china and international harmony: the role of confucius...

China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing'sSoft PowerAuthor(s): James F. ParadiseSource: Asian Survey, Vol. 49, No. 4 (July/August 2009), pp. 647-669Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2009.49.4.647 .

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Asian Survey, Vol. 49, Issue 4, pp. 647–669, ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2009 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permis- sion to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: AS.2009.49.4.647.

647

James F. Paradise is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Politi-cal Science at the University of California, Los Angeles. He would like to thank Richard Baum and an anonymous reviewer for comments on earlier versions of this article. He would also like to thank a program director for the Office of Chinese Language Council Interna-tional, current and former directors of a number of Confucius Institutes, and others in the education field whom he interviewed for this article. Email: <[email protected]>.

CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL HARMONY

The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing’s Soft Power

James F. Paradise

AbstractChina is setting up Confucius Institutes around the world to spread its lan-guage and culture and to increase collaboration with foreign academic insti-tutions. The institutes could increase China’s “soft power” and help it project an image of itself as a benign country. Concerns exist about a “Trojan horse” effect.

Keywords: Confucius Institute, Hanban, soft power, Chinese language

Amid anxiety around the world about China’s in-creasing economic and military power, the Chinese government is at-tempting to project a more favorable image of the country and reassure the world that its intentions are benign. Its approaches include espous-ing theories of China’s peaceful rise and development;1 boosting military cooperation with other countries through overseas naval visits and joint

1. The latter expression is currently more in vogue. See Bonnie S. Glaser and Evan S. Medeiros, “The Changing Ecology of Foreign-Policy Making in China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of ‘Peaceful Rise’,” China Quarterly 190 (June 2007), pp. 291–310.

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exercises;2 and disseminating more information through white papers and websites oriented toward foreign readers.3 These activities are designed to better explain the Chinese point of view and to instill confidence that what China is doing is non-threatening. Increased transparency is another objective.

At the same time that the Chinese government is putting out more in-formation in English, it is also moving vigorously to provide more oppor-tunities for people to study Chinese and to learn about Chinese culture. A principal means to this end is establishing Confucius Institutes. Over the past several years, Confucius Institutes have sprouted in many locations in Asia, Africa, north America, the Middle East, Europe, and Oceania. As of October 2008, a total of 326 Confucius Institutes had been set up in 81 countries and regions under the guidance of the Office of Chinese Language Council International4 (Guojia Hanyu Guoji Tuiguang Lingdao xiao zu Bangongshi, known by its abbreviation, Hanban). This is a non-profit public organization affiliated with the Ministry of Education that is re-sponsible for administering the program. Each institute has its own unique character—some, for example, are focused on business—but all are com-mitted to the mission of “promoting Chinese language and culture and supporting local Chinese [language] teaching.”5

That China would be setting up Confucius Institutes in the early years of the 21st century is somewhat surprising. Only several decades earlier, during the Cultural Revolution of 1966–76, Confucius was reviled, seen as an obstacle to social change and a throwback to the past. now, however, Confucius is back in fashion, useful for the government that needs sym-bols to unify the nation and lending a basis for ideas such as the “harmo-nious society,” which is essentially a Confucian concept.

The Confucius Institute project can be seen at one level as an attempt to increase Chinese language learning and an appreciation of Chinese culture,

2. These other measures include inviting foreign countries to observe a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) drill as happened during “Warrior 2007” in September 2007. The joint military exercises have been with a number of countries including Russia, India, and France. Exercises of this type could have a confidence-building effect or they could heighten concern as might have been the case in the United States when China and Russia teamed up in August 2007 to carry out joint drills. Chinese naval ships have been to a number of overseas locations, includ-ing Pearl Harbor, Guam, Singapore, and India. In november 2007, a PLA ship visited a Japa-nese port for the first time ever.

3. White papers have dealt with many topics such as China’s political party system, food safety, national defense, space activities, and environmental protection.

4. This information is on the Hanban website, at <http://english.hanban.edu.cn/kzxy.php>. 5. Office of the Chinese Language Council International, “Introduction to the ‘Confucius

Institute’ Project,” <http://english.hanban.edu.cn/market/HanBanE/412360.htm>, accessed March 5, 2007.

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JAMES F. PARADISE 649

but at another level it is part of a broader soft power projection in which China is attempting to win hearts and minds for political purposes. Other ways in which China is raising its cultural profile include broadcasting television programs abroad, staging concerts overseas by Chinese popular singers,6 translating Chinese literature into foreign languages, and spread-ing Chinese contemporary art outside of China.7

While some of these activities are probably less the product of deliber-ate government action (for example, the government does not seem to be actively promoting the spread of Chinese contemporary art around the world8), other activities appear officially orchestrated. For example, in the realm of overseas television broadcasting, the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television gave Chongqing Tv in november 2006 the green light to start an international channel.9 Earlier that year the interna-tional Chinese channel of government-owned China Central Television (CCTv-4) held a conference to “better coordinate the dissemination of Chinese language content, and content about China into international markets.”10 The staging of an exhibition of the Qin Dynasty terracotta army warriors at the British Museum beginning in September 2007 also had Chinese government involvement.11

6. An example is the north American tour of the hugely popular Zhou Huajian, also known as Wakin Chau, that kicked off at the Galen Center at the University of Southern California on november 9, 2007, and also included concerts in vancouver, British Columbia, and in San Francisco. Although Zhou was born in Hong Kong, it hardly matters as people often misidentify where singers are from, and China is still able to reap cultural dividends.

7. See James F. Paradise, “Impressions of the Contemporary Chinese Art Scene,” Asia Pacific Arts, October 19, 2007, <http://www.asiaarts.ucla.edu/071019/article.asp?parentID=80006>.

8. According to Meiqin Wang, assistant professor of Art History at California State Uni-versity, northridge, the Chinese government’s attitude toward contemporary art is lukewarm because it is difficult to control and open to different interpretations. However, there has been some support, e.g., at art shows in Europe, as the Chinese government has attempted to bring such art under its regulation and make it more official, she said in a talk at the University of California, Los Angeles, April 2008.

