OXFORD STUDIES IN DEMOCRATIZATION

Series editor: Laurence Whitehead

Oxford Studies in Democratization is a series for scholars and students of comparative politics and related disciplines. Volurnes will concentrate on the comparative study of the

democratization processes that accompanied the decline and termination of the cold war. The geographical focus of the

series will primarily be Latin America, the Caribbean, Southern and Eastern Europe, and relevant

experiences in Africa and Asia.

OTHER BOOKS IN THE SERIES

Democracy, Agency, and the State: Theory with Comparative Intent

Guillermo O'Donnell

Regime-Building: Democratization and International Administration

Oisin Tansey

Rethinking Arab Democratization: Elections without Democracy

Larbi Sadiki

Accountability Politics: Power and Voice in Rural Mexico

Jonathan A. Fox

Regimes and Democracy in Latin America: Theories and Methods

Edited by Gerardo L. Munck

Democracy and Diversity: Political Engineering in the Asia-Pacifi.c

Benjamin Reilly

Democracy and the State in the New Southern Europe Edited by Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros,

and Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos

International Democracy and the West: The Role of Governments, Civil Society, and Multinational Business

Richard Youngs

Democrarie Accountability in Latin America: Edited by Scott Mainwaring and Christopher Weina

Democratization: Theory and Experience Laurence Whitehead

Changes for Democracy Actors, Structures, Processes

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LEONARDO MORLINO

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OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

List of Figures List of Tables

Introduction

Contents

Part I The Basics

1. What Theory in Democratization Studies? 1.1 Theories of institutional change 1.2 A Retreat from theory? 1.3 What aie the possible theoretical developments?

2. Definitional Conundrums 2.1 Core definitions 2.2 Minimalist empirical definition 2.3 Main normative definitions

3. Are There Hybrid Regimef. 3.1 A widespread phenomenon? 3.2 Definition and analytic dimensions 3.3 Empirical cases of hybrid regimes, or sheer fantasy? 3.4 What kind of classification? 3.5 Where to go from here?

Part li Transitions, Consolidations, Crises

4. What Transitions to Democracy? 4.1 When is there a regime change?

'4.2 The 'first' transitions and installations 4.3 Subsequent transitions 4.4 Installation of democracy: dimensions of variation 4.5 Installation of democracy: explanatory factors 4.6 An addendum on parties 4. 7 What is the core mechanism of change?

5. Domestic Anchoring 5.1 Do consolidation and crisis exist?

lX

X

1

7 7

11 18

25 26 31 34

48 49 so 57 60 67

77 77 79 83 85 91 97

106

109 109

Vlll Contents

5.2 Legitimation and anchoring 5.3 The main patterns: Southern Europe 5.4 Contextual explanations and theoretical foundations 5.5 How much 'travel' can be done?

6. External Anchoring 6.1 Methods of influence: what to consider? 6.2 Layers of irnpact and cycles of change: the framework 6.3 Testing the framework empirically 6.4 Key final remarks

Part III Qualities Deepening

7. Analysing Democrarie Qualities 7.1 The question 7.2 What is 'quality'?

7.3 'Good' democracy and other normative notions 7.4 What qualities? 7.5 The procedures 7.6 The two substantive dimensions 7.7 The outcome 7.8 Recurrent patterns of subversion 7.9 What to focus on?

Appendix

8. TODEM Applied 8.1 Accountabilities and connections 8.2 From procedures to results and contents 8.3 Where are the qualities?

Appendix

9. Concluding Remarks

Bibliography Index

112 119 128 132

144 144 150 160 179

191 191 194 195 196 197 205 208 211 215 216

223 223 240 249 258

264

269 293

List of Figures

2.1 Most salient definitions of democracy

3.1 What kind ofhybrid regime?

4.1 Initial installation: Dahl's 'box'

4.2 Modes of democratic transition

4.3 Significant dimensions in the installation of democracy

4.4 Explicative factors in the installation of democracy

5.1 Patternsand cases of democratic consolidation: Southern Europe

5.2 Patterns and cases of democratic consolidation: Eastern Europe

6.1 EU cycles and layers of international democratic anchoring (EUCLIDA)

7.1 A few recurrent patterns of quality subversion

8.1 Democrarie qualities: COJillections among procedural dimensions

8.2 Constitutional accountability assessments in selected East European countries

8.3 Freedom strengthens equality and vice versa?

8.4 Quality democracies

8.5 Democracies without quality

8.6 The web of qualities: Northern and Central Europe (selected countries)

8.7 The web of qualities: Southern Europe

8.8 The web of qualities: Eastern Europe (selected countries)

8.9 The web of qualities: Latin America (selected countries)

8.10 Models and cases of democracies without qualities

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44

63

80

84

90

96

120

140

157

214

225

226

243

250

251

254

255

256

257

257

4 Introduction

St Anthony's. I would like to thank Jan Zielonka for this possibility and all consequent opportunities I had to work on the revisions.

I would also like to acknowledge very gratefully the comments on the entire manuscript or on some chapter of it of a few colleagues and friends, including Nancy Bermeo, Ian Carter, Donatella Della Porta, Michael Freeden, Timothy Garton Ash, Morgan Uewellyn, Liborio Mattina, Angelo Panebianco, Riccardo Pelizzo, Daniela Piana, Francesco Raniolo, Eugenio Somaini, Claudius Wagemann, Laurence Whitehead, and Jan Zielonka.

Thus, looking back over these years of research, if I recall the famous metaphor by the Greek poet Archilochus, quoted by Isaiah Berlin (1953: 1) at the beginning of his essay on Tolstoy: 'the fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing', this work should show that my model is the hedgehog. Whether the goal of knowing 'one big thing' has been even partially achieved is eventually up to the reader to decide.

PART I

THE BASICS

t r

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1

What Theory in Democratization Studies?

For many years a key issue in comparative studies has been: how far can democratic theory be developed while avoiding the double trap of the ban­ality of over-general assertions, on the one hand, and the short-sighted view of an important phenomenon, on the other hand, because of the limits and constraints imposed by a specific analysis of either one case or few cases within a limited time span? To deal with this topic we can start by asking: does a theory of dem9cratization or of regime change exist? This is an issue that has been around for decades in dassie political science literature, but it has been recast here in the new context of the spreading of democracies since the early 1970s. A reasonable response to this question should consider two other streams of Iiterature in addition to the one focusing on the most recent democratization phenomenon alone. They consist of the attempts to find theoretical propositions and ~podels at a high level of abstraction to explain the institutional changes, ancf the quantitative analyses of a large number of cases that basically develop the path-breaking work by Lipset in the 1950s (1959). As we will see in the following sections, what immediately distin­guishes these two groups of scholars from the democratization scholars is how theoretical goals take priority in the two groups whereas there is a sort of retreat from theory in the third group. To appreciate better these differences the theoretical Iiterature and the empirical studies will be discussed first before examining the theoretical contributions of democratization scholars.

1.1 THEORIES OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

Attempts to develop general theoretical propositions about institutional changes were made by Krasner (1984) with his notion of punctuated equili­bria, then by Berins Collier and Collier (1991) and the notion of ~ritical jundures, which recalls a similar concept proposed by Rokkan (1970), and, almost a decade later, by Pierson (2000: esp. 263ff.), whose notion of path dependence is one of the most important attempts to develop a theory of

8 The Basics

political change. Drawing on language borrowed from economics, Piersan sketches out his theory on the basis of a few key propositions: 'specific patterns of tirning and sequence matter'; 'a wide range of social outcomes are often possible'; 'large consequences may result from relatively small and contingent events'; 'particular courses of action, once introduced, are often difficult or virtually impossible to reverse even if their consequences prove to be disastrous'; 'political development is punctuated by critical moments and junctures which shape the basic contours of sociallife'; and, finally, in the political realm, the high density of institutions, the central role of collective action, the complexity and opacity of politics, compounded by the short -term horizons of politicians and the 'stickiness' of politics, make path dependence a relevant key theory. Following Pierson, Mahoney (2001) also makes a well­conceived attempt to apply such a theory to some cases of democratization in Central America.

Adopting a similar perspective for analysing and explaining political change, Goodin (1996: 24-5) usefully refers to the three basic ways in which institutions can be modified: by accident, evolution, and conscious interven­tion. Accordingly, we could say that the first transitions to democracy came about by accident; transitions with strong characteristics of continuity, such as the Mexican, Brazilian, and Chilean cases, display an evolutionary path; and the discontinuous transitions brought about by different and identifiable actors in other cases can be seen as the result of conscious intervention. Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 16-18) also identified four 'sources of institu­tional dynarnism': (1) broad changes in socio-economic or political context that make previously latent institutions more salient; (2) changes in socio­economic contex:t or political balance that 'produce a situation in which old institutions are put in service of different ends, as new actors come into play who pursue their (new) goal through existing institutions'; (3) exogenaus changes that 'produce a shift in the goal or strategies being pursued within existing institutions'; and ( 4) 'political actors adjust their strategies to accom­modate changes in the institutions themselves' through a dramatic change or 'piecemeal change'. In addition, Mahoney and Thelen (2009: 1-37) effectively elaborate on four more precisely developed 'modal types' of gradual institu­tional changes: displacement, namely the 'removal of old rules and the intro­duction of new ones'; layering, i.e. the 'introduction of new rules on top or alongside existing rules'; drift, which is the 'changed impact of existing rules due to shifts in the environment'; and conversion, that is to say, 'the changed enactment of existing rules due to their strategic redeployment'.

