col application part 2, fsar - nrc
TRANSCRIPT
Revision 38-i
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 2, FSAR
CHAPTER 8
ELECTRIC POWER
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section Title Page
8.0 ELECTRIC POWER ............................................................................ 8.1-1
8.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 8.1-1
8.1.1 General .................................................................................... 8.1-1
8.1.2.1 Utility Power Grid Description .................................................. 8.1-1
8.2 OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM ............................................................... 8.2-1
8.2.1.1 Transmission System .............................................................. 8.2-1
8.2.1.2 Offsite Power System .............................................................. 8.2-1
8.2.1.2.1 Switchyard ......................................................................... 8.2-4
8.2.1.2.1.1 Plant Switching Station ...................................................... 8.2-4
8.2.1.2.1.2 Unit Switchyards/Transformer Yards ................................. 8.2-7
8.2.1.2.2 Plant Switching Station and Transmission Lines Testing and Inspection ................................................................... 8.2-8
8.2.1.2.3 Communication with ERCOT/Oncor .................................. 8.2-9
8.2.2.2 Grid Reliability and Stability Analysis..................................... 8.2-11
8.2.3 Design Bases Requirements ................................................. 8.2-12
8.2.4 Combined License Information .............................................. 8.2-13
8.3 ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS .............................................................. 8.3-1
8.3.1.1 Description............................................................................... 8.3-1
8.3.1.1.9 Design Criteria for Class 1E Equipment ............................ 8.3-1
8.3.1.1.11 Grounding and Lightning Protection System ..................... 8.3-1
8.3.1.3.2 Short Circuit Studies .......................................................... 8.3-2
8.3.1.3.4 Equipment Protection and Coordination Studies ............... 8.3-2
8.3.1.3.5 Insulation Coordination (Surge and Lightning Protection) ......................................................................... 8.3-2
8.3.2.1.1 Class 1E DC Power System .............................................. 8.3-2
8.3.2.1.2 Non-Class 1E DC Power System ...................................... 8.3-3
8.3.2.3.2 Short Circuit Studies .......................................................... 8.3-3
8.3.4 Combined License Information ................................................ 8.3-3
8.4 STATION BLACKOUT......................................................................... 8.4-1
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 2, FSAR
Revision 38-ii
LIST OF TABLES
Number Title
8.2-201 345 kV Transmission Lines
8.2-202 Transmission Tie Lines
8.2-203 Failure Modes & Effects Analysis for Offsite Power Sources
8.3.1-1R Electrical Equipment Ratings - Component Data Main AC Power System (Nominal Values)
8.3.1-4R Electrical Load Distribution - Class 1E GTG Loading
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 2, FSAR
LIST OF FIGURES
Number Title
Revision 38-iii
8.1-1R Simplified One Line Diagram Electric Power System
8.2-201 Relevant Portions of Oncor Transmission System Configuration
8.2-202 CPNPP Units 3 & 4 Offsite Power System Key One Line Diagram
8.2-203 Normal PPS Unit Switchyard One Line Diagram
8.2-204 Alternate PPS Unit Switchyard One Line Diagram
8.2-205 Plant Switching Station One Line Diagram
8.2-206 Plant Switching Station Layout
8.2-207 Unit 3 Unit Switchyard Layout
8.2-208 Unit 4 Unit Switchyard Layout
8.2-209 Logic Diagram – 345 kV Reserve Auxiliary Transformer Circuit Breakers
8.2-210 Logic Diagram – 345 kV Main Transformer Circuit Breaker
8.3.1-1R Onsite AC Electrical Distribution System
8.3.1-2R Logic Diagrams
8.3.1-201 Ground Grid and Lightning Protection System
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 2, FSAR
Revision 38-iv
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ac alternating current
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
CCVT coupling capacitor voltage transformer
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
COL Combined License
CPNPP Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant
dc direct current
DCD Design Control Document
DFR digital fault recorder
ERCOT Electric Reliability Council of Texas
ETAP Electrical Transient Analyzer Program
FMEA failure modes and effects analysis
GIB gas-insulated bus
GIS gas-insulated switchgear
GLBS generator load break switch
HV high voltage
HVAC heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IPB isolated phase busduct
LOOP loss of offsite power
LV low voltage
MT main transformer
OLTC on-load tap changer
Oncor Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC
PPS preferred power supply
PUCT Public Utility Commission of Texas
RAT reserve auxiliary transformer
SCADA supervisory control and data acquisition
T/B turbine building
TSP transmission service provider
UAT unit auxiliary transformer
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 2, FSAR
Revision 38.1-1
8.0 ELECTRIC POWER
8.1 INTRODUCTION
This section of the referenced Design Control Document (DCD) is incorporated by reference with the following departures and/or supplements.
8.1.1 General
Replace the fourth paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.1.1 with the following.
Figure 8.1-1R is a simplified electrical one line diagram depicting the alternating current (ac) and direct current (dc) onsite and offsite electric power system including the site-specific switchyard.
8.1.2.1 Utility Power Grid Description
Replace the paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.1.2.1 with the following.
Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC (Oncor) is the transmission service provider (TSP) for the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP). Oncor operates the largest distribution and transmission system in Texas, providing power to three million electric delivery points over more than 101,000 miles of distribution and 14,000 miles of transmission lines. Oncor operates in a service area of east, west, and north central Texas and serves cities that include the Dallas-Fort Worth area and surrounding cities. The Oncor grid is connected to fossil-fueled plants, combustion turbine plants and nuclear plants supplying electric energy over a transmission system consisting of various voltages up to 345 kV. Oncor is a member of Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT). ERCOT is comprised of members engaged in generation, transmission, distribution and marketing of electric energy in the state of Texas. ERCOT is the independent system operator that oversees all generation and transmission functions.
A new 345 kV switching station for CPNPP Units 3 and 4 (plant switching station) is constructed prior to fuel loading. The plant switching station is a part of the ERCOT grid and has four outgoing transmission circuits to remote substations as described in Section 8.2. In addition, the plant switching station has four independent overhead transmission tie lines, two for CPNPP Unit 3 and the other two for CPNPP Unit 4. The plant switching station has two main buses configured in a breaker and a half scheme. The switching station equipment shared between Unit 3 and 4 has the capacity and is configured such that sharing will not significantly impair the ability to provide offsite power in response to an accident in one unit and an orderly shutdown and cooldown of the remaining unit and that adequate offsite power capacity exists to support both units during this scenario.
CP COL 8.2(3)
CP COL 8.2(1)
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L 8.
2(3)
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 2, FSAR
Revision 38.2-1
8.2 OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM
This section of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with the following departures and/or supplements.
8.2.1.1 Transmission System
Replace the paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.2.1.1 with the following.
Oncor is the TSP for CPNPP. Oncor operates the largest distribution and transmission system in Texas, providing power to three million electric delivery points over more than 101,000 miles of distribution and 14,000 miles of transmission lines. Oncor operates in a service area of east, west, and north central Texas and serves cities that include the Dallas-Fort Worth area and surrounding cities. The Oncor grid is connected to fossil-fueled plants, combustion turbine plants and nuclear plants supplying electric energy over a transmission system consisting of various voltages up to 345 kV. Oncor is a member of ERCOT. ERCOT is comprised of members engaged in generation, transmission, distribution and marketing of electric energy in the state of Texas. ERCOT is the independent system operator that oversees all generation and transmission functions. The relevant portions of the Oncor transmission system network configuration is shown in Figure 8.2-201.
A new Oncor 345 kV switching station for CPNPP Units 3 and 4 (plant switching station) is constructed prior to fuel loading. The plant switching station has four outgoing transmission lines to remote switching stations as indicated in Table 8.2-201.
The rights-of-way for the transmission lines listed in Table 8.2-201 is established and all four lines are constructed prior to fuel loading. These rights-of-way commence at the CPNPP property and continue towards the switching stations, listed in Table 8.2-201. The width of the rights-of-way is adequate for the planned transmission lines. The TSPs in the ERCOT region are subject to regulations of the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT) that controls new transmission facilities and needed interconnections to transmit power to and from the transmission grid. Any existing rights-of-way are utilized without compromising design basis criteria.
In addition, the plant switching station has four independent overhead transmission tie lines, two for CPNPP Unit 3 and two for CPNPP Unit 4, as indicated in Table 8.2-202.
8.2.1.2 Offsite Power System
Replace the first paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.2.1.2 with the following.
CP COL 8.2(1)
CP COL 8.2(4)CP COL 8.2(5)
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 2, FSAR
Revision 38.2-2
The offsite power system is a nonsafety-related, non-class 1E system, beginning at the transmission grid and ending at the line-side terminals of the main power supply circuit breakers feeding the 13.8 kV and 6.9 kV buses, and at the terminals on the main transformer (MT) side of the generator load break switch (GLBS). The plant switching station is connected to the transmission grid by four outgoing transmission lines. The one line diagram of the offsite power system is shown in Figure 8.2-202. The plant switching station has two independent control houses (#1 and #2) that contain the control and protection equipment for the four outgoing transmission lines. The control and protection equipment for the DeCordova and Johnson lines are in control house #1, and those for the Parker and the Whitney lines are in control house #2. The transmission lines that are associated with different control houses are designed such that, availability of the two lines associated with one control house is not lost by any single failure that may cause failure of lines associated with the other control house.
For each unit, there are two 345 kV gas-insulated switchgear, one is for the normal preferred power supply (PPS) and the other is for alternate PPS, hereinafter called unit switchyard. The normal PPS unit switchyard is located on the southwest side of the turbine building (T/B), and the alternate PPS unit switchyard is located on the southeast side of the T/B. The one-line diagrams for the normal PPS and alternate PPS unit switchyards are shown in Figures 8.2-203 and 8.2-204, respectively.
There are two indoor gas-insulated 345 kV circuit breakers in the normal PPS unit switchyard. One breaker is on the high-voltage side of reserve auxiliary transformer (RAT) 1 and RAT3, and the other is on the high voltage side of RAT2 and RAT4. The other sides of these two circuit breakers are connected to the overhead 345 kV transmission tie line going to the plant switching station. The 345 kV interconnections between the RATs, gas-insulated switchgear (GIS), and overhead transmission tie line are provided by gas-insulated bus (GIB).
There is one indoor gas-insulated 345 kV circuit breaker in the alternate PPS unit switchyard connecting the high-voltage side of the MT and the overhead 345 kV transmission tie line going to the plant switching station. The 345 kV interconnections between the MT, GIS, and overhead transmission tie line are provided by GIB.
The unit interface with the Oncor transmission system is at the connection to Oncor’s 345 kV overhead transmission tie line in the unit switchyards. The four unit switchyards and the four transmission tie lines between the unit switchyards and the plant switching station are physically separated.
Replace the first four sentences of the second paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.2.1.2 with the following.
For each unit, offsite electric power is provided to the onsite power system from the grid and other generating stations by two physically independent
CP COL 8.2(4)CP COL 8.2(5)
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 2, FSAR
Revision 38.2-3
transmission lines. During unit startup, shutdown, maintenance, and during all postulated accident conditions, offsite electric power can be supplied to each unit site from the plant switching station through two physically independent transmission tie lines. One of these two transmission tie lines connects to the high-voltage side of the MT via a 345 kV circuit breaker. The other transmission tie line connects to two 345 kV circuit breakers at the unit switchyard, one circuit breaker is for RAT1 and RAT3, and the other circuit breaker is for RAT2 and RAT4. Both of any two outgoing transmission lines between the plant switching station and the remote offsite switching stations adequately maintain the voltage within ±5 percent of 345 kV at the high voltage side terminals of the MTs and RATs, while supplying full auxiliary loads of both units for all normal, abnormal and postulated accident conditions.
Add the following information after the last sentence of the second paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.2.1.2.
Neither the grid stability analysis in Subsection 8.2.2.2 nor the failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) in Subsection 8.2.1.2.1.1 identified the non-safety related offsite power system as risk-significant during all modes of plant operation.
Add the following information after the last sentence of the eleventh paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.2.1.2.
The force-cooled continuous-current rating of the iso-phase bus duct section between the main generator and the main transformer is 44.4 kA, which provides 5% margin with respect to the 42.2 kA continuous current rating of the main generator.
Replace the last sentence of the fifteenth paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.2.1.2 with the following.
In case of a sudden pressure relay operation, the transformer is isolated.
Replace the second sentence of the eighteenth paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.2.1.2 with the following.
