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Albert Rojan T. Padilla Atty. Ligutan Civil Procedure Case Digest Mon, 5:30 – 8.00 Wed, 6:30 – 9:00 Rule 35 – 36 Nocom v. Camerino,G.R. No. 182984, February 10, 2009 Facts: Respondent Oscar Camerino and respondents-intervenors Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile, the deceased Nolasco Del Rosario, represented by Mildred Del Rosario, and Domingo Enriquez were the tenants who were tilling on the parcels of land planted to rice and corn previously owned by Victoria Homes, Inc. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 289237, now S-6135 (109,451 square meters); S-72244 (73,849 square meters); and 289236, now S-35855 (109,452 square meters). Without notifying the respondents, Victoria Homes, Inc. sold the said lots to Springsun Management Systems Corporation (SMSC) for P9,790,612. The three deeds of sale were duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and new titles were issued in the name of SMSC. Subsequently, SMSC mortgaged to Banco Filipino (BF) the said lots as collaterals for its loans amounting to P11,545,000. As SMSC failed to pay the loans due, BF extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and, later, was adjudged the highest bidder. SMSC redeemed the lots from BF. Earlier respondents filed a complaint against SMSC and BF for "Prohibition/Certiorari, Reconveyance/Redemption, Damages, Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order," docketed as Civil Case No. 95-020, with the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256. RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256, found respondents to be tenants who have been tilling on the subject land planted to rice and corn since 1967 and, thus, authorized them to redeem the subject lots. The CA affirmed with modification the RTC decision by declaring the respondents to be tenants or agricultural lessees on the disputed lots and, thus, entitled to exercise their right of redemption, but deleted the award of P200,000 attorney's fees for lack of legal basis. SC affirmed the CA and reiterated that being agricultural tenants of Victoria Homes, Inc. that had sold the lots to SMSC without notifying them, respondents had the right to redeem the subject properties from SMSC. Page 1 of 45

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Albert Rojan T. PadillaAtty. LigutanCivil Procedure Case Digest Mon, 5:30 8.00 Wed, 6:30 9:00Rule 35 36

Nocom v. Camerino,G.R. No. 182984, February 10, 2009

Facts:

Respondent Oscar Camerino and respondents-intervenors Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile, the deceased Nolasco Del Rosario, represented by Mildred Del Rosario, and Domingo Enriquez were the tenants who were tilling on the parcels of land planted to rice and corn previously owned by Victoria Homes, Inc. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 289237, now S-6135 (109,451 square meters); S-72244 (73,849 square meters); and 289236, now S-35855 (109,452 square meters).

Without notifying the respondents, Victoria Homes, Inc. sold the said lots to Springsun Management Systems Corporation (SMSC) for P9,790,612. The three deeds of sale were duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and new titles were issued in the name of SMSC.

Subsequently, SMSC mortgaged to Banco Filipino (BF) the said lots as collaterals for its loans amounting to P11,545,000. As SMSC failed to pay the loans due, BF extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and, later, was adjudged the highest bidder. SMSC redeemed the lots from BF.

Earlier respondents filed a complaint against SMSC and BF for "Prohibition/Certiorari, Reconveyance/Redemption, Damages, Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order," docketed as Civil Case No. 95-020, with the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256.

RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256, found respondents to be tenants who have been tilling on the subject land planted to rice and corn since 1967 and, thus, authorized them to redeem the subject lots.

The CA affirmed with modification the RTC decision by declaring the respondents to be tenants or agricultural lessees on the disputed lots and, thus, entitled to exercise their right of redemption, but deleted the award of P200,000 attorney's fees for lack of legal basis.

SC affirmed the CA and reiterated that being agricultural tenants of Victoria Homes, Inc. that had sold the lots to SMSC without notifying them, respondents had the right to redeem the subject properties from SMSC.

SC likewise denied SMSC's motions for reconsideration and for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and an Entry of Judgment was made.

The present G.R. No. 182984:

Petitioner Mariano Nocom gave the respondents several Philtrust Bank Manager's Checks amounting to P500,000 each, which the latter encashed, representing the price of their "inchoate and contingent rights" over the subject lots which they sold to him.

Respondents, with the marital consent of their wives, executed an "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" appointing Mariano Nocom as attorney-in-fact to negotiate, deal, transact with all persons and entities involved in Civil Case no. 95-020, RTC Branch 256, Muntinlupa City, which was notarized by their counsel Atty. Arturo S. Santos.

Meanwhile, respondents, in Civil Case No. 95-020 of the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256, filed a Motion for Execution with Prayer to Order the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City to divest SMSC of title to the subject lots and have the same vested on them. As SMSC refused to accept the redemption amount of P9,790,612 plus P147,059.18 as commission given by the petitioner, the respondents deposited, on August 4, 2005, the amounts of P9,790,612, P73,529.59, and P73,529.59, duly evidenced by official receipts, with the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256. The RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 granted respondents' motion for execution and, consequently, TCT Nos. 120542, 120541 and 123872 in the name of SMSC were cancelled and TCT Nos. 15895, 15896 and 15897 were issued in the names of the respondents. It also ordered that the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney," executed on December 18, 2003 by respondents in favor of petitioner, be annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances of TCT Nos. 15895, 15896, and 15897.

On October 24, 2005, respondent Oscar Camerino filed a complaint against petitioner, captioned as "Petition to Revoke Power of Attorney," docketed as Civil Case No. 05-172, in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203, seeking to annul the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" dated December 18, 2003, the turnover of the titles to the properties in his favor, and the payment of attorney's fees and other legal fees.

Respondent Oscar Camerino's complaint alleged that he and co-respondents were asked by their counsel, Atty. Arturo S. Santos, to sign a document with the representation that it was urgently needed in the legal proceedings against SMSC; that the contents of the said document were not explained to him; that in the first week of September 2005, he learned that TCT Nos. 15895, 15896 and 15897 were issued in their favor by the Register of Deeds; that he discovered that the annotation of the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" on the said titles was pursuant to the Order of the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 dated August 31, 2005; that the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" turned out to be the same document which Atty. Santos required him and the other respondents to sign on December 18, 2003; that despite repeated demands, petitioner refused to surrender the owner's duplicate copies of the said titles; that petitioner had retained ownership over the subject lots; that he had no intention of naming, appointing, or constituting anyone, including petitioner, to sell, assign, dispose, or encumber the subject parcels of land; and that he executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim which was annotated on the titles involving the subject lots.

In his Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner countered that on September 3, 2003, Atty. Santos informed him of the desire of his clients, herein respondents, to sell and assign to him their "inchoate and contingent rights and interests" over the subject lots because they were in dire need of money and could no longer wait until the termination of the proceedings as SMSC would probably appeal the CA's Decision to this Court; that they did not have the amount of P9,790,612 needed to redeem the subject lots; that on December 18, 2003, he decided to buy the contingent rights of the respondents and paid each of them P500,000 or a total of P2,500,000 as evidenced by Philtrust Bank Manager's Check Nos. MV 0002060 (for respondent Oscar Camerino), MV 0002061 (for respondent Efren Camerino), MV 0002062 (for respondent Cornelio Mantile), MV 0002063 (for Nolasco Del Rosario), and MV 0002064 (for Domingo Enriquez) which they personally encashed on December 19, 2003; that on August 4, 2005, he also paid the amount of P147,059.18 as commission; that simultaneous with the aforesaid payment, respondents and their spouses voluntarily signed the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" dated December 18, 2003; that being coupled with interest, the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" cannot be revoked or cancelled at will by any of the parties; and that having received just and reasonable compensation for their contingent rights, respondents had no cause of action or legal right over the subject lots. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and the payment of P1,000,000 moral damages, P500,000 exemplary damages, and P500,000 attorney's fees plus costs.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing on his special and/or affirmative defense that respondent Oscar Camerino had no cause of action or legal right over the subject lots because the latter and his wife received the proceeds of the Philtrust Bank Manager's check in the sum of P500,000 which they personally encashed on December 19, 2003 and that being coupled with interest, the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" cannot be revoked or cancelled at will by any of the parties.

