chapter 5 interpretation of words and phrases

5/27/2018 Chapter 5 Interpretation of Words and Phrases

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Chapter 5 INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES

A. IN GENERAL5.01 Generally

A word or phrase in a statute may have an ordinary, generic, restricted, technical, legal,commercial or trade meaning. The task involves ascertaining legislative intent primarily from the statute itself and

secondarily, from extraneous and relevant circumstances and, having ascertained it,

construing the word or phrase in such a way as to effectuate such intent.

GENERAL RULE: In interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used in the law, acareful review of the whole law involved, as well as the intendment of the law, ascertained

from a consideration of the statue as a whole and not of an isolated part or a particular

provision alone, must be made to determine the real intent of the law.

Hon. Secretary Vincent Perez vs. LPG Refillers Assn. of the PH

Respondent claims that the penalties imposed in the Circular issued by DOEexceeded the ceiling prescribed by B.P. Blg. 33. It was further contended by the

respondent that the penalties provided in the Circular on a per cylinder basis, is no

longer regulatory, but already confiscatory.

The said Circular was not deemed confiscatory in providing penalties on a percylinder basis. The penalties did not exceed the ceiling prescribed in Section 4 of

B.P. Blg. 33, which penalizes any person who commits any act therein prohibited.

Violation on a per cylinder basis falls within the phrase any act as mandated inSection 4.

The Court held that the use of general term in a statue does not render the lawuncertain, so long as the term is clear or made so from the whole statute.! A criminal statute is not rendered uncertain and void because general terms

are used therein. The lawmakers have no positive constitutional or statutory

duty to define each and every word in an enactment, as long as the legislative

will is clear, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly

expressed in B.P. Blg. 33.

!5.02 Statutory Definition

A statute defines particular words and phrases used therein. The legislative definition controls the meaning of the statutory word, irrespective of any

other meaning the word or phrase may have in its ordinary or usual sense. Where a statute defines a word or phrase employed therein, the word or phrase should

not, by construction, be given a different meaning.

When the term or phrase is specifically defined in a particular law, the definition must beadopted in applying and enforcing such law.

5.03 Qualification of Rule


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The definition is not conclusive as to the meaning of the same word or term as used in otherstatues, particularly with respect to transactions that took place prior to the enactment of the act.

GENERAL RULE:Statutory definitions control the meaning of statutory words; Except:Where its application:

! Creates obvious incongruities in the language of the statute;! Destroys one of its major purposes, or ;! Becomes illogical as a result of a change in its factual basis.

5.04 Words Construed in their ordinary sense

In construing words and phrases used in a statue, GENERAL RULE: In the absence oflegislative intent to the contrary, they should be given their plain, ordinary and common usage

meaning.

Words in a statute should generally be given their ordinary or usual meaning; they should notbe given a strict or limited signification in the absence of a legislative intent to that effect.

Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Issue: Whether a transferee of a forest concession is liable for obligations arising from thetransferors illegal encroachment into another forest concessionaire committed prior to the

transfer.

Sec. 61 of P.D. No. 705 provides that the transferee shall assume all the obligations of thetransferor.

Ruling: In construing statues, the terms used therein are generally to be given theirordinary meaning, that is, such meaning which is ascribed to them when they are

commonly used, to the end that absurdity in the law must be avoided.

! Obligations as used, is construed to mean those obligations incurred by thetransferor in the ordinary course of business.

Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs Court of Appeals

Issue: Whether or not the word lumber is included in the word timber as used in Sec.68 of P.D. No. 705.

Said act penalizes the cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest productswithout a license.

Ruling: Lumber is included in the term timber. The Revised Forestry Code contains nodefinition of either timber or lumber but the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or

common usage. Lumber, defined as, timber or logs after being prepared for the market.

Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.

5.05 General words construed generally

Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda What is generally spoken shall be generallyunderstood or general words shall be understood in a general sense

Generale dictum generaliter est interpretandum A general statement is understood in ageneral sense


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Where a word used in a statute has both a restricted and general meaning, the general mustprevail over the restrictedunlessthe nature of the subject matter or the context in which it is

employed clearly indicates that the limited sense is intended.

5.06 Application of rule

Foreigner in the Election Code prohibiting any foreigner from contributing campaign fundsincludes a juridical person.

Person comprehends private juridical corporation, unless it appears that it is used in a morelimited sense

Judge construed in its generic sense to comprehend all kinds of judges5.07 Generic term includes things that arise thereafter

Progressive Interpretation extends by construction the application of a statute to all subjectsor conditions within its general purpose or scope that come into existence subsequent to its

passage and thus keeps legislation from becoming ephemeral and transitory.

It is a rule of statutory construction that legislative enactments in general and comprehensiveterms, prospective in operation, apply alike to all persons, subjects and business within theirgeneral purview and scope coming into existence subsequent to their passage.

5.08 Words with commercial or trade meaning

Words and phrases, which are in common use among merchants and traders, acquire trade orcommercial meanings which are generally accepted in the community in which they have been

in common use.

In the absence of legislative intent o the contrary, trade or commercial terms, when used in astatue, are presumed to have been used in their trade or commercial sense.

5.09 Words with technical or legal meaning

GENERAL RULE:Words that have, or have been used in, a technical sense or those that havebeen judicially construed to have a certain meaning should be interpreted according to the sense

in which they have been previously used.

The presumption is that the language used in a statue, which has a technical or well-knownlegal meaning, is used in that sense by the legislature.

5.10 How identical terms in same statue construed

GENERAL RULE:A qord or phrase repeatedly used in a statute will bear the same meaningthroughout the statute.

A word or phrase in one part of a statue is to receive the same interpretation when used in everyother part , unless it clearly appears from the context or otherwise that a different meaning isintended.

