cndi japan re arm disadvantage

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CNDI 2010 Japan Re-arm DisadvantageStarter Pack

Index

Index..............................................................................................................................................................................................11NC Japan Re-arm Disadvantage 1/3............................................................................................................................................2

________________________.......................................................................................................................................................5*****UNIQUENESS*****..........................................................................................................................................................5Uniqueness No Re-arm 1/2........................................................................................................................................................6

Brink Japan Re-arm Likely........................................................................................................................................................8________________.......................................................................................................................................................................9*****LINKS*****.......................................................................................................................................................................9Link Military Presence 1/3.......................................................................................................................................................10

___________________...............................................................................................................................................................13*****IMPACTS*****................................................................................................................................................................13Impact Asia Arms Race 1/3......................................................................................................................................................14Impact Indo-Pak Arms Race 1/2..............................................................................................................................................17Impact Sino-Japan War............................................................................................................................................................19Impact North Korea..................................................................................................................................................................20Impact Nanotechnology............................................................................................................................................................21Impact Japan Economy 1/3......................................................................................................................................................23Impact US Economy 1/2..........................................................................................................................................................27

Impact Timeframe = Immediate...............................................................................................................................................30A2: No Re-arm Perception Link...............................................................................................................................................31A2: No Re-arm Technical Barriers...........................................................................................................................................32A2: No Re-arm DPJ..................................................................................................................................................................33A2: No Re-arm Public 1/2........................................................................................................................................................34

______________.........................................................................................................................................................................36*****AFF*****..........................................................................................................................................................................362AC Non-unique Re-arm Now.................................................................................................................................................372AC No Link Troops Not Key.................................................................................................................................................382AC No Impact No Re-arm (Technical Barriers) 1/2..............................................................................................................392AC No Impact No Re-arm (DPJ) 1/2.....................................................................................................................................412AC No Impact No Re-arm (Public) 1/4..................................................................................................................................432AC Strong Alliance Bad Sino-Japan War..............................................................................................................................472AC Strong Alliance Bad US-Sino War..................................................................................................................................48

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1NC Japan Re-arm Disadvantage 1/3

US security credibility with allies is high troop presence is keyRussell 10 (James, Co-Dir. Center for Contemporary Conflict at Naval Postgraduate School, Former Advisor tothe Sec. Def. on Persian Gulf strategy, PhD Candidate in War Studies Kings College U. London, ExtendedDeterrence, Security Guarantees and Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Strategic and Policy Conundrums in the Gulf, 1-5,http://www.analyst-network.com/article.php?art_id=3297)Her formulation reflects a firm historic grounding in the time-honored Cold War concepts of extended deterrence and security assurances, both of which have served as vitally important tools of American

statecraft since the dawn of the nuclear age.[15] Extended deterrence is the threat to use force , including nuclear weapons, against anadversary that threatens an ally. As noted by political scientist Paul Huth: The objective of extended deterrence is to protectother countries and territories from attack,as opposed to preventing a direct attack on ones own national territory.[16] Security assurances are the means throughwhich the actor drawing upon extended deterrence conveys the commitment to an allys security. Each of these concepts is critically contingent on the credibility of the actor extending the deterrent umbrella

and the security guarantees, which may or may not involve the specific commitment of nuclear weapons.[17] To be effective, the actor receiving theseassurances and the antagonist threatening action must be convinced that the security provider is preparedto follow through on its conveyed commitments.[18] The linked concepts of extended deterrence and security guarantees are nothing new to Americansecurity strategy.[19] During the Cold War, the United States commitment to defend Europe becameoperationalized througha series of extended deterrent commitments that included the basingof nuclear weapons in Europe that could have been used in the event of a Sovietattack. In Europe, the United States and its NATO allies eventually constructed a seamless web of conventional and nuclear capabilities to deterand, if necessary, defeat a Soviet invasion.[20] More recently, United States clearly still believes that the

concept has great relevance in Northeast Asia . In response to North Korean nuclear and missile tests during the last several years, senior U.S. officials quickly androutinely fan out to South Korea and Japan to assure them of Americas commitment to their security.[21] A main target of these efforts is to forestall the possibility that either South Korea or Japan will

reconsider decisions not to develop nuclear weapons. Japan in particular has a robust nuclear infrastructure and is now widelyconsidered to be a latent nuclear power that could develop a weapon reasonably quickly . As is thecase in Northeast Asia, the United States today routinely acts as if extended deterrence and securityassurances together constitute active, ongoing and useful tools in managing its regional securityrelationships in the Gulf. Secretary Clintons recent remarks only represent the latest evidence that this is the case. In May 2006, for example, the Bush Administration embarked on amuch ballyhooed Gulf Security Dialogue that sought to re-invigorate U.S. security relationships with the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The initiative was presented as part of a consultativeprocess to focus attention on building regional self defense capabilities; consulting on regional security issues like the Iran nuclear program and fallout of Irans struggle against Sunni extremists; the U.S.invasion of Iraq; counter-proliferation; counter-terrorism and internal security; and critical infrastructure protection.[22] The dialogue came as the Bush Administration proposed billions of dollars in new armssales to Israel and its Gulf partners that included precision guided munitions such as the Joint Defense Attack Munition and the Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile. The Gulf Security dialogue is butthe latest chapter of an active and ongoing practice of reassurance that dates to the early 1990s, and, in the case of Saudi Arabia, to 1945 and the assurances made by President Roosevelt to the Saudi leader,King Abdul Aziz al-Saud. The United States has worked assiduously to operationalize conventionally-oriented extended deterrence commitments and security guarantees in the Gulf. As noted by Kathleen

McKiness: Extended deterrence is not a hands-off strategy. It cannot be created from a distance through a submarinecapability in the Persian Gulf or a troop deployment in another country such as Iraq.

It is a real, tangible, physical commitment, to be palpably feltboth by allies and adversaries.[23] The United States has indeed worked hard at this in the Gulf largely through its ever-efficient military bureaucracies. In the aftermath ofOperation Desert Storm, the United States actively sought and concluded a series of bilateral security agreements with each of the Gulf States that became operationlized under something called defensecooperation agreements, or DCAs. These commitments between the United States and the regional signatories contained a number of critical elements: (1) that the United States and the host nation shouldjointly respond t o external threats when each party deemed necessary; (2) permitted access to host nation military facilities by U.S. military personnel; (3) permitted the pre-positioning of U.S. military

equipment in the host nation as agreed by the parties; (4) and status of forces provisions which addressed the legal status of deployed U.S. military personnel . The United States todayhas agreements with all the Gulf States except Saudi Arabia, which is subject to similar bilateral securitycommitments conveyed in a variety of different forums. Under these agreements, the United States and the host nation annually convene meetings toreview regional threats and developments in their security partnerships . One of the principal purposes of these meetings is for both sides toreassure the other side of their continued commitment to the security relationship . In short, this process operationalizes theconveyance of security guarantees in ways that reflect the principles in the DCAs. Using this Cold War-era template, the United States built an integrated system of regional security in the 1990s that saw it: (1)preposition three brigades worth of military equipment in the Gulf in Qatar, Kuwait and afloat with the Maritime Pre-positioning ships program; (2) build host nation military capabilities through exercises,training and arms sales; and, (3) build out a physical basing infrastructure that continues its expansion today. Each of the Central Commands major service components today have forward headquarters in theregion today spread between Arifjan in Kuwait, Al Udied Air Base in Qatar and the 5th Fleet Naval Headquarters in Manama. After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the United States further added to thisinfrastructure with bases in Iraq and a space at Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates used by the Air Force for ISR missions. As is the case in Northeast Asia, there is a substantial basinginfrastructure with significant numbers of forward deployed U.S. military personnel. The major difference in Northeast Asia is that a hostile actor (North Korea) has already achieved a nuclear capability while

in the Gulf, Iran may aspire to achieve North Koreas nuclear status. In Northeast Asia, the nuclear component of U.S. extended deterrence and security guarantees is palpable, whereas in the Gulf it is moreimplicit, or existential. Conventional and Nuclear Deterrence

