Colombia: Origins of the Conflict and U.S. Policy

Adam IsacsonCenter for International Policy

1717 Massachusetts Ave NW, Suite 801Washington DC 20036

(202) 232-3317 / isacson@ciponline.orgPrepared for NAIMUN,

February 15, 2008

1. A Difficult Country to Govern

2. State Weakness and Impunity

3. Armed Groups

4. The U.S. Role

5. Disappointing Results

6. What is Next?

7. Alternative Proposals

Difficult Geography

1. A difficult country to govern

Some of the World’s Worst Economic Inequality

3. The Region’s Real Problems

1. A difficult country to govern

State Weakness and Impunity

2. State Weakness and Impunity

“Ungoverned Spaces”

2. State Weakness and Impunity

Coca

2. State Weakness and Impunity

Poverty and Coca

2. State Weakness and Impunity

Conflict Throughout Colombia’s National Territory

3. Armed Groups

Illegal Armed Groups3. Putumayo: Dynamic of the Conflict

3. Armed Groups

FARC (Revolutionary Armed forces of Colombia)

3. Armed GroupsMapa 2.4 Distribución espacial de acciones violentas

realizadas por las Farc, durante el período 1995-2002

Fuente: Dane, Marco Geoestadístico Nacional, 2001. Observatorio de Violencia–Presidencia de la República. 55

ELN (National Liberation Army)

3. Armed GroupsMapa 2.6 Distribución espacial de acciones violentas

realizadas por el ELN, durante el período 1995-2002

Fuente: Dane, Marco Geoestadístico Nacional, 2001. Observatorio de Violencia–Presidencia de la República.58

Paramilitaries

3. Armed GroupsMapa 2.8 Distribución espacial de acciones violentas

realizadas por las Autodefensas, durante el período 1995-2002

Fuente: Dane, Marco Geoestadístico Nacional, 2001. Observatorio de Violencia–Presidencia de la República.6262

The Combatants

Group Approximate Size

Leader Responsibility for civilian murders

Annual income

Colombian Armed Forces

220,000 military, 180,000 police

President Álvaro Uribe 5-10%

Defense Budget $6 billion

FARC (Revolutionary

Armed Forces of Colombia)

13,000-18,000, plus support personnel and urban militias

Manuel Marulanda, seven-member

secretariat

30-40%(most kidnappings, about half of forced

displacement)

$250 million - $1 billion

ELN (National Liberation Army)

2,000-4,000, plus support personnel and urban militias

Nicolás Rodríguez, five-member

central command

0-5%(many kidnappings)

Less than $10 million

Paramilitaries 4,000-8,000

Very decentralized, after a questioned

demobilization process, over 20 new

groups

50-60%

Probably similar to FARC; much

income goes to private fortunes

Narcotics Trafficking

Organizations

At least 4,000 in 150+ gangs of varying sizes

DecentralizedSignificant

responsibility for common crime

More than $10 billion

3. Armed Groups

Failed Peace Processes

3. Armed Groups

The U.S. Role

4. The U.S. Role

$6.1 billion since 2000

$0 million

$250 million

$500 million

$750 million

$1,000 million

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2008, request

Military and Police Aid Economic and Social Aid

Millions of U.S. dollars 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007,

estimate2008,

request

Military and Police Aid

Economic and Social Aid

306.6 743.6 236.9 398.9 624.4 614.8 597.8 632.2 615.9 603.4

8.8 231.4 1.4 115.5 136.7 134.5 134.7 132.2 132.2 139.5

Total 315.4 975 238.3 514.4 761.1 749.3 732.5 764.4 748.1 742.9

4. The U.S. Role

Top U.S. Military-Aid Recipients

1. Iraq2. Israel

3. Afghanistan4. Egypt

5. Pakistan6. Colombia

4. The U.S. Role

821,000 hectares (2.05 million acres) sprayed 2000-2006.

That’s 33 acres per hour, 24 hours per day.

4. The U.S. Role

•More than 90 helicopters granted since 1999

•At least 56,364 trainees since 1999

•Over $200 million per year for aircraft maintenance

•Nearly half of U.S. aid given through contractors

•About $150 million for pipeline protection

•Army Counternarcotics Brigade; Commando

Battalion; Anti-Kidnapping units; Mobile Special

Forces Brigades; Police Carabinero units; Navy

Riverine Brigade

•Support for “Plan Patriota” military offensive

Other Military Aid Initiatives

4. The U.S. Role

“White Elephants”

4. The U.S. Role

Another Sprayed AD Project5. Plan Colombia: Alternative Development

4. The U.S. Role

U.S. Finds No Change in Coca Cultivation

5. Disappointing Results

Cocaine Prices in the United States

5. Disappointing Results

“Because cocaine production in South America appears to be stable or increasing, cocaine availability could return to normal levels during late 2007 and early 2008.” - Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, October 2007

Security Gains?

1. Who gets the credit?2. Rural Areas

3. Extrajudicial Executions4. Paramilitarism

5. Military Scandals6. Guerrilla Military Capacity

5. Disappointing Results

Manual Eradication

(Demobilized paramilitaries eradicate coca in Antioquia)

9. What Is To Come

6. What is Next?

“Integrated Action”: The Same Old Militarized Counterinsurgency?

6. What is Next?

Militarization

6. What is Next?

“Peace is born from soldiers and police, even though the civilian government must do the negotiating.” - Alvaro Uribe, August 2007

Troubled Peace Efforts

6. What is Next?

A Better Policy

Orito, Putumayo

10.A Better Policy

7. Alternative Proposals

No More Shortcuts: Demilitarize the Policy

1. Rural Governance2. Displacement, Land and Victims

3. The Justice System4. A Strategy for Peace

5. Put Our Own House in Order

7. Alternative Proposals

Many Amendments

2000: Obey amendment to H.R. 3908 would have delayed most U.S. military aid to Colombia. Lost 186-239.

2000: Ramstad amendment to H.R. 3908 would have cut out most U.S. military aid to Colombia. Lost 159-262.

2001: Lee-Leach amendment to H.R. 2506 to shift funding from the Andean Counterdrug Initiative to the Global AIDS Trust Fund. Lost 188-240.

2001: McGovern et al amendment to H.R. 2506 to cut $100 million from the Andean aid to pay for increased assistance for anti-tuberculosis programs. Lost 179-240.

2002: McGovern-Skelton amendment to H.R. 4775 to cut language broadening the mission of U.S. military assistance in Colombia to include combat against illegal armed groups. Lost 192-225.

2003: McGovern-Skelton amendment to H.R. 2800 to cut military aid for Colombia and transfer it to HIV-AIDS programs. Lost 195-226.

2003: McGovern-Skelton-DeLauro amendment to H.R. 1559 to cut military aid for Colombia that was included in a bill to fund the Iraq war. Lost 209-216.

2005: McGovern-McCollum-Moore amendment to H.R. 3057 to cut military aid for Colombia. Lost 189-234.

2006: Opposition to Burton amendment to H.R. 4939 to increase military aid to Colombia by cutting Iraq prison construction from supplemental funding bill. Lost 172-250.

2006: McGovern-Leach-Payne et al amendment to H.R. 5522 to move $30 million in military aid from the Andean Counterdrug Initiative to the Emergency Refugee and Migration Account. Lost 174-229.

7. Alternative Proposals

A Small Step in the Right Direction

$0 million

$200 million

$400 million

$600 million

$800 million

2005 2006 2007 2008 est 2009 req

Military and Police Aid Economic and Social Aid

Millions of U.S. dollars 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008, estimate 2009, request

Military and Police Aid

Economic and Social Aid

306.6 743.6 236.9 398.9 624.4 614.8 597.8 632.2 615.9 603.4 442.1

8.8 231.4 1.4 115.5 136.7 134.5 134.7 132.2 132.2 139.5 240.8

Total 315 975 238 514 761 749 733 764 748.1 742.9 682.9

7. Alternative Proposals

Online Resources from CIP

“Plan Colombia and Beyond”

Blog:www.cipcol.org

Database of U.S. Aid to the Americas:

www.justf.org

Colombia Program Home

Page:www.ciponline.org/

colombia