy of peace is narcotrafficking. If the FARC takesthe decision to eradicate drug crops, they’ll do it. Becausethey definitely have the influence to carry it out.”39 Headded, however: “First they must denarcotize themselves.”This is part of the rationale for the peace negotiations thatwere scheduled to begin January 7, 1999. The UnitedStates, it should be reiterated, is encouraging the peaceprocess. At the same time, one must question whether theFARC is truly the champion of the people’s cause if theycontinue to contribute to the downfall of Colombia viatoleration and protection of the drug traffickers and theirinfrastructure of corruption and violence.

The trouble is that American reticence to get moredeeply involved is well-founded. It is based on long

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experience of providing assistance to friendly governmentsbeset with internal war, fueled in part by high levels ofcorruption. El Salvador, a relative success story for U.S.policy and with no combat assistance from U.S. militaryforces, fought the insurgents to a negotiated peace. But ithad a steep strategic learning curve. With Americanprodding and cajoling and the prudent application ofsignificant leverage, El Salvador mobilized some politicalwill and augmented its institutional capacities.Importantly, it made necessary fundamental political,economic, and social reforms, restructured its armed forces,and changed its military strategy to deal with theinsurgents. Ultimately it went to the negotiating table atthe very twilight of the Cold War, when the Soviet-Cuban-Sandinista support system came to an end.

But the learning process was messy and never linear,often involving considerable backsliding on the part of theally in the field, notably in the area of human rights and theconstrained use of force. Twelve years of strategic andoperational learning were required before El Salvador’smilitary and police forces could sway the tide against theguerrilla Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, aperiod which led to a huge human and material toll on theSalvadoran people but which, in the end, forced theguerrillas to agree to peace talks which ultimatelysucceeded. But El Salvador did not face the awesomemenace of drug money feeding corruption, violence, and theguerrillas.

Thus, American caution on Colombia is understandableand prudent. The Colombian government has stated that itdoes not want U.S. counterinsurgency support. WhatColombia needs, just like El Salvador did, is effectivepressure to restructure and retrain its armed forces.Nonetheless, counternarcotics aid is a significantcommitment that comes close to crossing thecounterinsurgency line. The United States may have tocross the line, not with troops in active combat, but withtraining and equipment support for the military and police.

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It may also be necessary for the most compelling reasons: toallow the Colombian government to be successful incombating the guerrillas and drug traffickers, regaincontrol of its national territory, and thus end human rightsabuses, including those committed by the armed forces, theguerrillas, and the paramilitaries.

Under these circumstances, the United States andCongress will expect Colombians to make the sacrificesrequired to succeed, and they will not support an unjust orunwinnable war. But how are we to determine justness inthis kind of ambiguous warfare? Americans do so on thebasis of the legitimacy granted to the government throughdemocratic elections, and the rejection of illegal means inthe use of force, whether on the part of the insurgents, theparamilitaries, or rogues in the military. Support will alsobe premised on the expectation that the government ofColombia will engage in a serious effort at winning and atnational reconstruction. Accordingly, it must apply itslegitimate authority and power effectively to regainterritorial control and literally win “the hearts and minds ofthe people.” While many Colombian leaders recognize thisneed, the institutional and societal commitment has yet tobe made. It may be that society will have to reach a higherthreshold of pain before decisive action is taken.

Recovering the Legitimate Use of Force:Clausewitz and Colombia.

The Commanding General of the Colombian ArmedForces, Fernando Tapias, asserted: “Unless the staterecovers the legitimate use of force the country could wellsink into civil war.”40 The legitimate authority to haverecourse to force should reside in the state. The insurgentsand paramilitaries advance the principle that might makesright. Moreover, they conduct violence that negates theprinciples of just war by targeting noncombatants and byusing means proscribed by international humanitarian law. The legitimate authority of the state to use the monopoly of

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force has to be restored, but it must be done ethically andmorally.

