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geostrategic ProsPectiVes For tHe NeXt tHirtY Years

GEOSTRATEGIC PROSPECTIVES FOR THE NEXT THIRTY YEARS

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Report made under the direction ofthe Délégation aux affaires stratégiques

If you have any questions, please contactthe prospective division of DAS [email protected]

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Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1 - INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ....................................... 28

I - The international system ................................................................ 29I.1 state and sovereignty ................................................................................................................29

I.2 International institutions .........................................................................................................30

I.3 Common values and international law ...............................................................................32

I.4 Transnational non-state players .............................................................................................34

I.5 Regional spaces ..........................................................................................................................36

II - Regional analysis ........................................................................... 38II.1 United States ..............................................................................................................................38

II.2 Latin America..............................................................................................................................40

II.3 Europe (EU) .................................................................................................................................42

II.4 North Africa and the Middle-East .........................................................................................45

II.5 Sub-Saharan Africa ...................................................................................................................46

II.6 Russia and new independent states ....................................................................................48

II.7 Southern Asia .............................................................................................................................48

II.8 South-East Asia ..........................................................................................................................49

II.9 North-East Asia ..........................................................................................................................50

Consequences for defence .........................................................................52

CHAPTER 2 - MILITARY DIMENSION .................................................. 54

I - Typology of crises and military tool............................................... 55I.1 Forms of conflictuality ..............................................................................................................55

I.2 Humanitarian crises or interventions in support of national or foreign civil administrations ..................................................................................................................56

I.3 Global crisis management .......................................................................................................57

I.4 Legal context ...............................................................................................................................58

I.5 Media context ..............................................................................................................................58

I.6 Military tools ................................................................................................................................59

II - Adverse modes of action likely to demand a military response ........................................................................................ 60

II.1 Conventional modes of action ..............................................................................................60

II.2 Use of nonconventional weapons ........................................................................................60

II.3 The particular case of the use of outer space ....................................................................62

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III - Risks and threats likely to demand a military response ...................63III.1 Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction .................................................................63

III.2 Terrorism .....................................................................................................................................67

III.3 Organized crime .......................................................................................................................67

III.4 Marine piracy .............................................................................................................................68

IV - Spaces of operation ...................................................................... 69IV.1 Human environment ...............................................................................................................69

IV.2 Terrestrial environment ..........................................................................................................69

IV.3 Maritime environment ............................................................................................................70

IV.4 Air space and exo-atmospheric space ................................................................................72

IV.5 Space of information ...............................................................................................................73

V - Domains to master ........................................................................ 74V.1 Understanding the situation ..................................................................................................75

V.2 Possessing the required resources .......................................................................................75

V.3 Control of resources .................................................................................................................76

V.4 Producing the desired effects ................................................................................................76

V.5 Protecting engaged elements ...............................................................................................77

V.6 Regenerating potential............................................................................................................78

VI - Evolution of the main powers’ capacities on the military level ..................................................................... 79

VI.1 United States, the world power ...........................................................................................80

VI.2 Regional powers with a global focus .................................................................................81

VI.3 The standard troublemaker ...................................................................................................85

VII - Main trends and disruptions. Consequences for France and Europe .................................................................................. 85

VII.1 Nature of conflicts and military interventions................................................................85

VII.2 Main identified threats ..........................................................................................................86

VII.3 Military evolution of major state players .........................................................................87

Consequences for defence .........................................................................88

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CHAPTER 3 - ECONOMY .............................................................................90

I - World economy in the next thirty years ................................................91I.1 Main trends in the world economy .......................................................................................91

I.2 Major players in the world economy ....................................................................................95

I.3 Evolution of financial markets ............................................................................................. 103

II - European economy ...................................................................... 104II.1 Major trends in the European economy .......................................................................... 104

II.2 Possible evolutions of the European Union .................................................................... 107

III - Defence economy in the next thirty years ................................. 109III.1 International trade and war ............................................................................................... 109

III.2 Economic crime ..................................................................................................................... 109

III.3 Defence economy ................................................................................................................. 111

Consequences for defence .......................................................................114

CHAPTER 4 - RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT ............................. 116

I - Confrontations about resources and the environment ................................................................... 117

I.1 Food crises ................................................................................................................................. 118

I.2 Food crises and migration .................................................................................................... 119

I.3 Mineral and energy resources .............................................................................................. 121

II - Exacerbating factors: energy and climate .................................. 123II.1 Access to energy resources ................................................................................................. 124

II.2 Global warming ...................................................................................................................... 132

III - Perspectives on the adaptation process .................................... 135III.1 Global government............................................................................................................... 135

III.2 Adaptation through disruptive technology .................................................................. 136


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CHAPTER 5 - DEMOGRAPHY ...................................................................140

I - The face of the global population ................................................ 141I.1 Increase of the world population........................................................................................ 141

I.2 The ageing of the world population .................................................................................. 145

I.3 A growing imbalance between men and women .......................................................... 150

II - Migration flows ............................................................................ 151II.1 The configuration of international migration ................................................................ 151

II.2 Profile of a migrant ................................................................................................................ 156