The build out of the U.S. military infrastructure points around the region provide the hosting states withtangible evidence of the credibility of the American military commitment to their security . The militaryfootprint today in the Gulf is no trip-wire force, but is engaged in tangible military operations, such as themulti-national maritime security operations conducted in the Gulf and the Arabian Sea by the combined task force command operating out of the 5th Fleet Headquarters in Manama. Since the Britishwithdrawal from the Gulf in the early 1970s, the United States has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to deploy its conventional forces to the region in response to regional instability. Starting withOperation Earnest Will in 1988, the United States slowly but inexorably inserted itself into the role played by the British for over a century as protecting the Gulf States from external threats. FollowingOperation Desert Storm, the United States kept sufficient forces in theater to enforce the United Nations cease fire resolutions on a recalcitrant Saddam. Last, but not least, it flowed significant forces and

absorbed the monetary costs of toppling Saddam and providing a protective conventional force that can be readily called upon by the Iraq regime if needed . Given this history it isdifficult to see how any state could doubt the credibility of the United States commitments to use its

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conventional forces as an instrument of regional defense. This history suggests an overwhelmingemphasis on the role of conventional force in operationalizing American security guarantees andextended deterrent commitments. In the Gulfunlike Northeast Asiathe role of nuclear weapons has never been explicitly spelled out and has very much remained in thebackground. However, while reference to nuclear weapons might remain unstated, the reality is that they areexplicitly committed to defend American forces whenever the commander-in-chief might deem itnecessary. The entire (and substantial) American military regional footprint operates under a quite

explicit nuclear umbrellaheadlines or no headlines. If a nuclear umbrella is indeed draped over Americas forward deployed Gulf presence, its hard notto see how that umbrella is similarly draped over the states that are hosting those forces. The only problem with Secretary Clintons recent statements is that she seems unaware of this fact, i.e., the UnitedStates already maintains a nuclear umbrella backed by nuclear weapons in the region.

Current US military presence prevents Japanese re-arm withdraw causes spiraling Asian armsracePittsburg Post-Gazette, 7 (February 21, Flash points in Northeast Asia: North Korea, Japan and China all posechallenges for U.S. foreign policy http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/07052/763587-374.stm)

The United States sought to retain its influence and reassure Japan's neighbors after World War II bystationing forces there. The presence of those troops also made it logical for Japan not to rearm . Anargument can be made that Japan's having been spared the cost of defending itself was a key element in its postwar economic

resurgence. But Japan, now the world's second-largest economy, no longer needs that boon. The United States, pushedhard by the Iraq war and other calls on its military resources, now wishes to scale down its presence inJapan. This coincides with a Japanese desire to see the U.S. military presence in Japan reduced, which ismanifested regularly in public demonstrations.

But what does that mean? It means also that Japan is seeing increasingly to its own defense . The United States isencouraging this trend by asking Japan to contribute to international military efforts, including the Iraq war and U.N.peacekeeping. There is strong pacifist sentiment in Japan; there also is a strong military tradition. From before 1905, whenJapan defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, until 1945, the military basically ran Japan. If the United States hasforgotten this in its drive to save money and troops and to scratch up help for Iraq, it is absolutely certain that Japan'sneighbors have not.

So, point one. It is potentially disruptive to the region for Japan to rearm. Assuming that for other reasonsJapanese rearmament makes sense, the reasons for that not to occur also still exist. It is in that context that the current deal

with North Korea needs to be seen. If it is accepted that North Korea has nuclear weapons, there is everyreason to believe that Japan will want them, too. Japan is fully capable of developing them quickly , if itwishes. So that could mean three powers in Northeast Asia with nuclear weapons: China, Japan and NorthKorea. And then probably South Korea, a fourth.That's one flash point in the region well beyond American military or political capacity to control.The second is Taiwan. What saves U.S. policy and pride there is Chinese patience. Beijing certainly willnot give up the idea of eventual Taiwan reintegration into greater China , along the route that Hong Kong andMacau followed. And it is in little or no hurry. But even if America could get past the idea that China owns a big piece of theUnited States, with 10 percent of U.S. federal debt in its hands and with a huge trade deficit in China's favor, the fact is that

militarily the United States would be unable to respond effectively to a Chinese grab of Taiwan . That is toassume that the American people and the U.S. Congress would see it as in the U.S. interest to fight a war with China overTaiwan.

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1NC Japan Re-arm Disadvantage 3/3

Asian arms races escalate to nuclear conflictCimbala 8 (Stephen J.-, March, Comparative Strategy, Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis Stability in FutureAsia, Vol. 27 #2, Informaworld)

The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. States with

nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into amatrix of complex political, social, and cultural crosscurrents contributory to the possibility of war. Inaddition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatenedby regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of

the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversionthat marked the Cold War, in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold Warsuperpowers no longer exists, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or globalrespect.12 The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear-capable delivery systems in Asia, or in theMiddle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live closetogether and are already engaged in ongoing disputesabout territory or other issues.13 The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airbornedelivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one anothers vitals. But short-range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially

strategic effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with China and NorthKorea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on . The

short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that verylittle time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armedmissiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing over thehorizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to thechallenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asiamay also have first strikevulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision pressuresfor rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation. This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventionalwisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policymakers and academic theorists. Forpolicymakers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asiacould profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentiethcentury) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).14 This would profoundly shake

up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passe, on account of the emergence of the Revolution inMilitary Affairs and its encouragement of information-based warfare.15 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large-scale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties ofunconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.16 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia couldoverturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare .

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________________________*****UNIQUENESS*****

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Uniqueness No Re-arm 1/2

Japanese government currently committed to peace and relationsKoshoji Correspondent UPI Asia 9-8 (Hiroyuki-, UPI Asia, Will Hatoyama weaken ties with United States?,http://www.upiasia.com/Politics/2009/09/08/will_hatoyama_weaken_ties_with_united_states/9299/)

Yukio Hatoyama, leader of the Democratic Party of Japan and the countrys incoming prime minister, is softening his

stance to dispel concerns that he advocates an anti-U.S. foreign policy. Such concerns had heightened after acontroversial article by Hatoyama appeared in translation on U.S. news sites. American policymakers and experts areconcerned that the DPJs major policies rethinking the alignment of U.S. forces in Japan, the Japan-U.S. Status of ForcesAgreement, and Japans participation in naval refueling missions in the Indian Ocean could undermine the Japan-U.S.alliance. In the article posted on the online version of the New York Times on Aug. 26, titled "A New Path for Japan,"Hatoyama questioned U.S.-led market fundamentalism and the dollar as the key global currency, and stressed the need torestrain U.S. political and economic excesses. To protect Japans political and economic self-sufficiency and maintain abalanced relationship between the United States and China, Hatoyama explained the importance of monetary union andbuilding a permanent security framework in East Asia. In reaction to the article, major U.S. dailies questioned Hatoyamasqualifications as Japans next leader. The article "stirred a hornet's nest in Washington by casting Japan's embattled economyas the victim of American-inspired free-market fundamentalism," the New York Times said on Sept. 1. On the same day, the

