1. People Vs SandiganbayanFacts:Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. She was able to get hold of a cash advance in the amount of P71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in order to defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and Environmental Protection, which she headed. After almost two years since she obtained the said cash advance, no liquidation was made. As such, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a demand letter to respondent Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash advance within seventy-two hours from receipt of the same demand letter. The Commission on Audit, submitted an investigation report to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas), with the recommendation that respondent Amante be further investigated to ascertain whether appropriate charges could be filed against her under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known as The Auditing Code of the Philippines. Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Malversation of Public Funds against respondent Amante. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the OMB-Visayas' Resolution, prepared a memorandum finding probable cause to indict respondent Amante. The OSP filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445. The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Amante filed with the said court a MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION and was opposed by The OSP.The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution dismissed the case against Amante. Hence, the present petition.Issue:Whether or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who was charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Held:Yes. The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. The alleged commission of the offense, as shown in the Information was on or about December 19, 1995 and the filing of the Information was on May 21, 2004. The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the [15] action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense applies in this present case. Since the present case was instituted on May 21, 2004, the provisions of R.A. No. 8249 shall govern. The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4(a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law. By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent Amante, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.2. Tijam vs. SibonghanoyFACTS:The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of money in the sum of exactly P 1,908.00, exclusive of interest filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of the complaint, the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. 296.)The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding the appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court of Appeals' adverse decision.Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in which jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court along with the records of the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instanceduring the pendency of the appeal will prosper.

RULING:A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse as well as in Pindagan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have become persuaded that We can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals x x x granting plaintiffs' motion for execution against the surety x x xUPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.

3. Fukuzume vs People (2005) G.R.143647Facts:Sometime in July 1991, Yu, a businessman engaged in buying and selling aluminum scrap wires, accompanied by Jovate, went to the house of Fukuzume in Paraaque. Jovate introduced Fukuzume to Yu telling the latter that Fukuzume is from Furukawa Electric Corporation and that he has at his disposal aluminum scrap wires. Fukuzume confirmed this information and told Yu that the scrap wires belong to Furukawa but they are under the care of NAPOCOR. Believing Fukuzumes representation to be true, Yu agreed to buy the aluminum scrap wires from Fukuzume. This transaction later turned uneventful as Fukuzume failed to comply his undertaking to return Yus money when Yu was refused by NAPOCOR, thus, prompting Yu to file an estafa case.Upon arraignment, Fukuzume pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued, finding the accused guilty as charged. Aggrieved by the trial courts decision, he appealed to CA but CA affirmed the trial courts decision modifying only the penalty, hence, the petition before the SC.Issue: WON the trial court of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged.Held: SC answered on the negative.We agree with Fukuzumes contention that the CA erred in ruling that the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged.The CA ruled on the basis of the sworn statement of Yu filed with the NBI and the affidavit subscribed by Fukuzume. With respect to the sworn statement of Yu, which was presented in evidence by the prosecution, it is clear that he alleged that he gave Fukuzume the amount ofP50,000.00 at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However, we agree with Fukuzumes contention that Yu testified during his direct examination that he gave the amount ofP50,000.00 to Fukuzume in the latters house. It is not disputed that Fukuzumes house is located in Paraaque.Settled is the rule that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits takenex parteare inferior to testimony given in court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.CitingUy vs. Court of Appeals:However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside from the sworn statement executed by Yu, the prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yus sworn statement or to prove that any of the above-enumerated elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati.From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent jurisdiction.

