civil procedure case digests part ii (compiled)

8/10/2019 Civil Procedure Case Digests Part II (Compiled)

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Corazon Macapagal vs. People of the

Philippines

G.R. No. 193217 February 26, 2014

Roz Camacho

FACTS:

On November 25, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision

finding Petitioner Corazon Macapagal guilty of the

crime of Estafa for misappropriating for her own

benefit 800,000 Php, the value of unreturned and

unsold jewelry. Petitioner received the decision on

January 13, 2009 then timely moved for

reconsideration but was denied in an Order dated

May 20, 2009 which the petitioner allegedly received

on July 31, 2009. She supposedly filed a notice of

Appeal on August 3, 2009 but the same was denied

on June 29, 2010 for having been filed out of time.

Thus, this petition for review on certiorari under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the RTC of Manila gravely erred in

denying the Notice of Appeal filed by

petitioner-appellant

(2) WON the RTC erred in denying the motion

for reconsideration filed by petitioner-

appellant

HELD:

Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

(1) NO. Petitioner availed of the wrong mode of

assailing the trial courts denial of her notice of

appeal. Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure lay down the rules on where, how and

when appeal is taken. The disallowance of the notice

of appeal disallows the appeal itself. A petition for

review under Rule 45 is a mode of appeal of a lower

courts decision or final order direct to the Supreme

Court. However the questioned order denying the

notice of appeal is not a decision or final order from

which an appeal may be taken. The petitioner should

have availed of a special civil action under Rule 65.

Thus, in availing the wrong mode of appeal under

Rule 45 instead of Rule 65, the petition merits an

outward dismissal.

Even if the petition was treated as one for Certiorari

under Rule 65, it is still dismissible for violation of

the hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court

has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and CA to

issue writs of certiorari, the petitioner has no

absolute freedom of choice of court to which theapplication is directed. Direct Resort to the Supreme

Court is allowed only if there are special, important

and compelling reasons clearly and specifically

spelled out in the petition, which are not present in

this case.

(2) NO. The Motion for Reconsideration is bound to

fail because of petitioners repeated disregard of the

Rules and Courts lawful orders. Petitioner failed to

comply with the Courts resolutions and Rule 7 Sec. 4

on Verification despite the giving of extension and

counsels unsatisfactory explanation for the

extension.

Design Resources International Inc.

and Kenneth Sy

vs.

Lourdes L. Estringcol

G.R. No. 193966 February 19, 2014

Ash Salvoza

FACTS:

Design Sources International, Inc. ("Petitioner

Corporation") is a distributor of Pergo flooring.

Sometime in 1998, the Private Respondent bought

the said brand of flooring of the "Cherry Blocked"

type from the Petitioner Corporation. The flooring

was installed in her house.

On February 24, 2000, the Private Respondent

discovered that the Pergo flooring installed had

unsightly bulges at the joints and seams. The Private

Respondent informed the Petitioners of these

defects and the former insisted on the repair or

replacement of the flooring at the expense of the

latter.

After several inspections of the alleged defective

flooring, meetings between the parties and

exchanges of correspondence, the Petitioner

Corporation was given until May 31, 2000 to replace

the installed flooring. Nevertheless, on the deadline,

the Petitioner Corporation did not comply with the

demand of the Private Respondent. A complaint for

damages, docketed as Civil Case No.00-850, was thus

filed by the Private Respondent before the RTC on

July 13, 2000.

On February 8, 2006, Kenneth Sy, one of the

Petitioners' witnesses, testified in open

court.Immediately after his testimony, the following

occurred as evidenced by the transcript of

stenographic notes (TSN):

COURT : (To Atty. Posadas) Who will be your next

witness?

ATTY. POSADAS : Your honor, my next witness will

be Stephen Sy, also of Design Source.

ATTY FORTUN : Your honor, may I know if Mr.

Stephen Syaround [sic] the courtroom?

ATTY. POSADAS : (Pointing to the said witness) He is

here.


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ATTY. FORTUN : So the witness is actually inside the

Courtroom.

ATTY. POSADAS : But, your honor, please, I was

asking about it, nahiyalangakokay Atty. Fortun.

ATTY. FORTUN : But I was [sic] asked of the exclusion

of the witness.

COURT : (To Atty. Posadas) You shall have to tell the

Court of your ready witness.

ATTY. FORTUN : He already heard the whole

testimony of his colleague.

ATTY. POSADAS : I'm sorry, your honor.

COURT : All right. When were you present him,

today or next time.

ATTY. POSADAS : Next time, your honor.

COURT : All right. Next time, Atty. Posadas, if you

have other witnesses present in Court inform us.

ATTY. FORTUN : No, your honor, in fact I will object

to the presentation of Mr. Stephen Sy, because his

[sic] here all the time when the witness was cross-

examined.

ATTY. POSADAS : Your honor, I will just preserve [sic]

my right to present another witness on the technical

aspect of this case.

COURT : Okay. All right. Order. After the completion

of the testimony of defendant's second witness in

the person of Mr. Kenneth Sy, [A]tty. Benjamin

Posadas, counsel for the defendants, moved for

continuance considering that he is not feeling well

and that he needs time to secure another witness to

testify on the technical aspect, because of the

objection on the part of plaintiff's counsel Atty.

