choi - leaving it up to the imagination- pov shots and imagining from the inside

Leaving It up to the Imagination: POV Shots and Imagining from the insideAuthor(s): Jinhee ChoiReviewed work(s):Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Winter, 2005), pp. 17-25Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for AestheticsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1559136 .

Accessed: 28/02/2013 10:54

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Wiley and The American Society for Aesthetics are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extendaccess to The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded on Thu, 28 Feb 2013 10:54:59 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=black

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=tasfa

http://www.jstor.org/stable/1559136?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


JINHEE CHOI

Leaving It Up to the Imagination: POV Shots and Imagining from the Inside

[Strolling in a desolate amusement park on a winter developed in her book Reading with Feeling, evening] that our aesthetic appreciation of fiction Brand: I always liked the place [the amusement park] contains a temporal dimension, which is in fact at this time of year. constrained by the trajectory of the narration Lisa: Perhaps you prefer to imagine what it will be in process.5 Similarly, for Smith, POV shots- the spring. Because if it is already spring, there is although he carefully avoids linking POV shots nothing to imagine. directly to character identification-are one of

Letter from an Unknown Woman the important devices that align the viewer to a

(Max Ophuls, 1948) character by providing access to character (Max Ohuls,1948) subjectivity.6 In this essay, I will focus on Smith's claim

Recent literature in the philosophy of film not that POV shots tend to activate central imagin- only attempts to explain the cognitive processes ing. I attempt to show that such a tendency involved in engaging with fiction film, but also claim about the function of film technique is addresses the textual cues that contribute to rather dubious. In my view, POV shots rarely evoking an emotional response from the viewer, provide an occasion to employ central imagin- For instance,CarlPlantingaemphasizes therole ing. Even if POV shots can prompt central of facial expression in inducing affective imagining, with the aid of other techniques such mimicry in the viewer.1 Susan Feagin shows as reaction shots or devices to evoke startle how timing-via shot length and the interval response, the tendency relationship between between shots-has a bearing on bringing out POV shots and the activation of central imagin- emotional responses from the viewer.2 Murray ing becomes so tenuous that it is quite unin- Smith focuses on point of view (POV) shots as formative. It does not provide us with a one of the important features that encourage the systematic way to detect the function of such a viewer to imagine the character's experience filmic technique. A stronger and systematic from the inside.3 None of these scholars claims relation, I suggest, can be found between the that the parameters they foreground necessarily extent of viewers' knowledge and an activation result in a certain type of emotion in the viewer. of certain types of imagining. I will propose that Their claims are rather weak: these para- limited information on the character's experi- meters-facial expression, narration process, ence or behavior plays a more significant role in and POV shots-are "elicitors," following eliciting centralaimagining. Feagin's terminology, in the sense that they are textual cues that contribute to the spectator's engagement. I. THE ROLE OF POV SHOTS

These elicitors are identified within their larger theories of film emotion. For instance, The POV shot has taken a special place in film timing nicely illustrates Feagin's claim, theories as a device that leads the viewer to

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63:1 Winter 2005



18 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

identify with a character, by making the viewer these two examples-Gold Is Not All and replicate the perceptual state of the character. In Empire of the Ants-illustrate is that although his book Engaging Characters, Smith success- POV shots can contribute to an emotional fully argues against such a claim by delineating engagement with characters, they do not ensure different levels at which the text guides and it. Emotional engagement with characters requires relates to the spectator. Smith claims that there more than mere perceptual alignment with them are three levels in which the film text engages and it is achieved in conjunction with other the viewer: recognition, alignment, and alle- factors within the narrative, such as the charac- giance.7 Recognition refers to the viewer's con- ter type and the importance of the character. struction of a character as a unified person from Aside from the three levels at which a film the cues available in the text; alignment refers guides the viewer, Smith postulates three differ- to the distribution of knowledge and informa- ent types of mental process employed during tion about the story world. A POV shot is one of the spectator's engagement with the narrative: the devices that align the viewer to a certain acentral imagining, central imagining, and non- character by guiding the viewer's attention to cognitive responses such as affective mimicry what is significant in the narrative. We as and reflex responses. 10 Smith adopts the distinc- spectators are cued to attribute certain beliefs tion between acentral and central imagining and desires to characters-by witnessing what from Richard Wollheim.11 Similar distinctions those characters see, want, and intend to do. can be found in other models: Kendall Walton's Throughout this process, we are also informed imagining from the outside versus imagining about the story world. The last level that Smith from the inside and Currie's primary versus describes is allegiance: the level at which the secondary simulation (or impersonal versus spectator morally and emotionally engages with personal imagining).12 A main difference character. between these two types of imagining is that in

