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DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERFERENCE

CABILI V. BALINDONG

FACTS:

Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili (Atty. Cabili) was

counsel of the Heirs of Jesus Ledesma in the

latters action for damages against the Mindanao

State University (MSU) and others arising from

the death of the late Jesus Ledesma in Civil Case

06-254 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iligan

City, Branch 6. The RTC rendered judgment

against the defendants, including MSU, ordering

them to pay damages to the Heirs. On appeal,

the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC

decision which became final and executory.

Eventually, on motion of the Heirs, on

March 6, 2009 the RTC Branch 6 caused the

issuance of a writ of execution against the

defendants. The Office of the Solicitor General

(OSG) belatedly filed an opposition to the

issuance of the writ, resulting in its denial on the

ground of mootness of the motion. Meantime,

the Sheriff of Branch 6, Sheriff Gerard Peter Gaje,

served a notice of garnishment on MSUs funds

with the Land Bank of the Philippines Marawi

City Branch by reason of MSUs failure to obey

the writ.

On April 1, 2009, to prevent seizure of its

Land Bank deposits that it needed for

operations, MSU filed a special civil action of

prohibition and mandamus with application for

the issuance of a temporary restraining order

(TRO) and, subsequently, a preliminary

injunction before the RTC Branch 8, presided

over by respondent acting presiding judge, Judge

Rasad G. Balindong, against Land Bank and

Sheriff Gaje.

In its petition, MSU averred that it is a

state university, funded by appropriations law

enacted by Congress; that despite OSG

opposition to the issuance of a writ of execution

against it, such writ was issued and Sheriff Gaje

garnished upon MSUs deposits with Land Bank,

who in turn gave notice to MSU that it was

putting on hold the sum of P2,726,189.90 on its

deposit in Account 2002-0000-35; that, this

money being government funds, Sheriff Gaje

was executing on the same in violation of

Commission on Audit (COA) Circular 2001-002

dated July 31, 2001 and SC Administrative

Circular 10-2000; and that unless restrained, the

garnishment of government fund would disrupt

MSUs operations.

After due hearing, Judge Balindong

issued a TRO, enjoining Land Bank and Sheriff

Gaje from proceeding with the garnishment of

the MSU deposit with Land Bank. To determine

whether the issuance of a writ of preliminary

injunction was warranted, Judge Balindong

heard the parties and required them to submit

memoranda. Instead of submitting a

memorandum, Sheriff Gaje filed a motion to

dismiss on the ground that RTC Branch 8 had no

jurisdiction to issue an injunction order against

another court of equal rank. Finding merit, on

April 28, 2009 Judge Balindong issued an Order,

dismissing the petition.

For having initially taken cognizance of

the case and issuing a TRO, Atty. Cabili filed the

present administrative action Judge Balindong

for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of

authority, abuse of discretion and/or grave

misconduct prejudicial to the interest of the

judicial service. The Office of the Court

Administrator (OCA) found ground to hold Judge

Balindong guilty of gross ignorance of the law for

interfering with the judgment of a co-equal

court. It recommended the imposition of a fine

of P40,000.00 on Judge Balindong with a stern

warning against a future offense.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Balindong acted

with gross ignorance of the law when he issued

the TRO, pending hearing on the application for

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preliminary injunction that enjoined Sheriff Gaje

from garnishing MSUs Congress-appropriated

operating funds for the satisfaction of the

judgment of RTC Branch 6.

HELD:

YES. The doctrine of judicial stability or

non-interference in the regular orders or

judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary

principle in the administration of justice: no

court can interfere by injunction with the

judgments or orders of another court of

concurrent jurisdiction having the power to

grant the relief sought by the injunction. The

rationale for the rule is founded on the concept

of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction

over the case and renders judgment therein has

jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of

all other coordinate courts, for its execution and

over all its incidents, and to control, in

furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial

officers acting in connection with this judgment.

Judge Balindong clearly ignored the

principle of judicial stability by issuing a TRO to

temporarily restrain Sheriff Gaje from enforcing

the writ of execution issued by a co-equal court,

Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC, and from

pursuing the garnishment of the amount of

P2,726,189.90 from MSUs account with the LBP,

Marawi City Branch. The respondent Judge was

aware that he was acting on matters pertaining

to the execution phase of a final decision of a co-

equal and coordinate court since he even quoted

MSUs allegations in his April 8, 2009 Order.

The respondent Judge should have

refrained from acting on the petition because

Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC retains jurisdiction

to rule on any question on the enforcement of

the writ of execution.

DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURSIDICTION

BAGUNU V. AGGABAO

FACTS:

Spouses Aggabao filed a protest against

the petitioners’ free patent application over a

parcel of unregistered land located in Caniogan,

Sto. Tomas, Isabela, pending before the

Department of Environment and Natural

Resources, Region II, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan.

The subject land was previously owned

by Marcos Binag, who later sold it (first sale) to

Felicisimo Bautista. In 1959, Bautista, in turn,

sold the subject land (second sale) to Atty.

Samson Binag.

On December 12, 1961, Atty. Binag

applied for a free patent over the subject land

with the Bureau of Lands. On November 24,

1987, Atty. Binag sold the subject land (third

sale) to the petitioner, who substituted for Atty.

Binag as the free patent applicant. The parties

deed of sale states that the land sold to the

petitioner is the same lot subject of Atty. Binags

pending free patent application.

On December 28, 1992, the respondents

filed a protest against the petitioners free patent

application. The respondents asserted

ownership over Lot 322 based on the Deeds of

Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale, dated June

23, 1971 and April 15, 1979, executed in their

favor by the heirs of one Rafael Bautista.

On July 10, 1998, the DENR Regional

Office ruled that the petitioner wrongfully

included Lot 322 in his free patent application

since this lot belongs to the respondents.

The petitioner moved for

reconsideration. The DENR Regional Office

denied the motion ruling that in determining the

identity of a lot, the boundaries and not the lot

number assigned to it - are controlling. Since the

boundaries indicated in the deed of sale in the

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petitioners favor correspond to the boundaries

of Lot 258, what the petitioner acquired was Lot

258, notwithstanding the erroneous description

of the lot sold as Lot 322.

On appeal, the DENR Secretary affirmed

the ruling of the DENR Regional Office. After

noting the differences in the boundaries stated

in the parties respective Deeds of Sale, the DENR

Secretary concluded that the land claimed by the

petitioner is, in fact, distinct from that claimed

by the respondents.

The DENR Secretary ruled that based on

the parties respective deeds of sale, the

Subdivision Plan of the lot sold to the petitioner

and Atty. Binags affidavit - claiming that the

designation of Lot 322 in the Deed of Sale in the

petitioners favor is erroneous - what the

petitioner really acquired was Lot 258 and not

Lot 322. The petitioner appealed to the Court of

Appeals. CA affirmed DENR Secretary Decision

applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The

CA ruled that since questions on the identity of a

land require a technical determination by the

appropriate administrative body, the findings of

fact of the DENR Regional Office, as affirmed by

the DENR Secretary, are entitled to great

respect, if not finality.

ISSUE:

WON CA is wrong in applying the Doctrine of

Primary Jurisdiction.

HELD:

NO. Under the doctrine of primary

jurisdiction, courts must refrain from

determining a controversy involving a question

which is within the jurisdiction of the

administrative tribunal prior to its resolution by

the latter, where the question demands the

exercise of sound administrative discretion

requiring the special knowledge, experience and

services of the administrative tribunal to

determine technical and intricate matters of

fact.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction

applies where a claim is originally cognizable in

the courts, and comes into play whenever

enforcement of the claim requires the resolution

of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have

been placed within the special competence of an

administrative body, in such case the judicial

process is suspended pending referral of such

issues to the administrative body for its view.

The resolution of conflicting claims of

ownership over real property is within the

regular courts area of competence and,

concededly, this issue is judicial in character.