Despite their interest and importance, however, the studies by Goodin, Krasner, Berins Collier and Collier, Pierson, Thelen and Steinmo, Mahoney and Thelen, besides other works by Steinmo et al. (1992), Thelen (2004), and

What Theory in Democratization Studies? 9

the analysis of critical junctures by Capoccia and Kelemen (2007) (just to cite the best-developed ones), cannot be considered useful pieces of a theory of democrafuation or of regime change for a number of reasons. One is their very high level of abstraction. But the main reason is simply that they have been devised with different research goals to those of transition to democracy or crisis or other aspects of democratization. As their principal focus is change, gradual or otherwise, in well-established democratic contex:ts they cannot cope with key questions about democratization or regime change.

1

Although we will come back to some of these theoretical proposals in Chapter 8, here we might immediately add that a useful and crucial notion for understanding political change might have been that of 'critical juncture'. But as Capoccia and Kelemen wisely state, critical junctures, even in the moderate way they define them, i.e. as 'relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents' choices will affect the outcome of interest' (2007: 348), are 'rare events' as 'the normal state of an institution is either one of stability or one of constrained adaptive change' (2007: 368) of the kind suggested by Mahoney and Thelen (see above). In actual fact, as anyone who has clone field research in countries where there has been a transition to democracy will be tempted to say: they are very rare events, if they exist at all. This view is backed up by the literature, which stresses that 'no politipl elites operate in a vacuum ... politicians ... risk being displaced by a nef.r set of representatives if they do not meet the interests and demands of their supporters' (Boix 2003: 9). Thus, at the very least the suggestions ernerging from this stream of literatme should be 'translated' and mademorerelevant for the theoretical analysis of democrati­zation (for more on this, see Chapter 8).

The second group of quantitative scholars who have developed relevant and highly ambitious theoretical propositions are those who adopted a quantitative strategy with a large number of cases. Vanhanen (1990, 1997), in his search for 'the ultimate underlying factor of democratization' or 'the common factor of democratization' (Vanhanen 1997: 25-6), first in 147 countries and then in 172 countries, developed an 'evolutionary theory of democratization' where this factor is identified as the distribution of power resources2 and democracy is measured by aggregating the degree of competi­tion and that of participation.3 lt is not relevant here to emphasize that this seems to involve a quantitative reshaping of a dassie theory in the analysis of democracy. In fact, the distribution of power resources is actually a different

-way oflabelling econornic and social pluralism. Moreover, pluralism, compe-tition, and participation have been the dassie loci of democratic theory at least since Rousseau, Tocqueville, and several more recent authors such as Lipset (1960), Dahl (1970), or Sartori (1987). Notwithstanding a few reasonable

10 The Basics

criticisms that can be made of the method used to measure pluralism and democracy (for example, Norris 2008: 63-5), the study by Vanhanen, who is well aware of the limits ofhis explanation (see 1997: 155-66), is a significant preliminary step towards a more precise explanation of democratization.

Vanhanen's work can be complemented by the analysis of Przeworki et al. (2000) on the connections between economic development and democracy, though some of their most interesting observations concern the performance of democracy and dictatorships in different domains.4 Their key point shows how 'strong and tight' the relationship is between economic development, measured by per capita income, and democracy. More controversial is the relative importance they attribute to this factor compared to others, such as politicallegacy, social structure, cultural traditions, institutional framework, and international context (Przeworki et al. 2000: Chapter 2, esp. p. 79). They also clarify very effectively that there is no linear relationship between eco­nomic development and transitions to democracy that is compatible with a wide range of economic Ievels and that there is a definite strong relationship with the survival, if not consolidation, of democracy (Przeworki et al.: 98, 103).

Although a relevant early chapter ofhis book concerns 'a theory of political transition', the issue Boix (2003) chiefly tackles is the conditions of stable democracies, in addition to other less directly relevant aspects. He does so by developing a model for the preferences and resources of social actors and individuals, explained by three factors: the degree of economic equality; the nature of economic assets, determined by their mobility; and the distribution of political resources to repress or Outmanoeuvre opponents. There is no doubt that Boix's model, which also recalls aspects explored by Vanhanen, is one of the most successful attempts since Lipset to provide a socio-economic explanation of democratic stability, with data going back about two hundred years to the early nineteenth century.

The work of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) can also be mentioned in this review. These two authors propose a simplified theory of conflicts where the role of socio-economic forces in the creation and consolidation of democracy is analysed. A set of game theoretical hypotheses is developed with reference to the strength of a well-organized civil society, the impact of economic crises, the sources of elite income, the Ievel of inter-group inequality, the role of the middle dass, and the positive irnpact of economic globalization complemen­ted by non-majoritarian democratic institutions. The weakness of this analy­sis is that the key hypotheses are not really tested. In fact, besides a general quantitative picture of existing democracy, basically in the 1990s, there is a cursory analysis of four cases in different moments ( Great Britain, Argentina, Singapore, South Africa) and with different paths to democracy. In short,

What Theory in Democratization Studies? 11

there is an unacceptable disparity between the theoretical apparatus, a mix­ture of common sense and clever observations, and the empirical support. It seems ~ excellent example ofhow not to do good empirical theory.5

The 'revised theory of modernization' by Inglehart and Welzel (2005) complements the previous works by adding a better knowledge and under­standing of economic aspects in connection with the cultural changes that are so important in democratization. More precisely, with the essential contribu­tion of the results of several analytic surveys, 6 the authors single out the cultural changes brought about by socio-economic development, which include higher individual autonomy, the emergence of self-expression values, and other additional consequences for human development. The findings of these and other works with sirnilar characteristics mark an irnportant step towards explaining and developing a theory of regime change. However, these contributions are more pertinent when the focus is on democratic survival, consolidation, _ and stable democracies rather than when it comes to dealing with the transition to democracy or democratic deepening.7 Moreover, because of the approach and the research question, attention is actually devoted to the phenomenon as a whole rather than to di:fferences between cases and above all-and this is very irnportant for the perspective being pursued here-to the different, fundamental, and most specific recurring aspects within the macro-p:t;ocesses of democratization. Finally, the authors of these works are themselves lucidly aware of the limits of an exclusively statistical analysis. On the whole, their work can be regarded as a first, necessary step, which requires a subsequent, deeper and more qualitative analysis of the key aspects involved in the transition to democracy, consolida­tion, crisis, and an issue far removed from the perspective of these works, namely, the deepening of democracy, as well as of the evolution and di:ffer­ences between cases or groups of cases. In short, they are theoretical proposals and significant research accomplishments. But they still do not answer the questions that are irnportant for a deeper understanding of the whole phe­nomenon of democratization.

1.2 A RETREAT FROM THEORY?

When we consider the groqp of scholars who have focused more specifically ' on Southern European transitions to democracy in the early 1970s and on

other changes of regime in the subsequent decades, the picture appears to be the opposite: there are questions, but not theoretical results. To start with, one

12 The Basics

of the most authoritative statements is that made by O'Donnell and Sehnritter (1986: 3): 'We did not have at the beginning, nor do we have at the end ... a "theory'' to test or to apply to the case studies.' This statement was echoed several years later by McFaul (2002: 244): 'the project of constructing a general theory of democratization may very well fail ... The unique pattems generated by the fourth wave of regirne change in the post communist world suggest that the search for a general theory of democratization and authocra­tization will be a long one.'

Consideration of the contributions made in the field reveals a wide range of empirical research and theoretical results. A first, still meaningful overview of democratization literatme is the review by Valerie Bunce (2000: 715), who distinguished between theoretical propositions at a high level of generaliza­tion and regional propositions. At the higher level of abstraction Bunce singles out five broad propositions, some of which also go back to previous dassie analyses. The first regards a high level of economic development as a guarantee of democratic continuity; the second concems the centrality of political leaders in the founding and designing of democracy; the third stresses the assets of parliamentary rather than presidential systems for 'the continuation of democratic govemance'; the fourth considers the salience of the settlements of'national and state questions' for 'the quality and survival of democracy'; and the fifth concems the key importance of the rule of law for a fully fledged democracy. In addition, regional generalizations relate to the salience of 'pacting', that is, of reaching agreements and accommodation in the democratic transitions of Southem Europe and Latin America; the ad­vantages of breaking with the past in Eastem Europe; the high correlation between democratization and economic reform in a capitalist direction in Eastern Europe; and the threat to democracy in Latin America and post­socialist Europe because of the weakness of the rule oflaw. Even if we overlook the studies by Geddes (1999: 140), who 'found little evidence in a set of 163 regime transitions ... for the claim that pacts increase the likelihood of democracy', and by McFaul (2002: 213, 243), who shows how in Eastem European countries 'successful democratic transition did not follow the pacted path' and consequently 'in the long stretch of history, the successful transitions from communism to democracy may look like the norm, while the pacted transitions and transitions from above in Latin America and Southem Europe may look like the aberration', we can readily agree that these proposi­tions cannot build any theory of democratic transition, either general or regional.

The picture becomes much richer when 'the state of art', as delineated by Berg-Schlosser (2007) and Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell (2000), is added.8

First of all, both Berg-Schlosser and Munck (2007) present and discuss the

What Theory in Democratization Studies? 13

adopted concepts, the quantitative and qualitative analyses carried out, as well as the main empirical findings in the field. The main findings of the very full account of democratization provided by Berg-Schlosser are as follows: research conceming social classes as 'prime agents' of democratization is inconclusive; the analysis of consolidation should be substituted by an analy­sis of stability for more focused and clearly formulated questions; the ex­planations of democratic transitions are extremely varied; the old proposition about the association between the level of economic development and demo­cratic stability is still very solid; the influence of international factors can be strong; and, above all, there is a lack of a theory of democratization. 9 On

. international factors, specifically, they became a core feature of other analyses of transitions, especially Eastern European transitions, through authors such as Whitehead (1996), who points to the three mechanisms of 'contagion', 'control', and 'consent', or Linz and Stepan (1996: 72-81), who discuss the salience of the foreign policies of other countries-the USA for one-together with 'zeitgeist' "and 'diffusion', or those who have been doing research on the enlargement of the European Union (EU) (see Pridham et al. 1994; but also Pevehouse 2002; Schimmelfennig and Secleimeier 2005; Magen and Morlino 2008; and others).