Washington Post also said, "The threat of a nuclear North Korea makes Japan's neighborhood too dangerous ,we think, for the government in Tokyo to seek a rupture with Washington or for the Obama administration to let

one develop." Japan's conservative Sankei Shimbun quoted a former U.S. government official as saying that if RahmEmanuel, the White House chief of staff, read the article, he would persuade U.S. President Barack Obama not to deal withthe anti-U.S. Hatoyama government. Sheila A. Smith, senior fellow for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations,questioned if the DPJ would try to find another financial framework apart from the International Monetary Fund, the leftist

Asahi newspaper reported. In response to such unexpected reaction from the United States, Hatoyama explained that hisarticle was not intended to display anti-U.S. sentiment. Still, it surely contained expressions that could be seen asde-Americanization. "At a time when the G-20 is trying to address financial crisis on a global scale, the article has giventhe impression that Japan is not cooperative," said Masashi Nishihara, director of the Research Institute for Peace andSecurity in Tokyo. "Hatoyama's opinion regarding the Japan-U.S. alliance was not fully explained in the article. If it wasposted to foreign media in English, it should have been revised with due consideration of the United States," Nishiharapointed out. Meanwhile, Jun Iio, vice president of the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, was more sympatheticto Hatoyama. "I think Hatoyama does not have anti-American sentiment, he said. To counter the policy of the rulingLiberal Democratic Party, he wrote such an article. But he should be careful not to shake the Japan-U.S. alliance, as criticism

from the United States indicates that it contained anti-American sentiment." For Japan, which has consistently reliedon the U.S. nuclear umbrella, the Japan-U.S. alliance is the axis of its security policy. Until now all newprime ministers, without exception, have appealed for a strengthening of the alliance soon after takingoffice. This is the first time concerns have emerged that Japan's next prime minister might be anti-American.Hatoyama is already beginning to shift his stance to divert the criticism . He emphasized the positive side ofglobalization in his keynote address at the opening of the World Economic Forum Japan Meeting 2009, held in Tokyo onSept. 4. "Globalization and the deepening of mutual independency internationally have both positive and negative aspects,Hatoyama told the gathering. What is important is to limit the negative aspects as much as possible, while accentuating the

positive." In his first telephone conversation with Obama last Thursday, Hatoyama said he wanted to build aconstructive and future-oriented Japan-U.S. alliance. Clearly his intention was to amend the impression givenby the article and dispel any distrust of his policies . "As Hatoyama has been one of the opposition

lawmakers until now, he has voiced all kinds of criticism," said Naoyuki Agawa, former minister for publicaffairs at the Japanese Embassy in Washington, D.C., and now a professor at Keio University in Tokyo. "The U.S.medias comments may give an indication of general opinion in the United States, but the Japanese governmentdoesn't conduct its diplomacy based upon that."

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Uniqueness No Re-arm 2/2

No re-arm now US security shieldHung, China Post, 4-13-9 (Joe, Japan may now have to rearm itselfhttp://www.chinapost.com.tw/commentary/the-china-post/joe-hung/2009/04/13/204014/Japan-may.htm)

Japan has a mutual defense treaty with the United States. Uncle Sam provides a nuclear defense

umbrella for Japan under the treaty signed at the beginning of the Cold War era for protection against attacks from theSoviet Union. Thanks to the mutual defense arrangements, Japan has been able to refrain fromrearmament, which is frowned upon by the United States and the People's Republic of China, along withthose Asian countries that were invaded or occupied by the Japanese Imperial Army before and duringthe Second World War.

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Brink Japan Re-arm Likely

Obama weakness on NK and talk of disarm has put Japan on the brink of prolifBen Yakov 9 (Menachem, June 24, http://menachembenyakov.newsvine.com/_news/2009/06/24/2964035-obama-and-the-bomb)

Have President Obamas policies made a nuclear war less likely or more likely? Unfortunately I think the answer is

more likely and , as an unintended consequence of his speech in Cairo, he has set off a global nuclear armsrace.We are at a crucial moment in history. One that will determine whether or not nuclear conflict becomesa reality.Obama has taken a hands off approach to Iran. He has been even handed regarding the revolution in Iran. He has stated hiswillingness to work with whomever winds up in charge. Obama never offered support to the Brits who championed the moralrights of the protesters immediately. He never came to Gordon Browns defense. His current statements, mild as they are, tooksome prodding.

Obama has not taken a strong stand as far as North Korea is concerned either. His failure to communicatea severe American response has caused a panic in Japan . The Diet, Japans parliament, is holding talksabout acquiring nuclear weapons to defend themselves as the American umbrella becomes unreliable .Obamas statement in his Cairo address, " No single nation should pick and choose which nations hold nuclear weapons.",

has opened the Nuclear Pandoras Box. Why? Because all the other countries in the world, despite theirpublic bad mouthing of America, relied on America to be the Big Policeman. And that has been enoughto confine the spread of nuclear weapons to responsible countries. According to the President, theUnited States will not act alone. Yet it is the fear of American consequences that kept the genie in thebottle.

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________________*****LINKS*****

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Link Military Presence 2/3

Military presence in Japan key to preventing re-armLee, Asia Times, 10 (Peter, June 3, The Cheonan sinking and Korea rising The Global Realm,http://theglobalrealm.com/2010/06/02/the-cheonan-sinking-and-korea-rising/)

That role is traditionally played by Japan, which is locked in a zero-sum economic battle with China and highly

suspicious of Chinese military motives. The US forward military presence in Japan pre-empts Japaneserearmament, reduces the incentives for a regional arms race, and is welcomed by many regional actorsincluding, perhaps, China itself.

US military presence prevents re-armEbrey, History Professor at UWash, 9 (Patricia, Modern East Asia from 1600: A Cultural, Social, andPolitical History p 528)

The U.S. military presence in East Asia has had a strong stabilizing effect. It has prevented Japansrearmament and has stemmed both the growing Taiwanese desire for independence and China's ability to take Taiwan byforce. It has blocked a North Korean invasion of the South and a southern invasion of the North. If the United States finds away to reach a negotiated solution of problems with North Korea, ii might be able to maintain a beneficial presence in EastAsia. Otherwise, the United States could spark an even more disastrous Korean war, or East Asia might decide to solve its

own problems without U.S. interference. South Korea. Taiwan, and Japan are at a crossroads. In terms of security,they face east, allied militarily with the United States and Australia. In terms of prosperity, they nowface west as they strengthen economic cooperation with China.

Reducing military presence causes re-arm and proliferationScales and Wortzel 99 (Robert, Major Gen. and former Deputy Chief of Staff for Base Operations and formerDeputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine at Headquarters Training and Doctrine Command US Army and PhD in History

Duke, and Larry, Col. US Army, Dir. Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College, and PhD in Pol. Sci. U.Hawaii, THE FUTURE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN ASIA: LANDPOWER AND THE GEOSTRATEGY OFAMERICAN COMMITMENT, 4-6, https://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB75.pdf)

The presence of American military forces in the region was one of the reasons that U.S. nucleardeterrence was extended to our allies in Korea and Japan. As in Europe, the stationing of U.S.

conventional forces provided a deterrent option that is reinforced by the nuclear dimension. Americannuclear deterrence, therefore, is also welcome in Northeast Asia for its contribution to security andstability in the region. Chinas military strategists may complain that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is a threat to China;but they acknowledge in private discussion that without extended deterrence, as provided for in the U.S.-Japan andU.S.-Republic of Korea defense treaties, Korea might develop nuclear weapons and Japan could follow suit.23Chinas leaders even realize that without the defensive conventional arms provided to Taiwan by theUnited States under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, Taiwan might develop nuclear weapons. Japanese militarystrategists express their own concerns about South Korea.24 Threatened by the probability that NorthKorea has developed a nuclear capability, without the protection of U.S. extended deterrence, the Southwould probably respond in kind by developing its own weapons . Certainly South Korea has the requisitetechnological level to develop nuclear weapons. In the event of the reunification of the Korean peninsula, because

the North already has a nuclear capability, Japan would face a nuclear-armed peninsula. Tokyo might thenreexamine its own commitment to defense relying on conventional weapons with the support of the Japanese populace.Strategic thinkers in China and Japan acknowledge that the continuation of extended deterrence might inhibit Japan fromgoing nuclear in such a case.25 Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, two Americans, make this same argument: . . . Japans

leaders would be less likely to develop a nuclear arsenal as a hedge against Korean pressure.26 Strong U.S. diplomacycombined with continued extended deterrence, argue some of Korea and Japans strategic thinkers, might convincethe regime in charge of a reunified Korea to dismantle whatever devices the North has built instead ofimproving them.

