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Governance of Marine Fisheries and Biodiversity Conservation: Interaction and Coevolution, First Edition. Edited by Serge M. Garcia, Jake Rice and Anthony Charles. © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2014 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Chapter 1

Governance of marine fisheries and biodiversity conservation: A historyS.M. Garcia1, J. Rice1,2 and A. Charles1,3

1 IUCN Commission on Ecosystem Management (IUCN/CEM/FEG), Gland, Switzerland2 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Ottawa, Canada3 Sobey School of Business and the Environmental Science Department, Saint Mary’s University, Halifax, Canada

Introduction

The governance of fisheries and of nature conservation has developed within two parallel and interacting streams of events and decisions. Their present characteristics arise from this complicated history, which must be understood to improve their performance. Towards that end, this chapter presents the political, legal and institutional inter-national events that have shaped the evolution of the two streams of governance for centuries. The key events have been assembled in a timeline (Annex 1) that is the back-bone of Chapters 1 and 2. Despite our efforts, the list of events in Annex 1 cannot claim to be exhaustive. In the early years, governance has focused necessarily on the northern hemisphere where modern conservation, fishery

science and international governance originated. Being based on formal literature, the list is bound to be deficient with regard to evolution of customary practices. Even though the two streams seem to have developed with little direct interaction until recently, the processes of economic development, colonization, globalization and international collaboration as well as the Internet have progressively synchronized their evolution to some extent. Regarding conservation of biodiversity, the chapter starts necessarily on terrestrial systems where most of the concepts used in the marine environment originated. The phases and milestones of the timeline contained in Annex 1 reflect the purposes of this book, but we are confident that key events would be considered benchmarks in almost any reasonable timeline.

Abstract: The governance of marine fisheries and biodiversity conservation has evolved significantly since its origin. The chapter describes its evolution, at a global scale, using the international events compiled from the literature as data. The history of the two streams of governance is rich and reflects a constant quest to improve performance with mixed results. These streams have important common roots in pre-capitalistic and pre-colonial communities. They tend to emerge more clearly during the 19th century as a utili-tarian and an aesthetic branch of conservation with tumultuous relationships. In fisheries, centralized forms of governance already existed in the 13th century. In marine conservation, they were practically absent until the 1960s and have emerged forcefully since the mid-20th century. From 1970 onwards, the emergence of the Law of the Sea and a number of cross-sectoral summits established insti-tutional bridges between the two streams, accelerating conceptual convergence. The trend today towards creating new incentive structures and market-based approaches in both streams has the potential to accelerate their convergence and produce better integration in their implementation.

Keywords: governance; biodiversity; fisheries; history; coevolution

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COPYRIG

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4 Governance of Marine Fisheries and Biodiversity Conservation

This chapter describes the chronological phases of the historical development of the two streams of governance. The evolutionary strands contained in the two streams are identified and analysed in detail in Chapter 2 and the central issue of their integration is addressed in Chapter 3. More information on the underlying global frameworks, processes and instruments is provided in Chapters 7, 10 and 11.

Historical developments in fishery governance

The history of fisheries policy, development and manage-ment since the Second World War proposed by Garcia (1992), Garcia and Newton (1994, 1997), Caddy and Cochrane (2001), Roberts (2007) and Bolster (2012) have been consulted, completed and extended below to cover the period from 1850 to 2012. The succession of events (Annex 1) has been subdivided into phases (Figure 1.1) marked by major milestones such as wars, conferences, treaties and agreements. The phases reflect policy trajectories, from the traditionally integrated concern for ‘wise use’ to its modern avatars of sustainable development, responsible fishing and sustainable use. It presents them against an evolving background of industrial growth and of colonization, management

modernization, trade globalization and responses to growing environmental concerns.

Before 1850: Early concerns

Total removals from the ocean are not known and, for many decades, scientists and managers have implicitly or explic-itly considered that, in these early days, the fisheries impact on ocean resources and biodiversity was minimal. However, even if relative fishing pressures cannot be precisely mea-sured, pre-industrial technologies were sufficient to put marine animal populations under severe stress; by the late 19th century, extractions in Europe, North America and the Caribbean had reached levels that would be equivalent to today’s Total Allowable Catches (Holm et al., 2010, p. 19). Bolster (2012) confirms the severe declines in some marine birds and mammals in Europe as early as the 9th century, the progressive degradation of estuarine, anadromous and coastal marine resources in the Northeast Atlantic since the 13th century and the decline of Northwest Atlantic coastal resources from the middle of the 17th century.

The role of fishing and the environment on the degrada-tion of coastal fisheries was noted as early as in 14th century England (Alward, 1932, in Roberts, 2007), 15th century France (Typhaigne de la Roche, 1760) and 17th century USA (Bolster, 2012). Indeed, since the second half of medieval

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Figure 1.1 Landing trends: 1850–2012. The line joins the landings at the beginning and end of the different phases (FAO statistics).

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Governance of marine fisheries and biodiversity conservation: A history 5

times, some European marine fisheries have been regulated by laws and by-laws, community practices, inter-commu-nity agreements, town and Guilds’ regulations and state intervention on gear and restrictions on period and place of the fishing including rotational harvest schemes, access to fishing and trade, etc. (Alward, 1932; Bolster, 2012; Caddy and Cochrane, 2001; Holm, 2010; Roberts, 2007). Fishing activities have been regulated through professional organi-zations with conditional decision power or community-based groups in France (prud’homies), Spain (cofradias) and Japan since the 17th century and in the Philippines, Oceania, Pacific coast of North America and Mexico since the 19th century (Garcia, 1989; McGoodwin in Caddy and Cochrane, 2001). In less-developed areas, traditional governance of fishing and conservation activities through local use rights and regulations as well as religious taboos (cf. Johannes, 2003 in the South Pacific) probably emerged as soon as growing human aggregations visibly started impacting local resources.1

During the second half of the 18th century however, developed states increasingly reduced the power of non-state institutions because of the rising concept of national sovereignty (in the coastal 3 miles), the need to make room for industrialization and the need to start subsidising eco-nomically failing industrial fleets (e.g. in USA, England and France; Miller, 1989). To allow for new developments, colo-nizing states neglected or depressed local traditions and marine tenure systems and modified access rules and the distribution of benefits (cf. Kittinger et al., 2011 in Hawai).

