chapter iv geostrategic considerations: the tactics...
TRANSCRIPT
CHAPTER IV
GEOSTRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS: THE TACTICS EMPLOYED:
1. PAKISTAN'S SPONSORED TERRORISM IN PUNJAB AND JAMMU AND KASHMIR
•!• Pakistan's Sponsored Terrorism in Punjab and Kash1nir •!• Pakistan Sponsored Tet-rorism in Punjab •!• State-sponsored Terrorism: lSI's Current Modus
Operandi •!• JVlilitancy in Jammu & Kashmir (1996-1998) •!• Terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir (1988-1998) •!• Kashmir Violence: India's International Terrorism
2. PAKISTAN'S SPONSORED TERRORISM IN XINJIANG
•!• Islamic Unrest in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region •!• Uighm·'s Separatist Movement: Pakistan and
Afghanistan Activities •!• Pakistan's Activities in Xinjiang Region •!• Islamic Terrorism in Kashmir & Xinjiang Region •!• Separatism in Xinjiang: China's Strategy •!• China's Security and Xinjiang Province
Since the 1950s, India has been facing insurgencies and terrorism in many areas
along its international borders inhabited by ethnic/religious minorities. Alienation clue to
insensitive handling of the minorities by successive governments, whether at the
provincial level or in New Delhi, was the initial cause of insurgencies or terrorist
movements. The attempts of Pakistan to take advantage of these movements for its own
strategic objectives by assisting them added to our difficulties with the problems. In the
North East and Punjab, which Pakistan recognises as integral parts of India, Pakistani
assistance was confined to clandestine provision of funds, training and arms and
ammunition. In Jammu and Kashmir-which Islamabad does not recognise as an integral
part of India and which it looks upon as rightfully belonging to it-its involvement has
been with no holds barred. It has infiltrated thousands of jihadis into the state, most of
them Pakistani Punjabis, belonging to pan-Islamic organisations such as the Harkat-ui
Mujahidcen, Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami, Lashkar-e-Tayiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. These
Pakistani jihadis have practically taken over the responsibility of keeping the Indian
security forces bleeding in the hope that battle fatigue would ultimately set in and make
India amenable to a solution, which would, at least partly, if not fully, serve Pakistan's
strategic objectives. Pakistan's maximum objective is to acquire control of the \Vhole of
Jammu & Kashmir presently part of India; its minimum is to get at least the valley and
those areas of the Jammu and Ladakh regions, where the Muslims are in a majority 1•
Pakistan has shown a disturbing determination not to act against pan-Islamic
organisations active in Jammu & Kashmir. Its calculation that the US pressure on him to
act against their infrastructure in Pakistani territory would not lead to punitive
consequences for Pakistan if he continues to circumvent the pressure have proved correct
so far. These organisations are not interested in either democracy or development. No
package, political or economic, no palliatives, no reassuring words will make them
amenable to reason. Their objective is to bring Jammu & Kashmir under the sway of pan
Islamism.
India has land frontiers with Pakistan, Tibet (China), Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar
(Burma) and Bangladesh in the North. The most sensitive area in recent times has been
1 Dang Satyapal ( 1988), "Genesis of Terrorism: An Analytical Study of Punjab Terrorists'', New Delhi: Patriot Publishers.
129
the border with Pakistan. Four Indian states, namely Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir,
Rajasthan and Gujarat lie on India's border with Pakistan. While terrorism in Punjab has
been brought under control, violence continues to be promoted in Kashmir from across
the border. India has started fencing large sections of its border with Pakistan which are
vulnerable or are used frequently by infiltrators and terrorists. The total length of India's
border with Pakistan is 3310 kms.
Four Indian states share the border with Pakistan as follows:
State Length of Border with Pakistan
Punjab 547 kms. (of which 152 kms are riverine border)
--Rajasthan 1035 kms.
Gujarat 512 kms.
Jammu & kashmir 1216 kms. (of which 8 kms are riverine.) [The Line of Actual
Control in this state is 790 kms long]. ~-
Approximately 38,000 sq kms of Indian Territory are under occupation by China
111 Jammu & Kashmir. In addition, under the so-called Sino-Pakistan "boundary
agreement" of 1963, Pakistan has illegally ceded approximately 5120 sq kms of Indian
Territory in Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir to China.
Pakistan's Sponsored Terrorism in Punjab and Kashmir:
India has suffered for the past nearly two decades from terrorism tn Punjab, in
Jammu and Kashmir and in other parts of India. Countless innocent lives have been lost
to the terrorist's bombs and guns. India has consistently been highlighting the need for a
unified international response to transnational and trans border terrorism, which is today
affecting many numbers of countries and challenging established societies and
governments. The links between terrorists groups operating in India and other countries
are quite clear today and the role that Pakistan has played in allowing this scourge to
spread has also been amply documented lncliCJ h<1S sought to emphasi1c at international
fora that terrorism is a global menace to which democracies are particularly vulnerable.
130
TRAINING CAMPS FOR TERRORISTS IN PAKISTAN
i.'W~~~~l~ff;j T A J 1 K 1 s T A N 1
[ -~.-~ : _:.: ; .. :-lnt~r.D~tio~a! . . i /---·---L-~------. c H ' N A · · · ···c:oc·· ···. 1
./ "'-..., /~ :· ~-- · .... ·. ·, .· ·,· . :._-,, .:..----: .. . I boundary . -...r-t . ,.· _-, c -·- . -~ :,_-.·· :, •· \nternattona -t-="-.} . .
1. , ~- · r N~t~~~~!-.~~P-ltal .L,;~:=i-:---==~ . ..
a··'9[tQii ><··
AFGHANIST~ ~:j,P AKI sT A >0'~ ~ >~ K
.. -~-Kupwara
___ · · ·;e pe~hawar . · _ · · · · ·· -· •· . ock , e
.· . : • • 1. ,-,, o Poonch 0 . • - .K~hat . ISLA"B~~t; : \
0& Anantnag
· · ' F t h' ' .J Kahuta JAMMU a e tang /·"' Rj!Walplndi _ o RaJaUri . / • &
. ·. -r 'f.. ... _.. ["'~~-. o KASHMIR
.. .,J '---...-.d eluf1'1el • UdhamJur
:~s~~ k-~;:.--;~ .. ~5-\ · Chakw_)!' • Gu •• jra~l · .
. ·)· r.n~nw~uh . . . '. \.'c-' ·#--~1'~- . _· r /,./ 1, ·.. .• • .
·.·.· , •: · / _·. n' ··.. A .V1 -4~w~la ;e \_~ ;:
-r~::~~>~-:~T'§Z~?r · ;~_ / Porachinar .,.( ) Ja-:;,mu ! .. ~(.Shekhupu1fa' ~ ) .• i 1 K<lsh:nir / Lyallpur , -~-,...,~~ , ~
.. ~p~HANIS~~~r: j ~-~~;A ! .o . -~ J _..) , ·-. ·-: t/1
I / j (__...~r-. ; ~z_-..... ____ j • • • • ~( i: . . - ·~?~
.: ' ,i ',, PAKISTAN _/ · ~ -·-~• : )) • •[· I. -
, : C~~ ---··r ··~ ! Source: Frontline, vol.l8. no.21 , October 13-26, 2001.
India has called for concerted global action to counter terrorism and to ensure the
enactment of measures such as sanctions against states responsible for sponsonng
terrorist acts across international borders2.
India and Pakistan clashed in the Security Council after New Delhi described
Islamabad as "epicenter of terrorism" and charged it with not living up to its
commitments to the international community and the United Nations to stop cross-border
terrorism. It demanded that the Council's Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) identify
the countries that violate its resolutions aimed at countering terrorism. It blamed Pakistan
for the situation that inflames religious and communal passions around the country. It
charged Pakistan with not living up to the assurances given by it at the highest level to
stop cross border terrorism. The purpose of Pakistan is to attack the basis of a secular
state and the fabric of a society that lived peacefully together for centuries in inter
communal harmon/. Therefore, they (terrorists) chose to launch their attacks upon
places of worship, parliamentary institutions and public transportation and to target voters
and candidates engaged in democratic electoral processes as well as isolated and
vulnerable minority communities, including women and children. In past two decades,
India has lost 60,000 of its citizens to cross border terrorism in Punjab, Jammu and . 4
Kashmir and other parts of the country .
It is almost clear now that International terrorism has come of age. There is no
turning away from it. The Frankenstein has grown completely out of proportion and to
tame it is not the job of one country alone. Terrorism has spread its tentacles almost all
over the civilized world5.
Pakistan has been supporting all these terrorist movements, whether in the
Northeast or Punjab or Jammu & Kashmir. In the case of Jammu & Kashmir, it talks
openly of its right to extend political, moral and diplomatic support to the terrorists,
whom it projects as freedom fighters, because it considers the territory as rightfully
belonging to it. However, it denies giving military support to the terrorists anywhere--
2 Dang Satyapal (cd.). ( 1987 ). Terrorism in Punjab; Selected Articles and Speeches/ Darshan Singh Canadian. New Delhi: Patriot Publishers. 1 Dang Satyapal (ed.), ( 1987). Terrorism in Punjab; SeleC!cd Articles wtd Speeches/ Darshan Singh Canadian, New Delhi: Patriot Publishers. ~ Sharma D.P. ( 1996). The Punjub storr: The Decade of Turmoil. New Delhi: APH Publications Corporations.
131
neither in Jammu & Kashmir, nor in Punjab nor in the North East. In the case of Punjab
and the North East, it docs not talk of any right to extend political, moral or diplomatic
support to the separatists since it recognises the areas affected by separatist movements as
integral parts of lndia6.
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (lSI) is employing new strategies to revive
militancy in Punjab and putting pressure on the remaining militants to "undertake some
sensational terrorist actions", particularly on the "Pakistan-based Punjab militant groups,
particularly Khalistan Commando Force (Panjwar) (KCF-P), Babbar Khalsa International
(BKI) and International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF), are under pressure from lSI to
undertake some sensational terrorist actions in Punjab. At least 29 leaders of various
Punjab militant organisations are presently believed to be in Pakistan getting active
support of lSI. The lSI has embarked upon a new strategy to revive the atmosphere of
terror in the state. "As part of the new strategy, stress is being laid on coordination among
militant groups of Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir and Xinjiang along with various
fundamentalist organisations. The intelligence agencies have also discovered the
emergence of new militant groups, comprising splinter groups like Dal Khalsa, Babbar
Khalsa (Parmar) and Tiger of Sikh land. Pakistani national had entered India from
Pakistan through Samba sector of Jammu and Kashmir in January this year and had
brought five AK-47 rifles and some explosives. Intelligence agencies have also
discovered recent emergence of narco-terrorism with growing nexus between people
involved in smuggling of drugs and Punjab militants. Besides, militants released from
jails are being "re-used" for terrorist activities in Punjab and elsewhere in the country. In
addition to these, lSI has intensified its efforts to propagate the cause of "Khalistan" and
Sikh jathas visiting Pakistan have been subjected to "high pitched anti-India and pro
Khalistan"propaganda7.
Akhtar, Shaheen ( 1991 ), "Punjab at the crossroads", Regional Studies, vol I 0, no.l: pp.3-64. 6 Joshi. Manoj ( 1993). "Combating Terrorism in Punjab: Indian Democracy in Crisis" Confliu .)'tudies. vol.26: pp.l-32. 7 Mud gal. Vipul ( 1999), ''Roots of Violence in Indian Punjab·', AAKROSH vol. 2, no.J: pp.36-:'i6.
132
Table: 4.1
BrutallVlass-Killings by Khalistani Terrorists- Partial List
Date Place Description of the Incident
October 1983 Dhilwan 6 Hindu bus passengers killed. ·-
Oct. 21, 1983 Govind Garh Massacre of rail passenger
Sep. 12, 1984 Batala 8 Hindu bus passengers killed.
June 22.1984 Irish sea Air India Boeing 747 blasted by bomb, all
329 passengers were killed.
Feb.l986 Nakodar 15 persons killed and many injured in
indiscriminate firing.
March 6, 1986 Kapurthala Many innocent persons killed in
indiscriminate firing. --
March 28, 1986 Ludhiana 13 people (Hindus) killed in
indiscriminate firing in Dresi.
March 29,1986 Mall ian 20 innocent labours ki lied (Jalanclhar).
July 25,1986 Mukatsar 15 Hindu bus passengers gunned down.
Oct.3 L 1986 Ludhiana 8 migrant and local industrial workers, all
Hindus, gunned.
Nov.30, 1986 Khudda 24 Hindu bus passengers gunned down.
July 1987 Lalr1.1 80 bus passengers killed in Fatehbad on
three Harayana.
Aug.6, 1987 Jagdev kalan 13 Hindus gunned down.
Sep.28. 1987 Alawalpur 5 killed and 8 injured, firing near Geetha
Bhawan.
Oct20. 1987 Delhi 12 persons shot dead at various places in
Delhi on Diwali.
Jan 15, 1988 Dhadial, nijhran 8 members of a family were killed.
March 3. 1988 Kahri Sabri 35 persons shot dead, 50 others injured,
indiscriminate (Hoshiarpur) gathering.
March 31. 1988 Theh Rajbah 18 members of a Raj put farni ly shot dead
at village theh (Patti) police station
Harike, Sub-division Patti in Amritsar J
distt.
Apri I 2, I 988 Ram gam 6 persons massacred in this village under
P.S. Gharinda 18 more persons killed in
other parts of Punjab.
Mayl5,1988 Mukeria 40 persons gunned down, I 00 others
injured in different Samana, Pati 1la.
May 16, 1988 Jalandhar 26 killed (3 member of a family, 3 bus
passengers and 20 others) in Amritsar,
Ludhiana, Jalandhar and Gurdaspur.
May17, 1988 Kharar 3) labours killed.
May24, 1988 Dhaliwal 6 members of a family massacred.
Junel9, 1988 Kurukshetra I 5 persons blown to pieces whwn a bomb
exploded at a TV shop during the TV
serial Ramayana's telecast.