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Link Military Presence 3/3

Credibility. Troops are the best guarantee that nuclear threats mean something.Nye 9 (Joseph, Prof. IR Harvard U., Korea Times, Will US-Japan Alliance Survive, 7-14,http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2009/07/137_48423.html)

Japan officially endorses the objective of a non-nuclear world, but it relies on America's extended

nuclear deterrent, and wants to avoid being subject to nuclear blackmail from North Korea (or China). The Japanese fearthat the credibility of American extended deterrence will be weakened if the U.S. decreases its nuclear forces to parity withChina. It is a mistake, however, to believe that extended deterrence depends on parity in numbers ofnuclear weapons. Rather, it depends on a combination of capability and credibility. During the ColdWar, the U.S. was able to defend Berlin because our promise to do so was made credible by the NATOalliance and the presence of American troops, whose lives would be on the line in the event of a Sovietattack. Indeed, the best guarantee of American extended deterrence over Japan remains the presence ofnearly 50,000 American troops (which Japan helps to maintain with generous host-nation support). Credibility is alsoenhanced by joint projects such as the development of regional ballistic missile defense.

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___________________*****IMPACTS*****

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Impact Asia Arms Race 1/3

That causes Asian arms races that risk total explosionRichardson Presidential Management Fellow DOD 6(Corey-, Sept. 9, South Korea must choose sides,http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/HI09Dg02.html)

Japan must then consider its options in countering an openly nuclear, reunified Korea without USFK. Already building

momentum to change its constitution to clarify its military , it's not inconceivable that Japan wouldultimately consider going nuclear to deter Korea. As in South Korea, there is no technological barrierpreventing Japan from building nuclear weapons.While the details of the race and escalation of tensions can vary in any number of ways and are not inevitable, that an armsrac e would occur is probable. Only the perception of threat and vulnerability need be present for this tooccur.East Asia could become a nuclear powder keg ready to explode over something as childish as theDokdo/Takeshima dispute between Korea and Japan, a Diaoyu/Senkakus dispute between China andJapan, or the Koguryo dispute between Korea and China .The arms race need not occur

One could argue that the US would be able to step in and moderate things before such an escalationcould occur. Considering the recent US record on influencing either North or South Korea, it is perhaps

unwise to count on it being able to do so at some crucial point in the future .

ExtinctionKennedy & Irie 00 (Prof. Paul-, Prof. Akira-, Daily Yomiuri, Jan. 10, 21st Century--Dialogues on the Future/Globalization's sway in evolution of states put in focus, Lexis)

Kennedy: Over the past two or three decades, many Asian nations have increased their defense budgets , whileEuropean countries have done otherwise. During this time, there have been many flash points in Asia , such NorthKorea, Taiwan and Kashmir . Some Asian countries have developed nuclear weapons, as contrasted with fewEuropeans who even want nuclear power stations today.

We have good reason to feel worried that Asia could become a tinderbox should there be any conflict indisputed territories like the Spratly Islands and an autistic North Korean regime that does not bother tounderstand the outside world. Taiwan is often rash to provoke Beijing, while the Kashmir conflict couldgrow into an India-Pakistan war.There is great concern about how we should ensure that bitter rivalries in the Asian part of the globe will notbring down a system that is emerging in the world now. We do not want a repeat of 1914 . I amconcerned that an armed conflict might arise in South or East Asia in 2008 , for example, and bring downthe credit, financial flow and capital in the region.Irie: I share Prof. Kennedy's sense of pessimism about some serious problems facing the world today. There are many moresovereign nations today, and the majority of them are newly independent states. Therefore, they are even more nationalistic.Nationalism has often served as the only symbol of national unity for some African, Asian and Middle Eastern countries thathave been grated in their regions without national traditions comparable to those of European countries. This has made

matters even worse. Nationalism is all that can keep a country together. It is essential to ensure that local conflictswill be kept from blowing up the entire world.

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Re-Arm causes arms races and warGreb, PhD at Lawrence Livermore, 95 (G. A., Reasons for an American Military Presence in Asia, Document 43-95)

If Japan were to abandon its post war promise and decide to undertake a large arms build-up, the affect onstability in the region would be enormous. Fears of a renationalized Japan would spur an arms race throughout

the Pacific Rim which would turn the region into a multipolar version of Cold War Europe. The Spratley Islands, sea laneconflicts, and competing resource claims could much more easily turn into open war if the region were to becomethis sort of armed camp. The ethnic differences and historical animosities would exacerbate this effect and makewar much more likely.

Asian arms races escalate to nuclear conflictCimbala 8 (Stephen J.-, March, Comparative Strategy, Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis Stability in FutureAsia, Vol. 27 #2, Informaworld)

The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. States withnuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into amatrix of complex political, social, and cultural crosscurrents contributory to the possibility of war. Inaddition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatenedby regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of

the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversionthat marked the Cold War, in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold Warsuperpowers no longer exists, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or globalrespect.12 The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear-capable delivery systems in Asia, or in theMiddle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live closetogether and are already engaged in ongoing disputesabout territory or other issues.13 The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airbornedelivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one anothers vitals. But short-range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially

strategic effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with China and NorthKorea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on . Theshort flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that verylittle time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed

missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing over thehorizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to thechallenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asiamay also have first strikevulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision pressuresfor rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation. This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventionalwisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policymakers and academic theorists. Forpolicymakers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asiacould profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentiethcentury) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).14 This would profoundly shakeup prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passe, on account of the emergence of the Revolution inMilitary Affairs and its encouragement of information-based warfare.15 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large-scale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of

unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.16 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could

overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare .

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Japan re-arm causes Asian arms race and proliferationHalloran Military Correspondent NYT 9 (Richard-, May 24, Real Clear Politics, The Dangers of a NuclearJapan, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/ 2009/05/24/nuclear_japan_96638.html)

That anxiety has reinvigorated a debate about whether Japan should acquire a nuclear deterrent of its

own and reduce its reliance on the US. Japan has the technology, finances, industrial capacity, and skilled personnel to builda nuclear force, although it would be costly and take many years. The consequences of that decision would beearthshaking. It would likely cause opponents to riot in the streets and could bring down a government. SouthKorea, having sought at least once to acquire nuclear weapons, would almost certainly do so. Any hopeof dissuading North Korea from building a nuclear force would disappear. China would redouble itsnuclear programs. And for the only nation ever to experience atomic bombing to acquire nuclear armswould surely shatter the already fragile international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The main reasonJapan has not acquired nuclear arms so far has been a lack of political will . After the atomic bombings ofHiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the Japanese experienced a deep-seated nuclear allergy. That and the threat from the Soviet

Union during the Cold War kept Japan huddled under the US nuclear umbrella. Today, Japanese fear North Korea,which is developing nuclear weapons and has test fired missiles over Japan. Longer run, Japan casts wary eyes onChina's expanding nuclear arsenal and is again fearful of a revived nuclear threat from Russia .

