chapter iv connecting the city and disconnecting...
TRANSCRIPT
Chapter IV
Connecting the City and Disconnecting People
The Metro has changed the face of Delhi forever, from a city of construction, to a city with connectivity ... Delhi Metro has put great expectations and increased the aspirations of the city and its people for the best.
At'tkur Bhatia Chamber of Indian Industries (C/1) 260
Metro is running in some areas ... but who is going to use that ... is it the worker? The worker uses the bicycle and even that space on the road is taken away from him ...
Dharshana Resident of Bhalaswa Resettlement Co/on/61
The Delhi Metro Rail (DMR) initiated its operations, albeit partially, in 2002 ·
and was quickly celebrated by the state, media and middle class of Delhi as the city's
greatest step towards world class status and global recognition. The DMR enthusiasts
gushed, often in dramatic tones, that not only would this 'modem technology' to sort
out the twin challenge of vehicular congestion and pollution in the city but also, more
crucially, credibly enable popular access to mass transit.262 Whilst such a coupling of
modem transport technology with speed is crucial to 'making possible' the global
city, this chapter argues that the DMR needs to be critically situated outside the
widely described narrative of its technical conquests. Put differently, the DMR -
intended to be linked with the process of gentrification - produces a set of economic,
political and social effects as important as its technical achievements.
260 Ankur Bhatia, Chairman, Chamber of Indian Industries (CII), Delhi State Council in a one day Delhi Annual Session and Conference on 'The Brand Delhi: What Does it Represent?', 22"d March 2006, New Delhi.
261 Dharshana, resident of Bhalaswa resettlement colony. The colony is located in the northern periphery of the city. Quoted from the documentary film 'New Delhi Private Ltd.' produced by Hazards Centre, 2006.
262 Whether the DMR is effectively reducing congestion and pollution in the city, though a crucial question, is not the focus of this chapter.
115
Consequently, in order to reveal the DMR as economic, political and social
technology, rather than just a means to address contemporary transportation
challenges, this chapter will argue for recasting the conceptualisation of Delhi's quest
for speed. The DMR, in other words, can be shown to be crucially linked to several
overlapping processes of political economy that are shaping or attempting to
transform Delhi into a 'world class' city: an urban-space whose primary objective is,
in the words of David Harvey to reduce the 'turn-over time' for capitalist
accumulation and which is therefore critically marked by a series of dispossessions.263
The argument for this chapter comprises four sections. The first section
presents a brief history of the emergence of the idea of the DMR. It argues that,
though the initial plan for introducing mass rapid transit system (MRTS) in Delhi was
first discussed in 1969, it was only finalised in the early 1990s. This is the period,
when process of restructuring was initiated in Delhi. The second section takes the
discussion further by arguing that the DMR project was essentially aimed at pursuing
the process of gentrification fuelled by integration of middleclass residential colonies,
business centres, and service class work places, real estate speculation, and generation
of funds for the project form the Japanese Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC)
as a soft loan. The third section discusses how this troubled quest for gentrification is
followed by a series of dispossessions, made evident in terms of environmental
destruction, displacement of low income housing settlements, de-routing and
curtailing public buses, and high fare structure of the DMR. The fourth and final
section aims to tie the above three sections into the larger claim that the DMR, has
critically structured as political and social project, ended up geographically
connecting the city while disconnecting its people.
263 David Harvey. 2001. Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography. UK: Edinburgh University Press.
116
Emergence of DMR
The history of the DMR goes back to 1969, when there was an official
recognition of the need for a mass rapid transit system in Delhi. According to E.
Sreedharan, the Managing Director of the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC), in
developed countries planning for metro systems usually begins when a city's
population exceeds 10 lakh, so that it may be in place by the time the population is
between 20 and 30 lakh people. However, in Indian cities an extended jurisdictional
tug of war between the central and state governments over who controls urban mass
rapid transit, in combination with a general paucity of funds for large-scale projects,
has resulted in an under investment in such systems?64
Indian cities and their residents have had little experience with metro or
commuter rail systems. While cities such as Mumbai and Chennai have had urban
mass rapid transit systems, the only direct experience with Metro that the country had
before the DMR was in Calcutta. The first serious mention of MRTS for Delhi
emerged out of a 1969 traffic and travel characteristics study. 265 Since then, many
official reports by a wide variety of government departments have been
commissioned to explore the issue, with key areas of contention related to debates
over technology (underground rail, surface rail, light rail, bus based, etc.), route
alignment, and whether urban mass transit was ultimately the jurisdiction of the
national government or the DelhiUnion Territory government.266 As such, the desire
for extensive technical study, in addition to ongoing political contestation, the search
for appropriate financing, has contributed to the extended planning period.
264 E. Sreedharan. 2002. Delhi MRTS Project. Indian Rai{ways. New Delhi: 81-7.
265 Government oflndia (GOI). 1970. Annual Report I969-70.New Delhi: Delhi Administration: 29.
266 E. Sreedharan. 2002. Delhi MRTS Project. Indian Railways. New Delhi: 81-7.
117
Apparently, in 1990 the project got a green signal, when the Rail India
Technical and Economic Services (RITES) prepared a Feasibility Report on MRTS
for Delhi recommending a three-component system comprising rail corridors, metro
corridors and a dedicated bus way adding up to 198.5 km. While the report was
submitted in 1990, it received approval from the Central Government only in
September 1996.Z67 In 1995, the Delhi Rail Corporation (DMRC) was registered
under the Companies Act (1956) for the purposes of implementing and operating the
Delhi MRTS. It was also decided that the DMRC would have equal equity
participation from the Government of India and the Government of National Capital
Territory Delhi.Z68 The first phase of the DMR was taken up by DMRC in 1996 itself.