Philip SigfridFortun on his plan of presenting of Mr.

Stephen Sy as their next witness due to his failure to

inform the Court and the said counsel of the

presence of the said intended witness while Mr.

Kenneth Sy was testifying. There being no objection

thereto on the part of Atty. Fortun, reset the

continuation of the presentation of defendant's

evidence to April 5, 2006 at 8:30 o'clock in the

morning.

On 22 March 2006, petitioners moved for a

reconsideration of the Order, but their motion was

denied by the RTC on 1 June 2006 on the ground

that the Court deems it no longer necessary to

allow Stephen Syfrom testifying when a different

witness could testify on matters similar to the

intended testimony of the former. The Order alsostated that to allow Stephen Sy from testifying *sic+

would work to the disadvantage of the plaintiff as he

already heard the testimony of witness Kenneth Sy.

Petitioners filed a Second Motion for

Reconsideration (with Leave of Court) dated 19 June

2006, which was likewise denied by the RTC in the

assailed Order dated 26 February 2007.

Petitioners sought recourse before the CA by way of

a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of

Court raising the issue whether or not the RTC has

committed a grave abuse of discretion when it

refused to allow Stephen Sy to testify.

At the outset, the CA found no sufficient basis thatherein respondent previously asked for the exclusion

of other witnesses. It was the duty of respondents

counsel to ask for the exclusion of other witnesses,

without which, there was nothing to prevent

Stephen from hearing the testimony of petitioners

other witnesses. Nevertheless, following the

doctrine laid down in People v. Sandal (Sandal), the

appellate court ruled that the RTC did not commit

grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed

Orders considering that petitioners failed to show

that Stephens testimony would bolster their

position. Moreover, from the Manifestation of

petitioners counsel, it appears that petitioners had

another witness who could give a testimony similar

to Stephens.

Petitioners elevated the case to the SC assailing the

Decision of the CA. In the meantime, trial proceeded

in the lower court. On 11 February 2014, they filed a

Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary

Mandatory Injunction or Temporary Restraining

Order either to allow the presentation of Stephen as

a witness or to suspend the trial proceedings

pending the ruling in the instant Petition.

ISSUE:

WON the RTC has committed a grave abuse of

discretion for not allowing Stephen Sy to testify.

SC RULING:

Yes. Section 15, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of

Court provides:

SEC. 15.Exclusion and separation of witnesses. On

any trial or hearing, the judge may exclude from the

court any witness not at the time under

examination, so that he may not hear the testimonyof other witnesses. The judge may also cause

witnesses to be kept separate and to be prevented

from conversing with one another until all shall have

been examined.

There is nothing in the records of this case that

would show that there was an order of exclusion

from the RTC, or that there was any motion from

respondents counsel to exclude other witnesses

from the courtroom prior to or even during the

presentation of the testimony of Kenneth. We are

one with the CA in finding that under such

circumstances, there was nothing to prevent

Stephen from hearing the testimony of Kenneth.

Therefore, the RTC should have allowed Stephen to

testify for petitioners.

Therefore, this Court finds that the RTC committed

grave abuse of discretion in not allowing Stephen to

testify notwithstanding the absence of any order for


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exclusion of other witnesses during the presentation

of Kenneth's testimony.

In view thereof, the RTC is hereby ordered to allow

the presentation of Stephen Sy as witness for

petitioners. Accordingly, petitioners' Motion for

Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary MandatoryInjunction or Temporary Restraining Order is now

rendered moot.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant

Petition is hereby

GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

Antonio E. Unica vs. Anscor Swire Ship

Management Corporation,

G.R. No. 184318 February 12, 2014

Carl Deita

FACTS:

Petitioner was employed by respondent, a manning

agency for seafarers. His last contract was for a

period of nine months from January 29, 2000 to

October 25, 2000. However, since the vessel was still

at sea, Petitioner was only repatriated on November14, 2000 which is twenty days after the expiration of

his contract. Petitioner assumed that the twenty day

extension was an implied renewal of his contract. On

November 14, 2000, after repatriation, he was

dismissed without a valid cause.

An illegal dismissal case was then filed by the

Petitioner.

Labor Arbiter ruled in favour of the Petitioner. It

ruled that there was implied renewal when the

Petitioner was not repatriated after the expiration of

his contract. It directed Respondent to pay

Petitioner his salary for unexpired portion of his

impliedly renewed contract, medical benefits and

attorneys fees.

Respondent appealed to NLRC but it affirmed the

decision of the Labor Arbiter with modification.

NLRC deleted medical benefits and reduced the

amount of attorneys fees.

Aggrieved by the decision, Respondent filed a

Petition for Certiorari with the CA where it annulled

and set aside the decision of NLRC. CA ruled that

there was no implied renewal of contract, it was due

to the mere fact that it cannot be done because the

ship was still at sea.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was an implied renewal

of Petitioners contract.

HELD:

The Petition is without merit.