5.11 Meaning of word qualified by purpose of statute

The meaning of a word or phrase used in a statute may be qualified by the purpose whichinduced the legislature to enact the statute.


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The court should adopt that interpretation that accords best with the manifest purpose of thestatute or promotes or realizes its object.

If a statute is ambiguous and capable of more than one construction, the literal meaning of theword or phrase used therein may be rejected if the result of adopting such meaning will be to

defeat the purpose which the legislature had in mind.

Where the purpose of a statute will be accomplished by giving a word employed therein non-technical sense, its technical or legal meaning will be rejected in favor of that construction

which will effectuate intent or purpose.

5.12 Word or phase construed in relation to other provisions

GENERAL RULE:A word, phrase or provision should not be construed in isolation but mustbe interpreted in relation to other provisions of the law.

The rule is a variation of the rule that a statute should be construed as a whole, and each of itsprovisions must be given effect.

Claudio vs. COMELEC

Issue: Whether the first limitation regarding the one-year period in Sec. 74 of the LocalGovernment Code to the effect that No recall shall take place within one year from the

date of the officials assumption of office or one year immediately preceding a regular

election embraces the entire recall proceedings, such as the preparatory recall assembly,

or only the recall election.

Ruling: Recall refers only to the recall election and not those proceedings prior thereto.The Court stated that since the power vested in the electorate is not the power to initiate

recall proceedings but the power to elect an official into the office.

Garcia vs. COMELEC

Issue: Whether a local resolution of a municipal council can be the subject of an initiativeand referendum. The Constitution requires that the legislature shall provide a system of initiative and

referendum.

The Congress enacted R.A No. 6735 which includes resolutions as among the subjects ofinitiative. However, the Local Government Code, a later law, defines local initiative as

the process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly

propose, enact, or amend any ordinance.

It is claimed that since a resolution is not included in this definition stated above, then thesame cannot be the subject of an initiative.

Ruling: The provision clearly does not limit the application of local initiative toordinances, but to all subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the

Sanggunians to enact, which undoubtedly includes resolutions.

Motoomul vs. Dela Paz

Issue: Whether the word court in Section 5 of R.A. 5434, which reads, Appeal shallnot stay the award, order, ruling decision or judgment unless the officer or body

rendering the same or the court, on motion, after hearing, and on such terms as it may

deem just, should provide otherwise., refer to the Court of Appeals or the trial court.


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Ruling: The word court refers to the trial court. The Court ruled that the lawunequivocally stated its declared objective that appeal shall not stay the appealed

decision, award, order., etc. The exception given is where the officer or body

rendering the same, or the court on motion, after hearing should provide otherwise.

5.13 Meaning of term dictated by context

The context in which the word is used oftentimes determines its meaning. Verba accipienda sunt secundum materiam A word is to be understood in the context in

which it is used.

The context may likewise give a broad sense to a word of otherwise ordinarily limitedmeaning.

It may also limit the meaning of what otherwise is a word or broad signification.5.14 Where the law does not distinguish

Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus Where the law does not distinguish,the court should not distinguish.

General words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural andgeneral significance.

The rule requires that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and onepart distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of the

law.

Courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They shouldadminister the law not as they think It ought to be but as they find it and without regard to

consequences.

Where the legislature has clearly laid down a rule for one class of cases it is not readily tobe supposed that, in the same act, a different rule has been prescribed for another class of

cases within the same as the first.

Guerrero vs. COMELEC

In construing the word qualification mentioned in Art. VI, Sec. 17 of theConstitution.

Petitioner contends that the jurisdiction of HRET as defined in Art. V!, Sec. 17 of theConstitution is limited only to the qualifications prescribed under Art. VI. He claims

that any issue which does not involve these constitutional qualifications is beyond the

realm of the HRET.

Ruling: Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. Thereshould be no distinction in the application of a law where none is indicated.

FIRST: The drafters of the Constitution, in making no qualification in the use of ageneral word or expression, must have intended no distinction at all.

SECOND: Courts could only distinguish where there are facts or circumstancesshowing that the lawgiver intended a distinction or qualification.


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5.15 Illustration of rule.

! Where the statute itself did not make any distinctionRamirez vs. CA

Statute: An Act to Prohibit & Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violationsof Private Communications and Other Purposes

RA 4200 provides: It shall be unlawful, not being authorized by all the parties to anyprivate communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any

other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept or record such

communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone

or dictagraph or dectaphone, or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise

described.

Issue: Whether violation thereof refers to the taping of a communication other than aparticipant to the communication or even to the taping by a participant who did not

secure the consent of the party to the conversations.

Held: Law did not distinguish whether the party sought to be penalized ought to beparty other than or different from those involved in the private communication.

The intent is to penalize all persons unauthorized to make any such recordingunderscored by any

As the law did not distinguish, the court should not.Ligget & Myers Tobacco Co. v. CIR

Statute: Imposes a specific tax on cigarettes containing Virginia tobacco and/orflue-cured tobacco of 71 millimeters or less in length weighing 1 !kilos or less per

thousand, wrapped in tinfoil or cellophane or packed in cartoons covered with

paraffin or wax paper or in tin cans, on each thousand, 10 pesos.

Provided that of the length exceeds 71 millimeters or the weight per thousand exceeds1!kilos, the tax shall be increased by 100%.

Issue: Whether measuring length or weight of cigars, filters should be excludedtherefrom, so that tax would come under the general provision and not under the

proviso.

Held: Law not having distinguished between filter and non-filter cigars, court shouldnot distinguish.