II.3 The migrant, a new player in international relations ................................................... 158

III - Demographic evolutions: a territory management issue ......... 160III.1 Increasingly higher urban density.................................................................................... 161

III. Demographic pressure on natural resources ................................................................... 164

III.3 Natural risk becomes natural catastrophe ..................................................................... 165


CHAPTER 6 - HEALTH ....................................................................... 166

I - Supply and demand of health care .............................................. 167I.1 Demographic changes will influence health care supply and demand .................. 167

I.2 Development of risks and threats ....................................................................................... 169

II - Evolution of pathologies, techniques and technologies will change the health care o�er and health care systems organization ........ 170

II.1 Known pathologies will evolve .......................................................................................... 170

II.2 Substantial technological changes affecting the health care offer are expected 174

II.3 Upcoming technological developments will enable new forms of medicine to emerge ................................................................................................................................. 178

III - Vigilant supervision ................................................................... 180III.1 Serving populations ............................................................................................................. 180

III.2 Serving fighters ..................................................................................................................... 181


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CHAPTER 7 - CULTURES AND SOCIETIES ........................................ 184

I - The ageing and diminishing French and European population .... 185I.1 The diminishing European population .............................................................................. 185

I.2 An ageing European population ......................................................................................... 186

I.3 Relying on replacement migration ..................................................................................... 187

II - Network logistics will overlay territorial logistics ..................... 188II.1 Personalization of communication and information technologies will bring about new mobilisation capacities ....................................................................... 189

II.2 Networks will enable religious identities to be reinforced and take action .......... 189

II.3 Increasingly numerous and influential diasporas ......................................................... 190

III - state regulations increasingly individualized and integrated into the market sphere ..................................................................... 191III.1 Limits and insufficiencies of the nation-state ............................................................... 191

III.2 Transformation of the states’ role in Europe .................................................................. 191

IV - The religious factor .................................................................... 192IV.1 Persistent global balance of religions ............................................................................. 192

IV.2 A secularization trend specific to Europe ....................................................................... 195

IV.3 Elsewhere in the world, and even emphasis on religious practice ......................... 195

IV.4 The religious phenomenon, a factor for continuity and rupture ............................. 197

IV.5 Persistence of religious radicalism ................................................................................... 198

V - Identity fragmentation ............................................................... 198V.1 The weakening of national reference ............................................................................... 198

V.2 Multiple identities .................................................................................................................. 199

V.3 Transnational organizations ................................................................................................ 199

VI - Challenges to social cohesion .................................................... 199VI.1 The future of integration models in Europe .................................................................. 199

VI.2 What kind of social cohesion? ........................................................................................... 200


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CHAPTER 8 - TECHNOLOGY ............................................................. 204

I - Mastering science and technology: a recognized challenge becoming more common ........................... 205I.1 Accelerated rate of innovation ............................................................................................ 205

I.2 Universalizing knowledge ..................................................................................................... 205

I.3 A change tempered by possible ethical considerations .............................................. 207

I.4 Benefits of science and technical mastery from a defence perspective .................. 207

II - “ Technology”, industry and defence ........................................... 208II.1 Technology and industry ...................................................................................................... 208

II.2 The notion of a defence technological and industrial base ....................................... 208

II.3 Ownership ................................................................................................................................ 209

III - World dynamics .......................................................................... 210III.1 Long-established “technological” powers ...................................................................... 210

III.2 Newcomers to the competition ........................................................................................ 212

III.3 “Non-technological” wealthy countries........................................................................... 213


APPENDICES ..................................................................................... 214

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“I have decided to create a working party whose mission will consist in delivering to me a report of geostrategic and geopolitic prospectives for the next thirty years. It will, on this account, be the reference document on which the yearly editions of the PP30 can lean on. It will be updated every three years […] Based on an analysis of the general evolution trends of the strategic context, the nature and intensity of risks and threats, and the evolution of geopolitic equilibrium, it will attempt to define the main trends and ruptures of all natures likely to impact France’s future choices in matters of defence…”

[Excerpt from the working party’s mandate handed over to the DAS by the minister of defence (2003)]

�e present report on geostrategic prospectives for the next thirty years attempts to identify the changes which may affect our strategic environment, and draw conclusions for defence and security in the European Union (EU) and France.

Prospective: anticipation to enlighten action. �is “intellectual indiscipline” (dixit Pierre Massé) attempts to “see far ahead, deep and wide” (dixit Gaston Berger), but also differently (innovation) and together (appropria-tion). Global, voluntarist and long term vision is necessary to give meaning to action1.

Basing itself on the study of a global system (evolution of the strategic context and geopolitical equilibrium/ nature and intensity of risks and threats), the report follows a systemic reasoning, in order to reveal the emergence of new phenomena and possible ruptures, and is divided in eight main topics:

international relations;•military dimension;•economy;•resources and environment;•demography;•health;•cultures and societies;•technology.•

1 Cahiers du LIPSOR nr. 20, « Prospective stratégique: problèmes et méthodes ».

Methodological note

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Taking of diagnosis of the present situation as its starting point, this approach seeks to determine, among the possible scenarios, which of them seem likely. Cross-checking them with desirable scenarios for France and the EU helps to define strategic options.