Minimum one-hour rated fire barriers are provided between all transformers. Figures 8.2-207 and 8.2-208 show physical layout of equipment in the Unit 3 and
CP COL 8.2(4)CP COL 8.2(5)
STD COL 8.2(10)
CP COL 8.2(4)CP COL 8.2(5)
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 2, FSAR
Revision 38.2-4
Unit 4 unit switchyards/transformer yards, respectively. Cables associated with the normal and alternate PPS between unit switchyard and the electrical room in the T/B are routed in separate underground duct bank. Normal and alternate PPS cables are physically separated which minimizes the chance of simultaneous failure. The underground duct bank for these circuits is sealed to prevent degradation in wetted or submerged condition.
8.2.1.2.1 Switchyard
Replace the content of DCD Subsection 8.2.1.2.1 with the following.
8.2.1.2.1.1 Plant Switching Station
The plant switching station is located approximately half a mile south-west from the plant-site, within the CPNPP property. From the plant switching station, there are four outgoing transmission lines going to remote switching stations, and four transmission tie lines going to the four unit switchyards. There are two control houses in the plant switching station. The control and protection equipment associated with the DeCordova and Johnson transmission lines and the two normal PPS transmission tie lines are located in control house #1. The control and protection equipment associated with the Parker and Whitney transmission lines and the two alternate PPS transmission tie lines are located in control house #2. The control and protection circuit cables that are routed in the yard and associates with two different control houses are physically separated to avoid a common cause failure of the two control houses and the availability of the associated offsite power circuits. The four outgoing transmission lines to remote switching stations and the four transmission tie lines to the unit switchyards are installed on separate sets of transmission towers and do not cross each other. Any credible failure of one PPS circuit, including catastrophic failure of transmission towers, is not cause the failed circuit or tower to fall into PPS circuit for the same unit. The plant switching station, including the transmission lines, towers, protection relay systems, control houses, etc. are not specifically designed for earthquake, tornado or flooding; however, they are designed to the applicable industry standards and regulations to assure a safe and highly reliable offsite power system. Each power circuit of the normal and alternate PPS, originating from the ERCOT transmission grid and terminating at the line-side of the medium-voltage bus incoming circuit breakers, is designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena (excluding earthquake, tornado or flooding) and protected from dynamic effects, and has sufficient capacity and capability to assure satisfactory operation of all safety loads and non safety loads, under normal, abnormal and postulated accident conditions. Lightning protection system is also provided as discussed in Subsection 8.3.1.1.11.
The breakers in the plant switching station are arranged in a breaker-and-a-half scheme having six bays. Of the six bays, two bays are provided with three circuit
CP COL 8.2(3)
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 2, FSAR
Revision 38.2-5
breakers and the remaining four bays are provided with two circuit breakers. Provision is made for adding the third circuit breaker in the two-circuit breaker bays to accommodate future growth. All 345 kV circuit breakers have dual trip coils. The switching station main buses are constructed of six-inch aluminum tubes with standard 345 kV spacing. All of the circuit breakers have a disconnect switch on each side to allow isolation or removal of a circuit breaker without affecting availability of each transmission line. The one line diagram and the physical layout drawing of the plant switching station are shown in Figures 8.2-205 and 8.2-206, respectively.
In order to avoid crossings of the 345 kV lines out of the plant switching station, a section of the two main buses is lengthened to allow several of the existing circuits to pass through (fly-over) the plant switching station. The section of bus is approximately 300 ft. long to allow space for the fly-over circuits. The fly-over circuits are double dead-ended between the two main buses to avoid a scenario that would allow a single failure of one of the lines to trip both of the main buses. Standard 345 kV substation dead ends are utilized for these terminations. The lines that pass through the station are the 345 kV CPNPP Units 1 and 2 – Parker 345 kV switching station line, the 345 kV CPNPP Units 1 and 2 – Comanche Switch line and the 138 kV CPNPP Units 1 and 2 – Stephenville line.
The plant switching station has two 25 ft. X 65 ft. control buildings. These buildings house the primary and backup line relaying panels, voltage transformer and current transformer indoor junction boxes, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) unit, digital fault recorder (DFR) unit, batteries and battery chargers and all ac and dc panels. Each building houses a single set of batteries and battery charger in its own battery room separate from the relay panel room. One building houses dc source #1 and the other houses dc source #2. To reduce the cable lengths of the dc supplies in one control building to panels in the other control building, a set of fused cables are brought from the dc source in each control building to the dc box in the relay panel room of the other control building. This allows for short cable runs to the relay panels in the other control building, while keeping the batteries in different buildings. A SCADA unit is installed in each control building, with the data circuit bridged between the two units. This prevents bringing all of the SCADA cable to one building. A similar design is used on the DFR, but the station switcher is used to connect both DFRs to one phone line. Each building has its own heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system, portable fire extinguishers, and eyewash stations.
A fiber optic shield wire is installed on each of the four 345 kV tie lines between the plant switching station and the unit switchyards. These fibers are used for relay protection and for sending generator information to Oncor. Oncor has no direct control of any of the 345 kV circuit breakers located at the unit switchyards.
CP COL 8.2(3)CP COL 8.2(8)
CP COL 8.2(7)
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 2, FSAR
Revision 38.2-6
Each transmission line and the plant switching station buses are provided with primary and backup relay protection schemes. Each transmission line is protected by pilot protection using a directional comparison blocking scheme. Phase step-distance and ground directional-overcurrent protection are also provided as backup protection. Each plant switching station bus has dual independent differential protection schemes. Each transmission tie line has differential protection and phase step-distance and ground directional-overcurrent protection. The relay protection schemes for independent transmission lines are designed so that any single failure or incident, such as control house fire or cable dig-in, will not cause loss of both circuits in any combination of two independent transmission lines. The relay panels for independent transmission lines are physically located in separate control house and the control cables are physically separated. The design for every protection zone has fully redundant and electrically independent protection systems. This fully redundant concept is also applied to the breaker-failure schemes.
The primary ac power supply for the plant switching station is provided from existing local electric distribution system. The backup ac power is supplied by a separate power source from the primary ac power.
Any combination of two of the four outgoing transmission lines (DeCordova, Parker, Johnson, and Whitney), except for the combinations of DeCordova and Johnson and Parker and Whitney, are two independent offsite power circuits from the ERCOT transmission network to the plant switching station. Any credible single incident or single failure of a transmission line or a plant switching station component does not result in simultaneous failure of both circuits in any combination of two independent offsite power circuits. The FMEA presented in Table 8.2-203 indicates that at least one of the two independent offsite power circuits would remain available to perform its design basis functions under a postulated single incident or a single failure. The FMEA examines the various ways in which a failure may occur and the effects of this failure on the ability of the equipment to continue to perform its intended function. Each piece of critical equipment was reviewed to determine how it might fail. Physical as well as electrical failures were examined. Failures caused by external influences as well as failures due to overloading or over stressing of equipment were examined.
Each type of failure was evaluated to determine if it would affect any other equipment. For instance, if the trip out of a transmission line might cause other lines to be overloaded or interrupt an offsite power circuit.
The effects were analyzed to determine if critical functions of the plant switching station would be affected. There should be no single failure that results in un-availability of at least two power circuits and compromise the ability of the plant to maintain containment integrity and other vital functions. Failure modes and effects of the following equipment of the plant switching station were analyzed.
• Transmission line towers.
CP COL 8.2(9)
CP COL 8.2(11)
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 2, FSAR
Revision 38.2-7
• Transmission lines.
• Plant switching station main buses.
• 345 kV circuit breakers.
• 345 kV disconnect switches.
• Transmission line and bus relay systems within the plant switching station.
8.2.1.2.1.2 Unit Switchyards/Transformer Yards
The MTs, UATs, RATs, and the main generator excitation transformer are located outdoors in the transformer yard. There are two indoor GIS, the normal PPS GIS is located on the west side of the RATs, and the alternate PPS GIS located on the east side of the MTs. The two GIS buildings and the transformer yard are enclosed within a security fence that has controlled access. Three-hour rated fire barriers are provided between the transformers that are associated with the normal and alternate PPSs. There is a minimum one-hour rated fire barrier in between all transformers. The physical layouts of the Unit 3 and Unit 4 unit switchyards/transformer yards are shown in Figures 8.2-207 and 8.2-208, respectively.
The isolated phase busducts (IPBs) from the GLBS are connected to the low voltage (LV) side of the MTs and to high voltage (HV) side of the UATs. The MT circuit breaker in the GIS is connected to the HV side of the MTs by GIB. The alternate PPS GIS has one gas-insulated circuit breaker, designated as MT- CB, which connects the HV side of the MT to the Oncor alternate PPS transmission tie line. The normal PPS GIS has two gas-insulated circuit breakers, one designated as RAT-CB1 for RAT1 and RAT3, and the other designated as RAT-CB2 for RAT2 and RAT4. The RAT-CB1 connects the HV sides of RAT1 and RAT3 to the Oncor normal PPS transmission tie line. The RAT-CB2 connects the HV sides of RAT2 and RAT4 to the Oncor normal PPS transmission tie line. The breaker open/close logic diagrams for the unit switchyard circuit breakers are shown in Figures 8.2-209 and 8.2-210. The RAT-CB1 and RAT-CB2 has a continuous rating of 2000 amp and 63 kA short circuit rating. The MT-CB has a continuous rating of 4000 amp and 63 kA short circuit rating. Two trip coils are provided for each circuit breaker, actuated by the primary and back up relay protection schemes. The one line diagrams for the normal and alternate PPS GIS are shown in Figures 8.2-203 and 8.2-204, respectively. Each circuit breaker is provided with two motor-operated grounding type disconnect switches. Additional motor-operated grounding type disconnect switches are provided, as shown in the one line diagrams in order to isolate any section of the power circuit. Surge arresters are provided both at the transformer side and at the transmission tie line side to protect the equipment from damage due to lightning and switching surges.
CP COL 8.2(3)
CP COL 8.2(3)CP COL 8.2(7)
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 2, FSAR
Revision 38.2-8
Each unit switchyard has two sets of 125V dc batteries and two separate dc power distribution systems. Each battery system has its own 480V ac -125V dc battery charger. In addition, there is a spare battery charger that can be placed in service to replace any of the dedicated battery chargers. The batteries are sized conservatively to perform its design basis functions upon loss of the battery charger. The battery chargers are sized to charge a design basis discharged battery to 95 percent of its capacity within twenty-four hours. A primary and a backup relay protection scheme is provided for each of the transmission tie lines to the plant switching station. The dc control power for the primary and the backup protection scheme is provided from separate dc systems in each unit switchyard.
Four separate 480V ac power supply systems fed from four different non-Class 1E 480V load centers of each unit, are provided for the unit switchyards of each unit. Two systems are for the normal PPS unit switchyard and the other two for the alternate PPS unit switchyard. Within each unit switchyard, two separate low voltage ac power distribution systems provide power to two separate groups of electrical loads.
The normal PPS and the alternate PPS unit switchyards, the normal PPS and the alternate PPS transmission tie lines to the plant switching station, the low-voltage dc and ac power systems in the unit switchyards, are physically separated and do not share any common equipment. Hence, no FMEA is warranted for the equipment and circuits associated with the unit switchyards.
8.2.1.2.2 Plant Switching Station and Transmission Lines Testing and Inspection
An agreement between Luminant and Oncor for inspection, maintenance, calibration, and testing of transmission lines, and plant switching station, provides the procedure, policy and organization to carry out inspection, maintenance, calibration, and testing of transmission lines and plant switching station.
This agreement defines the interfaces and working relationship between Luminant and Oncor. As a service to Luminant, Oncor performs inspection, maintenance, calibration, and testing of Luminant transformer and circuit breaker assets at CPNPP. Luminant and Oncor are responsible for control of plant/grid interface activities. For reliability, Luminant and Oncor coordinate maintenance and testing of offsite power systems. Oncor establishes communication and coordination protocols for restoration of external power supply to the nuclear plant on a priority basis.
For performance of maintenance, testing, calibration and inspection, Oncor follows its own field test manuals, vendor manuals and drawings, industry’s maintenance practice and observes Federal Energy Regulatory Commission requirements and North American Electric Reliability Corporation reliability standard.
CP COL 8.2(8)CP COL 8.2(9)
CP COL 8.2(3)
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 2, FSAR
Revision 38.2-9
Oncor verifies that these test results demonstrate compliance with design requirements and takes corrective actions as necessary. Oncor plans and schedules maintenance activities, notifying the plant and transmission system operations group in advance. Oncor also procures necessary parts prior to the commencement of maintenance activities.
