chapter 9 analysis of the case studies:...
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CHAPTER 9
ANALYSIS OF THE CASE STUDIES: EVIDENCES FOR
SUPPORT OF HYPOTHESIS
The previous chapters 5 to 8 deals with turnaround cases, which is developed by the researcher
as illustrative cases based on the findings in Chapter 4. The cases illustrated are two successful
turnarounds in each public and private sectors in Karnataka and two unsuccessful turnarounds
each in public and private sector organisations in Karnataka. In the present chapter the researcher
has made an endeavor to compare the published companies� findings with the illustrative cases.
Thus, an attempt has been made to compare the causes of sickness and turnaround strategies of
published companies and illustrative cases of both public and private sector which are both
successful and unsuccessful and to prove the hypothesis stated in the research design.
For illustrating the cases in the chapters 5 to 8, the data-collection was carried out through
interview schedule. The researcher visited eight organizations in Karnataka and carried
interviews with the people involved in the turnarounds. The interview covered mainly three
categories of people namely, (1) the lower level employees (2) middle level personnel from
various departments involved in turnarounds, and (3) members of the top management. In all, the
researcher visited over eight locations across the state and interviewed more than 80 people over
a period of the study. The interview schedules were conducted around a variety of causes and
turnaround strategies, as listed in Appendix 6.
The interview data was further supplemented by secondary data from the internal documents and
records of the respective companies. An in-depth eight case studies analysis was carried out to
identify the causes of sickness and turnaround strategies among the eight case studies which
were developed. The analysis of the two categories revealed causal variables of industrial
sickness and turnaround strategies. A frequency count of each such causes and turnaround
strategies along with their percentages for each group is given in Table-2.
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Commonly observed causes of sickness
Hypothesis-1: External causes of organisational sickness can adversely affect an organization�s
health only if the organisation is internally weak with respect to the systems and competencies in
dealing with the developments in the external environment.
Table 9.1. Table showing the commonly observed causes of Industrial sickness of Illustrative cases
Item Causal factor no.
Number
(N=8)
%
1 IC1: Ambitious expansion 8 100
2 IC2: High cost of debt due to escalation of projects 4 50
3 IC3:slow initial growth 4 50
4 IC4: Poor financial structure 6 75
5 IC5: Poor marketing strategy 6 75
6 IC6: Incompetent management 7 87.5
7 IC7: Obsolete technology 8 100
8 IC8: High operating cost 6 75
9 IC9: High non-performing assets(NPA�s) 6 75
10 IC10: Inadequate capital 5 62.5
11 IC11: Operating Inefficiency 6 75
12 IC12: Large investment in new product line 6 75
13 IC13: Inefficient workers 7 87.5
14 IC14: Poor market demand 5 62.5
15 IC15: Low quality production 5 62.5
16 IC16: Low capacity utilisation 6 75
17 IC17: Low sales turnover 8 100
18 IC18: drop in exports 6 75
19 IC19: Fall in share Prices 5 62.5
20 IC20: Delay in projects 4 50
21 IC21: Excess employees 8 100
22 IC22: Huge stock of inventory 8 100
23 IC23: Low employee morale 6 75
24 IC24: High employee cost 4 50
25 IC25: Lack of liquidity 7 87.5
26 IC26: Improper utilisation of funds 8 100
27 IC27: Lack of market orientation 6 75
28 EC1: High input cost 8 100
29 EC2: Dumping from overseas market 5 62.5
30 EC3: Competitive advantage 5 62.5
31 EC4: High interest Cost 6 75
32 EC5: Market recession and lack of demand 4 50
33 EC6: Government constraints 4 50
34 EC7: Changes in the needs and demands of the customer 8 100
35 EC8: Forex fluctuations and weakening of rupee 2 25
36 EC9: Stagnant price of product 3 37.5
From the above table 9.1 it is evident that majority of the causes of sickness are internal to the
organization, adding up for 27 out of 36 causes. The various internal causes of sickness are IC1-
ambitious expansion, IC2-High cost of debt due to escalation of project, IC3-slow initial growth,
IC4-Poor financial structure, IC5-poor marketing strategy, IC6-incompetent management, IC7-
obsolete technology, IC8-high operating cost, IC9-high nonperforming assets(NPA�s), IC10-
poor capital, IC11-operating inefficiencies, IC12-large investment in new product line, IC13-
inefficient workers, IC14-poor market demand, IC15- quality production, IC16-low capacity
utilization, IC17-Low turnover/sales, IC18-drop in exports, IC19-depression in capital markets,
IC20-delay in projects IC21-heavily overstaffed, IC22-huge stock of inventory, IC23-low
employee morale, IC24-high employee cost, IC25-lack of liquidity, IC26-improper utilization of
funds, IC27-lack of market orientation. While, only 9 out of 36 are external causes of Industrial
sickness. The various external causes of sickness are EC1-high input cost, EC2-dumping from
overseas market, EC3-competitive advantage, EC4-high interest cost, EC5-Market recession and
lack of demand, EC6-Regulations by the government, EC7-Changes in the needs and demands of
the customer, EC8-Foreign exchange fluctuations and weakening of rupee, EC9-Stagnant price
of the Product.