Strategicoptions

Past Present Future

Desirablescenarios

Probablescenarios

Possible scenarios

�e report’s field of analysis covers a period which runs from the present and spans the next three decades. �is period is consistent with that of the 30-year prospective plan2, which the present report aims to provide the general prospective basis for.

For this second edition, the experience acquired during the first exercise has been capitalized through par-ticular attention on methodology, formulation of conclusions directly exploitable in the cycle of preparation for the future of the ministry of defence and the setting up of a wide network of expertise.

�e method chosen, prospective in essence, includes a phase of diagnosis, based on the analysis of the players’ games, of main trends and uncertainty factors, in each domain, likely to transform into ruptures. While the increasing complexity of the strategic system augurs of strong interaction of different phenomena, networks, actors, in unpredictable combinations, the difficulty lies in not minimizing the possibility of radical disrup-tions likely to cause an overhaul of the system and its constituent parameters.

Main trend: movement affecting a phenomenon over a long period (for example: urbanization, population increase, etc.). Main trends are indicated by the pictogram in the report.

Rupture: any phenomenon of strategic swing caused by main trends, or occurring unexpectedly. A rupture must introduce a clear separation between a “before” and an “after”, without necessarily being related to a notion of short temporality. Ruptures are indicated by the pictogram .

Uncertainty: uncertainty factors are indicated by the pictogram .

2 This document “30-year prospective plan” (PP30), drawn up by the DGA and the EMA, is one of the tools of “identification of the needs and orientation of defence studies and research, and is part of the process leading to planning and programming”.

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Elementary “building blocks”:

Main trends

Uncertainty facts

Consequencesfor defenceand security

With the declared ambition of assessing as objectively as possible future situations with multiple unknowns, the approach chosen had the following objectives:

stimulating imagination;•increased coherence between the various fields of study;•structuring collective thought;•creating a common language;•inciting appropriation by all the contributors.•

Prospective thinking along the lines of “anticipation towards action” leads to an assessment of risks.

�e analysis of each domain allowed the identification of consequences affecting defence.

�e approach emphasizes the connection between forms of knowledge that are both differentiated and comple-mentary, responding to the global nature of the set of themes chosen by the networking of the many bodies within the ministry of defence and multidisciplinary experts.

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SYNTHESIS - TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION: “What was it like in 2037?” ...........................................15

PART I: Main trends ....................................................................................17

• International relations .............................................................................................................................. 17

• Military dimension...................................................................................................................................... 18

• Resources and environment ................................................................................................................... 18

• Economy ........................................................................................................................................................ 19

• Demography ................................................................................................................................................. 20

• Health ............................................................................................................................................................. 20

• Technology .................................................................................................................................................... 21

• Culture and societies ................................................................................................................................. 21

PART II: Ruptures ........................................................................................22

• Order ............................................................................................................................................................... 22

• Power ............................................................................................................................................................... 22

• Modernity ...................................................................................................................................................... 23

PART III: Consequences for defence ..........................................................24

• Risks of conflict ............................................................................................................................................ 24

• Defence and security policies ................................................................................................................ 24

• Resources ...................................................................................................................................................... 25

• Strategy and missions ............................................................................................................................... 26

• Normative adaptation ............................................................................................................................... 26

• Industrial and research policies ............................................................................................................. 26

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WHAT WAS IT LIKE IN 2037?

�e following scenario is based on the identification of major main trends for the eight domains under consideration. With a narrative tone, it not only aims to synthesize the report’s significant facts, but also to present a possible vision, among others, of the international context that we may see in the late 2030s.

May 25th, 2062: a 25-year-old student in international relations converses with his 87-year-old grandfather, in an attempt to retranscribe his perception of the international disruptions which marked the period that followed the fall of the Berlin wall…

“When the Cold War ended, the concept of “new world order” appeared. But was “order” the right word? Where did the novelty lie in the international context?

— When the Berlin wall came down, I was 14. �ere was immense hope all around, fed by optimism and a wonderful feeling of liberation. Yet the next two decades saw the appearance of mass terrorism, accelerating pro-liferation in countries owning weapons of mass destruction, and more and more regional crises. Some thought the European Union might support what was the called “the American hyperpower”, in order to regulate and stabilize an international environment where disorder threatened to occupy every space of freedom. �e rise of China and India was celebrated in newspaper headlines, whereas energy and environmental issues already revealed the challenges we would have to face in subsequent decades. We were aware that a “new world” was emerging, but couldn’t define it or appreciate its main themes, so numerous were the uncertainties, and thus the range of possibilities.

When you were born, 25 years ago, the world no longer presented any of the points of reference which had endured until the end of the 20th century: states with extensive functions, “elementary building blocks” of a reconstructing international system; a prevailing “Western” model; international regulations based on a Security Council largely based on the will of World War II victors.

— So this was a period of transition. What were the main trends that structured international changes between the early 21st century and the end of the 2030s? How would you define this “new world”?