Transmission lines in the Oncor Electric Delivery transmission system are inspected through an aerial inspection twice per year. The inspection has a specific focus on vegetation management, inspection of structures and conductors, right-of-way encroachments, and any conditions that pose a danger to the public. Herbicide is used to control vegetation within the boundaries of the transmission line rights-of-way. Where herbicides cannot be applied, vegetation is cut and removed. This cutting and removal effort is extended beyond the formal right-of-way limit to address the presence of any danger trees which may adversely affect the operation of the transmission line.
The interconnecting plant switching station, as well as other substation facilities, has multiple levels of inspection and maintenance, including the following:
• Walk throughs and visual inspections of the entire substation facility.
• Relay functional tests.
• Oil sampling of power transformers. Oil samples are evaluated through the use of gas chromatography and dielectric breakdown analysis.
• Power circuit breaker maintenance is based on operating conditions and time and consists of visual inspection, diagnostic tests and internal inspections to determine the breakers operating conditions.
• A power test (Doble Test) is typically performed on oil filled equipment, along with other diagnostic tests to determine the transformers operating conditions.
• Thermography is used to identify potential thermal heating issues on buses, conductors, connectors, switches, transformers, and other equipment located within a plant switching station.
8.2.1.2.3 Communication with ERCOT/Oncor
The interfaces between CPNPP and Oncor are managed via a formal communication agreement. A reliability of the offsite power is managed by ERCOT, Oncor and CPNPP personnel through communications and actions governed and coordinated by the formal Interface Agreement.
The communication agreement specifies the responsibilities and communication methods among ERCOT, Oncor and CPNPP which have the responsibilities for
CP COL 8.2(1)
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 2, FSAR
Revision 38.2-10
the operation, maintenance, and engineering of transmission system. Planned activities and changes in plant structures, systems, and components (SSC) status which may affect grid stability/reliability are clearly identified and included in the communications. The main control room operators notify Oncor of any plant activity that may impact generation capability. The Oncor monitors transmission system conditions to ensure adequate voltage is maintained to support CPNPP, and notifies the main control room operators of conditions which will result in inadequate voltage support.
The instrumentation for monitoring and indicating the status such as breaker positions, bus and line voltages, frequency, watts and vars, etc., of the preferred power system ensure that any change in the preferred power system that would prevent it from performing its intended function is immediately identified by the main control room operator.
Methods and procedures for confirming the operational readiness of offsite power systems are provided to verify that main control room operators are aware of the capability of the offsite power system to supply power during operation and situation that can result in a loss of offsite power (LOOP) following a trip of the plant.
Adequate procedures, administrative controls, and protocols are implemented to ensure that no modifications of the offsite power system circuits credited for satisfying GDC 17 without the performance of a proper safety evaluation.
Grid reliability evaluations are performed for maintenance or modifications to the offsite power system, as part of the maintenance risk assessment required by 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.65 before performing “grid-risk-sensitive” maintenance activities. The results of the grid reliability evaluations are evaluated by the maintenance rule program which is described in Subsection 17.6.2.
Communication links exist between the main control room operators and ERCOT/Oncor as a means to obtain timely information on power grid operating conditions and status to verify the operability of the offsite power grid in accordance with the requirements of the technical specifications. Communications with ERCOT/Oncor exist for restoration of offsite power in the event of a LOOP or station blackout.
Real time analysis tools are provided to evaluate the impact of the loss or unavailability of various transmission system elements. The evaluation results of these analysis tools notify the main control room operators to provide compensatory actions for the event.
Add the following new subsections after DCD Subsection 8.2.2.1.CP COL 8.2(11)
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 2, FSAR
Revision 38.2-11
8.2.2.2 Grid Reliability and Stability Analysis
Oncor has performed a transient stability study for the proposed addition of CPNPP Units 3 and 4 generation facility to the ERCOT transmission network in accordance with BTP 8-3. The CPNPP Units 3 and 4 connect to the ERCOT network via four 345 kV transmission tie lines to the plant switching station and four 345 kV outgoing transmission lines, as discussed in Subsection 8.2.1.1. The purpose of this study is to determine if the expansion of this facility causes the proposed or existing nearby generators to experience transient instability for selected planning criteria contingencies. This study indicates that neither the proposed nor existing nearby generators experience transient instability for the selected planning criteria contingencies that have been considered.
This study, and its conclusions, is based on preliminary data and is subject to review using final data to be provided prior to the interconnection of the proposed generating facility expansion with the Oncor transmission system.
The pertinent details of the Oncor transient stability study are summarized below:
The study was conducted in accordance with the ERCOT Generation Interconnection or Change Request Procedure using a 2015 summer peak case projected from the 2012 ERCOT summer peak base case. The ERCOT dynamics database associated with the 2010 summer peak base case was modified for compatibility with the 2015 base case.
A series of contingencies consistent with the ERCOT planning criteria were applied to selected locations in the vicinity of CPNPP. The contingencies studied include the loss, as a result of a single event, of the largest generation capacity being supplied to the grid, removal of the largest load from the grid or loss of the most critical transmission line. The assumptions of this study are the following:
• All system elements were assumed to be in service prior to the contingency being simulated.
• Disturbances were modeled as close-in, normally-cleared faults by primary relaying and faults with stuck or hung breaker, cleared by back up protection.
• Normal clearing time for the primary relaying was assumed to be 4 cycles with one re-close attempt at 60 cycles.
• Selected machine rotor angles were monitored for indications of instability.
The expected contingencies are the following:
• Simultaneous trip of CPNPP Units 3 and 4 as the largest generator in the grid.
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 2, FSAR
Revision 38.2-12
• Loss of the largest load in the grid.
The addition of the proposed CPNPP Units 3 and 4 at the Comanche Peak facility does not adversely impact the stability of the existing units and the new units in the area. The Comanche Peak generation remains stable for reasonably expected contingencies. These study cases include loss of the most heavily loaded transmission circuit connected to the plant switching station, loss of the largest capacity transmission circuit connected to the plant switching station and removal of the largest load from the system. In addition, in case of loss of the largest supply, i.e. CPNPP Units 3 and 4, the transmission system remains stable with slight voltage and frequency variation. The voltage low point is about 0.976 pu and frequency deviation from 60 Hz is only 0.24 Hz at the lowest point. In addition, the maximum frequency decay rate does not exceed 5 Hz/second that is assumed in the reactor coolant system flow analysis in Chapter 15. The grid stability analysis justifies the assumption used in Chapter 15 to power RCPs through the UATs for at least three seconds after a turbine generator trip.
Grid stability is evaluated on an ongoing basis based on load growth, addition of new transmission lines, addition of new generation capacities and for planned system changes.
The plant switching station and associated outgoing transmission lines and tie lines are newly constructed in CPNPP site and the transmission lines are connected to the four independent and separate local switching station. The transmission system reliability is evaluated in a similar manner as the CPNPP Units 1 and 2. CPNPP Units 1 and 2 have not experienced any LOOP event caused by both the transmission system accepting the unit’s output and the transmission system providing the preferred power for the unit’s loads, from 1986 to 2007. According to this experience data, the transmission system is expected to be highly reliable.
8.2.3 Design Bases Requirements
Replace the first sentence of the second paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.2.3 with the following.
A failure modes and effects analysis is provided in Subsection 8.2.1.2.1.1 and the offsite power system conforms to the following requirements.
Replace the last sentence of the fifth paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.2.3 with the following.
A summary of a grid stability analysis is provided in Subsection 8.2.2.2 and the grid stability conforms to this requirement.
CP COL 8.2(11)
STD COL 8.2(11)
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 2, FSAR
Revision 38.2-13
Replace the last sentence of the eighth paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.2.3 with the following.
A transmission system reliability analysis is provided in Subsection 8.2.2.2.
Condition monitoring of underground or inaccessible cables within the scope of the maintenance rule (10 CFR50.65) is incorporated into the maintenance rule program. The cable condition monitoring program incorporates lessons learned from industry operating experience, address regulatory guidance, and utilizes information from detailed design and procurement documents to determine the appropriate inspections, tests, and cable monitoring criteria within the scope of the maintenance rule described in Subsection 17.6.2. The program takes into consideration Generic Letter 2007-01.
8.2.4 Combined License Information
Replace the content of DCD Subsection 8.2.4 with the following.
8.2(1) Utility power grid and transmission line
This Combined License (COL) Item is addressed in Subsections 8.1.2.1, 8.2.1.1, 8.2.1.2.3, Table 8.2-201, Table 8.2-202, and Figure 8.2-201.
8.2(2) Deleted from the DCD.
8.2(3) Switchyard description
This COL Item is addressed in Subsections 8.1.1, 8.2.1.2.1, 8.2.1.2.1.1, 8.2.1.2.1.2, 8.2.1.2.2, Figure 8.1-1R, Figure 8.2-202, Figure 8.2-203, Figure 8.2-204, Figure 8.2-205, Figure 8.2-206, Figure 8.2-207, Figure 8.2-208, Figure 8.3.1-1R and Figure 8.3.1-2R.
8.2(4) Normal preferred power
This COL Item is addressed in Subsection 8.2.1.2, Figure 8.2-202, Figure 8.2-203, Figure 8.2-207 and Figure 8.2-208.
8.2(5) Alternate preferred power
This COL Item is addressed in Subsection 8.2.1.2, Figure 8.2-202, Figure 8.2-204, Figure 8.2-207 and Figure 8.2-208.
8.2(6) Deleted from the DCD.
8.2(7) Protective relaying
STD COL 8.2(11)
CP COL 8.3(12)
CP COL 8.2(1)
CP COL 8.2(3)
CP COL 8.2(4)
CP COL 8.2(5)
CP COL 8.2(7)
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 2, FSAR
Revision 38.2-14
This COL Item is addressed in Subsections 8.2.1.2.1.1, 8.2.1.2.1.2, Figure 8.2-203, Figure 8.2-204, Figure 8.2-209 and Figure 8.2-210.
8.2(8) Switchyard dc power
This COL Item is addressed in Subsections 8.2.1.2.1.1 and 8.2.1.2.1.2.
8.2(9) Switchyard ac power
This COL Item is addressed in Subsections 8.2.1.2.1.1 and 8.2.1.2.1.2.
8.2(10) Transformer protection
This COL Item is addressed in Subsection 8.2.1.2.
8.2(11) Stability and Reliability of the Offsite Transmission Power Systems
This COL Item is addressed in Subsections 8.2.1.2.1.1, 8.2.1.2.3, 8.2.3 and Table 8.2-203.
8.2(12) Deleted from the DCD.
CP COL 8.2(8)
CP COL 8.2(9)
STD COL 8.2(10)
CP COL 8.2(11)STD COL 8.2(11)
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 2, FSAR
Revision 38.2-15
Table 8.2-201
345 kV Transmission Lines
345 kVTransmission
Line
TransmissionLine
DesignationTermination
Point
Approx. Length(Miles)
ThermalRating(MVA)
Whitney W WhitneySwitching Station
45 1631
Johnson J Johnson Switching Station
22 1631
DeCordova D DeCordova switching Station
17 1969
Parker P Parker Switching Station
42 1631
CP COL 8.2(1)
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 2, FSAR
Revision 38.2-16
Table 8.2-202
Transmission Tie Lines
TransmissionTie Line
DesignationTermination
Point
Approx. Length(Miles)
ThermalRating(MVA)
Unit 3Normal PPS
Take-off Tower at Unit 3 Normal PPS unit Switchyard
0.55 1072
Unit 3Alternate PPS
Take-off Tower at Unit 3 Alternate PPS unit Switchyard
0.66 2986
Unit 4Normal PPS
Take-off Tower at Unit 4 Normal PPS unit Switchyard
0.30 1072
Unit 4Alternate PPS
Take-off Tower at Unit 4 Alternate PPS unit Switchyard
0.42 2986
CP COL 8.2(1)
Rev
isio
n 3
8.2-
17
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uch
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ch th
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e pr
efer
red
pow
er s
upp
ly c
ircui
ts to
be
lost
to e
ither
Uni
t 3
or
4.
The
late
ral s
epa
ratio
n b
etw
een
the
four
34
5 kV
circ
uits
ass
ocia
ted
with
CP
NP
P U
nits
3
and
4 c
onst
ruct
ed
from
the
pla
nt s
witc
hing
sta
tion
to fo
ur 3
45
kV o
ff-si
te
tran
smis
sio
n ne
twor
k sw
itchi
ng s
tatio
ns
are
suc
h th
at, u
nde
r no
rma
l co
nditi
ons
, in
th
e e
vent
of a
phy
sica
l fai
lure
of a
ny s
truc
ture
in a
ny o
f the
se fo
ur c
ircui
ts, t
he
rem
ain
ing
circ
uits
will
hav
e s
uffic
ient
cap
acity
to s
upp
ly C
PN
PP
Uni
ts 3
and
4 w
ith
the
req
uire
d p
ower
to m
ain
tain
con
tain
men
t in
tegr
ity a
nd o
the
r vi
tal f
unct
ion
s at
the
requ
ired
volta
ge.