June25, 1988 Moga 26 RSS volunteers killed. 22 injured in an
indiscriminate firing in Nehru Park.
Sep. 7, 1988 Rure Aasal 15 rail passengers killed, 25 injured at
Rure Aasal railway station near Khem .. Karan in Amritsar district.
Nov.l, 1988 Pathankot Bomb blast in a Jammu-bound bus, many
killed or injured.
Nov. 1988 Majaat 32 migrant labourers working on SYL
Canal gunned dmvn.
Nov.3. 1988 Sufianwala 11 bus passengers killed by a BTFK gang.
Alighting them from a Dera Baba Nanak
bound bus killed all Hindus.
NovA, 1988 Lodhuwal 19 labourers shot dead at Govt. farm
Lodhuwal (Ludhiana).
Nov. 1988 Batala, Sirhind, 25 persons killed in a bomb blast in
Pathankot Chakkri bazaar. Indiscriminate firing in
bazaar, many killed. Bomb blast ncar a
tempo overloaded with passengers. Many I including a \VOman were killed. I
134
Nov.22, 1988 Kaithal 25 persons massacred. 37 others injured.
(Haryana).
Nov. 22, 1988 Batala 22 persons killed, many injured in
indiscriminate firing in bazaar on the eve
of Guru Nanak bi1thday.
Dec. 1988 Makhu 7 Hindu passengers kidnapped from a
Chandigarh bound bus and killed.
Dec. 7, 1988 Gujaran S members of a marriage party killed in
indiscriminate firing at Gujran on Zeera-
Makhu road.
May 21, 1989 Chakk Kania, Baggakalan 7 members of a family, including a CPI
(M) leader Comrade Dalip Singh
massacred. 4 members of a family killed.
Aug.27, 1989 Kabarwala Indiscriminate firing for 50 minutesd on a
train at Kabarwala station, dozens
(Abohar) shot dead.
Oct. 5, 1989 Kanclhwala S members of a family shot dead
(Fazilka).
Nov. 1989 Patiala 19 Hindu students massacred in Thapar
Engg. College who had come from other
states to pcuticipate in a youth festival.
Jan.l9, 1990 Bahrnanwal 8 massacred including 6 Hindus
(Majitha).
March 7, 1990 Abohar 32 shot dead in indiscriminate firing in
crowded bazaar.
March 19, 1990 Talwancli Bhai 14 persons shot dead.
March 19, 1990 Chancligarh, Nawan 6 persons killed, 27 injured in a bomb
Shahar blast. I I persons killed in a bomb blast.
April3, 1990 Bat ala 36 persons killed in a bomb blast.
April 19, 1990 Pathankot 15 passengers killed, 40 injured in a bomb
blast in a bus.
May 28, 1990 Fcrozepur 13 Biha1i labourers shot dead.
May 30, 1990 Talwandi Bhai I 0 persons massacred.
us
June 4. 1990 Patiala 8 including 6 children killed in a bomb
exlosion, 30 injured.
July!, 1990 Taredan 8 members of a family gunned down in
village Taredan under (Mamdot) Mamdot
police station.
Jule 30, 1990 Bidar 35 killed, 30 injured in a bomb explosion
in a local cinema haiL (Karnatka)
Aug.8, 1990 Ludhiana 9 gunned down in indiscriminate firing.
Nov.5, 1990 Batala 9 hindu passengers shot dead in a Batala-
Jalandhar bus.
Nov.9, 1990 Batala 5 Hindus shot dead after alighting them
from vehicles on Batala-Pathankot
hiahwav b J
Nov.l2, 1990 Kothe Lal Singh 8 Hindus killed by KCF (Zafarwal) gang
(Batinda). c---------- -
Nov.)), 1990 Ferozepur 7 Hindu passengers of a bus going from
Ferozepur to Dharamkot shot dead.
Nov.l7, 1990 Killianwali II RSS \Vorkers killed in in firing on
morning assembly (Dabwali).
Nov.20, 1990 Amritsar 12 killed in a massacre.
Nov.22, 1990 Chandigarh 16 Hindus killed after alighting from two
buses near Parhol.
Nov.24, 1990 Patti 5 Hindus shot dead.
Nov.25, 1990 Jalandhar 15 shot dead in indiscriminate firing.
Nov.26, 1990 Ludhiana 5 members of a Hindu family shot dead
on Daba road.
Dec.13. 1991 Sedeke 5 Hindu Passengers shot dead in Sedeke
vi II age near Guru Harsahal.
Jan.8, 1991 Gill 14 Hindu kidnapped from different places,
shot dead at a vi II age Gi II near Ludhiana.
March 22, 1991 Chandigarh 30 employees of Punjab Tractors Ltd.
Foundry, all Hindus, shot dead.
April 9. 1991 Sewewala 18 activists shot dead 22 injured
indiscriminate firing on front gathering.
June 15, 1991 Baddowal 75 train passengers shot dead by KLF Kila
Raipur.
Nov.9, 1991 Sirsa 16 persons, all Hindus, shot dead.
Nov. 9, 1991 Faridkot 7 f;unily members shot dead in a village in
Fandkot district.
Nov. 17, 1991 Rudrapur 12 persons shot dead.
Dec. 19, 1991 Ludhiana 12 killed in a bomb blast in Bharat Nagar
Chowk.
Dec. 26, 1991 Soh ian 32 rail passengers shot dead at Sohian
railway station crossing in Ludhiana
district
Jan. 8, 1992 Kharar 21 industrial workers shot to death. Kup
Kalan. 1-- --
Jan. 15, 1992 Dhanaula 5 electricity employees gunned down at
grid station.
Jan.l7, 1992 Samana 7 persons killed in a bomb blast
March I 0-20, 1992 Ghabdan, Ahmedgarh 75 persons gunned down in 4 separate
incidents, Ludhiana. Factory workers
from outside states at Ghabadan, general
people in indiscriminate shoot out twice in
Ludhiana and once in
Mandi Ahmedgarh.
June 25, 1992 Kila Raipur 9 Hindus gunned down.
July 13, 1992 Bassi an 9 Hindus gunned down.
July 14, 1992 Bhatinda 7 Hindus, 5 sweepers and 2 migrants
workers gunned down in spordiac shoot
out.
May 2, 1992 Kadarvaad 7members of a family among 8 killed in
village Kadarvaad, police district Majitha.
May 3, 1992 Sadarpur 10 persons killed, 3 injured in village
sadarpur, district Karnal (Haryana).
Source: Collected from internet sites, South Asia Analysis Group
1:17
In the late 1970s, the lSI contacted some members of the Sikh diaspora in the
U.K. and Canada and instigated them to take up a fight against the Government of India
for what was called an independent Khalistan in Indian Punjab. A number of terrorist
organisations came into being such as the Dal Khalsa, the Babbar Khalsa, the
International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF), the K1alistan Commando Force (KCF) etc.
The lSI gave them funds, arms and training in camps set up in Pakistani territorl. The
explosive post-1967 increase in hijackings by terrorists all over the world led to the
adoption of international conventions against hijacking and other criminal acts against
civil aviation such as those of The Hague ( 1970) and Montreal ( 1971 ). These conventions
made it obligatory for nations to arrest and prosecute hijackers or extradite them to the
countries whose aircraft were hijacked. Pakistan has never co-operated with India under
these Conventions9.
The use by the lSI of the HUM, the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) and the Lashkar
e-Toiba (LET), all Pakistan-based organisations, with Pakistani office-bearers and cadres
and with links with the AI Qaeda for sponsoring terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir and
earlier in Punjab is well known. The most damning indictment of the terrorist activities of
these organisations from Pakistani territory against India and their links \Vith the AI
Qaeda is to be found in the State Department's report on the Global Patterns of Terrorism
during 2000. This report is based not on Indian evidence, but on independent evidence
gathered by the USA. The credible nature of the evidence against them could be
understood from the fact that they have been banned by the UK under the Terrorism Act
of 2000 and designated as foreign terrorist organisations by the US under a 1996 law 10.
The Pakistani government has at every stage refused to act or avoided acting
against ten·orists operating from its territory against India, whether they are connected
with the North East or Punjab or Jammu & Kashmir or smuggling. The government of
Pakistan is blatantly able to encourage and protect the activities of terrorists narcotics
from its territory because of its conviction that the US would not go beyond a point in
pres;;urising it to act against terrorists threatening Indian lives and interests so long as it
x 'Paki~tan lend support to Sikh militants in Indian Punjab', (www.fas.or>!/ir]J/conl!rcss/1993) ·> Singh, Sukhdcv Sohal ( 1989), .. Past and present of the Punjab crisis··, Ne~r Que.\ I, no.77: pp.261-68 111 Singh, Sukhdev Sohal ( 198'1). '·Past and present of the Punjab crisis ... Ncu· Quesr. no.77: pp.261-68
extends full support to the US against terrori;ts threatening US nationals and interests 11•
Pakistan-Afghanistan was the main epicentre of international Islamic terrorism inspired
by Bin Laden and the Taliban and there was a large flow of funds to various
organisations in Pakistan associated with terrorism from contributors in Pakistan, the
West, Saudi Arabia and other members of the Ummah. Therefore, the funds frozen in
Pakistan have been much larger than in any other countr/ 2.
India has been witnessing tenorist violence since 1980, initially in Punjab and
smce 1989, in Jammu & Kashmir and other parts of India. Nearly 20,000 people have
been kilkd in terrorist violence in Jammu & Kashmir, involving both shootings and
bombings. It is a well documented fact that leaders of some of the most extremist Sikh
terrorist groups are in Pakistan and are continuing to try and motivate Sikh youth from
the UK, Canada as well as from Indian Punjab to take recourse to extremist activities.
Wadhawa Singh of the Babbar Khalsa, Paramjit Singh Panjwar of the Khalistan
Commando Force (Panjwar), Gajender Singh of the Dal Khalsa, Pritam Singh Sekhon of
the Khalistan Liberation Force, Lakhbir Singh Rode of the International Sikh Youth
Federation, are all presently in Pakistan and continue to try and engineer terrorist activity
with Pakistani help in India. The involvement of Pakistan in sponsoring terrorism in
Jammu & Kashmir has been documented by the Pakistani media, the international media,
the analysts of Jane's Intelligence Review and most importantly, by the US State
Department 13•
The state of Jammu & Kashimir has passed through agonising times in the face
of cross border terrorism. Several organisations and individuals had been involved in
encouraging and abetting this .cross border terrorism. The Government has taken action
against those who were participating in acts of insurgency, abetting them and have been
receiving funding for such secessionist activities. Frustrated by gains made by the Indian
army in Kargil and Dras the Pakistani army is trying its best to divert the army's attention
to other locations. It has tried to attack other sectors in Kashmir besides the Kargil and
Drass sectors; it has tried to create unrest in several Indian cities by sponsoring bomb
11 Grower. Vircndra (cd) (2002).""Encyc!opedia of Intcrnatinnal Terrc,ri"m··, Dncumenb <md Studic' on Terrorism and World Countries. 1
' 'Pakistan lend support to Sikh militants in Indian Punjab·, (www.fas.ore/irp/congress/19lJ3) "Singh, Kirpal (1990). ·'1947. Partition of Punjab and the Sikhs··, Sikh Re1·iew. vol. 38. no.2: pp.:'\0-39.
l.KAll'lll'lu LAlVlr~ J:UK l.I'.JKKUKJ.~l~ ll'llj
PAKISTAN OCCUPIED KASHMIR (POK)
POK ; . ',···
· (P.A:KISTAN OCCU_f tm _KASHMIRJ
P A K 'IS T A N • - a·· - . . . ~ ••• UPWAAA \.-~
~0 K. \) \.-MUZAFFAAABAD • •
1 ~ ~
Abbotabacf o ~· ~~ ~ ~ SRIN~GAA . ~ o Peshawar --.M e •.
· Uree 0 eaAGH . • ISLAMABAD •• RAWA~A KOT
Attock 0 OJhri @ Kolli o ~.I.. (POONCH Rawalpindi o Chaklala .. r.~
Kotli~. • • ~i;.I>Ur et.. D .JI-P ° K. A A J A U A I
r-------- ----·. --- l L-} •
JAMMU
&
KASHMIR
A
1• Militants training camps i Jh~um ""-~\~ ! Boundaries '-...£~....._/? " · ~JAMMU : - International Gujrat ( l -- LoC L I ~~ , ·p .
0 0 ~ KAT H U A
1 -- 0 a,e; rovtnce Sialkot i District I 1 @ National capital 1_
1 0 State/Province , capital
0 Important places
i Gujranwala 0
0 Lahore
~ j/ PUNJAB
I Source: Frontline, vol.l8. no.21, October 13-26,2001.
blasts. Again it is trying to revive the Khalistani movement in Punjab. It has recruited the
Islamic fundamentalist and terrorist organization, Jamaat-e-lslami for this task. A
convention of the separatist Sikhs from all over the world was called in Lahore and they
were assure by the Jamaat-e-Islami leadership that they were not alone in their struggle
and that all the Muslims of the world were with them. The Sikh separatists were attending
the "Sangh Sabha" convention called by the terrorist organizations like Dal Khalsa and
Babbar Khalsa in connection with the 15th anniversary of Operation Bluestar14.
According to Pakistani reports, so far 80,000 people (mostly Pandits and other
Hindu Tribes) died in Kashmir due to Islamic terrorism. 400,000 Kashmiri Pandits
(Hindus), of the Kashmir Valley, were forcibly pushed out of the Valley by Muslim
terrorists, trained in Pakistan, since the end of 1989. They have been forced to live the
life of exiles outside their homeland, by unleashing a systematic campaign of terror,
murder, rape, loot and arson. Genocide of Kashmiri Pandits has reached its climax with
Muslim terrorism succeeding in 'Ethnic Cleansing' the valley of this ancient Pandit
community.