However, regular courts would have no power to

conclusively resolve this issue of ownership

given the public character of the land, since

under C.A. No. 141, in relation to Executive

Order No. 192, the disposition and management

of public lands fall within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the Director of Lands, subject to

review by the DENR Secretary.

JURISDICTION BY ESTOPPEL

TIJAM V. SIBONGHANOY

FACTS:

After one month from the effectivity of

the Judiciary Act of 1948, spouses Tijam filed a

collection case against spouses Sibonghanoy.

The preliminary attachment filed by the plaintiff

was dissolve by a counterbond posted by the

defendants through a surety company. After

being duly served with summons the defendants

filed their answer in which, after making some

admissions and denials of the material

averments of the complaint, they interposed a

counterclaim. This counterclaim was answered

by the plaintiffs.

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The Court rendered judgment in

favor of the plaintiffs and, after the same had

become final and executory, upon motion of the

latter, the Court issued a writ of execution

against the defendants. The writ having been

returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the

issuance of a writ of execution against the

Surety's bond, against which the Surety filed a

written opposition upon two grounds, namely,

(1) Failure to prosecute and (2) Absence of a

demand upon the Surety for the payment of the

amount due under the judgment. Upon these

grounds the Surety prayed the Court not only to

deny the motion for execution against its

counter-bond but also the following affirmative

relief : "to relieve the herein bonding company

of its liability, if any, under the bond in question"

ISSUE:

Whether or not the surety company can

still question the jurisdiction of the trial court.

HELD:

No, though it is clear that the case is outside

the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial of Cebu,

defendants were estopped from questioning the

court's jurisdiction. The Court explained "a party

may be estopped or barred from raising a

question in different ways and for different

reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or

estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel

by laches.

Laches, in a general sense is failure or

neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained

length of time, to do that which, by exercising

due diligence, could or should have been done

earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a

right within a reasonable time, warranting a

presumption that the party entitled to assert it

either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of "stale

demands" is based upon grounds of public policy

which requires, for the peace of society, the

discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the

statute of limitations, is not a mere question of

time but is principally a question of the inequity

or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be

enforced or asserted.

The facts of this case show that from the

time the Surety became a quasi-party, it could

have raised the question of the lack of

jurisdiction [it only raised the question of

jurisdiction after 15 years] of the Court of First

Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the

present action by reason of the sum of money

involved which, according to the law then in

force, was within the original exclusive

jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so.

Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in

the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals,

it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain

affirmative relief and submitted its case for a

final adjudication on the merits. It was only after

an adverse decision was rendered by the Court

of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the

question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction

such conduct on its part, We would in effect be

declaring as useless all the proceedings had in

the present case since it was commenced and

compel the judgment creditors to go up their

Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness

of this is not only patent but revolting."

Moreover, adds the Court, "we frown

upon the 'undesirable practice' of a party

submitting his case for decision and then

accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and

attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when

adverse,"

PNB VS. IAC

FACTS:

Spouses Florendo are the registered

owners of three parcels of land covered by OCT

No. S-V-97. The said properties were mortgaged

with the Philippine National Bank to secure a

loan obtained by the Florendos. Upon the

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promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 27, the

property covered by OCT-S-V-97 was subjected

to operation land transfer of the land reform

program. This parcel of land was, therefore,

redistributed to 31 tenants. The value of the land

was assessed at P148,716.48. The Florendos

were paid under Section 80 of Republic Act 3844

as amended by Section 7 of Presidential Decree

251. Pursuant to this law, the Land Bank

remitted to the Philippine National Bank

P94,500.00 in bonds and a check in the amount

of P332.31 for a total of P94,832.31 to pay the

outstanding obligation of the Florendos so that

the lot covered by OCT No. S-V97 could be

released to the Land Bank and the "assignment

of rights" could be accomplished by the

Florendos.

However, petitioner PNB was only

willing to accept P15,500.00 at face value, and

the balance of P79,400.00 at a 40% discount for

a total discount of P31,600.00 thus crediting the

Florendos with a total sum of P53,232.31.

Petitioner ratiocinated that it had a policy of

accepting Land Bank bonds on a one to one basis

only in so far as property subjected to the

agrarian land reform was concerned. All others

were accepted at a discounted rate.

Spouses Florendo expressed their non-

conformity with the petitioner bank’s policy.

Petitioner maintained its stand and refused to

approve for registration with the Register of

Deeds of Negros Oriental the "Assignment of

Rights" and the release of lot No. S-V-97 to the

Land Bank.

The trial court ruled in favor of Spouses

Florendo and against petitioner bank.

The CA affirmed the judgment of the

lower court. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the PNB can still question the

jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations..

HELD:

NO. The issue of jurisdiction was first

raised in the Court of Appeals. In the Court of

Agrarian Relations, the PNB filed an answer

setting up its special and affirmative defenses

with counterclaim. The PNB through its counsel

and representative actively participated in all the

hearings. In fact, the parties agreed upon the

issues of the case and the PNB never raised the

issue on the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the

Court of Agrarian Relations.

On this score alone, the PNB is precluded

from raising for the first time on appeal the issue

of lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian

Relations over C.A.R. Case No. 494. Citing the

earlier case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy (23 SCRA

29):

“While petitioners could have prevented

the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over

the case by seasonably taking exception thereto,

they instead invoked the very same jurisdiction

by filing an answer and seeking affirmative relief

from it. What is more, they participated in the

trial of the case by cross-examining respondent

Planas. Upon this premise, petitioners cannot

now be allowed belatedly to adopt an

inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction

of the court to which they had submitted

themselves voluntarily.”

ATWEL V. CONCEPCION PROGRESSIVE

FACTS:

Assemblyman Emilio Melgazo founded

and organized Concepcion Progressive

Association (CPA) in Hilongos, Leyte. The

organization aimed to provide livelihood to and

generate income for his supporters.

Melgazo was elected President. He then

bought a parcel of land in behalf of the

association. The property was later on converted

into a wet market where agricultural, livestock

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and other farm products were sold. It also

housed a cockpit and an area for various forms

of amusement. The income generated from the

property, mostly rentals from the wet market,

was paid to CPA.

When Emiliano Melgazo died, his son,

petitioner Manuel Melgazo, succeeded him as

CPA president and administrator of the property.

On the other hand, petitioners Atwel and Pilpil

were elected as CPA vice-president and

treasurer, respectively.

While CPA was in the process of

registering as a stock corporation, its other

elected officers and members formed their own

group and registered themselves in the SEC

officers and members of respondent Concepcion

Progressive Association, Inc. (CPAI). Petitioners

were not listed either as officers or members of

CPAI. Later, CPAI objected to petitioners'

collection of rentals from the wet market

vendors.

CPAI filed a case in the SEC for

mandatory injunction.5 With the passage of RA

8799, the case was transferred to Branch 24 of

the Southern Leyte RTC and subsequently, to

Branch 8 of the Tacloban City RTC. Both were

special commercial courts.

CPAI alleged that it was the owner of the

property and petitioners, without authority,

were collecting rentals from the wet market

vendors. Petitioners refuted CPAI's claim saying

that it was preposterous and impossible for the

latter to have acquired ownership over the

property in 1968 when it was only in 1997 that it

was incorporated and registered with the SEC.

Petitioners was purchased using the money of

petitioner Manuel Melgazo's father (the late

Emiliano Melgazo), it belonged to the latter. -

The special commercial court ruled that

the deed of sale covering the property was in the

name of CPA, not Emiliano Melgazo. It also

considered CPA to be one and the same as CPAI.

Petitioners went to the CA and

contested the jurisdiction of the special

commercial court over the case. According to

them, they were not CPAI members, hence the

case did not involve an intra-corporate dispute

"between and among members" so as to

warrant the special commercial court's

jurisdiction over it.