Several other subsequent contributions basically confirm the key point I wish to make in this chapter and also clarify and specify the positions and rationale of different authorl. Thus, for example, Whitehead (2002) estab­lishes the background for an analysis of democratization as a long-term, non­linear, open-ended process, but by setting up an original 'interpretavist' approach, in which he also states that 'it avoids spurious rigour and untenable claims of causal necessity' (Whitehead 2002: 34) and displays scepticism about tne possible merits of such a theory.10 O'Donnell et al. (1986) seem to have been aware of this since the beginning, as already said above, and McFaul (2002) echoed them by developing a contrasting hypothesis to the one on pacts. Linz and Stepan (1996) demonstrate a similar awareness.

I might add here that the analyses proposed by these and other authors who have worked on several cases in Southern Europe and Latin America focus in particular on the following: the main characteristics of the previous regime; the important role performed by 'pacts' or elite agreement on the institutions to build (see also above); the 'resurrection' of civil society; the limited role of political parties; the salience of contingent consensus on the institutions to be set up; the enormaus uncertainties of the entire process of transition; and the importance of the first, fodnding elections. Put differently, what all these authors actually propose is a theoretical framework that points to key factors to look at when conducting an analysis of one or a small nurober of cases. In such a framework, actors, institutions, timing, and the very notion of process play

14 The Basics

a central role in the analysis of countries in two geopolitical areas, i.e. Southern Europe and Latin America.

The research led by Gunther et al. (1995), who arealso the chairmen of the Committee on Southern Europe of the American Social Science Research Council (SSRC), takes the same basic position with a definite nurober of cases (Southern Europe only) and the proposal of a theoretical framework. The main focus of the research they conducted was not to draft a nurober of empirical theoretical propositions on the phenomenon in Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece, but to elaborate a theoretical framework to scrutinize the consolidation in those and supposedly other countries. In their view, the historicallegacy, the differentiating elements of the previous non-democratic regimes, the characteristics of democratic transitions, and the emergence of partial regimes are the main domains that need to be analysed to ex:plain consolidation.

With reference to democratization, Pridham (2000: esp. eh. 1) effectively pursues a similar design by suggesting an appropriate framework for analys­ing mainly Southern and Eastern European changes as an overall phe:riome­non comprising historical determinants, modes of authoritarian breakdown, formal regime transition, the role of elite actors, economic transformations, the mutual influence of elite and civil society, the possible role of statehood and national identity in the transition, and the impact of international factors. All of these are aspects that should be considered together in the 'dynamics of transition' when analysing specific cases.

Apparently, Huntington (1991: 30) follows a different path by setting a temporally and spatially defined explanatory goal ('explain why, how and with what consequences a group of roughly contemporaneous transitions to democracy occurred in the 1970s and the 1980s') for transitions to democracy only. In his work, which can be paralleled to the quantitative analysis in terms of the search for ex:planation if not for theory, he ex:plicitly mentions five changes as the main causes of transitions in about thirty countries in those decades: the legitimacy problems of previous authoritarian regimes, closely connected to poor domestic performance; global economic growth during the 1960s; basic changes in the doctrine and activity of the Catholic Church; the new policies of external actors ( the EU, the USA, and the breakdown of the USSR); and 'snowballing' or demonstration effects (Huntington 1991: 45-6). That is, within a multi-causal ex:planation, 11 a few cultural, economic, and international aspects are considered the key factors and there is no theory built on the results.

When a systematic explanation of Southern European and Latin American cases is attempted (see Morlino 2003), the political traditions of the country stand out as a key factor. More precisely, the key variables are: the

What Theory in Democratization Studies? 15

oraanization and control of civil society by a hegemonic party and the co~sequent manipulated participation through which the regime was able to destroy.the social structure and the previous political and social identifica­tions; the consequent socialization and resocialization carried out by party organizations and other ancillary organizations to create new loyalties and identifications; and the suppression of the opposition. These variables were relevant, because during transition they heavily conditioned the subsequent activation of a democratic civil society together with its social and political structures. In other words, an authoritarian regime that has been able to carry out effective policies of socialization and suppression may leave a passive, weak, fragmented, poorly organized civil society during the subsequent transition.

As stressed above in recalling McFaul, within the transitions to democracy that have occurred in the different parts of the world, spatial and time differences were also characterized by additional aspects such as the change of polity boundanes and, consequently, of territory and population, as hap­pened in several Eastern European cases, but not in the Southern European and · Latin American transitions. Moreover, in the Southern European and Latin American cases the salience of economic factors has been totally ignored. These were highly relevant in Eastern Europe, while in Southern Europe there was no problern of changing the economy from a collectivist to a capitalist system with markel and private property. But the considerable attention devoted to the relationships between economic and political aspects in Eastern Europe has led some scholars to consider similar relationships in Southern Europe, as it was considered a mistake to think that there are no differences between an economy coexisting with an authoritarian regime and an economy coexisting with a democracy. With some exceptions, (see espe­cially Ethier 1990), most analyses of Southern European transitions simply overlook those important aspects, and, to mention one feature, they largely glossed over the reshaping of the relationships between more or less organized interests and parties and between those interests and the bureaucracy with or without a large public sector in the economy.

A rational choice approach has also been applied (e.g. Przeworski 1986; Colomer 1995) to transition, especially to pacted transitions or transition by agreement (see Colomer 2000), again with close attention to elites and their choice and strategies. The building of democratic institutions is basically the product of those strategies and choices. The analyses by Colomer (1995, 2000) should be emphasized, not ohly for the theoretical approach he applie's, but also because, starting from the analysis of a specific case, that of Spain, he develops a theoretical proposal to apply to all cases of transition by agree­ment. He referred in particular to Brazil and Chile, but also tested his

J

16 The Basics

proposal on other cases such as the dissolution of the USSR and the transition to democracy in Poland and other Eastem European countries. Although limited to the phenomenon of transition only, and in this case to a specific kind of transition, that by pact or agreement, the suggested theoretical perspective is worthy of consideration.

It should also be added that Spain is a case that has attracted considerable attention from a nurober of scholars who have developed other theoretical proposals on the basis of just that case. Share (1987), Fishman (1990), and Gunther (see especially Gunther et al. 2004) are just some ofthe authors who have focused on Spain in particular. Moreover, some of the theoretical frarne­works or propositions formulated for Spain have also influenced the analysis of Latin American and even Eastem European cases investigated by other authors, including Colomer (2000). The recurring references to pacts, the moderation of elites, the resurrection of civil society, the salience of memory of the past, and even some of the regional propositions mentioned by Bunce emerge from the closer attention paid to Spain. But this is really a country­specific analysis that cannot be extended far beyond that case, as a cursory overview of other, different situations in the sarne and other areas would immediately suggest.

In addition to theoretical frarneworks, able to cover more than one area and time or applicable to country-specific mechanisms, there has been a sort of intermediate set of proposals involving the development of models or pattems of transition for a definite, usually small, nurnber of cases. Over the years Stepan (1986), Karl and Schmitter (1991), Higley and Gunther (1992), Munck and Skalnik Leff (1997), and Berins Collier (1999) are some of the main authors who have proposed such models. Some of the differences between them can be explained simply in terms of the different cases consid­ered. For example, Stepan and Berins Collier also include the dassie Western European cases of the past in addition to Southem and Eastem European ones; Karl and Schmitter and also Munck and Skalnik Leff encompass the Latin American transitions as well as the Eastem European ones of the early 1990s. The similarities between these attempts lie in the fact that all the authors quoted above mainly focus on two macro-variables: the actors of transition, whether authoritarian incurnbent elites or those of the opposition, and the strategies they pursued, either accommodating or conflictive.

Thus, Higley and Gunther (1992) singleout two main pattems of demo­cratic consolidation. Emphasizing the key role of elites, their structural integration, and consensus on a set of values, the two pattems are: (1) there is consolidation from the beginning if the elites consciously choose accom­modation and cooperation in the democratic installation (settlement); or (2) there is consolidation when, following democratic installation, divided elites

What Theory in Democratization Studies? 17

gradually converge by accepting the electoral rules and fair competition and by takingmore ideologically mod~rate ~ositions (convergen.ce). In this pr~­posal the salience of ~e ~ul~ural di~~ns10~ must be emphasiZ~d? althoug~ 1t has to be considered m 1ts mtertwmmg With .the effect of polic1es and With other structural aspects. By contrast, Munck and Skalnik Leff (1997) come up with four models: 'revolution from above', if the actors of transition are the authoritarian elites who pursued a conflictive strategy of confrontation; 'conservative reform', if those elites chose agreements and compromises; 'social revolution', if counter-elites were at the heart of transition and pursued a conflictive strategy; and 'reform from below', if counter-elites at the heart of transition adopted an accommodating strategy. The advantages and limits of such models are fairly evident and connected. One of the main points is that the most immediate understanding of a country is counterbalanced by a strong sirnplification of many relevant aspects. In addition, the adoption of mixed models is very common. Consequently, strong simplification is accom­panied by a loss of theoretical efficacy that would have been to some extent rescued with the 'pure' models. On the whole, despite a nurnber of attempts, the 'impossibility' of a general or regional theory for dealing with the transi­tion to democracy or to some other regime is confirmed.

It seems, then, that a general theory of regime change or democratization, even one that is temporally bound, will not suffice if we really want to analyse and explain the cases on which we are working. When focusing more specifi­cally on the theoretical choices made by a large number of authors, a retreat from theory or the fear of developing a theory seems the dominant mood. This is not only a retreat from orthodox, predictive kinds of theories, remi­niscent of the 1960s (e.g. Kaplan 1964), but also from explanatory, compara­tive theory, and the actual explanation comes with a reconstruction of every case as a whole with its uniqueness. Within this choice, of course, there are various more specific solutions and positions, from utter scepticism about the possibility or even the desirability of theory, to a more self-conscious choice of a theoretical framework by a few distinguished senior scholars in the field, so as to reconstruct pattems that encompass one or very few cases, through to proposals of country-specific models. Overall, this retreat from theory ap­pears to stem from two different factors, which ultimately move in the sarne direction.

