citizen preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

46
Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it (brought to you by: Factors, Sectors, & Institutions)

Upload: hedya

Post on 25-Feb-2016

17 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

DESCRIPTION

Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it. (brought to you by: Factors, Sectors, & Institutions). Plan for THIS PART tonight:. Why do countries engage in trade? Why does a country have a “comparative advantage” in one industry but not another? - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Citizen Preferences over trade& what governments might do about it

(brought to you by:Factors, Sectors, & Institutions)

Page 2: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Plan for THIS PART tonight:1. Why do countries engage in trade?

2. Why does a country have a “comparative advantage” in one industry but not another?

3. Why is there protectionism?

4. Who is against immigration?

5. Is it factors or sectors?

Page 3: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Take-away: Abundant factors win from globalization (intuition: supply & demand)

In a closed economy (autarky),

Papa Smurf is in high demand.

And he has a lot of cheap labor.

But imagine there’s another country out there with lots of “Papas” and only one regular smurf. If these countries trade,

the supply of Papa-goods (for the 1st country) goes way up (and the price way down)

Meantime, the demand for regular smurf-goods (worldwide) goes way up – and so does their price.

WINNERS FROM TRADE!LOSERS FROM TRADE!

Page 4: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Why do countries engage in trade?

• Ricardian model: 2 countries, 2 goods & CONSTANT opportunity costs

• Logic of COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE

Page 5: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

• One American worker can produce more computers or more shoes than one Brazilian worker

• US has an ABSOLUTE ADVANTAGE in both computers and shoes

• So why trade?

Example is a li’l out of date…

Page 6: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Differences in opportunity costs!• Suppose we move one American worker from

Computers to Shoes

• We lose 50 computers for 200 shoes

• For each additional pair of shoes produced, the US must forgo 0.25 computers (50/200=¼)

• The (constant) opportunity cost of each pair of shoes is ¼ computer

• The (constant) opportunity cost of each computer is 4 pairs of shoes (200/50=4)

Page 7: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Differences in opportunity costs!• Suppose we move one Brazilian worker from

Computers to Shoes

• We lose 5 computers for 175 shoes

• For each additional pair of shoes produced, Brazil must forgo 0.03 computers (5/175=0.029)

• The (constant) opportunity cost of each pair of shoes is 0.03 computer

• The (constant) opportunity cost of each computer is 35 pairs of shoes (175/5=35)

Page 8: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Critical point

• Where is it RELATIVELY cheaper to produce computers?– In the US it costs 4 shoes– In Brazil it costs 35 shoes

• Where is it RELATIVELY cheaper to produce shoes?– In the US it costs 0.25 computer– In Brazil it costs 0.03 computer

Page 9: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Why does one country have a comparative advantage in one area?

• Heckscher-Ohlin:• Compared to the availability of capital & labor in one country,

another country will have relatively more or less• Capital-abundant countries: Cost of capital relative to wages is

lower• Labor-abundant countries: Wages relative to cost of capital is lower• H-O suggests that countries have an advantage in producing

different commodities because of the different factor endowments of countries and the different mixtures of these factors involved in production of different commodities

Page 10: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

So why is there protectionism?

Page 11: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Winners & Losers

• Trade: distributional consequences!

• Trade policy: – shaped by government-responses to interest

groups’ demands

• Government-responses:– shaped by POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Page 12: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Factor incomes & class conflict• Simplest version:

– labor v. capital– (workers v. owners of capital)

• Countries have a comparative advantage in producing goods requiring their ABUNDANT FACTOR

• There are capital-abundant countries & labor abundant countries

Page 13: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

In the factor model, trade causes…

• Income of the ABUNDANT factor to RISE

• Income of the SCARCE factor to FALL

Page 14: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

• Absent trade– “Capital” is relatively scarce in a country like

China, so the “rent” can be enormous– Labor is abundant, so wages are low

• By opening up to trade– Capital “rents” will fall until they equals the

(rising) rate of return in trading partner countries

– Wages will rise until they equal the (falling) wage in trading partner countries

Page 15: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

• Absent trade– Labor is relatively scarce in a country like

Switzerland, so wages can be enormous– Capital is abundant, so returns are low

• By opening up to trade– Return to capital will rise until it equals the

(dropping) rate in trading partner countries– Wages will drop until they equal the (falling)

wage in trading partner countries

Page 16: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Stolper-Samuelson Theorem• Factor-price equalization

• The tendency for trade to cause factor prices to converge

• Note that the losses for the scarce factor are NOT sufficiently offset by gains from trade (even if the net aggregate gains offset net aggregate losses).

• The scarce factor is a net LOSER!

Page 17: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

What do we do about losers?• Repress them?

– Dictatorship – repression?– Democracy – tyranny of the majority?

• Compensate them?– Training?– Retirement packages?

• Protect them?– Tariffs, barriers to trade, subsidies

• The answer may depend on political institutions!

Page 18: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Thought experiment

• Suppose 2 factors of production – (labor & capital)

• The majority of citizens are “labor”

• Under democracy, labor rules

• Under dictatorship, capital rules

• Question: Will the government be pro-trade or not?

Page 19: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Democracy Authoritarian

Capital abundant ???

Labor abundant

Page 20: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Back to 2 factors (ignoring collective action problem)

Democracy Authoritarian

Capital abundant Labor loses from trade but has political power protectionism

Labor abundant ???