CPAI, on the other hand, argued that

petitioners were already in estoppel as they had

participated actively in the court proceedings –

to which the CA agreed.

CA held that the fact that “petitioners

are admittedly not members of CPAI, then, the

special commercial court should not have taken

cognizance of the case as it exercises special and

limited jurisdiction under R.A. No. 8799.

However, as correctly argued and pointed out by

CPAI, the acts of the petitioners, through their

counsel, in participating in the trial of the

case...show that they themselves consider the

trial court to have jurisdiction over the case.”

Petitioners essentially argue that

estoppel cannot apply because a court's

jurisdiction is conferred exclusively by the

Constitution or by law, not by the parties'

agreement or by estoppel.

ISSUE/S:

1.W/N the court a quo has jurisdiction

over the case?

2. Did the doctrine of estoppel bar

petitioners from questioning the jurisdiction of

the special commercial court?

RULING:

1. NONE. Originally, section 5 of

Presidential Decree (PD) 902-A13 conferred on

the SEC original and exclusive jurisdiction over

“intra-corporate controversies.” However, the

jurisdiction of the SEC over such and other cases

enumerated under it were later on transferred

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to the courts of general jurisdiction pursuant to

the enactment of RA 8799. To determine

whether a case involves an intra-corporate

controversy to be heard and decided by the RTC,

two elements must concur: (1) the status or

relationship of the parties and; (2) the nature of

the question that is subject of their controversy.

These elements were not present in the case at

bar. Moreover, the issue in this case does not

concern the regulation of CPAI or even CPA.

The determination as to who is the true

owner of the disputed property should be

threshed out in a regular court. Cases of this

nature are cognizable by the RTC under BP 129.

Therefore, the conflict among the parties here

was outside the jurisdiction of the special

commercial court.

2. NO. The rule remains that estoppel

does not confer jurisdiction on a tribunal that

has none over the cause of action or subject

matter of the case. Unfortunately for CPAI, no

exceptional circumstance appears in this case to

warrant divergence from the rule. Jurisdiction by

estoppel is not available here. Consequently,

CPAI cannot be permitted to wrest from

petitioners (as the remaining CPA officers) the

administration of the disputed property until

after the parties' rights are clearly adjudicated in

the proper courts. It is neither fair nor legal to

bind a party to the result of a suit or proceeding

in a court with no jurisdiction. The decision of a

tribunal not vested with the appropriate

jurisdiction is null and void.

REPUBLIC V. BATINGUE DEVELOPMENT

FACTS:

Bantigue Point Development Corporation filed

with the RTC an application for original

registration of title over a parcel of land in

Barangay Barualte, San Juan, Batangas.

Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition.

Thereafter, the RTC Clerk of Court transmitted

motu proprio the records of the case to the MTC

of San Juan because the assessed value of the

property was allegedly less than ₱100,000. The

MTC awarded the land to respondent. Acting on

an appeal filed by the Republic, the CA RULED

that since the former had actively participated in

the proceedings before the lower court, but

failed to raise the jurisdictional challenge

therein, petitioner is thereby estopped from

questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court on

appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Republic is estopped from

questioning the court’s jurisdiction

HELD:

NO. At the outset, the court rule that

petitioner Republic is not estopped from

questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court,

even if the former raised the jurisdictional

question only on appeal.

The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction

over the subject matter may be raised at any

stage of the proceedings. Jurisdiction over the

subject matter is conferred only by the

Constitution or the law. It cannot be acquired

through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of

the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of

the court. Consequently, questions of

jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for

the first time on appeal.

The ruling of the Court of Appeals that “a

party may be estopped from raising such

[jurisdictional] question if he has actively taken

part in the very proceeding which he questions,

belatedly objecting to the court’s jurisdiction in

the event that the judgment or order

subsequently rendered is adverse to him” is not

applicable. (Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.)

In this case, petitioner Republic has not

displayed such unreasonable failure or neglect

that would lead us to conclude that it has

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abandoned or declined to assert its right to

question the lower court's jurisdiction.

CUDIAMAT V. BATANGAS SAVINGS

FACTS:

Atty. Restituto Cudiamat and his brother Perfecto were the registered co-owners of a 320 square meter parcel of land in Balayan, Batangas, which was registered in Nasugbu, Batangas. Restituto, who resided in Ozamiz City with his wife, entrusted the custody of the title to who Perfecto.

In 1979, Perfecto, without the knowledge and consent of Restituto, obtained a loan from Batangas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc with the said property as a security. On June 19, 1991 the bank foreclosed the property.

In 1998, as Perfecto’s widow Corazon was being evicted from the property, she and spouses Restituto and Erlinda filed on August 9, 1999 before the RTC of Balayan a complaint "for quieting of title with damages" against the bank and the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu, assailing the mortgage as being null and void as they did not authorize the encumbrance of the property.

ISSUE:

WON the RTC of Balayan had no jurisdiction over the petitioners’ complaint.

HELD:

Estoppel bars the bank from raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the Balayan RTC. The Balayan RTC had jurisdiction over the complaint for quieting of title. The present case is an exception to the rule that lack of jurisdiction on the subject matter can be raised at any time and is not lost by estoppel by laches. To compel petitioners to re-file and relitigate their claims before the Nasugbu RTC when the parties had already been given the opportunity to present their respective evidence in a full-blown trial before the Balayan RTC which had, in fact, decided petitioners’ complaint (for about two

years) would be an exercise in futility and would unjustly burden petitioners.

The Court, in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, held that as a general rule, if there is a judicial liquidation of an insolvent bank, all claims against the bank should be filed in the liquidation proceeding. The Court in Valenzuela, however, after considering the circumstances attendant to the case, held that the general rule should not be applied if to order the aggrieved party to refile or relitigate its case before the litigation court would be "an exercise in futility." In the present case, the Court finds that analogous considerations exist to warrant the application of Valenzuela. Petitioner Restituto was 78 years old at the time the petition was filed in this Court, and his co-petitioner-wife Erlinda died during the pendency of the case. And, except for co-petitioner Corazon, Restituto is a resident of Ozamis City. To compel him to appear and relitigate the case in the liquidation court-Nasugbu RTC when the issues to be raised before it are the same as those already exhaustively passed upon and decided by the Balayan RTC would be superfluous.

JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER

CITY OF DUMAGUETE V. PPA

FACTS:

The City of Dumaguete, through Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo (Remollo), filed before the RTC an Application for Original Registration of Title over a parcel of land with improvements, located at Barangay Looc, City of Dumaguete, under the Property Registration Decree. The application was docketed as LRC Case No. N-201.

In an Order dated October 23, 1998, the RTC noted that the records of the case shows that the annexes lack the following copies. The application did not also state the number of the lot sought to be registered, the number of parcels applied for, the improvements found thereon, and indicate whether it claims a portion of the road which serves as a boundary line.

9 CIV PRO SMC

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, and PPA, represented by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, filed separate Oppositions to the application for registration of petitioner. Both averred that petitioner may not register the subject property in its name since petitioner had never been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said property for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and the subject property remains to be a portion of the public domain which belongs to the Republic.

PPA filed a Motion to Dismiss, seeking the dismissal of LRC Case No. N-201 on the ground that the RTC lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. The subject property in LRC Case No. N-201 is not alienable and disposable, since it is a foreshore land, and a foreshore land is not registerable.

RTC granted the motion to dismiss agreeing with PPA and decreed that the instant application for original registration is dismissed for lack of merit.