An epochal swing in fishery objectives and social rela-tions resulted from the shift from pre-capitalistic (pre- colonial and pre-industrial) community-based management to capitalistic (colonial and industrial) and market-driven centralized management. It was accompanied by expo-nentially increasing landings (Figure 1.1).

From 1850 to 1900: Growing concerns

The period starts with accelerating industrial development and ends before the birth of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). Reported landings increased from 1.5–2 million tonnes in 1850 to about 5 mil-lion tonnes in 1900 (Garcia and Grainger, 2005).

Coastal states had exclusive jurisdiction only in the first 3 miles of the ocean. The repeated concerns of traditional fishers facing local depletions were disregarded (Bolster, 2012). The few warnings about the limitations of Earth pro-ductivity by T.R. Malthus (1766–1834), the vulnerability of ocean resources by Lankester (1884, 1890) and the early

description of overfishing by J. Cleghorn of Wick in 1854 (Roswadowki, 2002) were silenced by the rumble of the fast industrialization process, the growth of trawl fishing industries and the call for deregulation by T.H. Huxley (1825–1895).2 Some countries did impose limitations on trawling, fleet size, closed areas, mesh size, etc. (Anderson, 1998; Bolster, 2012) or established fishermen’s organiza-tions to resolve conflicts (Troadec, 1989, p. 45). The estab-lishment of the first marine research stations (created in Naples in 1872 and in Woods Hole in 1875) and the Stockholm Conference on Fisheries (1899) signalled a rising interest in rational exploitation resting on scientific enquiry (Roswadowski, 2002). The period ended with growing scientific concern on the impoverishment of the sea (Garstang, 1900) and growing overfishing in the North Sea (Heinke in Roswadowski, 2002).

From 1901 to 1945: World Wars and science development

This period starts with the Kristiana Conference (in 1901) and establishment of ICES (in 1902) and ends with the end of the Second World War. Estimated landings grew rapidly from 5 to 15 million tonnes. With the exception of the North Atlantic (particularly the North Sea) and a few resources in the North Pacific, fishing impact was limited to coastal areas. The pressure on whale stocks grew rapidly and their demise was regularly forecast from the 1930s onwards.3

Fisheries development continued, and its heavy impact was confirmed by the significant rebuilding that took place when fishing was curtailed during the two World Wars (Atkinson, 1988; Gulland and Carroz, 1968). ICES established an Overfishing Committee in 1903, the first large-scale sci-ence-based international management experiment. The effects of natural oscillations and fishing mortality were identified through the work of Hjort, Russel, Graham, Baranov, Ottestad and others, but it took until mid-century for the fishing industry to recognize the necessity of scientific advice (Roswadowski, 2002, p. 85). The revolu-tionary theory of bio-economic overfishing elaborated by Warming (1911) in Danish went unnoticed.4 The Great Law of Fishing of Graham (1935) foresaw that ‘all fisheries that are unregulated become unprofitable’ and that management measures elaborated without social and economic consideration were likely to be ineffective. The concept of ‘optimum yield’5 (a precursor of maximum sus-tainable yield or MSY, adopted in the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention) was proposed by Hjort, Jahn

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and Ottestad in 1933 (Roswadowski, 2002, p. 91). The conceptual biological foundations for modern fisheries management were therefore laid, but fishery regulations remained focused on mesh sizes and minimum landing sizes (Saetersdal, 1992).6 The establishment of the first regional commissions on seals (in 1911), halibut (1932) and salmon (1937) signalled rising international awareness and institutional development

From 1946 to 1958: Reconstruction and growth

The period starts at the end of the Second World War and ends with the first United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I). From 1950 to 1958, reported ‘fish’ landings rose from 15 to 24 million tonnes. North Atlantic fisheries expanded towards the Arctic Ocean and deep-sea stocks were discovered.

Countries focused on post-war reconstruction of the fishing capacity and development of food production. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), created in 1946 to support implementation of the Marshall Plan, established a fisheries technical committee. Overfishing of high-value species was internationally recognized in the North Atlantic and North Pacific oceans (Gulland and Carroz, 1968). However, ‘fishery regulations [were] still largely designed to promote orderly fishing and marketing and not really for the purpose of conservation’ (Royce, 1988). Concerns increased further in ICES as marine biology moved more decisively towards providing advice for orderly fisheries development first, and management later (Roswadowski, 2002; Royce, 1988). Questions of open access and effort control were raised at the 2nd London Conference on Overfishing (in 1946) with little support and impact on reg-ulations (Roswadowski, 2002, p. 107). New fishery bodies were created such as IWC in 1946, IPFC in 1948 and ICNAF, GFCM and IATTC in 1949. In the 1950s, the theory of economic overfishing was redeveloped by Gordon, Scott and Crutchfield. Simultaneously, Schaefer and Beverton and Holt turned the biological foundations established by their predecessors (e.g. Volterra, Gause, Baranov, Russel, Graham, etc.) into easy mathematics. These developments opened the possibility of scientific predictions that were subsequently pushed beyond their limits and the original intentions of their authors.