The first is the result of a conscious reflection on the failure of general functionalist theories, systems analysis, formal rational choice, and other general theories, which were in 'fashion' in the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, but, when submitted to empirical tests, displayed all their analytic and explanatory flaws and were practically abandoned or subjected to a major overhaul, with much better results, as happened for rational choice theory. 12

18 The Basics

This has led to an evident search for different, maybe less ambitious, but more empirically solid, theoretical choices and the consequent results. The con­sciousness of this failme and the new direction has been thoroughly charted by several scholars, especially by Ostrom (1982: 13, 26) when she stresses the need for 'the development of theory' in political science and at the same the fact that what 'we do achieve will be lirnited in scope to specific types of theoretically defined situations rather than sweeping theories of society as a

whole'. The second factor derives from an awareness of the complexities and major

differences between various cases around the world. Such differences ex:tend to the temporal plane as well, even in the arc of a lirnited forty-year period (1970-2010) during which several profound social and economic changes have taken place internationally.13 Such awareness is additionally strength­erred by the evident fact that in most comparative political research conducted in recent decades, democratization has been the dominant leitmotiv, follow­ing in this respect the spectacular developments of reality: when the world's five main geographic areas are considered, what irnmediately stands out is that hundreds of articles and books have been written on the topic in English alone, not to mention the ones in Spanish and various other languages.

Therefore, reflection on past failmes as well as an awareness of empirical complexities and !arge differences among the cases, emphasized by a very extensive literature, suggest great caution in articulating theoretical ambitions and choices. Furthermore, the irnpossibility of theory seems to lie at the core of the very phenomena to be ex:plored, and as such is effectively captmed by March and Olsen (1989: 65-6) when they write: 'institutional change rarely satisfies the prior intentions of those who initiate it ... Change cannot be controlled precisely ... there are frequently multiple, not necessarily consis­tent, intentions ... intentions are often ambiguous ... initial intent can be lost'. If the 'carnation revolution' triggered by the golpe of Portuguese captains and a nurober of other examples are considered, the words of March and Olsen become very telling, and additionally strengthen the point just

made above.

1.3 WHAT ARE THE POSSIELE THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENTS?

If the analysis above is correct, are no theoretical advances possible? How long will the 'long search for a general theory of democratization', mentioned by

What Theory in Democratization Studies? 19

McFaul (2002: 244), last? Are we actually in search of a sort of 'philosopher's stone', which was reputed to turn everything into gold and was so important to medieval chemistry? Reflection on the wide comparative politics literatme complemented by om research ex:perience seems to provide (fairly) precise indications. To begin with, the search for a general theory of democratization can indeed effectively be seen as the search for the 'philosopher's stone'. This is the case because within the broad phenomenon of democratization there are several more definite phenomena to be singled out. Minimally, they include: tra115ition to democracy and democratic installation, democratic consolidation and crisis, and democratic qualities' deepening or worsening.14 That is, there are at least three more precise, complex phenomena (transition to and installa­tion of a democracy, consolidation, and deepening), and their contrary (transition from democracy to authoritarianism or other regime, crisis, and worsening), each one requiring its own empirical analysis with different possible theoretical results. Thus, transition to democracy requires a different analysis than consolidation, as in this second macro-phenomenon the range of variation is unavoidably smaller because of the already existing institu­tional constraints; research into qualities' deepening or worsening, where the implementation of democratic values-yet another aspect-is on the spot entails a different analysis vis-a-vis transition and consolidation. This enables us to better understand why tt.e authors working on democratic transitions were more sceptical about thl possibility for theory development than those studying consolidation, even when the same areas and the same or similar spans of time are considered. The key consequence of these considerations is that the different and more specific phenomena requiring analysis may have different theoretical goals. Such theoretical pluralism emerges simultaneously from the literatme and from direct research ex:perience. 15 Although the problern of how to achieve theoretical advances may still be considered unsolved, at least it becomes more empirically accessible.

The problern was addressed in a different way by rational choice scholars, who considered theoretical achievements as a priority and solved it by focusing on 'ex:planatory mechanisms'. Elster (1989: esp. 9-10), in particular, ex:plicitly states that the key theoretical goal should be singling out ex:plana­tory mechanisms of 'human action and interaction' as recurring 'ways in which things happen'. In addition to rational choice analyses of transitions only (see esp. Colomer 2000, but also Przeworski 1986) and other analyses focusing on Spain (see Cololl},er 1995), this is also a path undertaken by other comparativists working in areas other than democratization, such as Pearson (2004), who ex:plicitly shares Elster's point, or Tsebelis, with his analyses of nested games (1990) and veto players (2002). The appropriateness of such a proposal is that it may allow theoretical advances while at the same time not

20 The Basics

being at so high a level of generality that our Statements become platitudes or pompous affirmations of the obvious, a trap which-as is well known-a number of rational choice contributions were unable to avoid.

If the 'solution' suggested by rational choice is accepted with its stress on theoretical priorities, looking for causal or explanatory 'mechanisms' still leaves open some important issues. First, despite the broader formulation by Elster, the core meaning of 'mechanism' always brings to mind some combination of cams, gears, belts, and chains or at least a set of links or connections designed to achieve a certain outcome. That is, a sort of deter­minism comes with the term and this is unacceptable in o_ur topic for everything empirical research has shown in these years, if not for another methodological reason, namely that attaching some sort of determinism to this term mutes a basic feature of democratization phenomena: they are 'open-ended' changes. Second, in all phenomena of democratization time, timing, sequences, and identification of time-bound windows of opportunity are key aspects to analyse (see esp. Linz 1998; Schedler and Santiso 1998; .Schmit­ter and Santiso 1998) and, although possibly present within the notion of mechanism, time does not lie at the core of this notion. Despite what Pearson affirms about mechanisms that are or should be 'temporally oriented' (2004: 7, but also 1-16 and 54-78), the same author adopts the term 'process' when the time to be considered is a long one (Pearson 2004: 79-102). Third, however, when conducting empirical field research it is not always possible and is often difficult to gather consistent (fairly) complete data that are time bound. Thus, all considered, singling out empirical mechanisms is a first, theoretical necessary step. But in addition we should embed the mechanism/s we are able to find into a meaningful 'process', where time, timing, and sequencing, when singled out, are essential components.

What Theory in Democratization Studies? 21

Moreover, such a starting point helps to clarify how the oft-proposed distinction between 'structure' driven and 'process' driven explanations ( e.g. Kitschelt i992), which are usually focused on transition to democracy only, can be overcome: different interactions among actors and structures, to be considered as salient contextual variables, are recurring elements of analysis within transition or consolidation processes. 16 There is also no doubt that not only is there a random component in the actual unfoldirig of those macro­processes, but they can be open-ended, often convoluted, and never teleolog­ical, as Whitehead (2002: 238ff.) rightly stresses. To better understand this point it suffices to recall that an individual or collective action or set of actions-for example, an implemented political strategy-can be teleologi­cally driven, but a process by itself cannot be such because it unfolds through several, often unexpected or unwanted interactions, even among different strategies, within a given or changing context with again sometimes unex­pected, unwanted results. 17

On the whole, these considerations suggest that advances in theory are indeed necessary. But to achieve such results, first, the whole, too-broad topic of democratization has to be broken down into more palatable, albeit still thorny, phenomena or processes. Those processes include at least: transition towards democracy, consolidation or crisis, and democratic qualities' deep­ening or worsening. Second, in connection with the reality that is analysed

l and the data we are actually able to detect and collect we have to be ready to accept different theoretical achievements. Thus, within the macro-processes mentioned above, we can come out with key, salient, and recurring more circumscribed sub-processes, with simpler theoretical frameworks, with recurrent patterns or other theoretical results when the former are not achieved just because that comes out as an impossible task. The consequent empirical question is: what sort of more specific theoretical results are possi­ble when analysing transitions to democracy, consolidations and crisis, and democratic qualities' deepening or worsening?

In order to reply to this question and to discuss those theoretical results, a step-by-step strategy seems_necessary. Accordingly,

To be more precise, at the core of our theoretical research there is the singling out of a 'process' as a 'set of recurring interactions among individual and collective actors within changing structures, which is spread out over time, may or may not unfold in an expected result, is on occasion unilinear, but is always open ended'. Inside this definition of process there is room for mechanisms minimally defined as 'recurrent links or connections'. These definitions help to overcome a possible objection by Vanhanen (1997: 26) and other scholars, who stress how 'process-oriented analysis resorting to various proximate factors cannot lead to any general theoretical explanations, although they may produce useful descriptions of democratization': as a , general theoretical explanation is actually impossible, as shown by empirical research in these years, singling out key processes and related mechanisms, conceived as above, is the best theoretical achievement we can actually obtain.

- first, an empirical definition of democracy that is suitable for conducting ' empirical research into the different democratization macro-processes,

including the pertinent normative aspects, has to be proposed; - second, the issue of how to define and empirically grasp ambiguous,

intermediate Situations has to be addressed; r

- third, these two steps should pave the way for delineating more precise indications to detect when there is a change of regime or not, with a full

22 The Basics

awareness of all the lirnitations and constraints this involves (see also Whitehead 2002: eh. 1);

- fourth, when necessary, empirical definitions of the macro-processes to analyse should be provided ( transition towards democracy and installation, consolidation and crisis, qualities' deepening and worsening);

- fifth, where feasible and with all necessary distinctions between the differ­ent macro-processes, the more specific theoretical results should fie singled out with possible limits and constraints in terms of time and area 'travel capabilities' as weil as with regards to mutual exchange or influence between factors that are mainly domestic and others that are mainly of international origin;

- sixth, and this is especially salient for democratic qualities' deepening or worsening, to single out the different aspects of and connections between the dimensions of deepening.