City of Dumaguete insisted that the RTC should continue with the hearing of LRC Case No. N-201 and allow petitioner to present evidence that the subject property is reclaimed land. City of Dumaguete sufficiently alleged in its application for registration that it has been in "open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject property for more than thirty (30) years under a bona fide claim of ownership. PPA posited that RTC lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

RTC issued another Order24 dated December 7, 2000, setting aside its Order dated September 7, 2000 in the interest of justice and resolving to have a full-blown proceeding to determine factual issues in LRC Case No. N-201. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found merit in the Petition of PPA and set aside the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the dismissal by the RTC of LRC Case No. N-201 for lack of jurisdiction is correct.

HELD:

NO. jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.

The jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss; for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint.

Jurisdiction over all applications for registration of title to land was conferred upon the Courts of First Instance (CFI) of the respective provinces in which the land sought to be registered was situated. Jurisdiction over land registration cases, as in ordinary actions, is acquired upon the filing in court of the application for registration, and is retained up to the end of the litigation.

TIMES BROADCASTING V. CA

FACTS:

Times Broadcasting Network leased a portion of Hotel Arocha in Ozamis City owned Filomeno Arocha. TBN leased the 4th floor of the Hotel. TBN began installing its equipment and apparatus in the leased premises. TBN however, installed its radio antenna on the third floor rooftop of the hotel, instead of the fourth floor rooftop as stipulated in the contract.

Arocha sent a letter to TBN demanding payment of P2,500.00 as monthly rental for the

10 CIV PRO SMC

use of the third floor rooftop, since the third floor rooftop is not covered by the lease. TBN refused to pay. TBN averred that it is impossible for it to mount its antenna on the fourth floor rooftop because it is already occupied by the hotel's TV antenna.

Arocha filed a petition for ejectment case with MTCC. TBN opposed the jurisdiction of the MTCC since, the action is one of specific performance and an ejectment case. TBN asserted that the RTC should have the jurisdiction over the case.

MTCC ruled in favor of Arocha. RTC reversed the MTCC decision and ruled that the case is one of specific performance. The CA reversed the RTC decision and reinstated the MTCC decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RTC and not MTCC should have jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:

MTCC. A reading of the allegations in the complaint shows that the action filed by Arocha was for ejectment and not for specific performance as asserted by petitioner.

The nature of the action and the jurisdiction of courts are determined by the allegations in the complaint. The complaint shows that the Arocha is the owner of the Hotel Arocha building in Ozamis City and that TBN through stealth and strategy, and without any authority from the owner, used the third floor rooftop of the building as mounting pad of its radio antenna.

Arocha was unlawfully deprived of the

possession of the third floor rooftop of Hotel

Arocha when TBN used it as mounting pad for its

antenna. Arocha sought to recover physical

possession thereof through an action for

ejectment filed before the MTCC. Hence, the

case properly falls within the jurisdiction of the

MTCC.

LARESMA V. ABELLANA

Abellana filed a Complaint with the RTC of

Toledo Cebu against Laresma for recovery of

possession of a parcel of agricultural land located

in Tampa-an, Aloguinsan, Cebu. Abellana alleged

that since 1985, Laresma had been a lessee of a

certain Socorro Chiong, whose agricultural land

adjoined his own; and that sometime in 1985,

Larresma, by means of threat, strategy, and

stealth, took possession the property and

deprived him of its possession.

Laresma averred that the dispute between him

and the Abellana was agrarian in nature, within

the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR. He alleged

that the property titled in the name of the

Abellana consisted of a portion of that property

owned by the Spouses Paras. Being a beneficiary

of the agrarian reform program of the

government, his wife was issued a portion of the

property. Since then, he and his wife became

owners of the property and, as such, were

entitled to the possession thereof.

RTC ruled in favor of Abellana and ordered

Laresma to vacate the said property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RTC had jurisdiction

over the action of Abellana

HELD:

NO. As gleaned from the receipt of realty

tax payments issued to the Abellana, the

assessed value of the property in 1993 was

P8,300.00.

Section 33 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg.

129, reads:

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,

Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial

Courts in Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts,

Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit

Trial Courts shall exercise:

11 CIV PRO SMC

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil

actions which involve title to, or possession of,

real property, or any interest therein where the

assessed value of the property or interest

therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos

(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila,

where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty

Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of

interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s

fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided,

That in cases of land not declared for taxation

purposes, the value of such property shall be

determined by the assessed value of the

adjacent lots.

To determine which court has

jurisdiction over the action, the complaint must

allege the assessed value of the real property

subject of the complaint or the interest thereon.

The complaint does not contain any allegation of

the assessed value of the property. Thus, there is

no showing on the face of the complaint that the

RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the action of

the respondent. The Municipal Trial Court of

Aloguinsan, Cebu, and not the Regional Trial

Court of Toledo City, had exclusive jurisdiction

over the action of the respondent. Hence, all the

proceedings in the RTC, including its decision,

are null and void.

NOTA BENE: It must be stressed that the

regular court does not lose its jurisdiction over

an ejectment case by the simple expedient of a

party raising as a defense therein the alleged

existence of a tenancy relationship between the

parties. But it is the duty of the court to receive

evidence to determine the allegations of

tenancy. If, after hearing, tenancy had, in fact,

been shown to be the real issue, the court should

dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

It is axiomatic that the nature of an

action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are

determined by the material allegations of the

complaint and the law at the time the action was

commenced. Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the

subject matter or nature of an action is

conferred only by law and not by the consent or

waiver upon a court which, otherwise, would

have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or

nature of an action. Lack of jurisdiction of the

court over an action or the subject matter of an

action cannot be cured by the silence,

acquiescence, or even by express consent of the

parties.40 If the court has no jurisdiction over

the nature of an action, it may dismiss the same

ex mero motu or motu proprio. A decision of the

court without jurisdiction is null and void; hence,

it could never logically become final and

executory. Such a judgment may be attacked

directly or collaterally.

INIEGO V. PURUGANAN

FACTS:

Fokker Santos filed a complaint for

quasi-delict and damages against Jimmy T.

Pinion, driver of the truck involved in the traffic

accident, and against Artemio Iniego, owner of

the said truck and employer of Pinion. The

complaint stemmed from a vehicular accident in

1999, where a freight truck driven by Pinion hit

PR’s jitney which Santos was driving at the time

of the accident. The total amount of damages

claimed is P490,000

Santos filed a Motion to Declare Iniego

in default for failure of the latter to file his

answer within the final extended period. Iniego

filed a Motion to Admit and a Motion to Dismiss

the complaint on the ground that the RTC has no

jurisdiction over the cause of action.

Judge Guillermo G. Purganan of the RTC

issued the assailed Omnibus Order, which ruled:

The Motion to Declare Iniego in default must be

denied, as Iniego’s failure to file his answer was

because the Order was sent to the wrong

address, and so Iniego never received it.

The main cause of action is not the claim for

damages, but quasi-delict. Damages are claimed

12 CIV PRO SMC

only as a result of the alleged fault or negligence

of both defendants under Art. 2176 in the case

of Pinion, and Art. 2180 for Iniego. But since fault

or negligence cannot be the subject of pecuniary

estimation, this court (RTC) has exclusive

jurisdiction.

Iniego moved for reconsideration, which

was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the amount of damages is within

the jurisdiction of the RTC

HELD:

YES.It is the claim for all kinds of

damages that is the basis of determining the

jurisdiction of courts, whether the claim for

damages arises from the same or from different

causes of action.

The Court concurs with Iniego that

actions for damages are actions that are capable

of pecuniary estimation. However, the total

amount of damages still exceeds the

jurisdictional limit of P400,000 and remains

under the jurisdiction of the RTC.

The distinction made between damages

arising from injuries in a QD (actual damages)

and those arising from a refusal to admit liability

for a QD (moral and exemplary damages), which

Iniego claims, is more apparent than real, as the

damages sought originate from the same cause

of action: the QD. (Note: The basis for the moral

and exemplary damages here is supposedly

Iniego’s refusal to acknowledge his liability and

pay the corresponding damages. The basis for

the actual damages is the accident itself. ) The

fault or negligence of the employee and the juris

tantum presumption of negligence of his

employer are the seeds of the damages claimed,

without distinction.