The
act
ual r
outin
g o
f som
e o
r al
l of t
hes
e fo
ur c
ircu
its w
ill b
e su
bjec
t to
the
app
rova
l of t
he P
UC
T. F
inal
de
sign
of
circ
uits
sub
ject
to P
UC
T a
ppro
val w
ill
take
pla
ce a
fter
such
the
PU
CT
app
rova
l is
rece
ived
.
CP
CO
L 8.
2(11
)
Rev
isio
n 3
8.2-
18
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
2, F
SA
R
Tra
nsm
issi
on
lines
P
rovi
de th
e so
urce
of p
ower
to
mai
nta
in
cont
ain
me
nt
inte
grity
and
oth
er
vita
l fu
nctio
ns
Loss
of a
tr
ansm
issi
on li
ne fo
r a
ny r
eas
on, s
uch
as
faul
ts, s
plic
e fa
ilure
, et
c.
CP
NP
P U
nits
3 a
nd 4
are
ea
ch s
upp
lied
from
the
pla
nt s
witc
hin
g st
atio
n vi
a a
345
kV
n
orm
al p
refe
rred
pow
er s
upp
ly c
ircu
it a
nd a
345
kV
alte
rnat
e p
refe
rred
pow
er s
upp
ly
circ
uit.
Und
er n
orm
al c
ondi
tions
, a fa
ult
on o
ne o
f the
se c
ircu
its w
ill b
e cl
eare
d by
o
pen
ing
two
brea
kers
in th
e pl
ant s
witc
hin
g st
atio
n an
d o
ne b
rea
ker
in th
e u
nit
switc
hya
rd w
ith n
o m
ate
rial a
ffect
on
any
othe
r no
rmal
or
alte
rnat
e p
refe
rred
pow
er
supp
ly c
ircui
t. U
nde
r no
rmal
con
ditio
ns,
in th
e ev
ent o
f th
e fa
ilure
of a
nor
mal
or
alte
rnat
e pr
efer
red
pow
er s
upp
ly c
ircu
it to
a u
nit,
the
rem
aini
ng
pre
ferr
ed p
ower
su
pply
circ
uit t
o th
at u
nit w
ill h
ave
suffi
cien
t cap
aci
ty to
su
pply
the
requ
ired
pow
er to
m
aint
ain
cont
ainm
ent i
nteg
rity
and
othe
r vi
tal f
unct
ion
s at
the
requ
ired
volta
ge.
The
pla
nt s
witc
hin
g st
atio
n is
con
nec
ted
to fo
ur s
epa
rate
off-
site
345
kV
tran
smis
sion
n
etw
ork
switc
hin
g st
atio
ns v
ia fo
ur 3
45 k
V tr
ansm
issi
on c
ircui
ts. U
nde
r no
rmal
co
nditi
ons
, a fa
ult o
n an
y on
e of
thes
e c
ircui
ts is
cle
ared
by
open
ing
one
or
mor
e b
reak
ers
in th
e pl
ant
sw
itchi
ng s
tatio
n an
d on
e or
mo
re b
reak
ers
in th
e of
fsite
sw
itch
ing
sta
tions
with
no
mat
eria
l affe
ct o
n th
e re
mai
ning
thre
e tr
ans
mis
sion
line
s.
Und
er n
orm
al c
ond
itio
ns, i
n th
e ev
ent
of f
ailu
re o
f any
one
of t
hese
four
circ
uits
, the
re
ma
inin
g th
ree
circ
uits
will
hav
e s
uffic
ient
cap
acity
to s
upp
ly th
e r
equi
red
pow
er to
C
PN
PP
Un
its 3
and
4 to
mai
ntai
n c
ont
ain
men
t int
egrit
y an
d o
ther
vita
l fun
ctio
ns a
t th
e r
equi
red
vo
ltage
.
Pla
nt s
witc
hin
g st
atio
n b
us
Pro
vide
the
sour
ce o
f pow
er
to m
aint
ain
co
ntai
nm
ent
in
tegr
ity a
nd o
ther
vi
tal f
unc
tions
Los
s of
a b
us s
ect
ion
for
any
reas
on,
suc
h a
s fa
ults
, m
aint
enan
ce o
uta
ge,
etc.
The
pla
nt s
witc
hin
g s
tatio
n is
co
nstr
uct
ed u
sin
g a
“bre
aker
and
a h
alf”
sch
em
e, s
uch
th
at,
unde
r no
rma
l con
ditio
ns, i
n th
e e
vent
of t
he o
utag
e o
f an
y ci
rcui
t con
nec
ted
to
the
pla
nt s
witc
hin
g s
tatio
n, th
e pl
ant s
witc
hin
g st
atio
n w
ill h
ave
su
ffici
ent c
apa
city
to
supp
ly th
e re
quire
d p
ower
to C
PN
PP
Uni
ts 3
an
d 4
to m
ain
tain
con
tain
men
t in
tegr
ity
and
oth
er v
ital f
unc
tions
at t
he r
equ
ired
volta
ge.
Und
er n
orm
al c
ond
itio
ns, a
faul
t on
a ci
rcui
t con
nect
ed to
the
pla
nt s
witc
hing
sta
tion
is c
lear
ed b
y th
e op
eni
ng o
f tw
o br
eake
rs w
ith n
o m
ater
ial a
ffect
on
any
othe
r ci
rcui
t co
nnec
ted
to th
e pl
ant s
witc
hin
g st
atio
n.
Und
er n
orm
al c
ondi
tions
, eith
er
bus
in th
e p
lant
sw
itchi
ng s
tatio
n is
ca
pabl
e of
bei
ng
isol
ated
with
out m
ater
ially
affe
ctin
g th
e ot
her
bus
or th
e op
era
tion
of th
e p
lant
sw
itchi
ng s
tatio
n.
Tab
le8.
2-20
3 (S
hee
t 2
of
6)
Fai
lure
Mo
des
& E
ffec
ts A
nal
ysis
fo
r O
ffsi
te P
ow
er S
ou
rces
Co
mp
on
ent
Fu
nct
ion
Fai
lure
Mo
de
Eff
ect
on
Saf
ety
Rel
ated
Fu
nct
ion
Rev
isio
n 3
8.2-
19
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
2, F
SA
R
The
pla
nt s
witc
hin
g st
atio
n is
equ
ippe
d w
ith tw
o in
dep
end
ent b
atte
ry s
yste
ms.
Eac
h ba
ttery
sys
tem
is c
onne
cted
to a
sep
ara
te b
atte
ry c
harg
er.
The
rat
ing
of e
ach
bu
s in
the
pla
nt s
witc
hin
g st
atio
n m
eets
or
exce
eds
the
ma
xim
um
calc
ula
ted
cu
rre
nt d
urin
g al
l exp
ecte
d op
erat
ing
con
ditio
ns.
The
mom
enta
ry r
atin
g of
eac
h bu
s in
the
pla
nt s
witc
hin
g s
tatio
n m
eets
or
exc
eed
s th
e m
axim
um
cal
cula
ted
faul
t cur
rent
und
er
all
expe
cted
op
erat
ing
co
nditi
ons
.
The
vo
ltage
ra
tings
of e
ach
bus
and
all
insu
lato
rs in
the
pla
nt s
witc
hing
sta
tion
mee
ts
or
exce
eds
the
ma
xim
um e
xpec
ted
ope
ratin
g vo
ltage
of t
he p
lant
sw
itchi
ng s
tatio
n.
Und
er n
orm
al c
ond
itio
ns, d
ue
to th
e us
e of
a “
bre
aker
and
a h
alf s
chem
e”, i
n th
e e
vent
of f
ailu
re o
f eith
er p
lan
t sw
itchi
ng s
tatio
n b
us, t
he p
lant
sw
itchi
ng s
tatio
n w
ill
hav
e su
ffici
ent c
apac
ity to
su
pply
the
requ
ired
pow
er to
CP
NP
P U
nits
3 a
nd 4
to
mai
ntai
n co
ntai
nmen
t int
egrit
y an
d ot
her
vita
l fun
ctio
ns
at th
e re
quire
d vo
ltage
.
345
kV c
ircui
t b
reak
ers
in th
e p
lant
sw
itchi
ng
stat
ion
Fa
ult c
lear
ing
an
d sw
itchi
ng o
f eq
uip
men
t
Fai
lure
of t
he
brea
ker
due
to o
verlo
ad,
e
xce
ssiv
e fa
ult
curr
ent,
inte
rnal
, or
ext
ern
al e
lect
rical
fa
ilure
.
All
345
kV
bre
aker
s in
the
pla
nt s
witc
hing
sta
tion
are
equ
ippe
d w
ith d
ual t
rip c
oils
.
The
con
tinuo
us
curr
ent r
atin
g o
f th
e br
eake
rs in
the
plan
t sw
itch
ing
stat
ion
mee
ts o
r e
xce
eds
the
ma
xim
um c
alc
ula
ted
curr
ent
dur
ing
an
y si
ngl
e c
ontin
gen
cy o
per
atin
g
cond
ition
.
The
inte
rrup
ting
rat
ing
of t
he b
reak
ers
in th
e p
lan
t sw
itchi
ng s
tatio
n m
eets
or
exc
eed
s th
e m
axim
um
cal
cula
ted
faul
t cur
rent
und
er
all
expe
cted
op
erat
ing
co
nditi
ons
.
The
vol
tag
e ra
ting
of th
e br
eake
rs in
the
pla
nt s
witc
hin
g st
atio
n m
eets
or
exce
eds
the
m
axim
um
cal
cula
ted
oper
atin
g v
olta
ge o
f the
pla
nt s
witc
hin
g s
tatio
n.
Tab
le8.
2-20
3 (S
hee
t 3
of
6)
Fai
lure
Mo
des
& E
ffec
ts A
nal
ysis
fo
r O
ffsi
te P
ow
er S
ou
rces
Co
mp
on
ent
Fu
nct
ion
Fai
lure
Mo
de
Eff
ect
on
Saf
ety
Rel
ated
Fu
nct
ion
Rev
isio
n 3
8.2-
20
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
2, F
SA
R
The
rel
ayin
g fo
r e
ach
circ
uit c
onn
ect
ed to
the
pla
nt s
witc
hing
sta
tion
is e
qui
ppe
d w
ith
bre
aker
failu
re p
rote
ctio
n. T
he o
per
atio
n o
f bre
ake
r fa
ilure
pro
tect
ion
trip
s al
l b
reak
ers
adja
cent
to th
e fa
iled
brea
ker
nece
ssar
y to
isol
ate
the
faile
d br
eak
er a
nd
oth
er fa
ulte
d eq
uip
men
t. U
nder
no
rmal
co
nditi
ons
, in
the
eve
nt o
f th
e op
era
tion
of
bre
aker
failu
re p
rote
ctio
n, th
e p
lant
sw
itchi
ng
sta
tion
will
hav
e su
ffici
ent
cap
acity
to
supp
ly th
e re
quire
d p
ower
to C
PN
PP
Uni
ts 3
an
d 4
to m
ain
tain
con
tain
men
t in
tegr
ity
and
oth
er v
ital f
unc
tions
at t
he r
equ
ired
volta
ge.
The
pla
nt s
witc
hin
g st
atio
n is
des
igne
d s
uch
tha
t a s
tuck
bre
ake
r, sl
ow b
reak
er, o
r re
lay
failu
re w
ill n
ot a
dver
sely
affe
ct m
ore
tha
n tw
o tr
ansm
issi
on
circ
uits
. Bec
ause
th
e p
lant
sw
itch
ing
sta
tion
is d
esig
ned
su
ch th
at t
he n
orm
al a
nd
alte
rna
te p
refe
rre
d p
ower
sup
ply
circ
uits
ass
ocia
ted
with
the
sam
e ge
ner
atin
g u
nit w
ill n
ot b
e co
nne
cted
in
the
sa
me
bay
in th
e p
lan
t sw
itchi
ng
stat
ion
, un
der
norm
al c
ondi
tion
s, in
the
even
t o
f the
loss
of t
wo
tran
smis
sion
circ
uits
con
nect
ed in
the
sam
e ba
y, th
e pl
ant
sw
itchi
ng
stat
ion
has
su
ffici
ent c
apa
city
to s
upp
ly th
e r
equ
ired
pow
er to
CP
NP
P U
nits
3 a
nd
4
to m
ain
tain
co
ntai
nmen
t in
tegr
ity a
nd
othe
r vi
tal f
unct
ions
at t
he r
equi
red
vol
tag
e.
