China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing'sSoft PowerAuthor(s): James F. ParadiseSource: Asian Survey, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2009), pp. 647-669Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27742666 .Accessed: 06/02/2011 07:32

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CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL HARMONY

The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing s Soft Power

James F. Paradise

Abstract China is setting up Confucius Institutes around the world to spread its lan

guage and culture and to increase collaboration with foreign academic insti tutions. The institutes could increase China's "soft power" and help it project an image of itself as a benign country. Concerns exist about a "Trojan horse" effect.

Keywords: Confucius Institute, Hanban, soft power, Chinese language

Amid anxiety around the world about China's in

creasing economic and military power, the Chinese government is at

tempting to project a more favorable image of the country and reassure the world that its intentions are benign. Its approaches include espous ing theories of China's peaceful rise and development;1 boosting military cooperation with other countries through overseas naval visits and joint

__-_??_?_ James F. Paradise is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Politi

cal Science at the University of California, Los Angeles. He would like to thank Richard

Baum and an anonymous reviewer for comments on earlier versions of this article. He would

also like to thank a program director for the Office of Chinese Language Council Interna

tional, current and former directors of a number of Confucius Institutes, and others in the

education field whom he interviewed for this article. Email: <paradise@ucla.edu>.

1. The latter expression is currently more in vogue. See Bonnie S. Glaser and Evan S.

Medeiros, "The Changing Ecology of Foreign-Policy Making in China: The Ascension and

Demise of the Theory of 'Peaceful Rise'," China Quarterly 190 (June 2007), pp. 291-310.

Asian Survey, Vol. 49, Issue 4, pp. 647--669, ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. ? 2009

by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permis sion to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press's Rights and

Permissions website, at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: AS.2009.49.4.647.

647

648 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLIX, NO. 4, JULY/AUGUST 2009

exercises;2 and disseminating more information through white papers and

websites oriented toward foreign readers.3 These activities are designed to

better explain the Chinese point of view and to instill confidence that what China is doing is non-threatening. Increased transparency is another

objective. At the same time that the Chinese government is putting out more in

formation in English, it is also moving vigorously to provide more oppor tunities for people to study Chinese and to learn about Chinese culture. A

principal means to this end is establishing Confucius Institutes. Over the

past several years, Confucius Institutes have sprouted in many locations in

Asia, Africa, North America, the Middle East, Europe, and Oceania. As of October 2008, a total of 326 Confucius Institutes had been set up in 81 countries and regions under the guidance of the Office of Chinese Language Council International4 (Guojia Hanyu Guoji Tuiguang Lingdao Xiaozu

Bangongshi, known by its abbreviation, Hanban). This is a non-profit public organization affiliated with the Ministry of Education that is re

sponsible for administering the program. Each institute has its own unique character?some, for example, are focused on business?but all are com

mitted to the mission of "promoting Chinese language and culture and

supporting local Chinese [language] teaching."5 That China would be setting up Confucius Institutes in the early years

of the 21st century is somewhat surprising. Only several decades earlier, during the Cultural Revolution of 1966-76, Confucius was reviled, seen as an obstacle to social change and a throwback to the past. Now, however, Confucius is back in fashion, useful for the government that needs sym bols to unify the nation and lending a basis for ideas such as the "harmo nious society," which is essentially a Confucian concept.

The Confucius Institute project can be seen at one level as an attempt to increase Chinese language learning and an appreciation of Chinese culture,

2. These other measures include inviting foreign countries to observe a People's Liberation

Army (PLA) drill as happened during "Warrior 2007" in September 2007. The joint military exercises have been with a number of countries including Russia, India, and France. Exercises

of this type could have a confidence-building effect or they could heighten concern as might have been the case in the United States when China and Russia teamed up in August 2007 to

carry out joint drills. Chinese naval ships have been to a number of overseas locations, includ

ing Pearl Harbor, Guam, Singapore, and India. In November 2007, a PLA ship visited a Japa nese port for the first time ever.

3. White papers have dealt with many topics such as China's political party system, food

safety, national defense, space activities, and environmental protection. 4. This information is on the Hanban website, at <http://english.hanban.edu.cn/kzxy.php>. 5. Office of the Chinese Language Council International, "Introduction to the 'Confucius

Institute' Project," <http://english.hanban.edu.cn/market/HanBanE/412360.htm>, accessed

March 5, 2007.

JAMES F. PARADISE 649

but at another level it is part of a broader soft power projection in which China is attempting to win hearts and minds for political purposes. Other

ways in which China is raising its cultural profile include broadcasting television programs abroad, staging concerts overseas by Chinese popular singers,6 translating Chinese literature into foreign languages, and spread ing Chinese contemporary art outside of China.7 While some of these activities are probably less the product of deliber

ate government action (for example, the government does not seem to be

actively promoting the spread of Chinese contemporary art around the

world8), other activities appear officially orchestrated. For example, in the realm of overseas television broadcasting, the State Administration of

Radio, Film, and Television gave Chongqing TV in November 2006 the

green light to start an international channel.9 Earlier that year the interna tional Chinese channel of government-owned China Central Television

(CCTV-4) held a conference to "better coordinate the dissemination of Chinese language content, and content about China into international

markets."10 The staging of an exhibition of the Qin Dynasty terracotta

army warriors at the British Museum beginning in September 2007 also had Chinese government involvement.11

6. An example is the North American tour of the hugely popular Zhou Huajian, also

known as Wakin Chau, that kicked off at the Galen Center at the University of Southern

California on November 9, 2007, and also included concerts in Vancouver, British Columbia, and in San Francisco. Although Zhou was born in Hong Kong, it hardly matters as people often misidentify where singers are from, and China is still able to reap cultural dividends.

7. See James F. Paradise, "Impressions of the Contemporary Chinese Art Scene," Asia Pacific

Arts, October 19, 2007, <http://www.asiaarts.ucla.edu/071019/article.asp?parentID=80006>. 8. According to Meiqin Wang, assistant professor of Art History at California State Uni

versity, Northridge, the Chinese government's attitude toward contemporary art is lukewarm

because it is difficult to control and open to different interpretations. However, there has been

some support, e.g., at art shows in Europe, as the Chinese government has attempted to bring such art under its regulation and make it more official, she said in a talk at the University of

California, Los Angeles, April 2008.

9. CMM Intelligence, 2007 China Media Yearbook & Directory (Hong Kong: CMM Intel

ligence [HK], Ltd., 2007), p. 25.