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Impact Indo-Pak Arms Race 1/2

Japanese rearm would be rapid and cause India/Pakistan arms racesKunii 03 (Irene M.-, Jan. 20, Business Week, Why Japan Just Might Build Nukes, Number 3816, P. 22, Lexis)

But if Japan decides to build its own nukes, get ready for an Asian arms race . China would likely want toboost its arsenal, which would prompt India to develop more nuclear weapons , which would spur

Pakistan to do the same -- and on and on into an ever more perilous future.

Unintentional nuclear exchangeRajaraman, Theoretical Physics Professor at Jawaharlal Nehru, 2 (November, Nuclear Weapons inSouth Asia Risks and Their Reduction Pugwash Workshop on South Asian Security,www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/Rajaraman.pdf)The point is not that our own early warning systems in India will also be prone to false alarms. In fact we will probably nothave the luxury of even such a fallible early warning system. This is not just because of the costs involved but also because of

geography. The missile travel time between Pakistan and India is only about 5 minutes far too short a timeto provide any meaningful warning. (Bombs delivered by planes will take longer, but that is offset by the difficulty in

spotting the bombers carrying nuclear weapons from the dozens of other similar planes in action during wartime.) Onewould therefore have to settle for indirect indicators that give a little more time to react things like

signs of unusual activity at missile launch sites . airfields and nuclear ammunition depots of the enemy, intelligencereports of their military plans and political intentions and so on. These can yield at best secondary evidence of animpending attack, much less concrete and more amenable to misinterpretation. A very plausible scenariois one where, at a time of wartime crisis, such indirect evidence suddenly peaks to a crescendo and pointstowards an imminent nuclear attack. Such evidence may be very strongly indicative, but it is unlikely to be onehundred percent certain. One can imagine the extraordinary dilemma that the country's political leadershipwould then face. They may find themselves under immense pressure from the more hawkish elementsamong them and the military to launch a preventive attack within a matter of hours if not minutes. Notwithstandingany declarations of No First Use. and no matter how responsible the leadership is or how conscious they are ofthe gravity of a wrong decision it is still hard to imagine them just sitting on their hands and waiting forthe bombs from the other side to land before retaliating. Herein lies the serious risk of circumstances

forcing a hasty panic-driven nuclear attack in response to a perceived threat that may eventually turn out tohave been false.The pressure to launch a preventive attack would be all the more intense if missiles and bombers loadedwith nuclear weapons were already fully deployed and ready to take off in minutes . When such f ire-pow er is kept primed day after day, ready to be used any moment , it is itching to be fired. The mereavailability of such capability generates a momentum of its own to the decision making process. There is very little doubt thatthe decision to drop the bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki was in part influenced by the fact that the bombs, only recentlyfabricated after a massive military and scientific effort, were sitting there, waiting to be tested over a "real target".

Finally, the fact that the antagonist also carries a similar nuclear arsenal with very similar risks, increasesthe danger many-fold. What may be viewed as a purely deterrent weapon by one side cannot, if kept in a state of ready-to-fire alert, be distinguished by the other side from a capability mounted to make a surprise first attack. Each side, inevaluating the threat from the other, will not only have to consider the likelihood of a deliberate attack, but

also factor in the possibility of inadvertent, unauthorised or hasty crisis driven attacks. Such increasedperceptions of threat can bounce back and forth between the strategic calculations of the two countries ,getting magnified in the process.

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Impact Indo-Pak Arms Race 2/2

And, Indo-Pak war causes extinctionFox, Independent Journalist 8 (Maggie, April 8, India-Pakistan Nuclear War Would Cause Ozone Holehttp://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/47829/story.htm)

WASHINGTON - Nuclear war between India and Pakistan would cause more than slaughter and

destruction -- it would knock a big hole in the ozone layer, affecting crops, animals and peopleworldwide, US researchers said on Monday. Fires from burning cities would send 5 million metric tonnes ofsoot or more into the lowest part of Earth's atmosphere known as the troposphere, and heat from the sun wouldcarry these blackened particles into the stratosphere, the team at the University of Colorado reported. "The sunlightreally heats it up and sends it up to the top of the stratosphere," said Michael Mills of the Laboratory for Atmospheric and

Space Physics, who chose India and Pakistan as one of several possible examples. Up there, the soot would absorbradiation from the sun and heat surrounding gases, causing chemical reactions that break down ozone."We find column ozone losses in excess of 20 percent globally, 25 percent to 45 percent at midlatitudes, and 50percent to 70 percent at northern high latitudes persisting for five years, with substantial losses continuing for fiveadditional years," Mills' team wrote in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. This would let in enoughultraviolet radiation to cause cancer, damage eyes and skin, damage crops and other plants and injure animals. Mills andcolleagues based their computer model on other research on how much fire would be produced by a regional nuclear conflict.

"Certainly there is a growing number of large nuclear-armed states that have a growing number of weapons. This could betypical of what you might see," Mills said in a telephone interview. SMOKE IS KEY Eight nations areknown to have nuclear weapons, and Pakistan and India are believed to have at least 50 weapons apiece,each with the power of the weapon the United States used to destroy Hiroshima in 1945. Mills said the studyadded a new factor to the worries about what might damage the world's ozone layer, as well as to research about the effects of

even a limited nuclear exchange. "The smoke is the key and it is coming from these firestorms that build upactually several hours after the explosions," he said. "We are talking about modern megacities that havea lot of material in them that would burn. We saw these kinds of megafires in World War Two inDresden and Tokyo. The difference is we are talking about a large number of cities that would be bombed within a fewdays." Nothing natural could create this much black smoke in the same way, Mill noted. Volcanic ash, dust and smoke is of adifferent nature, for example, and forest fires are not big or hot enough. The University of Colorado's Brian Toon, who also

worked on the study, said the damage to the ozone layer would be worse than what has been predicted by

"nuclear winter" and "ultraviolet spring" scenarios. "The big surprise is that this study demonstrates that a small-scale, regional nuclear conflict is capable of triggering ozone losses even larger than losses that werepredicted following a full-scale nuclear war," Toon said in a statement.

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Impact Sino-Japan War

Japan re-arm causes Sino-Japanese warXinbo, IR Professor at the Center for American Studies, 6 (Wu, Winter, The End of the Silver Lining: AChinese View of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance Washington Quarterly, Vol 29 No 1, p 119-130)Since the end of the Cold War, Japan has come a long way to becoming a major military player. It maintains one of the mostmodernized armies in the world and continues to expand its military capability. Since 1992, it has en- acted 21 major pieces

of security-related legislationnine in 2004 alone legitimizing and legalizing sending military forces abroad. Japan isdrifting away from pacifism, driven partly by its evolving domestic politics and partly by the United States. As one U.S.expert on Japan noted, Since the end of the Cold War in 1991 and particularly under the administration of George W. Bush,

the United States has been doing everything in its power to encourage and even accelerate Japaneserearmament. Such a development promotes hostility between China and Japan, the two superpowers ofEast Asia.15 This has given rise to strong Chinese concern over U.S. strategic intentions toward China,as well as the mission of the U.S.-Japanese alliance in todays security environment.