Irritated by the impact of foreign fleets on their resources, Peru and Chile (in 1947) and Ecuador (in 1952) unilaterally extended their jurisdiction to 200 miles and signed the 1952 Santiago Declaration, putting de facto the UNCLOS

process on its starting blocks. After years of heated debate, the 1st UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I in 1958) adopted a Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, which remained unsigned by some of the main actors concerned. The 1st ‘Cod War’ between Iceland and UK (19581961) started as Iceland extended its jurisdiction on fisheries to 12 miles.

From 1959 to 1972: Global expansion

The period starts with UNCLOS II (in 1960) and ends with the 1972 UN Conference on Human Environment (in Stockholm). Reported landings rose from 26 to 46 million tonnes as industrial fisheries spread through the world oceans.

During the 1960s, the priority of governments was discov-ering new grounds and resources with new technologies (e.g. tropical shrimp, tunas, small pelagics). Long-range fleets of developed nations (Europe, Japan, USSR) and developing nations (Cuba, Korea, Ghana, Thailand) expanded, supported by large subsidies and research programmes. The fishing capacity of developing countries (e.g. Peru, Chile, Morocco, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Angola and Thailand ) grew rapidly with the support of former colonial powers. Knowledge of world resources potential increased (Gulland, 1971). Concerns increased in the North Atlantic regarding overcapacity and the inefficiency of conventional technical measures (Roswadowski, 2002, p. 189). Whales were sequentially depleted (Gulland and Carroz, 1968). The idea of imposing catch limits progressed7 but direct regulation of fishing capacity was considered technically unfeasible (Garcia, 1992; Roswadowski, 2002). The ICES symposium on marine food chains (1968) opened a period of intense work for multispecies fishery research. The focus of the FAO Committee on Fisheries (COFI) moved from development to management. National jurisdiction became a major issue as the UNCLOS II process unfolded and, following the example of Iceland, many states extended their jurisdiction from 3–6 miles to 12 miles and even 100 miles in some Asian States.

The period closed in 1972 with: (1) the UN Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) in Stockholm and the formal birth of the sustainable development concept; (2) the spectacular collapse of the huge Peru–Chile anchoveta stock; (3) the recommendation of a 10 year moratorium on whaling; and (4) the 2nd Cod War between UK and Iceland as the latter claimed a 50 miles exclusive fishing zone. The time of uncontrolled geographical and technological expansion of fisheries seemed over.

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From 1973 to 1982: A new economic order of the ocean

This period started with the FAO Technical Conference on Fishery Management and Development (in Vancouver in 1973) and the beginning of the UNCLOS III process. It ended with the adoption of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) and the establishment of a new economic order in the oceans. Reported landings increased from 46 to 56 million tonnes, hiding growing sequential overfishing (Garcia, 1992) and discarding.

The 1973 FAO Technical Conference on Fishery Manage-ment and Development warned again about the fishing impact on resources, overcapitalization, incomplete science, free and open access and pollution. It called for precau-tionary, adaptive and anticipatory management, 9 years before adoption of the precautionary principle at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) and 22 years before the publication of FAO guidelines on the subject. Many national jurisdictions were unilaterally extended in 1976–1979, and long-range fleets concentrated on straddling stocks and the few shelves that remained open (e.g. off Western Sahara, Namibia and in the Southwest Atlantic). New high-seas resources were targeted: tropical tunas, oceanic squids, sharks and horse mackerel and krill (Garcia, 1992). The third Cod War exploded in 1975 as Iceland extended its jurisdiction to 200 miles. The movement was followed by USA in 1976 and many countries followed suit under an emergent international customary law of the sea. The formal adoption of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982 legalized the new claims, and established the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). Although it was not until 1994 that UNCLOS came into force, the battle over access to fishing grounds was over and a new battle for access to markets began.

The governance of inshore and coastal fisheries by communities emerges as a focus in the context of demo-graphic increases, economic globalization, coastal devel-opments, pollution and resilient pro-industrial national policy developments.

From 1983 to 1992: Towards the ‘global village’

This period starts with the FAO World Conference on Fishery Management and Development (in 1984) and ends with the UN Conference on Environment and Development (in 1992). Reported marine ‘fish’ landings grew from 56 to 77 million tonnes.

Overfishing and overcapacity became global concerns together with pollution and natural fluctuations. The new Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) owners experimented with fishery development and management, limited entry, Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) and control and surveil-lance. On multispecies fisheries management, ICES con-cluded that mixed-species fisheries were a more serious issue than predator–prey relationships. Annual economic losses in the North Atlantic reached US$ 1 billion, and the poor state of many resources called for improved management (FAO, 1981; Garcia, 1992). With its fishery and environmental mandates, the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR; cf. Chapter 17) became a precursor of an ecological approach to fisheries. A moratorium on whaling was endorsed in 1982. The FAO (1984) Conference on Fisheries Management and Development focused on the new order of ocean governance, poor management, access to foreign markets and fish trade,8 and social and economic issues. The 1984 International Conference of Fishworkers and Their Supporters, organized by the International Collective in Support of Fishworkers (ICSF), drew attention to the impor-tance and problems of the neglected small-scale fisheries.

International concerns regarding the collateral effects of fishing grew rapidly. The 1989 Wellington Convention in the South Pacific and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 44(225) banned large drift nets in the high seas from 1st July 1991 over concerns with bycatch, signalling a new importance of UNGA in cross-sectorial ocean matters. ICES established a Working Group on Ecosystem Effects of Fishing in 1990, incorporating eco-system considerations within European fishery manage-ment advice. In 1991, the Australian Fisheries Management Act introduced the concept of Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD) in fisheries (McLoughlin et al., 2008), strongly influencing the development of the precautionary and ecosystem approaches in FAO.

This period of rising concerns ended in 1992 with numerous significant events for fisheries and conservation. The Rio Declaration, its Principle 15 on the Precautionary Approach and its Agenda 21 provided guidance for fish-eries and marine conservation for decades. The newly established the Commission on Biological Diversity (CBD) played a growing role at the interface between fisheries and conservation and enhanced the concept of sustain-able use of biodiversity (hence fishery resources). Cod fishing in Canada became an emblematic example of a non-sustainable fishery, leading to a moratorium. For the first time, a fishery resource (tuna) was proposed for listing

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by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES).9 The International Conference on Respon-sible Fishing (Cancun, Mexico) elaborated on the respon-sible fishing concept and called on FAO to develop a Code of Conduct.

From 1993 to 2002: Sustainability challenge

This active decade of implementation of UNCED Agenda 21 ended with the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD). Reported marine landings grew from 78 to 83 million tonnes.

Overfishing was widespread (Garcia, 1992; Garcia and Grainger, 2005). The 1996 report of FAO on the State of Fisheries and Aquaculture (SOFA; FAO, 1996) indicated that the majority of the world’s fish resources were in need of urgent management, that 35% were overfished and that 20 million tons more fish could be landed through adequate management and development efforts.

The institutional framework for fisheries was significantly reinforced. The 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement10 and the 1995 UNFSA strengthened the arm of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) and Port States in control and surveillance. The UNFSA also called for a pre-cautionary approach and changed the role of MSY from a target to a limit reference value.

The 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries provided a comprehensive international code of ethics for fishing in all aquatic systems under all jurisdictions. Its implementation was facilitated by International Plans of Action (IPOAs) on seabirds bycatch, sharks, fishing capacity and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing (others came later). The framework was further strength-ened by the establishment of more RFMOs: the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT in 1993); the Central Bering Sea Donut Hole Agreement (in 1994); the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC in 1995); the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC in 2000); and Southeast Atlantic Fisheries Organization (SEAFO in 2001). The establishment of the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) by WWF and Unilever in 1994 confirmed the increasing role of non-state market-driven instruments and consumers in fisheries policy. A collision between fisheries and conservation governance occurred in 1996 with the first International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) ‘Red’ listing of a dozen com-mercially exploited species (including Atlantic cod and haddock), triggering a long-standing debate on the listing

of commercial species (cf. ‘From 1950 to 1970-80’ section; Chapter 12).

In 1999, the United Nations open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea (UNICPOLOS or the Informal Consultative Process, ICP) was established under the UNGA to facilitate an annual review of developments in ocean affairs and the law of the sea (resolution 54/33). Science advisory bodies to RFMOs and many developed States adopted more structured approaches to assessments and management advice, built on the precautionary approach, legitimized by Agenda 21 and operationalized by FAO (1996).

The ecosystem focus of fisheries management increased with the 1993 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admini-stration Global Environment Facility (NOAA-GEF) initiative on Large Marine Ecosystems (LME; Sherman, 2008). The ICES WG on Multispecies Assessments concluded its work on trophodynamic interactions in assessments and manage ment, noting that more traditional issues such as over-capacity and ineffective Monitoring Control and Surveillance (MCS) were more consequential than predator–prey relationships. The ICES WG on the ecosystem effects of fishing diversified the scope of investigations. The Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries (EAF) was interna-tionally adopted at the 2001 Iceland-FAO Conference on Responsible Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem (Reykjavik), a decision endorsed by the following Committee on Fisheries (COFI). In 2003, FAO EAF guidelines explicitly accounted for the 1998 CBD ‘Malawi Principles’ for the Ecosystem Approach adopted by the 4th Conference of the Parties (CoP4) of the CBD (in Bratislava, Slovakia). The 2002 WSSD Plan of Implementation (POI) called on imple-mentation of existing instruments to reach agreed time-bound objectives for fisheries and conservation. Its arbitrary and optimistic milestones proved to be unrealistic, however.

From 2003 to 2012: The biodiversity decade

This period started with the FAO-New Zealand International Conference on Governance and Management of Deep-Sea Fisheries (the Deep Seabed Conference), held in Queenstown, New Zealand. The new UNGA focused on seamounts biodiversity and vulnerable marine ecosystems in areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ), flagging the international focus of the decade. It ended with the Rio + 20 UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil). The reported marine ‘fish’ landings oscillated during the decade between 77 and 80 million tonnes.

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The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA, 2005) depicted a negative state of environment and biodiversity. The IUCN Sustainable Use concept based on the 1980 World Conservation Strategy principles and developed since 1994 was finally endorsed in 2000. Collaboration increased bet-ween FAO, CBD, United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), CITES and IUCN and some of the most important Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (ENGOs). Results included: (1) the UN Regular Process for a global assessment and reporting on the state of the Ocean (still ongoing) and the establishment by UNEP and IOC of a data-base for Global and Regional Assessments of the Marine Environment (GRAMED); (2) signing of an FAO-CITES memo-randum of understanding on the listing process (2006); (3) adoption of a legally binding Port States Agreement at FAO to fight against IUU (2009); (4) joint work of FAO, UNEP and CBD, with the participation of the IUCN Fisheries Expert Group, on destructive fishing practices (2009) and the consideration of biodiversity in fisheries assessments (2011), illustrating the will of international agencies to collaborate despite the sensitivity of some of issues; and (5) establish-ment of the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES 2011). CITES attempted again to list Atlantic Bluefin tuna (in 2009) in a renewed effort to introduce international trade controls in fisheries manage-ment. The failure of the attempt created tensions between FAO and CITES (cf. Chapter 12). The leadership role of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries in the incor-poration of biodiversity concerns in fishery-related policies recognized by the CBD in 2004 (Decision VII/4) was also recognized by Ramsar in 2005.

Fisheries agencies themselves increased efforts towards biodiversity conservation in the high seas, deep-sea habi-tats (seamounts, hot vents, cold seep, mineral crusts) and their particular vulnerable species assemblages and ecology. This focus was progressively extended to Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems (VMEs, cf. Chapter 13) in response to increasingly strident calls for a moratorium on deep-sea bottom trawling, at least in ABNJ. UNGA had increasing difficulties in negotiating compromise language in its Sustainable Fisheries resolutions (e.g. resolutions 61/105 and 64/72) and fisheries issues appeared increas-ingly often in its broader Ocean and Law of the Sea Resolutions.

The Green Growth concept of economic development, adopted at the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), is based on the more extensive use of economic incentives and market-based instruments to shift economic activity in directions more compatible

with sustainable use. Its relevance to reduce fisheries collat-eral damage on non-target species and ecosystems is being studied (see also ‘From 2000 to 2012’) with respect to biodi-versity conservation. The increasing role of these economic and financial instruments in the governance toolbox will probably be a major trend over the next decade.

Historical developments in biodiversity conservation

The chapter focuses on intergovernmental processes since 1850; it does not cover conservation strategies of private foundations, national societies, large ENGOs and large aquaria, the influence of which should not be underesti-mated. Nature conservation obviously started on land where its paradigms were born, developed and tested before expanding on oceans. The following is based on accounts given by Biot et al. (1995), Blaikie and Jeanrenaud (1996), Brandon et al. (1998), Ciriacy-Wantrup (1968), Johannes (2003), Larson et al. (1996), Sand (2001) and Thomas and Middleton (2003).

Following Ciriacy-Wantrup (1968), Evans (1987) and de Klemm and Shine (1993), we will refer in this chapter to two types of conservation related to their rationale defined as follows.

● A utilitarian or anthropocentric conservation. This con-siders that biodiversity needs to be conserved as the source of essential resources, goods and services for present and future human livelihood. Its value is mea-sured by its direct contribution to human wellbeing. This form of conservation view has existed for centuries (Evans, 1987) and rests on a community development ethic. It was initially aimed at wise use (Blaikie and Jeanrenaud, 1996) and, more recently, at sustainable development and use.

● An aesthetic or ecocentric conservation. This considers that biodiversity needs to be conserved for its charis-matic species, beautiful landscapes and, more recently, its intrinsic value as an indispensable part of ecosys-tems. It rests on an environmental ethic. It calls for pro-tection (or preservation) from human activities in the name of ‘general interest’. Enjoying much public support and private funding, it has been promoted by numerous institutions through a variety of causes and campaigns for specific ‘pet’ targets (landscapes, habitats or emblem-atic species) or against specific threats (e.g. deforesta-tion, whaling or destructive fishing).

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The evolution of the tensions between these two phi-losophies has shaped the evolution of governance styles which have evolved differently in different countries and parks at different times. In the Kruger Park management history, Venter (2008) distinguishes five philosophies: establishment (1898–1926); optimization (1902–1980); command and control (1955–1985); transition (1985–1995); and strategic adaptive management (1995–2008). During that evolution, the role of science increased after the mid-1950s and people participation after 1995. At the global level, the average trajectory probably has a large variation. Nonetheless, starting from a neo- Malthusian explanation of environmental degradation, Biot et al. (1995) and Blaikie and Jeanrenaud (1996) dis-tinguished three main conservation governance para-digms (classic, neo-populist and neo-liberal11) emerging in sequence but coexisting at times. Adding a traditional pre-industrial predecessor to the three paradigms above, an evolutionary trajectory may be drawn from the initial integration of preservation and use in traditional com-munities to the exclusion of humans and finally to modern ‘sustainable use’ with its pillars of equitable dis-tribution of conservation benefits and people’s partici-pation.

The timeline (Annex 1) and the literature of the last 5 decades show a turbulent progress towards more humanist perceptions of our relationships with nature. They also show socio-politico-economic divisions bet-ween conservation and development, entrenched in their respective legal and institutional frameworks and poorly coordinated (if not conflictual) implementation by special-ized agencies. The process is energized by the tensions existing between: (1) conservation and development; (2) international, national and local interests; (3) traditional and industrial development models; (4) developed and developing nations; (5) science and politics; (6) officials and folk; and (7) power relations at all levels (Blaikie and Jeanrenaud, 1996).

Before 1850: Traditional conservation

The period before 1850 could be called pre-industrial, pre-capitalist and colonial. The world had a large diver-sity of government systems from simple tribal organiza-tions to complex feudal states. Pre-modern fishing communities (e.g. in the South Pacific) developed a tradi-tional conservation ethic, an ‘awareness that one can deplete or otherwise damage one’s natural resources, coupled with a commitment to reduce or eliminate the

problem’ (Johannes, 2003; Ruddle, 2008). A utilitarian traditional form of self-conservation was in place to pro-mote wise usage of resources for sustainable livelihoods. In animist societies, emblematic animals were protected for cultural/religious reasons. Both were integrated in community governance. Utilitarian conservation (e.g. in subsistence fisheries) was community-based, largely self-governed (Biot et al., 1995) and used closed areas and seasons, gear regulations and some forms of limited entry and exclusive use rights, enforced through social pressure, rituals and even violent conflicts under the leadership of traditional authorities. In these cultures, regulation of fishing and what today we call ‘conservation’ co-existed in a mutually beneficial concept of ‘wise use’. The communities (and guilds of users) directly exerted the authority and resolved conflicts themselves.12 The conservation performance during that phase, sometimes presented as a model to revive, has not been always good (cf. Bolster, 2012),13 and worked better at sea than inland (Johannes, 2003).

Central governments had a non-systematic role, for example: (1) royal decrees protected special areas in India more than 2000 years ago; (2) protected areas for mam-mals, birds, fish and forests were established by the Emperor of India in 252 BC; (3) a nature reserve was established in the island of Sumatra by the King of Srivijaya in 684 AD; and (4) private hunting reserves were created in Europe for cen-turies by kings and lords, such as the New Forest created by William the Conqueror in 1079 (D. Laffoley, personal com-mication, 2012). These authorities closed and enforced reserves of charismatic or vulnerable species (e.g. stur-geons, swans and whales) for themselves and sometimes allocated some use rights to their people.