Tax should be paid as fixed under proviso.Tiu San v. Republic

Statute: An applicant may be allowed to take his oath as a citizen after 2 years fromthe promulgation of the decision granting his petition for naturalization if he can showthat during the intervening period he has not been convicted of any offense or

violation of government rules.

Issue: Whether the conviction of an applicant for naturalization for violation of amunicipal ordinance would disqualify him from taking his oath as a citizen.

Held: Law did not make any distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita. Convicted of any offense indicates both classes of crimes included within purview

of the law.


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Conviction of the applicant from violation of municipal ordinance is comprehendedwithin the statute and precludes applicant from taking his oath.

Peralta v. CSC

Issue: Whether provision of RA 2625, that government employees are entitled to 15days vacation leaves of absence with full pay and 15 days sick leaves with full pay,

exclusives of Saturday, Sundays or holidays in both cases, applies only to those who

have leave credits and not to those who have none.

Held: Respondent Commissions construction of RA 2625 is not in accordance withthe legislative intent.

Law speaks of granting of a right and does not distinguish between those who haveaccumulated credits and those who have exhausted their leave credits in order to enjoy

such right.

Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus - Where the law does notdistinguish, the court should not distinguish.

Sanciagco v. Rono

Where the distinction appears from the statute, the courts should make the distinction.

Statute: Sec 13 of BP Blg. 697 which provides that: Any person holding publicappointive or position shall ipso facto cease in office or position as of the time he filed

his certificate of candidacy

Governors, mayors, members of varioussanggunians or barangay officials shall uponthe filing of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office

Facts: An elective Barangay. Captain was elected President of Association ofBarangay Councils and pursuant thereto appointed by the President as member of the

Sanggunian Panlungsod. He ran for Congress but lost. He then wanted to resume hisduties as member of sangguiniang panlungsod. He was merely forced on leave when

he ran for Congress.

Sec 13 (2) of BP Blg. 697 did not distinguish between appointive and elective memberof thesanggunians.

Issue: Sec 13 (2) admits of more than one construction taking into consideration thenature of the positions enumerated therein governors, mayors, sanggunians or

barangayofficials.

Held: Any person holding public appointive office or position is clear. The legislative intent to distinguish between elective positions in Sec 13 (2) as

contrasted to appointive positions in Sec 13 (1) under the all embracing clause.

The Secretary of Local Government denied his request; being an appointivesanggunian member, he was deemed automatically resigned when he filed hiscertificate of candidacy.

! STATCON RULE: When the language of a particular section of a statute admits more than oneconstruction, that construction which gives effect to the evident purpose and object sought to be

attained by the enactment of the statute as a whole, must be followed.


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Garvida v. Sales, Jr.

Statute: Sec.424 of the Local Government Code provides that a member of theKatipunan ng Kabataan must not be 21 yrs old.

Sec. 428 as additional requirement provides that elective official of SangguniangKabataan must not be more than 21 yrs old on the day of election.

Issue: Whether petitioner who was over 21 but below 22 was qualified to be anelective SK member

Held: Distinction is apparent: the member may be more than 21 years of age onelection day or on the day he registers as member ofKatipunan ngKabataan. But the

elective official must not be more than 21 years of age on the day of election.

Alonto v. People

Statute: BP 22 applies even in cases where dishonoured checks are issued in the formof a deposit or guarantee.

Held: Law does not make any distinction as to whether the checks are issued in thepayment of an obligation or merely to a guarantee the said obligation.

No such distinction can be made by means of interpretation or application. That the accused had deliberately issued the checks to cover accounts and such were

dishonoured upon presentment regardless of whether or not the accused merely issued

the checks as a guarantee.

United BF Homeowners v. Brgy. Chairman

Sec. 391 (a)(7) of LGC: The sangguniang barangay, as the legislative body of thebarangay, shall: regulate the use of multi-purpose halls, pavements... or other similar

facilities constructed with government funds within the jurisdiction of the barangay

and charge reasonable fees for the use thereof.

Issue: Whether Sec. 391 of Local Government Code applies only to multi-purposehalls in open space of subdivision open to the public and not to other multipurpose-buildings.

Held: Sec 391 (a)(7) applies only to multi-purpose halls accessible to public in generaland not to those which cater to an exclusive segment such as the homeowners or

residents of a subdivision.

Legislature did not intend to make such a distinction. The courts cannot make anyvalid inference that the hall is different from the other multi-purpose halls referred to

in the provision otherwise it would encroach on the legislatures law-making power.

5.16 Disjunctive and conjunctive words

Word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing fromeach other. Or has sometimes been held to mean and, WHEN THE SPIRIT OR CONTEXT OF THE

LAW SO WARRANTS


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Trinidad v. Bermudez (e.g. of or to mean and)

Statute: Sec. 2, Rule 112 of Rules of Court authorizing municipal judges to conductpreliminary examination or investigation

Held: or may mean and because under the law he has the authority to do conductboth the first and second stages of preliminary investigation.

SMC v. Municipality of Mandaue

Or may also be used as equivalent of that is to say

Statute: Ordinance: imposes graduated quarterly fixed tax based on the gross value inmoney or actual market value of articles

Held: or actual market value intended to explain gross value in money.US v. De la Sabta

Or may also mean successively

Statute: Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code the offenses of seduction, abduction,rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint by the

offended party or her parents, grandparents or guardian, nor in any case, if the

offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may

be.

Held: Although these persons are mentioned disjunctively, provision must beconstrued as meaning that the right to institute a criminal proceeding is exclusively

and successively reposed in said persons in the order mentioned.

No one shall proceed if there is any person previously mentioned therein with legalcapacity to institute the action.