10. Ibid., p. 24.

11. The exhibition was the result of "years of diplomacy" and efforts by China and Britain

to improve cultural relations. An agreement paving the way for the exhibition was signed at

the Great Hall of the People in Beijing and witnessed by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and

former British Prime Minister Tony Blair who had previously agreed to collaboration between

the British Museum and Chinese institutions. The opening ceremony of the exhibition was

attended by Chen Kuiyuan, vice chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Con

ference, and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown. According to a statement from the Chi

nese Embassy in the United Kingdom, "Prime Minister Brown expressed his thanks to Chen

Kuiyuan and Fu Ying for attending the ceremony and to the Chinese government and relevant

departments of the two sides for their endeavors in the preparation of the exhibition." See

650 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLIX, NO. 4, JULY/AUGUST 2009

In spite of the many activities happening on the language and culture fronts in China in recent years, there has been relatively little academic at tention given to them, particularly with regard to the impact that they may be having on China's standing in the world and the way China is perceived by foreign countries. Although a number of newspaper or online articles have appeared and one important book has been published,12 other major writings by China scholars in recent years have had little or nothing to say about China's soft power or its public diplomacy.13 One reason may be that development of China's soft power is still in an early stage. Another reason may be that China lacks some of the crucial elements of soft

power14 such as the attractiveness of its political values. The purpose of this article is to understand how the Confucius Insti

tutes and other language promotion activities may be helping China

promote its goodwill agenda. Among the questions I ask are the follow

ing: What are the Confucius Institutes doing? How do they fit into China's

"grand strategy," if in fact there is such a strategy? How is soft power viewed in China? How are the Confucius Institutes thought of outside of China? What impact, if any, are they having on China's standing in the world?

"Exhibition of First Emperor: China's Terracotta Army Was Formally Launched in the Brit ish Museum," from the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, September 4,2007, <http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/ eng/sghd/t377942.htm>; "Terracotta Diplomacy," Guardian, September 15, 2007, <http://www. guardian.co.uk/leaders/story/0,2169663,00.html>; Rachel Campbell-Johnston, "Terracotta

Army Conquers British Museum," Times (London), September 11, 2007, <http://entertainment.

timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts_and_entertainment/visual_arts/article242360l.ece>; and Simon Baker, "Exhibition Marks Cultural Watershed," AOL News, <http://news.aol.co.uk/bigstorynews/ pm-opens-terracotta-army-exhibition/article/20070912055909990002>.

12. See Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the

World (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2007). Among the articles that have ap

peared are the following: Purnendra Jain and Gerry Groot, "Beijing's 'Soft Power' Offensive," Asia Times Online, May 17, 2006, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HE17Ad01.html>; Esther Pan, "China's Soft Power Initiative," Council on Foreign Relations, May 18, 2006,

<http://www.cfr.org/publication/10715/>; Gideon Rachmen, "The Hard Evidence That China's

Soft Power Is Working," Financial Times, February 20, 2007; and Howard W. French, "An

other Chinese Export Is All the Rage: China's Language," NYTimes.com, January 11, 2006,

<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/ll/international/asia/llchina.html>. 13. Three examples are Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy

and International Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); Bates Gill, Rising Star

China's New Security Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007); and

Sujian Guo, ed., China's ' Peaceful Rise' in the 21st Century: Domestic and International Condi

tions (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2006). 14. These reasons are given by David Shambaugh, "The Rise of China and Asia's New

Dynamics," in David Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics (Berkeley:

University of California Press, 2005), p. 2.

JAMES F. PARADISE 651

The Confucius Institute Project The Office of the Chinese Language Council International is governed by a group made up of members from state ministries and other organiza tions. These include the State Council, the Ministry of Education, the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Culture. The Confucius Institute Division is one part of Hanban, which also includes an Exami nations Division, focusing on Chinese proficiency tests; a Teaching Qual ity and Evaluation Division, which concerns itself with Chinese language teaching materials; and a Communications Division, which handles inter national cooperation and exchange activities.15

There are three main objectives of the Confucius Institutes, according to a Hanban program director. These are to teach Chinese, to promote cultural exchange, and to facilitate business activity.16 According to the

director, Confucius Institute assistance is helping the Chongqing motor

cycle industry export motorcycles to Thailand. Requests also come from

companies abroad seeking to do business in China.17 "A lot of people want to do business in China. Now there are not enough resources to help. But our people will do their best to get them the information they need," he said in reference to the activities of the Confucius Institute headquarters in Beijing.18 Other activities include sending teachers from China to Con fucius Institutes that need them and preparing and supplying Chinese lan

guage teaching materials.19 Cultural events include performances by Chinese art troupes, Chinese song competitions, and celebrations of Chinese holi

days, such as the Spring Festival. Confucius Institutes typically are created through a partnership between

two academic institutions, one foreign and one Chinese. Hanban provides start-up money for the institutes, which in most cases are physically lo cated on university campuses. Examples of Confucius Institutes operating on the university model are: the Confucius Institute at Japan Sapporo University, a partnership between Sapporo University and Guangdong University of Foreign Studies; the Confucius Institute at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, a collaboration between Chulalongkorn Univer

sity and Peking University; and the Confucius Institute at Far Eastern

15. The information in this paragraph comes from Hanban's website. See <http://www.

hanban.org/en_hanban/gywm.php>, accessed November 17, 2007; and <http://www.hanban.

org/en_hanban/jgsz.php>, accessed November 17, 2007.

16. Interview with Hanban program director, Beijing, China, September 24, 2007.

17. Ibid. When asked about the nature of cooperation in Thailand, the Hanban director

said, in an email of November 20, 2007, that it involved the Confucius Institute, connecting business leaders from two sides, which organized a meeting.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

652 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLIX, NO. 4, JULY/AUGUST 2009

National University, a cooperative venture between Far Eastern National

University in Vladivostok, Russia, and Heilongjiang University in north eastern China. In some cases, more than two universities may be involved as partners or in the setting up of an institute (for example, the Confucius Institute at Prince of Songkla University in southern Thailand involves

cooperation between Guangxi Normal University in Guilin, China; Ritsu meikan University in Kyoto, Japan; and Prince of Songkla University).