Moreover, the analysis of the qualities of democracy should at least cope with two additional issues. On the one hand, it should be able to detect and empirically relate citizens' or people's demands or needs and politicians' decisions and implementations with actual impacts. This has been one of the key flaws of old general theories, such as systernic analysis or functional­ism, which rightly addressed this issue, but failed to empirically detect those relationships in adequate ways. On the other hand, research on that topic can turn into a salient tool for subsequent analysis of the qualities of democracy and the aspects capable of deepening them. If adequate, the development of such a tool would be a more important result in terms of its possible future applications than the substantive empirical results presented and discussed in the following chapters. In fact, the implementation of such a tool could enable us to better understand the directions in which contemporary democracies are heading.

As known, in the three Southem European countries the transitionwas the result of the 'natural' exhaustion of long-term established authoritarian regimes (Spain and Portugal) or of an unconsolidated military regime (Greece) in the face of new problems and the transformation of societies in that part of Europe ( see Morlino 1998). In Latin America the end of military regimes came about due to economic failure or even to econornic success, but with unacceptable, unbearable costs-if protracted-in terms of suppression. In Eastem Europe the end of the communist regimes happenecl because of econornic bankruptcy and the end of hegemony in the region of the USSR. The indirect consequence of this is that unlike authoritarian solutions, as Diamond (2008: 294) eloquently affirms, 'democracies .... must demoostrate that they can solve governance problems and meet citizens' expectations for

What Theory in Democratization Studies? 23

freedom, justice, a better life, and a fairer society. If democracies do not work better to contain crime and corruption, generate economic growth, relieve econornic inequality, and secure justice and freedoms, sooner or later, people willlose faith and embrace (or tolerate) other-non-democratic-alterna­tives.' From our perspective this means that it is especially important to have the necessary analytic tools to check whether, how, and to what extent the people's needs have been achieved, or not. And the analytic tool mentioned above could be useful for that purpose.

With the goals that have just been set up, in the next chapter it will be necessary to take a stand on, if not to solve, the contested issue of the empirical definitions of democracy from the perspective of democratization. In the same chapter the need to cope with the empirical 'translation' of normative con­ceptions of democracy is spelled out, although it will be necessary to come back to this in the third part ofthe book (esp. in Chapter 7).

Notes

1. See below to see what these are more precisely. 2. Such a distribution of economic, intellectual, and organizational power resources

is measured by urban population, non-agricultural population, number of uni­versity students, literacy, arb of family farms, and decentralization of non­agricultural economic resources (see Vanhanen 1997: 42-60). Most of the data cover the early 1990s, but for some variables an earlier period, 1850-1980, is considered.

3. Competition and participation respectively measured by the smaller parties' share of the votes cast in parliamentary and/or presidential elections, calculated by subtracting the percentage of votes won by the largest party from 1 00; and by the percentage of total population who voted in the related election (see also Vanhanen 1990: 17-24).

4. They especially include economic growth aspects, such as consumption, invest­ment, labour force, distribution of income, and demographic issues such as birth and death rates, fertility, and life expectancy. The data cover the 1950-90 period and the whole 141 countries.

5. See a similar opinion expressed by Houle (2009) and the consequences for other aspects of their analysis.

6. The empirical source is a database built on the World Value Surveys and European Values Surveys, that is, a number of different surveys conducted in several COuntries between 1980 and 2001, but some of them arealso earlier (see Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

7. Although there is some reference to crisis in Przeworki et al. (2000).

24 The Basics

8. The first four chapters of the book by Gill (2000: 1-123) are also a good, balanced review of the literature, especially on transition to democracy. For more on this, see Chapter 3.

9. When we also consider a very well-written book like the one by Larry Diämond (2008) or the exhaustive textbook edited by Haerpfer et al. (2009) or other good textbooks ( e.g. Grugel 2002; Ciprut 2008; S~rensen 2008), we realize how rich the field has become in terms of research carried out and how high the level of interest is for a lot of people, including university students.

10. In Chapter 2 I will come back to the sensitive, careful definition of democracy discussed by Whitehead (2002: eh. 1).

11. This is characterized by the fact that the combination of causes varies from country to country (Huntington 1991: 38).

12. For an additional analysis of this matter, see Morlino (2000). 13. They are so well known that there is no reason to discuss here phenomena such as

the oil crisis with all its consequences, the end of the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the change of capitalist economy and different markets, and the reshaping of the middle classes.

14. The literal opposite of 'deepening' is 'shallowness', or a similar word. But when transforming this expression into a meaningful empirical concept it becomes unacceptably slippery and murky. For this reason I prefer 'worsening' instead. For more on this topic, see Chapter 8. -

15. This immediately suggests how other theoretical questions are also wrongly addressed. See, for example, the question of the role of actors or structure. The empirical replies are different if we analyse the transition to democracy or the consolidation. See Chapter 4 in particular for a discussion of this.

16. Although actors have often been a dominant focus in the analysis and reality of transitions, Doorenspleet (2004) shows the salience of structural context in several transitions. But for more on this, see Chapter 3.

17. On this issue, see Chapter 6, as O'Donnell (1996) sees this flaw in the notion of democratic consolidation itself.

2

Definitional Conundrums

Definitions are necessary compasses for empirical research. As Collier and Adcock (1999: 562) remind us, 'concepts, definitions, and operationalization may evolve with changes in the goals and context of research', and goals and context of research may change because key events and related processes have been taking place. In addition, there are terms, such as 'democracy', which have at the same time an empirical reference and a normative, ideal connota­tion. Consequently, for decades 'democracy' has been an essentially contested concept.1 Thus, we have a widespread phenomenon of democratization with about ninety political regirnes labelled in 2008-9 as free and democratic, and an additional sixty cases of partially free regimes (see Freedom House 2008), and thus the need to revise the definition of democracy to adapt it to the renewed research goals. As the main goal is the analysis of a few macro­processes of change, such as bjp.nsition towards democracy, consolidation, or crisis, and democratic qualiti~s' deepening or worsening, the definition/s of democracy we need should help to lay the foundations for that analysis.

Hence; first, it is necessary to spell out the core definition of democracy. This is especially important given that this kind of regime has become 'the only game in town' and is no Ionger challenged as such. The procedural definitions so irnportant in a different historical period as the most empiri­cally solid point of reference within the liberal tradition have to be comple­mented by other definitions referring to substantive aspects relevant to empirical research. Second, a minimalist definition is essential for understand­ing when in a transitional process a regime turns into a democracy, or is close to doing so. Such a definition should also be able to capture the complexities of a transitional period when a regime may already be democratic in some respects but continues to remain authoritarian in others. Third, if there are so many democracies, an empirical analysis of the actual irnplementation of the main democratic values or tenets, or better an analysis of the quality/ qualities of democracy, seems obvious.,2 This, however, implies some standard or a sort

r of maximum definition of democracy as a frame of reference in the develop-ment of quality. These three sets of definitions stillleave open the definition of all striking cases of uncertainty and ambiguity; those labelled by Freedom

26 The Basics

House as 'partially free' make up about one-third of all e:xisting independent regimes and cover all areas of the world. This important new phenomenon will be dealt with in the following chapter.

2.1 CORE DEFINITIONS

The first conundrum is characterized by the long and heated debate in past decades about democracy as 'form' and as 'substance'. It started with the critique of nineteenth-century liberal doctrine by socialist thinkers and poli­ticians, and acquired fresh momentum during and after World War Two, when 'democracies' were considered by people and scholars to be the Western political regimes, but the same label was also applied to the so-called real socialisms or people's democracies of the USSR and the other Bastern European countries. The prevailing conclusion ofthat debate in democratic theorywas to regard the definition of democracy as form or, better, procedure, as preferable to democracy as substance (see below). The notion of procedural democracy was the most important attempt to give a solid theoretical ground to the definition. Such a conclusion was based on the so-called non-reversible relationships between freedom, understood as civil and political rights, and equality. In the light of the experiences of Western Europe vis-a-vis Bastern Europe the key point to emerge was that no kind of equality can be achieved if there is no actual guarantee of civil and political rights as a prerequisite (see Sartori 1987). The consequence of this has been not only a growing shift towards substantive aspects in research, which in our field has been mirrored by enormous developments in policy studies, including welfare rights, but also to political equality as suggested by Dahl (2006) and to political justice as developed by astring of authors, from Rawls (1974) toSen (2009), and to the ways of complementing equality and freedom by giving to democracy a substantive, important content, as in Ringen (2007).3

The procedural definition, however, has remained salient and deserves a closer look. It was initially proposed by Schumpeter (1942: 269, 1964: 257), to which several other authors began referring: 'The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which indivi­duals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote.' A few years earlier and again basically in the same period, Kelsen (see Kelsen 1981: 190-1, and 1988)4 had stated: 'as method or proce­dure, democracy is a form. In fact, the procedure through which a social order is devised and implemented is considered formal, to distinguish it from the

Definitional Gonundrums 27

content of the order, which is a material or substantive element'. He then goes

00 to say: 'If democracy is above all eise a form, of State or governance, it must be remernbered that the antagonism between form and substance or between form and content is only relative, and that the same thing may appear to be form from one point of view and content or substance from another [ ... ] There is therefore no better way of impeding the movement towards democracy [ ... ] than discrediting the definition of democracy as procedure, using the argurnent that it is formalistic.' What is involved then are 'forms' that permit and guarantee the possibility that certain 'substances' or decisions will be taken in compliance with the procedures envisaged by those very same 'forms'.