And conjunction used to denote a joinder or union

! Defined as meaning together with, joined with, along with, added to orlinked to, binding together, relating the one to the other

! Does not mean or! And may mean or as an exception to the rule resorted to only when a literal

interpretation would pervert the plain intention of the legislature as gleaned from the

context of the statute or from external factors.

! Restricts the meaning of a broad word when a restrictive word is separated by theword and.

And/Or means that effect should be given to both conjunctive and and the disjunctive

or will best effectuate the purpose intended by the legislature as gathered from the whole

statute.

! Term is used to avoid construction which by use of disjunctive or alone willexclude the combination of several of the alternatives

! By the use of conjunctive and will exclude the efficacy of any one of thealternatives standing alone.


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B. ASSOCIATED WORDS5.17Noscitur a sociis.

Where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or equally susceptible of variousmeanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering thecompany of words in which it is found or with which it is associated.

To remove doubt, refer to the meaning of associated or companion words Most of the words in a statute are used in their generic and ordinary sense, the rest of the

words should similarly construed.

5.18 Application of rule.

Carandang v. Santiago

Statute: Art. 33 of Civil Code in case of defamation, fraud, & physical injuries, acivil action for damages entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may

be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the

criminal prosecution, and shall require only preponderance of evidence.

Respondent claimed that term physical injuries does not include frustratedhomicide because term refers to specific crime of physical injuries as defined in RPC

and should be understood in its technical sense not in its generic sense of bodily

injury.

Issue: Whether an offended party can file a separate and independent civil action fordamages arising from physical injuries during pendency of criminal action for

frustrated homicide.

Held: Physical injuries not as one defined in RPC, but to mean bodily harm orinjury such as physical injuries, frustrate homicide, or even death (words associated

with it are generic terms)

Article uses words defamation, fraud and physical injuries defamation & fraudare used in their ordinary/generic sense because there are no specific provisions in the

RPC using these terms as offenses defined therein

Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh

Statute: Proclamation of Gen. McArthur issued on October 23, 1944 that all laws,regulations andprocesses of any other government in the Philippines than that of the

said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect.

Issue: Whether proceedings in civil cases pending in court under the so calledRepublic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation are

affected by the said proclamation.

Held: Processes does not refer to judicial processes but to the executive orders ofthe Chairman of the Philippine Executive Committee, ordinances promulgated by the

President of so-called RP, and others that are of the same class as the laws and

regulations with which the word processes is associated.


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Commissioner of Customs v. Phil. Acetylene Co.

Statute: Sec. 6 of RA 1394 provides that tax provided for in Sec. 1 of this Act shallnot be imposed against the importation into the Philippines of machinery and/or raw

materials to be used by new and necessary industry xxx; machinery equipment, spareparts, for use of industries, miners, mining enterprises, planters, farmers; x x x.

Issue: Whether the word industries is used in ordinary, generic sense, which meansenterprises employing relatively large amounts of capital and/or labour.

Held: Since industries used in the law for the 2nd time, then it is classifiedtogether with the terms miners, mining industries, planters and farmers.

Legislative intent is to confine the meaning of the term to activities that tend toproduce or create or manufacture such as those miners, mining enterprises, planters

and farmers.

If used in ordinary sense, it becomes inconsistent and illogical.San Miguel Corp. v. NLRC

Statute: Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the NLRC, as last amended by BP Blg.227 including paragraph 3 all money claims of workers, including hose based on

non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay, and

other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for

employees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits.

Issue: Whether claim of an employee against his employer for cash reward orsubmitting process to eliminate defects in quality & taste of San Miguel product falls

within jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter of NLRC.

Held: Outside of jurisdiction of NLRC Labor Arbiter. Not necessary that entireuniverse of money claims under jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter but only those to

paragraphs:(1) unfair labor practices

(2) claims concerning terms & conditions of employment

(4) claims relating to household services

(5) activities prohibited to employers & employees.

Money claims of workers in par (3) of Art 217 embraces money claims which ariseout of or in connection with the employer-employee relationship.

Ebarle v. Sucaldito

Statute: EO 265 outlines the procedure which complainants charging governmentofficials and employees with commission of irregularities should be guided, applies

to criminal actions or complaints. EO 265 Complaints against public officials and employees shall be promptly acted

upon and disposed of by the officials or authorities concerned in accordance with

pertinent laws and regulations so that the erring officials and employees can be

soonest removed or otherwise disciplines and the innocent, exonerated or vindicated

in like manner, and to the end also that other remedies, including court action, may

be pursued forthwith by the interested parties, after administrative remedies shall

have been exhausted


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Held: After administrative remedies shall have been exhausted suggest civil suitssubject to previous administrative actions.

EO does not apply to criminal actions.Mottomul v. dela Paz

Statute: Appeal shall not stay the award, order, ruling, decision or judgment unlessthe officer or body rendering the same or the court, on motion after hearing, and on

such terms as it may deem just should provide otherwise. The propriety of a stay

granted by the officer or body rendering the award, order, ruling, decision or

judgment may be raised only by motion in the main case

Issue: Whether the word court in Sec 5, Art 5434 refers to the CA or to the Courtof Agrarian Relations.

Held: Correct construction made clear with reference to Sec. 1 of RA 5434, wherethe court, officers or bodies whose decision, award are appealable to the Court of

Appeals, enumerated as follows:

- Court of Agrarian Relations, Sec. Of Labor, Land Registration Commission,

Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Patent Office and

Agricultural Inventions Board From grouping, the enumeration in Sec. 5 means

Court of Agrarian Relations not deemed to belong in the same group of CA.

5.19 Ejusdem generis(of the same kind/class or species)

GENERAL RULE: Where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particularand specific words of the same class or where the latter follow the former, the general word

or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to, persons, things or cases akin to,

resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.