In some cases the Confucius Institute may include a partner other than a university (for example, at the China Institute in New York). According to Hanban, many inquiries arrive from abroad about setting up Confucius

Institutes, and in some cases it has not been able to approve applications.20 At the same time, it is clear that Hanban (or universities in China) have been actively courting institutions, which have not always signed up.21 Much of the legwork on the Chinese side is done by the Chinese universi ties themselves. They hold field trips abroad and negotiate with foreign partners; normally, they are able to select those partners themselves, and

"get married" of their own accord, says Hanban. Driving the universities' involvement has been a desire to strengthen contacts with foreign universi ties and organizations as a means to internationalizing themselves. By fos

tering academic exchanges, association with a foreign university through a Confucius Institute can bolster educational globalization, which some Chinese universities are aiming for.22

Although all Confucius Institutes have certain commonalities, includ

ing their pledge to abide by principles and requirements laid down by Hanban, there is considerable variation among them. The Confucius Institute for Business at the London School of Economics and Political

Science, for example, has an "explicit business focus." The Confucius Institute at Waseda University is research-oriented, and the University of California, Los Angeles, Confucius Institute focuses on, among other

20. Ibid.

21. The director of a Confucius Institute in the U.S. told me, concerning the genesis of his

institute, that he was approached by a Chinese university, and that "various Chinese have been

given the initiative to go out."

22. The desire to upgrade scientific research and institutional capacity was formalized in a program called Project 211. As one organization summarized the project's goals for the

government's Ninth Five-Year Plan of 1996-2000, "Top priority will be given to the strength ening of universities to help them approach and reach advanced international standards for the overall quality of teaching, scientific research, and the training of professional manpower, so as to establish their international prestige and position among universities in the world." See China Education and Research Network, "Project 211: A Brief Introduction (II)," at

<http://www.edu.cn/20010101/21852.shtml>, accessed April 20, 2008. The project can be construed as another way in which educational globalization is proceeding.

JAMES F. PARADISE 653

areas, health and medicine issues.23 This diversity may have grown out of Hanban experience. As one person involved in negotiations with Hanban said, "When Hanban developed the notion of Confucius Insti

tutes, they had a fairly rigid template for Confucius Institutes around the world. But schools were pushing back, and now there is a lot of flex

ibility on the Hanban side."24 Concerns about interference from China on matters such as teaching materials have generated caution among some foreign academics who fear that those who pay the piper may call the tune.

As of late September 2007, the countries with the most Confucius Insti tutes (either established or with agreements in hand to do so) were the

United States (32), the United Kingdom (16), Thailand (13), South Korea

(12), Japan (11), Russia (10), Germany (8), France (6), and Mexico (5).25 South Korea had the first overseas Confucius Institute, set up in Seoul in November 2004.

The Confucius Institute project is very much a work in progress. Be cause the institutes are so new, many of them are still carving out an iden

tity and have yet to grapple with or are doing so on things such as

head-office evaluations, teaching material issues, and so on. (In evaluating the Confucius Institutes, Hanban is concerned with things such as quality of instruction, management performance, and impact on society. Specific evaluation standards are being dealt with by a new department created at the head office, whose board was planning to set up a special project com

mittee to deal with evaluation issues. People involved in Confucius Insti tute activities around the world were to be invited to join.) Although China is said to have "sent more than 300 teachers and presented over 300,000 sets of textbooks and audio materials to Confucius Institutes with a total investment of over 26 million dollars,"26 there may still be a shortage of resources for the fast growth of Confucius Institutes worldwide. Hanban has been giving great attention to the way in which the institutes develop, creating guidelines and training programs to boost the quality of manage ment and teaching.27

23. Other emphases are distance learning at the Confucius Institute at Michigan State

University and theory and pedagogy at the Confucius Institute at the University of Iowa. The

Radio Confucius Classroom in Nairobi offers instruction over the radio.

24. Comment by a U.S. university administrator in an interview, September 5, 2007.

25. Based on a list supplied to me by Hanban. See Appendix 1 for a list of the institutes.

26. "Chinese Education Minister Vows to Maintain Sound Development of Confucius

Institute," Xinhua, December 12, 2007, <http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90782/6319838. html>, accessed January 27, 2008.

27. Ibid.

654 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLIX, NO. 4, JULY/AUGUST 2009

Communication among Confucius Institutes has been gradually in

creasing. In March 2008, Chinese and foreign directors from five Confucius Institutes in Nordic countries came together for the first time in a forum in Stockholm to discuss ways to cooperate. Conferences have been held in

Thailand, Japan, and the United States; in December 2007, representa tives of Confucius Institutes from around the world met in Beijing for a

second Confucius Institute Conference in China. People involved in Chi nese language education also met in Washington, D.C., in April 2008 for a National Chinese Language Conference, partially sponsored by Hanban.

Support has also come from Chinese embassies and consulates, which have sometimes provided information on applicants or have acted as inter mediaries between the applicants and Hanban. On some occasions, Chi nese ambassadors have inked agreements on behalf of Hanban for the creation of Confucius Institutes.

Other Language and Culture Promotion Activities

Another way in which Hanban is promoting Chinese language learning, this time focused on the United States, is through a Chinese Language and Culture Initiative with the College Board.28 One of the components of the

program, announced in 2006, is a Guest Teachers program that brings Chinese teachers to the U.S. to teach in schools at the K-12 level.29 Other

aspects of the program include the "Chinese Bridge Delegation to China," which enables U.S. educators to travel to China during the summer to learn about Chinese language, culture, and education30 and another bridge program that sends U.S. high school students to China during the summer months to study Chinese language and culture.31 In 2003, College Board and Chinese officials announced that an Advanced Placement Program

28. See the Office of Chinese Language Council International, "Chinese Language and

Culture Initiative," at <http://www.hanban.org/en_hanban/zdxm_more.php?ithd=apzwxm>, accessed November 15, 2007. The College Board is an organization involved in assessing students for college admissions through examinations such as the SAT. It also runs the

Advanced Placement program for high schools. 29. College Board, "Chinese Guest Teacher Program Helps Thousands of U.S. Students,"

August 13, 2007, <http://www.collegeboard.com/press/releases/185064.html>, accessed Octo

ber 14, 2007.

30. Ibid., "Destination China: 800 U.S. Education Leaders Tour China," June 18, 2007,

<http://www.collegeboard.com/press/releases/180235.html>, accessed October 14, 2007.

31. The Office of Chinese Language Council International, "Chinese Language and Cul

ture Initiative," <http://www.hanban.org/enJianban/zdxm_more.php?ithd=apzwxm>, accessed

November 15, 2007.