Three of Clausewitz’s principles are especially useful forColombia’s strategic purposes: the center of gravity,knowing what kind of war you are engaged in, and the“remarkable trinity” of the people, armed forces, andgovernment. The center of gravity for the government is itslegitimacy: regaining the support of the people. TheColombian Army probably has been involved in morecounterinsurgency warfare than any army in the world, butthe fact remains that it has not been able to defeat the FARC and ELN and is currently performing badly. It will requireextraordinary effort to wear down the guerrillas becausecounterinsurgency is indeed expensive in terms of time,resources, political endurance, and individual andinstitutional sacrifices.

At 146,300 troops, the armed forces may not be largeenough, given the size and terrain of the nationalterritory.41 Conventional wisdom holds that a successfulcounter- insurgency requires a ratio of 10 soldiers to 1guerrilla, though this is seldom achieved in the real world.Currently, only about 30,000 of Colombia’s troops are beingused for active military operations against the guerrillas.Even if the army were to achieve the 10 to 1 force ratio, itmight still not be enough to “saturate” the country, to usethe words of former Defense Minister Rafael Pardo. Unlesseffectively trained, organized, and deployed, it might simply create more lucrative targets for the guerrillas.42 The lowratio can be somewhat compensated for by the use of forcemultipliers, such as greater mobility and betterintelligence. However, in the fall of 1998 the militaryutilized only 20 helicopters, though it had access to over 100more. In contrast, El Salvador had 60 helicopters and60,000 troops in a territory 1/50 the size of Colombia. Themilitary needs major improvements in intelligencecollection, evaluation, and dissemination; close quarterscombat, small unit operations, logistics administration and

30

support, lift capabilities, leadership training, civil andhumanitarian operations, and human rights.

However tentatively, Colombia and the United Statesare deepening their relationship. Yet, it is uncertain how far this can go. The United States must communicate forcefullyto the Colombians that they must make fundamentalchanges based on proven principles for this kind ofambiguous warfare. This includes: respect for human rights and justice; adapting the army to aggressive small unitoperations by enhancing intelligence, mobility and quickreaction capabilities; and improved relations with thecivilian population. Such professional training is availablefrom U.S. Army Special Forces, as well as those of the Navyand Air Force.43 The difficulties of getting such trainingthrough the U.S. political process would diminish if theColombian government and the public security forcesdemonstrated that they can win the wars while respectinghuman rights.

These institutional improvements must be accompanied by careful cultivation of Clausewitz’s “remarkable trinity.”To be successful in war, the government, military, andpeople must have a trinitarian relationship of mutualsupport and cooperation. This relationship is the essence ofthe American military tradition. It originates fromprinciples of democratic civil-military relations and civiliancontrol of the military that were written into theConstitution by the founding fathers. Trinitarian strategydominates the American approach to planning for war.

The absence of such a relationship is another indicator of Colombia’s debility. Commenting on the weakness ofcivil-military relations, the respected former presidentialcandidate and Central Bank board member, MaríaMercedes Cuellar, commented that Colombia’s institutionsoperate as isolated “castes” hermetically sealed from eachother in defending their unique institutional interests.44

Regarding military service, for example, high schoolgraduates (some 35,000 bachilleres serving in the military)

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are exempted from serving in combat units. (Shades ofcollege deferments during America’s debacle with a “classwar” in Vietnam.) Moreover, one can buy freedom frommilitary service. Thus, peasant soldiers fight againstpeasant guerrillas, while the middle and upper classes arespared the nastiness of war. Clearly, the sacrifices for usingthe armed power of the state to fight the traffickers,paramilitaries, and insurgents need to be borne moreequitably. Until all sectors of society share the burden ofwar, they are likely to undervalue their stake in the endgame. It will take time—perhaps even a generation—toinculcate such changes. But unless these commitments andfundamental reforms are made, the three wars willcontinue indefinitely.