In the case at bar, although Petitioners contract

ended on October 25, 2000 and disembark only on

November 14, 2000 did not render automaticrenewal of contract. It was not done because the

said vessel was still at sea, thus It was deemed

impossible but only it was impossible the said

petitioner would have been repatriated by virtue of

the contracts expiration because a seafarer partakes

the nature of a co-terminus employee.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR

HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR SHANG KO

VINGSON YU SHIRLY VINGSON@ SHIRLY

VINGSON DEMAISIP,Petitioner,vs.

JOVY CABCABAN,Respondent.UDK No. 14817 January 13, 2014

Monz Gestoso

FACTS:

September 23,2011 Shang KoVingson Yu (Shang Ko)

run away from their home as alleged by her mother

ShirlyVingdon (Shirly). November 2, 2011 Shirly went

to the police station in Bacolod City upon receipt of

information that Shang Ko was in the custody of

respondent JovyCabcaban (Cabcaban), a police

officer in that station.Shang Ko was no longer with

Cabcaban. Pura an NBI agent told Shirly that Shang

Ko was staying with a private organization called

Calvary Kids.

This prompted petitioner Shirly to file a petition for

habeas corpus against respondent Cabcaban and the

unnamed officers of Calvary Kids before the Court of

Appeals (CA) rather than the Regional Trial Court ofBacolod City citing as reason several threats against

her life in that city.

December 18, 2012,the CA denies the petition for its

failure to clearly allege who has custody of Shang Ko.

According to the CA, habeas corpus may not be used

as a means of obtaining evidence on the

whereabouts of a person or as a means of finding

out who has specifically abducted or caused the

disappearance of such person.3The CA denied

petitioner Shirlys motion for reconsideration on

January 8, 2013, hence, this petition for review.

ISSUES:

Whether or not habeas corpus may be availed by the

petitioner?

Whether or not the case was properly file with CA?
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/jan2014/udk_14817_2014.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/jan2014/udk_14817_2014.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/jan2014/udk_14817_2014.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/jan2014/udk_14817_2014.html#fnt3


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HELD:

No

Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the

writ of habeas corpus is available, not only in cases

of illegal confinement or detention by which anyperson is deprived of his liberty, but also in cases

involving the rightful custody over a minor. The

general rule is that parents should have custody over

their minor children. But the State has the right to

intervene where the parents, rather than care for

such children, treat them cruelly and abusively,

impairing their growth and well-being and leaving

them emotional scars that they carry throughout

their lives unless they are liberated from such

parents and properly counseled.

No.

Since this case presents factual issues and since the

parties are all residents of Bacolod City, it would be

best that such issues be resolved by a Family Court in

that city.

WHEREFORE, thedecision of Court of Appeals was

set and the case forwarded to the Family Court of

Bacolod City for hearing and adjudication as the

evidence warrants. Meantime the minor Shang

KoVingson remain in the custody of Calvary Kids of

Bacolod City.

Further the Court ORDERS petitioner

ShirlyVingsonShirlyVingsonDemaisip to pay the

balance of the docket and other legal fees within 10

days from receipt of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.

Bignay EX-IM Philippines, Inc. Vs. Union

Bank of the Philippines / Union Bank of thePhilippines

Vs.

Bignay EX-IM Philippines, Inc.

G.R. No. 171590 & G.R. No. 171598.

February 12, 2014

Geh Gabriel

FACTS:

Alfonso de Leon, married to Rosario,

mortgaged a real property in favor of Union Bank of

the Philippines in 1984. the given land is located in

Esteban Abada, Loyola Heights, Quezon City which

was later foreclosed and sold at the auction to Union

Bank. On the other hand, Rosario filed a case in 1988

against Alfonso and Union Bank for the annulment of

the prior mortgage, claiming that her husband

mortgaged the property without her consent and for

conveyance.

While the case was pending, Bignay Ex-Im

Philippines, Inc. (Bignay) offered to purchase the

disputed property. On December 20, 1989, the Deedof Absolute sale was executed between Union Bank

and Bignay conveying the property to the latter for 4

million pesos.

On December 12, 1991, the case was

decided by the court in favor of Rosario annulling the

given contract and declaring her as the owner of the

undivided one-half of the subject property. As a

result, Bignay was evicted from the property.

On March 21, 1994, Bignay filed a case for

breach of warranty against eviction under articles

1547 and 1548 of the Civil Code, with damages

against Union Bank. The trial court rendered its

decision on March 21, 2000, in favor of Bignay,

ordering Union Bank to reimburse the cost of the

land and the value of the constructed building

thereon, since the bank has acted in bad faith. At the

same time, the trial court dismissed the banks

counterclaim without prejudice because it did not

acquire its jurisdiction since the bank did not pay the

docket fees.

The Union Bank appealed the decision to

the Court of Appeals which ruled that Union Bank

had timely paid its docket fees at the time it filed its

Answer Ad Cautelam on November 4, 1994, as

evidenced by the receipts and the rubber stampedmark on the face of the answer itself. Hence, the

trial court should have made a ruling thereon.

Bignay filed a Motion for Partial

reconsideration questioning the ruling on the banks

counterclaim. On the other hand, Union Bank took

an exception to the application of the decision of the

trial court through its Motion for Reconsideration.

Thereafter, the Court of Appeals denied the

respective motions of both parties.

Thus, it lead Bignay to initiate its petition

for Review on Certiorari which was followed by the

filing of the same by Union Bank. These petitions

were then ordered consolidated by the Supreme

Court through its resolution.