4. People Vs RegalarioFacts:Menardo Garcia, herein victim, Glenda Osabal and Romano Padillo, all students of Quezon National High School, were walking in the grounds of the Quezon National High School in Lucena City after dismissal from classes on their way home. The six accused, joined them. Menardo Garcia ran towards Don Feliciano Street, chased by the six accused. About 50 meters away from the corner of Don Feliciano and General Lucban Streets, in front of the former residence of Ex-Mayor Mario L. Tagarao, the six accused overtook Menardo Garcia and, acting in unison, they ganged up on him and boxed him. At this point accused Alex Regalario stabbed Menardo Garcia once with a fan knife locally known as "beinte nueve" and hit him at the left side of his back. Despite being stabbed, the six accused, still acting in unison, continued boxing Menardo Garcia until they saw he was down and could no longer stand up. The six accused then hurriedly left the scene together. Romano Padillo, who was walking side by side with Menardo Garcia witnessed the attack on Menardo Garcia from 10 meters away. He also left, fearing for his safety, and proceeded to the house of Menardo Garcia and reported the incident to his grandmother, Guida Rendon Panganiban. The other accused who pleaded guilty was Alex Regalario, the one who stabbed the victim. During their arraignment on October 28, 1986, appellants, with the exception of appellant Desembrana, entered a plea of not guilty. However, before the prosecution rested its case, appellants Regalario and Pabillar changed their plea to guilty. Appellant Desembrana was apprehended only on October 7, 1987 by elements of the Lucena City police for another offense, and when separately arraigned for the case at bar on November 3, 1987, he pleaded not guilty. Issues:(1) Whether or not the appeal be dismissed out-right for being time-barred.(2) Whether or not trial court err in accepting the plea of guilty of appellants Regalario and Pabillar when they were re-arraigned but were not apprised clearly and fully of the nature of the offense charged against them(3) Whether or not trial court err in not considering the testimonies of Rolando de Chavez, Augurio Villagracia, Jr., Jose Quiniquito and Alberto Desembrana;(4) Whether or not trial court err in relying on the testimonies of the two witnesses for the prosecution, instead of weighing the evidence adduced during the trial in favor of appellants that there was no conspiracy and the act of boxing and stabbing were independently committed by appellants Regalario and Pabillar;(5) Whether or not trial court err in not considering the age of minority of appellants Regalario and Pabillar at the time of the commission of the crime; and(6) Whether or not the trial court err in not considering the financial standing of appellant's parents in the imposition of the award of indemnity, as well as the funeral and other expenses incidental to the prosecution of the case.Held:I. Section 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court very clearly provides:Sec. 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the accused or his attorney.As earlier observed, the records of this case show that the judgment of conviction was promulgated in open court on January 17, 1991. Fourteen days thereafter, or on January 31, 1991, appellants filed a motion for reconsideration and a copy of the order denying the same was received by appellants' counsel on February 22, 1991. When appellants filed their notice of appeal on March 4, 1991, ten days had elapsed since the receipt of the notice of the order denying the motion for reconsideration.As hereinbefore noted, the appeal must be perfected within fifteen days from the promulgation of the judgment, but said period is interrupted from the time a motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed and starts to run again from receipt of the notice denying said motion. Accordingly, from receipt of such denial order, appellant has only the remaining period within which to perfect his appeal. In the case at bar, fourteen days had elapsed before the filing of appellants' motion for reconsideration, hence they had only one day from February 22, 1991 to file a notice of appeal. Consequently, the trial court was correct in rejecting appellants' notice of appeal since it was filed beyond the reglementary period.Ordinarily, therefore, the appeal herein could have been dismissed outright for being time-barred. The records, however, do not show that either the public or private prosecutor moved for the dismissal of said appeal or objected to the aforesaid order of the trial court directing the elevation of the records of the case to this Court, obviously for appellate review. It was only after appellants had filed their brief that appellee, in its brief, raised the issue of the belated appeal and, inferentially, the lack of appellate jurisdiction of this Court in this case. However, the principle of estoppel by laches to bar attacks on jurisdiction has been adopted and repeatedly applied by this Court, notably in Tijam, et al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al., and in several cases which followed thereafter, including criminal cases.In view of the gravity of the offense and the penalty involved, we feel that we should also follow the same judicial path and, in the oft-invoked broader interests of substantial justice, grant to appellants in this case the benefit of judicial review.II. The trial court did not err in accepting the plea of guilty of appellants Regalario and Pabillar when they were re-arraigned. As reflected in its order dated February 23, 1988, both appellants were assisted by their counsel and it was only after a series of questions to both of them that said court, after being convinced that the plea of guilty was made intelligently and voluntarily, accepted the change of plea, but nevertheless required the prosecution to present its evidence. As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, appellants never questioned the correctness of that order and of the declarations therein, until they filed their brief.Also, during the trial of the case, counsel for both appellants never raised the issue of improvident plea of guilt, as appellants Regalario and Pabillar even presented witnesses to prove their minority during the commission of the crime. IIIWe have carefully reviewed and evaluated the evidence in this case and we agree with the aforequoted findings of the lower court and its conclusion that the culpability of appellants and the existence of a conspiracy among them was sufficiently established by the prosecution.It has been our consistent ruling, founded on reason, logic and experience, that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses' testimonies is accorded great respect on appeal. We have repeatedly pointed out and with rational bases, that appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial courts since the latter are in a better position to weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying, unless it is found that the trial courts have overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. That doctrine applies in this case as the exceptive circumstance thereto does not obtain here.IV.From the foregoing circumstances, it cannot but be inferred that a conspiratorial undertaking animated the acts of appellants. In a number of cases, the Court has ruled that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove conspiracy if it shows a concerted plan, scheme or design to further a common objective. Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence but may be inferred from the acts of the accused immediately prior to, during and right after the assault on the victim which indicate their common intention to commit the crime. To prove conspiracy, the prosecution need not establish that all the parties thereto agreed to every detail in the execution of the crime or that they were actually together at all stages of the conspiracy.V.We do not agree with the conclusion reached by the trial court. The mitigating circumstance of minority, being favorable to both appellants, all doubts should be resolved in their favor.Also, it has been ruled that "(i)n regard to the doubt as to whether the accused is over or under 18 years of age, and in the absence of proof that on the day he committed the crime he was 18 years old, he must perforce be considered as still under that age. . . . ." In a more recent case, the mitigating circumstance of minority was appreciated by the Court despite the fact that the only evidence presented by the accused in said case was his own testimony regarding his age while he was on the witness stand narrating what happened two years earlier.VI.In rendering its judgment of conviction, the trial court also ordered appellants to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of Menardo Garcia the amount of P23,381.00 as funeral expenses and expenses incident to the prosecution of the case. We accept the ruling of the lower court on this score since such damages were duly proven by the prosecution. However, the death indemnity awarded by the court a quo should be increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with prevailing case law.Decision:Judgment of trial court affirmed with modification.