Difficult as it sounds, the war must be humanized. Thisdoes not mean putting down weapons, however. Rather, it is the creation of a more professional military force,restructured and retrained, which would be able to take theoffensive against guerrillas on the battlefield, thus givingthem an incentive to negotiate seriously at the bargainingtable. But turning the military institution around takestime, an asset that is diminishing for the government.Nonetheless, the outcome could be more humane in the form of limiting casualties, respecting the human rights of bothcombatants and noncombatants, and bringing the conflictto an earlier (rather than later) conclusion.45 The UnitedStates has a lot of experience in teaching its military forcesand those of other nations how to fight according to thehumane considerations of the laws of armed conflict. It must help train Colombian forces in order to inculcate thesevalues in their operations. This would be a powerful link forjustifying to the American public and Congress appropriatelevels of security assistance, which might be forthcomingonly if Colombia wages war through just means (jus inbello). Along these same lines, the United States also needsto jettison its outmoded prohibition of police trainingassistance to Latin America.46 Imparting the best of

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American investigative and policing techniques can be apowerful force multiplier for democracy.

Returning to General Tapias’s formulation, Colombiahas the choice of generating legitimate power in order topursue peace and reconciliation or attempting to imposeorder through the use of illegitimate power. The lattercourse may bring about civil war, while the former enhances the chances for peace. The broad alternatives aresummarized below:

GENERATING STATE POWER

Legitimate IllegitimateInclusive democratic governance Exclusive or “facade”

democracy

Respect for human rights Human rights violations

Accountability and impartial justice Injustice and impunity

Civilian control of the military Lack of control

Rules of engagement controlled by Autonomous and illegalpresident as commander-in-chief operations

Constrained use of force Arbitrary and disproportionate use

Respect for humanitarian considera- Massacres, extrajudicialtions in military operation abuse and killings

Discrimination between combatants Indiscriminate attacksand noncombatants

Effective public information program Secretiveness andat home and abroad incompetence

Agrarian reform and rural Abandonment of peasantsdevelopment and rural areas

Colombian national effort Dependence on external aid

Burdensharing by all sectors of Sacrifices made only bysociety poor

The fact that the Army will establish an air mobilecounternarcotics battalion is a critical step forward for tworeasons. First, it shows greater commitment by thegovernment to pursue drug trafficking. Second, by linkingthe unit’s establishment with U.S. counternarcotics

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assistance, it promises to create a new model of militaryprofessionalism that will have to adhere to U.S. humanrights law in order to receive U.S. support. (The LeahyAmendment to the 1996 international affairs budgetproscribes assistance to: “Any unit . . . if the Secretary ofState has credible evidence to believe such unit hascommitted gross violations of human rights unless theSecretary determines and reports to the Committee onAppropriations that the Government of such country istaking steps to bring the responsible members of thesecurity forces unit to justice.”) It remains to be seen howthis new battalion will operate with the police, what itsmission will be, how it will be subordinated to command andcontrol, and what its rules of engagement will be, and,ultimately, if it will make a difference. Nonetheless, thetraining and experience of an operationally effectivecounternarcotics battalion may have a positive profes-sionalizing impact on the military while strengthening thesupport to the police if Colombia is to avoid becoming a“failed state,” at war with itself and the region.

Colombia must also reconstruct its battered judicialsystem, where a mere 3 percent of those indicted arecurrently convicted. The issue of land distribution, a potentsource of peasant discontent and fertile ground for guerrillarecruiting, must also be addressed. Here a promising tacticwould be redistributing land now in the hands ofnarcotraffickers to peasants. This can also be a source ofbargaining leverage in the peace negotiations with theinsurgents, in addition to alternative crops, ruralinfrastructure projects, and marketing schemes. In sum,Colombia must maintain the moral high ground oflegitimacy in order to win the support of its own people, aswell as of the United States and other nations (especiallythe Europeans). But it should not continue to make themistake of putting its armed forces and police out frontwithout an effective national strategy that engages theefforts of all the ministries of government and all classes insociety. The Pastrana administration is committed to peace

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negotiations with the guerrillas. Through reforms andimproved institutional capabilities, combined with superior professional performance on the battlefield, it can create amore promising environment for peace negotiations.