Respondents Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile and Mildred Del Rosario, in her capacity as legal heir and representative of Nolasco Del Rosario, filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Admit the Complaint-in-Intervention with the attached Complaint-in-Intervention, dated January 26, 2006, seeking the nullification of the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" for being contrary to law and public policy and the annotation of the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" on the titles of the subject lots with prayer that petitioner be ordered to deliver to them the copies of the owner's duplicate certificate of TCT Nos. 15895, 15896, and 15897. Their Complaint-in-Intervention alleged that they had a legal interest in the subject matter of the controversy and would either be directly injured or benefited by the judgment in Civil Case No. 05-172; that they were co-signatories or co-grantors of respondent Oscar Camerino in the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" they executed in favor of the petitioner; that their consent was vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation, machination, mistake and undue influence perpetrated by their own counsel, Atty. Santos, and petitioner; that sometime in December 2003, Atty. Santos called for a meeting which was attended by petitioner and one Judge Alberto Lerma where petitioner gave them checks in the amount of P500,000 each as "Christmas gifts"; and that the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" was void ab initio as the same was contrary to law and public policy and for being a champertous contract.

Respondent Oscar Camerino filed a Motion for Summary Judgment alleging that since the existence of the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" was admitted by petitioner, the only issue to be resolved was whether the said document was coupled with interest and whether it was revocable in contemplation of law and jurisprudence; that Summary Judgment was proper because petitioner did not raise any issue relevant to the contents of the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney"; and that in an Affidavit dated January 23, 2005, he admitted receipt of a check amounting to P500,000.00 which was given to him by petitioner as financial assistance.

On February 3, 2006, petitioner opposed respondent Oscar Camerino's motion on the ground that there were factual issues that required the presentation of evidence.

On February 14, 2006, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that the petition for the cancellation of the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" was actually an action to recover the titles and ownership over the properties; that since respondent Oscar Camerino alleged in paragraph 29 of his Motion for Summary Judgment that the assessed value of the subject lots amounted to P600,000,000, the case partook of the nature of a real action and, thus, the docket fees of P3,929 was insufficient; and that due to insufficient docket fee, his complaint should be dismissed as the RTC was not vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint.

Respondent Oscar Camerino opposed petitioner's motion for preliminary hearing of special and/or affirmative defenses alleging that it was dilatory and that he had a cause of action.

Respondent Oscar Camerino filed his Reply to petitioner's Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment claiming that the determinative issue of whether or not the amount of P500,000 given to him by petitioner rendered the power of attorney irrevocable can be determined from the allegations in the pleadings and affidavits on record without the need of introduction of evidence.

Respondent Oscar Camerino filed an Opposition to petitioner's Motion to Dismiss stating that the instant case was a personal action for the revocation of the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" and not for the recovery of real property and, thus, the correct docket fees were paid.

RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203 admitted the Complaint-in-Intervention because the movants-intervenors ([herein respondents] Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile, and Mildred Del Rosario as legal heir of Nolasco Del Rosario) "have legal interest in the subject properties in litigation and in the success of the petitioner [herein respondent Oscar Camerino], who was precisely their co-plaintiff in Civil Case No. 95-020, entitled `Oscar Camerino, et al. v. Springsun Management Systems Corporation et al.,' where they are the prevailing parties against the defendant therein [SMSC], with respect to the same properties, subject of this case, in a decision rendered by Branch 256 of this Court." The RTC, Branch 203, also granted the Motion for Summary Judgment, denied the motion to dismiss and directed the petitioner to pay the docket fees which has remained unpaid. The Motion for Intervention was also granted.

RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203 rendered a Summary Judgment annulling the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" for being contrary to law and public policy.

The assailed "power of attorney" which was executed on December 18, 2003 is void ab initio for being contrary to the express prohibition or spirit of the aforesaid law or the declared state and public policy on the qualification of the beneficiaries of the agrarian reform program. It bears stressing that the redemption price of the subject lots was paid only on August 4, 2005 or 1 year, 8 months and 14 days after the execution of the assailed power of attorney.

If pursuant to the spirit of the Agrarian Reform Law, the tenant cannot even sell or dispose of his landholding within ten (10) years after he already acquired the same or even thereafter to persons not qualified to acquire economic size farm units in accordance with the provisions of the Agrarian Reform Code, with more reason should the tenant not be allowed to alienate or sell his landholding before he actually acquires the same.

The right of redemption of the petitioner and his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-020 as upheld by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court is founded on a piece of social legislation known as Agrarian Reform Code.

Enunciated in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, et al., vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989) is the policy of the State on agrarian reform legislation. Said State policy emphasizes the "Land for the Landless" slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of land among the people.

Furthermore, the assailed Special Power of Attorney is a champertous contract and therefore void for being against public policy. The pleadings of the parties show that the same special power of attorney was executed by the petitioner, et al. through the intercession of Atty. Arturo Santos and at the behest of the respondent. In his own answer to the instant petition which he is estopped to deny, the respondent alleges that the actual agreement was for the respondent to pay the expenses of the proceedings to enforce the rights of the petitioner and his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-020 without any provision for reimbursement. In other words, the respondents, through the intercession of Atty. Santos, petitioner's attorney, had agreed to carry on with the action for the petitioner et al. at his own expense in consideration of procuring for himself the title to the lots in question as the absolute owner thereof, with the respondent paying the redemption price of said lots, as well as separate amounts of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) to each of the five (5) co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-020, including herein petitioner, or a total sum of Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00).

Under the premises, the aforesaid contract brokered by Atty. Arturo Santos has all really the earmarks of a champertous contract which is against public policy as it violates the fiduciary relations between the lawyer and his client, whose weakness or disadvantage is being exploited by the former. In other words, the situation created under the given premises is a clear circumvention of the prohibition against the execution of champertous contracts between a lawyer and a client.A champertous contract is defined as a contract between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit, whereby the stranger pursues the party's claim in consideration of receiving part or any of the proceeds recovered under the judgment; a bargain by a stranger with a party to a suit, by which such third person undertakes to carry on the litigation at his own cost and risk, in consideration of receiving, if successful, a part of the proceeds or subject sought to be recovered. (Blacks Dictionary; Schnabel v. Taft Broadcasting Co., Inc. Mo. App. 525 S.W. 2d 819, 823). An Agreement whereby the attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client's rights is champertous. [JBP Holding Corporation v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324 (1958)]. Such agreements are against public policy especially where as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at its own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute. [See Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co., et al., 225 F. 242 (1918). The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanction.The intention of the law in prohibiting this kind of contract is to prevent a lawyer from acquiring an interest in the subject of the litigation and to avoid a conflict of interest between him and his client.

In the instant case, it seems that Atty. Santos and the respondent colluded and conspired to circumvent these prohibitions. Considering therefore that Atty. Santos, then petitioner's counsel, brokered the alleged deal between petitioners et al. and the respondent with respect to the lands subject of litigation in Civil Case No. 95-020, the deal contracted is illegal for being a champertous agreement and therefore it cannot be enforced.

Be that as it may, granting the agency established in the assailed Power of Attorney is coupled with interest, the petitioner and his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-020, who are the present intervenors, are not revoking the Power of Attorney at will but have precisely gone to court and filed the instant petition for its cancellation or revocation. What is prohibited by law and jurisprudence is the arbitrary and whimsical revocation of a power of attorney or agency coupled with interest, at will by a party, without court declaration.

Judgment was rendered nullifying the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" in question, and ordering the respondent to turnover the Certificates of Title Nos. 15895, 15896 and 15897 covering the lots to petitioners an intervenors.

Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration seeking to set aside the trial court's Joint Order dated June 9, 2005 and Summary Judgment dated June 15, 2006 which was opposed by the respondents.

Respondents filed a Motion for Execution Pending Final Decision/Appeal which was opposed by petitioner.

The trial court issued an order denying petitioner's Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration. Within the reglementary period, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal and paid the corresponding appeal docket fees.

CA affirmed the trial court's Joint Order dated June 9, 2006 and Summary Judgment dated June 15, 2006 and dismissed the petitioner's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The CA ruled that as the RTC rendered the assailed Summary Judgment based on the pleadings and documents on record, without any trial or reception of evidence, the same did not involve factual matters. The CA found the issues raised by the petitioner in his appeal to be questions of law. CA concluded that since the issues involved questions of law, the proper mode of appeal should have been through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court directly to this Court and not through an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 thereof and, thus, petitioner's appeal to the CA should be dismissed outright pursuant to this Court's Circular No. 2-90, dated March 9, 1990, mandating the dismissal of appeals involving pure questions of law erroneously brought to the CA.

CA denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA is correct in not voiding the assailed summary judgment for failure of respondents to implead an indispensable party.

RULING: Respondents maintain that they were deceived into executing the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" in favor of the petitioner which was done through the maneuverings of their own lawyer, Atty. Santos, who, according to them, had connived with petitioner in order to effect the fraudulent transaction. In this regard, respondents should have impleaded Atty. Santos as an indispensable party-defendant early on when the case was still with the RTC, but they failed to do so. However, their procedural lapse did not constitute a sufficient ground for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 05-172.

SCourt explained that the non-joinder of an indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules, as amended, requires indispensable parties to be joined as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality. Strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void. There is lack of authority to act not only of the absent party but also as to those present. The responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties rests on the petitioner or plaintiff. However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner or plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint or petition for the petitioner or plaintiff's failure to comply therefor. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. In the present case, the RTC and the CA did not require the respondents to implead Atty. Santos as party-defendant or respondent in the case. The operative act that would lead to the dismissal of Civil Case No. 05-172 would be the refusal of respondents to comply with the directive of the court for the joinder of an indispensable party to the case.

Spouses Villuga v. Kelly Hardware G.R. No. 176570, July 18, 2012Facts:On March 3, 1995, herein respondent filed with the RTC of Bacoor, Cavite a Complaint for a Sum of Money and Damages against herein petitioners alleging that during the period of November 19, 1992 to January 5, 1993, defendants [herein petitioners] made purchases of various construction materials from plaintiff corporation [herein respondent] in the sum of P259,809.50, which has not been paid up to the present time, both principal and stipulated interests due thereon. Plaintiff made several demands, oral and written, for the same defendants to pay all their obligations due plaintiff herein, but defendants fail and refuse to comply with, despite demands made upon them, to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff.

