classic diplomacy in the information age

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Classic Diplomacy in the Information Age

July/August 2001Stanley HoffmannStanley Hoffmann is Buttenwieser University Professor at Harvard University and reviews bookson western Europe for Foreign Affairs.

In June 2000, France's foreign minister, Hubert Vedrine, published Les cartes de la France al'heure de la mondialisation to address questions about French diplomacy. His interviewer wasDominique Moisi, editor of Politique etrangere and deputy director of the Institut Francais desRelations Internationales -- France's equivalents of Foreign Affairs and the Council on ForeignRelations, respectively. The statements of Vedrine, who had also been the secretary-general ofthe French presidency under Francois Mitterrand, are interesting for two reasons: first, theyproject light on some very controversial policies; and second, they reveal a style of intelligentforeign policy analysis and lucid detachment that is rare among heads of state and academicstoday. This is one of the reasons why the reader is often reminded of Henry Kissinger. Moisi'squestions are probing, and he never hesitates to indicate the disagreements between himselfand Vedrine. Thanks to Moisi's polite provocations, the foreign minister's cool discourse often

heats up.

The American edition, admirably translated by Philip Gordon, goes even further than theFrench version. It includes a fresh discussion of events since last year, such as the EuropeanUnion (EU) summit in Nice last December; Vedrine defends rather convincingly France'sconduct at the summit, which came under wide criticism. The American version also contains aspirited (if oblique) reply to Tony Judt's vinegary review of the French edition in The New YorkReview of Books last April.

The book does not offer a detailed analysis of French diplomacy per se. Rather, it assessesFrance's situation and objectives in a world in which the state's importance as a global actor

has diminished. Two concerns dominate the book: the continuity of French foreign policy andthe United States' weight in world affairs. Following the principles drawn up more than 40 yearsago by Charles de Gaulle, France continues to insist on the role of a major international actor.Indeed, both the left and the right agree on this ambition, which has made political cooperationbetween President Jacques Chirac, a neo-Gaullist, and Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, a socialist,quite easy in foreign affairs. This continuity also still irritates those "Anglo-Saxon" commentatorswho believe that France's defeat in 1940 should have cured it of its ambition to retain a globalrole. Indeed, "Anglo-Saxon" continuity in dismissive irritation is as tenacious as Frenchcontinuity in obstinate and distinctive ambition.

On the subject of the United States, Vedrine is in fact much more subtle than many otherFrench commentators. He rightly points out that globalization operates in a framework favorableto Americans, thanks to the size of the U.S. economy, the use of English, American free-marketprinciples, America's "mastery of global images," and its "technological and cultural creativity."But he explicitly dismisses the view that globalization is "the completion of an American plan."

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Although the United States' "soft power" complements its "hard power," he argues, its ability tocompel others is sharply limited by two constraints: "the natural indifference of a people who,sheltered by their geography and their power, feel self-sufficient," and a political system "tornbetween isolationism and hegemony."

Vedrine is more critical of other aspects of U.S. policy such as missile defense, which he viewsas an irrational American obsession that will provoke a new arms race. He also takes aim atAmerica's cultural preponderance in globalization, including its desire to treat cultural goods as

if they were ordinary products or services. "The United States is on its way to becoming a globalMicrosoft when it comes to the mass culture business," he warns. Nevertheless, he eloquentlypraises Bill Clinton, and he insists on distinguishing anti-Americanism, which he rejects, fromthe desire of France and Europe to preserve their distinctiveness -- "allied but not aligned."

THE NEW COLONIALISM?

Vedrine's vision of globalization is original and far from effusive. Globalization may not be goodfor democracy, he believes, because it is not necessarily adopted democratically. (Colonialexpansion, he repeatedly points out, was the first form of globalization.) Its embryonicinternational civil society is made up not of elected representatives but of active minority

interests of the most powerful countries. But even though globalization is not an unmitigatedblessing for the poor and the weak, neither is it necessarily a boon for France. Its definingfeatures -- market neoliberalism, mistrust of big government, and excessive individualism --correspond to neither French tradition nor French culture. With an identity built on its centralstate, he points out, "France must make an exceptional effort to adapt."

Yet while France adapts, Vedrine continues, it also must act as a "civilizer" that counters thedark side of globalization's free-market ideology and the new threats of the post-Cold Warworld: weapons of mass destruction, organized crime syndicates, and terrorism. Hence hemakes a plea for more rules and regulations -- which can come only from states, not frominternational civil society -- and greater solidarity and economic fairness among nations. (Here,too, his socialist discourse is remarkably Gaul list.)