The Peace Negotiations Process.

On January 7, 1999, President Pastrana made good onhis promise to begin peace negotiations with the FARC. Onthat day he met with guerrilla leaders (except the68-year-old Manuel Marulanda, “Tirofijo") in San Vicentedel Caguán, in the demilitarized zone (despeje). Peacenegotiations are fundamental for national reconciliationand further legitimize the reconstruction of state power.The first round of meetings was intended to test whether the political climate was conducive for putting substantiveissues on the agenda. The process may take years before ityields positive results.

For the peace process to be successful, it needs to beaccomplished by Colombians, who can take advantage of the advice, experiences, and support of other nations. It mustinclude insurgents as well as the paramilitaries. (Whetherthe latter can be brought in as a formally recognizedpolitical force or will have to remain as unofficialparticipants will have to be worked out during thenegotiations.) The armed forces must also be given animportant role. To fortify the legitimacy of the judicialsystem, the issue of impunity must be faced head on. Therecan be no impunity for the drug traffickers. The issue oflegal impunity for the insurgents and paramilitaries, bothof whom have much blood on their hands, is a more complexquestion. Complete justice in a deeply torn society isimpossible to achieve, and is potentially too divisive for thefuture of democracy. Numerous recent experiences aroundthe globe, from Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, El Salvador,Nicaragua, Guatemala, Haiti, and South Africa to thereunification of West and East Germany, point to variousforms of compromise for the greater good of a peaceful

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future. Establishing a democratic community requires adetermination of how far to go in punishing the guilty. Theexperience of other nations indicates that the healingprocess takes time. Thus, it will be imperative forColombians to strike a balance between what constitutessufficient punishment for the guilty and the need to move on to reconstruct the nation.

The FARC, as well as the ELN, claim to have an agendafor social justice at the negotiating table, including agrarian reform, income redistribution (in Colombia, the top 5percent earn more than 30 times that earned by the bottom5 percent), an end to fumigation intended to eradicate cocaplants, and economic development aid for neglected areas ofthe country.47 They also want security for their people oncethey put down their arms, fearing that unarmed they will be killed, as happened to former members of the M-19. Theymay also want political power, but would have to competefor it within the bounded uncertainty of democracy. Inexchange, they would help get rid of drug trafficking. TheUnited States supports the peace negotiations and hopesthat if they develop a momentum of their own, they willeventually persuade enough fighters now outside thepolitical process to reinsert themselves as productivemembers of society. The United States also insists that theFARC cut the umbilical cord to the drug business,something that would appear hard to do given the lucrativeincome the guerrillas receive from it. Indeed, the insurgents may be so corrupted by their involvement in the “warsystem” as to be unwilling to pursue the best agenda for theColombian people: peace, democracy, and justice. Ifdemocracy and justice were truly to come about, theguerrillas would cease to exist. Military power rather thanideology appears to be the basis of their influence andcontinued existence.48

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Conclusion.

Colombia and the United States are at a strategiccrossroads. The directions they take will help determinewhether the principles of democracy and human decencysurvive in Colombia, and whether this major threat toregional security thrives and infects other societies withcorruption and violence. This essay has set forthframeworks and strategic directions that should inform thedebate on what is to be done. The responsibility lies with thepeople of Colombia to reconstruct their nation. The UnitedStates, the crucial outside actor, has indispensableexperience, resources and political clout. The judiciousapplication of principles that have worked in the past inother settings, including legitimate power, democraticparticipation, the commitment and resources of thepopulace, focused and restrained external assistance, andcreative and sustained leadership, are the keys. There canbe no turning back if Colombia is to avoid becoming a “failedstate,” at war with itself and the region.