The actual construction, however, began only in October 1998.269
The DMR was planned and developed as a technology exchange, whereby
international firms with expertise in development of metro railways were contracted
to aid with specific tasks such as general planning, station design, construction
management and rolling stock production. These international firms from Japan,
Korea, France and the US were required to partner and transfer their expertise to
Indian firms, so that indigenous companies could take a lead role in the later stages of
the Delhi Metro project. It was also planned that the indigenous firms would later be
able to disseininate their knowledge to other cities in India that were seeking to
develop metro railways. 270
267 Staff Reporter. 1996. Union Cabinet Approves Delhi MRTS Project. Times of India. September 18, New Delhi.
268 http://www.delhimetrorail.com/corporates/about_us.html
269 Staff Reporter. 2002. Dashing through the Depth of Delhi. Geography and You 2 (6): 43-44.
270 Matti Siemiatycki. 2006. Message in a Metro: Building Urban Rail and Infrastructure and Image in Delhi. India International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 30 (2): 280
118
One of the governments stated intentions for introducing the DMR was that it
would serve as a viable and efficient mass transit system for the entire city.
According to the Managing Director of DMRC, E. Shreedharan,
It will be much more than a cheap and safer means oftranspcrt. It will reduce congestion on roads making movement easier. It will also reduce atmospheric pollution to a great level making the environment healthy ... The Metro will totally transform our social culture giving us a sense of discipline, cleanliness and enhance multifold .<fevelopment of this
I. . 271
cosmopo 1tan city.
Before the completion of phase I in 2003, he also claimed that 'the first phase will
generate substantial benefits to the economy by way of siphoning off the roads 21.8
lakh commuters per day. This would mean 2,500 less buses on the roads' .272 A re
examination of facts after completion of phase I, however, revealed a different story.
In December 2005, the ridership of the DMR, after the completion of all three lines,
was a mere 5 lakh passengers per day.273 Thus, if the DMR has consistently not been
able to draw in the claimed number of commuters, then it throws open the question of
its usefulness and cost efficiency for the city. Namely, for whom is the DMR actually
designed and what interests does it really serve?
It has to be noted that the idea and plan for the DMR emerged as a mode of
mass transit when Delhi, as an imagined neo-liberal urban space, was being reworked
in the early 1990s. The restructuring of Delhi, in tum, has to be viewed in the light of
the new economic profile that has been systematically imposed on its landscape by
the imperatives of neo-liberal economy. The shift in economic priority away from
manufacturing to the financial services, the transformation of parts of the city into ·
271 E. Sreedharan. 2002. Delhi MRTS Project. Indian Railways. New Delhi: Sl-7.
272 E. Sreedharan. 2003. Delhi metro rail...2,500 less buses on roads. www.indiainfoline.com: January 03.
273 Times News Network. 2005. On New Year -Eve, take the new metro line to Dwarka. Times of India. December 25, New Delhi.
119
landscapes of hyper consumption, the new requirements for flexible mobility, and the
redrawing of connectivity between middle class residences and work places have
combined to create intense pressure for a redefinition of transport and mass transit.
Thus, the emergence of DMR, in several ways, was a response to the felt need to
reorganise urban space for realising a type of mobility suitable to a neo-liberal
economy.
DMR for Gentrification
According to Neil Smith, gentrification is not merely about retaking the urban
core of cities for the middle class, rather it involves far more complex processes of
political economy. Rather than thinking about gentrification from the perspective of
consumption, or as a certain 'trend' in the preferences of the middle class in the
direction of centralised urban (rather than suburban) living, Smith argues that
gentrification should be seen from the perspective of the production of space. That is,
gentrification needs to be seen as part of a deliberate state strategy to convert low rent
spaces into high rent spaces: to valorise urban space by displacing older, lower value,
historical, land uses for newer capital intensive development that absorb surplus
capital and fix it in physical infrastructure and land; that is in space itself. 274
Gentrification as a capitalist process of urbanisation has evolved into a vehicle
for transforming whole urban areas into new landscape complexes that pioneer a
comprehensive class-inflected and capital intensive remake. These new landscape
complexes now integrate housing with shopping, restaurants, cultural facilities, open
space, employment opportunities - entirely new complexes of recreation,
274 Neil Smith. 1996. The New Urban Frontier: Gentrification and the Revanchist City. US: Routledge.
120
consumption, production, and pleasure, as well as residence. Just as importantly,
gentrification as urban strategy weaves global financial markets together with large
and medium sized real estate developers, local merchants, and property agents with
brand name retailers, all lubricated by city and local government tax incentives. Here,
just as we have seen with the DMRC's aggressive promotion of private sector real
estate development in favour of older land uses, government operates under the
assumption that social outcomes derive from free markets rather then from sate
investment in public services and housing. Most crucial in this nco-liberal urban
configuration, real estate development becomes a centerpiece of the city's productive
economy, an end in itself, justified by appeals to jobs, taxes, and tourism275.
DMR's contribution to the process of gentrification is threefold. Firstly it~
routes are carefully designed to integrate and to provide fast mobility to the middle
class residential zones, shopping centers and business offices etc. But the DMR does
not only facilitate this class's mobility, it also plays a second role in the process of
gentrification by actively remaking urban space by creating and promoting capital
intensive real estate development and speculation. The DMR contributes to the
gentrification process in a third way also, by generating funds for the project form the
JBIC bank as a soft loan for the construction of DMR.
Integrating Middle Class with Service Economy and Consumption
The DMR project has been modified several times since it was first proposed.