Even assuming that the claims for moral

and exemplary damages arose from a cause of

action other than the QD, their inclusion in the

computation of damages for jurisdictional

purposes is still proper. Rule 2, Sec. 5 (d)

provides that where the claims in joined causes

of action are principally for recovery of money,

the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test

of jurisdiction.

Hence, whether or not the different

claims for damages are based on a single cause

of action or different causes of action, it is the

total amount thereof which shall govern.

INSULAR SAVINGS BANK v. FEBTC

FACTS:

On December 11, 1991, Far East Bank

and Trust Company filed a complaint against

Home Bankers Trust and Company (HBTC) with

the Philippine Clearing House Corporation’s

(PCHC) Arbitration Committee.

FEBTC sought to recover from the

petitioner, the sum of P25,200,000.00

representing the total amount of the three

checks drawn and debited against its clearing

account. HBTC sent these checks to respondent

for clearing by operation of the PCHC clearing

system. Thereafter, respondent dishonored the

checks for insufficiency of funds and returned

the checks to HBTC. However, the latter refused

to accept them since the checks were returned

by respondent after the reglementary regional

clearing period.

Meanwhile, on January 17, 1992, before

the termination of the arbitration proceedings,

FEBTC filed another complaint but this time with

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Makati City for

Sum of Money and Damages with Preliminary

Attachment.

The complaint was filed not only against

HBTC but also against Robert Young, Eugene

Arriesgado and Victor Tancuan (collectively

known as Defendants), who were the president

13 CIV PRO SMC

and depositors of HBTC respectively. Aware of

the arbitration proceedings between

respondent and petitioner, the RTC, in an

Omnibus Order suspended the proceedings in

the case against all the defendants pending the

decision of the Arbitration Committee.

On February 2, 1998, the PCHC

Arbitration Committee rendered its decision in

favor of respondent. The motion for

reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied by

the Arbitration Committee.

Consequently, to appeal the decision of

the Arbitration Committee, petitioner filed a

petition for review in the earlier case filed by

respondent in Branch 135 of the RTC of Makati.

In an order dated January 20, 1999, the

RTC directed both petitioner and respondent to

file their respective memoranda, after which,

said petition would be deemed submitted for

resolution.

Both parties filed several pleadings. On

February 8, 1999, FEBTC filed a Motion to

Dismiss Petition for Review for Lack of

Jurisdiction, which was opposed by the

petitioner.

On November 9, 1999, the RTC

dismissed the petition for review.

The RTC denied petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration, hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the Regional Trial Court erred

in dismissing the Petition of Petitioner for lack of

jurisdiction on the ground that it should have

been docketed as a separate case.

HELD:

No, As provided in the PCHC Rules, the

findings of facts of the decision or award

rendered by the Arbitration Committee shall be

final and conclusive upon all the parties in said

arbitration dispute. Under Article 2044 of the

New Civil Code, the validity of any stipulation on

the finality of the arbitrators’ award or decision

is recognized. However, where the conditions

described in Articles 2038, 2039 and 2040

applicable to both compromises and arbitrations

are obtaining, the arbitrators’ award may be

annulled or rescinded. Consequently, the

decision of the Arbitration Committee is subject

to judicial review.

Furthermore, petitioner had several

judicial remedies available at its disposal after

the Arbitration Committee denied its Motion for

Reconsideration.

It may petition the proper RTC to issue

an order vacating the award

Invoking the grounds provided for under Section

24 of the Arbitration Law;

Filing a petition for review under Rule 43 of the

Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals on

questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of

fact and law; and Lastly,

Petitioner may file a petition for certiorari under

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground that

the Arbitrator Committee acted without or in

excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction.

Since this case involves acts or omissions

of a quasi-judicial agency, the petition should be

filed in and cognizable only by the Court of

Appeals.

In this instance, petitioner did not avail

of any of the abovementioned remedies

available to it. Instead it filed a petition for

review with the RTC where Civil Case No. 92-145

is pending pursuant to Section 13 of the PCHC

Rules to sustain its action. Clearly, it erred in the

procedure it chose for judicial review of the

arbitral award.

14 CIV PRO SMC

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is

conferred by law and not by the consent or

acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by

erroneous belief of the court that it exists.

In the instant case, petitioner and

respondent have agreed that the PCHC Rules

would govern in case of controversy. However,

since the PCHC Rules came about only as a result

of an agreement between and among member

banks of PCHC and not by law, it cannot confer

jurisdiction to the RTC. Thus, the portion of the

PCHC Rules granting jurisdiction to the RTC to

review arbitral awards, only on questions of law,

cannot be given effect.

Consequently, the proper recourse of

petitioner from the denial of its motion for

reconsideration by the Arbitration Committee is

to file either a motion to vacate the arbitral

award with the RTC, a petition for review with

the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the

Rules of Court, or a petition for certiorari

under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Alternative dispute resolution methods

or ADRs – like arbitration, mediation, negotiation

and conciliation – are encouraged by the

Supreme Court. By enabling parties to resolve

their disputes amicably, they provide solutions

that are less time-consuming, less tedious, less

confrontational, and more productive of

goodwill and lasting relationships. It must be

borne in mind that arbitration proceedings are

mainly governed by the Arbitration Law and

suppletorily by the Rules of Court

LHUILLIER, vs. BRITISH AIRWAYS

FACTS:

On April 28, 2005, petitioner Edna Diago

Lhuillier filed a Complaint for damages against

respondent British Airways before the Regional

Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. The tortuous

conduct by the flight attendants of said Airways,

which prompted petitioner to file a case for

damages, allegedly transpired when petitioner

boarded respondent’s flight 548 from London,

United Kingdom to Rome, Italy. On May 30,

2005, respondent, by way of special appearance

through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on

grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the case and

over the person of the respondent. Respondent

alleged that only the courts of London, United

Kingdom or Rome, Italy, have jurisdiction over

the complaint for damages pursuant to the

Warsaw Convention, Article 28(1) of which

provides:

“An action for damages must be brought

at the option of the plaintiff, either before the

court of domicile of the carrier or his principal

place of business, or where he has a place of

business through which the contract has been

made, or before the court of the place of

destination.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not British Airways, in

seeking remedies from the trial court through

special appearance of counsel have voluntarily

submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial

court.

HELD:

The Court held that the special appearance of

the counsel of respondent in filing the Motion to

Dismiss and other pleadings before the trial

court cannot be deemed to be voluntary

submission to the jurisdiction of the said trial

court. The High Court disagreed with the

contention of the petitioner and ruled that there

was no voluntary appearance before the trial

court that could constitute estoppel or a waiver

of respondent’s objection to jurisdiction over its

person.

“Jurisdictio est potestas de publico

introducta cum necessitate juris dicendi”

15 CIV PRO SMC

jurisdiction is a power introduced for the public

good, on account of the necessity of dispensing

justice.

RAPID CITY REALTY V. ORLANDO VILLA

FACTS:

Rapid City Realty and Development

Corporation filed a complaint for declaration of

nullity of subdivision plans and damages against

several defendants including Spouses Orlando

and Lourdes Villa. The complaint was lodge at

Branch 71. After one failed attempt at personal

service of summons, Gregorio Zapanta

(Zapanta), court process server, resorted to

substituted service by serving summons upon

respondents’ househelp who did not

acknowledge receipt thereof and refused to

divulge their names. Despite substituted service,

respondents failed to file their Answer,

prompting petitioner to file a “Motion to Declare

Defendants[-herein respondents] in Default”

which the trial court granted by Order of May 3,

2005.