ISSUES:

1. In a permissive counterclaim, when should

the docket fees be paid to enable the trial

court to acquire jurisdiction over the case?

2. In the event of non-payment of docket fees

for permissive counterclaims, can the court

dismiss the said counterclaims?

HELD:

1. The Supreme Court ruled that docket fees

should be paid after the trial court had ruled

that the counterclaim is a permissive one. The

bank in this case never raised the given issue

that it had already paid the corresponding fees

in its motion for reconsideration considering

that the trial court had already dismissed its


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counterclaim. The opportunity to cause the

counterclaim be reinstated was only during the

time that such case was pending before the trial

court.

2. Yes. The SC upheld the trial courts decision

in dismissing the counterclaims due to non-payment

of docket fees because it did not acquire itsjurisdiction over the case.

Hence, the SC dismissed the counterclaim

of Union Bank.

Penafrancia Sugar Mill, Inc., s. Sugar

Regulatory Administration

G.R. No. 208660

Beverly Bulanday

FACTS:

Penafrancia Sugar Mill (PENSUMIL) is a corporation

engaged in the business of milling sugar. The Sugar

Regulatory Commission on the other hand (SRA) is a

government entity tasked to uphold the policy of the

State to promote the growth and development of

the sugar industry through greater and significant

participation of the private sector and to improve

the working conditions of labourers.

SRA issued an order imposing a lien on all raw sugarquedan permits, as well as any other form of sugar

such as improved raw, washed, blanco directo,

plantation white or refined, in order to fund the

Philippine Sugar Research Institute (PHILSURIN). The

order also provided that the lien shall be paid by

Managers Checks in the name of PHILSURIN to be

collected by the mill company concerned.

Thereafter, SRA released issuances extending the

effects of the mentioned order.

PENSUMIL filed a petition for prohibition and

injunction against SRA and PHILSURIN before the

Naga City-RTC. It alleged that the SRA order is

unconstitutional because it was issued beyond the

powers and authority granted to it by law and the

amount levied constitutes public funds and thus

cannot be legally channelled to a private corporation

(referring to PHILSURIN).

SRA and PHILSURIN in response, filed their

respective motions to dismiss on the ground of

forum shopping.

SRA alleged that there is a pending case for

declaratory relief in the Quezon CitY-RTC and

that the main issue in both the Naga and QCcases is the validity of the sugar order.

PHILSURIN noted the existence of a pending

collection case that it filed against PENSUMIL

before the Makati City-RTC. It contended that

the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for in

the Naga and Makati cases are founded on the

same facts such that a final judgment in one will

constitute res judicata on the other.

The Naga City-RTC denied SRA and PHILSURINs

motions to dismiss. It held that it was PHILSURIN

and not PENSUMIL that initiated the Makati case and

that the latter only raised the validity of the sugar

order as a defense. The court found that although

the Naga and Makati cases would require theappreciation of related facts, their respective

resolutions would nevertheless result in different

outcomes, considering that the former is a petition

for prohibition and injunction while the latter is a

simple collection case.

SRA and PHILSURIN moved for reconsideration but

the same was denied1. Aggrieved, SRA filed a

petition for certiorari before the CA.

The CA ordered the dismissal of the case on the

ground of forum shopping. The CA found that while

PENSUMIL is not a party in the QC case, the

determination of the validity of the assailed order

would nevertheless amount to res judicata.

PENSUMIL moved for reconsideration but the same

was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PENSUMIL committed forum

shopping.

HELD:

The case at bar should be dismissed for having

become moot and academic.

A case or issue is considered moot and academic

when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy

by virtue of supervening events, so that an

adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue

would be of no practical value or use. In such an

instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a

petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be

negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts

generally decline over such case or dismiss it on the

ground of mootness. This is because the judgment

will not serve any useful purpose or have any

practical legal effect because, in the nature of things,

it cannot be enforced.

In this case, the supervening issuance of another

order which revoked the effectivity of the assailed

order has mooted the main case.

1 The Naga City-RTC reiterated that PENSUMIL did not commit

forum shopping. It also held that there is no identity of parties

between the Naga and QC cases. The court explained that the fact

that the QC case involves the validity of the sugar order does not

preclude PENSUMILs right to institute an action to protect its

own interests against the same.


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CORAZON S. CRUZ under the name and

style, VILLA CORAZON CONDO

DORMITORY,Petitioner,

vs.

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

AUTHORITY,Respondent.G.R. No. 184732 September 9, 2013

Ceril Lyn Burro

FACTS:

Cruz filed before the RTC of Pasig a

complaint for breach of contract, consignation and

damages against Manila International Airport

Authority (MIAA). Cruz alleged that she executed a

contract of lease with MIAA to establish commercialarcade to sublease to other businesses yet the latter

failed to inform her that part of the leased premise is

subject to an easement for public use. As a result,

she was not able to obtain a building permit as well

as a certification of electrical inspection.

Furthermore, some of Cruzs stalls located along the

easement area was demolished by MMDA.

On MIAAs part, it filed a motion to dismiss

stating that there is a violation of the certification

requirement against forum shopping since there isanother case filed in the RTC of Manila. It also added

that there is improper venue since Cruz indicated

that she is a resident of Manila and not Pasig.