There is, however no perceptible change in the desperate of the Pakistan based
pro-Khalistani militants and their mentor, the inter service intelligenceof Pakistan in
reviving militancy in the state. Pro-Khalistani militancy is now largely sustained by the
lSI which c·ontinues to provide· sanctuary, impart training, coordinate strategic and
tactical moves, provide sophisticated arms and high grade explosives and actively assist
in infiltration from across the border. Pakistan based top pro-Khalistani militants owing
allegiance to various terrorists groups are under tremendous pressure peressure from the
lSI to step up violence in Punjab and neighbouring states by resorting to targeted killing
of senior political leaders and government officials 15. In counter-terrorist operations,
many extremists were arrested and a large quantity of sophisticaterd firearms, including
rockets, hand grenades, detonators, timer devices and high-grade explosives have been
recovered from them. As part of the strategy devised by the government for effective
policing of the western border with Pakistan and for curbing infiltration/exfiltration of
14 Singh, Kirpal (1990), "1947, Partition ofPunjah and the Sikh<', <.;ikh Re1·inv, vol. :i8, no.2: pp.30-19.
15 Chohan, Sandeep and Ron.A. Geeves (2001 ). '·Religion Dimensions in the struggle for Khalistan and its roots in Sikh History'·, International Journal of' Punjab s·wdies, vol. 8. no.l: pp.79-96.
140
mercenaries/militants/drug trafficker's from across the border and for effectively
combatting trans-border terrorism, fencing/flood lighting of the Indo-Pakistan border in
the states of Punjab and Rajasthan has been taken up from 1988 onwards. A total length
of 451 kms. offencing and 465 kms. of floodlighting in the entire Punjab sector, with the
exception of some gaps in riverine areas was completed in 1993, but Punjab still remains
vulnerable to spor:1dic terrorist action by the remaining militants who are under pressure
from the Pakistan's lSI to revivie the separartist movement 16. The terrorist modules of
Pakistan-backed militants groups, such as Babbar Khalsa, KJ1alistan Liberation Force,
International Sikh Youth Federation and Khalistan Zindabad force were neutralized by
the central and state agencies which ensured peace in the state.
Pakistan Sponsored Terrodsm in Punjab:
There are several pre-requisites for a revolutionary war: a cause, which fits in the
case of Khalistan; a dedicated hare core of extremists; a source of supply of weapons;
popular support; a foreign sanctuary and local sanctuaries such as Gurudwaras or
sympathetic urban residents. Punjab has a clearly defined and easily patrolled
international border with Pakistan, and there are no mountainous jungles, which could
provide secret bases for locals which could be difficult for the security forces to detect.
Terrorism in Punjab is not the outcome of spontaneous anger but is carefully planned
organized violence fro effect. The terrorist's aim is to destroy the confidence which the
Sikhs have in the government by causing them to act outside the Jaw; to bring about the
moral alienation of the Sikh masses from the government unitil its isolation becomes total
and irreversible 17.
The lSI collaborated with 'Sikh home rule group' and Dr. Jagjit Singh Chauhan
leader of the 'Khalistan movement' based in the UK. Chauhan was prompted to start a
vigorous campaign for 'Khalistan' from UK. In order to fulfill its ulterior motives and
strategic objectives, lSI provided financial help, training and arms to all those who came
forward to receive training, irrespective of their ideology. Pakistan has refined its strategy
16 Chohan, Sandecp and Ror1.A. Gecves (200 I), .. Reiigion Dimensions in the struggle for Khalislan <HJU its
roots in Sikh history''. lntenwtionu/ Journal of Punjab Studies. vol. 8. no.l: pp.79-96. 17 Chopra V .D. ct al. (I 984). Agonr of Punjab. New Delhi: Patriot Publishers.
141
of cross-border terrorism 111 Jammu and Kashmir & Punjab with a comprehensive
network of terrorist outfits. It has also invested immensely 1n money, manpmvcr,
weapons and propaganda. Muslims in the guise of Sikhs were trained in Qasur by a
Brigadier of Pakistan artillery regiment. Each batch consisted of 300 to 400 Muslims and
the term of training was three to four months. Mostly the trainees in these camps were
smugglers, proclaimed offenders and other bad elements operating on the borders. They
were recruited by Pakistani intelligence with the help of influential persons living in the
border districts of Punjab and Rajasthan who lured them with substantial financial help.
After the completion of training, which included use of sophisticated weapons and
ammunitions and 'hate campaign against India', these terrorist were smuggled in to
Punjab from various points in Jammu, Rajasthan and Punjab for carrying out operations.
These points included Hira Nagar in Kathua district in Jammu, Bassaobarwan sector in
Gurdaspur district, Khem Karan and Dull posts in Amritsar district, Mamdoot sector in
Ferozepur district and Ganganagar in Rajasthan. Arms and ammunitions were also being
smuggled in to Pakistan occupied Kashmir from the various points of Punjab and
Rajasthan for use in Jammu and Kashmir for sabotage purposes 1x. Preliminary
intenogation of an extremist arrested by the army from the Golden temple revealed that
he was a Pakistani who had supplied specialized detonators to the extremists positioned
inside the temple, disclosed Lt.Gen. K.Sundarji GOC- in-C western command, at a press
conference. The extremists had admitted that he entered India on a Pakistani passport to
supply these detonators. He had stayed at the Golden temple even after his visa had
expired several months ago 19.
The teJTorism in Punjab was not brought about only because sant jarnail singh
Bhindranwale became a terrorist but because of the inefficiency of the local
administration, law enforcement agencies in Punjab and the political expediency at the
centre. The climate for gunrunning to encourage the growth of terrorism was ripe in the
Punjab area. Nearly a decade ago, a calculated plan was drawn up in Pakistan with one
!< Dang Satyapal (cd.). (I 987), Terrorism in Punjab; SeieCled Anicies and Speeches! Darshan Singh Canadian. New Delhi: Patriot Publishers. 1 ~ The Telegraph: Calcuua. J unc 19, 1984.
142
objective. The objective was tio some-how split Hindu-Sikh unity in the strategic border
j-p ·.h::'() state o un.Ja. .
Pakistan intelligence agencies had made a concerted move to identify people who
could give them support in various forms. Their efforts were primarily aimed at the Sikh
community abroad. The two main centres of activity were London and Washington DC.
Even the ad for the separate Sikh nation in the name of Khalistan was paid by the
information department of the Pakistan mission in Washington. A sum of US$ 5,000 had
been given as payment for publication of the ad. After the publication of the ad Dr.
Chauhan began openly talking about the formation of the state of Khalistan. It was during
one of his visits to the Pakistan mission in Washington that Dr. Chauahn builts up
contacts in Capital Hill. His frequent visits to Washington were being closely monitored
and it was on one of these visits, that he met a senior American official in the Pakistan
Embassy. Soon after, he began to establish Khalistan Consulates abroad 21. In 1975,
Pakistan's intelligence officials started to fraternize with another Sikh, a supporter of
Bhindranwale, Ganga S. Dhillon who does not advocate Khalistan but asks for greater
autonomy for the Sikh state, had worked hard in building up dossiers of people whom
they could usc. According to intelligence sources all expenses for Dhillon's visit to
Pakistan in 1979, were borne by the Pakistan government. He came to India in March
1981 to address the all India Sikhs educational conference where he talked of the Sikh
nation theory again. In the interim period, both Dhillon and Chauahn maintained close
contact with the Pakistan mission in Washington and London. Intelligence estimates
indicate that Pakistan agencies continued to help them, and others who supported the
Khalistan issue in various ways. Pakistan had adopted other methods too. The more
obvious method being the use of their national airline PIA that gave free tickets to
number of pro-Khalistan people to travel to different parts of the world and to India.
Other methods used by Pakistani agents included payment of rent of buildings used by
the pro-Khalistan factions in various cities of the world; use of diplomatic missions as
offices for the Khalistan group, primarily in London, New York, Paris and Washington;
"11
Azad Baluchistan: London. April 1984. Translational from Urdu. & R.G.S awheny: US-Pakistan Security Relations: Monograph presented at a seminar on Indo-Pakistan Relations, New Delhi, 24-25 April I 984. 21
Azad Baluchistan: London. April 1984, Translational from Urdu. & R.G.S awheny: US-Pakistan Security Relations: Monograph presented at a seminar on Indo-Pakistan Relations, New Delhi. 24-25 April 1984.
1-n
use of diplomatic bags to carry recorded videotapes and recorded cassettes of
Bhindranwale's speeches to various cities of the world; arranging and funding of
demonstrations against Indian establishments in various cities of the world22.
The latest Pakistani activity in support of the Khalistan movement has been an
indirect participation in the supply of weapons and training of men in guerilla tactics.
These activities came to light when gunrunners across the border, while attempting to
cross in to India, were caught. This and other intelligence gathered by various agencies in
India, indicate that the Pakistan government had given tacit sanction for the smugglers to
peddle guns across the border. Intelligence reports identify three main training grounds
inside Pakistan-Kasur, across the river Sutlej, 15 miles from Ferozepur, Shekhupura, a
few miles from Lahore, and Eminabad, easily accessible from Gurdaspur in Punjab.
These three separate training establishments, according to intelligence estimates, conduct
courses in guerilla warfare tactics, infiltration and the use of light weapons, followed by a
lecture course on the way of life in Punjab and an integrated course on Sikh scriptures.
Accessibility to these training grounds across the border has made it easy for scores of
men to obtain training.
State-Sponsored Terrorism: lSI's Current Modus Operandi:
In the early 1990s, when local recruits were not hard to motivate, the lSI relied on
Pakistan trained militants (PTMs) for organising ambushes of security forces convoys
and patrols (using AK-47s and machine guns). PTMs were also employed for executing
hit-and-run raids on the Central Police Organisations (CPOs) bunkers and pickets inside
urban areas (for which hand grenades and rocket propelled grenades were used). For low
risk tasks such as the planting of anti-personnel land mines and improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) and to act as couriers of arms, ammunition and messages, locally trained
militants (LTMs) were generally employed. The lSI had declared 1994 as the Year of
'Barood' (explosives). Though a fairly large measure of autonomy was given to the area
and district commanders of militant outfit; such as Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), the Jammu
and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and Harkat-ul Ansar to conduct operations, over all
2' Sharma D.P., ( 1996). The Punjab storv: The Decade of Turmoil. New Delhi: APH Publications
Corporations.
144
control was retained by the lSI as it held the purse strings and was the single largest
source of supplies of arms and ammunition 2'.
Mercenaries from POK, Pakistan, Afghanistan, several Gulf and West Asian
countries including Saudi Arabia and Iraq and many African countries including Egypt,
Libya and Algeria, were hired, trained and inducted into the Kashmir Valley. In addition,
criminals undergoing long imprisonment sentences in Pakistani jails were also enticed
into participating in the so-called jehad. They were told that their sentences would be
reprieved if they successfully completed tenure of lSI ordained duty in Jammu &
Kashmir. Gradually, the presence of foreign mercenaries among the militants went up
from 15 per cent in 1994 to 40 percent in end-199824.
The modus operandi was to give the mercenaries some rudimentary military
training and knowledge about using explosives, arm them with an AK-47 with four
magazines of ammunition and give them a few thousand rupees in Indian cuiTency. At an
opportune moment, they were infiltrated through the porous LoC with the support of the
Pakistani army. The army provided a safe passage through its own defences, guidance by
hired Gujjars and Bakkarwals (Kashmiri shepherds) and covering fire from small arms,
machine guns and even artillery, to draw away the attention of Indian troops on the LoC.
The mercenaries were usually assigned to operate in specified areas and co-ordinated
their operations with each other and the remnants of Kashmiri militants.
'' Gurmcct, Kanwal ( 1999), "Proxy War in Kashmir: Jchad or State-Sponsored Terrorism? Senior Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi . 24 'Pakistan-The chief promoter of Islamic militancy and ... , (www.idsa india.org/an/html)
145
lSI's Current Modus Operandi
J
Pakistan trained militants with AK-47'S & Machine guns (1990's)
Planting of anti personnel land mines & improvised explosive devices (lED)
Circulating fake currency notes
Using RDX for explosion
Hand grenades & Rocket propelled grenades
Money generates from narcotics trade
Suicide bombers
Smuggling of arms, explosives & narcotics
Figure 4. 1: Showing lSI's Current Modus Operandi in Kashmir, Punjab & Xinjiang
The lSI also enlarged the sphere of its diabolical activities to other areas in Jndia.
The obvious objectives were India's democratic and secular values, political stability and
economic growth. The sea route was followed to smuggle explosives to India's west coast
for the serial explosions in Mumbai. Thus today we have a situation where land borders,
sea coasts and now island territories have become porous and vulnerable to infiltration of
d . l'k 25 weapons an terronsts a 1 e ·.
In Jammu & Kashmir, the lSI provides comprehensive support to five maJOr
militant groups. These include Hizbul Mujahideen (approximate strength I ,000
militants), Harkat ul Ansar (350), Lashkar-e-Toiba (300), AI Barq (200) and AI Jehad
( 150). In all, about 2,500 militants, mostly foreign mercenaries, belonging to these and
other smaller militant groups are operating in Jammu & Kashmir at present. The lSI
spends about Rs. 60 to 80 crores every year for prcsecuting Pakistan's proxy war against
India in Jammu&Kashmir alone that is Rs. 5 to 6.5 crores per month. It is quite obvious
146
that Pakistan's doddering economy can ill afford such expenditure. As the lSI's links with
the narcotics trade in Afghanistan and the agency's active participation in the illegal arms
trade flourishing in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province are well known, it can only
be assumed that funding for its nefarious activities in India is being generated by the lSI
itself, with the active connivance of the Pakistan government and the army. To sustain the
Kashmir movement at minimal cost, the lSI plans to cause disaffection and alienation,
play the Islam-in-danger card, highlight the non-performance of the elected government
and atrocities allegedly committed by the security forces 26.
Pakistan wants to pursue the 'Qurban Ali Doctrine' or the inevitable balkanisation
of India by sending intensively trained and motivated Pakistani agents to carry out acts of
b d b . 27
sa otage an su verston .
The objectives of Pakistan's covert action plan against India are to:-
•!• Sustain the Kashmir movement at minimal cost.
•!• Force a settlement of the Kashmir problem on terms acceptable to Pakistan.