In their Answer to Complaint, petitioners admitted having made purchases from respondent, but alleged that they do not remember the exact amount thereof as no copy of the documents evidencing the purchases were attached to the complaint. Petitioners, nonetheless, claimed that they have made payments to the respondent on March 4, 1994 and August 9, 1994 in the amounts of P110,301.80 and P20,000.00, respectively, and they are willing to pay the balance of their indebtedness after deducting the payments made and after verification of their account.In a Manifestation dated July 18, 1995, petitioners stated that in order to buy peace, they were willing to pay respondent the principal sum of P259,809.50, but without interests and costs, and on installment basis.In its Counter Manifestation, respondent signified that it was amenable to petitioners' offer to pay the principal amount of P259,809.50. However, respondent insisted that petitioners should also pay interests, as well as litigation expenses and attorney's fees, and all incidental expenses.Subsequently, on August 11, 1995, respondent filed a Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadingscontending that petitioners were deemed to have admitted in their Answer that they owed respondent the amount of P259,809.50 when they claimed that they made partial payments amounting to P130,301.80. Based on this premise, respondent prayed that it be awarded the remaining balance of P129,507.70. Petitioners filed their Oppositionto the said Motion.On September 11, 1995, the RTC issued an Order deferring resolution of respondent's Motion for Partial Judgment on the ground that there is no clear and specific admission on the part of petitioners as to the actual amount that they owe respondent.On January 30, 1996, respondent filed an Amended Complaint, with leave of court, alleging that between October 1992 until January 5, 1993, petitioners purchased from it (respondent) various construction materials and supplies, the aggregate value of which is P279,809.50; that only P20,000.00 had been paid leaving a balance of P259,809.50.In their Answer to Amended Complaint, petitioners reiterated their allegations in their Answer to Complaint.On March 8, 1996, respondent filed a Request for Admissionasking that petitioners admit the genuineness of various documents, such as statements of accounts, delivery receipts, invoices and demand letter attached thereto as well as the truth of the allegations set forth therein.Respondent basically asked petitioners to admit that the latter's principal obligation is P279,809.50 and that only P20,000.00 was paid.On June 3, 1996, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motionbefore the RTC praying that since petitioners failed to timely file their comment to the Request for Admission, they be considered to have admitted the genuineness of the documents described in and exhibited with the said Request as well as the truth of the matters of fact set forth therein, in accordance with the Rules of Court.On June 6, 1996, petitioners filed their Comments on the Request for Admissionstating their objections to the admission of the documents attached to the Request.On January 24, 1997, respondent filed its Second Amended Complaint,again with leave of court. The amendment modified the period covered by the complaint. Instead of October 1992 to January 5, 1993, it was changed to July 29, 1992 until August 10, 1994. The amendment also confirmed petitioners' partial payment in the sum of P110,301.80 but alleged that this payment was applied to other obligations which petitioners owe respondent. Respondent reiterated its allegation that, despite petitioners' partial payment, the principal amount which petitioners owe remains P259,809.50.Petitioners filed their Answer to the Second Amended Complaintdenying the allegations therein and insisting that they have made partial payments.On September 4, 1997, respondent filed a Motion to Expunge with Motion for Summary Judgmentclaiming that petitioners' Comments on respondent's Request for Admission is a mere scrap of paper as it was signed by petitioners' counsel and not by petitioners themselves and that it was filed beyond the period allowed by the Rules of Court. Respondent goes on to assert that petitioners, in effect, were deemed to have impliedly admitted the matters subject of the said request. Respondent also contended that it is already entitled to the issuance of a summary judgment in its favor as petitioners not only failed to tender a genuine issue as to any material fact but also did not raise any special defenses, which could possibly relate to any factual issue.In their Opposition to Motion to Expunge with Motion for Summary Judgment,petitioners argued that respondent's request for admission is fatally defective, because it did not indicate or specify a period within which to answer; that verification by petitioners' counsel is sufficient compliance with the Rules of Court; that petitioners' request for admission should be deemed dispensed with and no longer taken into account as it only relates to the Amended Complaint, which was already abandoned when the Second Amended Complaint was filed; and that summary judgment is improper and without legal basis, as there exists a genuine controversy brought about by petitioners' specific denials and defenses.On September 28, 1998, the RTC issued an Order infavor of the defendant in which the petitioner submitted a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Then appealed to the CA. Then appealed again to the SC.ISSUE: Whether or not there should not have been a summary judgment against defendantsappellants (petitioners)RULING:The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds that the CA was correct in sustaining the summary judgment rendered by the RTC.Sections 1 and 3, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court provide as follows:Section 1. Summary judgment for claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.Section 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before the hearing. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays.Such judgment is generally based on the facts proven summarily by affidavits, depositions, pleadings, or admissions of the parties.In this respect, the Court's ruling in Nocom v. Camerino,is instructive, to wit:When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules of Court allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts. Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. A "genuine issue" is such issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. Section 3 of [Rule 35 of the Rules of Court] provides two (2) requisites for summary judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine.Phil. Business Bank v. ChuaG.R. No. 178899, November 15, 2010FACTS:On March 22, 2002, Tomas Tan (Tan), a stockholder and director/Treasurer of CST Enterprises, Inc. (CST), filed a derivative suit for the Declaration of Unenforceability of Promissory Notes and Mortgage, Nullity of Secretarys Certificate, Injunction, Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction against PBB, Francis Lee, Alfredo Yao, Rodulfo Besinga, Stephen Taala, Rose Robles, Henry Ramos, Yu Heng, Mabuhay Sugar Central, Inc., Nancy Chan, Henry Chan, John Dennis Chua, Jaime Soriano, Voltaire Uychutin, Peter Salud, Edgar Lo, respondent Felipe Chua, and John Does before the Makati City Regional Trial Court.In Tans amended complaint dated January 9, 2003, he alleged that sometime in February 2001, before he went abroad for medical treatment, he turned over to respondent Chua, a director and the President of CST, the original copies of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124275 and 157581, titles to lands owned by, and registered in the name of, CST. In January 2002, the respondent informed him that CSTs properties had been fraudulently used as collateral for loans allegedly taken out in CSTs name, but without proper authority from CST stockholders and/or the Board of Directors. From his investigation, Tan discovered that a certain Atty. Jaime Soriano had issued a Secretarys certificate, which stated that John Dennis Chua was authorized during a duly constituted CST board meeting to open a bank account and obtain credit facilities under the name of CST with PBB. This Secretarys Certificate also authorized John Dennis Chua to use CSTs properties as security for these loans.Using this Secretarys Certificate, John Dennis Chua took out loans with PBB in the total amount of Ninety-One Million One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P91,100,000.00),and used CST properties as collateral.Respondent Chua signed as co-maker with John Dennis Chua, who signed both as the representative of CST, as well as in his personal capacity, on six promissory notes to PBB to evidence parts of this loan. When PBB threatened to foreclose the mortgage on these properties after CST defaulted,Tan filed the present complaint, essentially arguing that the loans/promissory notes and mortgage made out in CSTs name are unenforceable against it, since they were entered into by persons who were unauthorized to bind the company. In its Amended Answer,PBB claimed that the loans to CST, as well as the corresponding mortgage over CST properties, were all valid and binding since the loan applications and documents accomplished by John Dennis Chua were supported by the duly accomplished secretarys certificate, which authorized him to obtain credit facilities in behalf of CST. In addition, the original copies of the titles to the properties were offered to PBB as collaterals.PBBs Amended Answer also included a cross-claim against respondent Chua, demanding payment of the promissory notes he signed as co-maker with John Dennis ChuaIn respondent Chuas Answer to the Cross-Claim of PBB,he claimed that he never applied for a loan with the PBB. He further denied authorizing John Dennis Chua to apply for any loans in CSTs name, or to use CST properties as security for any loans.Nevertheless, he admitted that he signed, as co-maker, six promissory notes covering the loans obtained by John Dennis Chua with PBB. According to respondent Chua, he executed these promissory notes after the loans had already been consummated, "in a sincere effort to persuade John Dennis Chua to pay off the unauthorized loan and retrieve from cross-claimant PBB the CST titles."PBB subsequently filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment based on Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules), claiming that since respondent Chua already admitted the execution of the promissory notes in favor of PBB amounting to Seventy Five Million Pesos (P75,000,000.00),insofar as its cross-claim against him was concerned, there was no genuine issue on any material fact on the issue of his liability to PBB. PBB argued that although respondent Chua claimed that he signed the promissory notes merely to persuade John Dennis Chua to pay off his loan to PBB, he was still liable as an accommodation party under Section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.A partial summary judgment was never intended to be considered a "final judgment," as it does not "[put] an end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has not entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for.Acting on PBBs motion, the RTC issued a partial summary judgment on PBBs cross-claim on July 27, 2005, finding respondent Chua liable as a signatory to the promissory notes amounting to Seventy-Five Million Pesos (P75,000,000.00). The RTC reasoned that by signing as a co-maker, he obligated himself to pay the amount indicated in the promissory notes, even if he received no consideration in return. Thus, the RTC ordered him to pay PBB the amount ofP75,000,000.00, plus interests and costs.Respondent Chua filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the CA to challenge the December 16, 2005 order, granting PBBs motion to disallow his appeal the December 21, 2005 order, granting PBBs motion to appoint Renato Flora as special sheriff to implement the writ of execution; and the February 16, 2006 order denying his motion for reconsideration and to suspend execution. In essence, respondent Chua alleged that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in disallowing his appeal of the partial summary judgment, and in issuing a writ of execution. Significantly, respondent Chua did not question the propriety of the partial summary judgment.ISSUE: Whether or not the honorable court of appeals committed an error in recalling and setting aside the writ of execution and all the proceedings taken for its implementation on the wrong notion that the partial summary judgment has not become final and executory.Ruling:Nature of Partial Summary JudgmentPBBs motion for partial summary judgment against respondent Chua was based on Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules, which provides:Section 1.Summary Judgment for claimant.- A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.A summary judgment, or accelerated judgment, is a procedural technique to promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on record, or for weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation to avoid the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.21When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts.22The rendition by the court of a summary judgment does not always result in the full adjudication of all the issues raised in a case. For these instances, Section 4, Rule 35 of the Rules provides:Section 4. Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this Rule, judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the reliefs sought and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel shall ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. The facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted on the controverted facts accordingly.This is what is referred to as a partial summary judgment. A careful reading of this section reveals that a partial summary judgment was never intended to be considered a "final judgment," as it does not "[put] an end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has not entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for."23The Rules provide for a partial summary judgment as a means to simplify the trial process by allowing the court to focus the trial only on the assailed facts, considering as established those facts which are not in dispute.After this sifting process, the court is instructed to issue an order, the partial summary judgment, which specifies the disputed facts that have to be settled in the course of trial. In this way, the partial summary judgment is more akin to a record of pre-trial,24an interlocutory order, rather than a final judgment.Buncayao vs. Fort Ilocandia Property, G.R. No. 170483, Apr. 19, 2010FACTS: Manuel C. Bungcayao, Sr. (petitioner) claimed to be one of the two entrepreneurs who introduced improvements on the foreshore area of Calayab Beach in 1978 when Fort Ilocandia Hotel started its construction in the area and later formed themselves into the DSierto Beach Resort Owners Association, Inc. (DSierto)6 parcels of land in Barrio Balacad (now Calayad) where the resort situated were transferred to the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1704Petitioner and other DSierto members applied for a foreshore lease with the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) and was granted a provisional permit.Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings and Development Corporation (respondent) filed a foreshore application over a 14-hectare area abutting the Fort Ilocandia Property, including the 5-hectare portion applied for by DSierto members.DENR Regional Executive Director denied the foreshore lease applications of the DSierto members, including petitioner, on the ground that the subject area applied for fell either within the titled property or within the foreshore areas applied for by respondent. The DSierto members appealed the denial of their applications- DENR Secretary denied the appeal on the ground that the area applied for encroached on the titled property of respondent based on the final verification plan.Respondent, through its Public Relations Manager invited the DSierto to discuss common details beneficial to all parties concerned. Atty. Liza Marcos (Atty. Marcos), wife of Governor Bongbong Marcos, was asked by Fort Ilocandia hotel officials to mediate over the conflict among the parties. Atty. Marcos offered P300,000 as financial settlement per claimant in consideration of the improvements introduced, on the condition that they would vacate the area identified as respondents property. A DSierto member made a counter-offer of P400,000, to which the other DSierto members agreed.Petitioner alleged that his son, Manuel Bungcayao, Jr., who attended the meeting, manifested that he still had to consult his parents about the offer but upon the undue pressure exerted by Atty. Marcos, he accepted the payment and signed the Deed of Assignment, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim[footnoteRef:1] in favor of respondent. [1: ]