Ea
ch b
reak
er in
the
pla
nt s
witc
hing
sta
tion
is e
quip
ped
with
a d
isco
nnec
t sw
itch
on
eac
h si
de o
f th
e br
eake
r to
allo
w th
e b
reak
er to
be
isol
ate
d fr
om th
e re
st o
f the
pla
nt
switc
hin
g st
atio
n eq
uip
men
t.
Und
er n
orm
al c
ond
itio
ns, d
ue
to th
e us
e of
a “
bre
aker
and
a h
alf”
sch
em
e a
nd th
e p
rovi
sion
of a
nor
mal
and
alte
rna
te p
refe
rre
d po
we
r su
ppl
y ci
rcui
t to
CP
NP
P U
nits
3
and
4, i
n th
e e
vent
of f
ailu
re o
f any
one
bre
ake
r in
the
pla
nt s
witc
hing
sta
tion
, th
e p
lant
sw
itchi
ng s
tatio
n h
as s
uffic
ien
t cap
acity
to s
upp
ly th
e r
equi
red
pow
er to
CP
NP
P
Uni
ts 3
an
d 4
to m
ain
tain
con
tain
me
nt in
tegr
ity a
nd o
ther
vita
l fu
nctio
ns a
t the
re
quire
d vo
ltage
.
Tab
le8.
2-20
3 (S
hee
t 4
of
6)
Fai
lure
Mo
des
& E
ffec
ts A
nal
ysis
fo
r O
ffsi
te P
ow
er S
ou
rces
Co
mp
on
ent
Fu
nct
ion
Fai
lure
Mo
de
Eff
ect
on
Saf
ety
Rel
ated
Fu
nct
ion
Rev
isio
n 3
8.2-
21
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
2, F
SA
R
345
kV
dis
conn
ect
switc
hes
in th
e p
lant
sw
itchi
ng
stat
ion
Iso
latio
n o
f eq
uip
men
tF
ailu
re o
f the
d
isco
nnec
t du
e to
o
verlo
adi
ng, f
aults
, ov
er s
tres
s, e
tc.
The
rat
ing
of t
he 3
45 k
V d
isco
nne
ct s
witc
hes
in th
e p
lan
t sw
itchi
ng
stat
ion
mee
ts o
r e
xce
eds
the
ma
xim
um c
alc
ula
ted
curr
ent
dur
ing
all
expe
cted
op
erat
ing
con
ditio
ns.
The
mom
enta
ry r
atin
g of
the
345
kV d
isco
nnec
t sw
itche
s in
the
pla
nt s
witc
hin
g
stat
ion
mee
ts o
r e
xcee
ds th
e m
axim
um c
alc
ula
ted
fau
lt cu
rre
nt u
nde
r al
l exp
ecte
d o
pera
ting
cond
itio
ns.
The
vol
tag
e ra
ting
of th
e 3
45 k
V d
isco
nne
ct s
witc
hes
in th
e pl
ant s
witc
hin
g st
atio
n m
eets
or
exce
eds
the
max
imum
cal
cula
ted
ope
ratin
g vo
ltage
of t
he p
lant
sw
itchi
ng
stat
ion.
Und
er n
orm
al c
ond
itio
ns, d
ue
to th
e us
e of
a “
bre
aker
and
a h
alf”
sch
em
e a
nd th
e p
rovi
sion
of a
nor
mal
and
alte
rna
te p
refe
rre
d po
we
r su
ppl
y ci
rcui
t to
CP
NP
P U
nits
3
and
4, i
n th
e e
vent
of f
ailu
re o
f any
one
345
kV
dis
con
nect
sw
itch
in th
e p
lant
sw
itch
ing
stat
ion
, the
pla
nt s
witc
hin
g st
atio
n w
ill h
ave
suffi
cien
t cap
aci
ty to
sup
ply
the
requ
ired
pow
er to
CP
NP
P U
nits
3 a
nd
4 to
mai
nta
in c
onta
inm
ent
inte
grity
an
d ot
her
vita
l fun
ctio
ns a
t the
req
uire
d vo
ltage
.
Rel
ay s
yste
ms
in
the
pla
nt s
witc
hing
st
atio
n
Det
ect f
aults
and
op
era
te th
e
app
ropr
iate
br
eake
rs to
cle
ar
thos
e fa
ults
.
Fai
lure
to o
pera
te
dur
ing
a fa
ult
cond
itio
n.
Ea
ch 3
45 k
V tr
ansm
issi
on
line
co
nnec
ted
to th
e pl
ant s
witc
hin
g st
atio
n, a
s w
ell a
s e
ach
345
kV
bus
sec
tion
in th
e p
lant
sw
itchi
ng s
tatio
n, a
re e
quip
ped
with
prim
ary
and
back
up p
rote
ctiv
e re
lay
sche
mes
.
The
pri
ma
ry a
nd
back
up p
rote
ctiv
e re
lays
at t
he p
lant
sw
itchi
ng s
tatio
n ar
e fr
om
diff
eren
t ma
nufa
ctur
ers
or, i
f fro
m th
e s
ame
man
ufac
ture
r, ar
e of
diff
eren
t des
ign,
su
ch th
at,
unde
r no
rma
l con
ditio
ns, a
“co
mm
on m
ode
failu
re”
will
not
cau
se th
ese
p
rote
ctiv
e s
yste
ms
to e
xpe
rienc
e s
imul
tane
ous
outa
ges.
The
prim
ary
an
d ba
ckup
rel
ays
at t
he
pla
nt s
witc
hin
g st
atio
n ar
e su
pplie
d b
y cu
rren
t fr
om d
iffer
ent s
ourc
es, i
.e.,
sepa
rate
cur
rent
tra
nsfo
rme
rs.
The
prim
ary
and
back
up
rela
ys a
t the
pla
nt s
witc
hing
sta
tion
me
asur
e p
owe
r sy
stem
vo
ltage
usi
ng d
iffer
ent
sou
rces
, i.e
. se
para
te c
oupl
ing
capa
cito
r vo
ltage
tran
sfor
mer
s (C
CV
Ts),
or
CC
VTs
with
sep
ara
te s
eco
nda
ry w
indi
ngs,
etc
.
Tab
le8.
2-20
3 (S
hee
t 5
of
6)
Fai
lure
Mo
des
& E
ffec
ts A
nal
ysis
fo
r O
ffsi
te P
ow
er S
ou
rces
Co
mp
on
ent
Fu
nct
ion
Fai
lure
Mo
de
Eff
ect
on
Saf
ety
Rel
ated
Fu
nct
ion
Rev
isio
n 3
8.2-
22
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
plic
atio
nP
art
2, F
SA
R
The
prim
ary
an
d ba
ckup
rel
ays
at t
he
pla
nt s
witc
hin
g st
atio
n ar
e su
pplie
d d
c po
wer
fr
om d
iffer
ent b
atte
ry s
yste
ms.
Th
ese
dc s
yste
ms
are
com
ple
tely
inde
pen
den
t fro
m
eac
h ot
her,
exce
pt th
at th
e ba
ttery
cha
rger
s a
re s
upp
lied
from
the
sam
e ac
sou
rce
with
a tr
ansf
er s
chem
e to
an
alte
rna
te a
c su
pply
if th
e no
rmal
su
pply
is in
terr
upte
d.
Und
er n
orm
al c
ond
itio
ns, t
he fa
ilure
of o
ne
dc
syst
em a
t the
pla
nt s
witc
hing
sta
tion
will
no
t affe
ct th
e ot
her.
The
prim
ary
an
d ba
ckup
rel
ayin
g s
che
me
s w
ill b
e in
depe
nde
ntly
pow
ered
from
se
para
te d
c sy
stem
s an
d op
erat
e se
para
tely
fuse
d a
nd in
dep
ende
nt t
rip c
oil
circ
uits
.
Tw
o in
depe
nden
t bre
aker
failu
re s
chem
es w
ill p
rovi
de e
ach
isol
ate
d co
nta
cts
tha
t will
re
-trip
ea
ch s
epar
ate
fuse
d a
nd
ind
epen
den
t trip
coi
l of t
he
asso
ciat
ed c
ircu
it br
eak
er.
Fai
lure
of a
circ
uit
bre
aker
trip
circ
uit w
ill n
ot a
ffect
the
oper
atio
n of
eith
er b
reak
er
failu
re s
chem
e or
the
ope
ratio
n of
the
oth
er
trip
circ
uit.
The
inte
nt o
f th
e de
sig
n of
the
prim
ary
and
bac
k u
p sy
stem
s at
the
plan
t sw
itch
ing
stat
ion
is to
ma
inta
in th
e av
aila
bili
ty o
f at l
east
one
pro
tect
ive
rel
ay s
yste
m.
Und
er n
orm
al c
ond
itio
ns, i
n th
e ev
ent
of f
ailu
re o
f eith
er
a pr
imar
y or
bac
kup
rel
ay
syst
em in
the
plan
t sw
itchi
ng s
tatio
n, th
e pl
ant s
witc
hing
sta
tion
will
hav
e su
ffici
ent
capa
city
to s
upp
ly th
e r
equ
ired
pow
er to
CP
NP
P U
nits
3 a
nd
4 to
mai
nta
in
cont
ain
men
t int
egrit
y an
d o
ther
vita
l fun
ctio
ns a
t the
req
uire
d vo
ltag
e.
Tab
le8.
2-20
3 (S
hee
t 6
of
6)
Fai
lure
Mo
des
& E
ffec
ts A
nal
ysis
fo
r O
ffsi
te P
ow
er S
ou
rces
Co
mp
on
ent
Fu
nct
ion
Fai
lure
Mo
de
Eff
ect
on
Saf
ety
Rel
ated
Fu
nct
ion
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
pli
cati
on
Par
t 2,
FS
AR
Rev
isio
n 3
8.2-
23
Sec
uri
ty-R
elat
ed In
form
atio
n –
Wit
hh
eld
Un
der
10
CF
R 2
.390
(d)(
1)
(SR
I)
Fig
ure
8.2-
201
Rel
evan
t P
ort
ion
s o
f O
nco
r Tr
ansm
issi
on
Sys
tem
Co
nfi
gu
rati
on
C
P C
OL
8.2(
1)
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
pli
cati
on
Par
t 2,
FS
AR
Rev
isio
n 3
8.2-
24
Fig
ure
8.2-
202
CP
NP
P U
nit
s 3
& 4
Off
site
Po
wer
Sys
tem
Key
On
e L
ine
Dia
gra
m
UA
T1
UA
T2
UA
T3
UA
T4
GE
N 3
GLB
S
RA
T4
RA
T2
RA
T3
RA
T1
26kV
Iso-P
hase B
us
26
kV
Iso-
Phase B
us
MT
MT
To
Whitney
To
Johnson S
W
To
DeC
ord
ova
To
Park
er
EW
CP
NP
P 3
& 4
Sw
itch
ing
Sta
tion
UA
T1
UA
T2
UA
T3
UA
T4
GE
N 4
GLB
S
RA
T4
RA
T2
RA
T3
RA
T1
Un
it 3
Un
it S
witc
hya
rd/T
ran
sfo
rme
r Y
ard
Un
it 4
Un
it S
witc
hya
rd/T
ran
sfo
rme
r Y
ard
MT
-CB
MT
-CB
RA
T-C
B1
RA
T-
CB
2R
AT
-C
B2
RA
T-
CB
1
Alte
rna
te P
PS
Alte
rna
te P
PS
No
rma
l PP
S
No
rma
l PP
S
Futu
re
Futu
re
Futu
re
Futu
re
CP
CO
L 8.
2(3)
C
P C
OL
8.2(
4)
CP
CO
L 8.