5. Zaldivia v ReyesFacts:A complaint was filed before the fiscals office constituting anoffensein violation of a city ordinance. The fiscal did not file the complaint before the court immediately but insteadfiledit 3 months later. The defendantscounselfiled a motion to quash on ground that the action to file the complaint has prescribed. The fiscal contends that the filing of the complaint before his office already interrupts the prescription period.Issue:Whether or not the filing of information/complaint before the fiscal office constituting a violation against a special law/ordinance interrupts prescription.

Held: The mere filing of complaint to the fiscals office does not interrupt the running of prescription onoffensespunishable by a special law. The complaint should have been filed within a reasonable time before the court. It is only then that the running of the prescriptive period is interrupted.

**Act 3326is the governing law on prescription of crimes punishable by a special law which states that prescription is only interrupted upon judicial proceeding.

6. Reodica v CA 292 SCRA 87Facts:IsabelitaReodica was allegedly recklessly driving a van and hit Bonsol causing him physical injuries anddamage to propertyamounting to P 8,542.00. Three days after the accident a complaint was filed before the fiscals office against the petitioner. She was chargedof"Reckless Imprudence Resulting inDamage to Propertywith Slight Physical Injury." After pleading not guilty trial ensued. RTC of Makati rendered the decision convicting petitioner of "quasi offense of reckless imprudence, resulting indamage to propertywith slight physical injuries" witharrestomayor of 6 months imprisonment and a fine of P 13,542.00. Petitioner made an appeal before the CA which re-affirmed the lower courts decision. In its motion for reconsideration, petitioner now assails that thecourt erred in giving its penalty on complexdamage to propertyand slight physical injuries both being light offenses over which the RTC has no jurisdiction and it cant impose penalty in excesstowhat the law authorizes. Reversal of decision is still possible on ground of prescription or lack of jurisdiction.Issues:a. Whether or not the penalty imposed is correct.b. Whether or not reckless imprudence resultingtodamage to propertyand reckless imprudence resultingtoslight physical injuries are light felonies.c. Whether or not there is a complex crime applying Article 48 of the RPC.d. Whether or not the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the first time on appeal.e. Whether or not the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the case.f. Whether the quasi offenses already prescribed.