•!• Weaken India's potential strength and national will by hitting at its perceived
'fault lines'.
•!• Prevent India from emerging as a strategically dominant power in the region.
•!• Make Indian borders porous and India's border states vulnerable to exploitation.
Pakistan wishes to embarrass India by internationalising the Kashmir tssue,
projecting India as a violator of UN resolutions and accusing it of human rights
violations. In pursuance of its objectives, the lSI is engaged in spreading the tentacles of
tenorism not only in Jammu & Kashmir but also in Punjab, Assam and Nagaland by
canying out subversive propaganda on fundamentalist and communal lines. The lSI has
established operational links with drug syndicates and fundamentalist Islamic groups in
Pakistan, Afghanistan and India.
The growing lSI presence along the lnclo-Nepal border is another cause for
concern. India has taken up the issue of lSI's anti-India activities, which include the
~ 5 GurmceL Kanwal ( 1999), Proxy War in Kashmir: Jehad or State-Sponsored Terrorism·' Senior Fellow, Institute fnr Defence Studies and Analvsis, New Delhi 2r' 'Pakistan-The chief promoter of lsl;mic militancy and ... , ( www. ids a india.org/an/html)
147
Table: 4.2
Community Wise killings by Terrorists from 1990 to May 2003
Year Hindus Muslims Sikhs 1990 177 711 6 1991 45 768 12 1992 67 916 10 1993 87 877 7 1994 95 856 5 1995 99 983 2 1996 110 1,177 3 1997 55 920 0 1998 152 767 I 1999 98 790 0 2000 158 708 41 2001 135 859 19 2002 \69 739 3 2003 42 272 I Total 1,489 11,343 110
Source: Jammu and Kashmir Police (in Strategic Analysis, July-Sep. 2003.)
"C-Q) Q) = Cl)
~ 'i Q) I
-~ Q. ·-0 c Q) = c. E .... E ~ 0 oo z-
Community wise Killings by Terrorists (1990 - 2003)
1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 -
200 0 l t r In r nf In f In r .. r r r r , [ r j
I
R>~ R>fl, R>bt. R>co R>co ~~ ~fl, ~Q) ~Q) ~Q) ~Q) ~Q) fl,~ ~
Years
Others 16 12 35 40 73 55 30 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 270
DHindus
Ill Muslims
OSikhs
oOthers
infiltration of militants and agents and the smuggling of arms, explosives and narcotics
through Nepal into India, with the Nepalese Government at the highest level. Along the
Rajasthan border also, the lSI is actively involved in setting up madrassas (Islamic
schools) inside Indian territory and in smuggling anns, explosives and narcotics. These
developments are pointers to the larger Pakistani gameplan to further extend the areas in
India in which internal security is not fully under the control of the civil government and,
consequently, to dissipate efforts to fight the menace of militancy and terrorism.
Pakistan's aim is clearly to de-stabilise India by all possible means. A protracted
'proxy war' and sustained political and diplomatic offensives, are part of a well-crafted
strategy to keep India engaged in internal squabbles and impose a heavy burden on the
Indian economy. Pakistan has achieved considerable success in projecting the Jammu and
Kashmir issue as an international 'flashpoint'28.
Pakistan also aims to ensure that the Indian army and Central Para-l'v1ilitary
Forces (CPMFs) remain increasingly engaged in counter-insurgency/internal security
operations in Jammu & Kashmir and the North-Eastern states, so as to degrade India's
superiority in conventional combat through a process of strategic fatigue. While ensuring
that violence in the ongoing low intensity conflict is maintained at a low level so that it
does not lead to a conventional war.
Militancy in Jammu & Kashmir (1996-1998)
Even today, Pakistan continues to finance, train, eqUip and support Kashmiri
militants and actively abet their ttempts at infiltration across the Line of Control (LoC).
As the initial recruitment base in the Kashmir Valley and Punjab has very nearly
completely d1ied up, Pakistan is increasingly resorting to sponsoring Islamic mercenaries
to let loose a reign of terror in Jammu & Kashmir.
Table shows the brutal and savage acts of terrorism perpetrated 111 the Kashmir
Valley and the areas south of the Pir Panjal Range in 1996-98, masterminded by the lSI
and executed with ruthless precision by foreign mercenaries. As m my as 19,956 people,
27 Peer. G. (1992). "Terrorism in Kashmir: Understanding the Kashmiri Insurgency.,. Jammu Tawi. Jay Kay Book House. 2g Peer. G. ( 1992), ·'Terrorism in Kashmir: Understanding the Kashmiri Insurgency'·. Jammu Tawi. Jay
Kay Book House.
including terrorists and security forces, have been killed in terrorist-related violence in
India's northern border State of Jammu and Kashmir between January 1990 and August
1998. Among those killed were 9,123 terrorists, 6,673 civilians killed by terrorists, 2,477
civilians killed in cross firings, and I ,593 security force personnel. A total of 40,031
terrorism-related incidents took place during the period, out of which 7,567 were of
explosions and 4,708 were of arson. There were II ,517 incidents of exchange of fire
between terrorists and security forces, and 594 rocket attacks by ultras on various
installations and security force positions during the period. Terrorists abducted 3,316
people and killed several of them while 2,833 extremists surrendered during the period,
adding, a large quantity of arms and ammunition was also seized from terrorists and their
hideouts during the period.
Table: 4.3 l\1 ' assacres In A reas S th f p· P . I R ou 0 Ir anJa ange:
Month & year Place District Killed Wounded
January, 1996 Barsh ala Dod a 5 -
April, 1996 Parankot Rajouri 26 -
July, 1996 Hinjan gali Dod a 13 -
May, 1996 Surankot Punch 4 2
June, 1997 Phagla Punch 4 I
June, 1997 Chapnari Dod a 25 7
July, 1998 Horn a Dod a 16 5
August, 1998 Kalab an Chamba 36 -
(H.P.)
August, 1998 Chandi Udhampur 5 -
August, 1998 Sail an Poonch 9 -
Source: Strategic Analysis, Apri/1999
The large number of militants who have been killed, appn:hended or have
surrendered and, the huge quantity of weapons, ammunition and explosives recovered,
point both to the scale and viciousness of the campaign launched by Pakistan by proxy
against India and the magnitude of the immense effort expended in successfully defeating
149
that campa1gn. Weapons such as RPGs (rocket propelled grenade launchers), infantry
mortars and anti-aircraft missiles, have been recovered in smaller numbers. In addition,
I ,403 radio sets, most of them extremely sophisticated, have also been recovered. At
present, 72,000 defence personnel are directly deployed in counter-insurgency/internal
security in Jammu & Kashmir, while about 47,000 are deployed in North Eastern states.
In addition, there are also personnel of supervisory and other formations who are
involved in supervisory roles whose number are not included. Prolonged employment of
army for such duties, besides adversely affecting the army's preparation for its main task
also imposes an extra burden on the defence budget which, in turn, affects army's
modernisation programmes. In addition, casualties suffered by the Army in peacetime
affect the morale of the army personnel.
Table: 4.4 Massacres in Kashmir Valley
Month & year Place District Killed Wounded
May, 1996 Las jan Sri nagar 8 I
July, 1996 Bakihakar Kupwara II 5 --
August, 1996 Ranbelpur Anantnag 9 I
October, 1996 Sunderkut Baramula 7 -
January, 1997 Musmilpur Baramula 7 -
March, 1997 San gram pur Bad gam 7 I
January, 1998 Wandhama Sri nagar 23 -
Source: Strategic Analysis, Apri/1999
Pakistan-sponsored terrorism 111 India has claimed the lives of 29,151 civilians
and 5, I 0 I security forces personnel. 2, 78,60 I persons have been rendered homeless. The
loss to public and private property is estimated at Rs. 2,000 crores. The cost of
compensation paid to victims, for border fencing and the amount expended on the raising
of local anti-terrorist force, works out to Rs. 18,500 crores. The expenditure on the army
and para-military forces is approximately Rs. 46,000 crores. Besides the cCJsualties being
suffered almost on a daily basis and their adverse impact on morale, the army's prolonged
150
involvement in counter-insurgency operations has several other major disadvantages. The
financial costs of sustaining a successful counter-insurgency campaign are staggering. It
has been estimated that the army spends approximately Rs. 2,500 crores (US $600
million) out of its annual budget on counter-insurgency operations. This is about 13 per
cent of the army's 1997-98 budget of Rs. 19,000 crores approximately. The outcome is
that the army spends almost 57 per cent of its budget on pay and allowances, about 40
percent on the maintenance of equipment and the replenishment of ammunition and other
essential stores being consumed for counter-insurgency operations, and is left with only
three per cent for modernisation, including capital acquisitions. Even the expenditure on
the Rashtriya Rifles, amounting to approximately Rs 500 crores annually, is incurred
from the army's budget. It is obvious that the army can ill afford an expenditure of 13 per
cent on counter-insurgency operations from its budget without its operational efficiency
for its primary task being significantly impaired.
India must project the Kashmir issue as one of international fundamentalist
Islamic terrorism with widespread adverse ramifications, including for the western
nations. Os~Hna Bin Laden's terrorist training bases in Afghanistan which were hit by US
cruise missiles in August 1998, were also training terrorists for operations in Jammu &
Kashmir. It would be in India's interest to further highlight through diplomatic channels
and by launching a conceited public information/awareness campaign that Pakistan is the
'mother nation' of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism 29.
This marked escalation in the lSI's support for the lslamist insurgency and
terrorism in Kashmir is a direct by-product of Pakistan's national security policy and
grand strategy. Ms. Bhutto has repeatedly emphasized the centrality of the annexation of
the entire Kashmir for the long-term development of Pakistan. The new rail-line that will
connect Karachi and Central Asia must pass through Indian-held Kashmir to be
engineeringly and economically effective. Ms. Bhutto's Islamabad considers the opening
of the road to Central Asia by using Pakistan as the region's gateway to the Indian Ocean
as the key to the growth of Pakistan's commercial activities. Kashmir is also Pakistan's
2~ Behcra. Ajay Darshan (2001 ), ··supporting Structures for Pakistan's Proxy War in Jammu and Kashmir", Strategic Analysis, vol.25. no.3: pp. 393-410
151
Table: 4.5
Destruction of Property by Terrorists
Year Total Govt. Edu. Private Bridges Shops incidents buildings Buildings houses
1990 646 501 129 1,242 172 202 1991 391 45 24 81 9 24 83 1992 564 65 57 2,3 12 28 200 1993 662 98 46 1,1 10 34 400 1994 606 172 11 9 666 46 162 1995 688 127 133 1,814 16 402 1996 482 52 68 602 2 161 1997 259 13 II 43 7 5 67 1998 177 13 15 273 I 66 1999 136 7 9 284 2 6 2000 129 14 6 330 I 107 2001 274 30 16 419 2 77 2002 255 14 10 421 4 20 Total 5,268 I ,151 643 10,729 337 1,953 Source: Ministry of Home Affalrs, Government of lndw.
ci 2500 c:: .!! :I
~ 2000 < Cl c::
·~ 1500 .r::. ~
~ 8. 1000 e a.. 0 5 500 ~ s :: 0 0
Destruction of Property by Terrorists
Years 0 Private houses
•Bridges
DShops
• Hospital
Hospital
0 0 0 0 4 2 3 I 0 0 0 I 0 I I
true gateway to the PRC and into Central Asia-the path of the new Silk Road and there
lies the future and strategic salvation of Pakistan30.
Pakistan has two reasons to support the so-called Mujahideen. First, the Pakistani
military is determined to pay India back for allegedly fomenting separatism in what was
once East Pakjstan and in 1971 became Bangladesh. Second, India dwarfs Pakistan in
population, economic strength, and military might. In 1998 India spent about two percent
of its $469 billion GDP on defense, including an active armed force of more than 1.1
million personnel. In the same year, Pakistan spent about five percent of its $61 billion
GDP on defence, yielding an active armed force only half the size of India's. The U.S.
government estimates that India has 400,000 troops in Indian-held Kashmir- a force more
than two-thirds as large as Pakistan's entire active army. The Pakistani government thus
suppotts the irregulars as a relatively cheap way to keep Indian forces tied down.
Pakistani militant groups are now exporting their version of jihad all over the
world. The Khudamudeen madrasah, according to its chancellor, is training students from
Burma, NepaL Xinjiang, Chechnya, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Yemen, Mongolia, and
Kuwait. Out of the 700 students at the madrasah, 127 are foreigners. Nearly half the
student body at Darul Uloom Haqqania, the madrasah that created the Taliban, is from
Afghanistan. It also trains students from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Russia, and Turkey, and
is currently expanding its capacity to house foreign students from I 00 to 500. According
to the U.S. State Department, Pakistani groups and individuals also help finance and train
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a terrorist organization that aims to overthrow
I . C I A. 11 secu ar governments 111 entra sta .
The long-term objective of Pakistan's army of Islam vis-a-vis India is no longer
the acquisition of territory in Jammu & Kashmir. It is to make the sub-continent safe for
the spread of Islam by weakening Hinduism, by debilitating the Indian state and thereby
paving the way for the restoration of the Mughal State.
The diversion of this army of Islam from the battlefields of Afghanistan to Jammu
& Kashmir serves three purposes, in Pakistan's perception:
10 Singh, Jasjit (1999), ··raki<.:tan·s Fourth War for Kashmir". Knowledge World. 11 Bodansky, Yossef (1995) ·Pakistan's trans Asian designs', (www.subcontinent.com/sapra-tcxt-only-/text
html)
152
•!• It keeps the Indian Security Forces and civilians bleeding without the Pakistani
Security Forces suffering any casualties.
•!• It keeps the fanatical jehadis dying at the hands of the Indian Security Forces,
thereby preventing their return to Pakistan and clamouring for the imposition of a
Tali ban-type rule the ·e.
•!• It provides a training and motivating force and a training ground for Muslim
extremist elements from other parts of India such as the cadres of the Students'
Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) just as it had functioned in the 1980s as a
training and motivating force in Afghanistan for Muslims from Muslim and non
Muslim States wanting to take up arms against the state.