— 2037 presented a whole different face. To paraphrase the words of a 20th century historian, Georges Duby, we were then living in a “full world”: the growing number of state powers - regional, then world-scale, despite the sustained American prominence - was reciprocated by an unprecedented abundance of a large variety of players, in their number and importance: multinational firms, lobbies, nongovernmental organi-zations [NGOs], churches, network community gatherings (metanetwork which fused together all Internet information and communication networks in 2019, etc.) �e move to the multipolar world hinted as early as the 2000s, manifested itself with the creation of the Universal Security Council which brought together the old P5, India, Japan, Brazil and South Africa, then the federate European states (Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Greece, Luxemburg, Slovenia), the Korean Federal Republic and the United Shiite Republic of Iran, bringing together Iran and the former Iraq’s Shiite regions. In parallel, the alliance of supra-state, economic and international society systems was built against the interstate system, emphasizing the movement of the states’ renouncement of their historical prerogatives.

But this full world also generated a fragmented world. �e development of national, religious, ethnic, even economic and social claims and tensions, translated into the proliferation of new states generating strong regional instability: break-up of Iraq in the Middle East, of the Democratic Republic of Congo in Africa and Indonesia in Asia; the emergence of centrifugal forces in China, South Africa and Russia. Within our Western countries, the dispersion of national and social identity has delegitimated solidarities, accelerating conflicts between generations, social classes and communities.

�is “polyfragmentation” was favoured by the emergence of a network world, which gradually replaced the territorial logic that prevailed until then: human networks - with globalization generating new migratory

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dynamics, with no link to the colonial past or geographic and cultural proximity -, economic networks - with each player now much more vulnerable to events occurring on other parts of the planet -, and lastly technological networks, with the bringing together of all state, private and professional networks into one metanetwork.

— But these various elements surely had consequences in terms of conflictual situations?

— Indeed, the trend, which could already be perceived in the early 21st century, of multiplying and diversify-ing risks, threats and, in fine, crises and conflicts, accelerated under the conjunction of this fragmented world saturated with links and connections. We had to face the generation of a world of conflicts: above the past antagonism - sometimes “frozen”, like those in Caucasus - resource and power conflicts agglomerated, rein-forced by demographic changes, strong growth of the world economy and the already marked effects of global warming.

— In the face of all these challenges, both national and transnational, what were the reactions at the international level?

— Paradoxically, these trends led to the creation of an hyperregulated world. �is direction could already be perceived in the early years of the century, but failed to fully manifest itself in a rather fixed interna-tional system. Little by little, with the increased multipolarity, the emergence of fragmentation and a world of networks, it asserted itself at every level (local, regional, international). An increasingly rich corpus of regulations was adopted by the international community in the face of major challenges - environmental, demographic, religious, etc.

Multipolarity

Oldcon�icts

Resources

Powers

Multiplyingplayers

Ethnicities

Technological

Socio-culturalReligion

Migratory �ows

In�uence policy

etc.

World ofconflicts

Regulatedworld

etc.

etc.Full

worldFragmented

worldWorld ofnetworks

Values

Strategic background:Global challenges (environment/resources, etc.) + sustained demographic growth + economic growth

2035 - 2040

Inequalities

Generations

Economical

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I - MAIN TRENDS

For each of the eight domains under consideration, the analysis of key variables helped to identify main trends, which formed the backdrop of prospective vision.

International relations

1.1 - International relations will be based on new dynamics born of the multipolarity and high diversity of players. �e new power centres (China in particular, but also India, even Brazil and South Africa) will structure the geopolitical world with the United States, Russia and the EU. �e emergence of this mul-tipolarity will result in increased geographic equilibrium of trade. �e Pacific, Indian Ocean and South Atlantic areas will assert themselves as major trade routes. �e “Western” influence will likely diminish in all fields (cultural, economic, media, etc.).

1.2 - A pragmatic international system will be based on a higher diversity of players, bonds and concepts. It will also face the coexistence of several power centres (international institutions, regional or thematic organizations), non-state players, various transnational networks and states which should remain the “elementary building block” of international relations. �e latter will be based on a wider corpus of regu-lations, in particular in the face of major challenges (environment, natural resources, etc.). International law will be based on universal texts complemented, in a pragmatic way, by bi- or multilateral agreements, but without challenging the UN’s legitimacy.

1.3 - Political fragmentation should continue and take on various forms:at the international level: increased influence of regional organizations around common interests;•at the local level: an increasing number of new states under pressure from ethnic or religious commu-•nities and irredentism, favoured by the coveting of natural resources or the existence of borders that don’t associate territory and culture.

1.4 - Interstate conflicts should not be ruled out. In spite of the numerous regulation tools of the interna-tional system and economic interdependency, it is possible that the rise in power of new players may result in rivalry, or that strong needs of supplying in strategic resources may cause an irreversible degra-dation of relations between states.

1.5 - �e United States will maintain their prominence in all fields: military, economic and technological. �e United States account for 20% to 25% of global wealth. �is instrument of power is enough to differentiate them from past great empires and to ensure, at least in the medium term3, the durability of their domination. �ey should also retain a strong international cultural influence. In matters of foreign policy, they will remain interventionist, due to the interdependency of their economic and security requirements.