The RTC dismissed Cruzs complaint on the

ground that it constitutes forum shopping yet it

sustain MIAAs argument on improper venue since

Cruz alleged to be a resident of Manila; therefore,

unless proven otherwise, the complaint shall be

taken on its face value.

On appeal, Cruz pointed out in her appellants brief

that the RTC erred in holding that there was forumshopping, that Cruz is not a real party-in-interest and

that it did not deny MIAAs motion to dismiss but

she did not raised the issue regarding improper

venue. The MIAA, on the other hand, refuted the

arguments and raised before the CA the argument

regarding improper venue. The CA affirmed the

decision of RTC with modification stating that Cruz

did not commit forum shopping yet the case is

dismissible on the ground of improper venue. Hence,

this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing Cruzs

appeal on the basis of improper venue.

HELD:

The CA committed a reversible error in sustaining

the dismissal of the Pasig case on the ground of

improper venue because the same was not an error

raised by Cruz who was the appellant before it. The

CA cannot take cognizance of MIAAs position that

the venue was improperly laid since, being the

appellee, MIAAs participation was confined to the

refutation of the appellants assignment of errors.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

ATTY. MARCOS R. SUNDIANG

vs.

ERLITO DS. BACHO, Sheriff IV, Regional

Trial Court, Branch 124, Caloocan City

Ariane Bobillo

FACTS:

Spouses Rene Castaneda and Nenita P. Castaedafiled a complaint for accion publiciana against

defendants Pedro and Rosie Galacan, Vicente

Quesada, Pablo Quesada, Antonio and Norma

Bagares for allegedly depriving them of the use and

possession of a parcel of residential lot registered in

their name, located in Camarin, Caloocan City. After

trial, the RTC ruled that as owners of the subject

property, plaintiffs have a better right over the

property as against the defendants. As such,

defendants were ordered to vacate and surrender

peaceful possession to the plaintiffs of the subject

property,

Defendants appealed before the Court of Appeals

(CA), which affirmed the Decision of the RTC.

Defendants then sought recourse before the

Supreme Court, but the Court denied the petition

even their motion for reconsideration with finality.

A Writ of Execution was thereafter issued by the RTC

in favor of the plaintiffs. However, since the

defendants refused to vacate the premises and

remove the structures therein, the writ was not

implemented. Hence, plaintiffs filed a motion

praying for the issuance of writ of demolition. TheRTC issued the Writ of Demolition prayed for.

Complainant avers that prior to the issuance of the

writ of demolition, respondent sheriff demanded

One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) for

the implementation of the writ. Despite receipt of

the amounts, however, respondent sheriff failed to

place the plaintiffs in possession of the subject

property because he failed to remove the structures

inside and in front of the subject property; hence,

ingress and egress to the property was hindered.

On the other hand, respondent sheriff averred thathe received the amount of Sixty Thousand Pesos

(P60,000.00) from the complainant. However, he

denied that he demanded such payment for his

personal benefit. He explained that the amount was

used to pay for the food and fees of the laborers,

who were hired to undertake the demolition of the

concrete structures on the subject property and

those contracted to provide security for the workers


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during the demolition. He found it difficult to evict

the defendants because the latter employed various

means to prevent the implementation of the writ of

demolition issued by the RTC. Nevertheless,

respondent sheriff claimed that he was able to fully

implement the writ and that the subject property

was delivered to the possession of the plaintiffs onDecember 10, 2004, as evidenced by his Sheriff's

Return.

The Court referred the case to the Executive Judge

of the RTC, Caloocan City, for investigation, report

and recommendation. In her Report and

Recommendation, Investigating Judge

recommended that the complaint against

respondent sheriff be dismissed for want of

evidence. Said Report was referred to the Office of

the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report

and recommendation. However, the OCA

recommended that respondent sheriff be held liable

for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the

service, and that he be suspended for a period of

one (1) year.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sheriff be held liable for

conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service

RULING:

Yes.

It is clear from the Rule that before an

interested party pays the expenses of a sheriff, the

latter should first estimate the amount which will

then be submitted to the court for its approval.

Upon approval, the interested party deposits the

amount with the clerk of court and ex officio sheriff.

The latter then disburses the amount to the sheriff

assigned to execute the writ. Thereafter, the amount

received shall then be liquidated and any unspent

amount shall be refunded to the party making the

deposit. From there on, the sheriff shall render a full

report.

The failure of the sheriff to observe the following:

(1) prepare an estimate of expenses to be incurred in

executing the writ; (2) ask for the court's approval of

his estimates; (3) render an accounting; and (4) issue

an official receipt for the total amount he received

from the judgment debtor, makes him

administratively liable. In the instant case, none of

these procedures were complied with by respondent

sheriff. He never submitted an estimate to the court

for approval, but, on his own, demanded andreceived sums of money from the complainant.

Neither did he advise the complainant that the

sheriff's expenses approved by the court should be

deposited with the clerk of court and ex-officio

sheriff. Furthermore, no liquidation was ever

submitted to the court.