2(5)
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
pli
cati
on
Par
t 2,
FS
AR
Rev
isio
n 3
8.2-
25
Fig
ure
8.2-
203
No
rmal
PP
S U
nit
Sw
itch
yard
On
e L
ine
Dia
gra
m
Dra
win
g Le
gend
CB
-Circ
uit B
reak
erC
omm
-C
omm
unic
atio
nD
S -
Dis
conn
ect S
witc
hFO
-Fi
ber-O
ptic
GIB
-G
as-In
sula
ted
Bus
GIS
-G
as-In
sula
ted
Switc
hgea
rG
S -G
roun
d Sw
itch
M -
Mot
or O
pera
tor
O/H
-O
verh
ead
PPS
-Pr
efer
red
Pow
er S
uppl
yR
AT
-Res
erve
Aux
iliary
Tra
nsfo
rmer
SA
-Sur
ge A
rrest
erV
T -V
olta
ge T
rans
form
erX
fmr -
Tran
sfor
mer
Fibe
r-Opt
icC
omm
Circ
uits
To C
PN
NP
3 &
434
5kV
Sw
itchi
ng S
tatio
n
GIB
-to-A
ir Te
rmin
atio
n
SA
M~G
S
GS
GIB
DS
Gas
-Insu
late
d S
witc
hgea
r (G
IS)
O/H
Tie
Lin
e
RA
T-C
B1
2000
A63
kAC
B
MMD
S
DS
MD
SM
DS
GS
GS
GSM
M
M
GS M
GS M
GSM
GSM
GSM
M
M
VT
GIB
GIB
SASA
~FO
Cab
les
~
GIB
-to-X
fmr
Term
inat
ion
RA
T-C
B2
2000
A63
kAC
B
MD
SM
DS
GS
GS
GS
DS
M
GS
MD
S
GSM
M
M
GS M
GSM
GSM
M
M
M
M
VT
M
M
VT
GIB
GIB
SASA
RAT
334
5-6.
9kV
53 M
VA
RAT
134
5-13
.8kV
72M
VA
RAT
434
5-6.
9kV
53 M
VA
RAT
234
5-13
.8kV
72M
VA
CP
CO
L 8.
2(3)
C
P C
OL
8.2(
4)
CP
CO
L 8.
2(7)
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
pli
cati
on
Par
t 2,
FS
AR
Rev
isio
n 3
8.2-
26
Fig
ure
8.2-
204
Alt
ern
ate
PP
S U
nit
Sw
itch
yard
On
e L
ine
Dia
gra
m
GLB
S
UA
T1U
AT2
UA
T3U
AT4
26-1
3.8k
V72
MV
A26
-13.
8kV
72M
VA
26kV
, 60H
z19
00M
VA
26-3
45kV
, 183
0 M
VA(3
Sin
gle-
Phas
e +
Spar
e@
610
MVA
Eac
h)
26-6
.9kV
53 M
VA26
-6.9
kV53
MV
A
Fibe
r-O
ptic
Com
m C
ircui
ts
To C
PN
NP
3 &
434
5kV
Sw
itchi
ng S
tatio
nO
/H T
ie L
ine Gas
-Insu
late
d S
witc
hgea
r (G
IS)
SA
M~G
S
GS
GIB
-to-X
fmr
Term
inat
ion
SA
Dra
win
g Le
gend
CB
-Circ
uit B
reak
erC
omm
-C
omm
unic
atio
nD
L -D
isco
nnec
t Lin
kD
S -D
isco
nnec
t Sw
itch
FO -
Fibe
r-Opt
icG
IB -
Gas
-Insu
late
d Bu
sG
IS -
Gas
-Insu
late
d Sw
itchg
ear
GLB
S -G
ener
ator
Loa
d-Br
eak
Sw
GS
-Gro
und
Switc
hM
-M
otor
Ope
rato
rM
T -M
ain
Tran
sfor
mer
O/H
-O
verh
ead
PPS
-Pre
ferre
d P
ower
Sup
ply
SA -
Surg
e Ar
rest
erU
AT -
Uni
t Aux
iliary
Tra
nsfo
rmer
U/G
-U
nder
grou
ndVT
-Vo
ltage
Tra
nsfo
rmer
Xfm
r -Tr
ansf
orm
er
DS
DL
DL
DL
DL
GE
N
~FO
Cab
les
~G
IB-to
-Air
Term
inat
ion
MT-
CB
4000
A63
kAC
B
DS
DS
GS
GS
GS
M
M
VT
M
VT
M
M
M
M
MM
GSM
GIB
GIB
CP
CO
L 8.
2(3)
C
P C
OL
8.2(
5)
CP
CO
L 8.
2(7)
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
pli
cati
on
Par
t 2,
FS
AR
Rev
isio
n 3
8.2-
27
Fig
ure
8.2-
205
Pla
nt
Sw
itch
ing
Sta
tio
n O
ne
Lin
e D
iag
ram
(S
hee
t 1
of
2)
CP
CO
L 8.
2(3)
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
pli
cati
on
Par
t 2,
FS
AR
Rev
isio
n 3
8.2-
28
Fig
ure
8.2-
205
Pla
nt
Sw
itch
ing
Sta
tio
n O
ne
Lin
e D
iag
ram
(S
hee
t 2
of
2)
CP
CO
L 8.
2(3)
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
pli
cati
on
Par
t 2,
FS
AR
Rev
isio
n 3
8.2-
29
Sec
uri
ty-R
elat
ed In
form
atio
n –
Wit
hh
eld
Un
der
10
CF
R 2
.390
(d)(
1)
(SR
I)
Fig
ure
8.2-
206
Pla
nt
Sw
itch
ing
Sta
tio
n L
ayo
ut
(Sh
eet
1 o
f 2)
C
P C
OL
8.2(
3)
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
pli
cati
on
Par
t 2,
FS
AR
Rev
isio
n 3
8.2-
30
Sec
uri
ty-R
elat
ed In
form
atio
n –
Wit
hh
eld
Un
der
10
CF
R 2
.390
(d)(
1)
(SR
I)
Fig
ure
8.2-
206
Pla
nt
Sw
itch
ing
Sta
tio
n L
ayo
ut
(Sh
eet
2 o
f 2)
C
P C
OL
8.2(
3)
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
pli
cati
on
Par
t 2,
FS
AR
Rev
isio
n 3
8.2-
31
Fig
ure
8.2-
207
Un
it 3
Un
it S
wit
chya
rd L
ayo
ut
Tu
rbin
e B
uild
ing
Un
it 3
345
kVG
IS B
ldg
for
RA
Ts
Lege
ndC
C -
Con
trol
Cub
icle
DS
-D
isco
nnec
t S
witc
hE
X -
Exc
itatio
n T
rans
form
erF
R -
Fire
-Rat
edG
IB -
Gas
-Ins
ulat
ed B
usG
IS -
Gas
-Ins
ulat
ed S
witc
hgea
rM
T -
Mai
n T
rans
form
erN
GR
-N
eutr
al G
roun
ding
Res
isto
rP
PS
-P
refe
rred
Pow
er S
uppl
yR
AT
-R
eser
ve A
uxili
ary
Tra
nsfo
rmer
SA
-S
urge
Arr
este
rT
/B -
Tur
bine
Bui
ldin
gU
AT
-U
nit
Aux
iliar
y T
rans
form
er
Nor
mal
PP
SA
ltern
ate
PP
S
Roa
d
Roa
d
Road
Roa
d
Fen
ced
Are
a44
0.5
ft x
100
ft
80 f
t x 4
5 ft
Tak
eoff
Tow
er
SA
Fen
ced
Are
a15
5 ft
x 12
5 ft
Fen
ce
Fen
ce
Fence
Pip
e B
ridge
~~
3-H
r F
R W
all
3-H
r F
R W
all
Pla
nt
Nor
th
Not
e -
Fire
-rat
ed w
alls
bet
wee
n tr
ansf
orm
ers
and
stru
ctur
es a
nd b
etw
een
the
tran
sfor
mer
s ar
e in
acc
orda
nce
with
Reg
Gui
de 1
.189
and
N
FP
A 8
04.
Pro
visi
ons
for
drai
nage
and
oil
-sp
ill c
onta
inm
ent
are
in a
ccor
danc
e w
ith N
FP
A
804
and
IEE
E 9
80.
RA
T 3
RA
T 1
RA
T 4
RA
T 2
Roa
d
3-Hr FR Wall
1-Hr FR Wall
3-Hr FR Wall
1-Hr FR Wall
1-Hr FR Wall
1-Hr FR Wall
3-Hr FR Wall
1-Hr FR Wall
3-Hr FR Wall
Fen
ce
SA
SA
SA
H-F
ram
e T
ower
DS
DS
DS
GIB
-to
-Air
Ter
min
atio
n
GIB
(ty
p)
GIB (typ)
1-H
rF
RW
all
Fence
Fen
ce
Fence
Fen
ceF
ence
DS
DS
DS
SA
SA
~ ~
GIB
(ty
p)
GIB
-to-
Air
Ter
min
atio
n
345
kVG
IS B
ldg
for
MT
's
NGR
NGR
NGR
NGR
CC
CC
CC
CC
Ph
AP
h B
Ph
CP
h A
Ph
BP
h C
AB
CA
BC A
BC
AB
C
UA
T
4U
AT
3
UA
T
2U
AT
1
EX
1-H
r W
all
1-H
r W
all
1-H
r W
all
1-H
r W
all
1-Hr FR Wall
1-Hr FR Wall
1-Hr FR Wall
1-Hr FR Wall
NGR
NGR
NGR
CC
CC
CC
NGR
CC
3-H
r F
R W
all
GIB (typ)
Spa
reM
TM
T-B
MT-
AM
T-C
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
CC
UA
T R
emov
al P
ath
3-H
r W
all
UAT and EX
Removal Path
CP
CO
L 8.
2(3)
C
P C
OL
8.2(
4)
CP
CO
L 8.
2(5)
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
pli
cati
on
Par
t 2,
FS
AR
Rev
isio
n 3
8.2-
32
Fig
ure
8.2-
208
Un
it 4
Un
it S
wit
chya
rd L
ayo
ut
*:A
spa
re m
ain
trans
form
er is
inst
alle
d as
sha
red
by C
PN
PP
Uni
ts 3
and
4.
*
CP
CO
L 8.
2(3)
C
P C
OL
8.2(
4)
CP
CO
L 8.
2(5)
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
pli
cati
on
Par
t 2,
FS
AR
Rev
isio
n 3
8.2-
33
Fig
ure
8.2-
209
Lo
gic
Dia
gra
m –
345
kV
Res
erve
Au
xilia
ry T
ran
sfo
rmer
Cir
cuit
Bre
aker
s
Uni
t Sw
itchy
ard
/ Sw
itchi
ng S
tatio
n P
rimar
y Li
ne P
rote
ctio
n
Res
erve
Aux
iliary
Tr
ansf
orm
er C
ircui
t B
reak
er 1
(RA
T_C
B1)
Clo
se
1O
pen
Res
erve
Aux
iliary
Tr
ansf
orm
er 1
,3 P
rote
ctio
n
Res
erve
Aux
iliary
Tr
ansf
orm
er C
ircui
t B
reak
er 2
(RA
T_C
B2)
Clo
se
1O
pen
RA
T_C
B1�
Ope
n
Res
erve
Aux
iliar
y Tr
ansf
orm
er 1
,3
Lock
out R
elay
(A)
Res
erve
Aux
iliar
y Tr
ansf
orm
er 1
,3
Lock
out R
elay
(B)
NO
T
OR
Uni
t Sw
itchy
ard
/ Sw
itchi
ng S
tatio
n B
uck-
Up
Line
Pro
tect
ion
RA
T_C
B1�
Clo
se
Syn
chro
niza
tion
Che
ck
Uni
t Sw
itchy
ard
Prim
ary
Bus
P
rote
ctio
n
Uni
t Sw
itchy
ard
Bac
k-U
p B
us
Pro
tect
ion
Res
erve
Aux
iliary
Tr
ansf
orm
er 2
,4 P
rote
ctio
n
RA
T_C
B2�
Ope
n
Res
erve
Aux
iliar
y Tr
ansf
orm
er 2
,4
Lock
out R
elay
(A)
Res
erve
Aux
iliar
y Tr
ansf
orm
er 2
,4
Lock
out R
elay
(B)
RA
T_C
B2�
Clo
se
Syn
chro
niza
tion
Che
ck
Uni
t Sw
itchy
ard
Prim
ary
Bus
P
rote
ctio
n
Uni
t Sw
itchy
ard
Bac
k-U
p B
us
Pro
tect
ion
AN
D
2 2
CP
CO
L 8.