Graph 9.1.a Graph showing the commonly observed internal causes of Industrial sickness
of Illustrative cases
Graph 9.1.b Graph showing the commonly observed external causes of Industrial sickness
of Illustrative cases
This proves the hypothesis 1 in both illustrative cases that there is a relationship between internal
weakness and the impact of external causes and is supported by Table 9.1, Graph 9.1.a and
Graph 9.1.b
Hypothesis-2: Multiplicity of causes can be a major reason for turnaround failures; organisations
that are afflicted by one or a few causes are likely to experience greater success in turnaround.
Table 9.2: Table showing the comparative Principal factors of causal variables of successful and unsuccessful turnarounds of illustrative cases
Sl.
No.
Causal factor no. and name with variable descriptions
Successful Turnarounds
Unsuccessful Turnarounds
Number
(N=4)
%
Number
(N=4)
%
Factor-1 (C1): Growth unsupported by resources and demand
1 IC4: High debt equity 2 50 4 100
2 IC19: Fall in share Prices 1 25 4 100
3 EC4: High interest Cost 2 50 4 100
4 IC9: High non-performing assets(NPA�s) 2 50 4 100
5 IC1: Ambitious expansion 4 100 4 100
6 IC2: High cost of debt due to escalation of projects 1 50 3 75
Factor-2 (C2): Recessionary conditions
7 EC5: Market recession and lack of demand 1 25 3 75
8 EC9: Stagnant price of product 1 25 3 75
9 IC12: Large investment in new product line 2 50 4 100
Factor-3 (C3): Operational inefficiency
10 IC25: Lack of liquidity 3 75 4 100
11 EC6: Government constraints 1 25 3 75
12 IC11: Operating Inefficiency 2 50 4 100
Factor-4 (C4): Inadequate utilisation of resources
13 IC21: Excess employees 4 100 4 100
14 IC10: Inadequate capital 4 100 4 100
15 IC22: Huge stock of inventory 4 100 4 100
16 IC16: Low capacity utilisation 2 50 4 100
17 IC26: Improper utilisation of funds 4 100 4 100
Factor -5 (C5): Low proactiveness vis-à-vis market and technology
18 IC14: Poor market demand 1 25 4 100
19 IC7: Obsolete technology 4 100 4 100
20 IC5: Poor market strategy 2 50 4 100
21 IC17: Low sales turnover 4 100 4 100
Factor-6 (C6): Poor adaptability
22 EC8: Forex fluctuations and weakening of rupee 1 25 2 50
23 IC16: Drop in exports 2 50 4 100
24 IC6: Incompetent management 3 75 4 100
25 EC1: High input cost 4 100 4 100
26 IC27: Lack of market orientation 2 50 4 100
27 IC13: Inefficient workers 4 100 4 100
It is clear from table 9.2 that almost 22 causes of industrial sickness out of 27 are prevalent in all
four unsuccessful turnarounds illustrative cases, while 9 out of 27 causes of sickness are
prevalent in all four successful turnaround illustrative cases. This indicates that 82% of the
causes of sickness are prevalent in all four unsuccessful turnarounds illustrative cases, while only
33% of the causes of sickness are prevalent in successful turnarounds illustrative cases, which
makes it very difficult for organizations with multiple causes of industrial sickness to turnaround
which proves the hypothesis in the illustrative cases also that unsuccessful cases have large
number of causes than the successful cases.