More than eight months thereafter or on

January 30, 2006, respondents filed a Motion to

Lift Order of Default, claiming that on January 27,

2006 they “officially received all pertinent

papers such as Complaint and Annexes. Motion

to Dismiss of the Solicitor General and the

ORDER dated May 3, 2005 granting the Motion

to Declare [them] in Default.” And they

denied the existence of two women helpers who

allegedly refused to sign and acknowledge

receipt of the summons. In any event, they

contended that assuming that the allegations

were true, the helpers had no authority to

receive the documents.

By Order of July 17, 2006, the trial court set

aside the Order of Default and gave herein

respondents five days to file their Answer.

Respondents just the same did not file an

Answer, drawing petitioner to again file a Motion

to declare them in default, which the trial court

again granted by Order of February 21, 2007.

On April 18, 2007, respondents filed an

Omnibus Motion for reconsideration of the

second order declaring them in default and to

vacate proceedings, this time claiming that the

trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their

persons due to invalid service of summons.

In the meantime, the trial court, by Decision of

September 4, 2007, rendered judgment in favor

of petitioner. By Decision of April 29, 2008, the

appellate court annulled the trial court’s Orders

declaring respondents in default for the second

time.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court acquires

jurisdiction over the defendants.

Held: Yes

It is settled that if there is no valid

service of summons, the court can still acquire

jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by

virtue of the latter’s voluntary appearance. Thus

Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court

provides:

Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. – The

defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action

shall be equivalent to service of summons. The

inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds

aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person

shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.

And Philippine Commercial

International Bank v. Spouses Wilson Dy Hong Pi

and Lolita Dy, et al. enlightens:

Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a

civil case is acquired either by the coercive

power of legal processes exerted over his

person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As

a general proposition, one who seeks an

affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to

16 CIV PRO SMC

the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this

rule that we have had occasion to declare that

the filing of motions to admit answer, for

additional time to file answer, for

reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift

order of default with motion for reconsideration,

is considered voluntary submission to the court’s

jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the

concept of conditional appearance, such that a

party who makes a special appearance to

challenge, among others, the court’s jurisdiction

over his person cannot be considered to have

submitted to its authority.

Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus

clear that:

(1) Special appearance operates as an

exception to the general rule on

voluntary appearance;

(2) Accordingly, objections to the

jurisdiction of the court over the person

of the defendant must be explicitly

made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal

manner; and

(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary

submission to the jurisdiction of the

court, especially in instances where a

pleading or motion seeking affirmative

relief is filed and submitted to the court

for resolution.

Respondents did not, in said motion,

allege that their filing thereof was a

special appearance for the purpose only

to question the jurisdiction over their

persons. Clearly, they had acquiesced to

the jurisdiction of the court.

CLARITA GARCIA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

Two petitions for forfeiture were filed with the

SB against retired Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, his

wife, herein petitioner Clarita, children Ian Carl,

Juan Paulo and Timothy Mark (collectively, the

Garcias). The petition alleged that the Garcia’s

allegedly amassed and acquired ill-gotten

wealth.

Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent

to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged the

Garcias and three others with violation of RA

7080 (plunder). The plunder charge, as the

parties’ pleadings seem to indicate, covered

substantially the same properties identified in

both forfeiture cases. After Forfeiture I,

summonses were duly served on respondent

Garcias. Instead of filing an answer, the Garcias

filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of the

SB’s lack of jurisdiction over separate civil actions

for forfeiture.

The motion was denied. The Garcias were

declared in default. Their MR was also denied. A

second motion for reconsideration was also

denied pursuant to the prohibited pleading rule.

The Garcias filed another motion to dismiss

and/or to quash Forfeiture I on, inter alia, the

following grounds:

(a) the filing of the plunder case ousted the SB

4th Division of jurisdiction over the forfeiture

case; and

(b) that the consolidation is imperative in order

to avoid possible double jeopardy

entanglements. The motion was denied.

Hence petitioner filed special civil action for

mandamus and/or certiorari with the SC. For

Forfeiture II, the summonses were only served

with Gen. Garcia. In the return, he merely noted

that "I’m receiving the copies of Clarita, Ian Carl,

Juan Paolo & Timothy – but these copies will not

17 CIV PRO SMC

guarantee it being served to the above-named

(sic)." Clarita and her children, thru special

appearance of counsel, filed a motion to dismiss

and/or to quash Forfeiture II primarily for lack of

jurisdiction over their persons and on the subject

matter thereof which is now covered by the

plunder case. The SB denied both the

petitioner’s motion to dismiss and/or to quash

and the Republic’s motion for alternative service

of summons. The denial of the motion cause

petitioner to file petition for certiorari under

Rule 65.

ISSUE:

Whether the Fourth Division of the SB has

acquired jurisdiction over the person of

petitioner —and her three sons for that matter

—considering that, first, vis-à-vis Civil Case Nos.

0193 (Forfeiture I) and 0196 (Forfeiture II),

summons against her have been ineffectively or

improperly served and, second, that the plunder

case—Crim. Case No. 28107— has already been

filed and pending with another division of the SB,

i.e., Second Division of the SB.

HELD:

No. On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner

argues that the SB did not acquire jurisdiction

over her person and that of her children due to a

defective substituted service of summons. There

is merit in petitioner’s contention.

Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil

Procedure clearly provides for the requirements

of a valid substituted service of summons, thus:

SEC. 7.Substituted service—If the defendant

cannot be served within a reasonable time as

provided in the preceding section [personal

service on defendant], service may be effected

(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the

defendant’s residence with some person of

suitable age and discretion then residing therein,

or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office

or regular place of business with some

competent person in charge thereof.

It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction

over a party for the latter to be bound by its

decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by

whatever mode authorized by and proper under

the Rules, is the means by which a court acquires

jurisdiction over a person.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that

summons for Forfeitures I and II were served

personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores Garcia,

who is detained at the PNP Detention Center,

who acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing

his signature. It is also undisputed that

substituted service of summons for both

Forfeitures I and II were made on petitioner and

her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNP

Detention Center. However, such substituted

services of summons were invalid for being

irregular and defective.

NOTA BENE:

Petitioner’s posture respecting Forfeitures I and

II being absorbed by the plunder case, thus

depriving the 4th Division of the SB of jurisdiction

over the civil cases, is flawed by the assumptions

holding it together, the first assumption being

that the forfeiture cases are the corresponding

civil action for recovery of civil liability ex delicto.

As correctly ruled by the SB 4th Division in its May

20, 2005 Resolution, the civil liability for

forfeiture cases does not arise from the

commission of a criminal offense, thus:

Such liability is based on a statute that

safeguards the right of the State to recover

unlawfully acquired properties. The action of

forfeiture arises when a "public officer or

employee [acquires] during his incumbency an

amount of property which is manifestly out of

proportion of his salary x x x and to his other

lawful income x x x." Such amount of property is

then presumed prima facie to have been

unlawfully acquired. Thus "if the respondent

18 CIV PRO SMC

[public official] is unable to show to the

satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully

acquired the property in question, then the court

shall declare such property forfeited in favor of

the State, and by virtue of such judgment the

property aforesaid shall become property of the

State.

JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE

DEFENDANT

DAVAO LIGHT V. CA

FACTS:

Davao Light and Power Inc, Co. filed a

complaint for recovery of sum of money and

damages against Queensland Hotel and

Teodorico Adarna. The complaint contained an

ex parte application for a writ of preliminary

attachment.

Judge Nartatez granted the writ and

fixed the attachment bond at around P4Million.

The summons, copy of complaint, writ of

attachment, copy of attachment bond were

served upon Queensland and Adarna. Pursuant

to the writ, the Sheriff seized the properties of

the latter.

Queensland and Adarna filed a motion

to discharge the attachment for lack of

jurisdiction to issue the same because at the

time the order of attachment was promulgated

(May 3, 1989) and the attachment writ issued

(May 11,1989), the Trial Court had not yet

acquired jurisdiction over cause and person of

defendants.