Laying emphasis on the 'procedural' aspect of a democratic regime leads on to a related feature. It is incorrect to suppose that any decision whatsoever, any decision-making 'content: can be taken on board as a result of these formalized rules. Above all, such procedures exclude decisions 'that might in some way contfibute to overcome one or more of the rules of the game' (Bobbio 1983: 316). Nor is it right to claim that in a democratic regime there is a real institutionalization of 'uncertainty' with regard to the substance of the decisions that can be made. When excessive stress is placed on the procedural dimension or one talks in terms of absolute uncertainty-by which it is understood that within defined and certain democratic procedures any decision, even, for examPie, that of abolishing the market and private property, may be taken-there is a change in the level of analysis, a shift towards the normative dimension and away from the empirical one. On the empirical, historical plane, in fact, the mass liberal democracy was based on the maintenance of certain socio-econornic conditions, principally asso­ciated with private property. These conditions have never been denied or modified, and their modificability-abstractly in certain situations, but not impossible-would need to be demonstrated in the future, if there was ever the opportunity.

Therefore, it can justifiably be argued that: ( a) the democratic regime is one that permits the most indeterminancy with regard to the concrete content of the decisions that can be taken by elected or electorally accountable bodies: this uncertainty is always relative and cannot exceed certain boundaries defined by the safeguarding of private property; (b) these boundaries are, furthermore, fixed by the fact that the democratic system is underpinned by a comprornise agreement which recognizes the collectively accepted rules for the peaceful resolution of conflicts between social, politically represented, and significant parties; (c) the lirnits are exceeded not only when an attempt is made to take decisions that contravene those rules, as Bobbio suggests, but also when decisions are taken that irnpinge on interests perceived to be vital

28 The Basics

by social actors involved in the political compromise agreement. In an industrialized liberal democracy, for instance, such actors would range from business associations to unionized workers' groups.

Such a procedural definitionwas still very salient in the 1970s and later, as shown by Bobbio and, very effectively, by Dahl (1970), who considers as democracies all regimes characterized by a genuine guarantee of broad, inclusive political participation on the part of the adult male and female population, and by the possibility of dissent and opposition. Dahl developed his notion by identifying five criteria as key elements of a democracy: effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, i.e. citizens have adequate and equal opportunities to learn about policy alternatives, control of the agenda, i.e. citizens have the opportunity to decide which matters are placed on the public agenda, and inclusion of adult residents who enjoy citizenship rights (Dahl1989: esp. 108-14).

Dahl's definition is simpler and more Straightforward than Sartori's, to which it may be compared for a better understanding of how the procedural definition developed. According to Sartori (1969: 105), democnicy is 'an ethical-political system in which the influence of the majority is entrusted to the power of competing minorities, which secure it' through the electoral mechanism. Or, referring to a subsequent and more elaborate formulation, democracy is 'the mechanism that (a) generates an open polyarchy whose competition in the electoral market, (b) attributes power to the people and (c) speci:fically enforces the responsiveness of the leaders to the led' (Sartori 1987: 156).5 This more complex definition does not just include participation and dissent, already envisaged by Dahl, but also lays emphasis on liberal and democratic values such as the competition and pluralism of the polyarchic system itself, 6 reference to electoral mechanisms, and the underlining of the relationship between elected and electors, which envisages the 'responsive­ness' of the former as a collateral effect of competition.

These two definitions, while still being largely procedural, contain a sub­stantive difference, behind which there lie two different research perspectives. Dahl is interested in producing an entirely empirically definition, an indis­pensable step for anyone wanting to conduct empirical research in this area, as he does. Sartori acknowledges, and indeed values, the connection between empirical and normative elements, and regards it as inevitable that such a link will be maintained in a political theoretical perspective. Whilst Sartori's more complex definition is important and quite legitimate when the focus is democratic ideals, and consequently, in our perspective, when dealing with the qualities of democracy (see Part III), Dahl's de:finition has the merit of being a more appropriate empirical description of democratic regimes, and is to be preferred when pursuing empirical research on transition and

Definitional Gonundrums 29

consolidation. In fact, while both participation and dissent are essential features of mass liberal democracies, competition and responsiveness are key characteristics of a normative de:finition. In other words, Sartori may be right in arguing indirectly that some degree of competition and responsive­ness, however minimal, is indispensable for a real democracy. But although these two elements are crucial for evaluating the gap between a real regime and an ideal democracy, they are of marginal importance when it comes to judging whether a country is a democracy or still an authoritarian or hybrid regime (see the next chapter). Expressed differently, if competition and responsiveness are almost non-existent, but rights and freedoms are con­cretely guaranteed, thereby enabling participation and the real possibility of dissent, would it not be fair to say that we are in the presence of a democratic regime? Considering nations usually regarded as democratic, such as Italy or Sweden, . the former characterized by limited responsiveness (however this difficult notion is measuredf and the latter by decades of political dominance on the part of the Social Democrats, it is difficult to argue that such character­istics are constitutive, essential components of a real democratic regime-that is, components such that the presence or lack of one or both would imply a change of definition, from democratic to non-democratic regime.

An additional step towards considering elements other than procedural aspects but still important in a democracy was made in a proposal by Schmitter and Karl, when •They state: 'political democracy is a system of govemance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives' (Schmitter and Karl 1993: 76). Their defini­tion includes not only the notion of competition but also that of cooperation, thus emphasizing the importance of the collective adhesion to values, rules, and institutions within which actors compete but also collaborate. Without denying the relevance of this aspect, it should be stressed that once again it appears to be of central importance for the better functioning of democracy, and therefore also for an ideal democracy, but is marginal from a strictly empirical point of view. However, the concept of cooperation should not be ignored, because it may also lead to an underlining of the initial, 'genetic' foundations of a democracy.

To make this preliminary empirical definition more concrete, it is necessary to decide which rules and institutions distinguish a democratic regime. Expanding the suggestions by Dahl (1989: 221), at least the following should be included: the set of formal rules and procedures regarding universal suffrage; free, fair, competitive, and recurent elections; a decision-making and goveming body elected with the above-mentioned norms, usually corresponding to a parlia­mentary assembly; a prime minister and a govemment that are answerable to

30 The Basics

parliament or are the result of direct election by the electorate; a set of interme­diary structures represented by political parties and interest groups; apart from all the bureaucratic structures (public administration, magistracy, armed forces, police, etc.) whlch continually interact with the directly elected democratic structures. These institutions and norms presuppose, albeit to different degrees, a genuine guarantee of political rights and liberty, such as freedom of e:xpression, union, and association and alternative sources of information and therefore also the e:xistence of other norms and of a bureaucratic apparatus that guarantees such rights. According to Schmitter and Karl (1993: 45-6), it is also important that these institutions (and, one might add, these rights) arenot subject to or conditioned by 'non-elected parties' or exponents of other external regimes. In the first case, one example might be the desire of the armed forces to influence democratic decision-making processes or the overall functioning of a democ­racy. In the second, the conditioning might come from an external power that undermines the independence and sovereignty of the democracy in question. The former scenario would lie outside the bounds of the democratic genus in a non-democratic or ambiguously democratic institutional arrangement. In the second scenario, there may be democracy within the country, but not indepen­dence and sovereignty, namely sovereignty may be consciously surrendered to achleve other important goals, as is happening in the case of the EU. The two forms of conditioning may therefore have very different outcomes, and the second one does not necessarily move in an anti-democratic direction.

The same phenomenon of democratization stresses the importance of another additional perspective in the discussion about definitions. In fact, it is relevant in the subsequent analysis of macro-processes of change to point out a genetic definition of democracy as that set of norms and procedures that stem from a compromise agreement for the peaceful resolution of conflicts between politically significant social actors and other institutional actors present in the political arena (see Przeworski and Wallertein 1982; Przeworski 1991: 26-34; see also Weingast 1997: 245-63). Moreover, this definition differs from the ones mentioned earlier not only because it lays more stress on the genetic aspect-how a democratic regime comes into being and forms-but because it indirectly makes reference to certain basic socio­economic conditions.

The genetic definition also helps us to gain a better grasp of a fundamental, but often neglected or underestimated, feature of any democratic regime: a democracy is a regime concretely characterized by rules and institutions that moderate or offset different aspects. As the procedural definition makes clear (see earlier), democracy requires the existence of some basic consensus on the rules and at the sametime must accept dissent and conflict about the content. It must accept the uncertainty of decisional results, but requires certainty

Definitional Gonundrums 31

bout the rules so that the uncertainty is relative and limited. It cannot, a . for example, abolish the right to private property. It must apply the principle of majority rule, the main decision-making rule to ensure the e:ffective functioning of its decisional organs, but must protect the rights of minorities. In some cases, therefore, it needs to obtain broader majorities or even unanimity. There must be the broadest possible representation of interests and identities in the appropriate government bodies, such as parliament and regional or local assemblies, but at the same time a democracy relies on some degree of decisional efficacy and functionality, which are much harder if not impossible to obtain when seeking to achleve a representative presence of a11 the components of fragmented and complex societies. Finally, and parado:xically, the stronger the consensus about democracy, the more conflict it can sustain; the smaller and more integrated the rninorities, the more government institutions can resort to the majority principle; the Iess complex the political structures, the greater the decision-making efficacy. r

This discussion helps to establish the bases for developing the definitions that are more appropriate for our research. In fact, we need a narrow empirical definition, indicated by several authors as 'minimalist', in order to better analyse cases of transition as weil as of consolidation and crisis, but we also need a 'maximalist' or rather a normative definition, which is necessary in the analysis of the qualiti!s of democracy, that is in the processes of deepening and worsening of qualities.

2.2 MINIMALIST EMPIRICAL DEFINITION

After the procedural and genetic definitions, it is now possible to retum to the first of the two issues raised by the first definition. In order to conduct an empirical analysis of the establishment of and transitions within democracies, it is important to arrive at a minimalistdefinition specifying a limited nurober of features that are more immediately controllable and essential at an empiri­callevel, thereby permitring the establishment of a threshold beneath which a regime cannot be considered democratic.