Globalization also needs to be contained in the one crucial domain of culture, Vedrine argues.No French speaker will find surprising his defense of the French language, the "genetic code"of his country. He does not mean this as an insult to other languages. Rather, he seeslanguage as the cement of French unity, a role similar to the one played by the U.S.Constitution for Americans. Furthermore, Vedrine's plea for cultural diversity and a robustFrench cultural policy is one that Americans should have the imagination to accept. Would theyreact any differently if, say, the Chinese language dominated the Internet, world business,politics, and culture?

Unfortunately, Vedrine does not say enough about French policy in Africa -- perhaps becausehe is in a difficult position to do so. He cannot -- and does not wish to -- endorse past practicesthat were shockingly undemocratic and corrupt, including those under Mitterrand. Nor doesVedrine want to condemn these policies publicly, since he had served as Mitterrand's aide andremains Chirac's foreign minister. But he is more explicit and persuasive on the Arab-Israeliconflict. Calling for a real EU policy, he asks the Israelis to understand that they need to accepta "genuinely viable Palestinian state" and the Palestinians to understand the deep Israeli needfor security; he also praises Clinton's active intermediary role as "essential and extraordinary."

L'EUROPE, C'EST NOUS

On globalization and the Franco-American relationship, in short, Vedrine is quintessentiallyFrench. On Europe, however, Vedrine takes a more pragmatic course. He defends EUenlargement as necessary and rightly argues (contrary to critics such as Judt) that Mitterranddid not try in 1991 to keep eastern Europe out of the EU, in a permanent limbo, with his


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"confederation" proposal. But Vedrine erroneously blames Czechoslovakia's president, VaclavHavel, for this fiasco, rather than the proposal's faulty formulation, which included Russia butexcluded the United States.

Vedrine is also right that a 27-member EU will be a very different entity from today's 15-memberorganization. It will need far less byzantine institutions and much greater diversity in the linksamong the members. Vedrine is quite explicit on the latter subject, preferring "variablegeometry" (different participants for different functions) over the idea of a "core" surrounded by

less-integrated countries. But he has very little to say about what kind of institutional designwould fit his kind of Europe, and he provides no encouragement to the "Federalists," who nowinclude German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and German Chancellor Gerhard Schrder.Although he acknowledges the meaninglessness of monetary sovereignty for EU members(especially the non-Germans), he defends their right to conduct their own foreign policies. Ashe sees it, a single monetary policy will coexist with a common (but not single) foreign policythat "orchestrates" the diverse views of its members -- whose viewpoints about European-American relations are too divergent to come down to a single approach.

Vedrine's rather lukewarm stance on European integration may result from his conviction thatthe EU has done little to enhance France's power since the early 1990s, even with Germanunification aside. On Germany, his discussion is also devoid of illusions. He sees the Franco-German partnership as less harmonious than before, but he acknowledges that cooperationbetween the two remains necessary, if no longer sufficient, for integration's progress. Vedrinealso does not fret over Germany's potential domination of Europe in the way that so manyforeign experts (Judt included) would expect. Vedrine's silence on this topic is not proof of hisanxiety. When he writes that Germany's rediscovery of its national interests is perfectly normal,he is simply following his own view of the state as the primary actor.

In defense and foreign policy, Vedrine takes a similar tack. Europe's role, he believes, will be toorganize the convergence of state policies, and each foreign minister will have to merge

national interests with the growing "European interest" that results from such convergence.Vedrine acknowledges that a larger Europe will not be France writ large, but he showssufficient confidence in French strength to believe that this mix of national self-assertion andcooperation is satisfying. He endorses the planned EU rapid reaction force but does not touchon the controversial issues of the extent of its autonomy and its relationship to NATO.

Vedrine's pragmatic approach to European integration raises three questions. First, howeffective will the future EU be if it maintains its intergovernmental institutions in diplomacy anddefense while the Council of Ministers remains the predominant legislative organ, even whenthe supranational European Commission plays a major role in areas such as economic andsocial policy? Will the French and the British -- the most reluctant "Federalists" -- be forced to

choose between a federal Europe and the mixed approach that Vedrine espouses? The UnitedStates once had to move from a confederation to a federation. Although parallels betweenEuropean and American integration are perilous, considerations of integration's effectivenessmay be compelling in both cases. Second, can one call for a multipolar world and yet, asVedrine does, relegate Europe to a diplomatically limited role with "too many voices and notenough policy" (as Moisi puts it)? After all, France plus the kind of Europe that Vedrinedescribes do not constitute a powerful enough "pole."

Finally, there is the question of inspiration. The EU has been built on a mix of material interestsand visionary faith. That faith has helped its members overcome crises and periods ofstagnation. A Europe based on pure reason is certainly conceivable, but it needs a vision that

transcends dry computations of interests. In fact, the definition of interests varies depending onthe passions and emotions of the players. Vedrine's passion is France; as long as there is noneed to choose between France and Europe, his cool approach to Europe makes sense. But agreater ambition or enthusiasm for Europe -- which Vedrine seems to shy away from -- might


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help make such a choice unnecessary. It could also build a European "public space" that couldsoften the EU's reputation as a distant, technocratic bureaucracy.