2(7)
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
pli
cati
on
Par
t 2,
FS
AR
Rev
isio
n 3
8.2-
34
Fig
ure
8.2-
210
Lo
gic
Dia
gra
m –
345
kV
Mai
n T
ran
sfo
rmer
Cir
cuit
Bre
aker
Mai
n Tr
ansf
orm
er
Circ
uit B
reak
er
(MT_
CB)
Clo
se
1O
pen
Mai
n Tr
ansf
orm
er P
rote
ctio
n
Turb
ine
Gen
erat
or E
lect
rical
P
rote
ctio
n
Uni
t Aux
iliary
Tra
nsfo
rmer
P
rote
ctio
n
Mai
n Tr
ansf
orm
er S
yste
m
Lock
out R
elay
(A)
Mai
n Tr
ansf
orm
er S
yste
m
Lock
out R
elay
(B)
NO
T
OR
AN
D
Uni
t SW
YD
/Sw
itchi
ng S
tatio
n P
rimar
y Li
ne P
rote
ctio
n
Uni
t Sw
itchy
ard
/ Sw
itchi
ng S
tatio
n B
uck-
Up
Line
Pro
tect
ion
MT_
CB
�C
lose
MT_
CB
�O
pen
Syn
chro
niza
tion
Che
ck
Uni
t Sw
itchi
ng S
tatio
n P
rimar
y B
us
Pro
tect
ion
Uni
t Sw
itchi
ng S
tatio
n B
ack-
Up
Bus
P
rote
ctio
n
2
CP
CO
L 8.
2(7)
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 2, FSAR
Revision 38.3-1
8.3 ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS
This section of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with the following departures and/or supplements.
8.3.1.1 Description
Replace the first sentence of the second paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.3.1.1 with the following.
The onsite ac power system is supplied offsite power from the 345 kV transmission system by two independent connections to the transmission system.
Replace the seventh sentence of the second paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.3.1.1 with the following.
The rated voltage of the high-voltage winding of the RAT is 345 kV.
8.3.1.1.9 Design Criteria for Class 1E Equipment
Replace the last sentence of the ninth paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.3.1.1.9 with the following.
Short circuit analysis for ac power system is addressed in Subsection 8.3.1.3.2.
8.3.1.1.11 Grounding and Lightning Protection System
Replace the last paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.3.1.1.11 with the following.
The ground grid is designed in the shape of uniform square or rectangular meshes as shown in Figure 8.3.1-201. The layout of the air terminals is shown in Figure 8.3.1-201.
CP COL 8.3(1)
CP COL 8.3(1)
STD COL 8.3(3)
CP COL 8.3(2)
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 2, FSAR
Revision 38.3-2
8.3.1.3.2 Short Circuit Studies
Replace the last two sentences of the first paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.3.1.3.2 with the following.
As a result of the studies, maximum short circuit current has been confirmed to satisfy short circuit interrupt rating of circuit breakers indicated in Table 8.3.1-1R.
8.3.1.3.4 Equipment Protection and Coordination Studies
Replace the last sentence of the first paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.3.1.3.4 with the following.
Coordination of protective devices is confirmed as part of equipment procurement.
8.3.1.3.5 Insulation Coordination (Surge and Lightning Protection)
Replace the last sentence of the first paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.3.1.3.5 with the following.
Surge arresters are selected to be compatible with lightning impulse insulation level of the 345 kV offsite power circuit so that the insulation of onsite power system is assured from lightning surge.
8.3.2.1.1 Class 1E DC Power System
Replace the last sentence of the third paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.3.2.1.1 with the following.
Short circuit analysis for dc power system is addressed in Subsection 8.3.2.3.2.
STD COL 8.3(3)
STD COL 8.3(10)
CP COL 8.3(11)
STD COL 8.3(8)
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 2, FSAR
Revision 38.3-3
8.3.2.1.2 Non-Class 1E DC Power System
Replace the last sentence of the fourth paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.3.2.1.2 with the following.
Short circuit analysis for dc power system is addressed in Subsection 8.3.2.3.2.
8.3.2.3.2 Short Circuit Studies
Replace the last two sentences of the first paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.3.2.3.2 with the following.
As a result of the studies, maximum short circuit current has been confirmed to satisfy short circuit interrupt rating of circuit breakers indicated in Table 8.3.2-3.
8.3.4 Combined License Information
Replace the content of DCD Subsection 8.3.4 with the following.
8.3(1) Transmission voltages
This COL Item is addressed in Subsection 8.3.1.1 and in Table 8.3.1-1R.
8.3(2) Ground grid and lightning Protection
This COL Item is addressed in Subsection 8.3.1.1.11 and in Figure 8.3.1-201.
8.3(3) Short Circuit analysis for ac power system
This COL Item is addressed in Subsections 8.3.1.1.9 and 8.3.1.3.2.
8.3(4) Deleted from the DCD.
8.3(5) Deleted from the DCD.
8.3(6) Deleted from the DCD.
8.3(7) Deleted from the DCD.
8.3(8) Short circuit analysis for dc power system
STD COL 8.3(8)
STD COL 8.3(8)
CP COL 8.3(1)
CP COL 8.3(2)
STD COL 8.3(3)
STD COL 8.3(8)
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 2, FSAR
Revision 38.3-4
This COL Item is addressed in Subsections 8.3.2.1.1, 8.3.2.1.2 and 8.3.2.3.2.
8.3(9) Deleted from the DCD.
8.3(10) Equipment Protection and Coordination Studies
This COL Item is addressed in Subsection 8.3.1.3.4.
8.3(11) Insulation Coordination (Surge and Lightning Protection)
This COL Item is addressed in Subsection 8.3.1.3.5.
8.3(12) Cable monitoring program
This COL item is addressed in Subsection 8.2.3.
STD COL 8.3(10)
CP COL 8.3(11)
CP COL 8.3(12)
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 2, FSAR
Revision 38.3-5
Table 8.3.1-1R
Electrical Equipment Ratings - Component Data Main AC Power System (Nominal Values)
1. Main Transformer (MT)
Quantity Three single phase units(Besides one spare for the site)
MVA rating 1 phase 610MVA (3 phase 1830MVA)
Low voltage winding 26kV
High voltage winding 345kV
2. Unit Auxiliary Transformers (UATs) UAT1, 2 UAT3, 4
Quantity Two 3 phase, 2 winding units
Two 3 phase, 2 winding units
MVA rating 72MVA 53MVA
Low voltage winding 13.8kV 6.9kV
High voltage winding 26kV 26kV
On-Load Tap Changer (OLTC)
Provided on high voltage side
Provided on high voltage side
3. Reserve Auxiliary Transformers (RATs) RAT1, 2 RAT3, 4
Quantity Two 3 phase, 3 winding units (including delta tertiary winding)
Two 3 phase, 3 winding units(including delta tertiary winding)
MVA rating 72MVA 53MVA
Low voltage winding 13.8kV 6.9kV
High voltage winding 345kV 345kV
On-Load Tap Changer (OLTC)
Provided on high voltage side
Provided on high voltage side
4. Generator Load Break Switch (GLBS)
Rated Voltage Over 28kV
Rated Current Over 44.4kA
Rated Frequency 60Hz
CP SUP 8.3(1)
CP COL 8.3(1)
CP COL 8.3(1)
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
pli
cati
on
Par
t 2,
FS
AR
Rev
isio
n 3
8.3-
6
Tab
le8.
3.1-
4R (
Sh
eet
1 o
f 4)
Ele
ctri
cal L
oad
Dis
trib
uti
on
- C
lass
1E
GT
G L
oad
ing
A C
lass
1E
GT
G
Load
Qua
ntity
In
stal
led
Ra
ted
Out
put
[kW
]
Load
In
put
[kW
]
Effi
cien
cy
[%]
Po
we
r F
acto
r
[%]
Loa
d F
acto
r
[%]
LOC
A C
onc
urre
nt w
ith a
LO
OP
LOO
P
Hot
Shu
tdow
nC
old
Shu
tdow
n
Qua
ntity
[kW
][k
VA
R]
[kV
A]
Qua
ntity
[kW
][k
VA
R]
[kV
A]
Qua
ntity
[kW
][k
VA
R]
[kV
A]
A S
afet
y In
ject
ion
Pum
p1
900
950
908
595
195
058
911
180
--
-0
--
-
A C
omp
onen
t Coo
ling
Wat
er P
ump
161
064
490
85
951
644
400
758
164
440
075
81
644
400
758
A E
ssen
tial S
ervi
ce W
ater
Pum
p1
650
686
908
595
168
642
780
81
686
427
808
168
642
780
8
A C
onta
inm
ent
Spr
ay/R
esid
ual H
eat R
emov
al P
ump
140
042
290
85
951
422
263
497
0-
--
142
226
349
7
A C
harg
ing
Pum
p1
820
866
908
595
0-
--
186
653
710
191
866
537
1019
A C
lass
1E
Ele
ctric
al R
oom
Air
Ha
ndlin
g U
nit F
an1
8089
858
095
189
6811
21
8968
112
189
6811
2
A E
ssen
tial C
hille
r U
nit
129
032
485
80
951
324
243
405
132
424
340
51
324
243
405
A S
pent
Fue
l Pit
Pum
p1
230
257
858
095
0-
--
1(2
57)
(19
3)(3
22)
1(2
57)
(193
)(3
22)
A C
lass
1E
Ele
ctric
al R
oom
Air
Ha
ndlin
g U
nit E
lect
rica
l Hea
ter
125
025
010
010
010
00
--
-0
--
-0
--
-
A P
ress
uriz
er H
eate
r (B
ack-
up)
156
256
210
010
010
00
--
-1
562
056
20
--
-
A E
ssen
tial S
ervi
ce W
ater
Pum
p C
oolin
g T
ower
Fan
215
016
885
80
952
336
252
420
233
625
242
02
336
252
420
Mot
or C
ontr
ol C
ente
rs (
A&
A1)
22
320
199
377
227
016
831
82
270
168
318
Tota
l37
7124
4144
9537
7720
9544
0236
3723
5843
37
(
):T
his
load
is s
tart
ed b
y m
anua
lly if
GT
G h
as n
eces
sary
mar
gin
afte
r co
mpl
etin
g a
utom
atic
load
seq
uenc
e.
ST
D C
OL
9.2
(6)
ST
D C
OL
9.2
(20)
ST
D C
OL
9.2(
20)
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
pli
cati
on
Par
t 2,
FS
AR
Rev
isio
n 3
8.3-
7
Tab
le 8
.3.1
-4R
(S
hee
t 2
of
4)
Ele
ctri
cal L
oad
Dis
trib
uti
on
- C
lass
1E
GT
G L
oad
ing
B C
lass
1E
GT
G
Load
Qua
ntity
In
stal
led
Ra
ted
Out
put
[kW
]
Load
In
put
[kW
]
Effi
cien
cy
[%]
Po
we
r F
acto
r
[%]
Loa
d F
acto
r
[%]
LOC
A C
onc
urre
nt w
ith a
LO
OP
LOO
P
Hot
Shu
tdow
nC
old
Shu
tdow
n
Qua
ntity
[kW
][k
VA
R]
[kV
A]
Qua
ntity
[kW
][k
VA
R]
[kV
A]
Qu
an
tity
[kW
][k
VA
R]
[kV
A]
B S
afet
y In
ject
ion
Pum
p1
900
950
908
595
195
058
911
180
--
-0
--
-
B C
omp
onen
t Coo
ling
Wat
er P
ump
161
064
490
85
951
644
400
758
164
440
075
81
644
400
758
B E
ssen
tial S
ervi
ce W
ater
Pum
p1
650
686
908
595
168
642
780
81
686
427
808
168
642
780
8
B C
onta
inm
ent
Spr
ay/R
esid
ual H
eat R
emov
al P
ump
140
042
290
85
951
422
263
497
0-
--
142
226
349
7
B E
mer
gen
cy F
eed
Wat
er P
ump
159
047
590
85
731
475
295
559
147
529
555
90
--
-
B C
lass
1E
Ele
ctric
al R
oom
Air
Ha
ndlin
g U
nit F
an1
8089
858
095
189
6811
21
8968
112
189
6811
2
B E
ssen
tial C
hille
r U
nit
129
032
485
80
951
324
243
405
132
424
340
51
324
243
405
A S
pent
Fue
l Pit
Pum
p1
230
257
858
095
0-
--
1(2
57)
(19
3)(3
22)
1(2
57)
(193
)(3
22)
B C
lass
1E
Ele
ctric
al R
oom
Air
Ha
ndlin
g U
nit E
lect
rica
l Hea
ter
125
025
010
010
010
00
--
-0
--
-0
--
-
B P
ress
uriz
er H
eate
r (B
ack-
up)
156
256
210
010
010
00
--
-1
562
056
20
--
-
B E
ssen
tial S
ervi
ce W
ater
Pum
p C
oolin
g T
ower
Fan
215
016
885
80
952
336
252
420
233
625
242
02
336
252
420
Mot
or C
ontr
ol C
ente
rs (
B&
A1)
22
320
199
377
227
016
831
82
270
168
318
Tota
l42
4627
3650
5433
8618
5339
4227
7118
2133
18
(
): T
his
load
is s
tart
ed b
y m
anua
lly if
GT
G h
as n
eces
sary
mar
gin
afte
r co
mpl
etin
g a
utom
atic
load
seq
uenc
e.
ST
D C
OL
9.2
(6)
ST
D C
OL
9.2
(20)
ST
D C
OL
9.2(
20)
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
pli
cati
on
Par
t 2,
FS
AR
Rev
isio
n 3
8.3-
8
Tab
le 8
.3.1
-4R
(S
hee
t 3
of
4)
Ele
ctri
cal L
oad
Dis
trib
uti
on
- C
lass
1E
GT
G L
oad
ing
C C
lass
1E
GT
G
Load
Qua
ntity
In
stal
led
Ra
ted
Out
put
[kW
]
Load
In
put
[kW
]
Effi
cien
cy
[%]
Po
we
r F
acto
r
[%]
Loa
d F
acto
r
[%]
LOC
A C
onc
urre
nt w
ith a
LO
OP
LOO
P
Hot
Shu
tdow
nC
old
Shu
tdow
n
Qua
ntity
[kW
][k
VA
R]
[kV
A]
Qua
ntity
[kW
][k
VA
R]
[kV
A]
Qu
an
tity
[kW
][k
VA
R]
[kV
A]
C S
afe
ty In
ject
ion
Pu
mp
190
095
090
85
951
950
589
1118
0-
--
0-
--
C C
ompo
nent
Coo
ling
Wat
er P
ump
161
064
490
85
951
644
400
758
164
440
075
81
644
400
758
C E
ssen
tial S
ervi
ce W
ate
r P
ump
165
068
690
85
951
686
427
808
168
642
780
81
686
427
808
C C
onta
inm
ent S
pray
/Res
idu
al H
eat
Rem
oval
Pu
mp
140
042
290
85
951
422
263
497
0-
--
142
226
349
7
C E
mer
genc
y F
eed
Wat
er P
ump
159
047
590
85
731
475
295
559
147
529
555
90
--
-
C C
lass
1E
Ele
ctric
al R
oom
Air
Han
dlin
g U
nit
Fan
180
8985
80
951
8968
112
189
6811
21
8968
112
C E
ssen
tial C
hille
r U
nit
129
032
485
80
951
324
243
405
132
424
340
51
324
243
405
B S
pent
Fue
l Pit
Pum
p1
230
257
858
095
0-
--
1(2
57)
(19
3)(3
22)
1(2
57)
(193
)(3
22)
C C
lass
1E
Ele
ctric
al R
oom
Air
Han
dlin
g U
nit
Ele
ctric
al H
eate
r1
250
250
100
100
100
0-
--
0-
--
0-
--
C P
ress
uriz
er H
eat
er (
Ba
ck-u
p)1
562
562
100
100
100
0-
--
156
20
562
0-
--
C E
ssen
tial S
ervi
ce W
ate
r P
ump
Coo
ling
Tow
er F
an2
150
168
858
095
233
625
242
02
336
252
420
233
625
242
0
Mot
or C
ontr
ol C
ente
rs (
C&
D1)
22
320
199
377
227
016
831
82
270
168
318
Tota
l42
4627
3650
5433
8618
5339
4227
7118
2133
18
(
):T
his
load
is s
tart
ed b
y m
anua
lly if
GT
G h
as n
eces
sary
mar
gin
afte
r co
mpl
etin
g a
utom
atic
load
seq
uenc
e.
ST
D C
OL
9.2
(6)
ST
D C
OL
9.2
(20)
ST
D C
OL
9.2
(20)
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
pli
cati
on
Par
t 2,
FS
AR
Rev
isio
n 3
8.3-
9
Tab
le8.
3.1-
4R (
Sh
eet
4 o
f 4)
Ele
ctri
cal L
oad
Dis
trib
uti
on
- C
lass
1E
GT
G L
oad
ing
D C
lass
1E
GT
G
Load
Qua
ntity
In
stal
led
Ra
ted
Out
put
[kW
]
Load
In
put
[kW
]
Effi
cien
cy
[%]
Po
we
r F
acto
r
[%]
Loa
d F
acto
r
[%]
LOC
A C
onc
urre
nt w
ith a
LO
OP
LOO
P
Hot
Shu
tdow
nC
old
Shu
tdow
n
Qua
ntity
[kW
][k
VA
R]
[kV
A]
Qua
ntity
[kW
][k
VA
R]
[kV
A]
Qu
an
tity
[kW
][k
VA
R]
[kV
A]
D S
afe
ty In
ject
ion
Pu
mp
190
095
090
85
951
950
589
1118
0-
--
0-
--
D C
ompo
nent
Coo
ling
Wat
er P
ump
161
064
490
85
951
644
400
758
164
440
075
81
644
400
758
D E
ssen
tial S
ervi
ce W
ate
r P
ump
165
068
690
85
951
686
427
808
168
642
780
81
686
427
808
D C
onta
inm
ent S
pray
/Res
idu
al H
eat
Rem
oval
Pu
mp
140
042
290
85
951
422
263
497
0-
--
142
226
349
7
D C
harg
ing
Pum
p1
820
866
908
595
0-
--
186
653
710
191
866
537
1019
D C
lass
1E
Ele
ctric
al R
oom
Air
Han
dlin
g U
nit
Fan
180
8985
80
951
8968
112
189
6811
21
8968
112
D E
ssen
tial C
hille
r U
nit
129
032
485
80
951
324
243
405
132
424
340
51
324
243
405
B S
pent
Fue
l Pit
Pum
p1
230
257
858
095
0-
--
1(2
57)
(19
3)(3
22)
1(2
57)
(193
)(3
22)
D C
lass
1E
Ele
ctric
al R
oom
Air
Han
dlin
g U
nit
Ele
ctric
al H
eate
r1
250
250
100
100
100
0-
--
0-
--
0-
--
D P
ress
uriz
er H
eat
er (
Ba
ck-u
p)1
562
562
100
100
100
0-
--
156
20
562
0-
--
D E
ssen
tial S
ervi
ce W
ate
r P
ump
Coo
ling
Tow
er F
an2
150
168
858
095
233
625
242
02
336
252
420
233
625
242
0
Mot
or C
ontr
ol C
ente
rs (
D&
D1)
22
320
199
377
227
016
831
82
270
168
318
Tota
l37
7124
4144
9537
7720
9544
0236
3723
5843
37
(
): T
his
load
is s
tart
ed b
y m
anua
lly if
GT
G h
as n
eces
sary
mar
gin
afte
r co
mpl
etin
g a
utom
atic
load
seq
uenc
e.
ST
D C
OL
9.2
(6)
ST
D C
OL
9.2
(20)
ST
D C
OL
9.2
(20)
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
pli
cati
on
Par
t 2,
FS
AR
Rev
isio
n 3
8.3-
10
Fig
ure
8.3.
1-1R
On
site
AC
Ele
ctri
cal D
istr
ibu
tio
n S
yste
m (
Sh
eet
1 o
f 7)
Mai
n O
ne
Lin
e D
iag
ram
C
P C
OL
8.2(
3)
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
pli
cati
on
Par
t 2,
FS
AR
Rev
isio
n 3
8.3-
11
Fig
ure
8.3.
1-1R
On
site
AC
Ele
ctri
cal D
istr
ibu
tio
n S
yste
m (
Sh
eet
5 o
f 7)
Cla
ss 1
E 4
80V
Bu
ses
A a
nd
B O
ne
Lin
e D
iag
ram
S
TD
CO
L 9.
2(20
)
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
pli
cati
on
Par
t 2,
FS
AR
Rev
isio
n 3
8.3-
12
Fig
ure
8.3.
1-1R
On
site
AC
Ele
ctri
cal D
istr
ibu
tio
n S
yste
m (
Sh
eet
6 o
f 7)
Cla
ss 1
E 4
80V
Bu
ses
C a
nd
D O
ne
Lin
e D
iag
ram
S
TD
CO
L 9.
2(20
)
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
pli
cati
on
Par
t 2,
FS
AR
Rev
isio
n 3
8.3-
13
Fig
ure
8.3.
1-2R
Lo
gic
Dia
gra
ms
(Sh
eet
2 o
f 24
)O
ne
Lin
e D
iag
ram
CP
CO
L 8.
2(3)
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
pli
cati
on
Par
t 2,
FS
AR
Rev
isio
n 3
8.3-
14
Fig
ure
8.3
.1-2
R L
og
ic D
iag
ram
s (S
hee
t 3
of
24)
No
n-C
lass
1E
13.
8kV
Inco
min
g C
ircu
it B
reak
er T
rip
pin
g a
nd
Clo
sin
g
CP
CO
L 8.
2(3)
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
pli
cati
on
Par
t 2,
FS
AR
Rev
isio
n 3
8.3-
15
Fig
ure
8.3
.1-2
R L
og
ic D
iag
ram
s (S
hee
t 4
of
24)
No
n-C
lass
1E
6.9
kV In
com
ing
Cir
cuit
Bre
aker
(N
3 &
N4
bu
ses)
Tri
pp
ing
an
d C
losi
ng
C
P C
OL
8.2(
3)
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
pli
cati
on
Par
t 2,
FS
AR
Rev
isio
n 3
8.3-
16
Fig
ure
8.3
.1-2
R L
og
ic D
iag
ram
s (S
hee
t 5
of
24)
No
n-C
lass
1E
6.9
kV I
nco
min
g C
ircu
it B
reak
er (
N5
& N
6 b
use
s) T
rip
pin
g a
nd
Clo
sin
g
CP
CO
L 8.
2(3)
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
pli
cati
on
Par
t 2,
FS
AR
Rev
isio
n 3
8.3-
17
Fig
ure
8.3
.1-2
R L
og
ic D
iag
ram
s (S
hee
t 18
of
24)
Cla
ss 1
E T
rain
A L
OO
P a
nd
LO
CA
Lo
ad S
equ
enci
ng
ST
DC
OL
9.2(
20)
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
pli
cati
on
Par
t 2,
FS
AR
Rev
isio
n 3
8.3-
18
Fig
ure
8.3
.1-2
R L
og
ic D
iag
ram
s (S
hee
t 19
of
24)
Cla
ss 1
E T
rain
B L
OO
P a
nd
LO
CA
Lo
ad S
equ
enci
ng
ST
D C
OL
9.2(
20)
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
pli
cati
on
Par
t 2,
FS
AR
Rev
isio
n 3
8.3-
19
Fig
ure
8.3.
1-2R
Lo
gic
Dia
gra
ms
(Sh
eet
20 o
f 24
)C
lass
1E
Tra
in C
LO
OP
an
d L
OC
A L
oad
Seq
uen
cin
g
ST
D C
OL
9.2(
20)
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
pli
cati
on
Par
t 2,
FS
AR
Rev
isio
n 3
8.3-
20
Fig
ure
8.3
.1-2
R L
og
ic D
iag
ram
s (S
hee
t 21
of
24)
Cla
ss 1
E T
rain
D L
OO
P a
nd
LO
CA
Lo
ad S
equ
enci
ng
S
TD
CO
L 9.
2(20
Co
man
che
Pea
k N
ucl
ear
Po
wer
Pla
nt,
Un
its
3 &
4C
OL
Ap
pli
cati
on
Par
t 2,
FS
AR
Rev
isio
n 3
8.3-
21
Sec
uri
ty-R
elat
ed In
form
atio
n –
Wit
hh
eld
Un
der
10
CF
R 2
.390
(d)(
1)
(SR
I)
Fig
ure
8.3.
1-20
1 G
rou
nd
Gri
d a
nd
Lig
htn
ing
Pro
tect
ion
Sys
tem
CP
CO
L 8.
3(2)
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application
Part 2, FSAR
Revision 38.4-1
8.4 STATION BLACKOUT
This section of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with the following departures and/or supplements.
Add the following text after the ninth paragraph of DCD Subsection 8.4.2.2.
The procedures to cope with SBO are addressed in Section 13.5 and the training is addressed in Section 13.2. In particular, although not specifically referenced, SBO procedures are discussed in FSAR Subsection 13.5.2.1. This subsection addresses Operating and Emergency Operating Procedures as well as the Procedure Generation Package. The Station Blackout Response Guideline, the AC Power Restoration Guideline, and a Severe Weather Guideline are covered by the discussions in FSAR 13.5.2.1.
CP SUP 8.4(1)