JAMES F. PARADISE 655

Course and Examination in Chinese Language and Culture was to be cre ated with financial assistance from the Chinese government.32

Hanban has also been involved in more broad-based activities, includ

ing international teacher training courses, a summer camp for students from the U.S., the U.K., and South Korea, and the provision of scholar

ships for students from around the world.33 It also administers the Chinese

Proficiency Test, commonly known as HSK for its Chinese name Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi.34

The International Context The promotion of Chinese language and culture is coming at a time when China's rise is prompting concern or alarm in some countries and regions, particularly the U.S. and Europe. Much of the alarm comes from concerns about the buildup of China's hard power, both in the military sphere and in the economic sphere.35 In the military sphere, the focus has been on

China's defense expenditures, which have been increasing rapidly in recent

years. Although China says that more military spending is needed to pay higher salaries and to upgrade equipment and bolster defensive war fight ing capabilities, others are afraid that China might use its more modern

military for offensive purposes. This view, in effect, downplays more mod erate explanations that see China's increased military spending as the

product of domestic politics, namely, the need for China's current political

32. College Board, "Chinese Officials and College Board Announce Advanced Placement

Course in Chinese Language and Culture," December 5, 2003, <http://www.collegeboard.

com/press/releases/30831.html>, accessed October 14, 2007.

33. See "International Training Courses for Chinese Language Teaching and Teachers

Held in Shanghai," November 12,2007; idem, "Summer Camp for Foreign Students," January 10, 2007; and idem, "Chinese Bridge Fund," all on the website of the Office of Chinese Lan

guage Council International, <http://www.hanban.edu.cn>. 34. See Hanban website, <http://www.hanban.org/en_hanban/content.php?id=1547>. 35. There are different ways to define "hard power" and "soft power." A more limited

definition of hard power would restrict the term to activities in the military sphere, giving a

broader province to soft power activities. According to Kurlantzik, "When the Chinese gov ernment talks about its new soft power in the world, it means all power outside the military

sphere, including diplomacy, aid, investment, and economic tools." See his book talk-related

essay, "Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World," Foreign

Policy Research Institute, August 2007, <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200708.kurlantzick. chinacharmoffensive.html>; and similar comments in his publication, "China's Charm: Im

plications of Chinese Soft Power," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, policy brief

(June 2006). In my view, the key issue is how a resource is used. If an economic asset such as

a trade surplus is used to promote a military buildup then it would be a hard power tool; but

if it is used to build bridges in a country as part of an economic aid program, then it would

be a soft power tool.

656 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLIX, NO. 4, JULY/AUGUST 2009

leaders to win the military's support to stay in power.36 Concerns also ex

tend to China's activities in space, which involved a missile test in 2007

that knocked out an old Chinese satellite. In the economic sphere, there is a perception that China is benefiting from unfair trade practices, in par ticular an allegedly undervalued currency, and government subsidies to

industry. With China using part of its massive trade surplus with the U.S. to buy U.S. Treasury securities, there is a concern that this could give China undue leverage. Things came to a head in 2005 when China Na tional Offshore Oil Corporation's attempt to buy Unocal Corp. was

stopped by opposition from U.S. lawmakers. Another problem China faces is criticism over its relationship with countries with poor human rights re

cords, including Sudan and Myanmar. China is seen variously as coddling these regimes for economic benefit (energy resources, trade, and so on) or not doing enough to encourage change.

What all this adds up to is the view that China is a threat?to the well

being of foreign companies, to U.S. security, to peace and stability, and to human rights. Worse, for China, is that these perceptions are now translat

ing into government policy. In the U.S., the Bush administration in 2007 decided on a preliminary basis to slap countervailing duties on some Chi nese paper imports; three times that year it filed complaints against China at the World Trade Organization (WTO), once on government subsidies, once on intellectual property issues, and once on market access. Bills have also been making their way around the U.S. Congress that would penalize China for its alleged unfair trade practices.

China has been fighting back with specific actions such as filing its own

complaint against the U.S. at the WTO, on the countervailing duty issue. It has also blocked some U.S. products from entering China because of what it says are "safety" issues?this coming amid major concerns in the U.S. about the safety of Chinese products. But at a more general level, China's strategy has been of a different sort, signing onto international treaties and attempting to live up to them, hosting talks on matters such as

North Korea, and negotiating the end of border disputes?all meant to reassure people of China's peaceful intentions. As Bates Gill has argued, "The Chinese leadership has since the late 1990s implemented a new secu

rity diplomacy, which is more confident, proactive, and convergent with international norms, and generally speaking, with U.S. interests."37

Among the ways this new security diplomacy has been carried out has been

through "such measures as participating in regional security mechanisms

36. Susan Shirk makes an argument of this type in her book, China: Fragile Superpower

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 73-74.

37. Gill, Rising Star, p. 203.

JAMES F. PARADISE 657

and confidence-building measures, expanding its peacekeeping and coun

terterrorism activities, and improving its nonproliferation and arms con trol policies at home and abroad."38 According to Avery Goldstein, who

makes a similar argument, China has what amounts to a "grand strategy" that is manifest through its "increased participation in multilateral forums, restrained currency policy, and active cultivation of major power partner ships [which] are designed to mute perceptions of a 'China threat,' to build China's reputation as a responsible actor, and to convince others of the benefits of engagement with China as well as the counterproductive con

sequences of attempting to threaten, isolate or contain it."39 What needs to be added to these analyses is an explicit discussion of

China's use of soft power, particularly in the language and cultural realms, as an instrument of its foreign policy. As Joseph Nye, the modern exposi tor of the concept, has defined soft power, "It is the ability to get what you

want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals and policies."40 China's use of soft power may still be limited today, but it is growing in

importance. An important question is what do Chinese think about soft

power, both those persons directly associated with the Confucius Institute

project and those further away? Are Confucius Institutes a part of the soft

power offensive, if one can use such a description to characterize China's new cultural diplomacy?

China's Views of Soft Power One finding is that some Chinese in the education field do not see the cre ation of Confucius Institutes as part of a soft power offensive and even bristle at the suggestion. "I don't think the creation of Confucius Insti tutes has anything to do with soft power and the rise of China. It is better to think of it academically, not politically," said one Chinese university administrator involved in the setting up of a Confucius Institute.41 The notion that China wants to increase its soft power via Confucius Institutes is a "wrong idea" and "misleading," he said. "Please let us do things aca

demically, peacefully. Students will benefit and teachers will benefit."42 Said the program director at Hanban, "I don't think we need to push the

38. Ibid.

39. Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge, p. 175.

40. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York:

Public Affairs, 2004), p. x.