1.6 - �e relative weight of the EU in the world will weaken due to the rise in power of other players and internal factors (low economic growth and population increase, etc.). �e EU should build according to a functional logic, in particular in the fields of security and defence, basing itself if necessary on a hard core of a few voluntarist countries. It should assert itself gradually as an autonomous key inter-locutor on the international scene.

3 �is prognosis may be noticeably qualified on a scale of 50 years and more.

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Military dimension

1.7 - Conflicts will mostly originate from rising national, interreligious and interethnic tensions, often within a state. But the increased scarcity of natural resources, territorial or extra-territorial claims, or increasingly inequality may provide motives for serious disagreements between states, likely to degenerate into open conflicts.

1.8 - Regional troublemakers, motivated by an aggressive ideology, will take advantage of widespread availability of new technologies, even the most sensitive ones. �e appeal of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and their equalizing power, will remain strong. �e pursuit of nuclear technology mastery to civilian or military ends, or even pure and simple acquisition of such weapons, will be accompanied by strong efforts in the field of ballistic and aerodynamic vehicles. Similarly, since the necessary technologies are both civilian and military, access to chemical or biological weapons will remain technically possible for all states as well as non-state organizations, especially since investments and equipments will much less sizeable than their nuclear equivalents.

1.9 - states will continue to be confronted with non-state organizations, terrorists in particular, in asym-metrical struggles during which technology and imagination may occasionally reverse the balance of power. Moreover, interstate conflicts may become asymmetrical, with the weaker protagonist freeing itself of the constraints imposed by law.

1.10 - Beyond their defence and security role, armed forces will be called upon for actions of all natures. �e armies of Western states will continue their evolution towards increased professionalization and the composition of reserves.

1.11 - �e United States should remain the only world-scale military power: the only one capable of autono-mous power projection at the global level, covering the whole range of required capacities. �ey will have ballistic antimissile defence. However, their surveillance and action requirements on world activities will dictate the search of partnerships (NATO) to share the resulting financial and human burden.

1.12 - China first and foremost, and to a lesser extent Russia and India, will continue to develop their mili-tary potential, particularly as regards their nuclear arsenals, their capacity to influence and control the environment and flows, but will remain unable to challenge the United States in their conventional supremacy at the world level.

Resources and environment

1.13 - Population increase in developing countries and the general improvement of living standards will result in a strong growth in the exploitation of natural and agricultural resources. In the absence of local agricultural production, food crises may occur. Meanwhile, good management of water resources in countries with the lowest supplies - often the most populated - will be a decisive factor for regional stability.

1.14 - Food crises may cause migratory movements leading to civilian violence in semi-desert areas, areas where rural economy still prevails, and around megalopolises.

1.15 - 80% of the world’s consumed energy will originate from fossil fuels, although domestic resources in fossil oils of non-OPEC countries4 (excluding coal) will be close to exhaustion, and those of OPEC countries will diminish. �en tensions around energy supplying will first concern gas. �e EU will increasingly energy-dependent (from 50% today, to 70% ca. 2030).

4 OPEC: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.

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1.16 - �e increased scarcity, caused by increasing demand and exhaustion of reserves, and the unequal distribution of hydrocarbons and ore, should result in exacerbated tensions, while resources are often located in already unstable areas.

1.17 - Control of energy sources should be differentiating factor of the states’ industrial and military power (autonomy of electrical production, control of the transportation sector’s energy dependency). It will give rise to new strategic alliances and partnerships.

1.18 - �e evolution of areas of energy production and consumption will reinforce the issues of secure access to areas of production and terrestrial or maritime extraction (Middle-East, Africa, Arctic, etc.) and securing of transports (maritime routes with the straits of Ormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, oil pipelines in Central Asia, Russia and Iran).

1.19 - As a consequence of global warming, extreme natural phenomena (heatwaves, hurricanes, etc.) should become recurrent, with notable consequences on the economy and health situation.

Economy

1.20 - A second wave of globalization should occur, based on the growing economic weight of developing countries (China, India…), on the potential for improvement of productivity offered by the globaliza-tion of production lines and the accelerated spreading of new technologies. Financial globalization should also continue, based on the compensation of risks by lesser exposure to the uncertainties of the domestic market.

1.21 - �e growth of the world economy should continue at a sustained pace: during the period of 2005-2035, the average per capita income should increase by 3% a year in developing countries. Global wealth should double, rising from 35 trillion dollars in 2005 to 72 in 2030.

1.22 - �e process economic catching-up of developing countries should be completed by the end of the considered period for Asia and Central and East European countries. �e relative living standards in Latin America, as well as Near- and Middle-East, should remain stable. �at of sub-Saharan Africa should tend to worsen.

1.23 - Inequality may tend to rise between countries as well as between social layers. In this respect, the rise of certain developing countries will have additional consequences on unskilled labour. Evolution towards a dual labour market should thus continue, with on the one hand less and less well-paid and increasingly insecure low-skilled jobs, and on the other steady and well-paid highly-skilled jobs.