However, we should note that engagement the case of the former in each pair, one merely with characters at the level of allegiance does imagines that such and such is true in the not necessarily depend on perceptual alignment fictional world; whereas in the latter case, one with characters via POV shots. As Smith and projects oneself into the fictional situation, others point out, character identification at the takes on the beliefs and desires of a character, level of allegiance can be achieved through and imagines what it would be like to be in the various means other than POV shots. For situation in which that character is placed. instance, in Gold Is Not All (1910), we emotion- There is disagreement among these scholars ally identify with a poor couple, even though regarding exactly what prompts central imagin- this is done by manipulating the ranges of ing or to what extent central imagining is knowledge between the viewer and the charac- employed during the film-viewing process. ter, without recourse to POV shots.8 We see a Some (such as Walton) argue that the film shot of both a poor couple and a rich couple medium in general prompts central imagining- walking along the street, divided by a wall. The especially imagining seeing-while others message that the poor couple, although they (including Smith and Currie) argue that central envy the rich couple, is happier than the rich imagining is prompted only locally within couple is narratively communicated by other specific narrative circumstances. Neither view, means-that is, the viewer has more knowledge seems to provide us with sufficient reasons to than both couples-rather than through a POV think that film as a whole or certain filmic shot of the poor couple. techniques reliably prompt central imagining.

Furthermore, the POV structure does not I will return to this point shortly. guarantee allegiance with characters. Noel Carroll As a rule of engagement, Smith proposes that provides us with an interesting example.9 He certain textual cues may foster imagining or argues that in Empire of the Ants (1977) there is predispose us to imagine in a certain way.13 a shot of people seen from a giant ant's perspec- Smith does not argue that certain textual cues tive. We see the people multiplied by the ant's are either necessary or sufficient to activate the many irises. However, such a structure would spectator's mental faculty in an automatic not emotionally ally us with the giant ant. What manner. Certain textual cues are elicitors or



Choi POV Shots and Imagining from the Inside 19

catalysts that tend to trigger certain cognitive need to anticipate how other people will behave, mechanisms. Moreover, Smith finds a closer we apply such a folk psychological theory. link between POV shots and central imagining Stephen Stich and Shaun Nichols propose a than any other cueing structure. He argues with weakened version of the theory-theory, suggest- caution that POV shots are able to trigger the ing that we do not necessarily make recourse to viewer's perceptual imagination because they law-like generalizations in attributing mental depict the perceptual states of characters that states to others, but do so based on a body of are then supposedly rendered in the spectator.14 knowledge governing a certain domain.18 In other words, when we as viewers see optical On the other hand, proponents of the simula- POV shots, we imagine ourselves seeing the tion theory-such as Robert Gordon, Alvin object of the character's gaze. For example, in Goldman, and Gregory Currie-deny that we Dead Calm (1989), the example Smith relies on possess a complex theory of human behavior.'9 to illustrate his point, John Ingram (played by Rather, we simulate the situation in which Sam Neill) inspects a deserted ship. A pulley others find themselves.20 We imagine being in suddenly flies in his direction. We as viewers the other's shoes and run our own inference or see a POV shot of Ingram in which the pulley decision-making mechanism "off-line" to gen- swings toward the camera. Yet, we imagine see- erate outputs. Drawing on our own response, we ing the pulley fly toward us! However, we further ascribe our imagined response to the should note that Smith's rule of engagement is target person. One of the assumptions behind applicable only to perceptual imagination- using our own cognitive or emotive mecha- which is a subcategory of central imagining- nisms to understand or to predict the mental/ not to central imagining in general. For, a' la affective states of others is that we and the Smith, POV shots render the perceptual states target person possess similar decision-making of a character effectively, but not the emotional mechanisms, and when personal dispositions or states.15 predilections are bracketed, we can reach a suc-