41. Interview with a Chinese university administrator, Shanghai, China, September 13, 2007.

42. Ibid.

658 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLIX, NO. 4, JULY/AUGUST 2009

language and culture?it is what people need." He added that many uni

versities around the world were eager to set up Confucius Institutes: "I

don't like soft power. I think power is aggressive. We just do something all

people like."43 In a similar vein, Wan Lixin, a columnist for Shanghai Daily, wrote

after a panel discussion on soft power in Dalian in September 2007 that

foreigners who lecture on soft power should "be reminded that some

people regard power suspiciously."44 He added that "Veteran diplomat Sha Zukang flatly rejected the whole idea of 'soft power,' calling it a con

descending approach and notion created by Western developed countries."45 Wan also noted that Jiang Jianqing, chairman of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, saw soft power as very much a part of

"China's thousands of years of history, culture and philosophy" and es

sentially what Confucius's Analects, & compilation of his main ideas, is concerned with.46

While it is understandable that people in the education field might not

like the idea of soft power?preferring instead to think of the Confucius Institutes as a vehicle for academic exchange and mutual understanding?it is clear that the idea has considerable support at the highest levels of the

Chinese government. In his keynote speech at the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in October 2007, President Hu Jintao called for increasing China's soft power through cultural enhancement for reasons of national cohesion and overall national strength.47 In July of that year, Jia Qinglin, chairman of the National Committee of the Chi nese People's Political Consultative Conference, at a seminar on soft power called for bolstering the country's soft power through cultural develop ment: "Cultural development, a main theme in building a country's soft

power, plays a significant role in enhancing comprehensive national

power."48 The importance of increasing soft power has also been sounded in other contexts. During the seven-nation African tour of Premier Wen Jiabao in June 2006, an article on a Chinese government website said that new opportunities existed for bolstering cultural exchanges between China

43. Hanban interview.

44. Wan Lixin, "The U.S. Is Told Hard Facts about Soft Power with a 'Chinese Touch',"

Shanghai Daily, September 13, 2007.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. "Hu Jintao Calls for Enhancing 'Soft Power' of Chinese Culture," Xinhua, October

15, 2007, <http://english.cpcnews.cn/92243/6283153.html>, accessed October 14, 2007.

48. "China's Top Advisory Body Holds Seminar of 'Soft Power'," ibid., July 25, 2007,

<http://www.gov.cn/english/2007-07/25/content_695451.htm>, accessed November 1, 2007.

JAMES F. PARADISE 659

and African countries.49 Shortly before a Shanghai Cooperation Organiza tion (SCO) summit that same month, the website quoted a Chinese scholar on how cultural cooperation could be used to strengthen relations between

member states.50

It is worth asking why there is such a division between what some edu cation officials and some high-level political leaders think about soft power. It may have something to do with the fact that as Hanban and other edu cation officials ventured out into the world, they found some resistance to the idea of setting up Confucius Institutes on university campuses because of concerns about Chinese interference in foreign academic life. In other

words, great sensitivity was needed in how to present the idea. This is an

important issue worthy of further consideration.

A Chinese Trojan Horse? The constitution and by-laws of the Confucius Institutes state that they "shall not contravene concerning the laws and regulations of China" and "shall not involve or participate in any activities that are not consistent with the missions of the Confucius Institute."51 These rules also state that the Confucius Institutes are to conduct their instruction in Mandarin

49. "China, Africa Boost Soft Power through Cultural Exchanges," ibid., June 18, 2006,

<http://www.gov.cn/misc/2006-06/18/content_313770.htm>, accessed November 1, 2007.

50. "Cultural Exchange Boost 'Soft Power' for SCO Development," ibid., June 13, 2006,

<http://www.gov.cn/misc/2006-06/13/content_308632.htm>, accessed November 1, 2007.

51. In December 2007, a new governing council was created for the Confucius Institute

headquarters in Beijing. Chaired by Chen Zhili, Chinese state councilor, the council also had

five vice-chairmen from two Chinese ministries and the State Council; 12 executive directors

from a variety of Chinese ministries, government organizations or departments; and 15 coun

cilmen, including 10 from overseas Confucius Institutes. The council agreed to a number of

changes to the constitution and by-laws, two of which were to set up a consultative committee

and to employ Chinese and foreigners as senior advisors. The wording of a number of articles

or by-laws found at the Office of Chinese Language Council International, "Constitution and

By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes (Provisional Version)," <http://www.hanban.org/en_

hanban/kzxy_list.php?ithd=xyzc>, accessed April 17, 2008, can also be seen to have changed from an earlier version accessed November 19, 2007. In that version, the constitution and

by-laws state that the Confucius Institutes "shall not contravene the laws and regulations of

China" and "shall not involve or participate in any political, religious, ethnic/racial, or any such related activities"; that the headquarters in Beijing "is the highest regulatory body of the

Confucius Institutes worldwide"; that the chair, vice chair, and executive council members will

be "appointed by the Chinese government"; and that a responsibility of the headquarters is

to select and appoint "deans and faculties for the Chinese partners." The conclusion to be

drawn from the changes seems clear?some articles in the new constitution and by-laws have

been considerably watered-down from the earlier version, possibly in response to foreign concerns.

660 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLIX, NO. 4, JULY/AUGUST 2009

Chinese and that simplified Chinese characters are to be used.5 Accord

ing to Article 12, the headquarters office in Beijing "is the regulatory body that provides guidelines to the Confucius Institutes worldwide" and will be governed by a council whose chair, vice-chair, and executive council members "shall be recommended by the education administrative

agency of the Chinese State Council and approved by the State Council"

(Article 13).53 Among the responsibilities of the headquarters is "examining and ap

proving the implementation plans of annual projects" and "selecting and

appointing directors and faculties from the Chinese side for individual Confucius Institutes."54 One duty of the Confucius Institutes is "to accept both supervision from and assessments made by the headquarters."55 In information elsewhere, on the "Standard Model for Confucius Institutes," foreign parties that apply to establish a Confucius Institute should be will

ing to "accept Confucius Institutes' operation model and teaching model and be able to accept the oversight, evaluation and certification by the Head Office once the institute is established."56 Section VIII, Item D (1) makes clear, "All institutes must use the unified set of teaching materials

supplied by the Head Office."57 One can see how some of these provisions might create problems or ten

sions between the headquarters and the overseas Confucius Institutes. For

example, would the provisions on obeying the laws of China and not be

coming involved in activities contrary to the mission of the Confucius In stitutes preclude classroom discussions on topics sensitive to the Chinese

government such as Taiwan or Tibet? What about the necessity of using teaching materials supplied by the headquarters in Beijing? Does that

mean that teachers overseas would not be able to use any materials of their own choosing? And if they do, or engage in any activities that find them in contravention of the stated rules, does that mean that they would receive a

negative evaluation? (Activities of great concern to Hanban, which could even be the basis for legal action, include ones that cause financial loss or

52. The Office of Chinese Language Council International, "Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes (Provisional Version)." Simplified characters are used in Mainland

China; in some other places, such as Hong Kong and Taiwan, they are not typically used, or are not the norm.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. The Office of Chinese Language Council International, "Standard Model for Con

fucius Institutes," <http://english.hanban.edu.cn/market/HanBanE/412379.htm>, accessed

September 5, 2007.