It must be stressed that sheriffs are not allowed to

receive any voluntary payments from parties in the

course of the performance of their duties. Nor can a

sheriff request or ask sums of money from a party-

litigant without observing the proper procedural

steps. Even assuming that such payments were

indeed given and received in good faith, this factalone would not dispel the suspicion that such

payments were made for less than noble purposes.

Neither will complainant's acquiescence or consent

to such expenses absolve the sheriff for his failure to

secure the prior approval of the court concerning

such expense. Any amount received by sheriffs in

excess of the lawful fees allowed in Section 10 is an

unlawful exaction. It constitutes unauthorized fees.

This renders them liable for grave misconduct,

dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best

interest of the service.

Surviving Heirs of Alfredo R. Bautista

v.

Francisco Lindo and Welhilmina Lindo

G.R. No. 208232

March 10, 2014

Donna Fresnido

FACTS:

Alfredo Bautista sold his free-patent land to several

vendees, including respondents Lindo. Three years

after the sale, Bautista filed a case in the Regional

Trial Court (RTC) in the exercise of his right to

repurchase the land within five years under Section

119 of Commonwealth Act 141 or the Public Land

Act.

Respondents Lindo later ceded to Epifania Bautista,

Alfredos successor-in-interest, a portion of the land

through a compromise agreement. However, other

respondents moved to dismiss the case, arguing that

the selling price of the land is only 16,500, which is

below the 20,000 jurisdictional threshold of theRTC.

The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of

jurisdiction, finding that Bautista failed to allege that

the value of the land exceeds 20,000.

ISSUE:

Whether the RTC correctly dismissed the case due to

lack of jurisdiction of subject matter.

HELD:

NO. The complaint to redeem a land subject of a free

patent is incapable of pecuniary estimation, it being

one for specific performance.

In Russel v. Vestil, it was held that if the complaint is

primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the

claim is capable of pecuniary estimation, and


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whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or the

RTCs would depend on the amount of the claim. But

where the basic issue is something other than the

right to recover money, where the money claim is

purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the

principal relief sought, such actions are cases where

the subject of the litigation may not be estimated interms of money, and, hence, are incapable of

pecuniary estimation. These cases are cognizable

exclusively by RTCs.

Bautista sold his land covered by a free patent. The

right to repurchase in CA 141 was implicitly

integrated and made part of the deeds of sale, thus

being a binding prestation which he can enforce. He

did file a case to enforce this right, thus making his

action one for specific performance.

ONE NETWORK RURAL BANK, INC.

versus DANILO G. BARIC

GR No. 193684, March 4, 2014

Kiefer Arguelles

FACTS:

This case sprung from the case initiated before the

Regional Trial Court of Davao City captioned as

Danilo G. Baric, Petitioner versus James S. Palado

and Network Rural Bank, Inc., Respondents whichwas the subject of a Petition for Review on Certiorari

seeking to set aside the January 29, 2009 Decision of

the Court of Appeals.

Jaime Palado (PALADO, hereafter) was the registered

owner of a real property with a building containing

commercial spaces for lease located at Barangay

Piapi, Davao City and covered by TCT No. 231531.

Respondent Danilo G. Baric (BARIC, hereafter) was a

lessee therein, operating a barber shop on one of

the commercial spaces. The lease was governed by a

written agreement, or Kasabutan.

In December 2000, BARIC demanded the return of

the leased commercial space. BARIC proceeded to

the Barangay for Conciliation and eventually got a

Certificate to Bar Action.

In February 2001, BARIC filed a case for Forcible

Entry against PALADO with paryer for Injunctive

Relief and One Network Rural Bank, Inc., (NETWORK

BANK, hereafter) before the MTCC of Davao City.

BARIC alleged that despite the agreement and

renovation of the property with the approval of

PALADO, the latter still fenced and enclosed the

premises, thereby denying BARIC access of the

property subject of lease. Network Bank purchased

the subject property on April 25, 2001 thats why he

was impleaded as one of the respondents. The

latter bank alleged good faith when it purchased the

property subject matter of this case, and therefore

according to the same bank, they should not be held

liable.

April 20, 2011 MTCC issued an ORDER dismissing

BARICs Complaint for Forcible Entry considering that

BARICs voluntary departure from the premises and

his subsequent posting of a signboard informing that

his barber shop had transferred to a new address

within the Agdao Public Market, constituted clear

and categorical evidence of his intention tovoluntarily vacate the premises.

BARIC appealed the case to the RTC of Davao City

where the same court upheld the decision of MTCC

finding that there was no irreversible error

committed by the court-a-quo in its decision. BARIC

elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, Cebu

City where the appeal was granted and the

challenged decision is hereby reversed. BARIC was

awarded Php 50,000.00 in NOMINAL DAMAGES for

which PALADO and NETWORK BANK were held

solidarily liable.

Case was elevated to the Supreme Court via Petition

for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUES:

1. IS A THIRD PARTY WHO DID NOT COMMIT A

VIOLATION OR INVASION OF THE PLAINTIFF

OR AGGRIEVED PARTYS RIGHTS MAY BE BE

HELD LIABLE FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES?;

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN

REVERSING THE RULINGS OF MTCC AND

RTC?

DECISION:

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS GRANTED.