To test whether optical POV shots indeed cessful prediction about the psychological states tend to trigger central imagining, we first need of others. The success of such a prediction can to ask under what circumstances we employ be measured against the external behavioral central imagination. Smith and others appeal to cues available to the attributor. the notion of "simulation" in explaining the pro- I will not try to determine which theory is cess of central imagining. Imagining a character more plausible in explaining mental attribu- from the inside amounts to simulating the char- tions. For the purpose of this essay, it is suffi- acter's situation oneself and projecting one's cient to point out that the occasion for own subsequent emotional outputs to the char- employing either a folk psychological theory or acter.16 However, it is important to note that the simulation method involves rather limited central imagining, understood as an exemplar of knowledge on the viewer's part: when the simulation, does not need to be activated unless viewer does not have full access to the mental there exists an epistemic gap for the viewer to states or the behavioral outcomes of the target fill in. subject. The film-viewing process places us

In the philosophy of mind, the simulation within a kind of epistemic situation where either theory is proposed as an alternative to the method can be employed. Films not only pro- theory-theory to explain how we attribute men- vide, but also withhold, information relevant to tal states to others. The theory-theory, proposed understanding a character's psychology and to by philosophers such as Jerry Fodor and others, predicting a character's behavior. Understand- claims that we deploy a theory of folk psychol- ing a character's psychology is a crucial step ogy in order to explain and predict others' for understanding the narrative, given that intentions, desires, and behaviors.17 According Hollywood narratives are often driven by to the theory-theory, we possess a tacit theory goal-oriented protagonists and that character of the human mind, which consists of a set of psychology provides for a specific narrative beliefs about causal relations that link belief- development. As a film unfolds, the narrative desire inputs, internal states, and behavior out- constantly poses questions to the viewer: puts. When faced with a situation where we What will the protagonist do next? What will




an antiprotagonist do next to prevent the protag- gradually tightened framing signals a looming onist from achieving his or her goals? We need danger and evokes suspense in the viewer, to fill in the information gap that the narrative although the source of the danger is yet to be leaves open by making inferences from cues revealed. When the pulley swings directly available to us. toward the camera, the viewer is startled at the

The film-viewing process does provide occa- sudden appearance of the pulley. However, as if sions for employing either folk psychology or in answer to our primary question of whether a simulation, especially when the viewer has Ingram will be able to escape the pulley, in the limited access to a character's psychology. next shot we see Ingram dodge the pulley. It is However, I doubt whether POV shots provide interesting to note that the camera, instead of occasions for either. When POV shots are used, showing us a reaction shot of Ingram immedi- the viewer's range of knowledge about what the ately, cuts away to an overhead shot of Ingram character perceives is no less than that of the in extreme long shot. The shot shows where the character. The structure of a POV shot is often pulley was coming from and assures the viewer composed of two steps: (1) the character looks that Ingram is safe. It is not until the next shot off screen (a point/glance shot) and (2) the that the viewer is able to see Ingram's facial object is seen (a point/object shot). By follow- expression-which is surprisingly calm-when ing the glance of the character, we attribute a he stops the swinging pulley. perceptual belief to the character that there is an Furthermore, the alleged employment of object. In my view, such a situation does not central imagination while watching the scene require any type of central imagination. POV seems to be redundant at least and indetermi- shots provide, not withhold, information about nate at most. On the one hand, the effect of the the character's perceptual state. We are scene, "a visceral flinching," as Smith puts it, informed about the object of the character's does not seem to be the result of central imagin- gaze, and thus we do not need to imagine the ing.22 This more or less startle response is a character's perceptual experience ourselves in product of neither acentral nor central imagin- order to infer that the character sees an object.2' ing. A startle response occurs independently of

