CHAPTER-V

RUSSIAN POLICY TOWARDS JAPAN: 1996-2000

When Primakov became Foreign Minister early in 1996, Russia's foreign

policy underwent a transformation. There was a shift from Westem

orientation to omnidirectional diplomacy. Greater attention was focused

on Asia and the Middle East. However, it did not mean that Russia had

::tdopted an anti-west foreign policy. Rather, it was intended towards

equilateral relations with the West. To bail out the stagnant relationship

with Japan emerged as a major task, simultaneously China factor also

became a serious motive for a rapprochement between Russia and

Japan.

Immediately after his appointment as Foreign Minister, Primakov made

serious efforts to break the impasse in the relations by eliminating the

distrust of Russia, through confidence building measures. While firmly

acknowledging the principle of territorial integrity, as regards the

Northem Territory, the new minister suggested postponing a resolution

regarding the sensitive territorial question for the future generation. 1

Japan vigorously protested the statement and argued that Primakov is

neglecting the commitment made in Tokyo Declaration. They stressed

that it is the fundamental issue for Japan and Russia both. Further

1 Izvestia, 18 January 1996, translated in The Current Digest of the Post Soviet Press, Vol. XLVIII, No.3, 14 February 1996. p.30.

164

Japanese newspaper published a map of a proposed 'Japanese economic

zone' that included the Southem Kuriles. The Russian Ministry of

Foreign Affairs was totally taken by surprise by the developments. 2

However, the visit of Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihino Ikeda yielded,

some positive results. During his visit both sides affirmed their

commitment to the principles of the Tokyo Declaration, a document that

calls for resolving the territorial dispute on the basis of the principle of

legality and justice. In addition it was agreed upon to reduce the number

of Russian troops stationed on the islands in the southem part of the

Kurile Chain to 3500 men. 3 The sides also agreed to expand thin bilateral

dialogue by including military officials from the Japanese Defense Agency

and the Russian Ministry of Defense.

Further both decided to open talks on the payment of the Soviet Union's

$ 11 billion debt to Japanese private companies. At the same time Japan

tumed down Russia's request for a new$ 2 billion subsidy. The Foreign

Ministry stressed that it is better to complete disbursement of the loans

pledged to Russia earlier, as well as to clarify the debt situation.

Meanwhile, Russia secured United States support in the Pacific. This

development can be seen in the light of Russian-Chinese rapprochement

2 Kommersant-Daily, 23 March 1996 translated in Ibid., Vol. XLVIII, No.l2, 17 April 1996, p.23. 3 Ibid.

165

that culminated in the signing of an unprecedente<;I agreement on

military confidence building measures in the border region. The United

States realized Russia's aspiration to play an active role in the Asia

Pacific region. Therefore US expressed unconditional support to the

Russian participation in the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC)

forum and conveyed the willingness to support Russian admission to

APEC by all means.4 Earlier US had opposed the Russian membership

and managed to secure a moratorium un the admission of new members.

As the moratorium got expired, it paved the way for Russian membership

to APEC an influential organization that includes all the leading

countries of the Asia Pacific region.

In order to improve the bilateral relations~ Primakov visited (Tokyo)

Japan in November 1996. He made an official proposal to reconsider the

question of joint economic activity' on the disputed islands. The scheme

contained among other things, the improvement of facilities for tourists,

the contraction of large-scale marine product processing factories and

the improvement of infrastructure of industry and social systems. 5 Tokyo

agreed, though with some qualifications, to consider the Russian

proposals that can certainlv be viewed as a step forward. However,

4 Sevodnya, 12 May 1996, translated in Ibid., Vol. XLVIII, No. 19,5 June 1996, p.l8. 5 Matohide Saito, ''Russia's Policy Towards Japan", in Genadi Chufrin, (ed.) Russia and Asia Pac[fic Security, <http://projects.spri.se!Russial>. Also see Yasily Golovin, ''Yevgeny Primakov invites Japanese to the South Kuriles",Sevodnya, 19 November 1996, translated in The Current Digest of the Post Soviet Press, Vol. XLIII, No. 46, 11 December 1996, p.25.

166

Primakov at a press conference emphasized that any renunciation or

softening of Russian stand over the territories is out of question. On the

other hand Russia is not insisting that Tokyo gives up its demands for

the return of the islands, Primakov further asserted that )oint economic

activity' is not the way to solve the conflict over the Southern Kuriles, but

a climate that would be conducive for the settlement of the territorial

dispute.6

Primakov attached utmost importance to confidence building measures

to create a favorable political and psychological atmosphere between

Russia and Japan. In April 1996, Russian Defense Minister Pavel

Grachev and Japan Defense Agency Chief, Hideo Useri signed a

document in Moscow on the reinforcement of bilateral security dialogue

during the first ever meeting between top Japanese and Russian defense

officials. The agreement covered the items such as, to notify each others

plans for massive military exercises, allow their naval vessels to visit

each other's ports and launch joint communication drill for the

prevention of maritime accidents and reciprocal visits by high ranking

officers of the Russian army and the Japanese self defense forces to

enhance high level bilateral security talks.7

6 The Current Digest of the Post Soviet Press, Vol. XLVIII, No. 46, 11 December 1996, p.25. 7 Motohidde Saito, op.cit.,in Genadi Chufrin, (ed) Russia and Asia Pacific Security, <htppl /project. spri.se/Russia/>.

167

Russia presented navigation chart, formerly regarded as secret, to their

Japanese counter-parts and even offered detailed accounts of the entry

route to the port of Vladivostak. Further the appointment of Deputy

Foreign Minister Alexander Panav, as ambassador to Japan in 1996 was

clear sign of Russia's determination to improve relations with Japan.

In 19961 a Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces (MSDF) paid a visit to

Vladivostak, the first by a MSDF ship to Russia and in 1997 Russia

reciprocated with an official visit to Tokyo i.e. 104 years after the last

port visit of this kind. 8

On the other hand,Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, who

had shown strong inclination to improve relations with Russia, when he

was Minister of Intemational Trade and Industry, was determined to

break the stalemate. In April 1996, on the occasion of the Moscow

Nuclear Safety Summit, Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Yeltsin

held a meeting to discuss bilateral questions, Russia's reform course,

and intemational issues, which was successful in creating a political

impetus for advancing over all relations between the two countries in a

balanced manner.9 He expressed Japan's support to Yeltsin in the

forthcoming presidential election and pledged to extend financial support

8 Sergey Sevastyanov, "The Russian Crisis: Implicatiuon for the Russian Far Ea~c"s Economy and Security", The Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies. November 1999, p.5. http://cns.miis.edu/cres!revast.htm. 9 Motohide Saito, op. cit.,

168

to Russia without linking to the settlement of the territorial issue.