Nuclear warBrzezinski 04 (Former Sect. Of State) 2004 [Zbigniew, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership,Perseus, New York)

How the power dynamics in the Far East are shaped by the interrelationship among America, Japan, and Chinawill also affect global stability. The United States should seek to translate the emerging equilibriumamong itself, Japan, and China into a more structured security relationship. Geopolitically, Asia roughlyresembles Europe prior to World War I. America has stabilized Europe but it still faces a potential structural crisis inAsia, where several major powers still contend, though checked by Americas peripheral strategic presence. That presence isanchored by the American-Japanese connection, hut the rise of a regionally dominant China and the unpredictability of NorthKorea signal the need for a more active U.S. policy to promote, at a minimum, a triangular security relationship. As arguedearlier, such a triangular equilibrium, to be enduring, will require a more internationally engaged Japan that will havegradually assumed a wider range of military responsibilities. Creating this equilibrium might entail, in turn, fostering a trans -

Eurasian multilateral security structure for coping with the novel dimensions of global security. Failure to engage Chinaand Japan in at least a de facto security structure could eventually trigger a dangerous tectonic shift,perhaps involving the unilateral remilitarization of Japan, which already has the potential to very quicklybecome a nuclear power, in addition to the already grave challenge posed by North Koreas quest for anuclear arsenal of its own, The need for a collective regional response to North Korea reinforces the more general pointthat only a co-optive American hegemony can cope effectively with the increasingly pervasive spread of weaponry of massdestruction, whether among states or extremist organizations. [P. 226-227]

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Impact North Korea

Japanes re-arm causes North Korean instabilityTamamoto Sr. Fellow World Policy Institute Fall 09 (Masaru-, World Policy Journal, The Emperors NewClothes Can Japan Live Without the Bomb?, Vol. 26 #3,http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/wopj.2009.26.3.63?cookieSet=1)

If Tokyo were to embark on a nuclear program, the historical antagonism between Japan and NorthKorea would only contribute to provoking Pyongyang in a manner the international community is tryingso hard to avoid. Any escalation of the threat carries the danger of breaking down deterrence . So, evenamong Tokyos hawks, a nuclear Japan, propelled by fear of abandonment and North Korean belligerence, makes littlesecurity sense.

North Korean nuclearization causes global prolif and nuclear instability.Huntley, director-Simons Center, 05 (Wade, director of the Simons Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Research, North Korea & the NPT, May 5, 2005, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/1190)

North Koreas reinvigorated nuclear program provides Pyongyang with the capability to fuelproliferation fires worldwide by exporting fissile materials, nuclear weapons development technologiesand expertise, or even completed operational weapons. This potential , highlighted by recent questions as to

whether uranium discovered in Libya might have originated in North Korea,5 constitutes probably the greatest directthreat that a nuclear North Korea poses to the NPT and to global nuclear stability.

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Impact Nanotechnology

Japan will deploy offensive nanotechnology risking extinctionHuang 3 (Joseph-, The Coming War with Japan!, www.hope-of-israel.org/japwar.htm)

Japan is already more militarized than most Americans and Australians think. Its wealth could quicklybecome a means to build one of the world's most technologically advanced arms industries in a short

time. Over the next decade, Japan will evolve a new generation of military technology easily convertible from defense tooffense.A 'Star Wars' type system is another possibility. Having brought Japan into the initial stages of Star Wars research, the United States may abandon the programs as too costly, especially with the end of the coldwar, a new administration under the Democrats, and a growing deficit to worry about. Japan, with its combination of high technologies and financial resources, will be quite willing to develop and perfect sucha system.

Japan is known for its ability to adapt technology for its own use, especially in miniaturising high-techproducts, ranging from camera, television, video camera, motor vehicle and electronics. Japan is reportedly ahead inthe field of nanotechnology. When this new technology is combined with artificial intelligence , theeffect could be more dreadful than nuclear weapons !!New Weapon Technology

In an eye-opening book, titled Engines of Creation by K. EricDrexler, the author explains the coming revolution inmachine building, a new-found technology thatwill enable us to construct machines a thousand times smaller than amicrochip, or the same size as an enzyme. This field of technology is called 'nanotechnology' (nano means the billionth

part), and could be used to revolutionize research into all areas of our lives from within the heart of the living cell tothe depths of space itself.The machines or molecular assemblers will be able to analyze and construct virtually anything that can be conceived, atomic layer by atomic layer. Machines might be programmed, for example, to enterindividual cells and repair damage or destroy diseases, even prevent the very process of aging. Similarly, small machines could be sent into outer space to construct spaceships or complex scientific equipmentout of basic ingredients that need be nothing more than earth and air. Once they control the machine tools and combine with a system of artificial intelligence to automate engineering, final products could flowforth almost like magic!Deadlier than Nuclear Weapons

Writing on nanotechnology, Drexler warns,

Replicators can be more potent than nuclear weapons: to devastate Earth with bombs would requiremasses of exotic hardware and rare isotopes, but to destroy all life with replicators would require only asingle speck made of ordinary elements . Replicators give nuclear war some company as a potentialcause of extinction, giving a broader context to extinction as a moral concern" (Engines of Creation,pp.174).

Escalation to nuclear war is likelyGubrud Center for Superconductivity Research 97 (Mark Avrum-, Fifth Foresight Conference onMolecular Nanotechnology, Nanotechnology and International Security,http://www.foresight.org/Conferences/MNT05/Papers/Gubrud/index.html)

The greatest danger coincides with the emergence of these powerful technologies: A quickening succession of"revolutions" may spark a new arms race involving a number of potential competitors . Older systems,including nuclear weapons, would become vulnerable to novel forms of attack or neutralization. Rapidly evolving, untested,

secret, and even "virtual" arsenals would undermine confidence in the ability to retaliate or resistaggression. Warning and decision times would shrink. Covert infiltration of intelligence and sabotage deviceswould blur the distinction between confrontation and war. Overt deployment of ultramodern weapons, perhaps ona massive scale, would alarm technological laggards. Actual and perceived power balances would shiftdramatically and abruptly. Accompanied by economic upheaval, general uncertainty and disputes over the future of major

resources and of humanity itself, such a runaway crisis would likely erupt into large-scale rearmament andwarfare well before another technological plateau was reached.International regimes combining arms control, verification and transparency, collective security and limited militarycapabilities, can be proposed in order to maintain stability. However, these would require unprecedented levels of

cooperation and restraint, and would be prone to collapse if nations persist in challenging each other withthreats of force.

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If we believe that assemblers are feasible, perhaps the most important implication is this: Ultimately, we will need an

integrated international security system. For the present, failure to consider alternatives to unilateral "peacethrough strength" puts us on a course toward the next world war .

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Impact Japan Economy 1/3

Japanese re-arm crushes Japanese economyMorgan 99 (Robert-, RFI Analysis: Clinton's China Policy: Unintended Consequences,http://www.pelagius.com/AppleRecon/monsoon.html)

It's no longer a joking matter or a discussion relegated to the likes of Japanese Nationalists over whether Japan should re-

arm in order to defend itself from aggression. It's being whispered and discussed as a possible necessity inlight of the Clinton Administration's caving in to China over defending them from Chinese or North Korean missiles.Suddenly, there is talk about having to increase defense spending and re-arming for "self-defense ," which isallowed under Japan's Constitution. How long would it take for the Japanese to build nuclear weapons? Missiles? Not long.Missile defenses? Not too long. Extremely expensive yes. Long? No.

That will have consequences. The Japanese will need hard currency to make the appropriate purchases , etc. It'sno longer a matter of national pride but survival. Therefore, they will need those Dollars in their massiveDollar reserves as well as those Dollars currently locked into Treasuries. If they have to, they will usethose reserves in order to finance their national defense. And to hell with the U.S. and the impacts that itwould have on the American economy and markets. Defense contractors might have salad days, but the rippleeffects throughout the rest of the U.S. economy and markets would be disastrous.If the Japanese have to re-arm to protect themselves, and therefore repatriate even more capital to

finance it then the Bond would tank and rates would rise . It takes a lot of money to build and deploy a nationaldefense that has been minimal all these years. And while those Dollars would be used to buy and manufacture tangible goods,

the impacts it would have on the Japanese economy might not be as stimulative as some might think .Yes, the "unthinkable" has become the thinkable in Japan now.