The first modification took place in 1995, when RITES prepared the Environment
Impact Assessment (EIA) report for the modified Phase I of the MRTS. Out of a total
proposed project length of 198.5 km, the modified Phase I, which was supposed to be
275 Neil Smith. 2002. New Globalism, New Urbanism: Gentrification as Global Urban Strategy. Antipode 34 (3): 443.
121
commissioned by 2005, included 45 stations and covered 55.3 km of track subdivided
among 11 km under-ground rail, 22.15 km of elevated rail, and 22.15 km of rail at
grade. This modified Phase I was divided into 8 operational sections, as given below
in the Table 4.1.
Table 4.1
Modified sections of DMR Phase I
Section Length (km)
Vishwavidyalaya- ISBT 4.5
ISBT- Connaught Place 4.2
Connaught Place - Central Secretariat 2.3
Shahdara- ISBT 6.4
ISBT - Shakur Basti 10.6
Shakur Basti- Nangloi 8.0
Subzi Mandi ~ Siraspur 12.8
Siraspur- Holambikalan 6.5
Total 55.3
Source: Government oflndia (GOI). 1995. Environment Impact Assessment for Integrated Multi Modal Mass Rapid Transport System for Delhi, RITES: 13
As noted above, Phase I was modified in 1995, but the present status shows
that during the period of construction it has gone through further major re
modifications, as shown in the Table 4.2 below.
122
Table 4.2
Present Routes of DMR Phase I
Route Length (km) Stations
Shahdara-Tri Nagar-Rithala 22.06 18
Vishwavidyalaya-Central Secretariat 10.84 10
Indraprastha-Barakhamba Road-Dwarka Sub City 32.10 31
Total 65.00 59
Source: http://www.delhlmetrora•l.com/corporates/proJeCtupdate/phase I_ network.html
Table 4.2 shows that the necessary eight operational sections originally
proposed were reduced down to three, whereas the total length of phase I was
increased from 55.3 km to 65 km. These modifications also show a rise in the number
of stations. In 1995, the number of stations proposed was 45, whereas after the last
modification, the number of stations rose to 59. The present project comprises only
the first four sections of the modified Phase I, along with additional lines to Rithala
and Dwarka. The other four sections of the DMR were simply cancelled during the
actual implementation of the plan. It should be noted that the sections which were
cancelled were mainly connected to the working settlements of the city.
The utility of the DMR for the privileged minority of tl1e city can be seen if
we carefully look at the route map of Phase I and Phase II of its network. The map of
present and proposed lines ofDMR below suggests that there is a clear motive behind
the selection of DMR routes.
123
ROUTE MAPPHASE-I & II
Figure 4.1
Route Map of DMR Phase I and Phase II
()WA"'K.oll SEC '~ ElWA~ SEC'l
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~t.0 <:i' ~ :.;¥' :,~ ., o ~A'< •cc,:.,;.-, SCI1:>Cl
~ .. .a- - o~ ~ -- ..o A.:t!J. .. ~AR"I
lj' SUStioliH.OK
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~ :·) :0.\ i E·:-c;; -~ '60104.C -y c f.~i'\ ~
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., o-~~:ct~sc~:cRJ2 ~-.;,ii~.LG.;.~ : :: ~
0 ·. ·.~f'l. 'I< 5":.•:-..·:;
Source: htrp ://www.de lhimetrorail .com/commuters/route_map.html
Figure 4 .1 shows that the present and proposed routes of the DMR are
designed to integrate and to provide fast mobilit) to the gentrified city consisting of
middle class residential zones, shopping centers and business offices etc. Firstly, it is
connected to colonies like Rohin i, Dwarka, Dilshad Garden, Sushant Lok , Vaishali
etc., which are mainly inhabited by the middle class . Secondly. it will connect places
like Noida and Gurgaon to Delhi. which ptimarily provide livelihood opportunities to
the middle c lass English-speaking workforce. Thirdly. it is connected to the shopping
centres such as Connaught Place and Karol Bagh etc., where th is gentrified class can
fu nction as consumer. Thus, it could be argued that most of the lines of the DMR
exclude working class settlement and have been chiefly designed to integrate the
gentrified city.
124
Developing Property
The DMR plays a second role in the process of gentrification by actively
remaking urban space by creating and promoting capital intensive real estate
development and speculation. The low ridership figures described above indicate that
revenues are lower than expected from ticket sales, and the facts reveal that the DMR
is not financially viable as a commuter service. The pattern of DMRC revenues
generated with the completion of Phase I is summarised in Table 4.3 below, on the
basis of its annual accounts starting from the year 2001-02 and going to 2005-06.
Table 4.3
Profit and Loss Account ofDMRC (Rs. in crore)
Particulars 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06
Income 5.9 46.6 72.2 448.9
Expenditure 6.7 5.8 32.0 52.2 102.4
Profit before 1.7 0.1 14.6 20.0 346.5
depreciation and
interest
Profit/ (Loss) (8.3) (32.4) (76.3) (33.8)
Source: I) Government of India (GOI). 2002. Annual Report 2001-02. New Delhi: Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd.: 21.
2) Government of India (GOI). 2003. Annual Report 2002-03. New Delhi: Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd.: 19.
3) Government oflndia (GOI). 2004. Annual Report 2003-04. New Delhi: Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd.: 15.
4) Government of India (GOI). 2005. Annual Report 2004-05. New Delhi: Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd.: 15.
5) Government of India (GOI). 2006. Annual Report 2005-06. New Delhi: Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd.: 19.
As can be seen, the five years trend of DMRC finances suggests that contrary
to the claims, the DMR was actually running at a loss. While incomes have not been
given, the declared profit of almost Rs 1. 7 crore before depreciation and interest in
the first year (2001-02) is inexplicable. The trend of loss from 2001-02 to 2005-06
125
continues. From Rs. 8.3 crore of loss in 2002-03, the DMRC loss is mounted to Rs.
76.3 crore in 2004-05. Surprisingly, in the subsequent year (2005-06) there is a fall in
the loss to Rs. 33.8 crore. Upon a deeper probe, one finds that the revenues of the
DMRC, in fact, are far less dependent on ridership growth than on real estate
development, thus revealing the DMR's role as actually functioning to spur real estate
investment and real estate based revenue generation/speculation. 276
Table 4.4
Details of Income (Rs. in crore)
Particulars 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06
Traffic Operation 2.4 12.7 53.5 113.2
Consultancy 1.3 6.6 5.9 10.1
Real Estate 1.7 24.0 0.6 296.2
Others 0.3 3.2 6.8 29.2
Total 5.8 46.5 72.2 448.9
Source: l) Government oflndia (GOI). 2002. Annual Report 2001-02. New Delhi: Delhi Metro RaJ! Corporation Ltd.: 21.
2) Government of India (GOI). 2003. Annual Report 2002-03. New Delhi: Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd.: 19.
3) Government of India (GOI). 2004. Annual Report 2003-04. New Delhi: Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd.: 15.
4) Government of India (GOI). 2005. Annual Report 2004-05. New Delhi: Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd.: 15.
5) Government of India (GOI). 2006. Annual Report 2005-06. New Delhi: Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd.: 19.
The major sources ofthe DMRC's income are traffic operation, consultancy,
real estate and others. The table 4.4 shows that until 2004-05 there has been a gradual
increase in the generation of income from traffic operation and others, whereas there
has been a negative trend of generation of income under the heads of real estate and
consultancy. But suddenly in 2005-06, there is an extraor-dinary rise in income from
traffic operation and real estate. The income from traffic operation has increased from
276 See Appendix 4 .I a to 4 .I d
126
Rs. 2.4 crore in 2002-03 toRs. 113.2 crore in 2005-06, whereas the income under real
estate has increased from Rs. 1. 7 crore in 2002-03 to Rs. 296.2 crore in 2005-06.
Thus, from 2002-03 to 2005-06, there was a 4 7.1 time increase in the income from
traffic operation, and a 174.2 time increase in the income from real estate. It has to be
noted that real estate comprises 65.9 percent of the total income generated by DMRC
in 2005-06.
Table 4.4 seems to suggest that the DMR's primary effect, in fact, has been to
fuel real estate speculation and growth. Since the completion of Phase I, the DMRC
has been extensively using the land available on both sides of the DMR lines to
develop property for residential and commercial purposes. One of the first major
projects undertaken by the DMRC for property development was the Information
Technology Park located at Shastri Park, which was completed in April 2005. The
Information Technology Park is considered to be at the heart of the city. It has been
constructed to provide a sylvan environment for IT corporates on a 6-hectare plot, the
location of which was selected keeping in view the issue of connectivity to the rest of
the city. The southern side of the park is connected to Shastri Park DMR station and
the northern side is connected to Grand Trunk (GT) road.277
The Information Technology Park is just a beginning of the process. Based on
the information available in the public domain, some of the other areas in the city
where the DMRC would develop real estate along with quantity and space available
are summarised in Table 4.5 below. It should be noted here that the Delhi Master Plan
2021, which was notified in 2007, but drafted in the early 2000s, specifically
discusses the role of the Metro in densifying the city and leading to the formation of
high-density and high-rise commercial development. It thus provided different
277 http://www .delhimetrorail.cornlcorporates/projectupdate/propertydvp/shashtri _park.html
127
building by-laws and land use norms for all segments of the land within 500 meters of
any Metro line, specifically increasing the Floor Area Ratio (FAR) and allowing
denser and higher buildings to be constructed. This demonstrates the manner ih which
the Metro has been envisaged as a strategic infrastructure project for rebuilding Delhi
into a more capital-intensive and commercially oriented city. Thus, while the land
given to the DMRC for the Metro was meant to be for the public good of the city's
residents, it is currently being sold off or leased to private developers for speculative
purposes, and virtually none of the land acquired by the DMRC that is not occupied
by the Metro rail is being used for public purposes.
The table 4.5 below shows that along with the construction of Phase I, the
DMRC has planned to develop property for residential purposes in six different
locations on 212,026 sq. meters of land. Similarly, it has planned to develop property
for commercial purposes in nine different locations on 66,464 sq. meters of land. In
total the DMRC would be developing property on 278,490 sq. meters of land. The
Delhi Development Authority (DDA) has persistently claimed that there is a shortage
of land in the city to house the poor; on this basis the DDA has increasingly been
displacing the urban poor to the city's peripheries. If there is no land available in the
city then how is the DDA managing to provide the DMRC with such a huge quantity
of land for property development?
128
Table 4.5
Property Development by DMR
Residential
Place Area (sq.m.)
Khyber Pass 68,000
Rithala 12,026
Vishwavidyalaya 30,000
Dwarka 30,000
Netaji Subash Nagar 12,000
Najafgarh 60,000
Total 212,026
Commercial
Place Area (sq.m.)
Shahdara 7,704
Inderlok 5,630
Inderlok Annexe 3,195
Pratap Nagar 2,000
Tis Hazari 1,892
Seelampur 1,446
Seelampur 41,000
Welcome 1,097
Kashmiri Gate 2,500
Total 66,464
Source: Prabhakar Smha. 2006. Metro Matters. Times of lndza. 7 January, New DeihL
129
Apart from developing property on both sides of the DMR corridor, the
DMRC is also engaged in selling/renting space at the DMR stations for shops, ATMs,
billboards and hoardings. The major DMR stations where this process has already
been initiated include Khyber Pass, Vishwavidyalaya, Seelampur, Welcome Colony,
Rohini West, Subhash Nagar, Pratap Nagar, Rithala, Dwarka, Najafgarh, Khayala,
Inderlok, Wazirpur, Kashmiri Gate, Kohat Enclave, and Pitampura.278
Thus, by developing property, DMRC is generating revenue as a land owning
agency - a surrogate landlord under the guise of a public body operating for the
common good-and a part of the surplus generated by land development is being
further employed to acquire land to earn yet more surplus, much of which benefits the
private sector at the expense of diminishing public land.
Generating Funds for the Project
If we observe only the funds for Phase I of the DMR, we can see that 56
percent of the total cost has been funded largely by the JBIC through a soft loan at the
interest rate of 1.8 percent. 30 percent of the project cost has been financed through
equity contributions subscribed equally by . the Central Government and the Delhi
Government. The two Governments also gave an interest-free loan to cover the cost
of land acquisition, which roughly works out to 8 percent of the project cost.
According to the DMRC, the balance 6 percent of the project cost is to be met by
raising money through property development. Table 4.6 gives the details of the
generation of funds for Phase I ofthe project.
278 Prabhakar Sinha. 2006. Metro Matters. Times of India. 7 January, New Delhi.
130
Table 4.6
Funds from Different Sources
Source of Fund Percentage of Total Cost
Equity contribution from Governments of India 15 percent each
and Delhi
JBIC Bank 56 percent approximately
Revenue from Property Development 6 percent approximately
Subordinate debt towards cost and land 8 percent approximately
The above financial plan is based on:
0 Debt equity ratio of2: 1
0 Fare: Base rate of Rs. 5.00 (at April, 1995 prices) per passenger trip of 7.12
km.
Source: http://www.dmrc.delhtgov.m
Excluding taxes and duties, the estimated completion cost of Phase I of the
DMR project by the year 2005 was about Rs.l 05700 crore, including the cost of land
and rolling stock. Considering this amount of investment in the light of the above
ridership figures, and taking into account" the manner in which the modifications to
Phase 1 of the DMR strategically excluded working-class settlements, on what basis
can it be said that the DMR was built primarily to serve the need of mass public
transit?
As discussed above, 56 percent of the project cost has been given as a long
term loan by the JBIC bank at a low interest rate of 1.8 percent. This rate is somewhat
misleading because Japan's domestic rate for short-term lending is less than 1.5
percent and hence there will be no loss in profits to the lender. Furthermore, the loan
has to be repaid by India in Yen currency, which protects the Japanese investment
131
fully. Given the Rupee's declining value in the international market, India will
actually pay almost 15 percent in interest in the long-term. In addition, a large chunk
of the Japanese loan is being used to pay Japanese consulting firms and
manufacturers for design, engineering skills, fabrication, and equipment. Indian
executives of the DMRC are even required to take loans to buy Japanese cars279•
Thus, in the long run, the Japanese economy is likely to benefit a .great deal from the
construction of the DMR project.
The funding of this mega project and other important projects in Delhi by
capitalist institutions such as the JBIC should be examined within the conceptual
framework defined by Harvey (2004) in the context of capitalist accumulation, which
is the problem of the overaccumulation of capital. After a cycle of economic
expansion and growth, a surplus quantity of capital is generated. Was this stock of
capital is accumulated; it has to be put back into circulation, lest it lose value. In such
moments of overaccumulated capital, when there is a shortage of lucrative investment
opportunities that can earn favorable returns on capital, a risk of devaluation arises
within capitalism.
Harvey argues that one of the main strategies to overcome this problem of
'overaccumulation and devaluation of capital' is what he calls a 'spatio-temporal fix,'
which is an investment in the fixed, built environment (i.e. space) that is capable of
absorbing surplus in space. The temporal· dimension of such an investment is that
once the investment is fixed in a physical form as a long-term investment, that
quantity of capital is locked up in an investment for a long period of time and does
not have to be booked for profit and accumulation for a long time. This process
279 Dunu"Roy. 2002. The Sun Rises in the East! India, Japan and the Environment. Unpublished Paper.
New Delhi: Hazards Centre: 1-2.
132
allows the problem of overaccumulation to be displaced through investment in long-
term capital projects (e.g. infrastructure investment, like a metro rail) or social
expenditures (e.g. public goods, like education, health care, that offer long term
benefits to the population) that defer the re-entry of current excess capital into
circulation well into the future. A certain portion of the total capital becomes literally
fixed in some physical form for a relatively long period of time (depending on its
economic and physical lifetime )?80 The formation of physical and social
infrastructures provides an excellent opportunity to shift continuing surpluses to the
future, as such investments are long-lived, difficult to alter, spatially immobile, and
capable of absorbing large and lumpy investments.281
Dispossession and the DMR
The DMR's contribution to the process of gentrification is followed by a
series of dispossession in the city. Harvey argues that capitalist accumulation is
always m concurrence with dispossession, termed as 'accumulation by
dispossession'282, which is a concept that draws upon the notion of 'primitive
accumulation' that Marx used extensively in his various writings. He states that the
concept of accumulation by dispossession reveals a wide range of processes. These
include commodification and privatisation of land and forceful expulsion of local and
squatter; conversion of various forms of property rights-commons, collective, state
280David Harvey.· 2004. The 'New' Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession. Socialist Register2004, 40: 64.
281 David Harvey. 2001. Spaces ofCapital: Towards a Critical Geography. UK: Edinburgh University Press: 319.
282 David Harvey. 2004. The 'New' Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession. Socialist Register 2004, 40: 74.
133
etc.- into exclusive private property rights; dismissal of rights to the common;
commodification of labour power and the destruction of alternative, indigenous forms
of production and consumption; colonial, neo-colonial, and imperial processes of
appropriation of assets, including natural resources; monetisation of exchange and
taxation, particularly of land; slave trade; and usury, the national debt and ultimately
the credit system. He argues that the state, with its monopoly of the means of violence
and the power to define legality, plays a crucial role in both backing and promoting
these processes?83
The DMR is causing dispossession in the following ways: 1) through
environmental impact; 2) through slum demolition and displacement; 3) by curtailing
and de-routing buses plying on routes adjacent to DMR lines; 4) by keeping its fares
higher than the fares of public buses; and 5) by not providing any concessional
scheme for the vulnerable section of the commuters.
Environmental Impact
Environmental impact of the DMR is manifested in the form of depletion of
the water table during the construction of underground lines, adverse impact on land
use and ecology, noise pollution, seismicity of the area, oil pollution, excavated soil
disposal and waste from maintenance of the DMR.
Impact on ground water: Since about one sixth of the DMR's route is
underground, it is expected that it would involve extensive water pumping during the
time of construction. Extensive pumping of water will actually create depletion of the
ground water table in and around the area. Additionally, the ground water recharge
will be reduced, as the construction of large concrete structures will prevent the
283 ibid.
134
percolation of water. In Delhi, it has been observed for the last several years that as
the water table falls, the contamination of ground water also increases. Extensive
pumping out of depleting ground water will further deteriorate the quality of water,
especially in terms of increase in nitrates and fluorides. 284
Impact on land use and ecology: The EIA of the DMR Phase I agrees that the
change in land use and ecology will have some negative impact - which is not
specified - but the EIA was carried out for a particular route, while the DMRC has
constructed the MR TS on a separate, and longer alignment. Such construction would
significantly alter the land use pattern converting agricultural, residential, and planted
areas into built-up areas. This would significantly impede the natural drainage pattern
of the city. While the EIA does not give any drainage details, it is also obvious that
the actual adverse impacts will differ from the impacts as assessed in EIA. In .
addition, there are already reports of impacts on utility lines, particularly sewerage,
and of vibration on nearby bmldings, which have not been considered at all in the
EIA.2ss
Noise pollution: The EIA acknowledges that during the operation phase, the
Metro workers as well as the commuters would be exposed to high levels of noise
(70-1 OOdb ). Drivers will be exposed to more than 92db of noise and even the
passengers will be exposed to 70-72db of noise level. As the EIA report states, 'The
levels are not comfortable for communication and other functional activities of
commuters and can cause hearing impairment'. Unspecified 'control' measures are
supposed to reduce the level to less than 70db. It should be remembered that the
284 Pritpal Randhawa et al. 2006. Delhi Metro Rail: A New Mode of "Public" Transport. New Delhi: Hazards Centre: 12.
285 Ibid. p.l3.
135
permissible levels in residential areas are much lower at 55db by day and 45 db by
night.286
Seismicity of the Area: The DMR project falls under seismic Zone IV, which
is second in severity only to the highest Zone V and is defined by the Bureau of
Indian Standards as High Damage Risk Zone, meaning that earthquakes of 3 to 6.7
magnitudes on the Richter scale have occurred in the past in the zone. Any seismic
episode may affect the stability of the underground and overhead structures of Metro.
But, curiously enough, the checklist of impacts in the EIA bluntly states that there
will be "no impact" from the risk of earthquake. It accepts the India Meteorological
Department's seismic factor of 0.07 (which was set in the 1930s) to be adequate for
the design of civil engineering structures. It is not mentioned in the EIA how this
factor will be incorporated for the proposed phase nor are the geological faults and
other unstable structures in and around the project area described.287
Oil Pollution: The EIA states that the collected oil from the DMR could be
either sold or incinerated to avoid any water pollution problem. This statement
ignores the possible pollution after its sale or incineration. DMR includes workshops
for maintenance of rolling stock at Khyber Pass, Shastri Park, Nangloi and Badli, of
which Shastri Park is in the fragile ecological zone of the river Yam una. The
Environment Management Plan suggests measures for removal of waste oil at the
source, but no specific treatment, recycling, or disposal provisions have been
mentioned in the EIA 288.
286 Ibid. 16.
2871bid.
288 Ibid. 17.
136
Excavated soil disposal: According to the EIA, the first phase would handle
5.59 million cum of excavated soil, which would be disposed of in 6 different sites
including 2 sites in the Ridge area, which are under reserve forest. The potential
conversion of disposal sites into wastelands and pollution of the groundwater,
particularly in the fractured terrain of the Ridge, have not been considered in the
EIA.289
Waste from maintenance of DMR: There is no treatment and disposal facility
for the wastewater generated from washing of coaches. An automatic washing facility
has been installed at Shastri Nagar, but the treatment of the wastewater has not been
specified. Thus, there is every possibility of all the wastewater draining into the river
Yamuna.290
Displacing the Marginalised for Construction
According to the EIA, 2502 slum clusters were supposed to be rehabilitated
due to the project.291 The construction of Phase I was completed in 2005, but no
credible and verifiable data exists on how many people were displaced during the
construction. As per the data acquired through the Right to Information Act, 2005
from the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD), 699 slum squatter families
inhabiting the land owned by the MCD were displaced for the construction of Phase I
of DMR. Table 4. 7 below gives the details of the clusters demolished and families
relocated in this process.
289 Ibid.
290 Ibid.
291 Government of India (GOI). 1995. Environment Impact Assessment for Integrated Multi Modal Mass Rapid Transport System for Delhi. New Delhi: RITES: 58.
137
Table4.7
Relocation by MCD due the construction of Phase I of DMR
Year Name of cluster Relocated families Relocation Site
1999-2000 Makki Sarai 271 Narela
1999-2000 Shahdara Railway Station 21 Narela
1999-2000 Shastri Park 120 Narela
1999-2000 Taj Colony 65 Narela
2000-2001 JJ Cluster Pul Bangash 71 Tikri Khurd
2000-2001 Seelampur 14 Bhalswa
2000-2001 JJ Cluster Thomson Road 15 Narela
2000-2001 JJ Cluster Amba Bagh 10 Bhalaswa
2003-2004 Bhai Veer Singh Marg, Gole 82 Holambi Kalan
Market
Total 669
Source: Government of NatiOnal Capttal Terntory of Delht (GNCTD). 2005. NO. SD/JJ/RIA/05/052, Municipal Corporation ofDelhi, New Delhi, 10 January.
There is no data available regarding the displacement of people inhabiting the
land owned by the DDA, Railways or any other agencies. Since the EIA report of
1995 is applicable to only some of the sections of the present Phase I of the project,
and there have been ad-hoc extensions into other areas, there is a possibility that
many more families would have been displaced. Furthermore the EIA does not even
mention anything about the demolition and displacement unfolding in the process of
property development along the DMR corridors. The Map below shows that there
were several slum clusters that were demolished during the construction of Phase I of
the DMR, as much as those that would be demolished during the construction of
Phase II.
138
Figure 4.2
Demolitions due to the construction of Phase I and II of DMR
Source: Pritpal Randhawa et al. 2006. Delhi DMR Rai l: A New Mode of·'Public" Transport. New Delhi : Hazards Centre: 19.
Any Resettlement and Rehabilitation Plan requires a complete listing of all the
affected families and their socio-economic condition . 2.502 slum clusters in
unauthorised areas, 195 permanent (pucca) houses, 292 permanent shops. and 3 71
temporary shops houses with a total population of 10. 788 people were supposed to
be displaced because of acquisi tion of land for the project. 292 However, fo r the
purposes of the EIA, only an 8 percent sample of the a ffected families was taken to
determine their profile. Even this statistically insignificant sample indicates that more
than 75 percent of the families had been living at the land acquisition site for more
than 7 years (that is, from before 1988), and over 92 percent were on the voters' list,
~92 Ib id. XV .
139
while almost 89 percent held ration cards for the specified areas. However, in spite of
this long record of settlement, the level of insecurity can be gauged from the fact that
only 15 percent had built pucca houses, and merely 9 percent had their own toilets.
In spite of this perceptible level of sub-standard living, the EIA states rather
glibly, 'potable drinking water is available to all families' (although only 44 percent
is from hand pumps), 'medical facilities are available for all' (63 percent from private
doctors), and 'education facilities are utilized by 89.5 percent' (with enrollment
dropping rapidly from 56 percent at the primary school level to 6.1 percent at the
college level). A more realistic estimate is that 50 percent of the people work as
casual labourers and 86 percent fall in the 'low income group of less than Rs 18,000
per annum', of which 76 percent is spent on routine items such as food and
clothing.293 For this unfortunate population, DMRC has set aside the princely amount
of Rs 45,000 per family for construction of 'new jhuggies' (slum clusters),294 where
'reasonable and adequate community facilities' will be provided. But, the EIA makes
no attempt to analyse the impact on livelihoods and services when this population
was eventually relocated to a distant area in the peripheries.
Curtailing and De-routing Buses
Buses are the main mode of public transport in the city at present, catering to
the travel needs of more than 60 percent of commuters. The majority of this 60
percent consists of the city's working poor. Buses provide this population with cheap
and affordable transport through an extensive network of approximately 800 different
routes, which provides wide range of coverage it provides, in comparison to the
293 Ibid. 47-54.
294 Ibid. 98.
140
limited network of DMR routes. Since the completion of Phase I of DMR, it has
impacted negatively on the bus system by reducing the number of routes.
There are a number of figures to prove that buses plying on routes· along the
DMR line have been asked to be deliberately taken off. The DMRC demanded that
the Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC) and State Road Transport Authority (STA)
de-route buses on the routes parallel to the DMR. Table 4.8 and Table 4.9 show the
details of the routes affected due to the induction of the DMR.
Table 4.8
DTC buses affected due to DMR
Route No. No. of buses affected
Discontinued routes 247 9
132 -167 -
Routes curtailed up to Metro 817 13
832 10
405 10
805 2
61 1
Routes extended up to Metro 778 3
801 4
915 2
927 1
968 1
Routes diverted through Metro station 233 1
917 1
Total 15 58
Source: Government of National Capital Terntory of Delht (GNCTD). 2006. NO. TRISH/RIA/06/161, Delhi Transport Corporation, New Delhi, December
141
Table 4.9
ST A buses affected due to DMR
Route No. No of buses affected
Route curtailed 832 29
817 61
Route cancelled 247 16
Total 3 106
Source: Government ofNat10nal Capttal Terntory ofDelht (GNCTD). 2006. NO. TR/SH/RIA/06/161. New Delhi: Delhi Transport Corporation, December.
Until March 2006, 15 routes of DTC and 3 routes of STA adjacent to DMR
routes have been affected. 106 buses of ST A and 58 buses of DTC have been
curtailed, de-routed or cancelled.
There could be two reasons behind this process. Firstly, as mentioned earlier,
the DMR ridership figures are almost three fourth below the expectation for Phase I.
Therefore it is possible that buses are being curtailed or de-routed to force bus users
to commute on the DMR. Secondly, as we know that Delhi is being reshaped to
transmute into a world-class city, the public transport in the city is also being
gentrified to suite the needs of a the agenda of 'world-class city', which means the
replacement of bad looking DTC and blueline buses with the posh and world-class
look ofthe DMR.