The three reasons why such a minimalist definition is empirically helpful can be more explicitly stated:

r

1. It is essential for understanding when in a transitional process a regime turns into a minimalist democracy, or is close to doing so.

J

32 The Basics

2. It helps to capture the complexities of a transitional period when a regime may already be democratic in some respects, but continues to remain authoritarian in others.

3. If properly expressed, it helps to trace more immediately the existence of a democracy in a country.

The best minimalist definition is still the one inspired by Dahl several years ago (1971: esp. eh. 1): a regime should be considered democratic if it has at least the following: (a) universal male and female suffrage; (b) free, competi­tive, periodic, and fair elections; (c) more than one political party; (d) different and alternative sources of information. Such a minimalist empirical definition has been considered as a procedural one (see e.g. Whitehead 2002: 10).8 However, it must be noted that ultimately it considers genuine respect of at least civil and political rights to be essential, assuming that these rights exist if there is effective universal suffrage, the quintessential expression of political rights, that is, if the right to vote extends to the whole adult demos; if, as a consequence, there are free, fair, and regular elections, an expression of the effective existence of freedom of speech and thought; if there is more than one genuinely competing political party, a manifestation of the existence of a real and practised right of association; and if there are different sources of media information with different proprietors, proof of the existence of the above­mentioned freedoms. 9 In other words, in this definition strictly procedural aspects such as competition and participation are actually complemented by an effective guarantee of freedoms where the substantive elements are also present (see also Part III on this).

One important aspect of such a definition is that if just one of these features is absent or ceases to exist, the regime concerned would no Ionger be a democracy but some other political-institutional arrangement, possibly an intermediate one characterized by differing degrees of uncertainty and ambi­guity. Finally, it is again useful to stress that the minimalist definition must focus on the characteristic institutions of democracy-elections, competing political parties (at least potentially), media pluralism-thereby tying in with the definitions given above, such as those of Dahl and Schumpeter, and shifting the level of abstraction of those two definitions on to the more immediately empirical plane of the institutions that are indispensable for a democratic regime.

An important addition was made to this definition by Schmitter and Karl (1993: 45-6; also see above), who stress that democratic institutions, existing rights, and also the decision-making process should not be constrained by either non-elected elites or external powers. When considered jointly, all six requested characteristics are clearly demanding, and the four adjectives attached to elections

Definitional Gonundrums 33

are particularly onerous. It is not easy to have 'recurring, free, competitive, and fair' elections; indeed in some democracies that have been consolidated for decades there are charges of corruption even today. Moreover, as Diamond (2002: 28) recalls, 'often particularly difficult are judgments about whether elections have been free and fair, both in the ability of opposition parties and candidates to campaign and in the casting and counting of the votes. In other cases, the element of "more than one source of information'' is diffi­cult to meet if we only make reference to TV broadcasts. Or in yet other countries a decision-making process not constrained by an army, which ironically can be formed by democratic officers-see the Turkish case-is difficult to .achieve:

This same discussion shows how important it is to be conscious of the problern addressed by Collier and Adcock (1999) with regard to the two possible paths to take when dealing with research into democracy: dichotomy and gradation. Although they a:ffirm (1999: 561-2) that 'research that focuses on democratization as a well-bounded event and on classical subtypes of democracy favours dichotomies', actual research in the field suggested how a graded approach can be more appropriate in the empirical analysis of transi­tions to democracy. The key point seems to be that in this kind of research measurement is not always possible: analysis necessarily has to be qualitative. Consequently, falling back upon non-dichotomaus classifications and typol­ogies as substitutes for quantitative measures is the only possible and feasible path. However, this is a non-dichotomaus path and sometimes it is essential to trace the processes of transition in its various dimensions, such as the electoral one, the btiilding of governmental institutions ( decisional and representative bodies, judiciary, bureaucracy, army, and police) with or with­out a constitutional sub-process, the establishment of a party system and the development of interests.

A graded approach to democracy is also useful in at least two additional domains of research. The first has again been pointed out by Collier in an article written with Levitsky (1997), where they show that adjectives may serve to cancel part of the meaning of democracy. Therefore, we have 'dimin­ished subtypes': 'The subtype thus expresses the idea of a gradation away from democracy. The use of dirninished subtypes presents an interesting alternative to employing an ordinal scale' (Collier and Adcock 1999: 560). A second important domain of research concerns the analysis of the quality/ qualities of democracy ( see Part III). In this, whenever possible, the use of gradation is essential to understand the ~ extent to which the quality under sdutiny is present in a democracy. Here again the key problern is the actual possibility of adopting measurement or, if this not possible, classifications, i.e. 'nominal scales'.

34 The Basics

2.3 MAIN NORMATIVE DEFINITIONS

The minimalist definition logically would imply that there is also a maximum definition. Bearing in mind that democracy is at one and the same time a descriptive and a prescriptive term, a maximum definition must necessarily start with ideals or principles, rather than with concrete institutions, as the minimalist definition does. If well formulated, a definition of this kind would be particularly useful for the present analysis, which regards the deepening of democratic qualities (see Chapter 8) as a further phase in the democratization process. Lastly, a definition rendered suitably applicable in empirical terms could help in gauging the distance separating real democracies from the maximum one, and also the degree of democraticity of regimes that have crossed the minimum threshold outlined above.

However, a maximum definition does not exist as such. In fact, it is neither possible nor appropriate to establish a point or points of arrival for principles and ideals that are constantly evolving. In a more limited sense, also with a view to pursuing the objectives mentioned above, it might be possible to come up with one or more definitions that indicate possible directions for the development of contemporary democracies, bearing in mind the principles or ideals that inform them in the relatively more advanced realization of the 'power of the people'. To quote Sartori (1987: 71), the problern of the maximization of real democracies is rather that of 'optimization', once the ideals and the directions of development have been established and efforts are made to achieve them gradually.

For the purposes of singling out a definition of what might better be called an ideal or normative democracy, there seems little point in attempting to classify and measure real, existing democracies, as various authors have done (see e.g. Freedom House, various years; Bollen 1990; Gurret al. 1990; Vanha­nen 1990). This approach yields a whole series of realized or 'perfect' democ­racies, normally corresponding to the countries ofWestern European and the Anglo-Saxon world, which obtain the maximum score, but fail to reveal the problems of lirnited and scarce democraticity or the areas of possible growth in democratic quality (see Part III) precisely in those and other countries. Alternatively, the point of departure may simply be the main normative definitions of democracy developed in previous decades. Those definitions include at least the following: (1) liberal, representative democracy; (2) responsive democracy; ( 3) participatory democracy; ( 4) deliberative democ­racy; (5) associative democracy; (6) egalitarian or social democracy; (7) good governance; (8) good democracy.10 They may partially overlap or be a

Definitional Conundrums 35

development of one another, as in the case of participatory and deliberative democracy. Thete are also other additional normative notions that mix the previous ones. In fact, there is an extensive literature for all of these notions that cannot be summed up here as it covers most of contemporary political philosophy. What can be done is to briefly discuss the main normative notions in our perspective, which is to assess how those ~otions can become an object of empirical research, that is, how they can be empirically translated. 11

In the most dassie normative notion of liberal democracy, as developed by Mill (1861) and, more recently, Schumpeter (1942), Dahl (1956, 1970), Sartori (1957, 1987), and several other authors (Held 2006: including Chapter 3), the key features are the procedural ones. Accountability and competition are at the core ofthat conception. But effective freedoms (see also Berlin 1953), namely a content value, complement them. The attainment of those values helps to establish the autonomy of an individual, which according to other authors (e.g. Held 1989: esp. eh. 9) is the key elementinan idealliberal democracy. This is the normative conception that is easiest to translate empirically, like the already cited procedural dimensions-for example, fol­lowing Dahl (1971) participation and competition are the key aspects. But, as mentioned above, electoral accountability and institutional accountability, 12

which are characterized by t!te division of powers that should check one another, are other empirical dimensions that need to be examined. Finally, the rule of law has often been considered a key component of a democracy. Consequently, when the task is to find out how to detect empirically if some aspect of that normative notion has been translated into reality, reference is necessarily made to this dimension as well. As for the other aspects, a discussion of definitions, indicators, and possibly measures of rule of law has to be postponed to the third part of this book, once other elements of analysis have been added.

In the proposals by Dahl (1970) and May (1978; seealso Kuper 2004), the key feature of the responsive democracy lies in the results of decisions that mirror the preferences of the governed. But according to this notion, proce­dural and content aspects are irnportant as well. From this perspective, there is a democracy if there is a 'necessary correspondence between acts of gover­nance and the wishes with respect to those acts of the persons who are affected' (May 1978: 1); or, in a partially different version, democracy has to be characterized by the 'conti.p.ued responsiveness of the government t~ the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals' (Dahl 1970: 1). This definition postulates that citizens always have clear ideas about their prefer­ences, taking it as read that they are all educated, informed, and aware. Moreover, it is worth bearing in mind because it serves to emphasize an

36 The Basics

important point: whatever the intermediate principles and guaranteed rights might be, freedom and equality, if they are to be effectively promoted, require active citizens who are willing to interact within different collectivities, to inform themselves and to participate, perhaps because they subscribe to and are prompted by notions of public ethics. In an empirical perspective it is not easy to assess the responsiveness of a political regime because of the difficul­ties in detecting empirically the 'preferences' of citizens on the more and more complex issues of a modern democracy. However, because of its salience it has to be done in some way, even with the (poor) help of proxies.