Let us examine closely the scene in Dead any cognitively mediated response, and in this Calm that Smith describes to illustrate his point. case, independently of the viewer's concern for As the boat that carries Ingram approaches the Ingram's safety. On the other hand, if, as Smith ship, we are aligned with Ingram via POV suggests, POV shots prompt central imagining shots. Shortly after he ascends the ship and along with the assistance of other techniques starts to investigate, he hears a loud bang. As he such as reaction shots or startle responses, it is turns around to find the source of the sound, the hard to pinpoint the exact causal connection camera cuts to show a closeup of a pulley flying between POV shots and central imagining in his direction, and then cuts back to Ingram employed by the viewer, if it were indeed who avoids the pulley. Smith argues that the employed. POV shot of the pulley flying toward the cam- Despite Smith's cautionary attempt to revive era, combined with other textual cues, invites an intuition that POV structure is closely linked the viewer to imagine Ingram' s experience from with character identification, I find such a the inside: we imagine the pulley swinging claim-that is, POV shots tend to trigger central toward us. However, there seem to be a couple imagining as a part of what Smith calls the of problems with using this kind of example to "multifaceted alignment"-rather too weak for support Smith's claim that POV shots trigger delineating the process of central imagining. perceptual central imagining. Although it is true that POV structure is a

First, despite the insertion of the POV shot of reliable-but not the only-device to align the the pulley, the camera positions in this scene viewer to a character, such an alignment does situate the viewer as an observer: the viewer's not necessarily demand that the viewer imagine knowledge slightly exceeds that of Ingram. As from the inside. It is often the case that the Ingram walks toward the middle of the ship disparity between the viewer and the character with his back to the camera, the camera zooms in terms of their ranges of knowledge inhibits in to show his back in medium closeup. The the former from simulating the latter's exact




experience even with the assistance of POV secondary (personal) imagination-in order to shots. Consider, for example, the scene in show the different levels of imagining involved which Ingram finds out that Hughie Warriner in watching films. One of the similarities between (Billy Zane) lied to him and his wife Rae central imagining and secondary imagining is (Nicole Kidman) about what happened on the that both are examples of self-imagining. That ship. Ingram hurries to return to his own boat to is, the object of imagining is yourself: "you" warn his wife about Hughie. As Ingram nears figure in the content of your imagination. In the the boat, he jumps off to get onto the rear of the case of central imagining, you imagine yourself boat but he misses by an inch. Instead, he is hit seeing the characters inside the fictional by the boat's propeller. Shortly after, we see world and observe the events as they unfold. Ingram's POV shot of the boat moving away Similarly, in the case of secondary imagining, from him and toward the far background, you imagine what you would do or feel in the followed by a reaction shot of him looking off situation that the characters are facing. screen in despair. It is interesting to note how POV shots, however, do not occupy a special the film orchestrates the scene in such a way position within Currie's theory. Currie is reluc- that our concern for Ingram discourages us from tant to privilege POV shots in terms of their completely identifying with him. Before we are power to trigger the secondary imagination, shown his point of view, we see him bleeding in but argues that subjective shots may trigger an underwater shot. We as viewers imagine secondary imagining. For instance, in North by both his pain and despair, while Ingram seems Northwest (1959), Thornhill (played by Cary for the moment to be oblivious to his own pain. Grant), is mistaken for Kaplan by Vandamn's He is preoccupied with his concern for his wife, henchmen. He is forced by Vandamn's hench- until he swims back to his boat and discovers men to drink and then to drive drunk. As the severe wound on his arm. In my view, there Thornhill realizes that he is in danger, he tries to is a stronger and more informative relationship escape by pushing Vandamn's men out of the between the extent of the viewer's knowledge car. When he drives rather recklessly down the and the employment of central imagining. In the hill, we see a series of subjective POV shots next section, I will explore this thesis further. intercut with reaction shots of Thornhill; we see Before I discuss my own model, I first need to a subjective shot of Thornhill onto which the address some possible objections. images of the road are superimposed. Currie

One might point out that I reduce the function would argue that in such a case the content of of POV shots solely to their representational the subjective POV shot is "a rough guide to roles, that is, that they deliver to the viewer what we should imagine his experience is information about what a character sees, while like."25 It is true that subjective POV shots mark neglecting their additional functions, such as the subjective states of characters more explic- performing an expressive role, that is, to under- itly than do optical POV shots. However, do score what a character feels or experiences.23 subjective POV shots more easily lead the One might further argue that subjective POV spectator to imagine the character's conditions shots occupy a special place by engaging the from the inside? I do not believe so. spectator's imagination more directly. For, Why does a subjective POV shot put us in a unlike optical POV shots, most of which depict better position than an optical POV shot to initi- the object of the character's vision more or ate central imagining? In fact, such a shot seems less objectively, subjective POV shots imitate to relieve the viewer from the burden of imagin- or emulate the subjective experience of the ing from the inside: the shot mimics, but does character. I will examine Currie's claim that not exactly replicate, the perceptual state of subjective shots have privileged access to a the character. Why should the viewer need to character's perceptual subjectivity. imagine anything when the character's per-