Graph 9.2. a. Graph showing the comparative principal factor-1 of causal variables of
successful and unsuccessful turnarounds of illustrative cases
Graph 9.2 b. Graph showing the comparative principal factor-2 of causal variables of
successful and unsuccessful turnarounds of illustrative cases
Graph 9.2 c. Graph showing the comparative principal factor-3 of causal variables of
successful and unsuccessful turnarounds of illustrative cases
Graph 9.2 d. Graph showing the comparative principal factor-4 of causal variables of
successful and unsuccessful turnarounds of illustrative cases
Graph 9.2 e. Graph showing the comparative principal factor-5 of causal variables of
successful and unsuccessful turnarounds of illustrative cases
9.2 f. Graph showing the comparative principal factor-6 of causal variables of successful
and unsuccessful turnarounds of illustrative cases
ii. A Comparative Analysis of Successful and Unsuccessful Cases of Turnaround
Hypothesis-3: Lean management strategy is likely to be used more frequently by successful
turnarounds than unsuccessful ones.
Hypothesis-4: As the most characteristic feature of a sick organisation is the cash crunch, Cost
management strategies are likely to be used more frequently by successful turnarounds than
unsuccessful ones.
Hypothesis-5: Refocussing on core business as well as customers is likely to be used more by all
turnaround efforts in an attempt to regain their erstwhile market position. However, finding and
developing markets make be more characteristic of successful turnarounds.
Hypothesis-6: Strategies for increasing operational efficiencies in the existing operations are
likely to be used more or less equally by both successful turnarounds and unsuccessful
turnarounds. However, investments in R&D for improving existing technologies and/or
developing new technologies are likely to be used more frequently by the successful ones.
Hypothesis-7: Corporate restructuring and image building are likely to be used more or less
equally by both successful and unsuccessful turnarounds.
Table 9.3: Table showing the commonly observed turnaround strategies in illustrative cases
Item Strategy variables of turnaround Number
(N=8)
Percentage
1 MS1- Innovative Marketing Strategies 3 37.5
2 MS2-reassessment of product mix 6 75
3 MS3-transition from seller market to buyers market 5 62.5
4 MS4-focus on core markets 8 100
5 MS5- entering newer markets 2 25
6 MS6-focus on promotional activities 5 62.5
7 MS7-aggressive pricing 6 75
8 MS8-entering newer markets 6 75
9 FS1-Debt restructuring 6 75
10 FS2-Reduction in cost of assets 6 75
11 FS3-efficiency in short term financing 6 75
12 FS4-Infusion of funds 8 100
13 FS5-Cost cutting 5 62.5
14 FS6-Cost of reduction of funds 6 75
15 HRS1-Huge retrenchment 8 100
16 HRS2-employee training 2 25
17 HRS3-Change in the top management 3 37.5
18 HRS4-Incentives to employees 6 75
19 HRS5-Motivating employees 4 50
20 HRS6-Culture building 5 62.5
21 HRS7-Employee involvement 4 50
22 HRS8-information dissemination 8 100
23 POS1-Efficiency measures for operations 7 87.5
24 POS2-Investment in R&D 6 75
25 POS3-reduction in the cost of raw materials 2 25
26 POS4-modernisation 5 62.5
27 POS5- Technical collaboration 5 62.5
28 POS6- Improvement in process 5 62.5
29 CPS1- Corporate social responsibility 5 62.5
30 CPS2-restructure the organisation 7 87.5
Table 9.4: Table showing the Principal factors of strategy variables in successful and unsuccessful turnarounds in illustrative cases
Strategy factor no. and name with variable descriptions
Successful turnarounds
(N=4)
Unsuccessful turnarounds
(N=4)
Factor-1 (S1): Employee engagement
HRS4: Incentives to employees 4 100 2 50
HRS7: Employee involvement 3 75 1 25
HRS5: Motivating employees 3 75 1 25
HRS6: Culture building 4 100 1 25
Factor-2 (S2): Aggressive promotion of products in markets
MS3: Transition from sellers market to buyers market 4 100 1 25
MS6: Focus on promotional activities 4 100 1 25