However, the two leaders confirmed that bilateral relations be developed

further on the basis of the Tokyo Declaration and agreed that its

important to revitalize the peace treaty negotiations at the Foreign

Ministers level. His policy of improving ties with Russia was in line with

US policy of securing Yeltsin re-election and integrating Russia into the

world economy. This US move was partly to soften Russia's objection to

NATO's eastward expansion.

These developments led to the beginning of Japan's more positive

approach towards Russia, which was reciprocated by Moscow. In

December 1996, Hashimoto sent a personal note to Yeltsin announcing

Japan's 'New Russia Policy' of multi-layered approach, in place of

expanded equilibrium approach, in order to advance relations with

Russia in various domains including political dialogue at the top level,

security dialogue, trade and economic co-operation, simultaneous

negotiation on the territorial question. 10 This multifaceted approach

envisaged comprehensive, encompassing co-operations in the areas of

security, environmental issues, cultural academic and technical co­

operation, people interchange and global issues. The new approach was

based on the awareness that that the old policy precluded a break from

the stalemate in the Russia-Japan relations, while a considerable change

10 Yomiuri Shimbun, January 4,1997, in Ibid.

169

took place in the atmosphere with in the Japanese Ministry of foreign

affairs.

Foreign Minister Ikeda's official visit to Moscow in May 1997 came on the

eve of the G-7 (G-7+Russia) June summit. Ikeda expressed concern for

Russia Joining G-7. He further said, Japan would deal with Russia on

the basis of a formula "principles and exceptions". In principle it would

support Russian membership but there would be certain exceptions,

such as dealing financial problems.1 1 Japan's initial position on Russia's

joining the G-7 was not nearly as benevolent. As after the Russo-

American Helsinky Summit, Bill Clinton assured Yeltsin that Russia

could join the G-7 as equal member. Japan questioned the

appropriateness of Russia's participation in the effort to solve the

economic problems of the world's leading states.

During talks with Ikeda, Yeltsin stressed, "We currently have good

relations with Japan". Yeltsin further expressed gratitude to the

Japanese leadership for supporting the idea of creating a G-8 and

assured Ikeda, that he was looking forward to a meeting with Japanese

Prime Minister Hashimoto at the Denver summit in June. Further

Russia-Japan summit was held on the occasion of the Denver Summit in

June 1997, where the leaders reached on a basic agreement that they

11 Kommersant-Daily, 24 May 1997, translated in The Current Digest ofthe Post Soviet Press, Vol. XLIX, No.21, 25 June 1997, p.22.

170

would visit each other's countries once a year. They pledged that steady

progress to be made on the Tokyo Declaration and so forth.

Further in an attempt to emphasize the de-linking of politics and

economics, Prime Minister Hashimoto in July 1997 announced three new

principles to govem bilateral relations. Trust, mutual benefit and a long-

term perspective. 12 He stressed that this is to finally bring about an

improvement in bilateral relations. Hashimoto characterized the

territorial problem, as the most challenging task remained unresolved

since World War II. But the outcome should not be one in which one side

looses and the other side wins. Nevertheless, Prime Minister viewed that

this problem needs to be resolved.

The Japanese Prime Minister said that these three principles must be

fully reflected in the sphere of business relations with Russia as well.

And showed interest in continuing joint efforts to develop oil and gas field

on the Sakhalin Shelf and also in developing gas extraction in Irkutsk

Province and Yakutia and building gas pipe lines there. 13 One of the

major promises of the Japanese Prime Minister was, without Russia,

especially its energy potential, progress in the Asia Pacific region in 21st

12 Brad Williams, ''Russia and the Northern Territories", Russia and Euro-Asian Bulletin, Vol. 7, No. 8, August 1998, p. 7. 13 Izvestia, 26 July 1997, translated in The Current Digest ofthe Post Soviet Press, Vol. XLIX, No. 30,27 August 1997, p.23.

17 I

Century would be difficult. This requires Japanese investment to explore

the opportunities in Russia.

The Hashimoto Doctrine was highly praised by Russia, which concluded

that Japan had finally made a drastic stance on Russia by de-linking

economy from politics. No doubt this development was due to the efforts

of Hashimoto rather than the diplomatic skills of Yeltsin and Primakov.

Russian-Japanese relations began to make remarkable progress,

particularly in economic field.

Further the newly appointed Japanese Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi

expressed the hope for the conclusion of peace treaty by the end of the

century. Meanwhile, Japan and US concluded a new version of basic

guidelines for Japan-US defense co-operation. 14 Though China viewed

the new accord as a threat to its security but Russia did not comment on

the issue.

When Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Tamba, visited Southem Kurile,

the first by a Japanese high ranking official, the economy of the Islands

were in a precarious state. Soon ruter the visit of Tamba got over, the

Chief Administrator of South-Kurile district Vladmir Zema, said "if a

referendum on the fate of the Islands were held right now, the result

14 Kommersant-Daily, 25 September 1997, translated in Ibid., Vol. XLIX, No. 39,29 October 1997, p.l9.

172

would be unambiguous recession from Russia. 15 This was mainly due to

economic condition and suffering of the people over there. It was hoped

that the Krasnoyarsk Summit would address this sorry state of 'Northem

Territories' economy.

Despite the changes in official policy there were doubts whether a

substantial policy shift has taken place. Nobuo Arai and Tsuyoshi

Hasegawa (expert on Japanese-Russo relations) believed that by adopting

the policy of expanded equilibrium the Foreign Ministry never repudiated

the policy of inseparability of politics and economy. Furthermore, Japan's

aid to Russia had been criticized on qualitative grounds. A large portion

of Japanese economic aid consist of non-grant assistance, such as·

Export-Import Bank loan, and Trade Insurance, which were designed to

promote Japanese trade as much as Russian Development. 16

Russia was in particular eager to expand economic relation with Japan,

it viewed Japanese investment as a vital element for breathing life into

the stagnant Far East economy and to help it to emerge from economic

isolation in Asia Pacific region. A number of Russian offers had been put

forward in recent year for joint development of the disputed islands.

However, the Govemment of Japan feared that if its cooperation is

15 Izvestia, 4 October 1997, translated in Ibid., Vol. XLIX, No. 40, 5 Novelllber 1997, p.21. 16 Nobuo Arai and Tsuyoshi, "The Russian Far East in Russo-Japanese Relations", in Tsuneo Akaha (ed.), Polities and Economies in the Russian Far East: Changing Ties With Asia Pacific, (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 176.