57. Ibid.

JAMES F. PARADISE 661

harm the reputation of the Confucius Institutes.) It may be that these is sues are only now being tested, given the newness of the whole Con fucius Institute project. As is so often the case in China, there is often a

big gap between formal rules and regulations and actual practice. Might not language and cultural promotion be an area where great flexibility is shown?58

One thing that can be said is that some quarters of American academia are wary. A typical comment, by a U.S. professor, is: "We need to think about how we will manage and develop China studies, rather than have China decide."59 Chinese involvement is not necessarily a cause for Ameri can alarm if it enables universities with few funds to expand, or begin, Chinese language programs. And not all are worried about Chinese gov ernment intrusion. As one news story put it, "Some program directors (all Americans) joke that, for once, they want China to provide more central

guidance,"60 a reference to the many uncertainties that surround the start of this new project. But there is uneasiness in some quarters of academia, and we can note that there are no Ivy League colleges in the U.S. on the list of Confucius Institutes. Regarding the absence of Harvard and Yale from the list, the Hanban program director said, "Some people were inter

ested, some people were opposed. We understand that."61 The establish ment of Confucius Institutes at some smaller universities may be related to the fact that, according to one Confucius Institute director, Hanban's

model?or at least its original model?was to target local communities or

colleges that lacked strong Chinese language programs. There are major exceptions such as the University of California, Los Angeles, which has a

very strong Chinese language program. With interference in academic life being a concern that Hanban officials

are hearing about as they interact with educators around the world, it seems

58. Two telephone interviews I conducted on November 30, 2007, suggest there is flexibil

ity. In one interview, the director of a U.S. Confucius Institute said she believed her institute

was "not regulated to strictly use Hanban materials" and that doing so was only a "sugges tion." "Teachers decide themselves the materials most suitable for the classroom and in the

best interests of the students," she said. In another interview, a person highly knowledgeable about another U.S. Confucius Institute said that she doubted Hanban would force Confucius

Institutes to use their teaching materials. "I think Hanban is very flexible. Of course, they would like us to use their materials, but they are not very strict about it." She said she did not

like most Hanban materials, including the textbooks, and that there was a lack of understand

ing of what was needed locally. 59. I heard this comment at an Asian studies conference in the United States in 2007.

60. Carol Huang, "Vv^hy China Wants You to Learn Chinese," Christian Science Monitor,

January 4, 2007, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0104/pl7s01-legn.html>, accessed Novem

ber 14, 2007.

61. Hanban interview.

662 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLIX, NO. 4, JULY/AUGUST 2009

sensible to think that they are giving much thought to how to sell the con

cept of Confucius Institutes. Marketing it as wholly academic, as many Chi nese educators seem to see it, is likely a better approach than associating it with a soft power offensive or conscious projection of Chinese interests, which are both political considerations. Though it is unclear why it hap pened, we can note that Hanban's English-language name has been changed from the China National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language to the Office of Chinese Language Council International. Regardless of the

motivations, the new name does not contain the word "National."

Maybe the best way to think of the Confucius Institute project is as a

type of impression management, an effort by China to craft a positive image of itself in a world fraught with danger. Faced with tremendous anxiety about China in the U.S. and other major trading partners, Confucius Insti tutes help create the impression of a kinder and gentler China. In this re

spect, the Confucius Institute project fits in well with the notion of China's

peaceful development. It may also be part of a grand strategy to increase the country's attractiveness as a major power. But it is not entirely a soft

power strategy, as Nye defines that approach: while it may not rely on coer

cion, it does rely on payments. In providing money for the establishment of Confucius Institutes, the concern has been that Hanban will have a great deal of power in influencing teaching and other language and cultural pro motion activities, either directly or indirectly. The "strings" associated with

accepting money may be fairly loose, and foreign directors and others may have input into decision-making and policy issues affecting the Confucius

Institutes, but there is a lingering concern among some that the project will be a way for China to subtly expand its influence abroad. Ultimately, how

ever, the success of the Confucius Institute project will be highly dependent on the attractiveness of Chinese culture, which makes it essentially a soft

power activity, or an activity with a large soft power component.

Measuring Success There are two difficulties in saying whether the establishment of Confucius Institutes is helping China win friends around the world. One is that the Confucius Institute project is so new that it is hard to know what its im

pact has been; another is that it is difficult to disentangle the effects of Confucius Institutes from a variety of other cultural promotion activities.

Still, one can try to get at the issue of soft power by looking at public opinion polls.62 One BBC World Service poll whose results were announced

62. This is an approach used by Nye in attempting to measure U.S. soft power. See his Soft Power (2004).

JAMES F. PARADISE 663

in March 2007 found that an average of 42% of people polled in 26 coun

tries, excluding China, had a mainly positive view of China's influence in the world, and 32% had a mainly negative view.63 In a similar BBC poll whose results were announced in February 2006, the numbers were 45%

mainly positive and 27% mainly negative,64 while a March 2005 survey found 48% of people mainly positive on China's influence and 30% mainly negative.65 One factor that may have affected the results was a perception that China had become more authoritarian.66 The impact that China's soft

power may have had on the people's responses was not mentioned, but one poll-related director said, "Countries that related to the world primar ily through soft power, like Japan, France and the EU in general, tend to be viewed positively."67

Another poll, this one part of the Pew Global Attitudes Project, also found a deterioration in the image of China in the world between 2005 and 2007. According to a summary of the findings, nine countries in the

poll (conducted in spring 2007) had less favorable views of China over the

period, one had a more favorable view, and five countries remained about the same.68 "Large majorities in many countries think that China's grow

ing military might is a bad thing, and the publics of many advanced na

tions are increasingly concerned about the impact of China's economic

power on their own countries," a Pew statement said.69

63. Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), "Views of Countries, Question

naire, and Methodology, March 2007," March 2007. PIPA, at the University of Maryland, carried out the poll for the BBC World Service with GlobeScan, an international polling

company. See <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/mar07/BBC_ViewsCountries_

Mar07_quaire.pdf>, accessed November 13, 2007.

64. PIPA, "BBC World Service Poll: Global Views of Countries, Questionnaire, and

Methodology." This survey, without China, covered 32 countries. See <http://www.worldpub

licopinion.org/pipa/pdf/feb06/ViewsCountries_Feb06_quaire.pdf>, accessed November 17, 2007.