Held:a. On penalty imposed

a. The proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injury is publiccensure(being the penalty next lower in degree toarrestomenor see the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies).

b. The proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting todamage to propertyamounting to 8,542.00 would bearrestomayor in minimum andmediumperiods.

b. Classification of each felony involveda. Reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries is a light felony. Publiccensureis classified under article 25 of RPC as a light penalty and it belongs on the graduated scale in Article 71 of the RPC as a penalty next lower toarrestomenor.

b. Reckless imprudence resulting todamage to propertyis punishable by a correctional penalty ofarrestomayor and thus belongs to less grave felony and not as a light felony as claimed by petitioner.

c. Rule on complex crime

a. Art. 48 on penalty for complex crime provides that when asingleact constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is necessary a means forcommittingthe other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Both offenses cannot constitute a complex crime because reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries is not either a grave or less grave felony. Therefore each felony should be filed as a separate complaint subject to distinct penalties.

d. Right to assail duplicity of information

a. Rule 120, section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that when two or more offenses are charged in asinglecomplaint and the accused fails to object against it before the trial, the court may convict theaccuseto as many offenses as charged and impose a penalty for each of them. Complainant failed to make the objection before the trial therefore the right to object has been waived.

e. Jurisdiction

a. Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the duration of the penalty and the fine imposed as prescribed by law to the offense charged. Reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries and reckless imprudence resulting todamage to propertyis within the jurisdiction of the MTC.

The case was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati and the decision of the CA was set aside.

Court Rulingon Zaldivia v Reyes and Reodica v CA on Prescription:

I. Zaldivia v Reyes involves a violation of an ordinance while in Reodica v CA the violation was against the RPC.

II. Filing of a complaint in the fiscals office involving a felony under the RPC is sufficient to interrupt the running of prescription. But filing a complaint under the fiscals office involving offenses punished by a special law (i.e. ordinance) does not interrupt the running of prescription.Act 3326is the governing law on prescriptions of crimes punishable by a special law which states that prescription is only interrupted upon judicial proceeding.

7. Panaguiton Jr vs Department of JusticeFacts:Based from the facts culled from the records, in 1992, Rodrigo Cawili borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson, jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit. However, Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Tongson averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had been falsified.To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures, which were purportedly the same as those appearing on the checks. He also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business associate.In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997, after finding that it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit.On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years.Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.On 3 April 2003, the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping. In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require consideration.The DOJ, in its comment, states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.

Issue:Whether there is prescriptive period upon violating B.P. Blg. 22 per Act No. 3326 and not Art. 90 of the RPC, on the institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment?

Held:It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.

Although, Tongson went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326.Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.The court rules and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioners filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner. No costs.Panaguiton, Jr. vs. DOJ(2)

Crime:violation of Batas PambansaBilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22)Lower Court Decision:dismissed the charges against TongsonCourt of Appeals Decision:dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.s (petitioners) petition for certiorari and his subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Supreme Court Decision:GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is alsoANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner.

Factsw In 1992, Cawili borrowed money from Panaguiton amounting to P1,979,459. In 1993, Cawili with his business associate Tongson issued 3 checks as payment Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. During preliminary investigation, Tongson claimed that he was not Cawilis business associate. On Dec. 6 1995 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner then appeal before DOJ and in 1997 DOJ found that it was indeed possible for Tongson to co-signed the checks. It then directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutors resolution. ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. Moreover, ACPSampaga stated that the order of the Chief State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could no longer be sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure because the initiative should come from petitioner himself and not the investigating prosecutor.

Issues1. Whether or not the rule on prescription as provided for in Act No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. 22

RulingWe agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in court can toll the running of the prescriptive period.It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment,[39] and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.[40]***************Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control.[55] A clear example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges againstTongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioners control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJs flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accuseds delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner s filing of his complaintaffidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is alsoANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner.

8. CRESPO vs MOGULFACTS:Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estaga against Mario Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to deter arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the office of provincial Fiscal.CARDINAL PRINCIPLE:Criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the Fiscal. He may or he may not file the complaint or information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the discretion and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons.It is through the conduct of preliminary investigation, that the fiscal determines the existence of a Prima Facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscals discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or even permissible for a Court of compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an information.In a clash of views between the Judge who did not investigate and the Fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscals should normally prevail.The action of fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subject to the approval to the Provincial or City Fiscal or the Chief of State Prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the Fiscal.