173

subject to Russian law, it could be interpreted as tacit consent to

Russian sovereignty over the Islands. It had therefore, expressed

reservation over such proposals.

On the other hand, most Japanese enterprises in the Russian Far East

have been engaged in small scale trading and services. However, a

number of Japanese proposals had existed which if realized, would have

had a major impact on the future regional economic cooperation. Notably

among these are plans to develop oil and gas reserves off Sakhalin

Island. A proposal had been floated to build a pipeline from Sakhalin via

Hokkaido to Niigata, in Japan.17

However, a myriad of problems casts some doubts on the validity of these

and other large-scale projects. This was mainly due to the Russian

default of previous credits, confusion over the distribution of power

between central authorities and the administrations in the Far East,

unclear legislation and the inconsistent legal enforcement of property

rights and contractual obligations. 18

In addition to seeking economic cooperation, it was argued that Russia's

growing concem over China's economic growth and military power may

be a significant factor in its Reeking rapprochement with Japan.

17 Ibid., p. 186. 18 Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 October 1997, p.30, in Brad Williams op. cit., p.8.

174

According to noted scholar Alexander Tsipko, "The improvement in

Russo-Japanese relations will become the triumph card for suppressing

China's projection". 19 The rapid growth of Russo-Chinese economic

relations in recent years has caused a dramatic increase in Russian

contact with Chinese citizens. Due to its proximity and its extensive

border trade, the Russian Far East has been particularly affected by

these developments. Despite the obvious benefits, there were

considerable strains on the social fabric of the Far East. This led to the

emergence of a view among some of the Russian officials that in Asia

Pacific region, Russia must strengthen relations with Japan, South

Korea, and the United States and become security partners. At the same

time many Russian political and military circles advocated stronger

relations with China rather than Japan. Nevertheless, by this time

Russia's stance towards Japan was far friendlier than China's.

The Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto too considered it extremely

important for Japan to pursue a more balanced foreign policy by

improving relations with Russia, which had lagged far behind the

relations with US, and China. He was also eager to create a favourable

atmosphere for the conclusion of the long awaited peace treaty with

Russia. To achieve this he intended personally buildup of confidence

19 See J.C. Moltz, "Russo-Chinese Normalization from an international perspective; coping with the pressure of change", in T. Akaha (ed.), op. cit., p.p. 190-191.

175

with President Yeltsin and tried to prompt him to make a decision on a

peace treaty on mutually accepted terms.

Russia and Japan held first no-necktie talks in Krasnoyarsk in November

1997. At the Krasnoyarsk meeting Hashimoto and Y eltsin signed the

Hashimoto-Yeltsin plan for economic co-operation, which included: 20

1. Development of Oil and :1atural gas fields in Russia's for east and

Siberia;

2. The launch of negotiations on a long delayed bilateral investment

protection agreement for protecting Japanese investment in

Russia;

3. Japanese support for Russia's bid to join APEC and World Trade

Organization (WTO) to integrate Russia into the world economy;

4. Japan's co-operation in upgrading the trans-Siberian .tailway

system;

5. Training of Russian business managers;

6. and Co-operation in the sphere of power engineering and

promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The Krasnoyarsk Summit was predominated by the view that mutual

distrust has been over come, the ice in relations has been broken, there

20 Rossiiskiye vesty, 4 November 1997 , translated in The Current Digest of the Post Soviet Press, Vol. XLIX, No.44, 3 December 1997, p.l, see also Yomiuri Shimbun, 2 November 1997.

176

has been warming in all spheres and a breakthrough in economic

relations, and a positive new page in world history has been opened.

There was a fruitful exchange of opinion on 43 items for the expansion of

co-operative relations.

The two leaders agreed to give their best to conclude a peace treaty by

the year 2000 based upon of the Tokyo Declaration signed in October

1993 by Yeltsin and then Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro. 21 Unlike

Tokyo Declaration, which said that only a peace treaty would be

concluded as soon as possible through resolution of the Northem

Territories issue, the Krasnoyarsk meeting was a definite advance.

Because simultaneously agreeing on the other issue it specified a time

limit to conclude a peace treaty.

At the Krasnoyarsk meeting, Japan called for Russia to take a more

active part in the affairs of the Asia Pacific region, in particular in

multilateral consultations on problems of regional security. It was noted

that in the 21st century peace, stability and prosperity in Asia Pacific

region will depend upon relations among the US, Japan, China and

Russia. The major impediment among these nations have been due to

the strained Russo-Japanese relations, therefore the rapprochement and

21 Konstantin Sarkisov, "Progress in Japan-Russia Relaations'", Japan Quarterly, April-June 1998, p. 15, also see, The Current Digest of the Post Soviet Press, Vol. XLIX, No. 44, 3 Decewber 1997, p .. 2.

177

strengthening of Russo-Japanese ties had became a priority, not only

from the stand-point of bilateral, but also regional interests.

It is to be noted here that before departure to Krasnoyarsk, Y eltsin

stressed that, we can not surrender the Kurile Islands to Japan and that

the settlement of the Kurile Islands should be left to the next generation,

but at the Krasnoyarsk he made the sensational proposal to Hashimoto

that they should do their best to conclude a peace treaty by the year

2000, totally by passing Primakov and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Even for Hashimoto it was a pleasant surprise, but Nemtsov the Russian

deputy Prime Minister made a discouraging comment to Japan, asserting

that Article 4 of the Russian constitution stipulates territorial integrity

and designates the President as the guarantor of the constitution.22 He

also said that a definite resolution of the territorial question must be

found by the date the treaty is signed.

Although, the bilateral negotiations that preceded Krasnoyarsk meeting,

resolution of the territorial issue and the expansion of economic relations

had been linked negatively, but at the Krasnoyarsk the linkage was a

positive one. The items, which were included in the meeting, were not

merely promises on the paper. Within a year various projects were

22 Rossiiskiye Vesti, 4 November 1997, translated in The Current Digest of the Post Soviet Press, Vol. XLIX, No. 44,3 December 1997, p.l.

178

initiated various regional project had been also developed in a series.

Finally the first "no-necktie" summit between Russia and Japan opened

a new chapter in their bilateral relation and paved the way for the future

engagements.

Another major achievement for Russia after 'Hashimoto Plan' was its

entry in to the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) forum.