While the Petition does not squarely address the

true issue involved, it is nonetheless evident that the

CA gravely erred in holding NETWORK ABNK

solidarily Liable with PALADO for the payment of

Nominal Damages.

NETWORK BANK did not violate any of BARICs

rights; it was merely a purchaser or transferee of the

property. Surely, it is not prohibited from acquiringthe property even while the forcible entry case was

pending, because as the registered owner of the

subject property, PALADO may transfer his title at

any time and the lease merely follows the property

as lien or encumbrance. Any invasion or violation of

BARICs rights as lessee was committed solely by

PALADO and NETWORK BANK may not be implicated

or found guilty unless it took part in the commission

of illegal acts, which does not appear to be so from

the evidence on record. On the contrary, it appears

that BARIC was ousted through PALADOs acts even

before NETWORK BANK acquired the property or

came into the picture. THUS IT WAS ERROR TO HOLD

THE BANK LIABLE FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES.

Resolution of Court of Appeals was MODIFIED.

NETWORK BANK is ABSOLVED from Liability.


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HERMINIA ACBANG,Petitioner,

vs.

HON. JIMMY H.F. LUCZON, JR., PRESIDING

JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH

01, SECOND JUDICIAL REGION,

TUGUEGARAO CITY, CAGAYAN, andSPOUSES MAXIMO LOPEZ and HEIDI L.

LOPEZ,Respondents.

Kevin Buyco

To stay the immediate execution of the judgment in

an ejectment case, the defendant must perfect an

appeal, file a supersedeas bond, and periodically

deposit the rentals becoming due during the

pendency of the appeal. Otherwise, the writ of

execution will issue upon motion of the plaintiff.

The Case

By petition for prohibition, the petitioner, a

defendant-appellant in Civil Case No. 6302 of the

Regional Trial Court RTC), Branch 1, in Tuguegarao

City, Cagayan, assails the order issued on March 31,

2004 by respondent Judge Jimmy H.F. Luczon, Jr.

Judge Luczon) granting the motion for execution

against her and her co-defendants on the ground

that she had not posted any supersedeas bond to

stay the execution.1

Antecedents

Respondent Spouses Maximo and Heidi Lopez

(Spouses Lopez) commenced an ejectment suit

against the petitioner, her son Benjamin Acbang, Jr.

and his wife Jean (Acbangs) in the Municipal Trial

Court (MTC) of Alcala, Cagayan (Civil Case No. 64).

The defendants did not file their answer. Thus, the

MTC rendered its decision on January 12, 2004 in

favor of the Spouses Lopez, disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment ishereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and as

against defendants as follows:

a) The plaintiffs are the true and lawful

owners of the land covered by Transfer

Certificate of Title No. T-139163.

b) The defendants are directed to vacate

immediately the land in suit which is

covered and described in TCT No. T-139163,

copy of the title is marked as Annex "A" of

the complaint.

c) The defendants are hereby ordered to

pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the

amount of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees.

d) The defendants are ordered to pay the

costs.2

The petitioner appealed to the RTC.

In the meantime, the Spouses Lopez moved for the

execution of the decision pending appeal in the

RTC,3 alleging that the defendants had not filed a

supersedeas bond to stay the execution. The

Acbangs opposed the motion for execution pendingappeal,4 insisting that the failure of the Spouses

Lopez to move for the execution in the MTC

constituted a waiver of their right to the immediate

execution; and that, therefore, there was nothing to

stay, rendering the filing of the supersedeas bond

unnecessary.

In his assailed order dated March 31, 2004, Judge

Luczon granted the motion for immediate execution,

viz:

The Motion for Execution is hereby granted, therebeing no Motion to Fix Supersedeas bond filed by

[the Acbangs] as of the date of the filing of the

Motion.

The opposition of [the spouses Lopez] on the appeal

taken by [the Acbangs] is hereby denied because

under the rules the loosing [sic] party may appeal

the case even if they did not post their supercedeas

[sic] bond. [The spouses Lopez] then are given 15

days from today within which to file their

memorandum and [the Acbangs] are also given

similar period to file their reply on the memorandum

of [the spouses Lopez]. Afterwhich (sic) the case

shall be submitted for decision with or without the

memorandum from the parties.

SO ORDERED.5

The petitioner moved for reconsideration,6 stressing

that the filing of the supersedeas bond was for the

purpose of staying the execution; and that she as a

defendant would not be placed in a position to stay

the execution by filing a supersedeas bond unless

she was first notified of the filing of the motion for

immediate execution.

The RTC denied the petitioners motion for

reconsideration on April 26, 2004,7 viz:

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by defendant

Herminia Acbang is denied, for the reason that the

Court finds no cause or reason to recall the order

granting appellees motion for execution. There was

no supersedeas bond filed by [the Acbangs], so the

execution of the decision is proper.

As the office of the supersedeas bond is to stay theexecution of the decision, the same should be filed

before the Motion For Writ of Execution is filed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.8

The petitioner then brought the petition for

prohibition directly in this Court on July 2, 2004,
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submitting that Judge Luczon thereby committed

grave error in granting the motion for immediate

execution of the Spouses Lopez without first fixing

the supersedeas bond as prayed for by the Acbangs.