65. PIPA, "22-Nation Poll Shows China Viewed Positively by Most Countries Including Its Asian Neighbors," <http://www.globescan.com/news_archives/bbcpoll3.html>, accessed

November 13, 2007.

66. World Public Opinion.org, "Global Poll Finds Iran Viewed Negatively," <http://www.

worldpublicopinion. org/pipa/articles/home_page/168. php?nid=&id=&pnt= 168&lb=hmpg 1 >, accessed November 17, 2007.

67. Ibid., "Israel and Iran Share Most Negative Ratings in Global Poll," <http://www.

worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/home_page/325.php?nid=&id=&pnt=325&lb=hmpgl>, accessed November 13, 2007. The comment is by Steven Kull, director of PIPA.

68. Pew Global Attitudes Project, "Global Unease with Major World Powers," released

June 27, 2007, <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=256>, accessed November

15, 2007. The 15 countries in the 2007 poll were those for which comparisons could be made

with countries in a 2005 poll. 69. Ibid.

664 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLIX, NO. 4, JULY/AUGUST 2009

Whether China's soft-power projection succeeds will ultimately depend on the sources from which soft power derives?a country's culture, the at

tractiveness of its political values, and its foreign policies, as Nye states.70 On the culture front, China may have the easiest time: there is already

widespread interest in Chinese food, music, art, and so on. Many people around the world want to study Chinese, if not because of an intrinsic in

terest in the language, which is very difficult to learn, then because of its

usefulness for doing business. On the political front, China may have a

more uphill struggle as criticism of its authoritarian system continually puts it on the defensive. Constructive behavior within international institu tions would bode well for China in the foreign policy sphere, but its image

would be wrecked by aggressive action in trouble spots, such as Taiwan. Much will also depend on how skillfully China can carry out public di

plomacy. One could argue that in many contentious areas, including Tai

wan, Tibet, Sudan, Myanmar, the Falun Gong organization and so on, China's performance has been dismal. In other areas, such as nudging for

eigners to think of China as a developing country rather than a great civi

lization, it has been more successful.71 (As a developing country, China is able to insist that different standards be applied to it or that it be cut more

slack, in areas such as environmental protection.) It may be that whether China's soft power projection succeeds will de

pend on the particular audience. China may find it easier to win friends

(or solidify relationships) with developing countries with whom it shares

political values. Indeed, public opinion polls show that China is generally viewed more positively in developing countries.72 The question is whether China can build new constituencies in countries it has less in common

with, including many in Europe and also the United States. Only time will tell whether the Confucius Institutes can help spark a more sympathetic understanding of China and usher in a more benign view of it. In August 2008, the world was exposed to what is likely to be one of the greatest soft

power projections of all time, the staging of the Beijing Olympic Games.

70. Nye, Soft Power, pp. 11-15. See also James F. Paradise, "Can China's Soft Power

Offensive Succeed?" AsiaMedia, March 5, 2007, <http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?

parentid=65078>. 71. This characterization of China?attributed to a China scholar in the United States?

was relayed to me by Robert Adanto, director of an interesting documentary on the contem

porary Chinese art scene entitled "Rising Tide." For a rare recent look at China's public

diplomacy, see Ingrid d'Hooghe, "Public Diplomacy in the People's Republic of China," in

Jan Melissen, The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations (Houndmills,

Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 88-105. This paragraph has benefited

from a conversation with an Asian studies scholar.

72. See, for example, the BBC World Service polls.

JAMES F. PARADISE 665

Judging the Confucius Institutes from the standpoint of expanding Chi nese soft power, however, may be the wrong standard for measuring their success. It may be that China does not get as much "bang for the buck" as it would like from its investment in Confucius Institutes in terms of win

ning hearts and mind around the world.73 But even if that were true (and it is far from clear that it is), the real winners may be China's universities,

which can expand their contacts and exchanges with foreign academic in stitutions. As China attempts to become an "innovation society" and bol ster its scientific capability, increased communication and exchanges with

foreign scholars facilitated by the Confucius Institutes could be a huge benefit?especially in a country whose opening to the world is one of the

driving forces for its economic development. Judging the Confucius Insti tutes in the terms in which Chinese university administrators view them,

may produce a conclusion of a different sort.

73. The amount of money provided to each Confucius Institute varies, according to the

Hanban program director in an email of January 11, 2008. Funding decisions are made after

the working plans and budgets of individual Confucius Institutes are submitted to Hanban.

APPENDIX 1 Confucius Institutes Worldwide (Institutes Established or to Be Established), as of September 23, 2007

Region Country English Name

Asia and Pakistan Confucius Institute in Islamabad

Middle Philippines Confucius Institute at Ateneo de Manila University, East Confucius Institute at Bulacan State University

Georgia Confucius Institute at Tbilisi Institute of Asia and Africa

Kazakhstan Confucius Institute at Eurasian University, Confucius

Institute at Kazakh National University South Korea Confucius Institute in Seoul, Confucius Institute at Woosong

University, Confucius Institute at Chungnam National

University, Confucius Institute at Dong-A University, Confucius Institute at Dongseo University, Confucius

Institute at Honam University, Confucius Institute at

Chunbuk National University, Confucius Institute at

Kangwon National University, Confucius Institute at

Keimyung University, Confucius Institute at Daebul

University, Confucius Institute at Soon Chun Hyang

University, Confucius Institute at Daejin University Lebanon Confucius Institute at Saint-Joseph University

Malaysia Shanghai Jiaotong University-Malaysia Global Chinese

Language Center

Mongolia Confucius Institute at National University of Mongolia

Bangladesh Confucius University at North South University

Nepal Confucius Institute at Kathmandu University

Japan Confucius Institute at Waseda University, Confucius Institute

at Ritsumeikan, Confucius Institute at Obirin University, Confucius Institute at Aichi University, Confucius Institute

at Hokuriku University, Confucius Institute at Sapporo

University, Confucius Institute at Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific

University, Confucius Institute at Okayama Shoka

University, Confucius Institute at Osaka Sangyo University,

Tokyo Confucius Classroom of Confucius Institute at

Ritsumeikan, Takashima Confucius Classroom of

Confucius Institute at Obirin

Sri Lanka Confucius Institute at the University of Kelaniya Thailand Confucius Institute at Chulalongkorn University, Confucius

Institute at Kasetsart University, Confucius Institute at

Khon Kaen University, Confucius Institute at Mae Fah

Luang University, Confucius Institute at Chiang Mai

University, Confucius Institute at Prince of Songkla

University, Confucius Institute at Mahasarakham

University, Confucius Institute at Bansomdejchaopraya

Rajabhat, Confucius Institute at Suan Dusit Rajabhat

University at Suphanburi, Confucius Institute at Phuket, Prince of Songkla University; Confucius Institute at Betong