Petitioner then filed an action for declaration of nullity of contract before the RTC- Laoag against respondent alleging that his son had no authority to represent him and that the deed was void and not binding upon him. The issue raised by petitioner was his claim for damages while respondents issue was only his claim for possession of the property occupied by petitioner and damages.RTC Dismissed the claim of plaintiff for and granted the counterclaim of the defendant for recovery of possession of the lot occupied by the plaintiff.Pet went on appeal to CA-affirmed RTC, Hence, petition was filed in SC.ISSUE: Whether or not summary judgment is appropriate in this case.Ruling:Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:Section 1.Summary Judgment for claimant.- A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays.When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts.Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper.A genuine issue is such issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.Section 3 of the said rule provides two (2) requisites for summary judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine.Since limited the issues to the damages claimed by the parties, summary judgment has been properly rendered in this case.Smart v. Aldecoa G.R. No. 166330, September 11, 2013Facts:Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the telecommunications business. On March 9, 2000, petitioner entered into a contract of lease4with Florentino Sebastian in which the latter agreed to lease to the former a piece of vacant lot, measuring around 300 square meters, located in Barangay Vira, Roxas, Isabela (leased property).Petitioner, through its contractor, Allarilla Construction, immediately constructed and installed a cellular base station on the leased property. Inside the cellular base station is a communications tower, rising as high as150 feet, with antennas and transmitters; as well as a power house open on three sides containing a 25KVA diesel power generator. Around and close to the cellular base station are houses, hospitals, clinics, and establishments, including the properties of respondents Arsenio Aldecoa, Jose B. Torre, Conrado U. Pua, Gregorio V. Mansano, Jerry Corpuz, and Estelita Acosta.Respondents filed before the RTC on May 23, 2000 a Complaint against petitioner for abatement of nuisance and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction.In the end, petitioner sought the dismissal of respondents Complaint; the denial of respondents prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction; the award of moral, nominal, and exemplary damages in the amounts which the court deem just and reasonable; and the award of attorneys fees in the sum ofP500,000.00 and litigation expenses as may be proven at the trial.Respondents then contested petitioners allegations and averred in their Reply and Answer to Counterclaim. Respondents likewise filed on September 21, 2000 their Opposition to petitioners Motion for Summary Judgment, maintaining that there were several genuine issues relating to the cause of action and material facts of their Complaint. They asserted that there was a need for a full blown trial to prove the allegations in their Complaint, as well as the defenses put up by petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rule 35 applies to this case.Ruling:Summary judgments are governed by Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, pertinent provisions of which state:SEC. 2. Summary judgment for defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before the hearing. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. For a summary judgment to be proper, the movant must establish two requisites: (a) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (b) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Where, on the basis of the pleadings of a moving party, including documents appended thereto, no genuine issue as to a material fact exists, the burden to produce a genuine issue shifts to the opposing party. If the opposing party fails, the moving party is entitled to a summary judgment.A genuine issue is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is a sham, fictitious, contrived or a false claim.The trial court can determine a genuine issue on the basis of the pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits or counter affidavits submitted by the parties. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or question as to any fact and summary judgment called for. On the other hand, where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial. The evidence on record must be viewed in light most favorable to the party opposing the motion who must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences as can reasonably be drawn from the evidence.

Phil. Business Bank v. Chua G.R. No. 178899, November 15, 2010FACTS:On March 22, 2002, Tomas Tan (Tan), a stockholder and director/Treasurer of CST Enterprises, Inc. (CST), filed a derivative suit for the Declaration of Unenforceability of Promissory Notes and Mortgage, Nullity of Secretarys Certificate, Injunction, Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction against PBB, Francis Lee, Alfredo Yao, Rodulfo Besinga, Stephen Taala, Rose Robles, Henry Ramos, Yu Heng, Mabuhay Sugar Central, Inc., Nancy Chan, Henry Chan, John Dennis Chua, Jaime Soriano, Voltaire Uychutin, Peter Salud, Edgar Lo, respondent Felipe Chua, and John Does before the Makati City Regional Trial Court.In Tans amended complaint dated January 9, 2003, he alleged that sometime in February 2001, before he went abroad for medical treatment, he turned over to respondent Chua, a director and the President of CST, the original copies of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124275 and 157581, titles to lands owned by, and registered in the name of, CST. In January 2002, the respondent informed him that CSTs properties had been fraudulently used as collateral for loans allegedly taken out in CSTs name, but without proper authority from CST stockholders and/or the Board of Directors. From his investigation, Tan discovered that a certain Atty. Jaime Soriano had issued a Secretarys certificate, which stated that John Dennis Chua was authorized during a duly constituted CST board meeting to open a bank account and obtain credit facilities under the name of CST with PBB. This Secretarys Certificate also authorized John Dennis Chua to use CSTs properties as security for these loans.Using this Secretarys Certificate, John Dennis Chua took out loans with PBB in the total amount of Ninety-One Million One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P91,100,000.00),and used CST properties as collateral.Respondent Chua signed as co-maker with John Dennis Chua, who signed both as the representative of CST, as well as in his personal capacity, on six promissory notes to PBB to evidence parts of this loan. When PBB threatened to foreclose the mortgage on these properties after CST defaulted,Tan filed the present complaint, essentially arguing that the loans/promissory notes and mortgage made out in CSTs name are unenforceable against it, since they were entered into by persons who were unauthorized to bind the company. In its Amended Answer,PBB claimed that the loans to CST, as well as the corresponding mortgage over CST properties, were all valid and binding since the loan applications and documents accomplished by John Dennis Chua were supported by the duly accomplished secretarys certificate, which authorized him to obtain credit facilities in behalf of CST. In addition, the original copies of the titles to the properties were offered to PBB as collaterals.PBBs Amended Answer also included a cross-claim against respondent Chua, demanding payment of the promissory notes he signed as co-maker with John Dennis ChuaIn respondent Chuas Answer to the Cross-Claim of PBB,he claimed that he never applied for a loan with the PBB. He further denied authorizing John Dennis Chua to apply for any loans in CSTs name, or to use CST properties as security for any loans.Nevertheless, he admitted that he signed, as co-maker, six promissory notes covering the loans obtained by John Dennis Chua with PBB. According to respondent Chua, he executed these promissory notes after the loans had already been consummated, "in a sincere effort to persuade John Dennis Chua to pay off the unauthorized loan and retrieve from cross-claimant PBB the CST titles."PBB subsequently filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment based on Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules), claiming that since respondent Chua already admitted the execution of the promissory notes in favor of PBB amounting to Seventy Five Million Pesos (P75,000,000.00),insofar as its cross-claim against him was concerned, there was no genuine issue on any material fact on the issue of his liability to PBB. PBB argued that although respondent Chua claimed that he signed the promissory notes merely to persuade John Dennis Chua to pay off his loan to PBB, he was still liable as an accommodation party under Section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.A partial summary judgment was never intended to be considered a "final judgment," as it does not "[put] an end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has not entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for.Acting on PBBs motion, the RTC issued a partial summary judgment on PBBs cross-claim on July 27, 2005, finding respondent Chua liable as a signatory to the promissory notes amounting to Seventy-Five Million Pesos (P75,000,000.00). The RTC reasoned that by signing as a co-maker, he obligated himself to pay the amount indicated in the promissory notes, even if he received no consideration in return. Thus, the RTC ordered him to pay PBB the amount ofP75,000,000.00, plus interests and costs.Respondent Chua filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the CA to challenge the December 16, 2005 order, granting PBBs motion to disallow his appeal the December 21, 2005 order, granting PBBs motion to appoint Renato Flora as special sheriff to implement the writ of execution; and the February 16, 2006 order denying his motion for reconsideration and to suspend execution. In essence, respondent Chua alleged that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in disallowing his appeal of the partial summary judgment, and in issuing a writ of execution. Significantly, respondent Chua did not question the propriety of the partial summary judgment.ISSUE: Whether or not the honorable court of appeals committed an error in recalling and setting aside the writ of execution and all the proceedings taken for its implementation on the wrong notion that the partial summary judgment has not become final and executory.