To his credit, Vedrine wisely rejects "an attitude of gloomy nostalgia" and the bloated rhetoric ofFrance's "universal message." Instead, he believes, Europe needs to go beyond the"Scandinavian" concept of merely being a "morally exemplary" space; it must seek to be "apower in its own right." But this call presupposes truly collective ambitions as well as thecommon institutions that would enable the EU to pursue them. In short, it goes beyond the

Europe of delicate balances and compromises that Vedrine seems to favor. But how seriouslydoes he take this contradiction?

A KINDER, GENTLER FOREIGN POLICY

Vedrine makes clear he is a subtle practitioner of realpolitik in the tradition of Richelieu,Talleyrand, and de Gaulle. This is a brilliant lineage, but is classical realpolitik -- even whenacutely aware of the needs of developing countries and the legacies of colonialism -- capable ofcoping with the formidable threats of globalization? Vedrine leaves that question unanswered.

Vedrine administers a series of cold showers to Moisi's pleas for "a true international morality,"

and he is superb at puncturing excessive hopes and illusions. He is rightly cautious aboutindiscriminate enthusiasm for military intervention in civil wars and the difficulty of achievingdemocracy from the outside. He also acknowledges that not everyone wants Westerndemocracy, and he stresses the difference between evangelization for human rights and thenecessary search for peace. Many violations of human rights result from the weakness of somedemocratizing states, he argues, and democracy is the product not of a conversion but of aprocess. Vedrine is correct to denounce economic sanctions that hurt innocent people but nottheir evil governments. Bringing criminal leaders before international tribunals, he says, doesnot resolve problems, end dictatorships, or heal countries. Threats of punishment do notnecessarily deter aggression, and diplomacy must deal with both good and bad regimes. Tohim, the reform of international law may be less essential than the fight against "theunfathomable injustices of globalization."

In fairness, Vedrine does make some concessions to liberals. He defends NATO's interventionin Kosovo and condemns Russian methods in Chechyna; he also supported EU pressure onVienna after Jorg Haider's far-right Freedom Party joined the Austrian government. He comesdown in support of the International Criminal Court (ICC). But his general caution -- that theinfusion of "Western" ethics into foreign policy will be perceived by non-Western peoples asparochial or arrogant -- goes a bit far. Non-Western peoples often share these values, andmany people in the West do not share liberal values. Furthermore, a sensible emphasis onprocesses -- linking democracy with development, for instance -- requires a clear and strong

vision of the direction for this process. An interest-based foreign policy alone cannot providesuch a vision. Instead, such a vision should be considered part of the national interest. Actingon strong moral convictions ought to be part of an ethic of responsibility.

Sovereignty may indeed represent "dignity, national identity, and protection against" theworrisome encroachments of globalization, but it also protects scoundrels more often thanVedrine suggests. He also goes too far in downplaying the ICC's significance, giving credit forits existence to a voluntary delegation of power by states -- but nothing more. Defending Frenchsecurity, autonomy, interests, and values may indeed be the "classical" and "most basic"expectation of French foreign policy, but Vedrine's impatience with those who think that"France's special role consists of intervening abroad in the interests of others" is more than a

little excessive.

A classic republican patriot determined to keep France a global power, Vedrine faces a world inwhich his country is overwhelmed by the American "hyperpower" and globalization. Given this,his realism has many virtues: it guards against the temptation of French hubris, and it wisely


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appeals to the French to understand that French unilateralism would be as ineffective asAmerican unilateralism is dangerous. His defense of state sovereignty is sufficiently enlightenedto accept the necessity of pooling sovereignty for such cases as European integration orinternational justice.

Like American diplomacy, however, French foreign policy has often shown a big gap between atough, realistic approach, aimed at preserving French power and influence, and an idealisticand universalist rhetoric. Sometimes these two sides have converged, such as in de Gaulle's

Algeria policy after 1962. Sometimes, the gap has been shocking, as in the Balkans before1995 or with central Africa in general. Vedrine is a good example of this tension betweenrealism and idealism, although he leans more toward the former. But to be at ease in the newcentury, France needs the appeals of genuine idealism -- call it "idealpolitik" -- as much asnational ambition. Even from a realpolitik perspective, idealism matters. An important state suchas France needs it to bolster its "soft power." It requires the glue of coalitions with necessarypartners to increase its influence, and it needs to rely on such purveyors of idealism as themedia and the nongovernmental organizations that Vedrine so sharply criticizes. Idealpolitik isgood in itself -- and good for realpolitik.

Copyright 2002-2009 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.All rights reserved.

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