9. CMM Intelligence, 2007 China Media Yearbook & Directory (Hong Kong: CMM Intel-ligence [HK], Ltd., 2007), p. 25.

10. Ibid., p. 24.11. The exhibition was the result of “years of diplomacy” and efforts by China and Britain

to improve cultural relations. An agreement paving the way for the exhibition was signed at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing and witnessed by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair who had previously agreed to collaboration between the British Museum and Chinese institutions. The opening ceremony of the exhibition was attended by Chen Kuiyuan, vice chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Con-ference, and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown. According to a statement from the Chi-nese Embassy in the United Kingdom, “Prime Minister Brown expressed his thanks to Chen Kuiyuan and Fu ying for attending the ceremony and to the Chinese government and relevant departments of the two sides for their endeavors in the preparation of the exhibition.” See

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In spite of the many activities happening on the language and culture fronts in China in recent years, there has been relatively little academic at-tention given to them, particularly with regard to the impact that they may be having on China’s standing in the world and the way China is perceived by foreign countries. Although a number of newspaper or online articles have appeared and one important book has been published,12 other major writings by China scholars in recent years have had little or nothing to say about China’s soft power or its public diplomacy.13 One reason may be that development of China’s soft power is still in an early stage. Another reason may be that China lacks some of the crucial elements of soft power14 such as the attractiveness of its political values.

The purpose of this article is to understand how the Confucius Insti-tutes and other language promotion activities may be helping China promote its goodwill agenda. Among the questions I ask are the follow-ing: What are the Confucius Institutes doing? How do they fit into China’s “grand strategy,” if in fact there is such a strategy? How is soft power viewed in China? How are the Confucius Institutes thought of outside of China? What impact, if any, are they having on China’s standing in the world?

“Exhibition of First Emperor: China’s Terracotta Army Was Formally Launched in the Brit-ish Museum,” from the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and northern Ireland, September 4, 2007, <http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/sghd/t377942.htm>; “Terracotta Diplomacy,” Guardian, September 15, 2007, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/leaders/story/0,2169663,00.html>; Rachel Campbell-Johnston, “Terracotta Army Conquers British Museum,” Times (London), September 11, 2007, <http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts_and_entertainment/visual_arts/article2423601.ece>; and Simon Baker, “Exhibition Marks Cultural Watershed,” AOL news, <http://news.aol.co.uk/bigstorynews/pm-opens-terracotta-army-exhibition/article/20070912055909990002>.

12. See Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World (new Haven, Conn.: yale University Press, 2007). Among the articles that have ap-peared are the following: Purnendra Jain and Gerry Groot, “Beijing’s ‘Soft Power’ Offensive,” Asia Times Online, May 17, 2006, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HE17Ad01.html>; Esther Pan, “China’s Soft Power Initiative,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 18, 2006, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/10715/>; Gideon Rachmen, “The Hard Evidence That China’s Soft Power Is Working,” Financial Times, February 20, 2007; and Howard W. French, “An-other Chinese Export Is All the Rage: China’s Language,” NYTimes.com, January 11, 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/11/international/asia/11china.html>.

13. Three examples are Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); Bates Gill, Rising Star: China’s New Security Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007); and Sujian Guo, ed., China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ in the 21st Century: Domestic and International Condi-tions (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2006).

14. These reasons are given by David Shambaugh, “The Rise of China and Asia’s new Dynamics,” in David Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), p. 2.

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http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/sghd/t377942.htm

http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/sghd/t377942.htm

http://www.guardian.co.uk/leaders/story/0,,2169663,00.html

http://www.guardian.co.uk/leaders/story/0,,2169663,00.html

http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts_and_entertainment/visual_arts/article2423601.ece

http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts_and_entertainment/visual_arts/article2423601.ece



The Confucius Institute ProjectThe Office of the Chinese Language Council International is governed by a group made up of members from state ministries and other organiza-tions. These include the State Council, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Culture. The Confucius Institute Division is one part of Hanban, which also includes an Exami-nations Division, focusing on Chinese proficiency tests; a Teaching Qual-ity and Evaluation Division, which concerns itself with Chinese language teaching materials; and a Communications Division, which handles inter-national cooperation and exchange activities.15

There are three main objectives of the Confucius Institutes, according to a Hanban program director. These are to teach Chinese, to promote cultural exchange, and to facilitate business activity.16 According to the director, Confucius Institute assistance is helping the Chongqing motor-cycle industry export motorcycles to Thailand. Requests also come from companies abroad seeking to do business in China.17 “A lot of people want to do business in China. now there are not enough resources to help. But our people will do their best to get them the information they need,” he said in reference to the activities of the Confucius Institute headquarters in Beijing.18 Other activities include sending teachers from China to Con-fucius Institutes that need them and preparing and supplying Chinese lan-guage teaching materials.19 Cultural events include performances by Chinese art troupes, Chinese song competitions, and celebrations of Chinese holi-days, such as the Spring Festival.

Confucius Institutes typically are created through a partnership between two academic institutions, one foreign and one Chinese. Hanban provides start-up money for the institutes, which in most cases are physically lo-cated on university campuses. Examples of Confucius Institutes operating on the university model are: the Confucius Institute at Japan Sapporo University, a partnership between Sapporo University and Guangdong University of Foreign Studies; the Confucius Institute at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, a collaboration between Chulalongkorn Univer-sity and Peking University; and the Confucius Institute at Far Eastern

15. The information in this paragraph comes from Hanban’s website. See <http://www.hanban.org/en_hanban/gywm.php>, accessed november 17, 2007; and <http://www.hanban.org/en_hanban/jgsz.php>, accessed november 17, 2007.

16. Interview with Hanban program director, Beijing, China, September 24, 2007.17. Ibid. When asked about the nature of cooperation in Thailand, the Hanban director

said, in an email of november 20, 2007, that it involved the Confucius Institute, connecting business leaders from two sides, which organized a meeting.

18. Ibid. 19. Ibid.

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national University, a cooperative venture between Far Eastern national University in vladivostok, Russia, and Heilongjiang University in north-eastern China. In some cases, more than two universities may be involved as partners or in the setting up of an institute (for example, the Confucius Institute at Prince of Songkla University in southern Thailand involves cooperation between Guangxi normal University in Guilin, China; Ritsu-meikan University in Kyoto, Japan; and Prince of Songkla University).