From 1850 to 1970–80: Increasing role of the State

This period corresponds to the classic governance para-digm mentioned in the introductory section, subdivided into time periods. The population of Western industrial countries grew from 117 million people in the early 19th century to 2.4 billion in 1960 (Ciriacy-Wantrup, 1968).

The conservation rift

By the middle of the 19th century, the fragile balance between use and conservation was profoundly changed in the Western economies by the consequences of demographic explosion, industrialization and emergence

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of the capitalistic market economy (Bolster, 2012; Ciriacy-Wantrup, 1968; Johannes, 2003; Ruddle, 2008). Colonization spread that change worldwide, affecting developing countries even after their decolonization. The massive industrial development led to burgeoning concerns for the environment and the progressive distinction between aesthetic/ecocentric and utilitarian/anthropocentric con-servations (Ciriacy-Wantrup, 1968; de Kemm and Shine, 1993; Evans, 1987). In the first half of the 20th century, util-itarian conservation gave birth to the management of wildlife, fisheries, forestry and agriculture (Ciriacy-Wantrup, 1968), building on common concepts.14

Aesthetic conservation focused on endangered and emblematic species (primates, large mammals, birds and, later on, marine mammals, turtles, sharks, etc.) as well as remarkable sceneries and landscapes. The literature estab-lishes the origin of this modern conservation movement in the USA in the 1870 s with the establishment of the first national forestry parks. The term ‘conservation’ was apparently adopted in 1907 in the US (Ciriacy-Wantrup, 1968, p. 27) and applied to natural and non-renewable resources. The Yosemite Park (established in 1865) and the Yellowstone Park (first National Park established in 1872) were established as ‘pleasuring ground for the benefit and enjoyment of the people’ to maintain a link between increasingly industrialized and urbanized citizens and Nature, rather than for the conservation of Nature per se. The Yellowstone Park became an example of conservation by exclusion of people, forcibly if necessary,15 and other examples exist in India16 and South Africa. The US parks initiative was followed by Canada in 1886, Australia in 1886, New Zealand in 1894, Sweden in 1909, Switzerland in 1914, Italy in 1923 and Japan in 1934 (Raffin, 2005). In parallel, a movement for the protection of selected species devel-oped between 1860 and 1900 for birds (1868), seals (1883) and salmon (1885) (Raffin, 2005). Since then, the control of areas (parks, wetlands and marine protected areas or MPAs) and the protection of individual species (e.g. in IUCN and CITES listings) have remained the two pillars of conservation until the introduction of market-based instruments (next main phase).

Conservation by exclusion

The concern for nature intensified after the Second World War and the conservation movement progressed towards its modern more cohesive shape, stimulated by the nega-tive or perceived effects of large-scale agriculture, forestry and fisheries. People (as opposed to just ‘industry’) started

being considered as the main threat to biodiversity. The movement developed first in rich countries and expanded to their colonies (Blaikie and Jeanrenaud, 1996). Conser-vation was seen as being in conflict with human uses of resources, disconnecting conservation from livelihoods and human welfare (Brown, 2002; Salafsky and Wollenberg,17 2000). Conservation was imposed or supported by the State,18 which also massively supported development (with questionable coherence). More areas were strictly pro-tected with top-down ‘command and control’ management (Venter et al., 2008) as in fisheries, and with different degrees of intervention in different countries (Uekoetter, 2006) including the eviction of people from traditional dwellings and livelihoods when necessary. The instruments of what was later referred to as ‘fortress conservation’ or conservation by ‘fines and fences’ (Biot et al., 1995) spread, turning traditional foresters, hunters and fishers into poachers by abolition of their traditional rights and pro-voking occasional bursts of violent reaction from affected populations. In the 1950s and 1960s, colonial powers applied these policies to their colonies where they per-sisted after independence, supported by international so-called development strategies.

The emergence of marine conservation

Marine conservation emerged slowly in the late 1960s and early 1970s. For example, Ratcliffe’s (1977) selection of UK sites of national importance for nature conservation did not include any marine habitats on rocky shores or below the low water mark. Marine conservation considered pro-tected areas as the instrument of choice for most needs. Strongly influenced by the forestry parks paradigm, marine parks and MPAs developed in coastal marine systems in the mid-1970s (cf. Chapter 8). The Great Barrier Reef, which extends 250 km offshore in its broadest part, was an exception.

Protection of marine species followed the terrestrial model, starting with iconic vulnerable species (e.g. whales, dolphins and turtles). The desire to identify threatened species and protect them from extinction led to many sep-arate initiatives; the IUCN emerged as the global leader in species conservation. Its Red List of threatened and endangered species began with terrestrial species and only slowly added aquatic species, with an initial domination of freshwater fish threatened by habitat loss and only later harvested marine fish (see Chapter 12). The command and control approach of a listing based on advice by conservation experts followed by stringent and mandatory

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(often court-ordered) prohibitions on harm, implemented by central governments, followed a the ‘fortress conser-vation’ approach, the social and economic costs of which were also seen as prohibitive.

From 1970–80 to 2000: Increasing the role of the actors

By the 1970s, conservation failures were conspicuous and top-down policies were progressively complemented by more participative and consensual policies. These addressed both protection and livelihood concerns, with some conflicts between conservation institutions such as IUCN and WWF and even within WWF itself (Blaikie and Jeanrenaud, 1996, p. 25).