Ruling:Nature of Partial Summary JudgmentPBBs motion for partial summary judgment against respondent Chua was based on Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules, which provides:Section 1.Summary Judgment for claimant.- A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.A summary judgment, or accelerated judgment, is a procedural technique to promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on record, or for weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation to avoid the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.21When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts.22The rendition by the court of a summary judgment does not always result in the full adjudication of all the issues raised in a case. For these instances, Section 4, Rule 35 of the Rules provides:Section 4. Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this Rule, judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the reliefs sought and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel shall ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. The facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted on the controverted facts accordingly.This is what is referred to as a partial summary judgment. A careful reading of this section reveals that a partial summary judgment was never intended to be considered a "final judgment," as it does not "[put] an end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has not entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for."23The Rules provide for a partial summary judgment as a means to simplify the trial process by allowing the court to focus the trial only on the assailed facts, considering as established those facts which are not in dispute.After this sifting process, the court is instructed to issue an order, the partial summary judgment, which specifies the disputed facts that have to be settled in the course of trial. In this way, the partial summary judgment is more akin to a record of pre-trial,24an interlocutory order, rather than a final judgment.

Gotamco v. Chan SengG.R. No. L-22737, November 28, 1924Facts: Antonio Tanpoco died in the year 1920 and left a will dividing his estate of over P300,000 among four sons, one-half of which he bequeathed to Tan Kim Hong, the claimant, whom he described in his will as his legitimate son, and the other half he left in equal shares to his three adopted sons, Tan Kimco. Tan Kimbio and Tan Kim Choo, and appointed Go Siu San, a resident of Manila, as executor of his will, which provided that no bond should be required. Two Chinese named Tan Kim Lay and Te Sue, one of Tarlac and the other of Manila, were appointed and qualified as commissioners, and later they published the usual notice to creditors to present their claims within six months at the office of Attorney M. G. Goyena, of Manila. The commissioners presented their report to the court in which, among others, they reported the allowance of the claim here in question. At the time all of the heirs, including Tan Kim Hong, were minors and had lived in China since the death of Antonio Tanpoco, as also had the widow of the deceased. When such report has been filed, the executor filed a motion asking for the appointment of an attorney of his own choice ascurador ad litemfor the minor heirs which, among other things, that the heirs who are interested in the estate of the above entitled action are all minors, to wit: Tan Kimco, age 20; Tan Kim Hong, age 12; Tan Kimbio, age 11; and Tan Kim Choo, age 4; and that all the above heirs are now in China, and the day of their return to the Islands is unknown to the administrator of the estate which court ignored but appointed Mr. Canillas who considered such appointment as only formality such that he did not make any investigations thereof and hence, the report was approved. In September, 1922, they arrived in Manila and employed counsel to represent and protect their interest, and it was then that Chan Seng learned for the first time of the allowance of the claim in favor of Tan Kim Hong. Upon her motion, on November 27, 1922, Judge Harvey ordered an investigation of the administration of Go Siu San as executor, which was made by Mr. Felipe Canillas, who still held the position of curador ad litem of all the minor heirs, including the claimant, who made a written report to the court. The report concluded with a recommendation for the removal of the executor for gross misconduct and fraud, and the annulment of the claim of Tan Kim Hong. After the report was filed, a hearing was had and testimony was taken, and Judge Harvey removed Go Siu San as executor, and in his order of removal, among other things, said that commissioners Te Sue and that he had not received any claim; that the claims which appears in the report were taken from the books of the business of the deceased, Antonio Tanpoco; nevertheless, the claim of Tan Peng Sue does not appear in the report of these commissioners on claims although it appears in the books and was afterwards accepted by the commissioners last appointed. After such proceedings, nothing was further done until November 14, 1923, when the present administrator applied to the court for authority, among other things, to pay the claim in question, to which the appellee appeared and objected. The court denied the application of the present guardian to the claimant to require the administrator to pay the claim in question upon the ground that it was void and fictitious, from which Tan Kim Hong appeals, contending that the lower court erred in hearing and sustaining the objections to the allowance of the claim, and in denying the motion of the administrator for authority to pay the claim, alleging that the report of the committee allowing the claim was made and filed on June 29, 1921, and contends that it became automatically final on July 14, 1921; that the opponent should have made her opposition within the time specified in the Code, and that her failure to take the statutory appeal is a bar to all defenses, citing and relying upon the case ofDe los Santos vs. Reyes.Issue: Whether or not the claim was timely filed and presented and that such filing became final.Ruling:NO. The court found as a fact that in theDe los Santos vs. Reyescase,supra, there was a substantial compliance with all of the statutory requirements, and the decision in that case was based upon that fact. But there is a marked distinction between the facts there and those in the instant case. Here, all of the parties in interest were minors. The evidence is conclusive that at the time the alleged claim was allowed, Tan Kim Hong was only twelve years of age, and that all of the other parties were minors. There is no claim or pretense that Tan Kim Hong had a guardian or that anyone had the legal authority to appear for and present his claim or to represent him, or that his claim was ever presented. There is no claim or pretense that any of the parties in interest had any knowledge of the fact that the claim was presented and allowed before they came to Manila from China in September, 1922. As a matter of fact, there is no evidence that the claim in question in any manner, shape or form was ever presented to the commissioners by anyone. For aught that appears in the record, the claim was allowed by the commissioners on their own motion and of their own volition. It also appears that the entries which were made in the books of the deceased were made by his bookkeeper, and there is nothing to show that they were made by the authority of the deceased. It is very significant that the will of the deceased was made sometime after the entries were made, and that no reference whatever is made in the will to the claim in question. A judgment is the law's last word in a judicial controversy. It may therefore be defined as the final consideration and determination of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the matters submitted to it in an action or proceeding. A more precise definition is that a judgment is the conclusion of the law upon the matters contained in the record, or the application of the law to the pleadings and to the facts, as found by the court or admitted by the parties, or deemed to exist upon their default in a course of judicial proceedings. It should be noted that only is a judgment which is pronounced between the parties to an action upon the matters submitted to the court for decision. . . .In the instant case there was not claim made, filed or presented by anyone. Legally speaking, the allowance of the claim would be like rendering a judgment without the filing of a complaint, or even the making or presentment of a claim.Upon the facts shown, to legalize the allowance of the claim with all of the formalities and requisites of a final judgment, would be a travesty upon justice. It appears from the record before us that the commissioners did not have any jurisdiction to allow the claim; that as to the claim in question their proceedings were null and void ab initio, and hence they were notres judicata, and in addition to that, it clearly appears that the allowance of the claim was a fraud upon the appellee.Jose v. Javellana, G.R. No. 158239, January 25, 2012 (Supra.)Facts:Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita) sold for consideration of P160,000.00 to respondent Ramon Javellana by deed of conditional sale two parcels of land with areas of 3,675 and 20,936 square meters located in Barangay Mallis, Guiguinto, Bulacan. They agreed that Javellana would pay P80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed and the balance of P80,000.00 upon the registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens System (the registration being undertaken by Margarita within a reasonable period of time); and that should Margarita become incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal M. Alma Jose (Juvenal), and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would receive the payment of the balance and proceed with the application for registration.After Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased Margarita without issue, the vendors undertaking fell on the shoulders of Priscilla, being Margaritas sole surviving heir. However, Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking to cause the registration of the properties under the Torrens System, and, instead, began to improve the properties by dumping filling materials therein with the intention of converting the parcels of land into a residential or industrial subdivision. Faced with Priscillas refusal to comply, Javellana commenced an action for specific performance, injunction, and damages against her in the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan (RTC). Javellana prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain Priscilla from dumping filling materials in the parcels of land; and that Priscilla be ordered to institute registration proceedings and then to execute a final deed of sale in his favor. Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred by prescription; and that the complaint did not state a cause of action.The RTC initially denied Priscillas motion to dismiss. However, upon her motion for reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself and granted the motion to dismiss.Javellana moved for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of any reason to disturb its order. Accordingly, Javellana filed a notice of appeal. Priscilla countered that the RTC order was not appealable; that the appeal was not perfected on time; and that Javellana was guilty of forum shopping. It appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to assail the June 24, 1999 and June 21, 2000 orders dismissing his complaint. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari.As to the notice on appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and remanded the records to the RTC "for further proceedings in accordance with law." The CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Priscilla. Issue: Whether or not the RTCs decision denying of the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal a final order and appealable;