Currie claims that subjective POV shots ceptual state is directly available to him or her? may encourage the viewer to imagine what it is It might be possible that subjective shots trigger like to have the experience of the character.24 a viewer's own personal memory similar to Like Smith, Currie distinguishes between two the experience portrayed. For instance, when types of imagining-primary (impersonal) and one sees a portrayal of a character's pounding




headache from a hangover via a swirling spectator to imagine a character's experience camera movement or shaking image, it might from the inside. bring back the viewer's own personal memory from past experience. But such a case does not make the viewer project himself or herself II. WHAT IS IT, REALLY? THE EXTENT OF THE VIEWER'S imaginatively into the fictional situation. Rather, KNOWLEDGE

it enables the viewer to retrieve, by association, his or her actual memory. What, then, contributes to engaging the viewer's

Currie and Smith might still ask: What, then, central imagination? Smith's and Currie's is the experience that we have while watching solutions rely on the intuition that the depth of more drastically marked subjective POV shots, narration-especially subjective narration-has such as the dolly-zoom shots that mimic the diz- to do with prompting central imagining. Both ziness of Scottie (played by Jimmy Stewart) in optical POV shots and subjective POV shots are Vertigo (Hitchcock, 1958) when he looks down often considered to be the devices that cue the a long, winding staircase?26 Smith and Currie viewer to the character's perceptual or mental might attempt to explain the effect rendered in subjectivity, which then presumably triggers the the viewer by recourse to the way a shot is pre- viewer to imagine the character's experience sented: that is, it is presented as a subjective from the inside. However, as I hope I have POV shot. However, it does not seem convinc- shown in the previous section, the fact that POV ing to argue that that is the main source of our shots inform us about character psychology experience. Suppose we see two images shot undercuts the possibility that central imagining from a moving rollercoaster: one is framed as a is needed: when we are given information subjective shot while the other is not. In both about characters, there is no need to imagine it cases, the images give rise to dizziness in most ourselves. viewers. Although it has yet to be determined There appears to be an inverse relationship empirically, my prediction, in the former case, between the extent of the viewer's background where the shot is framed as a subjective shot, is knowledge and the viewer's need to employ that the viewer's response does not result from folk psychology or a simulation: the more the centrally imagining having such an experience viewer's knowledge is restricted, the greater the or from simulating the character's experience, need for the viewer to engage in one or the other but rather that it is directly caused by seeing process. That is, when we lack psychological such an image. To give rise to such an effect, it information about characters, we then need to does not have to be framed as a subjective POV engage in some process-whether theorizing, shot or as an optical POV shot. simulating, or imagining-to obtain it. Cer-

If my hypothesis is correct, we do not need to tainly, we should add a few constraints to this appeal to the notion of central imagining or to general thesis. First, we as viewers do not gen- secondary imagining to explain the effects of erally employ folk psychology or a simulation watching the subjective shots of Scottie in to understand the psychological states of all Vertigo. The viewer does not experience feel- characters in a film, but only of those who are ings similar to those of Scottie because he or pertinent to the narrative.27 If this is the case, she simulates Scottie's perceptual experience. the need for engaging either process-theoriz- The viewer has such an experience because the ing or simulating-to understand a character's dolly-zoom affects his or her vision directly psychology will be bounded by the narrative with its swift shift of objects in focus. The main saliency of that character. Second, the viewer's reason for having such an experience has to do knowledge of generic norms sometimes with the fact that this affective mechanism is obviates the viewer's need to rely on folk modular; it is built in such a way that we cannot psychology or simulation in order to predict the help but feel dizziness when there is swift character's future behaviors. For example, change in the visual field or when it is unstable. while watching a generic Hollywood ending If so, unlike what Smith and Currie would where the protagonist runs to the heroine to argue, the subjective POV shot should not be confess his love for her-for example, When considered a special device that leads the Harry Met Sally (1989), Reality Bites (1994),