Municipality, Confucius Institute at Burapha University, Confucius Class at Traimit Wittayalai High School

(continued)

APPENDIX 1 Continued

Region Country English Name

Asia and Turkey Confucius Institute at Middle East Technical University, Middle Radio Confucius Classroom in Ankara, Radio Confucius

East Classroom in Istanbul

Uzbekistan Confucius Institute in Tashkent

Singapore Confucius Institute, Nanyang Technological University, Confucius Institute in Singapore

Israel Confucius Institute at Tel Aviv University India Confucius Institute of Jawaharlal Nehru University,

Confucius Institute at VIT University

Hong Kong Confucius Institute of Hong Kong

(China)

Africa Egypt Confucius Institute at Cairo University, Confucius Institute

at Egypt Suez Canal University, Radio Confucius

Classroom in Alexander

Zimbabwe Confucius Institute at the University of Zimbabwe

Kenya Confucius Institute at the University of Nairobi, CRI

Confucius Classroom in Nairobi

Rwanda Confucius Institute at the Kigali Institute of Education

Madagascar Confucius Institute at the Antananarivo University South Africa Center for Chinese Studies at the University of

Stellenbosch, Confucius Institute at Tshwane University of Technology, Confucius Institute at University of Cape Town

Nigeria Confucius Institute at University of Lagos, Confucius

Institute at Nnamdi Azikiwe University Cameroon Confucius Institute at the University of Yaounde

Europe Ireland UCD Confucius Institute

Austria Confucius Institute at the University of Vienna

Belarus Confucius Institute at Belarusian State University

Bulgaria Confucius Institute in Sophia

Belgium Confucius Institute in Brussels, Confucius Institute

in Liege, Confucius Class at GROUP T

Poland Confucius Institute in Krakow

Germany Confucius Institute at the Free University of Berlin, Confucius Institute at the University of D?sseldorf, Confucius Institute N?rnberg at Friedrich-Alexander

University, Confucius Institute at Frankfurt University, Confucius Institute at the University of Heidelberg, Confucius Institute at the University of Hamburg, Confucius Institute in Hannover, Confucius Institute at

the University of Leipzig

{continued)

APPENDIX 1 Continued

Region Country English Name

Europe Russia

France

Norway Finland

The Netherlands

Czech Republic Slovak Republic Romania

Portugal

Sweden

Serbia

Ukraine

Spain

Hungary

Italy

United Kingdom

Confucius Institute at Far Eastern National University, Confucius Institute at Russian State University for the

Humanities, Confucius Institute at Saint-Petersburg State University, Confucius Institute at Irkutsk State

University, Confucius Institute at Novosibirsk State

University of Technology, Confucius Institute at Kazan

State University, Confucius Institute at Blagoveshchensk National Pedagogical University, SPPU Radio

Confucius Classroom, two other institutes without

English names

Confucius Institute at the University of Poitiers, Confucius

Institute at Paris 7 Denis-Diderot University, Confucius

Institute of the Chinese Cultural Center in Paris, Confucius Institute in Brittany, Confucius Institute in La

Rochelle, Confucius Institute in Strasbourg Confucius Institute in Bergen Confucius Institute at the University of Helsinki

Confucius Institute in the Hague Confucius Institute at Palacky University Confucius Institute at Slovak University of Technology Confucius Institute at the University of Sibiu

Confucius Institute at the University of Lisbon, Confucius

Institute at the University of Minho

Nordic Confucius Institute in Stockholm

Confucius Institute in Belgrade Confucius Institute at Luhansk National Pedagogical

University Confucius Institute in Madrid, Confucius Institute at the

University of Granada, Confucius Institute at the

University of Valencia

Confucius Institute at Eotvos Lorand University Confucius Institute at the University of Rome La Sapienza, Confucius Institute at Oriental University of Napoli

London Confucius Institute, Confucius Institute for

Business, London, Confucius Institute at Specialist Schools and Academies Trust, Confucius Institute for

Scotland in the University of Edinburgh, Confucius

Institute at the University of Manchester, Confucius

Institute at the University of Nottingham, Confucius

Institute at the University of Sheffield, Confucius Institute

at the University of Wales, Lampeter, Confucius Institute

at Cardiff University, Confucius Institute for Traditional

Chinese Medicine, London, six other institutes without

English names

(continued)

APPENDIX 1 Continued

Region Country English Name

The Canada Confucius Institute at BCIT, Confucius Institute at the Americas University of Waterloo, Confucius Institute in Quebec,

Confucius Institute in New Brunswick United States Confucius Institute at the University of Maryland,

Confucius Institute in Chicago, Confucius Institute at San

Francisco State University, Confucius Institute at China

Institute, Confucius Institute at the University of Kansas, Confucius Institute at the University of Hawaii at Manoa,

University of Massachusetts Confucius Institute at

Boston, Confucius Institute at the University of Iowa, Confucius Institute at Michigan State University, Confucius Institute at Pace University, Confucius Institute at the University of Oklahoma, Confucius Institute at

Purdue University, Confucius Institute at North Carolina

State University, Confucius Institute at Bryant University, Confucius Institute at the University of California, Los

Angeles, Confucius Institute at Portland State University, Confucius Institute at the University of Rhode Island, Confucius Institute at the Community College of Denver, Confucius Institute at New Mexico State University, Confucius Institute at the University of Nebraska Lincoln, Confucius Institute at the University of Pittsburgh, Confucius Institute at Arizona State University, Confucius Institute at the University of Oregon, Confucius Institute at the University of Memphis, Confucius Institute at Wayne State University, Confucius

Institute at Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, Confucius Institute at University of Central Arkansas, Confucius Institute at Valparaiso University, Confucius

Institute at Miami University, Confucius Institute in

Indianapolis, Confucius Institute at the University of

Wisconsin-Platteville, Confucius Classroom in Denver

Mexico Confucius Institute in Mexico City, Confucius Institute at

the Universidad Aut?noma de Nuevo Leon, Confucius

Institute at the Universidad Aut?noma de Yucatan, Confucius Institute at the Universidad Nacional

Aut?noma de Mexico, Confucius Institute at the

Universidad Aut?noma de Chihuahua

Colombia Confucius Institute in Medellin

Oceania Australia Confucius Institute at the University of Western Australia, Confucius Institute at the University of Melbourne, Confucius Institute in Adelaide, Confucius Institute at the

University of Queensland New Zealand Confucius Institute in Auckland

SOURCE: The Office of Chinese Language Council International.