Factor-3 (S3): Cost management strategies
FS6: Reduction in cost of funds 4 100 2 50
FS5: Cost cutting 4 100 1 25
PS3: Reduction in raw material cost 4 100 2 50
Factor-4 (S4): Investments in new markets and R&D
MS8: Entering new markets 4 100 2 50
POS2: Investment in R&D 4 100 2 50
POS1: Efficiency measures for operations 4 100 3 75
Factor-5 (S5): Focus on core business
FS4: Infusion of funds 4 100 4 100
HRS1: Huge retrenchment 4 100 4 100
MS4: Focus on core business 4 100 4 100
Factor-6 (S6): Changes in product mix and pricing
MS7: Aggressive pricing 4 100 2 50
MS2: Reassessment of product mix 4 100 2 50
Factor-7 (S7): Lean management
FS2: Reduction in assets 4 100 2 50
FS9: Enhance shareholders value 4 100 2 50
FS1: Debt restructuring 4 100 2 50
CPS2: Restructure the organisation 4 100 3 75
FS3: Efficiency in short term financing 4 100 2 50
Factor-8 (S8): Image building
HRS8: Information Dissemination 4 100 4 100
From Table No. 9.4 it is evident that Factor-7 (S7): Lean management which has the variables
FS2: Reduction in assets, FS9: Enhance shareholders value, FS1: Debt restructuring, CPS2:
Restructure the organization and FS3: Efficiency in short term financing are used by all the four
illustrative successful turnaround cases, while on an aggregate less than 2 out of 4 (50%) of the
unsuccessful companies use this strategy for turnaround. This proves the hypothesis-3 that, lean
management strategy is likely to be used more frequently by successful turnarounds than
unsuccessful ones is evident in the illustrative cases also.
Table No. 9.4 also shows that Factor-3 (S3): Cost management strategies whose variables are
FS6: Reduction in cost of funds, FS5: Cost cutting and PS3: Reduction in raw material cost are
used by all the four(100%) illustrative successful turnaround cases, while on an aggregate less
than 2 out of 4 (50%) of the unsuccessful companies use this strategy for turnaround, which
proves the hypothesis 4 that the most characteristic feature of a sick organisation is the cash
crunch and that Cost management strategies are likely to be used more frequently by successful
turnarounds than unsuccessful ones is also seen in the illustrative cases as well.
Table No. 9.4 also states that Factor-5 (S5): Focus on core business whose variables are FS4:
Infusion of funds, HRS1: Huge retrenchment and MS4: Focus on core business which used by all
the eight illustrative successful and unsuccessful turnaround cases, while on an aggregate less
than 2 out of 4 (50%) of the unsuccessful companies use Factor-4 (S4): Investments in new
markets and R&D, whose variables are MS8: Entering new markets, POS2: Investment in R&D
and POS1: Efficiency measures for operation, which proves the hypothesis that the hypothesis-
5, which states that Refocussing on core business as well as customers is likely to be used more
by all turnaround efforts in an attempt to regain their erstwhile market position. However,
finding and developing markets make be more characteristic of successful turnarounds is seen in
the illustrative cases also.
It is evident from the Table 9.4 that all the 4 (100%) illustrative cases in the successful
turnarounds and 3 out of 4 (75%) illustrative cases in unsuccessful turnarounds adopt
improvement in operational efficiencies in the existing operations. This supports the hypothesis-
6 that strategies for increasing operational efficiencies in the existing operations are likely to be
used more or less equally by both successful turnarounds and unsuccessful turnarounds. While,
investment in R&D is used by all 4 (100%) of the illustrative cases in the successful turnarounds
and only 2 out of 4 (50%)of the illustrative unsuccessful turnarounds adopt this strategy. This
proves the second part of hypothesis-6 that investments in R&D for improving existing
technologies and/or developing new technologies are likely to be used more frequently by the
successful ones.