and There's Something About Mary (1998)- transparency, which makes simulation unneces- there is no need for the viewer to employ folk sary, and absolute opacity, which makes simu- psychology or a simulation to predict whether lation nearly impossible. This requirement, as the heroine will accept the protagonist's love Currie calls it, can be named "psychological for her. We know that she will! However, films naturalism."29 governed less by generic formulas invite the I wonder, however, whether so-called psy- viewer to imagine the character's situations. chological naturalism is a useful constraint for

An example will illustrate my point. In the the viewer to simulate the character's experi- last scene of Vertigo, Scottie takes Judy (played ence. The requirement is so broad that the vast by Kim Novak) to the top of a bell tower to con- majority of narratives will fulfill it. Even experi- front her with the fact that she helped Scottie's mental films such as Chantal Akerman's avant- friend murder his wife. As Scottie walks up the garde film, Jeanne Dielman, 23 Quai du stairs, he stops to look down twice. Both times, Commerce, 1080 Bruxelles (1975), which relies we see the stairs shot with a dolly-zoom, which on neither POV shots nor reaction shots, is able emulates the subjective state of Scottie. How- to communicate the character's psychology in ever, when Scottie is near the top of the tower, such a way that the viewer registers the charac- he looks down the stairs one more time. It ter's psychological disturbances. seems that if we are to employ central imagin- In the remainder of this essay, I will examine ing, it occurs when Hitchcock does not cut to Akerman's Jeanne Dielman to show that what the shot of the stairs. That is, only then does the facilitates the viewer's central imagination is central imagining come into play; for that is the primarily the viewer's limited access to charac- only time that Scottie's perceptual state is not ter psychology. By examining this example, available to the viewer. Looking at Scottie's I wish to show that neither the presence of a ambivalent facial expressions, the viewer imag- certain type of filmic device nor explicit cues ines what Scottie's experience would be like, to character psychology is necessary for the and at the same time attempts to predict whether viewer to exercise central imagination. It has Scottie will be able to continue to follow Judy. been alleged that Akerman's minimal and Shortly after, we see a shot of stairs using a nor- hyperrealist style blocks the viewer from identi- mal lens, which indicates that Scottie finally fying with a character. However, in my view, overcame his fear of heights. Given his current POV shots are only one of many devices that perceptual state, we can further anticipate that align the viewer with the character. It is true he will go up the stairs to confront Judy. that Jeanne Deilman is not as expressive as

Currie seems to believe that there is a con- protagonists in Hollywood movies; she rarely nection between secondary imagination and the communicates her emotions verbally. But this extent of a viewer's knowledge, although he means only that more attention and imagination does not fully explore the idea. He argues that is required of the viewer. secondary imagining is needed when we lack Jeanne Dielman is a middle-aged housewife information about the character's experience; and a part-time prostitute. She is visually domi- we need to imaginatively experience it in order nant throughout the film; indeed, excessively to fill in the gap. Although the author or film- so. The story takes place in three days and we maker guides us and provides us information observe Jeanne's everyday routine. Each scene about the characters and what they feel, it is in Jeanne Dielman is differentiated by a type of impossible for a fiction or a film to portray action within a specific space. Together they every minute detail about character psychology. function as narrative building blocks: potato Moreover, if a character's psychology is com- peeling in the kitchen, coffee brewing in the pletely laid out for the viewer, then it leaves kitchen, taking a bath in the bathroom, shoe "nothing to the imagination."28 This, according shining in the kitchen, and dining in the living to Currie, should be considered a stylistic vice. room. We become used to Jeanne's patterns of To make the viewer simulate a character's action during the first day in the film. That first situation or mental process, the extent to which day, Jeanne establishes a rhythm that will be the narrative provides information about char- disturbed after the visit of her second customer. acter psychology should be between complete We centrally imagine what she feels by paying




attention to her behavioral cues: she is indiffer- enables the viewer to detect visual disruption ent, meticulous, compulsive, and self-content. and to anticipate some of the dramatic changes