Keeping the Fare Structure Higher than Public Buses
The poor are also impacted because the DMR has a much higher fare structure
than public buses. Even while it claims to be the most efficient and feasible mode of
public transport in the city, it is not affordable to the majority of the commuters. The
Table 4.10 below gives the details ofthe DMR and bus fare.
142
Table 4.10
Comparison ofDMR and DTCFare (in Rs)
NoofKm DMR DTC
1-2 6 3
2-4 8 3
4-6 9 5
6-9 11 5
9-12 12 7
12-15 13 10
15-18 14 10
18-21 15 10
21-24 16 10
24-27 17 10
27-30 18 10
30-33 19 10
33-36 20 10
36-39 21 10
Over 39 22 10
Source: I) http://dtc.mc.m/dt3.htm 2) Staff Reporter. 2005. New Line, New Rate. Times of India. 25 Dec, New Delhi.
The DMR has a fare structure with a minimum ticket price of Rs 6 and
maximum ofRs 22 as compared to the public buses' minimum ofRs 3 and maximum
of Rs 10. This means that the DMR does not really attract low-income group
commuters who travel short distances. It only attracts the commuters who travel for
long distances. It has to be noted that there has been a significant increase in the fare ·
of the DMR after the completion of the third line of Phase I. Earlier the maximum
143
fare was Rs 14 and after the completion of third line in 2005 it is Rs 22. It could be
argued that the fare should increase because the network has increased. This means
that each time the network increases there will be a rise in fares. But since the DMR
is projected as a mode of public transportation, the fare cannot be increased arbitrarily
merely on the basis of an increase in the network.
Depriving the Marginalised without any Concession
Normally, any mode of public transportation offers concessional fares to its
commuters. In Delhi, the DTC offers seven different categories of passes, namely
student pass, resettlement colony pass, general all route pass, police all route pass,
press all route pass, senior citizens pass and free pass, to different sections of
commuters. In contrast, the DMR does not offer any concessional scheme to its
commuters. All it offers in the name of concession is a 10 percent bonus travel on
Smart Cards, which are cards that require a minimum purchase of Rs. 50 and can be
used for multiple trips until they require recharging295• Table 4.11 below gives the
details of these categories.
295 Times News Network. 2005. New metro takes in Rs 21 lakh on Day 2. Times of India. July 5, New Delhi:
144
\_ ~-Table 4.11
Concession Scheme in DTC and DMR
S. No Type of Concessional Passes in DTC Charges Concession in metro (in Rs)
1. Student Passes
a) Monthly Destination 13/-
b) All Route Passes 13/-
c) All Route (G.L.S.) 55/-
d) All Route Ordinary Pass 150/-
2. a) Resettlement Colony 0 to 10 km. 501- No passes for any
b) Resettlement Colony Above 10 km. 100/- category of commuters.
3. General All Route Passes (G.L.S) 450/- Only 1 0 percent bonus
4. Police All Route Passes 400/- travel on smart cards for
5. Press All Route Passes 100/-all categories of
6. Senior Citizens (All Route G.L.S.) 50/-commuters.
7. Free Passes
a.) Disabled Persons
b.) Freedom Fighters with one Attendant
c.) Sportsman (International)
d.) National Awardees
e.) War Widows and their Dependents
f.) MLAs/MPs of Delhi with Attendant
.. Source: http://dtc.mc.m/dt3.htm#3
Thus, it could be argued that by keeping the fare structure higher than public
buses and by not keeping any concessional scheme, DMR is not only denying the
right of vulnerable sections of the city access to travel on a 'fast' and 'efficient'
145
public transportation system, but it is also transforming what was previously a right to
low cost movement into a consumer choice by forcing people to commute on it by
curtailing or de-routing the bus service on DMR adjacent routes.
Conclusion
The DMR, as argued, cannot be understood, located nor its impacts calculated
merely as a technological system. Rather, the DMR was designed, crafted and
structured to address the unique pressures that were generated following the attempts
to transform the city of Delhi into a globalised urban space: a 'world-class' city that
was now intended to express the need for a faster 'turn-over time' for neo.:liberal
capital. A fresh template for capitalist accumulation, marked by the economic
dominance of financial services, hyper-consumption, real estate speculation and the
unprecedented growth of the white collar middle class. The DMR, put differently,
gives expression to the need for this new spatio-temporal fix, in which neo-liberal
economic practices are made possible by encouraging different kinds of mobility
through a 'modern' capital intensive transportation technology.
The new regime ofneo-liberal economy for post-1991 Delhi, however, is not
merely about acquiring speed and the technical imperatives for enabling mass transit.
The DMR in essence is meant to carry out several unstated political and social
objectives. Chiefly, as I have argued, it has enabled a version of gentrification
through displacement or enclosure and sought to transform a part of Delhi's urban.
landscape into a site for real estate speculation. That is, the DMR has systematically
carried out a double dispossession involving the eviction of slum clusters and the
urban poor along its routes as well as the pricing out of the underclass from access to
speed and faster mobility through its restrictive fare structure. Thus, one could argue
146
that the DMR has reinforced the economic dominance of the middle class as the
beneficiaries of the new economy. Secondly, as part of its social project, the DMR
has shaped its route as essentially a zone for real estate speculation. A landscape, in
other words, that feeds into the logic of gentrification and serves to tum urban lands
into commodities for extreme speculation. In sum, the DMR must be explained and
explored as much for its technological effects as it must be understood for its
political, economic and social imperatives. The DMR, thus, is tied in more ways than
one to the great neo-liberal churning and transformation of the city of Delhi.
147