Following the Krasnoyarsk Summit meeting, Hashimoto made great

efforts to realize the admission of Russia as a full-fledged member of

APEC. And with Japan's help, Russia officially joined in November 1998,

together with Vietnam and Peru. This was in addition to its previous

admission to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a multilateral forum on

security affairs in Asia Pacific, where since 1996 Russia has held the

status of a non-regional dialogue partner, like USA, China and Japan.

Thus Russia became an important player in the Asia Pacific region.

Soon after the Krasnoyarsk meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Primakov

visited Tokyo in mid November 1997. Primakov tried to convince

Japanese officials that, Russia was serious about implementing the

Krashoyarsk Agreement to make every effort to sign a peace treaty by the

year 2000. To accelerate the drafting of a peace treaty, which would

entail a solution to the problem of the Southern Kurile as well, both sides

agreed to create a new structure for conducting negotiations, which was

179

to be headed henceforth by the Foreign Ministers themselves, not their

deputies, as was the case before. Japan was surprised when Primakov

proposed that, structure include not only Foreign Ministry officials but

also the representative of other departments and regions with a stake in

the matter.23

However, the Russian approach seemed promising that, under the new

format, the peace treaty talk would progress quickly. Russia included the

regions because without the participation of Sakhalin Province, it would

have been difficult to resolve the issue as, Southem Kurile being part of

Sakhalin province, was govemed by the Russian law. At the final press

conference in Tokyo, Prim.akov indicated that Russia is prepared to take

its partners demands into full account in creating the new negotiation

structure.

As an example of the mutual understanding that had already been

established at Krasnoyarsk meeting, Japan agreed to open a new$ 100

million credit line for Sakhalin-2 oil field on the shelf of Sakhalin island

for the development of natural gas and oil resources. 24 Since November

1997, not only govemment agencies but also eleven leading Russian

private banks had got the right to insure the operations of Japanese

companies in Russia.

23 Izvestia, 15 November 1997, translated in Ibid., Vol. XLIX, No. 46, 17 December 1997, p.20. 24 Ibid.

180

Another positive gesture by Japanese Prime Minister, while addressing

the parliament in February 1998, he did not mention about the dispute

over the Southem Kuriles. Since Soviet times, all Japanese Prime

Minister had invariably reiterated about the territorial dispute in

parliamentary speeches. Hashimoto said that co-operative relations are

now emerging in the Asia-Pacific region among China, Russia the US and

Japan. He stressed upon fundamental improvement of Japan's relation

with Russia in this quadrangle.

Further Japan had extended small-scale aid to Kurile Islands. Breaking

its self-imposed ban on infrastructure, it extended 100 million yen for

the construction of modem clinic and a school in Shikotan. 25 In

February 1998 Japanese Foreign Minister, Obuchi visited Russia. During

his visit Obuchi and Boris Nemtsov signed a 'Joint agreement' on fish

industry co-operation in southem Kurile region. The accord allowed the

Japanese fisherman to harvest fish legally in Russian territorial water i.e.

around the disputed Kurile Islands. 26 Obuchi also announced that the

Japanese Export-Import Bank in concurrence with the World Bank had

decided to grant Russia a two year unrestricted credit of$ 1.5 billion.

25 Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, "'Russo-Japanese relations and the security ofNorth-East Asia in the 21 51 Century'', in Genadi Chufrin, (ed.), Russia and Asia: The Emerging Security Agenda, (Oxford: Sipri, 1999). p.334 26 lbid.,

181

Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi and his counterpart, Yevgeny Primakov,

meeting in Moscow February 22, reaffirmed the goal of both countries to

formally end the state of war between them by the year 2000. The two

officials issued this statement at the first 'meeting of a special joint

committee established last November by Prime Minister Ryutaro

Hashimoto and Russian President Boris Yeltsin to facilitate conclusion of

3. peace treaty with in the next two years. Mr. Obuchi described his three

days of meetings with Mr. Primakov and Mr. Yeltsin as "the first step to

translate the Krasnoyarsk agreement into reality. "27

Meanwhile, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin visited Japan

to discuss the conclusion of peace treaty within the framework of the

Russia-Japan Joint Commission on drafting the peace treaty. United

State's ambassador to Japan stated that the Southem Kuriles are

Japanese territory, he merely restated the US's standing position of the

territorial dispute between Russia and Japan. However, Karasin confined

his remarks to the statement and stated that we are oriented towards a

very constructive dialogue.

Since, the Krasnoyarsk meeting there had been a significant development

in the bilateral relation between Russia and Japan. As the Japanese

fishermen were given the fishing rights in the Russian water, a )oint

27 Barbara Wanner, "Japan-Russia Inch Towards Peace Treaty'', Japan Economic Institute Report (JEIR), No.9, 6 March 1998, p.l<http://www.jei.org/Archive!JEIR98/9809 w4.html

182

committee' dealing with the Russia-Japan Peace Treaty issue was set up

and an agreement had been reached to form a 'special study group' to

draft a peace treaty. Most conspicuous was the closest relationship

between the defense organizations of the two nations.

In April 1998, President Yeltsin held the second round of no-necktie

summit talk with Hashimoto in Kawana. The summit further deepened

the personal trust and friendship between the two leaders fostered at the

Krasnoyarsk talks in 1997. Yeltsin's main objective in the midst of

political crisis triggered by his dismissal of Prime Minister Chemomyrdin

in Kawana were to obtain emergency financial assistance from Japan

and to urge the Govemment of Japan to promptly implement the

Hashimoto plan and expand it to include cooperation in space

development. 28

At Kawana, Hashimoto told Yeltsin that, of$ 1.5 billion aid previously

pledged in United loans to Russia the$ 600 million would be deposited

in accounts in the Central Bank as early as this fall. 29 The two leaders

agreed to establish a committee for bilateral cooperation in the

development of space stations and establishing a satellite network. It was

·decided that a joint Russia-Japan meeting on cooperation in space

28 Motohide Saito, op. cit. 29 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 21 April 1998, translated in The Current Digest of the Post Soviet Press, Vol. 50, No. 16, 20 May 1998, p.20

183

exploration would be held in Tokyo. Japan would also take part in

Russia-America exercises to practice marine oil spill clean up operation

in the areas of Sakhalin Shelf.

With regard to energy development project in the Russian Far East and

Siberia, Yeltsin called for greater participation by Japanese companies.