The creation of UNEP in 1972, the adoption of UNCLOS in 1982, the cross-sectoral summits (UNCHE, UNCED, WSSD and Rio + 20) and the establishment of the CBD in 1992 provided the legal, institutional and policy frames needed to boost marine biodiversity conservation. During this period, Venter et al. (2008) identify three successive and partially overlapping governance styles in the Kruger Park: a conventional command and control phase (1955–1985) with no participation at all; a transition phase (1985–1995) towards more ecosystem approaches still with no partici-pation; and a strategic adaptive management phase (1995–2008) recognizing systems complexity and facili-tating active participation.

In terrestrial systems, the shift from exclusion to partici-pation was apparently prompted by the high failure rate of exclusion and an emerging vision of parks and surround-ings as complex socio-ecological systems. The spectre of global warming strengthened the awareness of related-ness between natural and human subsystems. The rela-tions between the utilitarian and aesthetic streams of conservation governance remained tumultuous (Tickell, 1995, cited by Blaikie and Jeanrenaud, 1996). By the 1990s, there was little support left for fortress conservation (Blaikie and Jeanrenaud, 1996). The neo-populist approach that emerged recognized the social and economic roots of biodiversity. It involved and empowered communities and indigenous populations, mobilizing their traditions including use rights (Biot et al., 1995; Blaikie and Jeanrenaud, 1996). It rested on local ownership and control, self- determination and rights of representation. It was facili-tated by greater involvement of social sciences (since the 1980s), a better understanding of common pool resources management (Berkes, 1989; Ostrom, 1990) and recognition of the relation between conservation and poverty.

The approach was advocated in international policy documents such as Caring for the Earth (IUCN/UNEP/WWF in 1991), the Global Biodiversity Strategy (WRI/IUCN/UNEP 1992) and UNCED Agenda 21. Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs) (cf. Chapter 2) were developed in the 1980s to generate alternative revenues, e.g. in WWF and in UNESCO Biosphere reserves and Man and Biosphere Programmes. By the 1990s, however, ICDPs were criticized for: (1) unac-ceptable tradeoffs; (2) a naïve view of the ‘community’; (3) difficulties of effective participation; (4) lack of direct linkage between the substitution activities19 and conser-vation; and (5) the excessively intrusive role of large NGOs (Blaikie and Jeanrenaud, 1996, p. 26; Brown, 2002; Salafsky and Wollenberg, 2000; Weigel et al., 2007; cf. Chapter 25).

The development of modern marine conservation

Space-based marine conservation governance (see Chapter 8) first developed its financial and public support strategies and instruments for terrestrial issues; it started covering coastal and marine areas in the 1970s, where it developed together with the emerging concept of sustain-able development. Its development was boosted by the Stockholm Declaration in 1972, the World Conservation Strategy in 1980, UNCLOS in 1982, the Brundtland report in 1987, the IUCN Sustainable Use Initiative 1980–2000, the establishment of the CBD in 1992 and its 1995 Djakarta mandate, as well as the large UN cross-sectoral summits (UNCHE, UNCED, WSSD and Rio + 20 from 1972 to 2012). The total area covered by MPAs and the number of publica-tions concerning them are probably good indicators of the development of modern marine conservation (Figure 1.2).

In Australia, the first offshore marine parks were established in 1937 and 1974 (R. Kenchington, personal communication). The MPA movement started in Europe in the late 1960s on the wake of the Torrey Canyon oil spill. The first Conference on Marine Parks and Reserves in Tokyo in 1975 confirmed its nascent dynamism. The emblematic Great Barrier Reef Marine Park established that same year in Australia served as a flagship. By the 1990s, virtually every coastal country had implemented some form of MPA, a high proportion of them unfortunately unmanaged ‘paper parks’ (Kelleher et al., 1995). Nonetheless, the movement gained momentum in science, funding and policy follow-ing UNCED and WSSD (Willis et al., 2003), and expanded from coastal areas to the high seas and deep seas there-after (Toropova et al., 2010).

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This growing MPA coverage was accompanied by the emergence of good governance principles (PNUD, 1997) and the growing requirement of the CBD and IUCN for management effectiveness in MPAs. The period 1990–2010 was clearly one of rapid expansion of marine biodiversity conservation and particularly of its science-based advocacy and governance (cf. Chapter 9).

From 2000 to 2012: Growing role of incentives and the market

In recent years, there has been growing focus on the creation and utilization of economic incentives and the tapping into market forces to shift human behaviour in conservation directions (see discussions by Blaikie and Jeanrenaud, 1996 and Brown, 2002). This has led to new governance approaches that seek to simultaneously address conservation failures (e.g. in MPAs and in ICDPs) and institutional, market and policy failures, and specifically to add value to biodiversity as an incentive to conserve it in the long term. Livelihoods drive conservation instead of being simply compatible with it. The approach has the potential to integrate fisheries and biodiversity and is an application of the ‘green economy’ paradigm (UNEP, 2011) and of the Economics of the Ecosystems and Biodiversity (Kumar, 2012; TEEB, 2011). The 2012 IUCN Resolution WCC-2012-Res-110

on biodiversity offsets and related compensatory approaches underlined the significantly increased interest of conservation institutions in the approach.

This approach calls for the creation of appropriate incen-tives while eliminating perverse incentives, as well as inter-nalization of environmental costs. In principle, economic and market-based incentives offer policymakers new and cheaper ways to reach conservation objectives, using market forces to complement traditional measures, that is, generating revenue to support management (Bräuer et al., 2006). Options include taxes, fees, payments for ecosystem services, subsidies, grants, tradable use rights, eco-labelling, financial mechanisms and liability and compensation payments (offsets). These approaches may be applied to habitat, ecosystem and species conservation to complement impact reduction measures (e.g. closed areas or seasons, technological adaptation) and to increase compliance. Their cost must be passed to the consumer, internalizing the cost of biodiversity damage and making it explicit.