Trial Court denied the motion to discharge. CA

annulled the Trial Court’s Order. Davao seeks to

reverse CA’s order.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a writ of preliminary attachment

may issue ex parte against a defendant before

acquisition of jurisdiction of the latter's person

by service of summons or his voluntary

submission to the Court's authority.

HELD:

It goes without saying that whatever be

the acts done by the Court prior to the

acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of

defendant — issuance of summons, order of

attachment and writ of attachment (and/or

appointments of guardian ad litem, or grant of

authority to the plaintiff to prosecute the suit as

a pauper litigant, or amendment of the

complaint by the plaintiff as a matter of right

without leave of court — and however valid and

proper they might otherwise be, these do not

and cannot bind and affect the defendant until

and unless jurisdiction over his person is

eventually obtained by the court, either by

service on him of summons or other coercive

process or his voluntary submission to the

court's authority.

Hence, when the sheriff or other proper

officer commences implementation of the writ

of attachment, it is essential that he serve on the

defendant not only a copy of the applicant's

affidavit and attachment bond, and of the order

of attachment, as explicity required by Section 5

of Rule 57, but also the summons addressed to

said defendant as well as a copy of the complaint

and order for appointment of guardian ad litem,

if any, as also explicity directed by Section 3, Rule

14 of the Rules of Court.

Service of all such documents is

indispensable not only for the acquisition of

jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,

but also upon considerations of fairness, to

apprise the defendant of the complaint against

him, of the issuance of a writ of preliminary

attachment and the grounds therefore and thus

accord him the opportunity to prevent

attachment of his property by the posting of a

counterbond in an amount equal to the

19 CIV PRO SMC

plaintiff's claim in the complaint pursuant to

Section 5 (or Section 12), Rule 57, or dissolving it

by causing dismissal of the complaint itself on

any of the grounds set forth in Rule 16, or

demonstrating the insufficiency of the

applicant's affidavit or bond in accordance with

Section 13, Rule 57.

JURISDICTION OVER THE ISSUES

LAM V. CHUA

FACTS:

Lam and Chua were married in the year

1984 and said marriage conceived a son. Chua

claims that Lam was psychologically

incapacitated to comply with his marital

obligations. To justify the claims, Chua says that

he is irresponsible and keeps on asking for

money for luxury items. Lam does not support

his family and he rarely comes home. He was

also said to be a womanizer and mismanages

their conjugal properties. With this set-up, Chua

had no choice but to agree to dissolution of their

conjugal partnership of gains and separation of

properties. This was granted by the regional trial

court. The spouses have been living separately

and Chua seeks the nullification of her marriage

with Lam. Chua presented evidence stating the

facts given above but failed to show how much

is needed for child support.

The case was reopened at her instance

and she presented evidence showing that Lam

has been married twice before their marriage

which renders it bigamous. The Trial Court

declared their marriage void and ordered Lam to

pay child support of 20,000 a month.

This was contested by Lam stating that a

common fund was agreed upon wherein they

would both contribute 250,000 each for the

support of their child. The CA affirmed the trial

courts decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court made a

serious error by rendering judgment on issue not

presented in pleadings.

HELD:

It is also a general principle of law that a

court cannot set itself in motion, nor has it power

to decide questions except as presented by the

parties in their pleadings. Anything that is

decided beyond them is coram non-judice and

void. Therefore where a court enters a judgment

or awards relief beyond the prayer of the

complaint or the scope of its allegations the

excessive relief is not merely irregular but is void

for want of jurisdiction, and is open to collateral

attack.

The appellate court also ruled that a

judgment of a court upon a subject within its

general jurisdiction, but which is not brought

before it by any statement or claim of the

parties, and is foreign to the issues submitted for

its determination, is a nullity. (Emphasis

supplied)

Pursuant to the foregoing principle, it is

a serious error for the trial court to have

rendered judgment on issues not presented in

the pleadings as it was beyond its jurisdiction to

do so. The amendment of the petition to reflect

the new issues and claims against Jose was,

therefore, indispensable so as to authorize the

court to act on the issue of whether the marriage

of Jose and Adriana was bigamous and the

determination of the amount that should have

been awarded for the support of John Paul.

When the trial court rendered judgment beyond

the allegations contained in the copy of the

petition served upon Jose, the Pasay RTC had

acted in excess of its jurisdiction and deprived

petitioner Lam of due process.

Insofar as the declaration of nullity of

the marriage between Adriana and Jose for

20 CIV PRO SMC

being bigamous is concerned, the decision

rendered by the Pasay RTC could be declared as

invalid for having been issued beyond its

jurisdiction. Nonetheless, considering that Jose,

did not assail the declaration of nullity of his

marriage with Adriana in his motion for

reconsideration which he filed with the Pasay

RTC. In the petitions he filed in the Court of

Appeals and with us, he likewise did not raise the

issue of jurisdiction of the Pasay RTC to receive

evidence and render judgment on his previous

marriages with other woman which were not

alleged in the petition filed by Adriana.

Petitioner Jose is estopped from questioning the

declaration of nullity of his marriage with

Adriana and therefore, the Court will not undo

the judgment of the Pasay RTC declaring the

marriage of Adriana and Jose null and void for

being bigamous. It is an axiomatic rule that while

a jurisdictional question may be raised at any

time, this, however, admits of an exception

where estoppel has supervened.

ANITA BUCE V. CA

FACTS:

Sps. Tiongco leased to Anita Buce a

parcel of land in Pandacan, Manila. The lease

terminated without any agreement for renewal

being reached. Buce, however, still tendered

checks representing rentals to Sps. Tiongco

which the latter refused to accept. Buce filed

with the RTC a complaint for specific

performance with prayer for consignation. In his

Answer with counterclaim, Tiongco did not

include a prayer for the restoration of possession

of the leased premises. The RTC ordered the

ejectment of Sps. Tiongco in its Decision. CA

reversed the RTC Decision and ordered Buce to

immediately vacate the leased premises on the

ground that the lease expired.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA went beyond the bounds of

its authority because the case she filed before

the RTC was for "Specific Performance" not

unlawful detainer.

HELD:

It must be noted, however, that Sps.

Tiongco did not include in their Answer with

Counterclaim a prayer for the restoration of

possession of the leased premises. Neither did

they file with the proper Metropolitan Trial

Court an unlawful detainer suit against

petitioner after the expiration of the lease

contact.

Moreover, the issues agreed upon by the

parties to be resolved during the pre-trial were

the correct interpretation of the contract and

the validity of Sps. Tiongco’s refusal to accept

Buce’s payment of P400 as monthly rental.

They later limited the issue to the first,

i.e., the correct interpretation of the contract.

The issue of possession of the leased premises

was not among the issues agreed upon by the

parties or threshed out before the court a quo.

Neither was it raised by private respondents on

appeal.

Accordingly, as correctly contended by

Anita Buce, the Court of Appeals went beyond

the bounds of its authority when after

interpreting the questioned provision of the

lease contract in favor of Sps. Tiongco, it

proceeded to order Buce to vacate the subject

premises.

JURISDICTION OF THE MTC, METC and MCTC

PANTRANCO V. STANDARD INSURANCE

FACTS:

Crispin Gicale was driving a jeepney

owned by his mother Martina Gicale. While

driving north bound along the National Highway

in Nueva Ecija, a passenger bus, owned by

Pantranco driven by Alexander Buncan, was

21 CIV PRO SMC

trailing behind. When the two vehicles were

negotiating a curve along the highway,

Pantranco bus overtook the jeepney. The bus hit

the jeepney and sped away.