In some cases the Confucius Institute may include a partner other than a university (for example, at the China Institute in new york). According to Hanban, many inquiries arrive from abroad about setting up Confucius Institutes, and in some cases it has not been able to approve applications.20 At the same time, it is clear that Hanban (or universities in China) have been actively courting institutions, which have not always signed up.21 Much of the legwork on the Chinese side is done by the Chinese universi-ties themselves. They hold field trips abroad and negotiate with foreign partners; normally, they are able to select those partners themselves, and “get married” of their own accord, says Hanban. Driving the universities’ involvement has been a desire to strengthen contacts with foreign universi-ties and organizations as a means to internationalizing themselves. By fos-tering academic exchanges, association with a foreign university through a Confucius Institute can bolster educational globalization, which some Chinese universities are aiming for.22

Although all Confucius Institutes have certain commonalities, includ-ing their pledge to abide by principles and requirements laid down by Hanban, there is considerable variation among them. The Confucius Institute for Business at the London School of Economics and Political Science, for example, has an “explicit business focus.” The Confucius Institute at Waseda University is research-oriented, and the University of California, Los Angeles, Confucius Institute focuses on, among other

20. Ibid.21. The director of a Confucius Institute in the U.S. told me, concerning the genesis of his

institute, that he was approached by a Chinese university, and that “various Chinese have been given the initiative to go out.”

22. The desire to upgrade scientific research and institutional capacity was formalized in a program called Project 211. As one organization summarized the project’s goals for the government’s ninth Five-year Plan of 1996–2000, “Top priority will be given to the strength-ening of universities to help them approach and reach advanced international standards for the overall quality of teaching, scientific research, and the training of professional manpower, so as to establish their international prestige and position among universities in the world.” See China Education and Research network, “Project 211: A Brief Introduction (II),” at <http://www.edu.cn/20010101/21852.shtml>, accessed April 20, 2008. The project can be construed as another way in which educational globalization is proceeding.

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areas, health and medicine issues.23 This diversity may have grown out of Hanban experience. As one person involved in negotiations with Hanban said, “When Hanban developed the notion of Confucius Insti-tutes, they had a fairly rigid template for Confucius Institutes around the world. But schools were pushing back, and now there is a lot of flex-ibility on the Hanban side.”24 Concerns about interference from China on matters such as teaching materials have generated caution among some foreign academics who fear that those who pay the piper may call the tune.

As of late September 2007, the countries with the most Confucius Insti-tutes (either established or with agreements in hand to do so) were the United States (32), the United Kingdom (16), Thailand (13), South Korea (12), Japan (11), Russia (10), Germany (8), France (6), and Mexico (5).25 South Korea had the first overseas Confucius Institute, set up in Seoul in november 2004.

The Confucius Institute project is very much a work in progress. Be-cause the institutes are so new, many of them are still carving out an iden-tity and have yet to grapple with or are doing so on things such as head-office evaluations, teaching material issues, and so on. (In evaluating the Confucius Institutes, Hanban is concerned with things such as quality of instruction, management performance, and impact on society. Specific evaluation standards are being dealt with by a new department created at the head office, whose board was planning to set up a special project com-mittee to deal with evaluation issues. People involved in Confucius Insti-tute activities around the world were to be invited to join.) Although China is said to have “sent more than 300 teachers and presented over 300,000 sets of textbooks and audio materials to Confucius Institutes with a total investment of over 26 million dollars,”26 there may still be a shortage of resources for the fast growth of Confucius Institutes worldwide. Hanban has been giving great attention to the way in which the institutes develop, creating guidelines and training programs to boost the quality of manage-ment and teaching.27

23. Other emphases are distance learning at the Confucius Institute at Michigan State University and theory and pedagogy at the Confucius Institute at the University of Iowa. The Radio Confucius Classroom in nairobi offers instruction over the radio.

24. Comment by a U.S. university administrator in an interview, September 5, 2007.25. Based on a list supplied to me by Hanban. See Appendix 1 for a list of the institutes.26. “Chinese Education Minister vows to Maintain Sound Development of Confucius

Institute,” xinhua, December 12, 2007, <http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90782/6319838.html>, accessed January 27, 2008.

27. Ibid.

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Communication among Confucius Institutes has been gradually in-creasing. In March 2008, Chinese and foreign directors from five Confucius Institutes in nordic countries came together for the first time in a forum in Stockholm to discuss ways to cooperate. Conferences have been held in Thailand, Japan, and the United States; in December 2007, representa-tives of Confucius Institutes from around the world met in Beijing for a second Confucius Institute Conference in China. People involved in Chi-nese language education also met in Washington, D.C., in April 2008 for a national Chinese Language Conference, partially sponsored by Hanban.

Support has also come from Chinese embassies and consulates, which have sometimes provided information on applicants or have acted as inter-mediaries between the applicants and Hanban. On some occasions, Chi-nese ambassadors have inked agreements on behalf of Hanban for the creation of Confucius Institutes.

Other Language and Culture Promotion Activities

Another way in which Hanban is promoting Chinese language learning, this time focused on the United States, is through a Chinese Language and Culture Initiative with the College Board.28 One of the components of the program, announced in 2006, is a Guest Teachers program that brings Chinese teachers to the U.S. to teach in schools at the K-12 level.29 Other aspects of the program include the “Chinese Bridge Delegation to China,” which enables U.S. educators to travel to China during the summer to learn about Chinese language, culture, and education30 and another bridge program that sends U.S. high school students to China during the summer months to study Chinese language and culture.31 In 2003, College Board and Chinese officials announced that an Advanced Placement Program

28. See the Office of Chinese Language Council International, “Chinese Language and Culture Initiative,” at <http://www.hanban.org/en_hanban/zdxm_more.php?ithd=apzwxm>, accessed november 15, 2007. The College Board is an organization involved in assessing students for college admissions through examinations such as the SAT. It also runs the Advanced Placement program for high schools.

29. College Board, “Chinese Guest Teacher Program Helps Thousands of U.S. Students,” August 13, 2007, <http://www.collegeboard.com/press/releases/185064.html>, accessed Octo-ber 14, 2007.

30. Ibid., “Destination China: 800 U.S. Education Leaders Tour China,” June 18, 2007, <http://www.collegeboard.com/press/releases/180235.html>, accessed October 14, 2007.

31. The Office of Chinese Language Council International, “Chinese Language and Cul-ture Initiative,” <http://www.hanban.org/en_hanban/zdxm_more.php?ithd=apzwxm>, accessed november 15, 2007.