1.24 - �e United States should remain the most powerful economy in the world, but its advance on China should be reduced, possibly even cancelled. Consequently they should still have to rely on the rest of the world’s savings, particularly those of China and Japan, to finance their foreign deficit. In a context of ageing population in Europe, conditions for growth will not be met in the long term, which will require the implementation of structural policies favouring sustained dynamism. In France, a potential growth rate of 1.8% can be expected in the long term.

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Demography

1.25 - Population increase (to 8.6 billion inhabitants within the next thirty years, up from 6.5 billion now) will result from high natural increase in developing countries, particularly in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, combined with the general increase of life expectancy in the world. In contrast, most developed countries will be confronted with population decline, particularly Japan, Russia and European countries.

1.26 - �e world population will age due to the continued increase of life expectancy and diminishing birth rate. �e average age will be 35 years old ca. 2035, as opposed to 28 now. 18% of the world population will be 60 or over, as opposed to 10% today. �is age range will account for over 30% of European popu-lation at the same date. �e increase in life expectancy will be most important in Africa and Southern Asia, where it is currently at its lowest.

1.27 - Migratory flows will be similar to the present ones. A significant part of migrations will occur from Asia towards Australia, Asia and Africa towards Europe and North America, and Central America towards North America. Sub-Saharan Africa, where birth rates are still very high, will be a major purveyor of immigrants, while Maghreb countries will remain a major transit area. South-South migrations will remain significant, in particular in Africa, but also towards the Middle-East.

1.28 - Distribution of the population should remain largely unchanged, with a densification of already inhabited areas. « Littoralization » and heliotropism phenomena should endure. 95% of the world’s increase in population will be absorbed by towns in developing countries. 60% of the world’s popula-tion will live in cities, as opposed to 49% today.

1.29 - �e continued development of population centres will weigh strongly on natural riches, particularly water. Growing urbanization will not be without consequences on the environment and quality of life in towns that are often unprepared for such rapid growth.

Health

1.30 - �e increase of health expenses will largely result from constant medical advances, rather than ageing. It will be in the region of two points of GDP in developed countries in the next thirty years.

1.31 - Ageing of the population will cause an increase of degenerative illnesses, including neurodegenera-tive (Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s diseases), and senescence-related disorders, while cardiovascular mortality should continue to diminish. Cancer will be the leading cause of death, while obesity will be a major public health issue.

1.32 - �e appearance of pandemics will be likely, favoured notably by the increased international travel-ling and global warming (displacement and geographical extension of repartition areas of vectorial illnesses like paludism). �e Aids epidemic is likely to spread in developing countries, and to stagnate in developed countries.

1.33 - The bioterrorist threat will endure, and may increase through the mastery of new technologies. In addition to the use of already identified agents (smallpox, anthrax, plague and botulinus), other means of action may be used: germs made resistant to antibiotics by genetic manipulation, new germs developed with the help of biotechnologies, attacks on health information networks.

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Technologies

1.34 - Science, technology, and more generally innovation, will still be considered as instruments of power, not only for economic reasons, but also on grounds of military power.

1.35 - �e United States will try to maintain their technological supremacy, which should be sustained, although several countries or regional units will try to challenge it.

1.36 - �e sustained pace of innovation observed since the early 20th century should be maintained, notably due to its economic effects.

1.37 - �is dynamic will be coupled with a tendency for technological diffusion, even dissemination, based on the increase in the exchange of information, people and capital, as well as increasing industrial integration.

1.38 - �is tendency will allow certain states or groups (terrorist organizations, mafias, etc.) to develop military-type applications or misappropriate civilian technologies, sometimes extremely rustic ones, in order to constitute a credible threat.

1.39 - �e increasing complexity of equipment and processes will make it more and more difficult for a (non-American) designer to master the whole range of constituents, their real characteristics and evolution, as well as their geographical origin. �is tendency will cause a partial deterritorialization of technolo-gies and innovation.

Cultures and societies

1.40 - Europe will be one of the world’s regions whose relative share of the world population will decrease. To compensate its demographic deficit, it will have to open its borders to immigration and develop its family policy. �e share of people of foreign origin may consequently double in European countries during the considered period.

1.41 - �e constant development of communication technologies, of migrations and networks of all kinds - physical or immaterial - will favour a different logic of structuring of the world space to that of territories on which our representation of the world and national strategies were built.

1.42 - In Europe, after witnessing the gradual effacing of the state, the next decades will see it refocus on its kingly functions, which will not prevent some of the latter to be partly assumed by the market sector.

1.43 - �e equilibrium between major religions will not be turned upside down, although Islam and Pentecostalists will gain an increased following. In Europe, the tendency towards secularization should endure, unlike the rest of the world.

1.44 - National identity will be fragilized by three phenomena: the abolition of distances, which allows to communicate directly and exist without reference to a collectivity, the weakening of national states and the resulting loss of identity, and the situation of identity volatility inherent to the globalizing dynamic.

1.45 - �e rise of « multiple identities », based on origin, religion, values and shared interests may result in the setting up of new solidarities and lines of fracture with less reference to territories than before.