PURPOSE: To give effect to both particular or general words, by treating the particularwords as indicating the class and the general words as indicating all that is embraced in saidclass, although not specifically named by the particular words.

PRINCIPLE: Based on proposition that had the legislature intended the general words to beused in their generic and unrestricted sense, it would have not enumerated the specific words.

PRINCIPLE: Legislators addressed specifically to the particularization.5.20 Illustration

Cu Unjieng Sons, Inc. v. Bord of Tax Appeals

Statute: In the case of a corporation, all losses actually sustained and not charged offwithin the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.

Issue: Whether losses due to the war were to be deductible from gross income of1945 when they were sustained, or in 1950 when Philippine War Damage

Commission advised that no payment would be made for said losses.

Claims: The assurances of responsible public officials before the end of 1945 thatproperty owners would be compensated for their losses as a result of the war sufficed

to place the losses within the phrase compensated xxx otherwise than by insurance.


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Held: Court rejected the claim. Otherwise in the clause compensated for byinsurance or otherwise refers to compensation due under a title analogous or similar

to insurance.

In order to be deemed compensated for by insurance or otherwise, the lossessustained by a taxpayer must be covered by a judicially enforceable right, springing

from any of the juridical sources of obligations, namely, law, contract, quasi-contract,

torts, or crimes, and not mere pronouncement of public officials.

Cebu Institute of Technology v. Ople

Statute: Rule V of IRR of Labor Code: This rule (on service incentive leaves) shallapply to all employees, except filed personnel and other employees whose

performance is unsupervised by the employer including those who are engaged on

task or contract basis.

Issue: Whether teachers hired on contract basis are entitled to service incentive leavebenefits as against the claim that they are not so.

Held: Those who were employed on task or contract basis should be related withfield personnel teachers are not field personnel and therefore entitled to service

incentive leave benefits.

Cagayan Valley Enterprises v. CA

Statute title: RA 5700 An Act to regulate the use of stamped or marked bottles,boxes, casks, kegs, barrels, & other similar containers.

Issue: Whether the phrase other lawful beverages which gives protection tomanufacturer with the Phil. Patent Office its duly stamped or marked bottles used for

soda water, mineral or aerated waters, cider, milk, cream or other lawful beverages,

includes hard liquor.

Held: Title clearly shows intent to give protection to all marked bottles of all lawfulbeverages regardless of the nature of their contents.

National Power Corp. v. Angas

Statute: Central Bank Circular # 416 by virtue of the authority granted to it underSec. 1 of Act Number 2655, as amended, otherwise known as Usury Law, the

Monetary Board in a resolution prescribed that the rate of interest for loan or

forbearance of any money, good or credit and the rate allowed in judgments in the

absence of express contract shall be 12% per annum.

Issue: Whether the term judgment, refers to any judgment directing the payment oflegal interest.

Held: Judgements involving loans or forbearance money, goods or credit, theselater specific terms having restricted the meaning judgments to those of the sameclass or the same nature as those specifically enumerated.

Republic v. Migrino

Facts: Retired military officer was investigated by the Presidential Commission onGood Government (PCGG) for violation of Anti-Graft Act in relation to EO Nos. 1 &

2 authorizing the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth from the former Presidents

subordinates and close associates


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Issue: Whether or not PCGG has jurisdiction to investigate such military officer forbeing in the service during the administration of the former President and was

therefore his subordinate.

Held: Subordinates one who enjoys close association or relation to the formerPresident and his wife; not to any government officer during former Presidents

administration

Close associates restricted the meaning of subordinates5.21 Limitations of ejusdem generis

Requisites:1) Statute contains an enumeration of particular & specific words, followed by a general

word or phrase.

2) Particular & specific words constitute a class or are the same kind.3) Enumeration of the particular & specific words is not exhaustive or is not merely by

examples.

4) There is no indication of legislative intent to give the general words or phrases a broadermeaning.

Rule of ejusdem generis, is not of universal application; it should use to carry out, not defeatthe intent of the law.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. American Express

Ejusdem generis rule not applicable

Statute: Regulatory provision contains an enumeration of particular or specific words,followed by the general phrase any other similar services such words do not

constitute a readily discernible class and are patently not of the same kind.

Intent: Regulatory intent to give the general phrase and other similar services abroader meaning; preceding phrase as well as is not meant to limit the effect ofand other similar services.

Scope: Statutory provision upon which the regulation is based is by itself notrestrictive. The scope of the word services in Sec 102 (b)(2) of the Tax Code is

broad; it is not susceptible of narrow interpretation.

Garcia v. Social Security Commission

Ejusdem generis rule does not apply where the law is clear and free from ambiguity

Rule: Where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, such generalwords are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying to

persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. Issue: Whether one must be the managing head, or managing partner in order to

be liable under Sec. 28(f) of the Social Security Law

Held: Court finds no need to resort to statutory construction. Sec. 28(f) of the SocialSecurity Law imposes penalty on:

(1) The Managing Head(2) Directors(3) Partners, for offenses committed by a juridical person.


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Provision does not qualify that director and partner should likewise be a managingdirector or managing partner.

Law is clear and unambiguous

US v. Santo Nino

Ejusdem generis rule should not be applied as to defeat legislative intent

Statute: It shall be unlawful to for any person to carry concealed about his personany bowie, knife, dagger, kris or other deadly weapon. Provided, that this prohibition

shall not apply to firearms who have secured a license or who are entitled to carry the

same under the provisions of this Act.

Issue: Whether the carrying of an unlicensed revolver concealed in the personconstitutes a violation of a statute.

Held: The rule of ejusdem generis is only resorted to only for the purpose ofdetermining what the intent of the legislature was in enacting the law.