The approach creates direct linkages and interdepen-dence between conservation and livelihoods (Salafsky and Wollenberg, 2000) while re-focusing the State’s role on norm and target setting, together with oversight. This requires that difficult challenges be addressed, for example: the utilitarian appropriation of nature that is implied by these measures; the estimation of benefit/cost

1945

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Empirical studies (1990–2001)

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2010

Figure 1.2 Evolution of the MPA coverage (1945–2008) in the ocean and in the literature. Area covered from IUCN and UNEP-WCMC (2009). Empirical studies from Willis et al. (2003). Studies on governance (Google Scholar search in French, English and Spanish, September 2011).

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ratios and required compensation (Boncoeur et al., 2011); the effective generation and capture of benefits; and the major challenge of achieving equity. Implementation will certainly require capacity-building in innovative economic and banking domains (Bräuer et al., 2006).

Return to the barriers

In terrestrial conservation a recent trend called ‘return to the barriers’ (recalling the past ‘fortress conservation’ con-cept) argues that failing conservation should return to the values of aesthetic beauty and intrinsic value (Büscher and Diets, 2005) and ‘that protected areas are the last bastions of biodiversity and wildlife conservation and hence should be protected at all costs and focus on preservation, the strictest form of conservation’ (Terborgh and Van Shaik, 2002). It relates to the perceived failure of many ICDPs and participation processes (Brockington, 2003; Butz et al., 1991; Cernea and Schmidt-Scholtau, 2003). It is too soon to evaluate the trend, but the controversy is symptomatic of the century-old tension in the Humans–Nature relation.

It looms as a strong warning for the oceans in case of failure to successfully integrate fisheries and biodiversity conservation governance.

Conclusions

The history of the two streams is rich in international activity, reflecting growing concerns and efforts to improve performance through modification and diversifi-cation of the two governance paradigms. The comparison of the two timelines in Annex 1 and of the historical changes reminds us that the governance streams for fishery management and biodiversity conservation have important common roots in pre-capitalistic pre-colonial communities. Historically joined in traditional community governance (with a possible bias towards a utilitarian vision), the two streams diverged during the 19th century under growing impacts of industrialization, as distinct utili-tarian and aesthetic branches of conservation with tumul-tuous relationships (cf. Chapter 2). Forms of management involving organized corporations and the State emerged much earlier on land (during the 13–15th centuries) than in the ocean (middle 20th century). From 1970 onwards how-ever, the UN cross-sectoral summits established bridges between the two streams, accelerating their conceptual convergence. This increase of high-level cross-sectoral

events (after 1970) has funnelled the two governance streams into closer and closer evolution through phases of indifference, conflict and apparent convergence in the last four decades. The recent focus on economic incentives and market-based approaches in both fisheries and biodiversity conservation, the efficiency of which as a win-win solution still needs to be tested, may significantly accelerate the pre-sent convergence and improve the scope for real integration.

Notes

1. Exterminations of large mammals in North America, for example, occurred as early as 9500 years BC (McGoodwin, 1984 in Troadec, 1989, p. 43). A North Sea resource of turbot (Psetta maxima) was collapsed in only 17 years (1823–1840) using simple technology (Alward, 1932 in Cushing, 1968, p. 91). Bolster (2012) describes early exter-mination of seabirds and walrus by the Vikings in the 9th century.

2. T.H. Huxley influenced the Royal Commissions on Sea Fisheries of the United Kingdom (1863–1865) and the subsequent Sea Fisheries Act of 1868 which repealed more than 50 fisheries acts. He maintained this position 20 years later at the 1882 Fisheries Exhibition in London, recommending ‘that unrestricted freedom of fishing be permitted hereafter’. He stressed that ‘with the present forms of fishing’, the stocks such as ‘cod, herring and mack-erel were inexhaustible’ (Roswadowski, 2002). Forgetting the underlined caveat, he has been repeatedly accused of having unleashed overfishing. Other scientists such as E.R. Lancaster disputed (in vain) his conclusions, proving by a decade-long experiment starting in 1885 in Scotland that harvesting had serious impacts and resources needed protection (Lankester 1884; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marine_Biological_Association_of_the_United_Kingdom).

3. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/641450/whaling/65551/Regulation

4. Warming’s work was eventually translated into English by Andersen (1983).

5. This concept is different from the ‘optimum yield’ pro-posed later by Roedel (1985) that combines ecological and socio-economic criteria.

6. Refer to the 1937 London Convention for the Regulation of Meshes for Fishing Nets and the Size Limits for Fish (the 1st London Overfishing Convention).

7. Limitations of total allowable catch (TACs) were introduced.8. The FAO COFI subcommittee on fish trade was established

in 1985, signalling the growing importance of fish trade.

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9. The proposal was withdrawn but resurfaced in 2010.10. Agreement to Promote Compliance with the International

Conservation and Management measures by Fishing Vessels in the High Seas (the FAO Compliance Agreement).

11. Or ‘new conservation’ (Brown, 2002)12. In case of failure, higher-level authorities were called in.13. Bolster (2012) illustrates very well the way in which the con-

servative concern of traditional fishers for sustainability of changing practices and local/traditional resource depletion is constantly overwhelmed by technology development and geographical and economic fisheries expansion.

14. T.H. Huxley, for example, stressed the similarities between fisheries and agriculture to justify his views on management.

15. In the USA in 1863, the establishment of the Yellowstone Park (sometimes considered as a model of conservation by exclusion) led to forced evictions and the death of 300 Shoshoni Native Americans in a single day (Walsh, 2011).

16. In India, 7000 people were evicted over a 5 month period to create a lion protection area (Blaikie and Jeanrenaud, 1996, p. 58).

17. According to Salfsky and Wollenberg (2000), 60% of all IUCN MPAs do not have any development objective.

18. It can be assumed that, under Kings and Lords’ ruling, something very similar already existed in many countries.

19. Activities of substitution replaced activities considered as producing unacceptable impacts with others not affecting the reserve.

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