Ruling:Yes. First of all, the denial of Javellanas motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one. The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that "appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable;" but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari.Calderon v. Roxas, G.R. No. 185595, January 9, 2013FACTS:

Petitioner Ma. Carminia C. Calderon and private respondent Jose Antonio F. Roxas, were married on December 4, 1985 and their union produced four hildren. On January 16, 1998, petitioner filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.

While the action was pending, the trial court granted Calderons request for support pendent lite (while the action for nullity is pending).

On May 16, 2005, the trial court rendered its decision declaring the marriage null and void, awarding custody of the children to the mother and ordering Roxas to provide support to the children. Several actions were raised in court, with Roxas asking for a decrease of the monthly support while Calderon asking for an increase in the amount and Roxas payment on his arrears for support.

ISSUE: This petition is raised by Calderon not to assail the nullity of their marriage but, rather, is premised on whether or not the matter of support pendent lite is already interlocutory and final

Ruling:

Petitioner contends that the CA failed to recognize that the interlocutory aspect of the assailed orders pertains only to private respondents motion to reduce supportwhich was granted, and to her own motion to increase support, which was denied. Petitioner points out that the ruling on support in arrears which have remainedunpaid, as well as her prayer for reimbursement/payment were in the nature of final orders assailable by ordinary appeal. SC disagrees.An interlocutory order merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of the case. In contrast, a judgment or order is considered final if the order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of the same action. Clearly, whether an order or resolution is final or interlocutory is not dependent on compliance or noncompliance by a party to its directive, as what petitioner suggests.

Moreover, private respondents obligation to give monthly support in the amount fixed by the RTC in the assailed orders may be enforced by the court itself, as what transpired in the early stage of the proceedings when the court cited the private respondent in contempt of court and ordered him arrested for his refusal/failure to comply with the order granting support pendente lite. A few years later, private respondent filed a motion to reduce support while petitioner filed her own motion to increase the same, and in addition sought spousal support and support in arrears. This fact underscores the provisional character of the order granting support pendente lite.

Petitioners theory that the assailed orders have ceased to be provisional due to the arrearages incurred by private respondent is therefore untenable.

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Having chosen the wrong remedy in questioning the subject interlocutory orders of the RTC, petitioner's appeal was correctly dismissed by the CA.

Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111610, February 27, 2002

FACTS: It appears that in an Information dated December 1, 1983 petitioner Romeo Nazareno and his wife, Elisa Nazareno, were charged with Serious Physical Injuries in the Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite and that upon arraignment, both pleaded "not guilty" to the offense charged.After trial on the merits, the said court set the promulgation of judgment for April 24, 1986, but the same was postponed due to petitioners filing of a motion to re-open the case on the ground of non-presentation of a vital witness who could not be produced during the trial proper.Said motion was opposed by the prosecution. On November 27, 1987, after Presiding Judge Manuel C. Diosomito was suspended, Acting Municipal Trial Court Judge Aurelio Icasiano, Jr. issued a resolution denying the motion to re-open. Petitioner brought the matter up to the Court of Appeals on certiorari with a prayer for a temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 14329.In the meantime, Acting Municipal Trial Court Judge Icasiano, Jr. set the promulgation of judgment on April 15, 1988. On April 15, 1988, Acting Municipal Trial Court Judge Icasiano, Jr. promulgated the Decisiondated November 8, 1985 of Judge Manuel C. Diosomito acquitting Elisa Nazareno but convicting the petitioner as charged. However, on the same date, the Court of Appeals in said CA-G.R. SP No. 14329 issued a temporary restraining orderenjoining Judge Icasiano, Jr. from proceeding with the promulgation of said judgment since a copy of the same resolution containing the temporary restraining order was received by the Metropolitan Trial Court only after said date.Petitioner thereafter filed in the Court of Appeals a supplemental petition in said CA-G.R. SP No. 14329 to declare the nullity of judgment, on the ground that the decision, having been signed by Judge Diosomito, should have also been promulgated by him, and not by Acting Judge Icasiano, Jr.Petitioner also alleged that the decision is void since at the time of the promulgation of the decision by Judge Icasiano, Jr., Judge Diosomito who signed the subject decision has already retired from office. Said supplemental petition, however, was denied by the Court of Appeals in its decision dated February 11, 1991.Reconsideration of the said decision of the appellate court was denied in a Resolution promulgated on March 13, 1991. Petitioner interposed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court questioning the February 11, 1991 decision of the Court of Appeals but the same failed for having been filed out of time, more specifically twelve (12) days late. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the Supreme Court in a Resolution dated September 18, 1991.On October 3, 1991, petitioner received a copy of the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, and on the same date he filed his notice of appeal with the said Municipal Trial Court of Naic, appealing its decision to the Regional Trial Court. On October 10, 1991, the records of the case were forwarded to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Naic, Cavite, presided by the respondent Judge Enrique M. Almario who, in a decision dated October 12, 1992, dismissed the appeal of petitioner for having been filed out of time.Reconsideration was soughtby petitioner but the same was denied by respondent Judge Almario in his Order dated February 4, 1993. Undaunted, petitioner interposed a Petition for Mandamus and Certiorari with the Court of Appeals upon the premise that respondent Judge Almario, in dismissing the appeal, unlawfully neglected to perform a duty resulting from his office to give due course to petitioners appeal which was already approved.The appellate court dismissed the petition.Petitioner soughtreconsideration of the decision but the same was denied in a Resolutionpromulgated on August 10, 1993.Issue: Whether or not the Judgment has become final and executory.Ruling:Yes. Admittedly, petitioner made possible the failure of the prior petition for review (G.R No. 97812) before this Court to proceed by reason of its late filing as well as his choices of remedial measures. However, oft-repeated is the dictum that courts should not place undue importance on technicalities, when by so doing, substantial justice is sacrificed. Rules of procedure are intended to promote, not defeat, substantial justice. It is within the power of this Court to temper rigid rules of procedure in favor of substantial justice. While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. If the rules are intended to ensure the proper and orderly conduct of litigation, it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the attainment of justice and the protection of substantive rights of the parties. Thus, the relaxation of procedural rules, or saving a particular case from the operation of technicalities when substantial justice requires it, as in the case at bar, should no longer be subject to cavil.