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Course and Examination in Chinese Language and Culture was to be cre-ated with financial assistance from the Chinese government.32

Hanban has also been involved in more broad-based activities, includ-ing international teacher training courses, a summer camp for students from the U.S., the U.K., and South Korea, and the provision of scholar-ships for students from around the world.33 It also administers the Chinese Proficiency Test, commonly known as HSK for its Chinese name Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi.34

The International ContextThe promotion of Chinese language and culture is coming at a time when China’s rise is prompting concern or alarm in some countries and regions, particularly the U.S. and Europe. Much of the alarm comes from concerns about the buildup of China’s hard power, both in the military sphere and in the economic sphere.35 In the military sphere, the focus has been on China’s defense expenditures, which have been increasing rapidly in recent years. Although China says that more military spending is needed to pay higher salaries and to upgrade equipment and bolster defensive war fight-ing capabilities, others are afraid that China might use its more modern military for offensive purposes. This view, in effect, downplays more mod-erate explanations that see China’s increased military spending as the product of domestic politics, namely, the need for China’s current political

32. College Board, “Chinese Officials and College Board Announce Advanced Placement Course in Chinese Language and Culture,” December 5, 2003, <http://www.collegeboard.com/press/releases/30831.html>, accessed October 14, 2007.

33. See “International Training Courses for Chinese Language Teaching and Teachers Held in Shanghai,” november 12, 2007; idem, “Summer Camp for Foreign Students,” January 10, 2007; and idem, “Chinese Bridge Fund,” all on the website of the Office of Chinese Lan-guage Council International, <http://www.hanban.edu.cn>.

34. See Hanban website, <http://www.hanban.org/en_hanban/content.php?id=1547>. 35. There are different ways to define “hard power” and “soft power.” A more limited

definition of hard power would restrict the term to activities in the military sphere, giving a broader province to soft power activities. According to Kurlantzik, “When the Chinese gov-ernment talks about its new soft power in the world, it means all power outside the military sphere, including diplomacy, aid, investment, and economic tools.” See his book talk-related essay, “Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, August 2007, <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200708.kurlantzick. chinacharmoffensive.html>; and similar comments in his publication, “China’s Charm: Im-plications of Chinese Soft Power,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, policy brief (June 2006). In my view, the key issue is how a resource is used. If an economic asset such as a trade surplus is used to promote a military buildup then it would be a hard power tool; but if it is used to build bridges in a country as part of an economic aid program, then it would be a soft power tool.

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leaders to win the military’s support to stay in power.36 Concerns also ex-tend to China’s activities in space, which involved a missile test in 2007 that knocked out an old Chinese satellite. In the economic sphere, there is a perception that China is benefiting from unfair trade practices, in par-ticular an allegedly undervalued currency, and government subsidies to industry. With China using part of its massive trade surplus with the U.S. to buy U.S. Treasury securities, there is a concern that this could give China undue leverage. Things came to a head in 2005 when China na-tional Offshore Oil Corporation’s attempt to buy Unocal Corp. was stopped by opposition from U.S. lawmakers. Another problem China faces is criticism over its relationship with countries with poor human rights re-cords, including Sudan and Myanmar. China is seen variously as coddling these regimes for economic benefit (energy resources, trade, and so on) or not doing enough to encourage change.

What all this adds up to is the view that China is a threat––to the well-being of foreign companies, to U.S. security, to peace and stability, and to human rights. Worse, for China, is that these perceptions are now translat-ing into government policy. In the U.S., the Bush administration in 2007 decided on a preliminary basis to slap countervailing duties on some Chi-nese paper imports; three times that year it filed complaints against China at the World Trade Organization (WTO), once on government subsidies, once on intellectual property issues, and once on market access. Bills have also been making their way around the U.S. Congress that would penalize China for its alleged unfair trade practices.

China has been fighting back with specific actions such as filing its own complaint against the U.S. at the WTO, on the countervailing duty issue. It has also blocked some U.S. products from entering China because of what it says are “safety” issues––this coming amid major concerns in the U.S. about the safety of Chinese products. But at a more general level, China’s strategy has been of a different sort, signing onto international treaties and attempting to live up to them, hosting talks on matters such as north Korea, and negotiating the end of border disputes––all meant to reassure people of China’s peaceful intentions. As Bates Gill has argued, “The Chinese leadership has since the late 1990s implemented a new secu-rity diplomacy, which is more confident, proactive, and convergent with international norms, and generally speaking, with U.S. interests.”37

Among the ways this new security diplomacy has been carried out has been through “such measures as participating in regional security mechanisms

36. Susan Shirk makes an argument of this type in her book, China: Fragile Superpower (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 73–74.

37. Gill, Rising Star, p. 203.

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and confidence-building measures, expanding its peacekeeping and coun-terterrorism activities, and improving its nonproliferation and arms con-trol policies at home and abroad.”38 According to Avery Goldstein, who makes a similar argument, China has what amounts to a “grand strategy” that is manifest through its “increased participation in multilateral forums, restrained currency policy, and active cultivation of major power partner-ships [which] are designed to mute perceptions of a ‘China threat,’ to build China’s reputation as a responsible actor, and to convince others of the benefits of engagement with China as well as the counterproductive con-sequences of attempting to threaten, isolate or contain it.”39

What needs to be added to these analyses is an explicit discussion of China’s use of soft power, particularly in the language and cultural realms, as an instrument of its foreign policy. As Joseph nye, the modern exposi-tor of the concept, has defined soft power, “It is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals and policies.”40 China’s use of soft power may still be limited today, but it is growing in importance. An important question is what do Chinese think about soft power, both those persons directly associated with the Confucius Institute project and those further away? Are Confucius Institutes a part of the soft power offensive, if one can use such a description to characterize China’s new cultural diplomacy?

China’s Views of Soft PowerOne finding is that some Chinese in the education field do not see the cre-ation of Confucius Institutes as part of a soft power offensive and even bristle at the suggestion. “I don’t think the creation of Confucius Insti-tutes has anything to do with soft power and the rise of China. It is better to think of it academically, not politically,” said one Chinese university administrator involved in the setting up of a Confucius Institute.41 The notion that China wants to increase its soft power via Confucius Institutes is a “wrong idea” and “misleading,” he said. “Please let us do things aca-demically, peacefully. Students will benefit and teachers will benefit.”42 Said the program director at Hanban, “I don’t think we need to push the

38. Ibid.39. Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge, p. 175.40. Joseph S. nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (new york:

Public Affairs, 2004), p. x. 41. Interview with a chinese university administrator, Shanghai, China, September 13, 2007.42. Ibid.