He also proposed the construction of large-scale marine product

processing facilities and the improvement of roads and ports on the

Northem Territories. Since such a project involved complications like

property rights, legal jurisdiction over the criminal and civil cases and

taxation, Japan intended to consider this request in connection with the

territorial question.30 However, Yeltsin regarded the results as

satisfactory. He remarked, at Kawana, "I am convinced that the two great

nations were able to establish a strategic partnership in the economic

field". 31

During Kawana meeting, Yeltsin proposed to Hashimoto to broaden the

scope of the treaty, by making it a peace, friendship and cooperation

treaty and stressed that the current framework of the peace treaty was

too narrow in scope because the !egal status of war between the two

30 Yomiuri Shimkun, 20 April 1998, quoted in Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, op. cit., p.329 31 Sankei Shim bun, 21 April 1998, quoted in Motoh ide Saito, op. cit. in Genadi Chufrin ( ed)

184

countries had been terminated in 1956.32 Though Hashimoto agreed to

Yeltsin's idea but on the condition that the agreement would also resolve

the issue of the four islands (Japan called it Northem Territories) in

accordance with Article two of the Tokyo Declaration 1993, which states

conclusion of a peace treaty by resolving the issue of possession of the

four islands on the basis of the principles of legality and faimess. As per

the timetable for the revision of the four islands, he proposed that until

both sides reached an agreement, Russia would retain administrative

powers over all four islands in retum for acknowledgment of Japan's

residual sovereignty with no mention of actual time frame for their actual

transfer to Japan.33

In a clear departure from the past approaches, Japan agreed to consider

Primakov's proposal for joint development of the Northem Territories

Islands. But Hashimoto's above proposal for granting sovereignty over

the Islands deferred the actual transfer indefinitely, with joint economic

development of the island, was not acceptable to Russia because of the

sensitivity of the sovereignty issue. Instead, Russia had been advocating

the idea of recognizing Japan's 'special economic rights' on the islands

while the border delimitation could be deferred, as has been the case of

three islands on the Russo-Chinese border. According to a high ranking

32 Nezavisimaya gazeta,21 April 1998, translated in The Current Digest of he Post Soviet Press. Vol. 50, No. 16,20 May 1998, p.20. 33 Ibid., p.21.

185

official of Japanese Foreign Ministry, Yeltsin was on the verge of

approving the Hashimoto's proposal, but after desperate efforts by

President's Press Secretary, Yastrzhembsky, he decided to reply at the

formal talks to be held later in Moscow.34

According to Konstantin Sarkisov (a leading Russo-Japanese expert),

there are three conceivable alternatives for drawing the border between

Japan and Russia. The first would be to stick to the border agreement of

1855 where by all four islands return to Japan. The second would be to

return two islands (Habomais and Shikotan) on the basis of 1956 Soviet-

Japanese Joint Declaration, and continuation of negotiation for other two

islands. The third would be demarcation of that part of the border where

markers can be placed, leaving the remainder to be decided later.35 Thus

it can be said the time would decide about the ways and means of

resolving the territorial problem.

However, at the Kawana meeting both leaders publicly agreed to

accelerate negotiations on a peace treaty. It could be assumed that

Yeltsin's pledge to accelerate the peace treaty negotiations was a card to

extract the largest possible amou11t of material and technical support

from Japan. After the Kawana meeting, Japan provided the disputed

34 Kato, "Concerns remai'1 despite big step forward" Sekaishulw. 15 December 1998, quoted in Motohide Saito, op. cit., 35 K . S k. . 8 onstantm ar 1sov, op. Cit., p.l

186

islands with diesel generators to alleviate the chronic power shortage in

the Kuriles and undertook the repair of a pier in Yuzhno-Kurilsk on

Kunashiri. 36

Meanwhile, security dialogue between Russia and Japan commenced. In

June 1998 Aden Kazuya Natsukawa, Chairman of the Joint Committee of

Chiefs of Staff in Japan, visited Russia (Moscow). The Chief of the

Russian General Staff Kavashnin, after meeting Natsukawa said that

prospects for the development of cooperative relations between Russia

and Japan in military and other technical fields were highly favorable. In

his opinion the bilateral relations in the military realm would make a

great contribution to the over all security system in the Asia Pacific

Region. 37

In July the Russian Pacific Fleet and Japan Maritime Self Defense Force

(MDSF) conducted their first ever Joint Search and Rescue Exercise in

the Sea of Japan about 390 km east of Vladivostak. In December 1998,

the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Army paid a historic

courtesy visit to Tokyo.38 However, Izvestia reported that the contact

between the military authorities of Russia and Japan lagged '.Jehind

those between Russia and other G-8 nations. Nonetheless, new warming

36 Hokaido Shimbun, 24 June 1998, in Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, op. cit., p. 37 Izvestia, 2 June 1998, translated in The Current Digest of he Post Soviet Press, Vol. 50, No. 22, I July 1998, p.20. 38 Motohide Saito, op. cit., p. also see Izvestia, 2 June 1998, Translated in Ibid.

187

1n the Russia-Japan relations could be felt in the field of security too.

Both had started consulting each other on the joint training of soldiers in

natural disaster relief as well as confidence building measures like

mutual notification of large-scale exercises. In August 1998, Japanese

Minister of Defense Hosei Norota, paid an official visit to Russian Defense

Minister Marshal Sereyev, he also met the Pacific Fleet Commander

Admiral Zakharendo. In Russia, Norota signed a memorandum on

bilateral understanding and military cooperation. He also approved the

establishment of a hotline between Japan MSDF and the Russian Pacific

Fleet in Vladivostak and he proposed for conducting annual search and

rescue exercises.39 These developments manifested the Japanese desire

to achieve a level of military contact with Russia.

When Russian Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko, visited Japan in July

1998, a memorandum on protecting Mutual Investment was signed. It

had prohibited the confiscation of investments and guaranteed the

unrestricted repatriation of profits. This document assured safety for the

Japanese investors in Russia. Both sides had also agreed on a basic

provision to create a Japan-Russia investment Company that would

promote direct investment in Russia. It wuuld also provide assistance to

the Joint ventures established with the support of the Russian and

Japanese gove1nment. It was a~eed that each country would invest$ 50

39 Sergey Sevastyanov, "The Russian Crisis: lmplicatiuon for the Russian Far East's Economy and Security", op. cit., p.5.

188

million in the company's establishment. 40 Further both side reached an

agreement that$ 600 million credit, which was extended as part of$ 1.5

billion package, of that amount $ 400 million would be assured to Russia

by the end of July 1998.41

The Japanese Prime Minister Masahiko Komura reached Russia on

October 17, 1998 to make preparation for Yeltsin's meeting with

Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obucli, which was to be held in

November. However the Japanese Minister for most of the time discussed

the economic problems. But both sides agreed to continue to work upon

the text of a peace and co-operation treaty to be signed by 2000.42

In November 1998, the newly elected Prime Minister Obuchi paid an

official visit to Moscow. This was the first official visit by a Japanese

Prime Minister in 25 years. For Russia it was a priority to obtain Japan's

consent to 'Joint economic activities' on the disputed islands, while it

confirmed its commitment to do its best to conclude a peace treaty by the

year 2000.

A summit meeting between president Yeltsin and Prime Minister Obuchi

resulted in the signing of the Moscow Declaration in which two nations

4° Kommesant-Daily, 15 July I 998, translated in The Current Digest of he Post Soviet Press, Vol. 50, No. 28, 12 August 1998, p.21. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid., 20 October I 998, translated in lbid.,Vol. 50, No. 42, 18 November 1998, p.17.

189

agreed upon the construction of a creative partnership consistent with

then strategic and geopolitical interests, overcoming the legacy of the

past. The declaration stated there commitment to further strengthening

Russia-Japan co-operation in all area, including polities, economy,

security, culture and intemational co-operation, towards the 21st

century, by developing the bikateral relationship into an era of agreement

by strengthening trust. 43

Obuchi had offered to extend $ 8 billion as part of United loans to help

Russia to come out of its severe financial crisis and signed bilateral

investment agreement, which Russia had been pressing for long to

promote investment by the Japanese private sector. The Moscow

Declaration called for the establishment of a creative partnership based

upon the principles of trust, mutual benefits, a long term perspective and

close economic co-operation, overcoming the legacy of the past. The

principle of close economic co-operation was added to the three

principles of Hashimoto policy. 44 Both sides agreed to establish a par mol

to study the possibility of joint economic activities on the Kurile Island

without damaging the legal positions of each other.

43 The Ministry of Foreign affairs of Japan, Japan's Northern Territories <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia!territory.html> 44 Motohide Saito, op. cit.

190

On the territorial issue, Yeltsin replied in writing to Hashimoto's

demarcation proposal, which was made at Kawana Summit. He proposed

the conclusion of a peace and friendship treaty without a territorial

settlement. This virtual rejection of proposal, however, surprised the

Japanese govemment, which had expected some signs of compromise, if

not acceptance of the Hashimoto Proposal in totality. Nevertheless both

sides agreed to create a 'border demarcation committee' to work out a

compromise solution.45 To realize joint economic development Yeltsin

also proposed that a special zone be created on· the disputed island in

which Japan would enjoy special treatment in its economic activities. 46

The incongruity between Russia and Japan was still wide. Yeltsin's view

on a peace treaty was clearly a departure from the Tokyo Declaration of

1933, which stipulated that the peace treaty would be conducted after

the territorial issue was settled. Making optimum demands at the start of

negotiations, which is very much evident after analyzing their negotiating

behaviors. The factor that led to this traditional pattem toward territorial

dispute at the Moscow Summit meeting has been due to Yeltsin's waning

political condition especially after the fiscal crisis in Russia.

However, putting aside the territorial question, both leaders agreed to

strengthen bilateral relations by holding top-level official dialogue

45 Tsuyoshi Hasezawa, op. cit., p. 334 46 Sankei Shimbun, 13 November 1998, quoted in Motohide Saito, op. cit.

191

annually and also informal talks and to negotiate in such a way to

maintain security and building confidence in North East Asia. They also

pledged their commitment to continue and expand recent exchanges in

the security and defense field.

In 1999, Japan and Russia continued to maintain regular and high-level

dialogue and worked to strengthen bilateral relations based on the series

of agreements and declarations between the Japanese and Russian

leaders, which includes the Krasnoyarsk Agreement and the Moscow

Declaration on building a creative partnership between Japan and

Russia.

It was reported that Japan finally realized that, the insistence on the

Hashimoto proposal would virtually ensure not only failure to conclude a

peace treaty by the year 2000, but also the retum of bilateral relations to

stalemate. Therefore Japan started considering other options for

proposing an intermediate treaty on the basis of the retum of Shikotan

and Habomais. But at the Deputy Foreign Ministerial talks held in

Moscow in January, Russia even refused to admit the validity of the

territorial clause in the 1956 Soviet-Japanese Declaration.47

47 Motohide Saito, op. cit.

192

Further, the financial crisis in Russia and the weakened federal /

govemment led to the Sakhalization of Russia's policy towards Japan.

Prior to his February 1999 visit to Japan, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov

made a stopover at Yuzhno Sakhalinsk and there in a speech he laid out

Russia's foreign policy priorities, particularly as regards to Japan. He

said that residents of the Southem Kurile (Northern Territories) have no

reason to wony over their uncertain future in relation to our current

negotiations with Japan. The land on which they live in is and will

remain an integral part of Russia. 48 Thus reemphasized that the Russian

govemment strongly supported Sakhalin in the territorial dispute with

Japan.

Though no progress was made on the territorial dispute, the Russian

Foreign Minister acknowledged positive atmosphere in the bilateral

relationship. He said that, "we now discuss bilateral co-operation in a

broad strategic context. People in Japan understand the importance of

relations with Russia without abandoning attempts to solve the territorial

problem, they realize the more positive the relations are, the more

extensive dialogues will be and greater the mutual trust and easier it will

be to resolve all other questions as well". 49 Ivanov further indicated to his

Japanese counterpart that the conclusion of a peace treaty by 2000

48 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 23 February 1999, translated in The Current Digest of the Post Soviet Press, Vol. 51, No.8, 8 March 1999, p.l7. 49 Ibid.

193

would not be possible and proposed instead a treaty of friendship and co-

operation, while asking Japan to promote joint economic activities

including the development of offshore Oil and gas resources near

Sakhalin Island.

Yeltsin invited former Prime Minister Hashimoto to Russia and asked

him to take steps to conclude a peace treaty. Hashimoto paid an

unofficial visit to Moscow in April 1999 and before departure he was

advised not to give direct answers to any Russian proposals or requests.

However, during discussions Yeltsin avoided discussing the peace treaty

negotiations and said he was following the commission progress

carefully. 50 But this statement did not specify clearly that to which

commission he was referring too. The one on territorial demarcation in

the Kuriles which was formed on Japan's initiative, or the one on Joint

economic use of islands, the pinnacle of Russia's dreams.

On the security aspect, Russia changed its earlier stand on the 'new

guidelines' for the US-Japanese defense co-operation. According to the

new guidelines Japan would be able to support US armed forces out side

its territory if armed conflict arise in the area surrounding Japan. 51 Thus

for the first time since World War II, Japan's armed forces were permitted

to go across the national borders not just to hold maneuvers or evacuate

5° Kommersant Daily, 22 April 1999. translated in Ibid .• Vol. 51. No. 16, 19 May 1999. p.22. 51 Nezavisimayagazeta,27 May 1999, translated in Ibid .• Vol. 51. No. 21.23 June 1999, p.l7.

194

refugees, but also to participate in actual operation. Moreover, it did not

set any geographical limits on this cooperation. Hence, lchiro Ozawa,

leader of the liberal party of Japan, which was part of the goveming

coalition, declared that the US-Japan military co-operation zone could

also extend to the Russian Far East. Reacting to the statement Russian

Foreign Ministry stated that Russia had no intention of interfering with

the content of the US-Japanese treaty but it was unacceptable to include

Russia in the area surrounding Japan. Russia was also critical to the

proposed, Theater Missile Defense System on the ground that it would

destabilize the regional balance.

Further to facilitate the efforts to conclude a peace treaty, Japanese

Foreign Minister Komura visited Russia in May 1999. He stressed that

Japan would try its best to create a condt,lcive environment for the

settlem(;nt of dispute over the Northern Territories. During the talks it

was stressed that Japan was ready to provide assistance to the resident

of the Kuriles and to develop a joint economic ventures, they also

discussed the legal aspect of fishing operations. It was also proposed that

Japanese citizen, who lived on the islands before being part of Russia,

was permitted to visit the southem Kurile Tslands without restriction. 52 ·

52 Kommersant Daily, I June 1999, translated in Ibid., Vol. 5 L No. 22, 30 June 1999, p.l9.

195

In addition, the Japanese Foreign Minister assured that Japan was

willing to support Russian reforms and the new Russian govemment. He

also assured that Japan would tiy to facilitate the negotiations between

the Intemational Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Russian Federation over

the release of credit to Russia. Komura also offered Japanese assistance

in salvaging and disposal of the nuclear weapon system especially the

decommissioned nuclear powered submarine in the Far East.

1 he Russo-Japanese relations remained on track during the first quarter

of 1999 and were highlighted by a brief but significant meeting between

Prime Minister Obuchi and Russian President Yeltsin during the G-8

meeting in Cologne. Both sides appeared committed to their earlier

stated goal of achieving a peace treaty by the year 2000.53 Although their

meeting lasted for few minutes, they scored some progress in their

bilateral relations.

The idea of border demarcation that was proposed originally by then

Prime Minister Hashimoto, was claimed by Yeltsin as his suggestion.

However, Japan was pleased with this development. During Cologne

summit Obuchi told Yeltsin "lets achieve the historic task of concluding a

53 Janet Snyder, "Japan-Russia Relations: Moving Ahead, But on Separate Tracks", Pacific Forum CSIS, Comparative Correction, 2"d Quarter 1999, <http://www.csis.org/pactor/cc/992 qjapan _ rus.htm I.

196

peace treaty and demarcate the border based on the Krasnoyassk

agreement". 54

Bilateral personal exchanges and defense exchanges were further

promoted, keeping in stride with political dialogue and the advancement

of co-operation in the economic area. The Japan-Russia Youth Exchange

Centers were opened. In terms of defense exchanges Minister of State for

Defense (Director of Japan's National defense Agency (NDA) Hosei Norota

visited Russia in August 1999, where he and Russian Minister of Defense

Lgor Sergeyev exchanged views on Japanese and Russian defense policy

and regional situation. During the talks Russian Minister sought to

obtain guarantees with respect to Tokyo and Washington's intentions to

deploy a )oint theater missile defense system'. Although Igor Sergeyev

promised Hosei Norota, that during the visit to North Korea by Foreign

Minister Ivanov, Russia would attempt to persuade North Korea to

refrain frorri modifying its missile, but Japan refused to undertake any

commitments to refrain from research work on a missile defense system.

However, both sides signed a Memorandum of Understanding on laying

the foundation for continued dialogue and contacts between National

Defense Agency and the Russian Defense Ministry. 55 It was hoped that

this would in many ways draw-their positions close together.

54 Ibid. 55 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 August 1999, translated in The Current Digest oft he Post Soviet Press, Vol. 51, No.33, 15 September 1999, p.l8.

197

The documents provided for continued reciprocal visits by the Director of

National Defense Agency and the Russian Minister of Defense, meeting at

the level of their deputies and of commanders in chief and chiefs of staff,

consultation between Working Groups, exchanges of delegations and

visit by ships.

In October 1999, the former Foreign Minister Minour Tamba was

appointed as a new ambassador to Russia. Tamba was one of the chief

architects of former Prime Minister Hashimoto's Eurasian Diplomacy.

Tamba's appointment was clearly a measure by Japan to push relations

forward at all level and at the same time Russia also greeted this in a

positive manner. Upon his arrival, Tamba was forced to deal with the

tense hostage situation in Kyrgyzstan, where the four Japanese

geologists were kidnapped. As Japan did not have embassy in

Kyrgzystan, Russia was forced to handle this delicate issue. Upon

resolution of the crisis in late October 1999, Japanese Prime Minister

Obuchi extended a personal note of thanks to Russian President Yeltsin

and Prime Minister Vladmir Putin. 56 In the message addressed to

President, Obuchi reiterated his readiness to step up interaction between

Russia and Japan in their fight against international terrorism.

56 Joseph Ferguson, "Weathering War, Elections, and Yeltsin's Resignation", Comparative Connections, 4th Quarter 1999, p.2. <http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/992 Qjapan _rus.html.

198

Early November 1999, Japanese Foreign Ministry recognized Chechnya

as an intemal matter of Russia owing to which, they refused to support

the aid cut off to Russia by the West. But later considering the

intemational opinion, Japan announced that it would extend$ 1 million

as humanitarian aid to Chechen refugees in the North Caucasus. 57

Nevertheless, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been careful

not to allow the war in Chechnya to upset the relationship with Russia.

In fact, when the IMF was insisting that it would cut off aid to Russia

because of the campaign in Chechnya, Japan announced in late

November 1999, that Japan Export-Import bank would release $ 375

million as credit to Russia. This credit was linked to the loan package of

$1.5 billion announced by the Japanese govemment in early 1998.