However, the film withholds narratively in Jeanne's life. When the viewer begins to important information from the viewer. We do notice the changes in Jeanne's life, the viewer not see what happens in the bedroom between first tries to figure out what is causing all the Jeanne and her first two customers. We only changes. When Jeanne is shown, for the first see the effects of the encounter with the second time, with her customer in the bedroom, the customer on the second day. After the second viewer centrally imagines what Jeanne is going customer leaves her apartment, her meticulous- to do or what exactly Jeanne is experiencing. ness is replaced by sloppiness, and her effi- Jeanne's facial expression does not provide a ciency with delay. For instance, Jeanne' s hair is clear cue to her psychological state. The murder all tussled when she sees her second customer of Jeanne's last customer might come as a sur- out. She puts the money that she earned from prise to the viewer if the viewer had not the second customer in the tureen, but forgets to detected the changes in Jeanne's life, or as a replace the top. Jeanne remembers that she suspenseful resolution if the viewer had noticed forgot to put the top back only after her son, slight changes in Jeanne's behavior. Akerman Sylvain, arrives home from school. We also consciously refrains from using POV shots or learn that she overcooked the potatoes and that closeups of the character's facial expressions. she is perplexed by how to dispose of them. We Such a strategy in fact mandates the viewer to see that she leaves the light on in her room and imagine Jeanne's experience from the inside. turns it off only after she throws away the As the Jeanne Dielman example illustrates, potatoes. the resort to simulation or central imagining is

Since Jeanne's gestures and behavior are so more likely to occur in situations where the meticulous in the first half of the film, the spectator does not have direct access to charac- mistakes she makes in the latter half stand out. ter psychology or future behavior, rather than in Jeanne drops the brush when she shines cases where certain filmic devices are used. If Sylvain's shoes. She drops a spoon and has to this is the case, the rules of engagement cannot wash it again. All the objects that seem so be derived from the structure of filmic devices deliberately manipulated in the first half of the such as POV shots or subjective shots, but are film slip through her fingers in the second part. rather to be found in the ways the narrative and Her swift movement in the first half is delayed the narrative processes of the film withhold or slowed in the second half. When Jeanne information about the character's psychology or peels the potatoes, she stops every so often as if behavior. she is distracted. Dinner is late because Jeanne In this essay, I began by examining Smith's had to go out and buy more potatoes after she claim that POV shots tend to trigger central overcooked the first batch. All these excessive imagining. However, as Smith admits, the struc- behavioral cues indicate that Jeanne's life is ture of POV shots does not necessarily prompt disturbed. They lead the viewer to centrally central imagining. In my view, POV structures imagine what might have happened in the are, in fact, frequently unnecessary for the viewer bedroom with the second customer. What is it to exercise his or her own central imagination, that Jeanne is trying to cope with? since the viewer is already informed about the

Contrary to dominant analyses of the film character's perceptual experience. Next I that claim that Jeanne Dielman blocks the shifted the focus to subjective shots, which, engagement with Jeanne, the film seems to according to Currie, tend to engage the viewer provide the viewer with behavioral cues to the more directly by giving rise to certain percep- protagonist's psychology. Akerman presents the tual or visceral effects in the viewer. I argued character's psychology only indirectly, that is, that the effects in question should rather be via visual disturbances and the pace of move- ascribed to the particular perceptual capacity ments, rather than through the cause and effect that makes us susceptible to certain types of linear logic often found in Hollywood narrat- visual stimuli, rather than to central imagining. ives. The formal pattern that is set up through Instead of looking for a cause that triggers the repetition of similar types of activities central imagining in the depth of narration,




I proposed to examine the cases in question in the light of the range of the viewer's knowledge about characters. That is, what triggers central imagining or simulation is the lack of the viewer's knowledge regarding character psychology or his or her future behavior, which mandates the viewer to employ central imagining. 30

JINHEE CHOI Department of Film Studies Carleton University Ottawa, Ontario KIS 5B6, Canada

INTERNET: [email protected]

1. Carl Plantinga, "Scene of Empathy and the Human Face" in Passionate Views, ed. Carl Plantinga and Greg M. Smith (Johns Hopkins University, 1999), pp. 239-255.