It appears that the RTC rendered its decision in Civil

Case No. 6302 on July 30, 2004,9 finding that thepetitioner had not received the summons, and that

the sheriffs return did not show the steps taken by

the server to insure the petitioners receipt of the

summons, like the tender of the summons to her;

that the non-service of the summons on her resulted

in the MTC not acquiring jurisdiction over her; and

that the MTCs decision in Civil Case No. 64 dated

January 14, 2004 was void as far as she was

concerned. Thus, the RTC disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court

declares that the decision rendered by the MunicipalTrial Court of Alcala, Cagayan dated January 14, 2004

is null and void, as far as defendant Herminia Acbang

is concerned.

The MTC of Alcala is Ordered to reopen the case and

served [sic] the summons to Herminia Acbang and

conduct the proceedings without any delay.

It is so adjudged.10

In the petition, the petitioner insists that the

Spouses Lopezs motion for execution pending

appeal should be filed before she posted a

supersedeas bond. She argues that even if the MTCs

decision was immediately executory, it did not mean

that a motion for execution was dispensable; and

that the Spouses Lopez waived their right to the

immediate execution when they did not file a

motion for execution in the MTC.

On the other hand, the Spouses Lopez claim that the

issuance of a writ of execution was ministerial

because of the defendants failure to file a

supersedeas bond prior to or at the time of the filing

of their notice of appeal in the MTC.

Ruling

Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure reads:

Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how

to stay same. If judgment is rendered against the

defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon

motion unless an appeal has been perfected and the

defendant to stay execution files a sufficient

supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal TrialCourt and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay

the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the

time of the judgment appealed from, and unless,

during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with

the appellate court the amount of rent due from

time to time under the contract, if any, as

determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial

Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit

with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of

the use and occupation of the premises for the

preceding month or period at the rate determined

by the judgment of the lower court on or before the

tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The

supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by theMunicipal Trial Court, with the papers, to the clerk of

the Regional Trial Court to which the action is

appealed.

All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be

deposited with said court or authorized government

depositary bank, and shall be held there until the

final disposition of the appeal, unless the court, by

agreement of the interested parties, or in the

absence of reasonable grounds of opposition to a

motion to withdraw, or for justifiable reasons, shall

decree otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make

the payments above prescribed from time to time

during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate

court, upon motion of the plaintiff, and upon proof

of such failure, shall order the execution of the

judgment appealed from with respect to the

restoration of possession, but such execution shall

not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the

final disposition thereof on the merits.

After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court,

any money paid to the court by the defendant for

purposes of the stay of execution shall be disposed

of in accordance with the provisions of the judgmentof the Regional Trial Court. In any case wherein it

appears that the defendant has been deprived of the

lawful possession of land or building pending the

appeal by virtue of the execution of the judgment of

the Municipal Trial Court, damages for such

deprivation of possession and restoration of

possession and restoration of possession may be

allowed the defendant in the judgment of the

Regional Trial Court disposing of the appeal.

Here, there was no indication of the date when the

petitioner filed her notice of appeal. Her petitionstated simply that she had filed a "timely notice of

appeal which was given due course without the

respondents filing a motion for execution in the

Municipal Trial Court of Alcala, the court a quo."11

On the other hand, the Spouses Lopez filed in the

RTC their motion for execution pending appeal on

February 19, 2004.

The ruling in Chua v. Court of Appeals12 is

instructive on the means of staying the immediate

execution of a judgment in an ejectment case, to

wit:

As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff

in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, in

order to prevent further damage to him arising from

the loss of possession of the property in question. To

stay the immediate execution of the said judgment

while the appeal is pending the foregoing provision

requires that the following requisites must concur:
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(1) the defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a

supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically deposits

the rentals which become due during the pendency

of the appeal. The failure of the defendant to comply

with any of these conditions is a ground for the

outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the

court in this respect being "ministerial andimperative." Hence, if the defendant-appellant

perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas

bond, the immediate execution of the judgment

would automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of

a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of

the judgment if the appeal is not perfected.

Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be

filed within the period for the perfection of the

appeal.

In short, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an

ejectment suit is immediately executory, but the

defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must: (1)

perfect an appeal; (2) file a supersede s bond; and

(3) periodically deposit the rentals becoming due

during the pendency of the appeal. Although the

petitioner correctly states that the Spouses Lopez

should file a motion for execution pending appeal

before the court may issue an order for the

immediate execution of the judgment, the spouses

Lopez are equally correct in pointing out that they

were entitled to the immediate execution of the

judgment in view of the Ac bangs failure to comply

with all of the three abovementioned requisites for

staying the immediate execution. The filing of thenotice of appeal alone perfected the appeal but did

not suffice to stay the immediate execution without

the filing of the sufficient supersede s bond and the

deposit of the accruing rentals.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the decision of the R

TC favored the petitioner because it declared the

judgment of the MTC void as far as she was

concerned for lack of jurisdiction over her person.

The RTC thus directed the MTC to cause the service

of the summons on her and to conduct further

proceedings without any delay. In effect, thesupervening declaration of the nullity of the

judgment being sought to be executed against her

has rendered moot and academic the issue in this

special civil action as far as she was concerned.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for

prohibition for being moot and academic, without

pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

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