Russian President's envoy to the G-8, praised the Japanese govemment

and said, "Japan is the only country which is keeping its credit line to

Russia open and fragment and we highly assess that". 58

Later former Prime Minister Hashimoto, during his unofficial visit to

Russia, referred Chechnya issue as Russia's intemal matter and

expressed his concem. However, the Russian Duma drafted a statement

and declared that territorial concession to Japan was impermissible and

reminded the Russian President of his constitutional duty to take steps

to protect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the

57 Ibid. 58 The Current Digest of the Post Soviet Press, Vol. 51, No. 47, 22 December 1999, p.25.

199

Russian Federation. The resolution also said, "Any treaty implying the

loss or restriction of the sovereignty of the Russian Federation over the

South Kurile Islands has no prospect of being ratified by the state

Duma". 59 However this approach of Duma, was a clear indication that

still there was lack of coordination between Russian President and the

Russian Parliament, on the issue of the Southern Kuriles. Six days later

Yeltsin announced that he would not visit Japan in 1999, as he had

promised earlier in the year. Meanwhile, President Yeltsin, who had

played the lead role in promoting Japan-Russia relations on the Russian

side, resigned on December 13, 1999.

Russia and Japan through out the year by personal exchanges and

negotiations on the various political, economic, and security aspects

maintained close political dialogue. Both continued to maintain regular

high-level dialogue to strengthen the bilateral relations supported by

series of agreements and summits. Russo-Japanese relations steadily

progressed towards the building of a creative partnership.

After Yeltsin's resignation, Vladmir Putin (then acting President) in an

attempt to make an impression, stressed his commitment to the former

administrations aim of developing comprehensive relations with Japan as

well as expressed his intention to comply with all existing agreements

59 Joseph Ferguson, op. cit., p.3.

200

regarding the complex negotiations on a bilateral peace treaty and

resolution of the territorial dispute over the Southern Kurile Islands.

The new Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori was one of the first

Japanese leaders to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin in St.

Petersburg in April 2000. The Japanese leadership wanted to capitalize

upon Putin's domestic political strength in order to reach a breakthrough

on the territoria1 issue. 60 But Putin, owed his electoral victory to his

tough stance on Russian territorial integrity, and is unlikely to rush any

deal with Japan involving the surrender of land. Thus, Mori left Russia

with nothing more than hopes.

Japan was looking forward to a substantive discussion during an official

visit that Putin would pay to Tokyo in September 2000. Meanwhile for

the first time a rift was noticed among the Japanese officials, when

Hiromu Nonaka, Secretary General of the ruling Liberal Democratic

Party, declared that a treaty with the Russians could be signed even in

the absence of a settlement of the territorial dispute. Negotiations over

the Southern Kurile, he said, should be pursued on a separate but

parallel track, without making the full range of Russo-Japanese relations

6° Kommersant, 3 May 2000, translated in The Current Digest of the Post Soviet Press, Vol. 52, No.8, 31 May 2000, p.l7.

201

contingent on them.61 Foreign Minister Kono Yohei was quick to dismiss

this idea.

Another event prior to the September summit that could be seen as a

pre-summit gesture was, Putin's stopover in Sakhalin, prior to his arrival

in Tokyo. Putin stated that we recognize the problem but not more than

that, he further said, "after all no one has said that the govemment is

planning to hand over the Kuriles. We are holding negotiations. "62 Which

was seen as a signal to Tokyo that, Putin was in no mood to bargain.

Putin made his first official visit to Tokyo in September 2000, where

Putin and Japanese Prime Minister Mori signed the documents of the

Russian-Japanese summit in Tokyo. They expressed their satisfaction

towards the outcome of the negotiations held. Nevertheless, both sides

failed to reach an agreement as regards the signing of the peace treaty.

But they did sign a joint statement on cooperation' in international

affairs and a programme deepening bilateral trade and economic ties.

Russia declared its support for Japan as a candidate for permanent

membership in the UN Security Council, and Japan indirectly pro;.nised

to help Russia gain admission to the World Trade Organization (WT0).63

Putin stated that all the necessary condition for continued dialogue are

61 The Current Digest of the Posl Soviet Press, Vol. 52. No. 32, 6 September 2000. p.l7. 62 Ibid., Vol. 52., No.36, 4 October 2000, p. 5. 63 Ibid. p.6.

202

now in place and moreover, Russia and Japan would enter the new

millennium in a new capacity. On the other hand, Japanese Prime

Minister stated that intention to sign a peace treaty by the end of 2000,

is still in force, and the two leaders will make utmost efforts to achieve

this goal.64 It was agreed to continue the process of dialogue and meeting

of the officials to achieve the goal of signing a peace treaty.

Later in November 2000 Japan Foreign Minister Yohei Kono concluded a

visit to Russia. During the visit Kono and the Russian deputy Prime

Minister Victor Kristenko singed a memorandum on economic

cooperation, but again the crucial problem of the Kurile Islands was once

again left unresolved. Japan's Foreign Minister called on the Russian

President Putin to step up efforts to prepare public opinion, in order to

create a climate conducive to a settlement of the territorial dispute and

the conclusion of a peace treaty.65

Thus, during the period of study under this chapter Japan-Russia

relations steadily developed along with growing Russia's interest in Asia.

In the area of security, since mid 90's exchanges were greatly increased

and events such as mutual visits of defense and military officials, mutual

visits of naval vessels and the implementation of joint exercises have

become annual events. Today, both countries mutually regard each other

64 Ibid. 65 Kommersant, 4 November 2000, translated in Ibid, Vol. 52, No. 45, 6 December 2000, p.l8.

203

as potential partners for cooperation in all fields across the political and

economic spectrum.

In this relationship, one political issue remains unresolved, which is the

conclusion of a peace treaty. In this context, both Japan and Russia are

continuing negotiations based on an agreement that with the conclusion

of the issue of the sovereignty of the four disputed islands, a peace treaty

will be signed. Fifty-five years have passed since the end of the Second

World War, but a national border is yet to be determined between Japan

and Russia. Not only does this spell a loss to both the countries, it also

constitutes a factor of instability in the Asia Pacific region.

Of course, the Japanese side is not at all taking an approach whereby if

a peace treaty remains unconcluded then other cooperation will not

progress. However, both Russia and Japan value and appreciate the

close discussions and cooperation with each other with respect to

various regional and global issues.

If the leaders of Japan and Russia can resolve the difficulty lying between

them and normalize their bilateral relations on the basis of a peace

treaty, the ties between the two countries will become stronger. Such

friendly Japan-Russian relations would greatly contribute to peace and

stability in the Asia-Pacific region and, indeed, to the entire world. With

204

this belief both Russia and Japan intend to work for further

strengthening of their relations.

205