Page 21: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Back to 2 factors (ignoring collective action problem)

Democracy Authoritarian

Capital abundant Labor loses from trade but has political power protectionism

???

Labor abundant Labor wins from trade & has political power free trade

Page 22: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Democracy Authoritarian

Capital abundant Labor loses from trade but has political power protectionism

Capital wins from trade & has political power free trade

Labor abundant Labor wins from trade & has political power free trade

???

Back to 2 factors (ignoring collective action problem)

Page 23: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Back to 2 factors (ignoring collective action problem)

Democracy Authoritarian

Capital abundant Labor loses from trade but has political power protectionism

Capital wins from trade & has political power free trade

Labor abundant Labor wins from trade & has political power free trade

Capital loses from trade but has political power protectionism

Page 24: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Does the factor-approach predict preferences over “globalization”?

Trade, immigration…

Page 25: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Effect of education on pro-trade attitude by country-factor endowment

Page 26: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Effect of occupational skill on pro-trade attitude by ctry-factor endowment

Page 27: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Who is against immigration?

Mayda, Anna Marie. 2006. Who is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants. The Review of Economics and Statistics 88 (3):510-530.

Page 28: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Theory: The Prediction

• In countries characterized by *high skill* composition of natives relative to immigrants,– *skilled* individuals should favor immigration

– *unskilled* individuals should oppose immigration

• In countries characterized by *low skill* composition of natives relative to immigrants,– *unskilled* individuals should favor immigration

– *skilled* individuals should oppose immigration

Page 29: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

The skill composition of natives to immigrants is positively correlated with GDP per capita (level of development.

Page 30: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

The effect of education (skill) is stronger in more developed countries.

Page 31: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

The effect of education appears to be economically not culturally driven – holds only for people in the labor force

Page 32: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Effect of education on pro-immigration attitude by ctry-factor endowment

Page 33: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Effect of education on pro-immigration attitude by ctry-factor endowment

Page 34: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Alternative explanations?• Non-economic variables also matter• Concerns about crime rates and cultural effect of

foreigners covary with immigration attitudes• Racist feelings have a very strong, negative and significant

impact on pro-immigration preferences• Economic findings are "robust" to the inclusion of cultural

variables• Important (and sad): non-economic determinants are

relatively more important than the economic variables (explain more variance)– R2 of model with/without the economic variables increases 6%– R2 of model with/without the cultural variables increases 15%

Page 35: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Is it FACTORS or SECTORS?

Page 36: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Factor mobility• The ease with which labor and capital can move

from one industry to another

• We have implicitly assumed that capital and labor are highly MOBILE

• All capital is the same (computers, car factories, etc…)

• All labor is the same (shoe-makers, furniture-makers, steel-workers, etc…)

• But what if factors are highly SPECIFIC?

Page 37: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Sector Incomes & Industry Conflict

• It’s really about computers, shoes, etc…

• Factor mobility is low

• Incomes of labor AND capital in the same SECTOR (industry) rise and fall together

• Now we do not completely abandon the factor model

• We still use the factor model to tell us which industries benefit from trade, however,…

• LABOR & CAPITAL EMPLOYED IN INDUSTRIES THAT RELY INTENSIVELY ON SOCIETY’S ABUNDANT FACTOR BOTH GAIN FROM TRADE

Page 38: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Advanced industrial countries

• Capital abundant, so…

• Capital AND labor employed in capital-intensive industries both gain from trade

• The export-oriented SECTOR

• Capital AND labor employed in labor-intensive industries both lose from trade

• The import-competing SECTOR

Page 39: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Developing countries

• Labor abundant, so…

• Capital AND labor employed in _______-intensive industries both gain from trade

• The export-oriented SECTOR

• Capital AND labor employed in _______- intensive industries both lose from trade

• The import-competing SECTOR

Page 40: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Summarizing factors & sectors• Factor model (abundant factor wins, scarce

loses)

• Sector model (both factors in an abundant-factor-sector win; both factors in a scarce-factor-sector lose)

• What do we about losers?

– Institutions matter!

Page 41: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Take homes• Trade is “efficient”

• But there are winners & losers– Globalization winners – factor model: Abundant factor– Globalization losers – factor model: Scarce factor

– Globalization winners – sector model: Export-oriented sector– Globalization losers – sector model: Import-competing sector

• Political institutions may influence how we deal with losers

Factors, Sectors, Institutions

Page 42: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Thank youWE ARE GLOBAL GEORGETOWN!

Page 43: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

• When the US opens up to trade, they move from producing at EaA to PtA.

• So they shift from shoes to computers.

• Who gains?– Capital

• Who loses?– Labor

Page 44: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

• When the US opens up to trade, they move from producing at EaB to PtB.

• So they shift from computers to shoes.

• Who gains?– Labor

• Who loses?– Capital

Page 45: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

• Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade. American Political Science Review 81 (4):1121-1137.

• 3 factors: land-labor-capital– Considers the land-labor ratio– High land-labor ratio land-abundant, labor-scarce– Low land-labor ratio labor-abundant, land-scarce– Define “advanced” economies as capital-abundant

Page 46: Citizen Preferences over trade & what governments might do about it

Pro-trade

Anti-trade

Pro-trade

Anti-trade

Pro-trade

Anti-trade

Pro-trade

Anti-trade

URBAN-RURAL CONFLICT

URBAN-RURAL CONFLICT

CLASS CONFLICT

CLASS CONFLICTExamples:

Peron in Argentina,

Vargas in Brazil