It is evident from the Table 9.4 that all four illustrative successful turnarounds and 3 out of 4
(75%) illustrative unsuccessful turnarounds use corporate restructuring as their turnaround
strategies. While all the four illustrative cases each in successful and unsuccessful turnarounds
adopt image building as their strategies for turnarounds. This proves the hypothesis-7 that
corporate restructuring and image building are likely to be used more or less equally by both
successful and unsuccessful turnarounds.
Graph 9.3.a: Graph showing the commonly observed turnaround strategies in illustrative
cases Marketing (M) and Financial(F).
Graph 9.3.b: Graph showing the commonly observed turnaround strategies in illustrative
cases Human Resources (HR), Production (POS and Corporate Planning(CP)
Graph 9.4.a: Graph showing the principal factor-1 of strategy variables in successful and
unsuccessful turnarounds in illustrative cases
Graph 9.4.b: Graph showing the principal factor-2 of strategy variables in successful and
unsuccessful turnarounds in illustrative cases
Graph 9.4.c: Graph showing the principal factor-3 of strategy variables in successful and
unsuccessful turnarounds in illustrative cases
Graph 9.4.d: Graph showing the principal factor-4 of strategy variables in successful and
unsuccessful turnarounds in illustrative cases
Graph 9.4.e: Graph showing the principal factor-5 of strategy variables in successful and
unsuccessful turnarounds in illustrative cases
Graph 9.4.f: Graph showing the principal factor-6 of strategy variables in successful and
unsuccessful turnarounds in illustrative cases
Graph 9.4.g: Graph showing the principal factor-7 of strategy variables in successful and
unsuccessful turnarounds in illustrative cases
Graph 9.4.h: Graph showing the principal factor-8 of strategy variables in successful and
unsuccessful turnarounds in illustrative cases
iii. A Comparative Analysis of Private and Public Sector Turnarounds
Hypothesis-8: Sickness in the public sector may be caused more by exogenous factor such as
governance structure, stakeholder complexities and resource inadequacy, whereas in the private
sector the causes may relate more to internal inefficiencies aggravated by general economic
conditions.
Table 9.5: Table showing the Principal factors of causal variables in private and public sector turnarounds in illustrative cases
Sl.
No.
Causal factor no. and name with variable descriptions
Private sector Turnaround(N=4)
Public sector Turnarounds(N=4)
Number % Number %
Factor-1 (C1): Growth unsupported by resources and demand
1 IC4: High debt equity 4 100 2 50
2 IC19: Fall in share Prices 4 100 2 50
3 EC4: High interest Cost 4 100 2 50
4 IC9: High non-performing assets(NPA�s) 3 75 3 75
5 IC1: Ambitious expansion 3 75 2 50
6 IC2: High cost of debt due to escalation of projects
2 50 2 50
Factor-2 (C2): Recessionary conditions
7 EC5: Market recession and lack of demand 3 75 1 25
8 EC9: Stagnant price of product 3 75 1 25
9 IC12: Large investment in new product line 4 100 4 100
Factor-3 (C3): Operational inefficiency
10 IC25: Lack of liquidity 4 100 1 25
11 EC6: Government constraints 3 75 1 25
12 IC11: Operating Inefficiency 4 100 2 50
Factor-4 (C4): Inadequate utilisation of resources
13 IC21: Excess employees 4 100 4 100
14 IC10: Inadequate capital 4 100 4 100
15 IC22: Huge stock of inventory 4 100 4 100
16 IC16: Low capacity utilisation 4 100 2 50
17 IC26: Improper utilisation of funds 4 100 4 100
Factor -5 (C5): Low proactiveness vis-à-vis market and technology
18 IC14: Poor market demand 3 75 2 50
19 IC7: Obsolete technology 4 100 4 100
20 IC5: Poor market strategy 4 100 2 50
21 IC17: Low sales turnover 4 100 4 100
Factor-6 (C6): Poor adaptability
22 EC8: Forex fluctuations and weakening of rupee
3 75 0 0
23 IC16: Drop in exports 4 100 2 50
24 IC6: Incompetent management 3 75 1 25
25 EC1: High input cost 4 100 4 100
26 IC27: Lack of market orientation 4 100 2 50
27 IC13: Inefficient workers 4 100 4 100
From Table 9.5, it is evident that majority of causes of sickness in the public sector are not
exogenous in nature, which does support the first part of hypothesis 8. However, the second part
of the hypothesis 8 is supported, which was about the private sector being more affected by
external causes of sickness .Thus, majority of private sector organizations have been affected by
external causes of sickness. Wherein, 3 out of 4 (75%) private sector organizations have
operational inefficiency and recessionary conditions as the prominent causes of sickness. This
does not support the hypothesis-8 that public sector cases have causes of sickness as exogenous
in nature. While, the second part of the hypothesis is supported.