The proviso of the Act clearly indicates that carrying such would be in violation ofstatute.

By the proviso, it manifested its intention to include in the prohibition weapons otherthan armas blancas therein specified.

Cagayan Valley Enterprises v. CA

Statute title: RA 5700 An Act to regulate the use of stamped or marked bottles,boxes, casks, kegs, barrels, & other similar containers.

Intent: To give protection to all registered marked bottles and containers of all lawfulbeverages regardless of the nature of their contents other lawful beverages

Held: Other lawful beverages grants protection to persons engaged or licensedto engage in manufacture, bottling, or selling of soda water, mineral or aeratedwaters, cider, milk, cream or other lawful beverages may not be limited to the same

kind or class as those mentioned.

Should be taken in their general sense to include not only soft drinks but also hardliquor.

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Social Security Commission

Statute: Any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carried in thePhilippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind and

uses the services of another person, who is under his orders as regard the

employment, except the Government, and any of its political subdivisions branches

or instrumentalities, including corporation owned or controlled by the government. Issue: A religious institution invoking ejusdem generi whether employer is limited

to undertaking an activity which has an element of profit or gain.

Claim: Employer should be limited to those who carry an undertaking or activityof any kind which has the element of profit or gain because its definition is preceded

by words any trade, business, industry, undertaking

Held: The rule of ejusdem generis applies only when there is uncertainty. The rule is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the legislature would

be hindered and defeated.


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The definition is sufficiently comprehensive to include charitable institutions andcharities not for profit; it contained exceptions which said institutions and entities are

not included.

5.22Expressio unius est exclusio alterius

Express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule and its variations are canons of restrictive interpretation It is formulated in a number of ways:

! Expressum facit cessare tacitum - what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied! Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis a thing not being excepted must be

regarded as coming within purview of the general rule

! Expressio unius est exclusio alterius- expression of one or more things of a class impliesthe exclusion of all not expressed, even though all would have been implies had none

been expressed.

Parayno v. Jovellanos

Under Article III of Official Zoning Code of Calasiao, there were certain distinctionsmade by the municipality about the designation of the gasoline filling station and that

of the gasoline service station as appearing in Article III, Nos. 21 and 42

Zoning ordinance made a distinction between gasoline service station andgasoline filling station

Section 21. Filling Station. A retail station servicing automobiles and other

motor vehicles with gasoline and oil only.[

xxx xxx xxx

Section 42. Service Station. A building and its premises where gasoline oil,

grease, batteries, tires and car accessories may be supplied and dispensed at retail

and where, in addition, the following services may be rendered and sales and no

other.

a. Sale and servicing of spark plugs, batteries, and distributor parts;

b. Tire servicing and repair, but not recapping or regrooving;

c. Replacement of mufflers and tail pipes, water hose, fan belts, brake fluids,

light bulbs, fuses, floor mats, seat covers, windshield wipers and wiper blades,

grease retainers, wheel, bearing, mirrors and the like;

d. Radiator cleaning and flushing;

e. Washing and polishing, and sale of automobile washing and polishing

materials;

f. Grease and lubricating;

g. Emergency wiring repairs;

h. Minor servicing of carburators;

i. Adjusting and repairing brakes;

j. Minor motor adjustments not involving removal of the head or crankcase, or

raising the motor


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xxx xxx xxx

Ordinance intended the two terms to be separate and distinct from each other Ejusdem generis could not be applied Activities undertaken in a gas service station did not automatically embrace those

in a gas filling station

San Pablo Manufacturing Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Facts: SBMC is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of milling,manufacturing and exporting coconut oil and other allied products.

Respondent ordered payment in the amount of Php 8,182,182.85 as taxes for the year1987

Issue: whether or not petitioner is exempt from tax Statute: That this tax shall not apply to rope, coconut oil, palm oil and the by-product

of copra from which it is produced or manufactured and desiccated coconut, if such

rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and desiccated coconuts, shall beremoved for exportation by the proprietor or operator of the factory or the miller

himself, and are actually exported without returning to the Philippines, whether in

their original state or as an ingredient or part of any manufactured article or product

Held: SPMCs interpretation unduly enlarged the scope of the exemption clause.! Pursuant to expressio unius est exclusion alterius rule, statue did not provide exemption

for the materials or ingredients utilized in manufacturing the enumerated products in Sec.

168, thus petitioner is not exempted from millers tax

NOT APPLICABLE: When words are mentioned by example and when it defeats plainly

indicated purpose of the Legislature

Coconut Oil Refiners Assn., Inc. v. Torres

Expressio unius est exclusion alterius cannot be applied since words are used byexample only

Sec. 12 of RA 7227! The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a separate customs

territory ensuring free flow or movement of goods and capital within, into and exported

out of the Subic Special Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives SUCH AS tax

and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment.

5.23 Negative-opposite doctrine.

Argumentum a contrario- What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.Chung Fook v. White

Statute: Exempts wife of a NATURALIZED American from detention for treatmentin a hospital, who is afflicted with a contagious disease

Held: Court resorted to the negative-opposite doctrine, statute plainly relates only tothe wife of a NATURALIZED citizen, not a NATIVE-BORN citizen. Petition for a

writ of habeas corpus filed by a native-born American citizen was denied.


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Analysis: Application of the rule resulted to injustice to native-born citizens, in favorof naturalized citizens. Legislature is not supposed to discriminate against native-

born citizens. Doctrine of necessary implication should have been used.

5.24 Application of expressio unius rule.

The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its corollary canons are generally used inthe construction of statutes granting powers, creating rights and remedies, restricting common

rights, and imposing penalties and forfeitures, as well as those statutes which are strictly

construed.

Where a statute directs the performance of certain acts by a particular person or class orpersons, it implies that it shall not be done otherwise or be a different person or class of

persons.

If a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything else mustnecessarily, and by implication, be excluded.

Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos

Issue: Whether or not solicitation for religious purposes, i.e., renovation of a churchwithout first securing a permit from the Regional Office concerned of the Department

of Social Services, constitutes a violation of P.D. No. 1564

To solicit or receive contribution for charitable or public welfare purposes Depends on whether the charitable purpose includes that of a religious purpose Held: There was no intent to include solicitations for religious purposes within

coverage, otherwise it would have been expressly stated.Expressio unius est exclusio

alterius is applied

In Sec. 28 (3), Article VI of the Constitution, terms charitable and religious areseparate and independent

Lopez v. CA Statute: Sec. 27. xxx only orders, directives or decisions of the Office Ombudsman in

administrative cases imposing the penalty of the public censure, reprimand, or

suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary

shall be final and unappeallable hence, immediately executory xxx

Issue: Are decisions of the Ombudsman imposing the penalty of 6 months and 1 daysuspension without pay immediately executor pending appeal?

Held: Where penalty imposed is other than public censure, reprimand, or suspensionof not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the law

gives the respondent right to appeal

All other decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which impose penalties that arenot enumerated in said section 27 are not final.

The express mention of the things included excludes those that are not included5.25Limitations of rule

Not a rule of law, but is a mere tool to ascertain the legislative intent.! Must yield to what is clearly a legislative intent! Cannot be used to defeat indicated purpose of legislature! To be ignored where other circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not intended

to be exclusive


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It will not apply where the enumeration is by way of example or to remove doubts only. The rule may be disregarded of it will result to incongruities or a violation of the equal

protection clause of the constitution, inconvenience, hardship and injury to the public interest.

Javellano v. Tayo

Statute: Majority of the (municipal) council elected shall constitute a quorum to dobusiness, which shall be presided by the mayor, and another statute requires that the

vice-mayor, or in his place, the councilor who obtained the largest number of votes,

should perform the duties of the mayor in the event of the latters temporary

incapacity

Analysis: to construe the enumeration as exclusive or to apply the maxim would leadto inconvenience, hardship and injury to public service since much undue authority is

given to the 3 officials

5.26 Doctrine of casus omissus

Casus omissus pro omisso habendus eststates that a person, object or thing omitted from anenumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally

Court under its power of interpretation supply the omission even though such may haveresulted from inadvertence

Exemptions: where it is shown that the legislature did not intend to exclude the person, thing,object from the enumeration. If such legislative intent is clearly indicated, the court may

supply the omission if to do so will carry out the clear intent of the legislature and will not do

violence to its language.

5.27 Doctrine of last antecedent

Qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediatelyassociated. They do not qualify words or phrases which are distantly or remotely located.

In the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, preferential and qualifying words andphrases must be applied only to their immediate or last antecedent, and not to the other

remote or preceding words or association of words.

The maxim expressive of this rule is proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatursententia, or relative words refer to the nearest antecedents, unless the context otherwise

requires.

The use of comma to separate an antecedent from the rest exerts a dominant influence in theapplication of the doctrine of last antecedent.

5.28 Illustration of Rule

Florentino v. Philippine National Bank

Issue: Whether or not holders of backpay certificates can compel government-ownedbanks to accept said certificates in payment of the holders obligations to the bank

Statute:The holder of a backpay certificate may apply the same for the payment ofobligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this amendatory act for which the

applicant may directly be liable to the government or to any of its branches or

instrumentalities, or to corporations owned or controlled by the government, or to

any citizens of the Philippines or to any association or corporation organized under


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the laws of the Philippine, who may be willing to accept the same for the such

settlement. (Note: Qualiying phrase -IMMEDIATE ANTECEDENT)

Held: Pursuant to proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentential, thecourt held that backpay certificate holders can compel government-owned banks to

accept certificates as payment.

5.29 Qualification of the doctrine

Doctrine of last antecedent is subject to the exception that where the intention of the law is toapply the phrase to all antecedents embraced in the provision, the same should be made

extensive to the whole.

Slight indication of legislative intent so to extend the relative term is sufficient. Nor does thedoctrine apply where the intention is not to qualify the antecedent at all.

5.30Reddendo singular singulis

The maxim means referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to itsappropriate object, or let each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be taken

distributively.

Antecedents and consequences should be read distributively to the effect that each word is tobe applied to the subject to which it appears by context most appropriately related and to

which it is most applicable.

People v. Tamani

Question: When to count the 15-day period within which to appeal judgment ofconviction in a criminal action? Date of promulgation of judgment or date of receipt

of notice of judgment?

Statute: Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court. an appeal must be taken within 15days from thepromulgationor noticeof thejudgmentor orderappealed from

Held: Should be counted from the promulgation and not from the receipt of copy ofjudgment.Promulgation refers to judgment, while notice refers to order.

Amadora v. CA

Issue: Whether Art. 2180 of the Civil Code applies to all schools, academic as well asnon-academic

Statute: Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trade shall be liable fordamages caused by theirpupils and studentsor apprenticesso long as they remain in

their custody

Held: Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature,responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher incharge of such student, following the first provision; except where school is technical

in nature, head shall be responsible


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C. PROVISO, EXCEPTIONS and SAVING CLAUSES5.31 Provisos, generally

The common and usual role of a proviso is to restrain or qualify the generally of the enactingclause or section to which it refers.

PURPOSE: Limit or restrict the general language or operation of the statute, not to enlarge it. Commonly found at the end of a section, or provision of a statute and is introduced, by the

word Provided

What determines whether a caluse is a proviso is its substance rather than its form.