MARIO FL. CRESPO vs. HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL(2)FACTS: On April 18, 1977 the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo. When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice. In an order, the presiding judge, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the CA which was eventually granted while perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review. The Undersecretary of Justice reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. But the respondent judge denied the motion.ISSUE: Whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits. RATIO: YES. It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. And it is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the fiscal determines the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as we all know is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much less should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and void. The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his direction and control. The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

9. Dimatulac v Villon

FACTS:SPO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in Barangay San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga. A complaint for Murder was filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) private respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, Martin Yabut, Servillano Yabut, Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Casti David, Francisco Yambao, Juan Magat, Arturo Naguit, Fortunato Mallari, Jesus de la Cruz, Joselito Miranda, SPO3 Gilberto Malabanan, Aniano Magnaye, Vladimir Yumul, a certain Danny, and a certain Koyang/Arding.

Judge David conducted a preliminary investigation and found probable cause, issued warrants for the arrest of the accused. Only David, Mandap, Magat and Yambao were arrested; while only Yambao submitted his counter affidavit.

After the prelim investigation, the judge found reasonable ground to believe that Murder has been committed and the accused are probably the perpetrators thereof. He recommended the issuance ofwarrants of arrests and provided no bail

Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia Q. Alfonso-Flores conducted a reinvestigation. It is not clear from the record whether she conducted the same motu proprio or upon motion of private respondents. The offense committed was only homicide (NOT murder) and all Yabuts were in conspiracy with one another. The 2 requisites of murder qualified by treachery were absent. She also recommended bail of 20k each. (note: the Yabuts were not under the custody of the law)

Before the information for Homicide was filed, the heirs of Dimatulac filed an appeal on the resolution of Ass. Prov. Pros. Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of Justice (SOJ) alleging mainly that Alfonso-Flores erred in lowering the crime from Murder as originally filed to Homicide despite the glaring presence of treachery, evident premeditation, etc. (Take note of Rule 70- NPS Rules on Appeal in Syllabus[footnoteRef:2]) [2: ]

Notice of the appeal was furnished to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Alfonso-Flores ignored this and proceeded to file the information for Homicide which the Prov. Prosecutor (Manarang) approved and certified Private prosecutor (counsel for private complainants) filed a motion to defer proceedings (i.e. arraignment) before the RTC in view of his clients pending appeal with the SOJ YABUTs opposed motion to defer proceedings/arraignment arguing that the pendency of the appeal before the SOJ was not a ground to defer arraignment and they had a right to a speedy trial [invoked the case of Crespo v. Mogul.RTC judge denied motion to defer arraignment.RTC Judge setthe arraignment. Private prosecutor moved to inhibit the judge, and filed a petition for prohibition to enjoin the judge from proceeding with the arraignment. RTC Judge voluntarily inhibited himself and then the case wastransferred to herein respondent Judge Villion.Petitioners filed manifestation informing Judge Villlon him of the cases pending before the SOJ and the prohibition case before the CA. Judge ignored this and set the arraignment. Yabuts entered their plea of not guilty. Petitioners moved to set aside arraignment but to no avail. SOJ Guingona FINALLY came up with a resolution of the appeal. He directed the Provincial Prosec. To amend the info against the accused from homicide to murder. But he wrote to Provincial Prosec. Again and SET ASIDE his order to amend the info from homicide to murder, considering the appeal was moot and academic by the arraignment of the accused but Mallari must be included.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment of Accused Fortunato Mallari, denied.

CA also dismissed the petition.

Petitioners filed with the SC a petition for Certiorari/Prohibition and Mandamus to reverse the order of respondent Judge denying their Motion to Set Aside Arraignment; set aside arraignment of private respondents; order that no further action be taken by any court in criminal case until this petition resolved; and order Sec. of Justice and the prosecutors concerned to amend the information from homicide to murder.ISSUES1. WON the provincial prosecutor erred downgrading or lowering the crime charged from Murder to Homicide [YES]2. WON Judge Villion erred in proceeding with the arraignmentof the accused and denying motion to set aside arraignment[YES]3. WON SOJ erred in reversing himself and his order to amend the information from Homicide to Murder [YES]

HELD: Petition GRANTED. The orders denying the Motion to Defer Proceeding/Arraignment and denying the Motion to SetAside Arraignment are declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The arraignment of private respondents is likewise declared VOID and SET ASIDE. Furthermore, the order of SOJ is SET ASIDE and his initial order REINSTATED. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga is DIRECTED to file with the RTC the amended information for Murder.