Graph 9.5.a: Graph showing the Principal factor-1 of causal variables in private and public
sector turnarounds in illustrative cases
Graph 9.5.b: Graph showing the Principal factor-2 of causal variables in private and
public sector turnarounds in illustrative cases
Graph 9.5.c: Graph showing the Principal factor-3 of causal variables in private and public
sector turnarounds in illustrative cases
Graph 9.5.d: Graph showing the Principal factor-4 of causal variables in private and
public sector turnarounds in illustrative cases
Graph 9.5.e: Graph showing the Principal factor-5 of causal variables in private and public
sector turnarounds in illustrative cases
Graph 9.5.f: Graph showing the Principal factor-6 of causal variables in private and public
sector turnarounds in illustrative cases
Hypothesis-9: Employee engagement strategy is likely to be used more frequently by public
sector turnarounds than private sector ones.
Hypothesis-10: Since public sector organisations often have monopoly positions in the market
they are traditionally known to be lethargic about product quality and promotion. However, in a
turnaround situation they have to have special focus on these two critical aspects for regaining
market acceptance. Hence, we propose that there would be a greater focus on changing product
mix, pricing and promotion in the public sector compared to private which have been active in
these matters.
Hypothesis-11: Public and private sector organisations are unlikely to differ in the substantive
turnaround strategies relating to cost and lean management strategies, focus on core business,
investments in markets and R&D and image building.
Table 9.6: Table showing the Principal factors of strategy variables in private and public sector turnarounds in illustrative cases
Strategy factor no. and name with variable descriptions Private sector turnarounds
(N=4)
Public sector turnarounds
(N=4)
Factor-1 (S1): Employee engagement % %
HRS4: Incentives to employees 3 75 3 75
HRS7: Employee involvement 2 50 2 50
HRS5: Motivating employees 2 50 2 50
HRS6: Culture building 2 50 2 50
Factor-2 (S2): Aggressive promotion of products in markets
MS3: Transition from sellers market to buyers market 2 50 3 75
MS6: Focus on promotional activities 2 50 3 75
Factor-3 (S3): Cost management strategies
FS6: Reduction in cost of funds 3 75 3 75
FS5: Cost cutting 2 50 3 75
POS3: Reduction in raw material cost 3 75 3 75
Factor-4 (S4): Investments in new markets and R&D
MS8: Entering new markets 3 75 3 75
POS2: Investment in R&D 3 75 3 75
POS1: Efficiency measures for operations 4 100 3 75
Factor-5 (S5): Focus on core business
FS4: Infusion of funds 3 75 3 75
HRS1: Huge retrenchment 3 75 3 75
MS4: Focus on core business 3 75 3 75
Factor-6 (S6): Changes in product mix and pricing
MS7: Aggressive pricing 2 50 4 100
MS2: Reassessment of product mix 2 50 4 100
Factor-7 (S7): Lean management
FS2: Reduction in assets 3 75 3 75
FS9: Enhance shareholders value 3 75 3 75
FS1: Debt restructuring 3 75 3 75
CPS2: Restructure the organisation 4 100 3 75
FS3: Efficiency in short term financing 3 75 3 75
Factor-8 (S8): Image building
HRS8: Information Dissemination 4 100 4 100
It is evident from Table 9.6 that Factor-1 (S1): Employee engagement which involves the
variables HRS4: Incentives to employees, HRS7: Employee involvement HRS5: Motivating
employees and HRS6: Culture building is used by almost same number of illustrative public and
private cases. That is, almost 3 out of 4 (75%) private and public sector illustrative cases use
these strategies for turnarounds. This does not supports the hypothesis that public sector would
be using employee engagement more frequently than the private sector in the illustrative cases.