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language and culture––it is what people need.” He added that many uni-versities around the world were eager to set up Confucius Institutes: “I don’t like soft power. I think power is aggressive. We just do something all people like.”43

In a similar vein, Wan Lixin, a columnist for Shanghai Daily, wrote after a panel discussion on soft power in Dalian in September 2007 that foreigners who lecture on soft power should “be reminded that some people regard power suspiciously.”44 He added that “veteran diplomat Sha Zukang flatly rejected the whole idea of ‘soft power,’ calling it a con-descending approach and notion created by Western developed countries.”45 Wan also noted that Jiang Jianqing, chairman of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, saw soft power as very much a part of “China’s thousands of years of history, culture and philosophy” and es-sentially what Confucius’s Analects, a compilation of his main ideas, is concerned with.46

While it is understandable that people in the education field might not like the idea of soft power––preferring instead to think of the Confucius Institutes as a vehicle for academic exchange and mutual understanding—it is clear that the idea has considerable support at the highest levels of the Chinese government. In his keynote speech at the 17th national Congress of the Communist Party of China in October 2007, President Hu Jintao called for increasing China’s soft power through cultural enhancement for reasons of national cohesion and overall national strength.47 In July of that year, Jia Qinglin, chairman of the national Committee of the Chi-nese People’s Political Consultative Conference, at a seminar on soft power called for bolstering the country’s soft power through cultural develop-ment: “Cultural development, a main theme in building a country’s soft power, plays a significant role in enhancing comprehensive national power.”48 The importance of increasing soft power has also been sounded in other contexts. During the seven-nation African tour of Premier Wen Jiabao in June 2006, an article on a Chinese government website said that new opportunities existed for bolstering cultural exchanges between China

43. Hanban interview.44. Wan Lixin, “The U.S. Is Told Hard Facts about Soft Power with a ‘Chinese Touch’,”

Shanghai Daily, September 13, 2007.45. Ibid.46. Ibid.47. “Hu Jintao Calls for Enhancing ‘Soft Power’ of Chinese Culture,” xinhua, October

15, 2007, <http://english.cpcnews.cn/92243/6283153.html>, accessed October 14, 2007. 48. “China’s Top Advisory Body Holds Seminar of ‘Soft Power’,” ibid., July 25, 2007,

<http://www.gov.cn/english/2007–07/25/content_695451.htm>, accessed november 1, 2007.

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and African countries.49 Shortly before a Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-tion (SCO) summit that same month, the website quoted a Chinese scholar on how cultural cooperation could be used to strengthen relations between member states.50

It is worth asking why there is such a division between what some edu-cation officials and some high-level political leaders think about soft power. It may have something to do with the fact that as Hanban and other edu-cation officials ventured out into the world, they found some resistance to the idea of setting up Confucius Institutes on university campuses because of concerns about Chinese interference in foreign academic life. In other words, great sensitivity was needed in how to present the idea. This is an important issue worthy of further consideration.

A Chinese Trojan Horse?The constitution and by-laws of the Confucius Institutes state that they “shall not contravene concerning the laws and regulations of China” and “shall not involve or participate in any activities that are not consistent with the missions of the Confucius Institute.”51 These rules also state that the Confucius Institutes are to conduct their instruction in Mandarin

49. “China, Africa Boost Soft Power through Cultural Exchanges,” ibid., June 18, 2006, <http://www.gov.cn/misc/2006–06/18/content_313770.htm>, accessed november 1, 2007.

50. “Cultural Exchange Boost ‘Soft Power’ for SCO Development,” ibid., June 13, 2006, <http://www.gov.cn/misc/2006–06/13/content_308632.htm>, accessed november 1, 2007.

51. In December 2007, a new governing council was created for the Confucius Institute headquarters in Beijing. Chaired by Chen Zhili, Chinese state councilor, the council also had five vice-chairmen from two Chinese ministries and the State Council; 12 executive directors from a variety of Chinese ministries, government organizations or departments; and 15 coun-cilmen, including 10 from overseas Confucius Institutes. The council agreed to a number of changes to the constitution and by-laws, two of which were to set up a consultative committee and to employ Chinese and foreigners as senior advisors. The wording of a number of articles or by-laws found at the Office of Chinese Language Council International, “Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes (Provisional version),” <http://www.hanban.org/en_ hanban/kzxy_list.php?ithd=xyzc>, accessed April 17, 2008, can also be seen to have changed from an earlier version accessed november 19, 2007. In that version, the constitution and by-laws state that the Confucius Institutes “shall not contravene the laws and regulations of China” and “shall not involve or participate in any political, religious, ethnic/racial, or any such related activities”; that the headquarters in Beijing “is the highest regulatory body of the Confucius Institutes worldwide”; that the chair, vice chair, and executive council members will be “appointed by the Chinese government”; and that a responsibility of the headquarters is to select and appoint “deans and faculties for the Chinese partners.” The conclusion to be drawn from the changes seems clear––some articles in the new constitution and by-laws have been considerably watered-down from the earlier version, possibly in response to foreign concerns.

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Chinese and that simplified Chinese characters are to be used.52 Accord-ing to Article 12, the headquarters office in Beijing “is the regulatory body that provides guidelines to the Confucius Institutes worldwide” and will be governed by a council whose chair, vice-chair, and executive council members “shall be recommended by the education administrative agency of the Chinese State Council and approved by the State Council” (Article 13).53

Among the responsibilities of the headquarters is “examining and ap-proving the implementation plans of annual projects” and “selecting and appointing directors and faculties from the Chinese side for individual Confucius Institutes.”54 One duty of the Confucius Institutes is “to accept both supervision from and assessments made by the headquarters.”55 In information elsewhere, on the “Standard Model for Confucius Institutes,” foreign parties that apply to establish a Confucius Institute should be will-ing to “accept Confucius Institutes’ operation model and teaching model and be able to accept the oversight, evaluation and certification by the Head Office once the institute is established.”56 Section vIII, Item D (1) makes clear, “All institutes must use the unified set of teaching materials supplied by the Head Office.”57

One can see how some of these provisions might create problems or ten-sions between the headquarters and the overseas Confucius Institutes. For example, would the provisions on obeying the laws of China and not be-coming involved in activities contrary to the mission of the Confucius In-stitutes preclude classroom discussions on topics sensitive to the Chinese government such as Taiwan or Tibet? What about the necessity of using teaching materials supplied by the headquarters in Beijing? Does that mean that teachers overseas would not be able to use any materials of their own choosing? And if they do, or engage in any activities that find them in contravention of the stated rules, does that mean that they would receive a negative evaluation? (Activities of great concern to Hanban, which could even be the basis for legal action, include ones that cause financial loss or

52. The Office of Chinese Language Council International, “Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes (Provisional version).” Simplified characters are used in Mainland China; in some other places, such as Hong Kong and Taiwan, they are not typically used, or are not the norm.

53. Ibid.54. Ibid.55. Ibid.56. The Office of Chinese Language Council International, “Standard Model for Con-

fucius Institutes,” <http://english.hanban.edu.cn/market/HanBanE/412379.htm>, accessed September 5, 2007.

57. Ibid.

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harm the reputation of the Confucius Institutes.) It may be that these is-sues are only now being tested, given the newness of the whole Con-fucius Institute project. As is so often the case in China, there is often a big gap between formal rules and regulations and actual practice. Might not language and cultural promotion be an area where great flexibility is shown?58

One thing that can be said is that some quarters of American academia are wary. A typical comment, by a U.S. professor, is: “We need to think about how we will manage and develop China studies, rather than have China decide.”59 Chinese involvement is not necessarily a cause for Ameri-can alarm if it enables universities with few funds to expand, or begin, Chinese language programs. And not all are worried about Chinese gov-ernment intrusion. As one news story put it, “Some program directors (all Americans) joke that, for once, they want China to provide more central guidance,”60 a reference to the many uncertainties that surround the start of this new project. But there is uneasiness in some quarters of academia, and we can note that there are no Ivy League colleges in the U.S. on the list of Confucius Institutes. Regarding the absence of Harvard and yale from the list, the Hanban program director said, “Some people were inter-ested, some people were opposed. We understand that.”61 The establish-ment of Confucius Institutes at some smaller universities may be related to the fact that, according to one Confucius Institute director, Hanban’s model––or at least its original model––was to target local communities or colleges that lacked strong Chinese language programs. There are major exceptions such as the University of California, Los Angeles, which has a very strong Chinese language program.

With interference in academic life being a concern that Hanban officials are hearing about as they interact with educators around the world, it seems

58. Two telephone interviews I conducted on november 30, 2007, suggest there is flexibil-ity. In one interview, the director of a U.S. Confucius Institute said she believed her institute was “not regulated to strictly use Hanban materials” and that doing so was only a “sugges-tion.” “Teachers decide themselves the materials most suitable for the classroom and in the best interests of the students,” she said. In another interview, a person highly knowledgeable about another U.S. Confucius Institute said that she doubted Hanban would force Confucius Institutes to use their teaching materials. “I think Hanban is very flexible. Of course, they would like us to use their materials, but they are not very strict about it.” She said she did not like most Hanban materials, including the textbooks, and that there was a lack of understand-ing of what was needed locally.

59. I heard this comment at an Asian studies conference in the United States in 2007.60. Carol Huang, “Why China Wants you to Learn Chinese,” Christian Science Monitor,

January 4, 2007, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0104/p17s01-legn.html>, accessed novem-ber 14, 2007.

61. Hanban interview.

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sensible to think that they are giving much thought to how to sell the con-cept of Confucius Institutes. Marketing it as wholly academic, as many Chi-nese educators seem to see it, is likely a better approach than associating it with a soft power offensive or conscious projection of Chinese interests, which are both political considerations. Though it is unclear why it hap-pened, we can note that Hanban’s English-language name has been changed from the China national Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language to the Office of Chinese Language Council International. Regardless of the motivations, the new name does not contain the word “national.”

Maybe the best way to think of the Confucius Institute project is as a type of impression management, an effort by China to craft a positive image of itself in a world fraught with danger. Faced with tremendous anxiety about China in the U.S. and other major trading partners, Confucius Insti-tutes help create the impression of a kinder and gentler China. In this re-spect, the Confucius Institute project fits in well with the notion of China’s peaceful development. It may also be part of a grand strategy to increase the country’s attractiveness as a major power. But it is not entirely a soft power strategy, as nye defines that approach: while it may not rely on coer-cion, it does rely on payments. In providing money for the establishment of Confucius Institutes, the concern has been that Hanban will have a great deal of power in influencing teaching and other language and cultural pro-motion activities, either directly or indirectly. The “strings” associated with accepting money may be fairly loose, and foreign directors and others may have input into decision-making and policy issues affecting the Confucius Institutes, but there is a lingering concern among some that the project will be a way for China to subtly expand its influence abroad. Ultimately, how-ever, the success of the Confucius Institute project will be highly dependent on the attractiveness of Chinese culture, which makes it essentially a soft power activity, or an activity with a large soft power component.

Measuring SuccessThere are two difficulties in saying whether the establishment of Confucius Institutes is helping China win friends around the world. One is that the Confucius Institute project is so new that it is hard to know what its im-pact has been; another is that it is difficult to disentangle the effects of Confucius Institutes from a variety of other cultural promotion activities.

Still, one can try to get at the issue of soft power by looking at public opinion polls.62 One BBC World Service poll whose results were announced

62. This is an approach used by nye in attempting to measure U.S. soft power. See his Soft Power (2004).

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in March 2007 found that an average of 42% of people polled in 26 coun-tries, excluding China, had a mainly positive view of China’s influence in the world, and 32% had a mainly negative view.63 In a similar BBC poll whose results were announced in February 2006, the numbers were 45% mainly positive and 27% mainly negative,64 while a March 2005 survey found 48% of people mainly positive on China’s influence and 30% mainly negative.65 One factor that may have affected the results was a perception that China had become more authoritarian.66 The impact that China’s soft power may have had on the people’s responses was not mentioned, but one poll-related director said, “Countries that related to the world primar-ily through soft power, like Japan, France and the EU in general, tend to be viewed positively.”67

Another poll, this one part of the Pew Global Attitudes Project, also found a deterioration in the image of China in the world between 2005 and 2007. According to a summary of the findings, nine countries in the poll (conducted in spring 2007) had less favorable views of China over the period, one had a more favorable view, and five countries remained about the same.68 “Large majorities in many countries think that China’s grow-ing military might is a bad thing, and the publics of many advanced na-tions are increasingly concerned about the impact of China’s economic power on their own countries,” a Pew statement said.69

63. Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), “views of Countries, Question-naire, and Methodology, March 2007,” March 2007. PIPA, at the University of Maryland, carried out the poll for the BBC World Service with GlobeScan, an international polling company. See <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/mar07/BBC_viewsCountries_Mar07_quaire.pdf>, accessed november 13, 2007.

64. PIPA, “BBC World Service Poll: Global views of Countries, Questionnaire, and Methodology.” This survey, without China, covered 32 countries. See <http://www.worldpub-licopinion.org/pipa/pdf/feb06/viewsCountries_Feb06_quaire.pdf>, accessed november 17, 2007.

65. PIPA, “22-nation Poll Shows China viewed Positively by Most Countries Including Its Asian neighbors,” <http://www.globescan.com/news_archives/bbcpoll3.html>, accessed november 13, 2007.

66. World Public Opinion.org, “Global Poll Finds Iran viewed negatively,” <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/home_page/168.php?nid=&id=&pnt=168&lb=hmpg1>, accessed november 17, 2007.

67. Ibid., “Israel and Iran Share Most negative Ratings in Global Poll,” <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/home_page/325.php?nid=&id=&pnt=325&lb=hmpg1>, accessed november 13, 2007. The comment is by Steven Kull, director of PIPA.

68. Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Global Unease with Major World Powers,” released June 27, 2007, <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=256>, accessed november 15, 2007. The 15 countries in the 2007 poll were those for which comparisons could be made with countries in a 2005 poll.

69. Ibid.

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Whether China’s soft-power projection succeeds will ultimately depend on the sources from which soft power derives––a country’s culture, the at-tractiveness of its political values, and its foreign policies, as nye states.70 On the culture front, China may have the easiest time: there is already widespread interest in Chinese food, music, art, and so on. Many people around the world want to study Chinese, if not because of an intrinsic in-terest in the language, which is very difficult to learn, then because of its usefulness for doing business. On the political front, China may have a more uphill struggle as criticism of its authoritarian system continually puts it on the defensive. Constructive behavior within international institu-tions would bode well for China in the foreign policy sphere, but its image would be wrecked by aggressive action in trouble spots, such as Taiwan.

Much will also depend on how skillfully China can carry out public di-plomacy. One could argue that in many contentious areas, including Tai-wan, Tibet, Sudan, Myanmar, the Falun Gong organization and so on, China’s performance has been dismal. In other areas, such as nudging for-eigners to think of China as a developing country rather than a great civi-lization, it has been more successful.71 (As a developing country, China is able to insist that different standards be applied to it or that it be cut more slack, in areas such as environmental protection.)

It may be that whether China’s soft power projection succeeds will de-pend on the particular audience. China may find it easier to win friends (or solidify relationships) with developing countries with whom it shares political values. Indeed, public opinion polls show that China is generally viewed more positively in developing countries.72 The question is whether China can build new constituencies in countries it has less in common with, including many in Europe and also the United States. Only time will tell whether the Confucius Institutes can help spark a more sympathetic understanding of China and usher in a more benign view of it. In August 2008, the world was exposed to what is likely to be one of the greatest soft power projections of all time, the staging of the Beijing Olympic Games.

70. nye, Soft Power, pp. 11–15. See also James F. Paradise, “Can China’s Soft Power Offensive Succeed?” AsiaMedia, March 5, 2007, <http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp? parentid=65078>.

71. This characterization of China––attributed to a China scholar in the United States––was relayed to me by Robert Adanto, director of an interesting documentary on the contem-porary Chinese art scene entitled “Rising Tide.” For a rare recent look at China’s public diplomacy, see Ingrid d’Hooghe, “Public Diplomacy in the People’s Republic of China,” in Jan Melissen, The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations (Houndmills, Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 88–105. This paragraph has benefited from a conversation with an Asian studies scholar.

72. See, for example, the BBC World Service polls.

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Judging the Confucius Institutes from the standpoint of expanding Chi-nese soft power, however, may be the wrong standard for measuring their success. It may be that China does not get as much “bang for the buck” as it would like from its investment in Confucius Institutes in terms of win-ning hearts and mind around the world.73 But even if that were true (and it is far from clear that it is), the real winners may be China’s universities, which can expand their contacts and exchanges with foreign academic in-stitutions. As China attempts to become an “innovation society” and bol-ster its scientific capability, increased communication and exchanges with foreign scholars facilitated by the Confucius Institutes could be a huge benefit––especially in a country whose opening to the world is one of the driving forces for its economic development. Judging the Confucius Insti-tutes in the terms in which Chinese university administrators view them, may produce a conclusion of a different sort.

73. The amount of money provided to each Confucius Institute varies, according to the Hanban program director in an email of January 11, 2008. Funding decisions are made after the working plans and budgets of individual Confucius Institutes are submitted to Hanban.

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appendix 1 Confucius Institutes Worldwide (Institutes Established or to Be Established), as of September 23, 2007

Region Country English Name

Asia and Pakistan Confucius Institute in Islamabad Middle

EastPhilippines Confucius Institute at Ateneo de Manila University,

Confucius Institute at Bulacan State UniversityGeorgia Confucius Institute at Tbilisi Institute of Asia and AfricaKazakhstan Confucius Institute at Eurasian University, Confucius

Institute at Kazakh national UniversitySouth Korea Confucius Institute in Seoul, Confucius Institute at Woosong

University, Confucius Institute at Chungnam national University, Confucius Institute at Dong-A University, Confucius Institute at Dongseo University, Confucius Institute at Honam University, Confucius Institute at Chunbuk national University, Confucius Institute at Kangwon national University, Confucius Institute at Keimyung University, Confucius Institute at Daebul University, Confucius Institute at Soon Chun Hyang University, Confucius Institute at Daejin University

Lebanon Confucius Institute at Saint-Joseph UniversityMalaysia Shanghai Jiaotong University-Malaysia Global Chinese

Language CenterMongolia Confucius Institute at national University of MongoliaBangladesh Confucius University at north South Universitynepal Confucius Institute at Kathmandu UniversityJapan Confucius Institute at Waseda University, Confucius Institute

at Ritsumeikan, Confucius Institute at Obirin University, Confucius Institute at Aichi University, Confucius Institute at Hokuriku University, Confucius Institute at Sapporo University, Confucius Institute at Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, Confucius Institute at Okayama Shoka University, Confucius Institute at Osaka Sangyo University, Tokyo Confucius Classroom of Confucius Institute at Ritsumeikan, Takashima Confucius Classroom of Confucius Institute at Obirin

Sri Lanka Confucius Institute at the University of KelaniyaThailand Confucius Institute at Chulalongkorn University, Confucius

Institute at Kasetsart University, Confucius Institute at Khon Kaen University, Confucius Institute at Mae Fah Luang University, Confucius Institute at Chiang Mai University, Confucius Institute at Prince of Songkla University, Confucius Institute at Mahasarakham University, Confucius Institute at Bansomdejchaopraya Rajabhat, Confucius Institute at Suan Dusit Rajabhat University at Suphanburi, Confucius Institute at Phuket, Prince of Songkla University; Confucius Institute at Betong Municipality, Confucius Institute at Burapha University, Confucius Class at Traimit Wittayalai High School

(continued )

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appendix 1 Continued


Asia and Middle East

Turkey Confucius Institute at Middle East Technical University, Radio Confucius Classroom in Ankara, Radio Confucius Classroom in Istanbul

Uzbekistan Confucius Institute in TashkentSingapore Confucius Institute, nanyang Technological University,

Confucius Institute in SingaporeIsrael Confucius Institute at Tel Aviv UniversityIndia Confucius Institute of Jawaharlal nehru University,

Confucius Institute at vIT UniversityHong Kong

(China)Confucius Institute of Hong Kong

Africa Egypt Confucius Institute at Cairo University, Confucius Institute at Egypt Suez Canal University, Radio Confucius Classroom in Alexander

Zimbabwe Confucius Institute at the University of ZimbabweKenya Confucius Institute at the University of nairobi, CRI

Confucius Classroom in nairobiRwanda Confucius Institute at the Kigali Institute of EducationMadagascar Confucius Institute at the Antananarivo University South Africa Center for Chinese Studies at the University of

Stellenbosch, Confucius Institute at Tshwane University of Technology, Confucius Institute at University of Cape Town

nigeria Confucius Institute at University of Lagos, Confucius Institute at nnamdi Azikiwe University

Cameroon Confucius Institute at the University of yaounde

Europe Ireland UCD Confucius InstituteAustria Confucius Institute at the University of viennaBelarus Confucius Institute at Belarusian State UniversityBulgaria Confucius Institute in SophiaBelgium Confucius Institute in Brussels, Confucius Institute

in Liege, Confucius Class at GROUP TPoland Confucius Institute in KrakowGermany Confucius Institute at the Free University of Berlin,

Confucius Institute at the University of Düsseldorf, Confucius Institute nurnberg at Friedrich-Alexander-University, Confucius Institute at Frankfurt University, Confucius Institute at the University of Heidelberg, Confucius Institute at the University of Hamburg, Confucius Institute in Hannover, Confucius Institute at the University of Leipzig

(continued )

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Europe Russia Confucius Institute at Far Eastern national University, Confucius Institute at Russian State University for the Humanities, Confucius Institute at Saint-Petersburg State University, Confucius Institute at Irkutsk State University, Confucius Institute at novosibirsk State University of Technology, Confucius Institute at Kazan State University, Confucius Institute at Blagoveshchensk national Pedagogical University, SPPU Radio Confucius Classroom, two other institutes without English names

France Confucius Institute at the University of Poitiers, Confucius Institute at Paris 7 Denis-Diderot University, Confucius Institute of the Chinese Cultural Center in Paris, Confucius Institute in Brittany, Confucius Institute in La Rochelle, Confucius Institute in Strasbourg

norway Confucius Institute in BergenFinland Confucius Institute at the University of HelsinkiThe netherlands Confucius Institute in the HagueCzech Republic Confucius Institute at Palacky UniversitySlovak Republic Confucius Institute at Slovak University of TechnologyRomania Confucius Institute at the University of SibiuPortugal Confucius Institute at the University of Lisbon, Confucius

Institute at the University of MinhoSweden nordic Confucius Institute in StockholmSerbia Confucius Institute in BelgradeUkraine Confucius Institute at Luhansk national Pedagogical

UniversitySpain Confucius Institute in Madrid, Confucius Institute at the

University of Granada, Confucius Institute at the University of valencia

Hungary Confucius Institute at Eotvos Lorand UniversityItaly Confucius Institute at the University of Rome La Sapienza,

Confucius Institute at Oriental University of napoli United Kingdom London Confucius Institute, Confucius Institute for

Business, London, Confucius Institute at Specialist Schools and Academies Trust, Confucius Institute for Scotland in the University of Edinburgh, Confucius Institute at the University of Manchester, Confucius Institute at the University of nottingham, Confucius Institute at the University of Sheffield, Confucius Institute at the University of Wales, Lampeter, Confucius Institute at Cardiff University, Confucius Institute for Traditional Chinese Medicine, London, six other institutes without English names

(continued )

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The Americas

Canada Confucius Institute at BCIT, Confucius Institute at the University of Waterloo, Confucius Institute in Quebec, Confucius Institute in new Brunswick

United States Confucius Institute at the University of Maryland, Confucius Institute in Chicago, Confucius Institute at San Francisco State University, Confucius Institute at China Institute, Confucius Institute at the University of Kansas, Confucius Institute at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, University of Massachusetts Confucius Institute at Boston, Confucius Institute at the University of Iowa, Confucius Institute at Michigan State University, Confucius Institute at Pace University, Confucius Institute at the University of Oklahoma, Confucius Institute at Purdue University, Confucius Institute at north Carolina State University, Confucius Institute at Bryant University, Confucius Institute at the University of California, Los Angeles, Confucius Institute at Portland State University, Confucius Institute at the University of Rhode Island, Confucius Institute at the Community College of Denver, Confucius Institute at new Mexico State University, Confucius Institute at the University of nebraska Lincoln, Confucius Institute at the University of Pittsburgh, Confucius Institute at Arizona State University, Confucius Institute at the University of Oregon, Confucius Institute at the University of Memphis, Confucius Institute at Wayne State University, Confucius Institute at Rutgers, the State University of new Jersey, Confucius Institute at University of Central Arkansas, Confucius Institute at valparaiso University, Confucius Institute at Miami University, Confucius Institute in Indianapolis, Confucius Institute at the University of Wisconsin-Platteville, Confucius Classroom in Denver

Mexico Confucius Institute in Mexico City, Confucius Institute at the Universidad Autonoma de nuevo Leon, Confucius Institute at the Universidad Autonoma de yucatan, Confucius Institute at the Universidad nacional Autonoma de Mexico, Confucius Institute at the Universidad Autonoma de Chihuahua

Colombia Confucius Institute in Medellin

Oceania Australia Confucius Institute at the University of Western Australia, Confucius Institute at the University of Melbourne, Confucius Institute in Adelaide, Confucius Institute at the University of Queensland

new Zealand Confucius Institute in Auckland

SOURCE: The Office of Chinese Language Council International.

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china and international harmony: the role of confucius...

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