After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, the lSI's heroin cell started using its
network of refineries and smugglers for smuggling heroin to the western countries and
using the money as a supplement to its legitimate economy. But for these heroin dollars,
Pakistan's legitimate economy must have collapsed many years ago. Not only the
legitimate State economy, but also many senior officers of the Army and the lSI
· ber1efited from the heroin dollars32.
• "The Government of Pakistan increased its support to the Taliban and continued
its support to militant groups active in Indian-held Kashmir, such as the Barakat
ui-Mujahidin (HUM), some of which engaged in terrorism.
• "Islamic extremists from around the world-including North America, Europe,
Africa, the Middle East, and Central, South, and Southeast Asia-continued to use
Afghanistan as a training ground and base of operations for their worldwide
terrorist activities in 2000. The Taliban, which controlled most Afghan territory,
permitted the operation of training and indoctrination facilities for non-Afghans
and provided logistics support to members of various terrorist organizations and
mujahidin, including those waging jihads (holy wars) in Central Asia, Chechnya,
Xinjiang and Kashmir.
• "Throughout 2000 the Taliban continued to host Osama Bin Ladin despite UN
sanctions and international pressure to hand him over to stand trial in the United
32 Reddy, L.R. (2002), The Worst of Global Temxism. New Delhi: A.P.H.Puhlishing House. Darya Ganj.
15)
States or a third country. In a serious and ongoing dialogue with the Tali ban, the
United States repeatedly made clear to the Taliban that it would be held
responsible for any terrorist attacks undertaken by Bin Ladin while he is in its
territory.
• "Massacres of civilians in Kashmir during March and August were attributed to
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) and other militant groups.
• "Pakistan's military government, headed by Gen. Pervez Mushanaf, continued
previous Pakistani Government support of the Kashmir insurgency, and Kashmiri
militant groups continued to operate in Pakistan, raising funds and recruiting new
cadre. Several of these groups were responsible for attacks against civilians in
Indian-held Kashmir, and the largest of the groups, the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba,
claimed responsibility for a suicide car-bomb attack against an Indian garrison in
Srinagar. "In addition, the Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM), a designated Foreign
Terrorist Organization, continues to be active in Pakistan without discouragement
by the Government of Pakistan.
• "The United States remains concerned about reports of continued Pakistani
support for the Taliban's military operations in Afghanistan. Credible reporting
indicates that Pakistan is providing the Taliban with materiel, fuel, funding,
technical assistance, and military advisers. Pakistan has not prevented large
numbers of Pakistani nationals from moving into Afghanistan to fight for the
Taliban. Islamabad also failed to take effective steps to curb the activities of
certain madrassas, or religious schools that serve as recruiting grounds for
terrorism.
• "In South Asia, the United States has been increasingly concerned about reports
of Pakistani support to terrorist groups and clements active in Kashmir, as well as
Pakistani support, especially military support, to the Taliban, which continues to
harbour terrorist groups, including al-Qaida, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, ai
Gama'a al-lslamiyya, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan."
154
Terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir (1988-1998)
Between January I, 1988, and October 31,1998, there was a total of 38,753
Pakistani-sponsored terrorist incidents in Jammu & Kashmir. During the same period,
according to the annual reports on the Patterns of Global Terrorism issued by the US
State Department, there were 4,411 terrorist incidents in the rest of the world.33 There
were nine times as many terrorist incidents in Jammu & Kashmir as there were in the rest
of the world. These incidents could be categorised as follows:
Table: 4.6
Terrorist Incidents in Jammu & Kashmir:
Targeted attacks on the security forces 18,064
Targeted attacks on civilians 9,793
Indiscriminatate killings with explosives and arson 10,896
attacks
. Source: Jammu and Kashmir Police (in Strategic Analysis, ./uly-Sep. 2003.)
The security forces were the exclusive victims 1n 18,064 incidents and in the
remaining 20,689, the victims were either exclusively or largely civilians. The majority
of those killed in the explosions and arson attacks were civilians. The annual variation of
the terrorist incidents in Jammu & Kashmir was as follows:
;_; 'Pakistan-'rhe chief protnotcr of Islarnic Inilitancy and.--~ (\V\V\v.idsa india.org/an/ht1nl)
155
ad :::::J E E ns .., t:
s t: ... Q) ·-:2 E (,).C:: t: en - ns s~ en 'i: 0 ... ... Q)
1--0
0 z
Table: 4.7
Annual Variations of the Terrorist Incidents
In Jammu & Kashmir:
Year No. of Incidents 1988 149 1989 962 1990 3393 1991 2931 1992 4664 1993 4012 1994 6043 1995 6039 1996 4866 1997 2964 1998 2348
Source: Strategic Analysis, Apri/1999
Annual Variations of the Terrorist Incidents In Jammu & Kashmir
7000 -
6000 - -5000 ,... ,...
4000 ,... ,...
3000 ,... ,....
2000
1000 ,_.
0 r-1
I I
I I
I I I
,.... ,
R>'b RJOJ ~~ ~" ~f), ~~ n.cy>< ~(:) ~10 ~ ~'b ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Years l C No. of Incidents
Table: 4.8
Civilians killed (Religion Based) Between Jan. 1988 and Dec. 1999:
Religions Civilians killed
Muslims 7536
Hindus 962
Sikhs 46
Others 1189 (uncategorized)
Source: Strategic Analysis, April 1999
More than 75 per cent of the civilians killed were Muslims. Pakistani and pro
Pakistani Muslims killing Kashmiri Muslims in the name of jehad. The Muslims killed
were either the victims of indiscriminate killings with explosives or of targeted attacks
because they refused to support the terrorists34.
Table: 4.9
Civilians killed Between Jan. 1988 and Dec. 1999:
Civilian governments servants 369
Political activists 139
Members of the judiciary 10
Journalists 10
Foreign tourists 3
Source: Jammu and Kashmir Police (in Strategic Analysis, ]uly-Sep. 2003.)
>.J ·Pakistan-The chief promoter of Islamic militancy and .... (www.idsa india.org/an/html)
L'io
Table: 4.10
Killings by Terrorists in Jammu & Kashmir and in the rest of the
World between January 1995 & December 1999:
Year Jammu and Kashmir Rest of the world 1995 1436 165 1996 1649 311 1997 1124 221 1998 1442 741 1999 1176 233 Total 6827 1671
Source: Reports of the U.S. State Department.
"C ..! i: en c 0 (!! Cl)
D.. -0
ci z
Killings by Terrorists in Jammu & Kashmir and in the rest of the World (1995-1999)
1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 800
Jammu and Kashmi~ • Rest of the world J
600 400 200
0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Years - --- -----
, ~ ~ -Ill 1: g CIJ .... ... 0
0 z
Table: 4.11
Terrorists killed by the Security Forces between the Years
1988-1998:
Year No. of Terrorist killed 1988-91 798 1992 873 1993 1330 1994 1596 1995 1332 1996 1209 1997 1075 1998 776 Total 8989
Source: Strategic Analysis, April 1999
2000
1500
1000
500
0
-- ------- --- - ------ -- --
Terrorists killed by the Security Forces (1988-1998)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Years No. of Terrorist killed
Table: 4.12
Indian Security Forces captured Arms and Ammunition and othet·
Equipments supplied to the Terrorists by Pakistan
Between Jan. 1988 & Dec. 1999
AK series rifles 2i,165
Sniper rifles 312
Pistols/revolvers 8363
Machine guns 1167
Rocket launchers 923
Grenades 38611
Rockets 2964
Rocket Boosters 1786
Mines 5874
Grenade launchers 268 --
Mortars 88
Ammunition rounds 30,56,000
Explosives 20,382
Bombs 1957
WT sets 1974
Source: Strategic Analysis, Aprill999
The plans of the lSI are really the plans of the Pakistan army.The lSI, is therefore,
an organ of the army, not an organ of the state. The lSI combines in itself all the
functions carried out in India by the Research and Analysis Wing, the Intelligence
Bureau, the Special Intelligence Bureau, the Central Bureau for Investigation, the various
specialist agencies under the Home Ministry, the Intelligence Directorates of the armed
forces and para military forces, and the Joint Intelligence Committee. The lSI has been
working towards the dismemberment of India ever since the time of it's raising in 1949.
Pakistan is not comfortable with an India seven times its size and would like India's
northern, eastern. and southern \Vings to be severed, so that, what remains of India
157
approximates Pakistan's size. Kashmir and its annexation or liberation would continue to
be the prime objective of the Pakistan army and hence the basic aim of the lSI. Pakistan
would not be happy with an independent Kashmir as it could be under the sway of other
countries35.
The ISJ spends nearly Rs I 00 crores every )Car to run its proxy war in Jammu &
Kashmir. Each militant is paid between Rs 2000 to Rs 3000 per month depending upon
his experience and status in the terrorist outfit. In case a militant dies in action, his or her
family gets a compensation ranging from Rs 20,000 to Rs 30,000. ISI agents active in
Kashmir receive between Rs 50,000 to Rs one lakh a month as emoluments. They are
accorded five star facilities during their visits to Rawalpindi. Some Islamic organisations
are also funding the militants in Jammu & Kashmir. About 30 militant training camps are
running in Pakistan and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir [POK]. These camps are controlled
from headquarters in Muzaffarabad and Kotli.
The ISI is assisted in its activities by the Harkat-ui-Ansar [HUA]. The HUA's two
militias- Harkat-ui-Mujahideen and the more extreme Harkat-ui-Jehad- provide shelter,
food and clothing for the trainees at these camps, while the ISI provides weapons,
ammunition and transport, along with specialist instructors for training.
Pakistan claims Kashmir as an adjoining Mus~im majority state that should be part
of Pakistan. It is true that Kashmir is India's only Muslim-majority state. It also is true
that India has at least as many Muslims as Pakistan. Approximately 12% of India's one
billion plus population are Muslim. This compares with Kashmir's total population of
approximately eight million that also includes Hindus, Buddhists and Sikhs36.
Kashn1ir Violence: India's International Terrorism
lSI continues to be charged with efforts to revive political violence in Punjab, as
well as linking Sikh extremists to Muslim militant movements in Kashmir. Two men
arrested in Punjab with weapons, bomb making materials and various informational
militant materials on June 19, 2002 reportedly are linked to Sikh insurgency groups, the
Khalistan Zindabad Force and the Babbar Khalsa International. They were charged by the
-'' Karim, Afsir ( 1999), ··Rise of Terrorist Culture in South Asia",AAKROSH, voL2, no.2: pp.3-l 9. Jo Maroof. Raza ( 1999), '·Pakistan Sponsored Insurgency in Kashmir: A Case Study'', AAKROSH, voL2, noA: pp. 31-56.
ISX
police with "having links with ultras in Jammu and Kashmir" and "working directly
under the lSI." (Tribune, India, June 20, 2002). Islamic militant groups in Kashmir and
operating in India and Pakistan constitute the core concern of these two principles South
Asian states.
Table: Post 9/11 Majo1· Incidents in South Asia
•!• October I, 2001: Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) militants attack Kashmir Legislative
Secretariat in Sri nagar killing 38.
•!• Dec 13,2001: India's 9/11. JeM and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) suicide squad attacks
India's Parliament, 14 killed. India mobilizes 750,000 troops along the border
with Pakistan.
•!• January 23, 2002: Militants kidnap, then kill US reporter Daniel Pearl in Karachi.
•!• February 27, 2002. 58 Hindus killed by unknown people in Godhra train station in
Gujarat, India. Organized Hindu mobs kill about I ,000 Muslims; I 00,000 in
refugee camps.
•!• March 17, 2002: A grenade attack on a church 111 Islamabad kills five people.
including two Americans.
•!• March 30, 2002: A suicide squad enters Raghunath Temple in Jammu; 8 killed.
•!• May 8, 2002: Suicide bombers kill 14, including II French engineers in Karachi.
•!• May 14, 2002: At least 30 people, primarily women and children, are killed in a
terrorist attack on an Indian army camp in Jammu. Foreigners begin to leave
India.
•!• May 21, 2002: Abdul Ghani Lone, a popular moderate Hurriyat Conference
leader is assassinated in Kashmir.
•:• June 14, 2002: Car bombing of US Consulate 111 Karachi kills 12, InJures 44.
Embassy and consulates closed for three days.
June 15, 2002. Kashmir Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah escaped an
assassination attempt when two rinc grenades missed him.
Sources: Newspapers and journals from India, Pakistan and the IUS.
Infiltration from Pakistan to Indian Kashmir is part of the problem. Jihacli groups
continue to be in Indian Kashmir with the ability for major actions. "Terrorists have
J5l)
seized upon the worldwide practice of using information technology (IT) in daily life.
They embrace IT for several reasons: it improves communication and aids organization,
allows members to coordinate quickly with large numbers of followers, and provides a
platform for propaganda. The Internet also allows terrorists to reach a wide audience of
potential donors and recruits who nny be located over a large geographic area. "In
addition, terrorists are taking note of the proliferation of hacking and the use of the
computer as a weapon. Extremists routinely post messages to widely accessible web sites
that call for defacing western Internet sites and disrupting online service. There are
thousands of young, motivated Pakistani men anxious to join the militancy in Kashmir,
which they consider a holy war. They come from all walks of life: not merely from the
religious schools known as madrassahs, or the far-flung, poverty-mired towns and
villages, but also from Pakistan's educated and westernized middle and upper classes.
Pakistan's Sponsored Terrorism in Xinjiang:
Xinjiang located on the northwest area of China that borders Mongolia in the
northeast; Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrghyzstan, and Tajikistan in the west; and Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and India in the southwest. Since the last century-with changes in the domestic
and world situation-terrorist activities by domestic and overseas reactionary elements
have been complicated and changeable, and Xinjiang has made remarkable achievements
in fighting against violence and terrorism-and \viii continue to do so under the current
new situation, separatists in Xinjiang at home or abroad get both material and financial
support from some extreme terror organizations abroad, and violent actions that have
taken place in Xinjiang received financial aiel fro•n overseas37. During the US anti-terror
war in Afghanistan, some separatists in Xinjiang joined some training programs abroad.
Chinese police had caught some terrorists who returned to Xinjiang secretly after
receiving training in the terrorist camps of Pakistan, Afghanistan and some other
countries. The police of those countries concerned had also extradited and handed some
of those terrorists to China. The paper on "East Turkistan" terrorist forces issued by the
State Council Information Office has made it clear that various terrorist activities have
n Bodansky, Yossef ( 1995) 'Pakistan·s trans Asian designs'. (w\\W.suhcontincnt.com/sapra-text-only-/tcxt
hunt
160
been under way in Xinjiang since the 1950s. Incomplete statistics show that from 1990 to
2001, the "East Turkistan" terrorist forces inside and outside Chinese territory were
responsible for over 200 terrorist incidents in Xinjiang, resulting in the deaths of 162
people of all ethnic groups, including grass-roots officials and religious personnel, and
injuries to more than 440 people. But although small-scaled activities of violence and
terror have never stopped, generally speaking Xinjiang enjoyed stability in 2001 without
occurrence of major terrorist and violent incidents38.
Islamic Unrest in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region:
Xinjiang is the nexus between China, the Middle East and Russia; it also lies at
the cultural crossroads between the Islamic world and the Han Chinese heartland. More
importantly, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the vast energy supplies of the former
Soviet Central Asian republics are becoming a focus of geopolitical attention as regional
and extra-regional states seek to secure access to new sources of oil. These factors
combine to make the outcome of the separatist struggle in Xinjiang of growing
international strategic importance and will influence developments in the region. This
paper considers the origins and extent of the Muslim separatist movement in Xinjiang
and assesses its potential impact from the perspective of Canada's wider economic and
security interests in the region39.
Xinjiang is a vast, largely desert area which contains many valuable resources
including oil, lead, zinc and gold. The central Tarim basin is believed to hold enormous
oil deposits but, despite intensive exploration efforts, this potential has yet to be realised.
However, even if current exploration efforts fail to discover the hoped-for oil in the
Tarim basin, Xinjiang will remain vital to China's long-term energy requirements because
of its location next to the proven oil reservoirs in the neighbouring Central Asian
republics. A logical exploitation of the energy resources of Kazakhstan would include
construction of a pipeline to carry the region's oil to the major industrial markets in China
iX Raman. B. (1999) ·continuing unrest in Xinjiang'. (W\\·w.subcontincnt. Com/sapra/world/w.html) 19 foltL R.C., (1999). "Religions of the Silk Road''. London: Macmillan Press Ltd.
161
and Japan. Such a tran~.portation system would require a stable and cooperative
X. .. 40 IllJiang .
Table: 4.13 D emograp IC 1 ua ton m In.Jtang h. s·t r x· p rovtnc e
Demographic situation
XUAR 16.327,048
Uighurs 47.14'7<'
Hans 37.76%
Kazakhs 7.45%
Dunghans 4.5%
Kyrgyzs 0.96%
Mongolians 0.93%
Source: Himalayan and Central Stud1es, ]an-march 1999.
Xinjiang is situated in northwest China, some 4000 km from Beijing, and
represents the eastern extremity of the larger Turkic cultural community, which extends
from Turkey in the west through post-Soviet Central Asia and Afghanistan. The region is
known locally as East Turkestan, signifying its historical and cultural distinctiveness
from China. 41 The indigenous population of Xinjiang is predominantly Turkic or Indo
European in origin and the main languages have Turkic or Mongolian roots. The most
important Turkic groups are the Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Uzbecks. The Tajiks, the
other significant Muslim minority, are linked linguistically to modern Iran through their
Indo-Persian language. All of these ethnic groups have much in common with their
brethren in the newly independent Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The Sunni branch of Islam has been the
dominant cultural and religious force in Xinjiang since the 1Oth centur/2.
-HI Chaudhary, L .K. (2002), ··Islamic, Militancy and Temxism in Xinjiang: China·s Anxieties and Concerns, India Quarterlr, vol.58, no.2: pp.69-92.
~ 1 Blank, Stephcn (2004) 'Uighur-! continuing unrest in Xinjiang'. (www.MaiLArchivc.com/uighure taklamakan .org/html) 4
' Sinha. P.B. ( 1995-96), .. Islamic Militancy and Separatism in Xinjiang''. Eurosian Studies, 1'01.20, no.3: pp.451-60.
162
The Afghan war should not be underestimated in terms of the impact it has had on
disaffected Islamic youth from Algeria to Kashmir. As an ideological event, the Afghan
conflict clearly had a powerful effect on those who now seek to create an Islamic state in
East Turkestan. A number of Xinjiang Muslims are known to have fought alongside the
Mujahideen in Afghanistan together with other committed revolutionaries from a number
of Islamic states. It is feasible that some of the Xinjiang Muslims who fought in
Afghanistan have returned to take up arms against the Chinese. Certainly, radical Islamic
international contacts were consolidated in Afghanistan and the end of that conflict has
created a pool of well-trained, religiously motivated, fighters and a vast amount of
surplus weapons. There is a virtually uncontrollable trade in weapons from Afghanistan
to the border regions of Pakistan, Kashmir, Tajikistan and to criminal elements elsewhere
in the region. Smuggling of all kinds of contraband is endemic throughout the area and
centuries old tribal connections make it unreasonable to dismiss the intluence of
"outsiders" in the Xinjiang contlict43.
Beijing has been particularly interested in developing ties with the authorities in
neighbouring states to restrict the operations of Islamic separatist groups who maintain
the independence campaign safe from Chinese intervention. In April 1996, Chinese
President Jiang Zemin signed an agreement with counterparts from Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan that included calls to oppose Islamic fundamentalism. The
Central Asian Republics will have to play a fine balancing act if they wish to
accommodate Beijing without alienating their own radical populations but they are
expected to cooperate, at least in the short tenn, as they need Chinese support to offset
continuing Russian pressure on their independence. Similarly, Beijing is believed to have
pressured Pakistan to crack down on Muslim groups it suspects of arming
fundamentalists in Xinjiang. However, no evidence has been presented that the separatist
movement in Xinjiang is being managed or manipulated by foreigners44. External support
for Muslim groups advocating independence for Xinjiang seems to be a marginal aspect
of the threat to Chinese rule. Instead, the resurgence of Islamic nationalism in Xinjiang
41 Akb3rZ3dt:h. S. (2003), ··India and Pakistan's gcostrategic riv:1lry in Centr3l Asia," Contemporary South
Asia vol-12, no.2: pp.219-228. ~-~ Grower Verinder, (ed.) (2002), "Encyclopedia of International Terrorism", Documents :1nd Studies on Terrorism and World Countries.
16:i
has developed as China itself has become more open to outside economic and political
influences since the death of Mao Tse Tung. Both countries India and China are
confronted by a similar threat- Islamic extremism and terrorism. China confronts it in its
restive Xinjiang province and India in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. While the
mechani:;m to fight teiTorism jointly is yet to be worked out, that the two countries are on
the same side in a fight in which Pakistan's role is dubious is immensely significant. The
decision to work jointly to tackle terrorism comes at a critical time. China's "all-weather
friend" - Pakistan - is locked in an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with India on the
issue of Islamabad's support to terrorist groups operating in the Kashmir Valley. In case
of India and Pakistan, China has called for restraint and revival of dialogue and it has
refrained itself from taking sides45.
The Chinese themselves have been estimating the number of Uighurs trained 1n
Afghanistan by the Tali ban and the AI Qaeda before October 7, 200 I, as about I ,000, but
this appears to be an over-estimation. The Uighur of western China, Pashtun of
Afghanistan and Pakistan are likely to be the primary fourth world players in the future of
Afghanistan. The Uighur figure to play an important role in the future of Afghanistan by
virtue of their very limited shared boundary at the far northeast of Afghanistan 4('. China
with its long-standing communist policies towards ethnic minorities and religion, is
primarily concerned with Uighur Islamism and separatism China's apprehensions of the
Taliban and their role in supporting Islamic militancy in Central Asia <:mel Xinjiang, has
led to problems with Pakistan, its long standing ally in the region which supports the
Taliban47. On May 5, 1997, the Pakistani auth01ities handed over to the Xinjiang
authorities 12 Uighurs, wanted in connection with bomb explosions in Xinjiang. They
had entered the Gilgit area and got enrolled in the local madarsas and training in the
region. ln August 1997, the Xinjiang authorities announced a plan to lay a security
fencing along the border with Pakistan to prevent the infiltration of terrorists and drug
smugglers48.
15 Ahrari, M.Ehsan (2000). "China, Pakistan and the "Tali ban Syndrome'·, Asian Sun·cy,\oL 18. no.4: pp.658-71.
~ 7 'Xinjiang: oppression hidden under the guise of anti terrorism·. (www .alkhilafah.info/massacre/xinjiaqg) ~x Sinha. P. B. ( 1997). "Pakistan: The Chief Patron-Promoter of Islamic Militancy and Tnrorism'· Stratcgi1· Ann/rsis. vol.21. no.7: pp.1015-29.
164
Uighur's Separatist Movement: Pakistan and Afghanistan Activities
One important agreement was signed by Pakistan and China, ( 1995) & it was
decided to upgrade the Karakoram highway to facilitate the trade. Subsequently, Beijing
started going slow on this project. Writing in the "Herald" (December 1995), a monthly
journal of the "Dawn" group, Ahmad Rashid, the well-known Pakistani columnist and
expert on Afghanistan and Central Asia, attributed the loss of Chinese interest in this
project to Beijing's anxiety to restrict contacts between the Uighur nationalist elements
and the Islamic parties of Pakistan. He wrote: "Beijing's reluctance stems from the fact
that the proposed road would run across Xinjiang and the Chinese fear that the route
would increase the traffic in fundamentalism after an abortive Islamist uprising in the
town of Baren in 1992 in which 22 people were killed, China closed its road links with
Pakistan for several months." He added: "In the second week of November 1995, Ibrahim
Rouzi, Director of Xinjiang's Religious Affairs Bureau, ordered a Government probe into
the mushrooming of unauthorized mosques and Quranic schools in the region which, he
said, were often opened with funds received from abroad" 49.
During the US anti-terror war in Afghanistan, some separatists belongs to
Xinjiang were found taking training programs in afghanistan. Chinese police had caught
some terrorists who returned to Xinjiang secretly after receiving training in the terrorist
camps of Afghanistan and some other countries. The police of those countries concerned
had also extradited and handed some of those terrorists to China. Incomplete statistics
show that from 1990 to 2001, the "East Turkistan" terrorist forces inside and outside
Chinese territory were responsible for over 200 terrorist incidents in Xinjiang, resulting
in the deaths of 162 people of all ethnic groups, including grass-roots officials and
religious personnel, and injuries to more than 440 people. But although small-scaled
activities of violence and terror have never stopped, generally speaking Xinjiang enjoyed
stability in 2001 without occurrence of major terrorist and violent incidents.
1 ~ Chaudhary, L.K. (200 I), "Bhattacharya Ahanti, "Afghan Crisis, Xinjiang and Chinese Nationhood'' Maimtream. vo1.39, no.S I: pp.7-9.
165
TKAlNlNli (.;AMPS ~·UK T~l{l{UH.lSTS lN A.l1tJtlANlSTAN
··.·. !?'-
Khost 0 '
. o · Loraiai
~ Sukkur·. . 0
Hyderabad . () ....
P: .0. K
Landi KotaJ 0 Mardon ·
. · t9esh~war ISLAMABAD • · Anoc~ tB J hal Kohg . . . ~) . . . Rawalpindi0 Bannu 0
Dera Ismail Khan Sai'godha 0 'i?"- . 0
·Multan 0
o. Bahawa!pur
Faisalabad 0
i~ SRINAGAR
J & K
. --·--· - -· -- -~ - -.
i e Militants training camps I I Boundaries I 1- International !
~ - LoC .II
; ~ National capital
I; State/Province •@ , I ,, ! caprta,
L. _ ~-. ~~po~~ pia~~ Source: Frontline, vol.l8. no.21 , October 13-26,2001.
Pakistan's Activities in Xinjiang Region:
Uighur militants from Xinjiang (China) are increasingly usmg Afghanistan &
Pakistan as a sanctuary, a supply base for training and weapons, and a means to fund their
movement back home through the lucrative opium trade. Heroin addiction is now a major
social problem in Xinjiang. Uighur militants have enlisted with and get support from the
foreign Islamic units fighting for the Taliban. These units include the 800 men Arab
brigade led by Osama Bin Laden, units of Pakistani student militants, and the 2,000 men
force of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan led by Juma Namangani now based in
northern Afghanistan. China with its long-standing communist policies towards ethnic
minorities and religion, is primarily concerned with Uighur Islamism and separatism
China's apprehensions of the Taliban and their role in supporting Islamic militancy in
Central Asia and Xinjiang, has led to problems with Pakistan, its long standing ally in the
region which supports the Taliban50.
The oldest friend and Great ally China is now not ready to overlook the
involvement of lSI's created Islamic terrorism in Xinjiang Province, Here is another
question, why lSI and Pakistan Army did all this. The answer is very simple, Religion.
Pakistan Army's structure is based on the religion. Pakistan Army is supposed to spread
the spirit of Jihad, wherever is possible.
Rashid (well-known Pakistani columnist and expert on Afghanistan and Central
Asia) reported in the second week of November 1995, that Ibrahim Rouzi, Director of
Xinjiang's Religious Affairs Bureau, ordered a Government probe into the mushrooming
of unauthorised mosques and Quranic schools in the region which, he said, were often
opened with funds received from abroad." mushrooming of unauthorized mosques and
Quranic schools in the region which, he said, were often ope11ed with funds received from
abroad" 51• He also reported that six Uighurs from Xinjiang, who were undergoing
training at the Islamabad Islamic University, attended a convention of the JI at Lahore in
December 1995. Quoting a Chinese diplomat in Islamabad, the Urdu language daily
"Nawai Waqt" of Pakistan repo1ted on June 4,1996, as follows: "China has deported
'0 Sinha, P.B. ( 1995-96), '·Islamic Militancy and Separatism in Xinjiang··. Eurasian Studies, ·,·oL20, no.3:
pp. 451-60.
166
hundreds of Pakistanis, who had illegally entered Xinjiang for hunting eagles52. These
Pakistanis did not possess any valid travel documents to enter the Chinese territory. He
also disclosed that dozens of people, allegedly involved in smuggling of drugs, were
an·ested by Chinese guards and one has been sentenced to death. Several Pakistani drug
smugglers are still languishing in Chinese jails." The paper added: "He said that
following the arrest of about 450 Pakistanis in October 1995 in Xinjiang for illegal
activities, Beijing has decided not to issue visas to any individual tourist. Abdul Rasul, a
Pakistani citizen of Xinjiang origin who had fled from Xinjiang to Pakistan in 1967, now
heads in Pakistan an organisation called the Asian Muslims' Human Rights Bureau and
canvasses support for the cause of the Uighurs53.
In an interview to the "Nation" of Islamabad (November 7, 1998), he claimed as
follows:
> Uighurs from Xinjiang are undergoing religious education 111 the madrasas of
Pakistan and Egypt.
> Many Uighurs are participating 111 the jihad in Kashmir with the Hizbul
Mujahideen, 111 the Lebanon with the Hizbollah and in Afghanistan with the
Taliban.
r After launching the Asian I\1usJin1s' I-Iun1an Rights Bureau u.t lslan1ahad on
October 2,1998, he had met Osama Bin Laden in the Khost area of Afghanistan.
Bin Laden had promised to assist the Muslims of China.
He had also met at Teheran Ali Muza, a senior office-bearer of the Hizbollah of
the Lebanon, and senior leaders of the Taliban in Afghanistan. He claimed that
there were about 4,000 Uighur nationalists in their independence movement54.
Following the arrest of 16 Pakistan-trained Uighurs in Xinjiang, the Chinese
authorities protested to the Pakistan Interior Ministry on January 6, 1999 over this. The
Chinese complained that the arrested persons admitted during their interrogation that they
51 Gaye, Christofferson (2002), ·ccC-China War on Terrorism in Xinjiang·, (www.ccc.nps.Navy.mil/east asia-esp-56k) '
2 Rudder. Chautel De ( 1999), "Exporting Jehad: An interview with Ahmed Rashid". Journal of Peace
Studies, vol. 6 no. 6: pp. 74-77. '
3 Clark. Michael (2003), "Xinjiang and China's relations with Central A<;ia, 1991-2001, A eros..; the Domestic -Foreign Frontier, Asian Ethnicitv, volA, no.2:.pp. 207-24. 54 Rudder. Chautel De ( 1999), "Exporting J~had: An interview with Ahmed Rashid", Joun!{{/ of Peace
Studies, vol. 6 no. 6: pp. 74-77.
167
had been trained in guerilla warfare in training camps at Jalalabad in Afghanistan and at
Landi Kotal, in the Khyber Agency of Pakistan. The Pakistani authorities denied the
existence of any training camps for Uighur separatists in Pakistani territory-"5.
China has expressed concern that Islamic extremists operating in and around the
Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region who are opposed to Chinese rule received training,
equipment, and inspiration from Al-Qaida, the Taliban, and other extremists in
Afghanistan & Pakistan. Several press reports claimed that Uighurs trained and fought
with Islamic groups in the former Soviet Union, including Chechnya. Uighurs were found
fighting with Al-Qaida in Afghanistan. We are aware of credible reports that some
Uighurs who were trained by Al-Qaida have returned to China56.
Separatists in Xinjiang at home or abroad got both material and financial support
from some extreme terror organizations abroad, and violent actions that had taken place
in Xinjiang received tinancial aid from overseas. The religious fundamentalist elernents
have been in receipt of support from the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)-backed jehadi
organizations in Pakistan, the Taliban and Bin laden's International Islamic Front for
Jihad against the USA and Israel. By exporting Islamic militancy and terror through a
subservient Islamic dispensation in Kabul as well as indepen~ent of it, Pakistan would be
able to exercise a commanding ideological and politico-economic influence over
preponderantly Muslim areas of erstwhile Soviet Union and Xinjiang, the Muslim
majority region in north-west China. Towards the end of 1995, a three day convention
was organized by the Jamaat-e-Islami in Lahore where the Jamaat leaders promised to
lead and 'Islamic revolution'. It was attended by militants from 30 countries, including
Algeria, Afghanistan, America, Bangladesh, Tunisia, France, Tajikistan, of course,
Pakistan, several other Arab and European countries, Xinjiang and Kashmir57.
The Jamaat-e-Islami runs the Syed Maudoodi International Institute at its
headquarters in Lahore that trains and financially helps Islamists. At the end of 1995,
some 100 Uighur Muslims from Xinjiang (China) were said to be receiving training in
that Institute. The Islamic University in Islamabad and a host of other madrassas
" Warikoo, K. (2000) ... Muslims Separatism in Xinjiang", Himalayan and Central Asian Studies. vol.4. no.3-4: pp 35-55. ;r, Hagerty, D.T. (2002). "China & Pakistan: Strains in the Relationship", Current Hisrorr, \'oi.IOI. no. 656: pp. 284-89.
168
(theological schools) across Pakistan are actively engaged 111 producing hard-core
Islamists58.
A number of Xinjiang Muslims are known to have fought alongside the
Mujahideen in Afghanistan together with other committed revolutionaries from a number
of Islamic states. It is feasible that some of the Xinjiang Muslims who fought in
Afghanistan have returned to take up arms against the Chinese. Certainly, radical Islamic
international contacts were consolidated in Afghanistan and the end of that contlict has
created a pool of well-trained, religiously motivated, fighters and a vast amount of
surplus weapons. There is a virtually uncontrollable trade in weapons from Afghanistan
to the border regions of Pakistan, Kashmir, Tajikistan and to criminal elements elsewhere
in the region59.
Islamic Terrorism in Kashmir & Xinjiang Region
Both China and India are confronting with a similar threat of Islamic extremism
and terrorism. China confronts it in its restive Xinjiang province and India in the state of
Jammu and Kashmir. Both the countries are on the same side in a fight in which
Pakistan's role is dubious is immensely significant, while calling for restraint and revival
of dialogue, has refrained from asking sides. The problem of terrorism/religious
extremism faced by China in Xinjiang has certain similarities with that faced by India in
the Punjab in the past and in Jammu & Kashmir presently. The first similarity relates to
the role of some members of the diaspora in fomenting terrorism. In India, Sikh terrorism
in the Punjab was initially started by some members of the Sikh diaspora in Canada, the
USA, the UK and other Western countries, with the encouragement of Pakistan's Inter
Services Intelligence (lSI) and the USA's Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) during the
Nixon Administration, but it could never gather much support from amongst the Sikh
population of Punjab. This facilitated the counter-terrorism operations of the Punjab
Police. On the contrary, terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir was initially started by
indigenous elements with the support of the Kashmiris in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir
07 Becquwlin, Nicolas (2000)," Xinjiang in the Nineties", Thr C:hina .lollrnal, vol.44: pp.fl:'i-90 c.,x Becquwlin, Nicolas (2000)," Xinjiang in the Nineties'', The China Journal, vol.44: pp.oS-90 5~ Warikoo, K. (1995-96), "Ethnic Religious Resurgence in Xinjiang'·, Eurasian Studies, vo1.2, no.4:pp. 30-42.
169
(POK), with very little involvement of the Kashmiri (essentially Mirpuri) diaspora in the
West. In Xinjiang, the role of the Uighur diaspora in the Central Asian Republics
(CAR's), Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the West in fomenting terrorist violence and political
destabilization has been as considerable as in the case of the Sikh diaspora in the Indian
P . b60 unJa .
Briefing the media in Beijing after a party conference on March, II, 2002,
Abdulait Abuderexit, the Chairman of the Xinjiang provincial Administration, made the
following points:
•:• Separatists 111 Xinjiang at home or abroad got both material and financial
support from some extreme terror organizations abroad, and violent actions
that had taken place in Xinjiang received financial aid from overseas.
•!• During the US anti-terror war in Afghanistan, we did find some separatists in
Xinjiang who joined some training programs abroad. Chinese police had
caught some terrorists who returned to Xinjiang secretly after receiving
training in the terrorist camps of Afghanistan and some other countries. The
police of those countries concerned had also extradited ancl handed some of
those terrorists to China.
•!• The paper on the East Turkestan terrorist forces issued by the State Council
Information Office had made it clear that various ten·orist activities had been
under way in Xinjiang since the 1950s. Incomplete statistics showed that from
1990 to 2001, the East Turkestan terrorist forces inside and outside Chinese
territory were responsible for over 200 terrorist incidents in Xinjiang,
resulting in the deaths of 162 people of all ethnic groups, including grass-roots
officials and religious personnel, ~wd injuries to more than 440 people 61.
60 Mnckerras, Colin (200 I). "Xinjiang ill the Turn of lhc Cenlilry: Tlw rau<;CS nf Separatism" Centro! Asian Survev, vol.20, no.3: pp.289-304. 1'1 Marika, Vicziany (2003), "State responses to Islamic Terrorism in western China and their impact on
South Asia", Collfemporary South Asia, vol.-12, no.2: pp-243-262.
170
Separatism in Xinjiang: China's Stt·atcgy
China has launched a multi-pronged counter-campaign. The threat of separatism
comes mainly from a section of the 70 lakh Uighurs who comprises the largest, single,
ethnic group in the Xinjiang province. The Uighurs are concentrated in large numbers in
Kashgar, the base from where Islam spread south of the Pamir. Other Uighur strongholds
are Hotan, Southeast of Kashgar along with Turpan and Hami, which are located further
to the east. High strategic stakes are driving China to aggressively counter "splittist
tendencies" in this area. Given Xinjiang's unique strategic location because it borders
eight other countries, any advance in separatism can threaten to delink China from
Central Asia and large parts of South Asia. China therefore can hardly be expected to sit
back and accept the unlikely possibility of Xinjiang's emergences a buffer state between
itself and central Asia in the future 62.
The region is likely to emerge as an economic powerhouse in the future, besides
its other resources. Xinjiang has huge reserves of oil and gas whose exploitation has only
recently begun. According to official Chinese statistics, Xinjiang's oil reserves
concentrated in the arid Tarim and Jungaar basins stand at around 20.8 billion tones,
while its stocks of natural gas are estimated at I 0.3 billion cubic meters. Xinjiang
therefore acquires pre-eminence in China's future plans for acquiring energy securitl'.
Beijing is reportedly engaging Pakistan, over which it exercises enormous
leverage, to turn the heat on the Afghanistan-based "jehadis". They are also actively
engaging central Asian governments not to provide separatists any cross border
sanctuaries 64.
China's response to terrorism has been draconian. Xinjiang has seen
considerable terrorism during the past decade instigated by Uighur separatists demanding
the formation of an independent Islamic republic of East Turkestan. The country's strike
hard against the Uighurs has contributed to the United States generated paradigm that the
single largest threat to world security is terrorism. This has had an impact on South Asia,
62 Chaudhary, Debasish (2005), "A survey of the Economic siillation in Xinjiang and its role in the 21 '' century," China Report, A Journal of East Asian Studies. vo1.41, no. I: pp.-I-2R "
3 Gladney, Druy (2002), Xinjiang· China Future West Bank, Current History, vol. I 01, No.o5n: pp. 2o7-70. !•
4 Gaye. Christofferson (2002). 'CCC-China War on Terrorism in Xinjiang', (www.ccc.nps.Navy.mil/cast
asia-esp-56k)
171
PULlTlLAL MAP 011' PAKl~TAN ANU Al1~HA1~l:'SIA1~
?8". -
N'·----- -· ·-·
ARABIAN
L i
: SEA ! .
MOO~~:_:::~.:~~-=··-· ---·---~·---·- ··.--·-·· -.... ··-· · ·•-· ·---·~
N D A
ScalD 1:10 OOG CO\)
Source: P. Srinivasan, The Modern School Atlas, TTK Healthcare Limited- Printing Division, Chennai.
mainly in the form of supporting India's obession with cross border terrorism by Islamic
groups. First, there is widespread agreement that the greatest threat to regional security is
Pakistan 65. China, Russia and India share a common view of the dangers of Islamic
militancy and there is a consensus that Pakistan is central to the export of that militancy
to the region. It is their concern for Pakistan's pro Islamic and pro-Taliban policies that is
driving a wedge between that country and Kyrgyzstan, Kazakstan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan. Pakistan has also emerged as an issue of wider concern in the Asia Pacific
region because of its trade in military technology and arms with North Korea66.
Pakistan's interest in Afghanistan and Central Asia is often linked by some
analysts to a desire for 'strategic depth'. It is argued that Pakistan's relatively small
territory does not offer any depth to absorb a conventional assault from India. Since the
break up of the Soviet Union, Central Asia have received special attention in Islamabad's
strategic thinking. Pakistan's illicit support for the Taliban movement, culminating 1n
their recognition of the Taliban in 1997, was aimed at installing a friendly regime 111
Kabul. Xinjiang has been a strategic backyard of China both in security and economic
terms. In economic terms, the fabled Silk route passes through the resource-rich region of
Xinjiang. It contains approx. two-fifth of China's oil, 40 percent of its coal and rich
resources of gold and copper. In security terms, Xinjiang's 9 to I 0 million Muslims,
deeply intluenced by 900 years of Islamic influence, pose a threat to its integration with
China67.
Three points which have triggered awakening among the Muslims of Xinjiang
about their Islamic and pan-Turkic identity are:
•!• The demise of the former U.S.S.R. and the establishment of independent Central
Asian states.
•!• The freedom to practice religious and cultural rites after 1978, further aided the
rise in ethno-nationalist activities in Xinjiang.
•:• The increased trans-border trade and traffic between Xinjiang and Kazakhstan, Kyrghyzstan and Pakistan has resulted in greater interaction among the Xinjiang
c-5 Warikoo~ K. ( J 991 )~ ·•rvtuslirns Migration fron1 Xinjiang to Kash1nir ( 1 931-1949)", Strategic Analysis,
vol.l4, no. I: pp. 17-34. f16 Vicziany, Marika (2003t '·State responses to Islamic Terrorism in western China and their impact on South Asia'·. Contemporary South Asia, vol.l2, no.2: pp.243-62. 67 Sharma, M.L., "Exporling Terrorism Pakistan style" Third World Impact, voi.X no.l I: pp.24 7-253.
172
people and their ethnic counterparts in Central Asia, Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
Table: 4.14 Number of Uighur Executions in Xinjiang for
S f IIS rtf I f t T t I E f 1997 1999 epara tsn ,pit tsm rea 1ve 0 oa xecu IOns m -Month 1997 Total 1998 Total 1999 Total
Uighur Uighur Uighur January 16 230 II 211 14 135 February 0 49 () 15 13 139 March 5 64 0 59 8 41 April 3 177 () 172 () 88 May 8 281 0 132 II 51 June ~ 294 0 285 () 381 ·' July 12 121 () 113 2 46 August () 103 0 160 2 91 September 0 192 0 103 6 126 October () 25 12 68 0 4 November 0 44 0 94 0 26 December 16 199 0 388 0 57
Total 6~ .) 1779 23 1800 56 1263
Uighur Executions
Ill 3.57r 1.27'7r 4.43'10 Xinjiang as
a '7(. of total executions in china
0.7% 0.7% 0.7'1<· Uighurs as
%of The total Population
of China Sx 2x 6x
Uighur executions
As a multiple of The weight
of The Uighur Population
in china
Source: Amnesty International, China Death Penalty log, )an -Dec 1997; 1998 and 1999. In 1999, the Uighurs Xinjiang numbered about 8.25 million people and the Total Population of China was just over 1.13 billion: the 2020 project: Policy support in the People's Republic of China: Final report and policy directions (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2002)
173
Xinjiang is the nexus between China, the Middle East and Russia; it also lies at
the cultural crossroads between the Islamic world and the Han Chinese heartland. More
importantly, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the vast energy supplies of the former
Soviet Central Asian republics are becoming a focus of geopolitical attention as regional
and extra-regional states seek to secure access to new sources of oil. Even some of the
vital mountain passes and trade routes criss-cross this region; this enhances its
geostrategic importance. Further, some of China's vital defence establishment related to
its nuclear programme are located in this region. These factors combine to make the
outcome of the separatist struggle in Xinjiang of growing international strategic
importance and will influence developments in the region 6s.
The Uighurs used to be in a preponderant majority, but this has been slowly
eroded under a P.?licy of assimilating the non-Han minorities with the Han majority.
Beijing calls this the policy of "hanhua", meaning, "making them Chinese". The Uighurs
denounces it as a policy of Han colonization, which threatens to reduce the non-Hans to a
minority in their traditional homelands. The extent of the alleged Han colonization of
Xinjiang would be evident from the fact that the Han Chinese today constitutes 38 per
cent of the population in the province (total population of the province 16 million) and 80
per cent in Urumqi, its capital, as against 15 per cent and 20 per cent respectively in
1950. The benefit of this economic development has mainly gone to the Han settlers,
thereby aggravating the feelings of alienation of the Uighurs69.
However, amongst other aggravating factors are:
•!• The rigorous enforcement of the local directive permitting only two children per
family in the urban areas and three in the rural areas.
•!• Prohibition of religious books not published and printed by the state.
•!• Ban on Government servants attending prayers in mosques.
•!• Ban on receipt of funds from abroad for religious purposes.
These incidents indicate that ethnic marginalisation and religious suppression,
combined with the example of the accession to independence of the CARs, have thus
f•R Hagerty, D.T. (2002), "China & Pakistan: Strains in the relationship". Current Histon·. vol. 101. no. 656: pp. 284-89. 69 Madirov, Sheripjan M. ( 1999), "Socio .. Economic Situation of Uighurs in Xinjiang'', Himalayan and Central Asian Studies. vol.3, no. 1: pp. 41-52.
174
aga111 rekindled the desire of the Uighur Muslims for an independent state to be called
either Uighurstan or East Turkestan in which the I 0 million Uighurs of Xinjiang and
about half a million of their community presently scattered in Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan can live. Two important developments of the 1980s helped the separatist
movement. The first was the Afghan war during which the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) of
Pakistan and the Hizbe-Islami, the Afghan Mujahideen group of Gulbuddin Heckmatyar,
recruited Sunni Muslims from Xinjiang, without Beijing raising any objection, for
fighting against the Soviet troops. After the war, these clements returned to Xinjiang and
joined the nationalist movement against Beijing and the Han settlemene 0.
During the US anti-terror war in Afghanistan, some separatists groups in Xinjiang
joined some training programs abroad. Chinese police had caught some terrorists who
returned to Xinjiang secretly after receiving training in the terrorist camps of Afghanistan
& Pakistan and from other countries. The police of those countries concerned had also
extradited and handed some of those terrorists to China71•
• The paper on the East Turkestan terrorist forces issued by the State Council
Information Office had made it clear that various terrorist activities had been
under way in Xinjiang since the 1950s. Incomplete statistics showed that from
1990 to 2001, the East Turkestan terrorist forces inside and outside Chinese
territory were responsible for over 200 terrorist incidents in Xinjiang, resulting in
the deaths of 162 people of all ethnic groups, including grass-roots officials and
religious personnel, and injuries to more than 440 pcoplc72.
Today most of the senior administrators, and all of the military commanders in
Xinjiang, are Han Chinese appointed by Beijing. Typically, Han Chinese control the
major industries in Xinjiang, and its economic production is expressly geared to the
requirements of the centre. The Muslims largely remain in traditional agricultural and
livestock occupations and have few opportunities for advancement in other sectors. Most
of the region's resources are exported unprocessed to China proper and are reimported as
Ju Mackerras, Coli11 (2001 ), ·'Xinjiang at the Turn of the C~:ntury: The Causes of Separatism'· Cenrrul Asian Surver, vol.20. no.3: pp.289-304. 71 Raczka. Witt ( 1998). "Xinjiang and its Central Asian Borderlands''. Central Asian Survey. vol.l7, no.3: pp. 373-407. 72 Gayc. Christofferson (2002), 'CCC-China War on Terrorism in Xinjiang', (www.ccc.nps.Navv.mil/cast asia-csp-56k)
175
manufactured goods at high prices. Furthermore, Xinjiang has become a dumping ground
for Beijing's social and internal security problems with thousands of criminal and
political prison camps giving justification to the region's reputation as China's Siberia73.
Discriminatory policies favouring the Han Chinese over the locals in access to
jobs, education, health care and other services, combined with Beijing's insensitivity to
traditional cultural and religious mores in Xinjiang, have compounded Muslim
resentment at being treated as second-class citizens in their homeland. Anti-Chinese
unrest in Xinjiang therefore stems from the twin assaults of cultural/ religious repression
and demographic manipulation. Beijing's rigorous attempts to assimilate the Uighurs
through the repression of religion, assembly and language, as well as through the
systematic introduction of Han Chinese immigrants into the region, have fomented deep
rooted anti-regime sentiment. It is of little surprise that there have been periodical
uprisings against Chinese domination74.
China's Security and Xinjiang Province:
China established a security framework through the Shanghai Five. The first is
related to the Islamic extremism and separatism. In the past I 0 years, these have become
a major factor both regionally and internationally. From the Balkans to the Caucasus, and
from Central Asia to Afghanistan and Kashmir, there are many types of radicalism or
separatism; most of them have their own international backgrounds, and most of them are
related to Islam. During the Kosovo War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and the United States developed a new concept and model of intervention, from
which some separatists gained encouragement and confidence. China experienced some
terrorist activities in Xinjiang, and connections were found between those activities and
Islamic extremists elsewhere. A couple of years ago there were reports of a Chinese
Muslim brigade that received training in Afghan camps75. The recent aiTest of heavily
armed militants on the Pakistani border with China who are charged with supporting
71 Mackerras, Colin (200 I), Xinjiang at the Turn of the Century: The Causes of Separatism, Central Asian Survey, vol 20, no.3: pp. 289-304. 74 Clark. Michael (2003). "Xinjiang and China's relations with Central Asia. 1991-2001. Across the Domestic -Foreign Frontier, Asian Ethnicity, vol.4, no.2: pp.207-24. 7
' Khalid. Zulfiqar (1987). "Pakistan in Pamir Knot: Geostrategic Imperatives", Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd.
176
Muslim separatists in Xinjiang has the potential to complicate China's relations, not only
with Afghanistan where the men allegedly trained, but also with China's traditional friend
and ally Pakistan. It is likely that Beijing will begin to publicly criticize Islamabad for its
failure to clamp down on fundamentalist groups within its own borders. Furthermore, the
possibility of China pursuing a more pro-active Afghan policy independent from, and at
times contradictory to, that taken by Pakistan is now a very real possibility.
A number of incidents have served to underscore Chinese concerns. In addition to
the arrest of the militants on the border between China and Pakistan, a number of
Pakistani students have recently been expelled from International Islamic University in
Xinjiang causing China to tighten the visa rules for Pakistanis entering Xinjiang. Chinese
foreign minister Tang is believed to have urged his Pakistani counterpart, Abdul Sattar, to
pressure the Taliban into cutting links with the Uighur separatists and also urged Pakistan
to play a more "constructive" role in the settlement of the Afghan problem. China is
concerned at the spread of Muslim fundamentalists in Pakistan, many of whom have
close contacts with the Taliban and sympathize with their particular brand of Islam76.
Beijing's greatest fear is that Xinjiang will become another Kashmir, the only
Ivfuslim-majority state in India. Since 1989, India has experienced a separatist campaign,
which has grown in ferocity as fighters trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan have joined
the conflict to wrestle the state from New Delhi's control. More broadly, China is worried
about the Taliban's potential to influence developments in the other Central Asian
republics, thereby impacting negatively its security particularly in Xinjiang. Beijing has
typically been wary that it may be susceptible to charges of involving itself in the
"internal affairs" of another country, repeating its mantra that it wants a political rather
than military solution to the Afghanistan problem. The possibility of China pursuing a
more pro-active Afghan policy independent from and at times contradictory to that taken
by Pakistan is nevertheless now a very real possibility, as is the possibility of Beijing
publicly criticizing Islamabad for its f<lilure to clamp clown on fundamentalist groups
7r' Bhattacharya. Abanti (2(Xl I), "Afghan Crisis, Xinjiang and Chinese Nationhood·', Mainstream, vol.l9. no.51: pp. 7-9.
177
within its own borders. Although they may not be life threatening at this stage, these
tensions will certain serve to complicate relations between China and Pakistan 77.
Table: 4.15
Population of Six Nationalities in Xinjiang (In Thousands)
Year Hans Uighurs Dunghans Kazakhs lVIongolians Kyrgyzs
1949 292 3291 126 444 53 66
1994 6164.8 7697.3 740 1217 151.9 156.2
Source: Himalayan and Central Studies, ]an-march 1999.
Years
1992-93
1993-Y4
Table: 4.16
Population Growth of Six Nationalities in Xinjiang
(In % during 1993-94)
Hans Uighurs Dunghans Kazakhs Mongolians Kyrgyzs
2.28 3.93 348 3.59 3.36 4.68
2.12 I .42 1.11 1.72 181 128
Source: Himalayan and Central Studies, ]an-march 1999.
Keeping in view the strategic importance of the province in which China's Lop
Nor nuclear testing site is located and which is believed to have important, but as yet
untapped oil reserves, Beijing has combined its policy of forced assimilation of the
Uighurs with greater attention to the economic development of the province and its trade
links with the neighbouring Central Asian Republics (CARs).
Last year, hundreds of splittist terrorists were detained and a terrorist training
camp and an underground regional supply network were smashed.
• Police had arrested more than 80 people near the city of Kashgar alone 111
connection with 15 bomb explosions over a five-month period.
77 Sinha, P.13.(1995-96), "Islamic Militancy and Separatism in Xinjiang'', Eurasian Studies. vol.20, no.3: pp.451-60
178
• Some of those arrested had been recruited by foreign terrorist groups and trained
during their pilgrimage to Mecca.
There is also evidence of trade in heroin and weapons over Xinjiang's borders
with Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, Afghanistan and three CARs. The paper said: "The
Central Committee of the Communist Party is paying special attention to social stability
in Xinjiang and particularly in Yili County and has taken an important decision to station
troops in Yining city" 78.
The main thrust of the Dushanbe Declaration was to contain "separatism,
terrorism and extremism" from spreading into Central Asia and Xinjiang from
Afghanistan. The leaders agreed to "create a joint anti-terrorist center" in Bishkek,
Kyrgyzstan. All leaders including China's President Jiang Zemin backed Russia's
crackdown in Chechnya and condemned the terrorist incidents and bombing campaigns
by Islamic militants that have taken place in Central Asia over the past 12 months.
China's limited policy thrust over the past few years has been to persuade Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan not to give sanctuary or support to Uighur militants. China is now looking
further a field, drumming up similar pledges from Tajikistan and warning the Taliban.
Uighur militants from Xinjiang, China arc increasingly using Afghanistan as a
sanctuary, a supply base for training and weapons, and a means to fund their movement
back home through the lucrative opium trade. Heroin addiction is now a major social
problem in Xinjiang. Although the Taliban are not directly recruiting Uighurs into their
forces, Uighur militants have enlisted with and gets support from the foreign Islamic
units fighting for the Taliban. These units include the 800 men Arab brigade led by
Osama Bin Laden, units of Pakistani student militants, and the 2,000 men force of the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan led by Juma Namangani now based in northern
Af I . 79
g 1amstan .
n Chung Chicn-Pcng (2002), ''China's ·'war on terror'': September II and Uighur separatism··, Foreign Affairs, vol81 no.4: pp.S-12. N 'China·s pro-Afghan Policy·, (www.cacianalyst .org/Jan 3 2001 ).
179