And as the Bond tanks so will the U.S. markets . Flight to quality and safety would be the norm. But even then itwouldn't prove to be safe as rates would continue to rise. And those higher interest rates would also stall the U.S. economywith the aforementioned exceptions. Think Japan in the '90s.

Don't take this lightly, or as our engaging in gloom and doom scenarios. Think of the massive build upthe United States had to undergo during World War II. Think of the expenditures the U.S. had to undergo duringWorld War I and the resultant inflation. Think of all the treasure that was expended during the Cold War and the coststhat it inflicted. Not to mention the inflation that it caused. Yes, the economy and markets flourished for the most part duringthe Cold War but it came at a high cost. Don't expect history to repeat itself if Japan has to re-arm. And we wouldn't blame

them if they did.This potential "arms race" and "New Cold War" could cause a huge disruption in the global economyand both Japan's and the United States' economies are inextricably linked. Some would dispute that assertion,but we disagree. If Japan has to re-arm it would have very negative consequences in the U.S. and the entireglobe.

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Japanese economic collapse causes Asian instability and collapses trade and democracyAuslin, American Enterprise Institute, 9 (Michael, February 17, Japans Downturn is Bad for the WorldWall Street Journal)

If Japan's economy collapses, supply chains across the globe will be affected and numerous economies will face

severe disruptions, most notably China's. China is currently Japan's largest import provider, and the Japaneseslowdown is creating tremendous pressure on Chinese factories. Just last week, the Chinese governmentannounced that 20 million rural migrants had lost their jobs. Closer to home, Japan may also start running out ofsurplus cash, which it has used to purchase U.S. securities for years. For the first time in a generation, Tokyo is runningtrade deficits -- five months in a row so far. The political and social fallout from a Japanese depression alsowould be devastating. In the face of economic instability, other Asian nations may feel forced to turn tomore centralized -- even authoritarian -- control to try to limit the damage. Free-trade agreements may be rolledback and political freedom curtailed. Social stability in emerging, middle-class societies will be severely tested,and newly democratized states may find it impossible to maintain power. Progress toward a more open,integrated Asia is at risk, with the potential for increased political tension in the world's most heavilyarmed region.

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Asian economic stagnation causes global conflict escalationAuslin, American Enterprise Institute, 9 (Michael, February 6, Averting Disaster Daily Standard,http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.29339/pub_detail.asp)

As they deal with a collapsing world economy, policymakers in Washington and around the globe must not forget that when

a depression strikes, war can follow. Nowhere is this truer than in Asia, the most heavily armed regionon earth and riven with ancient hatreds and territorial rivalries. Collapsing trade flows can lead topolitical tension, nationalist outbursts, growing distrust, and ultimately, military miscalculation. Theresult would be disaster on top of an already dire situation . Asia's political infrastructure may not bestrong enough to resist the slide towards confrontation and conflict. No one should think that Asia is on the vergeof conflict. But it is also important to remember what has helped keep the peace in this region for so long.Phenomenal growth rates in Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, China and elsewhere since the 1960s havenaturally turned national attention inward, to development and stability. This has gradually led to increased politicalconfidence, diplomatic initiatives, and in many nations the move toward more democratic systems. America hasdirectly benefited as well, and not merely from years of lower consumer prices, but also from the general conditions of peace

in Asia. Yet policymakers need to remember that even during these decades of growth, moments of economic shock, suchas the 1973 Oil Crisis, led to instability and bursts of terrorist activity in Japan, while the uneven pace of growthin China has led to tens of thousands of armed clashes in the poor interior of the country. Now imagine suchinstability multiplied region-wide. The economic collapse Japan is facing, and China's potentialslowdown, dwarfs any previous economic troubles, including the 1998 Asian Currency Crisis. Newly urbanizedworkers rioting for jobs or living wages, conflict over natural resources, further saber-rattling fromNorth Korea, all can take on lives of their own. This is the nightmare of governments in the region , andparticularly of democracies from newer ones like Thailand and Mongolia to established states like Japan and South Korea.

How will overburdened political leaders react to internal unrest? What happens if Chinese shopkeepersin Indonesia are attacked, or a Japanese naval ship collides with a Korean fishing vessel? Quite simply,Asia's political infrastructure may not be strong enough to resist the slide towards confrontation andconflict. This would be a political and humanitarian disaster turning the clock back decades in Asia. Itwould almost certainly drag America in at some point, as well. First of all, we have alliance

responsibilities to Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines should any of them come underarmed attack. Failure on our part to live up to those responsibilities could mean the end of America'scredibility in Asia. Secondly, peace in Asia has been kept in good measure by the continued U.S. militarypresence since World War II. There have been terrible localized conflicts, of course, but nothing approaching asystemic conflagration like the 1940s. Today, such a conflict would be far more bloody, and it is unclear if theAmerican military, already stretched too thin by wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, could contain the crisis .Nor is it clear that the American people, worn out from war and economic distress, would be willing to shed even more blood

and treasure for lands across the ocean. The result could be a historic changing of the geopolitical map in theworld's most populous region. Perhaps China would emerge as the undisputed hegemon. Possiblydemocracies like Japan and South Korea would link up to oppose any aggressor. India might decide itcould move into the vacuum. All of this is guess-work, of course, but it has happened repeatedly throughout history.

There is no reason to believe we are immune from the same types of miscalculation and greed that havedestroyed international systems in the past. Here are some things America, its allies, and all interested nations in Asia can doto mitigate the possibility of the worst happening. The United States will have an opportunity to arrange a meeting of theregion's top leaders on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Singapore later this year. There, President Obama might expresshis determination to intervene at the first sign of possible conflict--even if that means putting U.S. forces in between shipsaiming their guns at each other. President Obama might also establish an Asia crisis ad hoc committee in Washington, at theNational Security Council, to keep tabs on possible flare-ups. This could be replicated in the region by an ad hoc mechanismtied to the ASEAN secretariat that would allow for immediate discussions between parties in confrontation. Working withJapan, Australia, and China, the United States can also establish clear procedures to limit humanitarian crises that erupt frominternal instability in Asian countries. Perhaps most important, Washington must get clear assurances from its allies that they

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will stand with us should hostilities erupt and that any aggressor will be met with a united front. None of this may be needed.

Decades of economic integration and political discussion have made Asia a far more peaceful place. Butwar, like politics, is local. The pain being felt in Asian countries, their sense of national honor, and fears about theirfuture, may coalesce into a toxic brew. Without preparation now, the world may be paying the price foryears to come.

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Impact US Economy 1/2

Japanese re-arm crushes the U.S. economyMorgan 99 (Robert-, RFI Analysis: Clinton's China Policy: Unintended Consequences,http://www.pelagius.com/AppleRecon/monsoon.html)

It's no longer a joking matter or a discussion relegated to the likes of Japanese Nationalists over whether Japan should re-

arm in order to defend itself from aggression. It's being whispered and discussed as a possible necessity inlight of the Clinton Administration's caving in to China over defending them from Chinese or North Korean missiles.Suddenly, there is talk about having to increase defense spending and re-arming for "self-defense ," which isallowed under Japan's Constitution. How long would it take for the Japanese to build nuclear weapons? Missiles? Not long.Missile defenses? Not too long. Extremely expensive yes. Long? No.