ENDNOTES

1. Michael Shifter, “Policy Brief: Colombia’s Security Predicamentand Opportunities for Peace,” Washington: Inter-American Dialogue,1998, p. 3.

2. James, Latin America, 4th edition, New York: Odyssey, 1969, p.426.

3. Richani, “The Political Economy of Violence: The War System inColombia,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 2, Summer 1996, pp. 37-82; and “The Political Economy of a CivilWar: Extraction and the Crisis of the War System in Colombia,” paperpresented at the conference “Landpower and Ambiguous Warfare: TheChallenge of Colombia in the 21st Century,” U.S. Army War College,Carlisle, PA, December 10-11, 1998; hereafter cited as USAWCColombia conference.

4. Statistics derived from Ambassador Myles R. Frechette, “TheChallenge to Democracy, Regional Security and the United States,” andAmbassador David Passage, “Untying the Gordian Knot: Differ-

37

entiating Counternarcotics from Counterinsurgency,” papers presented at the USAWC Colombia conference.

5. Frechette, “The Challenge to Democracy,” pp. 6-7.

6. Thomas J. Umberg and Allison Major, “The Challenges ofColombia and Our National Drug Control Strategy,” paper presented atthe USAWC Colombia conference.

7. Gallón, “The Threat to Human Rights in Colombia,” paperpresented at the USAWC Colombia conference, p. 12.

8. Noemí Sanín, “A Democracy Without People,” paper prepared forthe USAWC Colombia conference, p. 4.

9. Sanín, p. 4.

10. Ibid., pp, 4-5.

11. Edmundo Jarquín and Fernando Carrillo, Justice Delayed:Judicial Reform in the Americas, Washington: Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank, 1998, p. 11.

12. For an excellent analysis of corruption and its relationship todrugs, see Francisco Thoumi, “Corruption and Drug-Trafficking:General Considerations and References to Colombia,” paper presentedat the USAWC Colombia conference.

13. “Colombia Leads in Kidnapings With 1,678 This Year,” MiamiHerald, December 25, 1998; www.herald.com/americas/digdocs/067395.htm.

14. See also the comprehensive and balanced reporting by HumanRights Watch, War Without Quarter: Colombia and InternationalHumanitarian Law, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1998.

15. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human RightsPractices for 1996 and 1997, Submitted to Committee on ForeignRelations, U.S. Senate, and the Committee on International Relationsof the U.S. House of Representatives, February 1997, pp. 389-398, andFebruary 1998, pp. 451-465, and February 1999, www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report/colombia.html.

16. Frechette, “The Challenge to Democracy,” p. 3.

17. Others estimate less. See Richani, “The Political Economy ofCivil War.”

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18. Pardo, De Primera Mano, Colombia 1986-1994: Entre Conflictosy Esperanzas, Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma, 1996, p. 497.

19. Human Rights Watch, War Without Quarter.

20. García-Peña, “Negotiating With Multiple, Possibly Incom-patible Armed Organizations: Is Peace Possible?,” presentation made at the USAWC Colombia conference.

21. Spencer, “Colombia’s Paramilitaries: Criminals or PoliticalForce?,” paper presented at the USAWC Colombia conference.

22. Marc Chernick, “Negotiating Peace Amid Multiple Forms ofViolence: The Protracted Search for Settlement to the Armed Conflictsin Colombia,” in Cynthia Arnson, ed., Comparative Peace Processes inLatin America, Stanford University Press, forthcoming.

23. Alejandro Reyes, “Compra de tierras por narcotraficantes,” inFrancisco Thoumi, et. al., Drogas ilícitas en Colombia, Bogotá: Ariel,Naciones Unidas-PNUD, Ministerio de Justicia, Dirección Nacional deEstupefacientes, 1997, pp. 270-346.