Re: Hon. Suan, A.M. RTJ-04-1849, September 20, 2004Facts:The Report of the Judicial Audit Team of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) dated May 15, 2002, disclosed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15,OzamizCity, had as of December 14, 2001, an inventory of two hundred twenty-three (223) civil and criminal cases, of which thirty-nine (39) had already been submitted for decision, but had yet to be acted upon.Earlier, presiding Judge Pedro L. Suan, in his December 13, 2001 Letter, requested an extension of time within which to finish the foregoing backlog.In a Resolution dated February 11, 2002, this Court granted his request and gave him one hundred eighty (180) days from notice to decide the cases.During the extended period, only fifteen (15) cases were disposed of within the mandated reglementary period.Thus, he left a total of twenty-four (24) unresolved cases.On account of this delay, the Court, in a Resolution dated August 12, 2002, directed Judge Suan to a)toDECIDEwithin thirty (30) days from notice Civil Cases Nos. 93-64 (Guani Milling vs. PPA); 99-12 (Rural Bank of Ozamiz City, Inc. Vs. Casco) and 97-39 (Tee vs. Argelio, et. Al.) And Criminal Case No. 2795 (People vs. Jamago); and toSUBMITcopies of his decisions, through the Office of the Court Administrator, within (10) days from rendition/promulgation thereof;b)to inform the Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator, within ten (10) days from notice hereof, whether or not the following cases were decided/resolved within the reglementary period to wit: Civil Cases Nos. 07-99 (Heirs of Roberta de Ruedas, et. Al., vs. Lolita Carpio); OZC-98-65 (Constancio Suezo IV vs. Guadioso III): OZC00-24 (Leo Obut vs. Hilda E. Hamot); SP-01-0146 (In Re: Petition for Adoption, Fuentes, petitioner), OZC-98-21 (Florida vs. Sps. Role), SP-022-01 (In Re: Petition for Adoption of Joshua Tecson), OZC 00-46 (Uy vs. Standard Insurance) 98-42 (Tudela Evangelical Church, Inc. Vs. United Church of Christ of the Philippines), 97-46 (Heirs of C. Villagoagalo vs. Anslag, et al.) And 21-01 (Go vs. PNB) and toSUBMITcopies of hisdecisions through the Office of the Court Administrator within ten (10) days from rendition/promulgation thereof;c)toIMMEDIATELY RESOLVEthe pending motions in Criminal Case No. 2710 and Civil Case No. 91-19; and toSUBMITa report thereon within twenty (20) days from notice;d)toTAKE APPROPRIATE ACTIONon the three (3) cases which were not acted upon and/or without further setting after the lapse of considerable length of time namely; Civil Cases Nos. 97-40 and 2910 and Criminal Case No. 2811, and on the following ten (10) criminal cases which may be acted upon in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 dated 21 June 1993, re: Guidelines in the archiving of cases, namely: Criminal Cases Nos. 2925, 2998, 2999, 3001, 3004, 2991, 3005, 3006, 3007 and 3011, toSUBMITa report thereon,within twenty (20) days from notice, and toFURNISHthis Court copies of his decisions on the twenty-eight (28) cases subject of his request for extension of time to resolve cases in A.M. No. 02-1-41-RTC, within ten (10) days from rendition/promulgation thereof.

The Office of the Court Administrator found Judge Suan to have incurred delays in deciding cases and to have decided cases even after his retirement. It also found that these Decisions had inappropriately been promulgated by Judge Inting.Hence, it recommended that they both be held liable for gross inefficiency and ignorance of the lawIssue: Whther or not the judgments made by Hon. Suan was valid.Ruling. No. Under Article VIII of Section 11 of the Constitution, judges shall hold office during good behavior until the age of seventy or until they become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office.Because Judge Suan compulsorily retired on May 29, 2002, he could no longer continue -- after that date -- to exercise the powers of his office, including the authority to decide and promulgate cases. Thus, his Decisions in Civil Case Nos. 93-64, 98-42 and 95-01 -- promulgated on July 19, 2002, August 18, 2002 and July 3, 2002, respectively -- are null and void.Entrenched in our jurisprudence as early as 1917 is the principle that for judgments to be valid and binding, they should be made by legally constituted judges. Further, not only must judges make their judgments during their tenure, they must also promulgate these within that period.As reiterated inPeople v. Labao, for a judgment to be valid, it must be duly signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who signed it; otherwise, it cannot acquire a binding effect.UP v. Hon. Dizon, G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2010Facts:The UP, through its then President Jose V. Abueva, entered into a General Construction Agreement with respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders), for the construction of the extension building and the renovation of the College of Arts and Sciences Building in the campus of the University of the Philippines in Los Baos (UPLB). When the UP failed to pay the billing, prompting Stern Builders and dela Cruz to sue the UP and its co-respondent officials to collect the unpaid billing and to recover various damages. After trial, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of the Stern Builders. Following the RTCs denial of its motion for reconsideration, the UP filed a notice of appeal. Stern Builders and dela Cruz opposed the notice of appeal on the ground of its filing being belated, and moved for the execution of the decision. The UP countered that the notice of appeal was filed within the reglementary period because the UPs Office of Legal Affairs (OLS) in Diliman, Quezon City received the order of denial only on May 31, 2002. Both the CA and the RTC found the filing on June 3, 2002 by the UP of the notice of appeal to be tardy. They based their finding on the fact that only six days remained of the UPs reglementary 15-day period within which to file the notice of appeal because the UP had filed a motion for reconsideration on January 16, 2002 vis--vis the RTCs decision the UP received on January 7, 2002; and that because the denial of the motion for reconsideration had been served upon Atty. Felimon D. Nolasco of the UPLB.Legal Office on May 17, 2002, the UP had only until May 23, 2002 within which to file the notice of appeal.Issue:Whether or not the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco was defective considering that its counsel of record was not Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB Legal Office but the OLS in Diliman, Quezon CityRuling:Yes. Firstly, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB Legal Office was invalid and ineffectual because he was admittedly not the counsel of record of the UP. The rule is that it is on the counsel and not the client that the service should be made. That counsel was the OLS in Diliman, Quezon City, which was served with the denial only on May 31, 2002. As such, the running of the remaining period of six days resumed only on June 1, 2002,rendering the filing of the UPs notice of appeal on June 3, 2002 timely and well within the remaining days of the UPs period to appeal.Verily, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration could only be validly made upon the OLS in Diliman, and no other. The fact that Atty. Nolasco was in the employ of the UP at the UPLB Legal Office did not render the service upon him effective. It is settled that where a party has appeared by counsel, service must be made upon such counsel.95Service on the party or the partys employee is not effective because such notice is not notice in law. This is clear enough from Section 2, second paragraph, of Rule 13,Rules of Court, which explicitly states that: "If any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Where one counsel appears for several parties, he shall only be entitled to one copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side." As such, the period to appeal resumed only on June 1, 2002, the date following the service on May 31, 2002 upon the OLS in Diliman of the copy of the decision of the RTC, not from the date when the UP was notified. Secondly, even assuming that the service upon Atty. Nolasco was valid and effective, such that the remaining period for the UP to take a timely appeal would end by May 23, 2002, it would still not be correct to find that the judgment of the RTC became final and immutable thereafter due to the notice of appeal being filed too late on June 3, 2002.In so declaring the judgment of the RTC as final against the UP, the CA and the RTC applied the rule contained in the second paragraph of Section 3, Rule 41 of theRules of Courtto the effect that the filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupted the running of the period for filing the appeal; and that the period resumed upon notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration. For that reason, the CA and the RTC might not be taken to task for strictly adhering to the rule then prevailing.However, equity calls for the retroactive application in the UPs favor of thefresh-periodrule that the Court first announced in mid-September of 2005 through its ruling inNeypes v. Court of Appeals. Consequently, even if the reckoning started from May 17, 2002, when Atty. Nolasco received the denial, the UPs filing on June 3, 2002 of the notice of appeal was not tardy within the context of thefresh-period rule. For the UP, the fresh period of 15-days counted from service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration would end on June 1, 2002, which was a Saturday. Hence, the UP had until the next working day, or June 3, 2002, a Monday, within which to appeal, conformably with Section 1 of Rule 22, Rules of Court, which holds that: "If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a holiday.Amovit v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154559, October 5, 2011Facts:On August 20, 1965 and November 23, 1971, Bengson Commercial Building, Inc. (BCBI) obtained loans from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in the total amount ofP4,250,000.00, secured by real estate and chattel mortgages. When BCBI defaulted in the payment of the amortizations, GSIS extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged properties and sold them at public auction where it emerg