It is also evident from Table 9.6 that Factor-6 (S6): Changes in product mix and pricing which
consists of variables MS7: Aggressive pricing and MS2: Reassessment of product mix is used by
all 4 (100%) of public sector illustrative cases and 2 out of 4 (50%) private sector illustrative
cases. Similarly, Factor-2 (S2): Aggressive promotion of products in markets which consists of
variables MS3: Transition from sellers market to buyers market and MS6: Focus on promotional
activities is used by almost 3 out of 4 (75%) public sector illustrative cases and 2 out of 4 (50%)
private sector illustrative cases. This supports the hypothesis-10 that public sectors are coming
out of their lethargic position in product quality, and promotion and that there was significant
differences in favour of the public sector with reference to the two relevant strategies changes in
product mix and pricing, and aggressive promotion of products in markets.
It is also evident from Table 9.6 that Factor-3 (S3): Cost management strategies which consists
of variables - FS6: Reduction in cost of funds, FS5: Cost cutting POS3: Reduction in raw
material cost is present in almost 3 out of 4 (75%) private and public illustrative cases.
Factor-4 (S4): Investments in new markets and R&D which consists of variables- MS8: Entering
new markets, POS2: Investment in R&D and POS1: Efficiency measure for operations is present
almost in 3 out of 4 (75%) private and public illustrative cases.
Factor-5 (S5): Focus on core business which consists of variables - FS4: Infusion of funds,
HRS1: Huge retrenchment and MS4: Focus on core business is present in 3 out of 4(75%)
private and public illustrative cases.
Factor-7 (S7): Lean management which consists of variables - FS2: Reduction in assets, FS9:
Enhance shareholders value, FS1: Debt restructuring, CPS2: Restructure the organization and
FS3: Efficiency in short term financing is present in 3 out of 4 (75%) private and public
illustrative cases.
Factor-8 (S8): Image building which consist of a variable -HRS8: Information Dissemination is
present in all 4 (100%) private and public illustrative cases. This supports the hypothesis that
there is no difference in a few substantive turnaround strategies namely cost and lean
management strategies, focus on core business, investment in markets and R&D, and image
building in the illustrative cases.
Graph 9.6.a: Graph showing the Principal factor-1 of strategy variables in private and
public sector turnarounds in illustrative cases
Graph 9.6.b: Graph showing the Principal factor-2 of strategy variables in private and
public sector turnarounds in illustrative cases
Graph 9.6.c.: Graph showing the Principal factor-3 of strategy variables in private and
public sector turnarounds in illustrative cases
Graph 9.6.d.: Graph showing the Principal factor-4 of strategy variables in private and
public sector turnarounds in illustrative cases
Graph 9.6.e.: Graph showing the Principal factor-5 of strategy variables in private and
public sector turnarounds in illustrative cases
Graph 9.6.f.: Graph showing the Principal factor-6 of strategy variables in private and
public sector turnarounds in illustrative cases
Graph 9.6.g.: Graph showing the Principal factor-7 of strategy variables in private and
public sector turnarounds in illustrative cases
Graph 9.6.h.: Graph showing the Principal factor-8 of strategy variables in private and
public sector turnarounds in illustrative cases
Based on the information mentioned under different tables and Graphs it is evident that the illustrative
cases developed in public and private, successful and unsuccessful turnarounds, analyzed matches with
the hypothesis developed and proved under chapter 4.