That will have consequences. The Japanese will need hard currency to make the appropriate purchases , etc. It'sno longer a matter of national pride but survival. Therefore, they will need those Dollars in their massiveDollar reserves as well as those Dollars currently locked into Treasuries. If they have to, they will usethose reserves in order to finance their national defense. And to hell with the U.S. and the impacts that itwould have on the American economy and markets. Defense contractors might have salad days, but the rippleeffects throughout the rest of the U.S. economy and markets would be disastrous.If the Japanese have to re-arm to protect themselves, and therefore repatriate even more capital to

finance it then the Bond would tank and rates would rise . It takes a lot of money to build and deploy a nationaldefense that has been minimal all these years. And while those Dollars would be used to buy and manufacture tangible goods,

the impacts it would have on the Japanese economy might not be as stimulative as some might think .Yes, the "unthinkable" has become the thinkable in Japan now.

And as the Bond tanks so will the U.S. markets . Flight to quality and safety would be the norm. But even then itwouldn't prove to be safe as rates would continue to rise. And those higher interest rates would also stall the U.S. economywith the aforementioned exceptions. Think Japan in the '90s.

Don't take this lightly, or as our engaging in gloom and doom scenarios. Think of the massive build upthe United States had to undergo during World War II. Think of the expenditures the U.S. had to undergo duringWorld War I and the resultant inflation. Think of all the treasure that was expended during the Cold War and the coststhat it inflicted. Not to mention the inflation that it caused. Yes, the economy and markets flourished for the most part duringthe Cold War but it came at a high cost. Don't expect history to repeat itself if Japan has to re-arm. And we wouldn't blame

them if they did.This potential "arms race" and "New Cold War" could cause a huge disruption in the global economyand both Japan's and the United States' economies are inextricably linked. Some would dispute that assertion,but we disagree. If Japan has to re-arm it would have very negative consequences in the U.S. and the entireglobe.

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Impact Timeframe = Immediate

Loss of the credibility of U.S. deterrence causes Japanese prolif and destabilizing Asian arms racesin 30 daysRowe 95 (Stephen C.-, Ph D Candidate Chicago, April 15, The Negative Effects of Minimal Deterrence on theProliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, http://synapticstorm.org/thesis.html#N_67_)

"The rule of thumb among nuclear experts in Washington is that Japan could produce a nuclear device in 30 days ifit so chose." - Larry Pressler, Washington Times, January 11, 1994.Should Japan decide to move in such a direction, it could well be disastrous. A nuclear Japan would threaten many ofits neighbors who still vividly remember what Japan did to them during World War II. They may decideto pursue nuclear weapons to counter the Japanese threat. What would result is the simultaneousdestabilization of the region's security balance and a race for nuclear weapons.(68)

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A2: No Re-arm Perception Link

Even if Japan doesnt nuclearize controversy causes an arms raceBakanic MA International Affairs Princeton 8 (Elizabeth D.-, June 9, The end of Japan's nuclear taboo,http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-end-of-japans-nuclear-taboo)All that said, by no means is Japan on the road to nuclear weapons development--or even considering it as a serious option.

Technically speaking, Japan has several huge constraints to nuclear weapons development--see "PreventingNuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt" PDF and "Japan's Nuclear Future: Policy Debate,Prospects, and U.S. Interests." PDF

So why should the world be concerned about Japan's fading nuclear allergy? Because Tokyo's attitudetoward nuclear weapons is incredibly important to Japan's neighbors and the nonproliferation regime,meaning subtle changes in its attitude could carry serious security consequences for both.Historically, Japan has maintained complicated relations with many of its neighbors--specifically China,North Korea, and South Korea. While functional relationships do exist, deep mistrust and suspicions persist,creating a paranoid security environment where an innocuous change from an outside perspective setsoff alarm bells in the region. So what may seem like a natural shift in Japan's nuclear attitudes may be adestabilizing change for those less trustful and less objective . Therefore, if discussing nuclear weaponsbecomes more acceptable in Japan, China and the Koreas might perceive this as a dangerous

development and use it as an excuse to increase their military capabilities--nuclear or otherwise .In terms of the teetering nonproliferation regime, a change in Japan's attitude toward nuclear weapons would bea serious blow. To date, Tokyo has been a foremost advocate of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,campaigning against proliferation and rejecting the idea of developing nuclear weapons despite possessing the best nuclear

capability of any non-nuclear weapon state and having two nuclear weapon states near its borders . The binding nature ofinternational agreements relies on such attention and support from its signatories. So although Japan maynever violate the treaty, if Tokyo is perceived as being less supportive as it opens up domestically on thenuclear issue, the effect on NPT morale could be dire , which speaks directly to the NPT's current vulnerability.Some element of the changing attitude toward nuclear weapons in Japan must be due to discomfort with the status quo and asecurity need that the NPT or the country's other security partnerships isn't satisfying. Therefore, a disturbing factor ofJapan's nuclear normalization is what it may symbolize for the NPT overall.

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A2: No Re-arm Technical Barriers

No technical barriers to Japanese Re-armMatsumura Fellow Brookings 6(Masahiro-, Nov. 10, The Brookings Institution, Prudence and Realism in Japan's Nuclear Options,http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2006/1110japan_matsumura.aspx )

The world is watching Japan's reaction to North Korea's nuclear test for signs that it may go nuclear itself. Japan, already avirtual nuclear superpower, could build an arsenal ranked only behind the U.S. and Russia. It possessesplenty of fissile material, and its space program's advanced rockets could easily be converted to carrynuclear payloads. The nation also clearly has the financial capacity to join the nuclear club . Finally,Japan's pacifist Constitution could be interpreted to tolerate the possession of nuclear weapons for purelydefensive objectives, or for deterrence by retaliation.

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A2: No Re-arm DPJ

DPJ doesnt solve the risk of prolif- public concern still drives their security motivations.Wittner 09 (Lawrence, prof of history at SUNY-Albany, Japan's Election and Anti-Nuclear Momentum,http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/22524)

At the moment, the degree to which the Japanese elections will increase the clout of this burgeoning

nuclear abolition campaign remains uncertain. The DPJ faces a number of challenges if it is toimplement its nuclear-free promises. Although public sentiment in Japan is strongly antinuclear, there is also arising fear of North Korea's nuclear program - a fact that might lead to an erosion of the newadministration's nuclear-free doctrine. Compromise on maintaining a nuclear-free Japan is alluring, as Japan has thescientific and technological capability to produce nuclear weapons easily and quickly. Furthermore, many Japanese (andparticularly LDP members), though uneasy about Japan's development of nuclear weapons, feel comfortableunder the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Thus, they might resist international efforts to create a nuclear-freeworld.

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A2: No Re-arm Public 1/2

Japanese public willing to re-arm because of North KoreaEbrey, History Professor at UWash, 9 (Patricia, Modern East Asia from 1600: A Cultural, Social, andPolitical History p 528)

Japan's fear of North Koreas nuclear weapons and missiles has pushed public sentiment toward

rearmament and nuclear weapons. Six hundred books have been published on North Korea in Japan, most of thimextremely hostile. Initial attempts to negotiate with North Korea to pay reparations for the damage done by Japanesecolonialism backfired when Kim Jong II admitted kidnapping Japanese as a means of recruiting Japanese language

instructors. The public, the media, and Japanese nationalists have responded with demands for a hard lineagainst North Koreano peace treaty, no economic aid without a full accounting of all the abductees.Nationalists also argue that until Japan has a legitimate military, it will not be a truly independent nation.

Calls for re-arm increasingTakai Fmr. Researcher Military Science JSDF Staff College 9-11 (Mitsuo-, JSDF = Japan Self-DefenseForce, UPI Asia, Japan's priority: Non-nuclear conventional weaponshttp://www.upiasia.com/Politics/2009/09/11/japans_priority_non-nuclear_conventional_weapons/1755)Against the backdrop of China's rapid military buildup, there are rising voices in Japan arguing in favor of nuclear armament

a hitherto unthinkable option in the only nation that has ever suffered a nuclear catastrophe in hum

cndi japan re arm disadvantage

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