24. Chernick, “Negotiating Peace Amid Multiple Forms.”

25. Diana Jean Schemo, “Congress Steps Up Aid for Colombians toCombat Drugs,” New York Times, December 1, 1998; Todd Robberson,“Experts Question Strength of Colombian Rebel Group,” DallasMorning News, January 11, 1999.

26. George Vickers, Washington Office on Latin America, privatecorrespondence with authors, January 6, 1999.

27. Francisco E. Thoumi, “Some Implications of the Growth of theUnderground Economy in Colombia,” Journal of Interamerican Studiesand World Affairs, Vol. 29, Summer 1986, p. 42; Maria Celia Toro, “ThePolitical Repercussions of Drug Trafficking in Mexico,” in ElizabethJoyce and Carlos Malamud, eds., Latin America and the MultinationalDrug Trade, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998, p. 137.

28. Cited in Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, Drugs in the Caribbean:Sovereignty Under Siege, State College: Pennsylvania State UniversityPress, 1997, p. 1.

29. Saavedra, “Venezuelan Perspective of the Colombian Crisis,”paper presented at the USAWC Colombia conference.

39

30. Colonel Luis Hernández, “The Colombian Crisis and RegionalSecurity: An Ecuadorian Perspective,” paper presented at the USAWCColombia conference.

31. Associated Press, “Colombia Rebels Attack Remote PoliceGarrison,” Miami Herald, November 2, 1998.

32. Thayer, “Colombia and Regional Security: A PanamanianPerspective,” paper presented at the USAWC conference. See also:“Afirma Monseñor: Peligra Entrega del Canal a Panamenos,” La Prensa(Panama), January 29, 1999; www.sinfo.net/prensa/hoy/nacional.htm.

33. Benítez, “Mexico-Colombia: Problemas Estratégicos de laRelación Bilateral a Fin del Siglo,” paper presented at the USAWCColombia conference.

34. Sereseres, “Applying the Lessons of the Past to Colombia,”presentation made at the USAWC Colombia conference.

35. Zartman, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restorationof Legitimate Authority, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995.

36. Zartman, p. 273.

37. Chicola, “United States Policy Towards Colombia,” presentation made at the USAWC Colombia conference.

38. Beers and Thomas Umberg, “U.S. Counterdrug Strategy inColombia,” joint presentation made at the USAWC Colombiaconference.

39. Pastrana, cited in Diana Jean Schemo, “Bogotá Sees Drug Waras Path to Peace,” New York Times, January 6, 1999; nytimes.com/library/wor10699colombia-pastrana-rebels.html.

40. Tapias, “Colombia’s Military Strategy,” presentation made atthe USAWC Colombia conference.

41. For this perspective, see David Spencer, “Bogotá Continues toBleed as FARC Find Their Feet,” Janes Intelligence Review, November1998, Vol. 10, No. 11, p. 39. See also, Douglas Farah, “Colombian ArmyFighting Legacy of Abuses,” Washington Post, February 18, 1999, p.A15. Farah cites unnamed U.S. officials: “It will take at least ageneration to turn the armed forces around.”

42. Passage, “Untying the Gordian Knot,” p. 3.

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43. Ibid., p. 5.

44. Cuellar, comments made at the “Houston Project Conference onCivil-Military Relations,” Cartagena, Colombia, August 25-28, 1998.

45. This is not a view shared by some analysts, who argue thatexpanding military capabilities would simply create more bloodshed.See, for example, Gallón, “The Threat to Human Rights in Colombia.”

46. Passage, “Untying the Gordian Knot,” p. 2.

47. Tim Johnson, “Rebels Might Be Willing to Switch Sides in theDrug War,” Heraldlink, Miami Herald, January 8, 1999; Schemo,“Bogotá Sees Drug War as Path to Peace.”

48. On the seeming contradiction between power and ideologywithin the FARC, see Serge F. Kovaleski, “Rebel Movement on the Rise:Colombian Guerrillas Use Military Force, Not Ideology to Hold Power,”Washington Post, February 5, 1999, p. A27.

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