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II - RUPTURES

�e analysis of potential ruptures identified within the eight considered domains allowed to derive three major transverse themes:

the order of the world system;•the concept and attributes of power;•the relationship with modernity.•

Order

�e issue at stake is to determine whether we are heading towards a more or less ordered world, and whether ruptures may affect this tendency. Several of the identified potential ruptures may fall within this theme:

2.1- �e development - even profusion - of international law may lead to an excess, which may translate into general non-respect by states of these rules.

2.2 - �e fragmentation or implosion of sensitive counties, for instance Iraq, Pakistan or Indonesia would have major regional, even global, consequences in terms of stability.

2.3 - �e - legal - coming to power of a radical islamist movement (“Muslim brothers”, etc.) in a Maghreb, Near- or Middle-East countries would have major consequences on regional stability.

2.4 - �e crumbling of non-proliferation and banning regimes would be a particularly aggravating factor for the spreading of WMDs and associated vehicles.

2.5 - Coordinated WMD or cybernetic attacks disrupting vital information networks such as telecommunica-tion networks, would constitute a major change in terrorist modes of action.

2.6 - Large-scale attacks on French - or European - soil would seriously question the process of social cohesion and translate into strong ethnic and/or religious identity withdrawal. �is crisis may be stronger, should it be manipulated by active islamist movements based in France or abroad.

2.7 - Each state will be much more vulnerable to economic events occurring in other parts of the world, even when it has few relations with the region concerned (paradoxical propagation of crises). �is contagion process might result in a major global economic crisis (realization of the systemic risk).

Power

�e concept of power will remain at the heart of the game of strategic players. It will result from a combination of factors of increasingly varied nature. �e foundation of power will thus reside in the capacity to synchronize the state, economic and cultural spheres, in order to implement a true global strategy. Again, several potential ruptures may be linked to this theme:

2.8 - �e rivalry between “traditional” powers for the access to resources (particularly energy) or the preserva-tion of their influence zone may cause strong tensions, possibly even an armed conflict.

2.9 - Widespread access to WMDs may weaken the regulating effect of Western countries’ conventional military superiority.

2.10 - Renewed use of the nuclear weapon - for the first time in over 60 years - would mark the end of a historical taboo, with potential consequences on the dissuasion doctrine.

2.11 - �e arsenalization of space would deeply affect the approach of the environment and the capacities required for the maintenance of decisive freedom of action.

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Modernity

Attitudes towards the future varies according to societies and historical periods. Some societies consider their golden age as a thing of the past and, consequently, regression to be inevitable. Others, on the contrary, view their evolution primarily in terms of progress. In this context, can there be a convergence - or at least a dialogue - between “Western” societies, which have largely lost their faith in modernity as a spring of progress, and other societies (the Arab and Muslim world, the Asian world also) in search of a new paradigm of progress?

Several ruptures can be linked to this theme:

2.12 - Identity dispersion, which delegitimizes solidarities within societies, may result in the questioning of the concept of defence itself. In divided or extremely community-based societies, “who will agree to defend what?”

2.13 - China and India will seek to attain leadership in the field of scientific and/or technological innovation. Catching up with the level of the USA would constitute a very significant rupture.

2.14 - Increasingly pervasive regulations surrounding the action of soldiers will come against an environment deprived of codes. From that point, the use of force may turn out to be inappropriate to face the propa-gation of indirect strategies and the emergence of population wars.

2.15 - �e means allowing the jamming or diversion of messages will lend an unexpected dimension to the information war.

Possible ruptures, a few examples of which have just been summarily described, add an element of unpre-dictability and disruption to the backdrop drawn by main trends (cf. § I).

�ese are not to be taken into account as input data for the conception of strategic options, but should serve as a test of these options’ robustness: it is the “what if?” test.

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III - CONSEQUENCES FOR DEFENCE

�e aim of the present report on geostrategic prospectives for the next thirty years is to draw conclusions which may directly affect the preparation of the future of the ministry of defence.

�e recombination of the various main trends, uncertainty factors and ruptures allows to identify a number of consequences for defence and security. �ese consequences are constructed on the basis of a sustained level of national ambition.

They are presented below according to six main themes directly exploitable for the ministry of defence’s next projects:

risks of conflicts;•defence and security policies;•resources;•strategy and missions;•normative adaptation;•industrial and research policies.•

Risks of con�icts

ContextConflicts will occur as a result of the combination of an increasing number of factors encouraging crises: population increase, tensions around the access to natural resources, fulfilment of strategic needs, global warming, preservation of spheres of influence, social and economic inequality, community, religious or social identities, failing rule of law, etc. A majority of these conflicts will be local or regional, of intrastate origin, but may impact regional stability. Sensitive areas appear to be sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and to a lesser degree South-East Asia. Interstate tensions, notably about access to natural resources, the fulfilment of strategic needs - or the preservation of spheres of influence - remain likely.

3.1 - �e probability of conflicts or aggressions, and thus the possible action of French or European armed forces, should be high in an intrinsically uncertain world.

3.2 - With potentially unstable areas located in the periphery of the European continent, ensuring the stability of its margins will be a major concern for the European Union.

3.3 - Consequently, the risk of a major conflict cannot be ruled out.

Defence and security policies

Excluding scenarios of stagnation or falling apart of the EU, France will remain a driving force in the development of a European defence. Defence will be strongly involved in the development of the ESDP. Interventions will mostly occur in a multinational framework, particularly the EU and NATO. Besides, new geostrategic players (BRICs), whose presence on foreign theatres will be asserted, must be taken into account. Lastly, defence capacities will need to consider new fields of action.

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3.4 - �e success of these operations will be a necessary condition to the credibility of the international institu-tions France and its close partners will seek to promote, for example the UN and the EU.

3.5 - �e management of all crises will have a strong interministerial character and, whatever the level of European integration, an interagency and interpillar approach will be necessary to achieve maximum efficiency, unless the present organization is reconsidered.

3.6 - It will be in France’s and the EU’s interest to continue to develop their support to regional organizations whose field of action will expand to security in Africa, Latin America or Asia. In so doing, they will seek to make regional or local players aware of their responsibilities in the management and crises, by pro-viding support and training (sub-Saharan Africa, neighbourhood of the EU…).

3.7 - Interoperability of forces will be crucial between Europeans, and necessary with Americans. It will be very desirable with new players.

3.8 - France will contribute to the EU’s operations at a high level by providing such fundamental capacities as situation assessment tools, and participation in the deployed forces.

3.9 - Defence will need to be able to respond to acute needs of freedom of access - even preservation of diver-sification - to strategic resources (ores, energy).

3.10 - It could also be led to ensure protection of French or European interests in outer space, cyberspace, open sea and the Antarctic.

Resources

Population ageing and decline in France and Europe will influence the societal choices and their impact will be felt on the hierarchy of priorities between the financing of social expenses and that of defence expenses. Similarly, economic growth at half-mast in Europe may cause an erosion of defence budgets which are already low on the European continent. Lastly, armies will need to integrate an increasing share of soldiers of foreign origin.

3.11 - In an international context where crises are increasingly frequent, France’s level of ambition may need to be redefined.

3.12 - �e issue of a specialization of the military tool may be posed, particularly at the European level.

3.13 - If demographic trends are maintained, the number of young people between 16 and 30 will diminish by 15% for the whole of Europe5. Defence and its industrial base will have to face important recruitment problems, both in quantity and quality, related to population ageing.

3.14 - Increasing immigration will pose the issue of the representativeness of armed forces, compared to French population as a whole, as well as their cohesion.

5 Source: European Defence Agency.

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Strategy and missions

�e range of the armed forces’ missions will be wide.

3.15 - It is possible that nuclear deterrence, either mutualized or put at the EU’s disposal by the United Kingdom and France, would be the best way to ensure protection of populations and territories.

3.16 - Apart from the permanent safety posture6, which will remain the basis of armed forces missions, these forces may be engaged in an armed conflict, possibly a major one, which may require capacities beyond the reach of the European Union alone.

3.17 - �ey will be asked to contribute to the struggle against proliferation and terrorism, and participate in the defence of economic interests by ensuring freedom of movement and access to resources.

3.18 - �ey will continue to undertake missions of restoring and maintaining peace and contribute to civilian activities: protection of nationals, missions of circumstantial public service (pandemics, etc.), civilian/ military support outside of national territory and emergency assistance.

Normative adaptation

Non-state players will exercise strong pressure on decisions of intervention and the implementation of stan-dards, notably in the use of force, the environment and human rights.

3.19 - �e respect of new obligations in terms of disarmament will cause an adaptation of armament and rules of use of armed forces.

3.20 - The evolution of environmental standards will imply new constraints on the use or training of armed forces (noise pollution, pollution, need of modes of management integrating sustainable development, recycling of military equipment, etc.).

3.21 - �e strengthening of European regulations will impose new demands on armed forces.

Industrial and research policies

�e acceleration of globalization dynamics will continue to weaken state means of controlling research, pro-duction and even exportation of sensitive technologies and goods. Concurrently, the rise of developing countries will translate into growing strategic investments abroad (buyout of companies, etc.).

3.22 - French defence will need to invest in technologies of direct interest to it, particularly those allowing to retain in a totally autonomous way one’s nuclear deterrence, to thwart modes of action based on rustic technologies and to quickly integrate various civilian or military technologies into increasingly complex systems.

6 �ey are missions of nuclear deterrence, of prevention and protection of the territory and safeguarding of populations.

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3.23 - Mutualization at the European level should respond to industrial, technological and political challenges related to the globalization dynamic.

3.24 - France will need to continue to work at the international level for the limitation of technology transfers related to proliferation, and prevent other powers from acquiring the corresponding skills.

3.25 - France, alone or globally in Europe, will have to implement mechanisms of traceability of components of all natures, so as to prevent risks of embargo. Mechanisms of risk analysis and particular measures to consider for sovereignty equipment (technological watch, double sources, precaution stocks when necessary) will have to be perpetuated.

Consequences for armed forces

�e extent of missions will require a wide range of capacities to be integrated into:

the preservation of strategic autonomy on a European scale;•the development of a global strategy (interministerial/ interagency/ interpillar);•the continued development of European defence.•

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