Issue #1: WON the provincial prosecutor erred downgrading or lowering the crime charged from Murder to Homicide [YES]

There was No Basis for the Reinvestigation or downgrading of the Offense from Murder to Homicide. Warrants of arrest were issued against the Yabuts but they were never arrested/or surrendered and never brought into the custody of the law. How can the Ass. Prov Prosec. Conduct a reinvestigation then lower the crime from murder to Homicide? (Note that they re-appeared after crime was downgraded).

She should have also waited for the resolution of the Sec of Justice, but instead entertained the motion for reinvestigation, accepted counter-affidavits and recommended bail. REMEMBER! They were never brought into the custody of the law.Petitioners had the right to appeal to the DOJ under Section 4 of Rule 112of the Rules of Court and DOJ Order No. 223 S. 1993 recognizes the right of both offended parties and the accused to appeal from resolutions inpreliminary investigations or reinvestigations. The sec. speaks of dismissing criminal complaintpetitioners herein were not barred from appealingfrom the resolution holding that only homicide was committed,considering that their complaint was for murder. By holdingthat only homicide was committed, the Provincial Prosecutor'sOffice of Pampanga effectively "dismissed" the complaint formurder.

Appeal to the Sec. of Justice should not be dismissed motu propio on account of the Yabuts arraignment. The bar on Sec 4does not apply! The cases of Crespo v Mogul forecloses the power of authorityof the SOJ to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminalcases despite an information already having been filed in court.The SOJ is only enjoined to refrain, as far as practicable, fromentertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of theprosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court. There was clear and indecent haste on the part of the public prosec. In the filing of the information for homicide depriving the State and offended parties of due processs.

Issue #2: WON Judge Villion erred in proceeding with the arraignment of the accused and denying motion to set aside arraignment [YES]

Judge Villon set arraignment of the accused almostimmediately upon receiving the records of the case from theformer RTC Judge. He should have gone over the case and noticed the multiple motions, manifestations and uttervehemence of the petitioners to hear their cause. The judge had COMPLETE control over the case and any disposition rested on his discretion + was not bound to await the DOJ resolution on appeal.

But he committed grave abuse of discretion in rushing the arraignment of theYABUTs on the assailed information for homicide denying due process.

Actions:nullifying without jurisdiction, the denial ofthe motion to defer further hearings, the denial of the motion toreconsider such denial, the arraignment of the YABUTs and theirplea of not guilty

Issue #3. WON SOJ erred in reversing himself and his order to amend the information from Homicide to Murder [YES]

DOJ relinquished its power of control andsupervision over the Provincial Prosecutor and the Asst. Provincial Prosecutors of Pampanga; and meekly surrenderedto the latter's inappropriate conduct even hostile attitude,which amounted to neglect of duty or conduct prejudicial tothe best interest of the service.

The DOJ could have joined cause with petitioners to set aside arraignment and, in the exercise of itsdisciplinary powers over its personnel, the DOJ could havedirected the public prosecutors concerned to show cause whyno disciplinary action should be taken against them for neglectof duty or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

10. Elcano vs. Hill

Facts:ReginaldHillwas prosecuted criminally for killing Agapito Elcano. At the time of the occurrence, ReginaldHillis still a minor and is already legally married. Reginald is still living and gets subsistence with his father, MarvinHill. Reginald was acquitted on the ground that his acts were not criminal because of lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistakes.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the presentcivil actionfor damages is already barred by the acquittal of Reginald.

(2) Whether or not Atty. MarvinHillhas a vicarious liability being the father of a minor child who committed a delict.

Held:

No. The acquittal of ReginaldHillin the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delicts, hence the acquittal is not a bar to theinstantaction against him. To find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required unlike in civil cases, preponderance of evidence is sufficient. The concept of culpa acquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. Also, Art 2177 CC provides that Responsibility for fault or negligence is separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. However, plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (ART 327CC), and under Art 397, emancipation takes place by marriage of the minor, such emancipation is not absolute and full. Reginald although married, was living with his father and still dependent from the latter. ART 2180 applies to Atty. MarvinHillnotwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald.