Collective Security or Pipe Dream?Collective Security beyond the Cold War by George W. DownsReview by: James J. WirtzMershon International Studies Review, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Oct., 1995), pp. 263-265Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/222756 .

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Mershon International Studies Review (1995) 39, 263-265

Collective Security or Pipe Dream? REVIEW BY JAMES J. WIRTZ

Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School

Collective Security Beyond the Cold War Edited by George W. Downs. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994. 281 pp., $39.50 (ISBN: 0-472- 10457-8).

Interest in collective security usually increases following hegemonic war, a time when political rapproachment produced by the fear of hostilities overshadows balance-of-power politics (Jervis, 1985). Recently, interest in collective security peaked immediately after the relatively bloodless demise of the Soviet Union; it appeared possible, especially following the coalition victory in the Gulf War and the ensuing Russian-American detente, to reinvigorate this approach to interna- tional security. Advocacy of various forms of collective security prompted a sharp, albeit brief, scholarly debate. In light of the mixed record of the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations, and the United Nations, it is still possible to depict collective security either as a source of stability (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991) or instability (Betts, 1992) in world politics.

Hoping to erode the stereotypical views and partisan positions of the past by exploring new theories of collective security and suggesting how it might address current regional problems, George Downs has assembled a set of finely crafted essays in Collective Security Beyond the Cold War Defining collective security as collec- tive self-regulation, Downs argues that it occurs when "a group of states attempts to reduce security threats by agreeing to collectively punish any member state that violates the system's norms" (p.18). This definition demands much of states. It implies not only that nations will respond collectively to threats to the peace, but also that they will take punitive action against states that fail to live up to collective standards.

The volume's chapters fall into three categories. The first group, by Downs and Keisuke Iida and Emerson Niou and Peter Ordeshook, is based on noncooperative game theory and provides a positive assessment of collective security's potential contribution to world peace. These authors are primarily interested in identifying the specific arrangements that would facilitate the emergence and operation of a collective security system. Along with Charles Kupchan's more traditional argument about the benefits of collective security, these analyses take a normative tone by suggesting how leaders' cost-benefit analyses could be altered to bolster the chances that states will engage in collective self-regulation.

A second group of authors are far less optimistic about the possibility of devel- oping a collective security arrangement or even the relevance of collective security to current defense issues. They hint that the game theorists simply ignore political realities when they contemplate collective self-regulation. William Bianco and James Lindsay, for instance, suggest that in practice it is extremely difficult to punish defectors from a collective security agreement. It may, for example, be impossible to target individual states. The act of sanctioning, embodied in the notion of self-regulation, may also prove more damaging to the common good than

? 1995 The Mershon Center at The Ohio State University. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 238 Main Street, Cambridge, MA 02142, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK.

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Book Reviews

ignoring the defector. Similarly, Steven Walt identifies a host of political considera- tions that would impede collective action, especially when dealing with revolution- ary regimes. In Walt's view, revolutions affect individual states unevenly, giving them different incentives to take action. Because of the uncertainty provoked by revolutionary situations, it will be difficult to decide whether confrontation or accommodation is the best approach. Collective security in this instance would also violate the norm of nonintervention in a state's domestic affairs, making it harder, according to Walt, "to obtain support for a collective response when consensus on a clear and present danger is lacking" (p. 179). Charles Glaser's chapter also highlights the political and practical drawbacks of collective self-regulation. In his comparative assessment of various approaches to European security, Glaser argues that, compared to NATO, collective security offers the West few advantages given the wide range of potential problems posed by the demise of the Soviet Union.

The third set of chapters suggests that a form of collective security already exists. Michael Doyle's essay on "classical" balance of power (a situation in which a state or group of states recognize that they "hold the balance") highlights the similarities between collective security and balancing behavior. If one moves beyond a pure neorealist (Waltz, 1979) definition of balancing, then balance-of-power systems are more than "the default model of international systemic behavior." According to Doyle, "the orderly results of the classical balance of the eighteenth century required . . . independent states, coherent and similar domestic structures, a shared transnational culture, even a degree of inspired leadership . . . these pre- requisites were not far short of those conventionally seen to produce collective security" (p. 162). Charles Lipson concurs in this assessment by suggesting that, at least in the West, everyday economic activity (the Group of 7) and more recent military endeavors (the Gulf War coalition) approximate past efforts at collective self-regulation. By raising the point that collective security sometimes means that states will remain relatively inactive in the face of a deteriorating political situation, Lipson also suggests that collective security and action are not necessarily synony- mous. If one looks for self-regulation in non-events-the failure to exploit political or military turmoil in the former Soviet Union, or responsible trade or monetary policies-then collective security could already be a reality.

Clearly, Collective Security Beyond the Cold War is provocative, especially in light of recent events. Signs of neo-isolationism in American politics and the vagaries of democracy-problems anticipated by Bianco and Lindsey and Lipson-raise real complications for collective-security advocates. It is increasingly difficult to imagine that democracies will fulfill the two-stage process (collective action and collective sanction) embodied in Downs's definition of self-regulation. Collective inactivity, which in fact could be a form of collective security (Elrod, 1976), now seems to be the order of the day. But this would not please advocates of collective self-regula- tion, who seem to favor international activism.

Collective Security Beyond the Cold War ultimately fails to bridge the gap between collective security's advocates and detractors, although Downs has brought them together for a coherent and insightful exchange. Nothing revolutionary is revealed by this theoretical and empirical discourse. But the volume does update the age-old debate about collective security, thereby providing a useful point of departure for graduate seminars in international organization or collective action.

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JAMES J. WIRTZ 265

References

BETTS, RICHARD K. (1993) Systems of Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control and the New Europe. International Security 17:5-43.

ELROD, RICHARD. (1976) The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System. World Politics 28:159-74.

JERVIS, ROBERT. (1985) From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation. World Politics 38:58-80.

KUPCHAN, CHARLES A., AND CLIFFORD A. KUPCHAN. (1991) Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe. International Security 16:114-16.

WALTZ, KENNETH. (1979) Theory of International Politics. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.

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