5.32 Proviso may enlarge scope of law

A proviso may enlarge, instead of restrict or limit, what otherwise is a phrase of limitedimport had there been no proviso qualifying it.

5.33 Proviso as additional legislation

A proviso may also assume the role of an additional legislation. A clear and unqualified purpose, expressed in the opening statement of a section of a statute

comprising several subdivisions has been construed as controlling and limiting a proviso

attached to one of the subdivisions, where the proviso, if segregated therefrom, would mean

exactly the reverse of what it necessarily implied when read in connection with the limitation.

5,34 What proviso qualifies

GENERAL RULE: The office of the proviso qualifies or modifies only the phraseimmediately preceding it or restrains or limits the generality of the clause that it immediately

follows.

A proviso is to be construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of theprovision, to which it is attached, and not to the statute itself or to other sections thereof.

Flores vs. Miranda

Petitioner contended that the approval by the Public Service Commission of the saleof a public service vehicle was not necessary because of the proviso in Sec. 20 ofCommonwealth Act No. 146.

Said Section read that it shall be unlawful for any public service vehicle or for theowner, lessee, or operator thereof, without the previous approval and authority of the

Commission previously had xxx to sell, alienate, xxx its property, franchise,

certificate, privilege, or right, or any part thereof; XXX Provided, however, that

nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the transaction from being


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negotiated or completed before its approval or to prevent the sale, alienation, or lease

by any public service of any of its property in the ordinary course of business.

Ruling: The proviso means only that the sale without the required approval is stillvalid and binding between the parties

5.35 Exception to the rule

Where the legislative intent is to restrain or qualify not only the phrase immediatelypreceding it but also earlier provisions of the statute or even the statute itself as a whole, then

the proviso will be construed in that manner, in order that the intent of the law may be carried

out.

5.36 Repugnance between proviso and main provision

In case of conflict between a proviso and the main provision of a statute, that which is alocated in a later portion of the statute prevails, unless legislative intent to the contrary or

such construction will destroy the whole statute itself. Legislative intent ultimately prevails. The latter provision, whether a proviso or not, is given preference because it is the latest

expression of the intent of the legislation.

5.37 Exceptions generally

An exception consists of that which would otherwise be included in the provision from whichit is excepted.

Exception confirms the general rule, not just to qualify the words or phrases constituting thegeneral rule

! Operates to exclude other exceptions! Without exception, matter comes within general rule

5.38 Exception and proviso distinguished

Exception exempts something absolute from the operation of a statute, by express words inthe enacting clause.

A proviso defeats its operation conditionally. A proviso avoids them by way of defeasance or excuse. An exception is generally a part of

the enactment itself, absolutely excluding from its operation some subject or thing that

otherwise would fall within its scope.

But when the enactment is modified by engrafting upon it a new provision by way ofamendment, providing conditionally for a new case, it is in the nature of a proviso.

5.39 Illustration

MERALCO v. Public Utilities Employees Association

Statute: No person, firm, or corporation, business establishment or place shallcompel an employee or laborer to work on Sundays & legal holidays, unless paid

an additional sum of at least 25% of his renumeration: Provided, that this

prohibition shall not apply to public utilities performing public service, e.g.


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supplying gas, electricity, power, water etc. (Note: ENACTMENT CLAUSE,

EXCEPTION)

Issue: Whether or not MERALCO is liable to pay an additional compensation of 25%of regular renumeration in favor of those employees required to work during Sundays

and legal holidays

Held: 2nd part is an exception , as appellant is a public utility that supplies electricity& provides means of transportation, it is evident that appellant is exempt from

qualified prohibition established in the enactment clause

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

Statute: No bill shall be passed by either House shall become a law unless it haspassed 3 readings on separate days, & printed copies thereof in its final form have

been distributed to its Members 3 days before its passage, except when the President

certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or

emergency.

Held: The except phrase qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill become alaw.

Legislative intent is to secure the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified inorder to meet a public calamity or emergency.

Pendon v. Diasnes

Statute A person shall not be qualified to vote "who has been sentenced by finaljudgment to suffer one year or more from imprisonment, such disability not having

been removed any plenary pardon or "who has been declared by final judgment

guilty of any crime against property.

Issue: Whether or not a person convicted of a crime against property, who wasgranted absolute pardon by the President, is entitled to vote.

1st clause- 2 exceptions (a) Person penalized by less than 1 yr.; and (2) Persongranted an absolute pardon

2nd clause Creates another exception to 1st but not to 2nd (person convicted ofcrime against property cannot vote unless pardon was granted).

Held: Absolute pardon for any crime for which one year of imprisonment or morewas meted out restores the prisoner to his political rights.

Gorospe v. CA

Statute Rule 27 of Rules of Court, "service by registered mail is complete uponactual receipt by the addressee; but if fail to claim his mail from the post office

within 5 days from date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect at

the expiration of such time. Issue: Whether or not actual receipt the date of a registered mail after 5 day period, is

the date from which to count the prescriptive period to comply with certain

requirements.

Held: Service is completed on the 5th day after the 1st notice, even if he actuallyreceived the mail months later.

2nd part is separated by semicolon, and begins with but which indicates exception.


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5.40 Saving Clause

It is a clause in a provision of law which operates to except from the effect of the law whatthe clause provides or to save something which would otherwise be lost.

It is used to except or save something from the effect of a repeal of a statute. It should be construed in the light of the intent or purpose of the legislature (the principal

consideration being to effectuate such intent or carry out such purpose).

It should be given a strict or liberal construction depending upon the kind of interpretationthat should, considering its nature, be given to the statute as a whole.

chapter 5 interpretation of words and phrases

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