2. Susan Feagin, "Time and Timing" in Passionate Views, pp. 168-179.

3. Murray Smith, "Imagining from the Inside" in Film Theory and Philosophy, ed. Richard Allen and Murray Smith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 412-430.

4. Feagin, "Time and Timing," pp. 171-172. 5. Ibid. 6. Smith, "Imagining from the Inside," pp. 416-417. 7. Murray Smith, Engaging Characters: Fiction, Emo-

tion, and the Cinema (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 82-86.

8. I owe this example to Ben Brewster, "The Scene at the Movies" in Early Cinema: Space, Frame, Narrative, ed. Thomas Elasesser (London: BFI, 1990), p. 323.

9. Noel Carroll, "Toward a Theory of Film Editing" in Theorizing the Moving Image (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 407.

10. Smith, "Imagining from the Inside," p. 416. 11. Richard Wollheim, The Thread of Life (Harvard

University Press, 1984), pp. 74-75. 12. Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe (Harvard

University Press, 1990), pp. 28-35; Gregory Currie, Image and Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 152-155.

13. Smith "Imagining from the Inside," p. 416. 14. Smith "Imagining from the Inside," p. 417. 15. Smith "Imagining from the Inside," p. 418. 16. Smith, Engaging Characters, pp. 95-98.

17. Jerry Fodor, The Language of Thought (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1975); Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind (MIT Press, 1987).

18. Stephen Stich and Shaun Nichols, "Folk Psychology: Simulation or Tacit Theory?" Mind and Language 7 (1992): 35-71.

19. Robert Gordon, "Folk Psychology as Simulation," Mind and Language 1 1986: 158-171; Alvin Goldman, "Empathy, Mind, and Morals" in Mental Simulation, ed. Martin Davies and Tony Stone (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 185-208; Gregory Currie, "Imagination and Simulation: Aesthetics Meets Cognitive Science" in Mental Simulation, pp. 151-169.

20. Goldman, "Empathy, Mind and Morals," pp. 188-189. 21. Carroll makes a similar claim when he questions the

necessity of the secondary simulation (personal imagining) in order to understand the narrative. That is, POV shots do not necessarily lead us to infer the mental states of the characters. For instance, in the example Carroll uses, when a character sees lava approaching him, we know without inference that he will think that the lava is dangerous. That is, there is no need to simulate the character's mental state in order to think that a character will view the lava as dangerous. My point is concerned with an earlier step; a perceptual belief ascribed to the character-that is, the lava is coming in his direction-does not need to be simulated by the viewer. See Noel Carroll, "Toward a Theory of Film Editing" in Theorizing the Moving Image (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 407.

22. Smith, "Imagining from the Inside," p. 412. 23. An anonymous referee brought such an objection to

my attention. 24. Currie, Image and the Mind, p. 180. In his criticism

of Currie's claim that POV shots seldom engage the central imagining but that subjective shots do, Smith argues that both subjective shots and objective optical point of view are likely to foster central imagining. According to Smith, there is no principled way of privileging subjective shots over POV shot in terms of giving rise to central imagining. Murray Smith, "Imagining from the Inside," p. 422.

25. Ibid. 26. Smith, "Imagining from the Inside," p. 422. 27. Noel Carroll brought this counterexample to my

attention. 28. Currie, Image and Mind, p. 153. 29. Currie, Image and Mind, p. 155. 30. An earlier version of this essay was presented during

the panel entitled "Philosophical Studies of Contemporary Visual Arts" of the Pacific APA, 2003. I would like to thank the audience there for comments. I would also like to thank Noel Carroll, Susan Feagin, Carl Plantinga, and an anonymous referee of JAAC for their insightful comments. Rebecca Swender and Stephan Johnson helped me tremen- dously in improving the writing of this essay.



choi - leaving it up to the imagination- pov shots and imagining from the inside

Documents

reaction shots

point of view pov shots

jstor terms

jstor archive

terms conditions of

journal of aesthetics

fiction film

amall use subject

choi - ￼leaving it up to the imagination- pov shots and imagining from the inside

choi - leaving it up to the imagination- pov shots and imagining from the inside