After paying P8,000(the insurance claim

of Gicale) for the damages sustained by her

jeepney, Standard Insurance joined Gicale in her

action to recover the remaining P13,415-

damages due from Pantranco in a complaint

before the RTC. In their answer, Pantranco

alleged that jurisdiction lies with MTC and not

with the RTC. RTC ruled in favor of Standard

Insurance and Gicale. CA affirmed the decision of

the RTC.

ISSUE:

Which Court has jurisdiction?

HELD:

Affirming RTC and CA, the SC ruled RTC

has jurisdiction, following the rule on totality

rule. Here the causes of action of Gicale and

Standard Insurance could be properly joined as

the causes of action (the bumping of jeepney

owned by Gicale by the Pantranco bus) arose

from the same transaction.

Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides that

the RTC has "exclusive original jurisdiction over

all other cases, in which the demand, exclusive

of interest and cost or the value of the property

in controversy, amounts to more than twenty

thousand pesos (P20,000.00)". Standard’s claim

is P8,000.00, while that of respondent Martina

Gicale is P13,415.00, or a total of P21,415.00.

Clearly, it is the RTC that has jurisdiction over the

instant case. It bears emphasis that when the

complaint was filed, R.A. 7691 expanding the

jurisdiction of the Metropolitan, Municipal and

Municipal Circuit Trial Courts had not yet taken

effect. It became effective on April 15, 1994.

Nota Bene: totality rule applies only if there is

proper joinder of causes of action

HILARIO V. SALVADOR

FACTS:

Petitioners herein are co-owners of a

parcel of land located in Romblon. In 1996, they

filed a complaint with the RTC of Romblon

against herein, respondent, alleging that as co-

owners, they are entitled to possession of the

lot, and that respondent constructed his house

thereon without their knowledge and refused to

vacate the property despite demands to do so.

They prayed for the private respondent to vacate

the property and restore possession thereof to

them.

The complaint, however, failed to allege

the assessed value of the land. Nevertheless,

petitioners were able to present during trial the

most recent tax declaration, which shows that

the assessed value of the property was Php

5,950.00. The respondent filed a Motion to

Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction

because of the failure to allege the value of the

land. The motion was denied. Respondent then

files an Answer, traversing the material

allegations of the complaint, contending that

petitioners had no cause of action against him

since the property in dispute was the conjugal

property of his grandparents, the spouses

Salustiano Salvador and Concepcion Mazo-

Salvador.

The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners.

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision, holding

that the action was one for the recovery of

ownership and possession of real property and

that “absent any allegation in the complaint of

the assessed value of the property, the MTC had

exclusive jurisdiction over the action” (citing

Sec.33 of RA 7691). The CA then ordered the

refilling of the case in the proper court.

ISSUE:

Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over

the action?

22 CIV PRO SMC

HELD:

No. Petitioner argues that the RTC has

jurisdiction since their action is an accion

reinvindicatoria, an action incapable of

pecuniary estimation. Thus, regardless of the

assessed value of the subject property, exclusive

jurisdiction falls within the said court.

This argument is without merit. The

jurisdiction of the court over an action involving

title to or possession of land is now determined

by the assessed value of the said property and

not the market value thereof. In the case at bar,

the complaint does not contain allegation stating

the assessed value of the property subject of the

complaint. The court cannot take judicial notice

of the assessed or market value of land.

The Court noted that during the trial, the

petitioners adduced in evidence a tax

declaration, showing that the assessed value of

the property in 1991 was Php 5, 950.00. The

petitioners, however, did not bother to adduce

in evidence the tax declaration containing the

assessed value of the property when they filed

their complaint in 1996.

Even assuming that the assessed value

of the property in 1991 was the same in 1995-

1996, the MTC, and not the RTC has jurisdiction

over the action of the petitioners, since the case

involved to or possession of real property with

an assessed value of less than Php 20,000.00. As

the CA had held that the determining

jurisdictional element for the accion

reinvindicatoria is, as RA 7196 discloses, the

assessed value of the property in question. For

properties in the provinces, the RTC has

jurisdiction if the assessed value exceeds Php

20,000.00 and the MTC, if the value is Php

20,000.00 or below.

An assessed value can have reference

only to the tax rolls in the municipality where the

property is located, and is contained in the tax

declaration. In the case at bench, the most

recent tax declaration secued and presented by

plaintiffs-appellees is Exhibit B.

The loose remark made by them that the

property was worth 3.5 million pesos, not to

mention that there is absolutely no evidence for

this, is irrelevant in light of the fact that there is

an assessed value. It is the amount in the tax

declaration that should be consulted and not

other kind of value, and as appearing in Exhibit

B, this is Php 5,950.00. The case, therefore, falls

within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the

MTC of Romblon that has jurisdiction over the

territory where the property is located, and not

the court a quo.

QUINGORAN V. CA

FACTS:

The heirs of Juan dela Cruz, represented

by Senen dela Cruz filed a Complaint for

Recovery of Portion of Registered Land with

Compensation and Damages against Victorino

Quinagoran before the RTC Cagayan. They

alleged that they are the co-owners of a a parcel

of land at Centro, Piat, Cagayan, which they

inherited from the late Juan dela Cruz.

Quinagoran started occupying a house

on the north-west portion of the property, by

tolerance of the heirs. The heirs asked petitioner

to remove the house as they planned to

construct a commercial building on the property

but petitioner refused, claiming ownership over

the lot.

The heirs prayed for the reconveyance

and surrender of the disputed lot and to be paid

the amount of P5,000.00 monthly until the

property is vacated.

Quinagoran filed a Motion to Dismiss

claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the

case. He argued that since the lot which he owns

adjacent to the contested property has an

assessed value of P1,730, the assessed value of

23 CIV PRO SMC

the lot under controversy would not be more

than the said amount. He likewise avers that it is

an indispensable requirement that the

complaint should allege the assessed value of

the property involved.

The heirs maintain that the contention

of petitioner in his Motion to Dismiss before the

RTC that the assessed value of the disputed lot is

below P20,000.00 is based on the assessed value

of an adjacent property and no documentary

proof was shown to support the said allegation.

It also contended that the tax declaration which

petitioner presented, together with his

Supplemental Reply before the CA, and on the

basis of which he claims that the disputed

property's assessed value is only P551.00, should

also not be given credence as the said tax

declaration reflects the amount of P56,100.or

the entire property.

The RTC denied petitioner's Motion to

Dismiss on the basis that the action is accion

publicciana and therefore, its jurisdiction lies in

the RTC, regardless of the value of the property.

The CA affirmed decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction

over all cases of recovery of possession

regardless of the value of the property involved?

HELD:

No. MTC has the jurisdiction over the

case. The doctrine that all cases of recovery of

possession or accion publiciana lies with the RTC

regardless of the value of the property -- no

longer holds true. As things now stand, a

distinction must be made between those

properties the assessed value of which is below

P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and

P50,000.00, if within.

In Atuel v. Valdez, the Court likewise

expressly stated that:

Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is

vested in a court of general jurisdiction.

Specifically, the regional trial court exercises

exclusive original jurisdiction “in all civil actions

which involve x x x possession of real property.”

However, if the assessed value of the real

property involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in

Metro Manila, and P20,000.00 outside of Metro

Manila, the municipal trial court exercises

jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of

real property.

In the case, Quinagoran maintains that

there should be such an allegation of the

assessed value of the real property to determine

jurisdiction. However, nowhere in said complaint

was the assessed value of the subject property

ever mentioned. There is therefore no showing

on the face of the complaint that the RTC has

exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the

respondents. Absent any allegation in the

complaint of the assessed value of the property,

it cannot be determined whether the RTC or the

MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over

the petitioner's action. The courts cannot take

judicial notice of the assessed or market value of

the land.

Considering that the respondents failed to

allege in their complaint the assessed value of

the subject property, the RTC seriously erred in

denying the motion to dismiss. Consequently, all

proceedings in the RTC are null and void. The CA

also erred in affirming the RTC.