As regatds the more recent conceptions of participatory democracy, mainly but not exdusively procedural, as for example those developed by Pateman (1970), MacPherson (1977), and several other authors, participation and freedom are the key empirical aspects to take into account. To assess the prospects of translating such a notion empirically-already complemented by an abundance of dassie political science literatme on participation-the 'ladder of participation' by Arnstein (1969) can be recalled. In her view the goal and result of citizen participation must be the redistribution of power in favour of citizens ( as regards economic resources, information, and the possibility of having a genuine say in the definition of policies). If participa­tion does not lead to the redistribution of resources, to significant reforms benefiting the 'have-nots', and the status quo is maintained, participation is an empty ritual and a mere exercise in political rhetoric. In this respect participation should promote change from the bottom up and in endogenous forms. Thus, the 'ladder of participation' has three basic levels. The bottom level is that of non-participation, which can basically be summed up by the notion of'cure', and consists oftwo rungs or steps (manipulation, therapy). lt applies to actions undertaken by the state for the explicit purpose of 'educat­ing' and 'curing' the disadvantaged. These have inhibitory effects on the empowerment of individuals and local communities. The next level, token­ism, 13 essentially relates to ways in which citizens are given a chance to hear and be heard. The three rungs here are informing, consultation, and placation, and are still the most common forms of participation today, albeit with a different degree of political and social awareness. The highest level is citizen power, where citizens have a genuine influence in decision-making processes, and is divided into partnership, delegated power, and, at the top, citizen controL In these rungs there is effective parity between participants, and the divide between 'powerholders' and the 'have-nots' is dosed.14

In Pateman's contribution to the debate on participatorydemocracy (1970) and Bachrach and Baratz's analysis of the 'mobilization of bias' and 'non­decision' (1970), it is possible to find many parallels with the analysis pro­posed by Arnstein.15 According to Pateman, there is a dose tie between

Definitional Conundrums 37

institutions fundamental for a society, the relations of Subordination stem­ming from them, arid democracy.

16 The bonds are based on dyadic relation­

ships. Strong arid concrete inequalities are created within these institutions. In their research Bachrach and Baratz affirm that citizen participation is a form of political action that influences the allocation of values. Participatory processes tend to redistribute power, authority, and influence in favour of participants. In anti-poverty programmes, the involvement of disadvantaged citizens is incentivized in order to arouse their political interest and, in this way, to strengthen their ability to pursue their own interests. In the view of the two authors, well-structured and guided participatory initiatives offer a means of anticipating and dealing with conflicts. In this sense, it has been observed that participatory practices can be viewed as technologies instru­mental to the process of government. Such a perspective is effective ifbuilding and maintaining consensus is considered a priority for the stability of demo­cratic systems. There is no doubt that empirically participatory phenomena change considerably according to the level focused on by research, be it state­national or local government. In the former, specific representative institu­tions and political participation in the circuits of representative democracy remain absolutely central. Moreover, the solid tradition of research into participation does not create unsurmountable problems in the empirical assessment of this normative notitn, be it in one of the different conceptions that are present in the literature, and which we have briefly commented on here.

Deliberative democracy, as proposed by Cohen (1989), Habermas (1996), Dryzek (1990, 2000), Bohman (1996), and others, is grounded on public discussion among free and equal individuals and entails a procedural dimen­sion (participation) and a content one (freedom). Accordingly, such a nor­mative notion is a development of the previous one and like the other it is grounded on an explicit or implicit criticism of representative democracy as opposed to a much more effective direct democracy. By reaffirming the importance of basic democratic principles, induding equality and freedom, from which it draws its legitimacy, deliberative democracy is characterized by its strongly normative impulse; it would like to find a different way of being democratic without supporting the forms of representative democracy, con­sidered to be in crisis.

More precisely, deliberative democracy is inspired by the search for satis- ' factory ways of combining preferetices and aggregating them in contexts of pluralistic coexistence of the kind found in contemporary societies. Through discussion, and individual and collective thought, views and preferences mature and become more clearly delineated. One possible outcome of delib­erative processes is that the preferenCP~ nf ~~..._ : - ' -

38 The Basics

· through interaction, and may change quite significantly. The path taken to reach collective decisions and build consensus and agreement about a choice is very different to the procedures and mechanisms of representative democ­racy. On the one hand, deliberative democracy is based on a set of principles that tend to be expressed in universalistic terms, especially in Habermas's interpretation of public democracy as a rediscovery of 'govemment through discussion' and in the work of other North European, Anglo-Saxon, and American scholars. 17 On the other hand, in cantrast to the wave of participa­tion that took place in the 1960s and 1970s, deliberative democracy grants little or no space to spontaneaus impulses, to the forms of protest and the claims of movements, as the dimension of 'bottom up' participation. Even in the model proposed by Habermas, the organizational networks of civil society ,converge in the public sphere in a structured way, institutionalizing a kind of ideal communicative community through practices of public deliberation. These are the presuppositions of the current of thought that adopts a radical interpretation of deliberative thought, defined as a 'process based on public discussion between free and equal individuals'.

18

Moreover, from Elster's (1993, 1998) different perspective, another theo­reticalline of deliberative democracy emerges, which stresses the 'strategic' interweaving of argumentation and negotiation in deliberative processes and presupposes a strategic result-oriented rationality. Butthisvision of delibera­tive democracy weakens the role of dialogue as a 'neutral' discursive practice animated by universalistic ideals and offers space for differences in the expression of vested interests and reaching agreements based on an instru­mental adjustment of preferences rather than a profound change in points of view where values would be affected. Comparatively, the Habermasian per­spective is more radical in affirming the desire of participants to reach agreement and the power of the best argument, and in the capacity to go beyond the instrumental agreement, developing a genuine sharing of views between the parties involved, and hence consensus, against a background of communication inspired by a faith in dialogic rationality. The empirical translation of such a notion, already attempted by a few scholars (see e.g. Bächtiger et al. 2005), partially overlaps with the previous normative notion, and its main difference is in the more specific aspects of participation, especially in the decision-making process, which should be analysed to detect how much and with what characteristics some deliberative features have been implemented in the reality of certain democracies. In fact, Bächtiger, Steiner, and associates who translated the notion ofHabermas pointed to the working of parliaments.19

In the associative democracy, as theorized by Hirst (1997) and others, accountability, participation, and freedom are key elements, that is, there is

Definitional Gonundrums 39

a mix of procedural :imd content features. Unlike the previous proposals, where participation or deliberative decisions are promoted by public institu­tions, especially by the govemment (at various levels, from the supranational to the subnational), a different scale of participation regards forms of self­management by groups with a deep-rooted social base and different forms of organization and action (committees, local associations, movements). Groups participate by joining tagether in protest ( on the basis of which there are shared values), or by converging araund the definition of proposals and projects with a view to bringing about change. Associative experiences of 'organized civil society' incorporate participatory and deliberative practices designed to solve collective problems and satisfy social needs in subsidiary or remedial action with respect to the state intervention; sometimes the interests pursued are autonomaus and independent from the more or less explicitly stated ones of the political-administrative system. Such forms reflect the social nature of human beings and their need for associative life (Walzer 1992: 97). 'Democratic civil society' is an environment in which it is possible to perform a responsible role of participation and choice, even if for 'minor' decisions, and to gain direct experience in the 'exercise of authority'.20

According to the reconstruction of associative democracy by Hirst (1993, 1994), which draws on and develops ideas from the Anglo-Saxon school of political pluralism and the con,>orative socialism of the 1920s, associational­ism has a dual quality in that it allows both for cooperation and the market. The social solidarity action of self-run, voluntary associations, of active citizenship networks, can contribute to individual growth, social well-being, and the sustainability of economic development by attending to the produc­tion and reproduction of common goods, carrying out what is often a subsidiary function in relation to that of governments. Hirst also stresses the elements of spontaneaus activation in associationalism, the quality of self­govemance and the voluntary nature of actions, particularly at a locallevel. Associative democracy can strengthen representative institutions and help to provide society with a framework of basic laws to guide social actors, to oversee forms of public service provision, to hold public offleials accountable, and to protect the rights and interests of citizens (Hirst 1997: 18). Underlying Hirst's argument is observation of the crisis in the associative capacity of political parties, the fragmentation of their hinterland, and the progressive nationalization of society brought about as a consequence of the rationale and means of producing public goods introduced with the welfare state, which have gradually reduced society's capacity. and scope for taking steps to solve

"al bl ?J \ soCI pro ems.-

The acknowledgement of pluralism and the valuing of the self-organiza­tional components of informal social networks and intermediate ;~<:<:nri<>t;""

40 The Basics

bodies has encouraged a profound transformation of the state, starting with a redefinition of its tasks. The state is called upon to act as an arbitrator and guarantor, giving civil society organizations opportunities to act directly and perform an overseeing function, while at the same time regulating that associative pluralism. This perspective of political and social action reopens the debate on the procedural dimension of democracy, suggesting original and differentiated regulatory solutions, and also poses the question of how the procedural component can be integrated with the participatory ones and the welfare state. In our perspective it is interesting to stress again how political thinkers have been striving to find alternatives to representative democracy by developing different modes of participation at different levels and with different forms. . In the egalitarian or social democracy, equality is one of the two key empiri­cally relevant dimensions and is complemented by freedom. In relation to this normative notion, the most influential conception of all is the one developed by Rawls (1971), who also uses the expression "'property-owning" democ­racy'. More recently, Ringen (2007) has focused once again on the inter­relatedness, rather than the conflict, between the implementation of freedom and that of equality, both being key values of democracy. If we briefly focus on Rawls's contribution, his two principles of 'justice as fairness' are: (1) each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme ofliberties for all; and (2) social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: they must be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportu­nity; and they must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society. The freedoms that those principles entail are: freedom of thought and liberty of conscience; politicalliberties and freedom of association, as well

- as the freedoms specified by the liberty and integrity of the person; and finally, the rights and liberties covered by the rule oflaw (see esp. Rawls 1993). Rawls also argues that a virtually permanent feature of modern democracies is the existence of a wide variety of divergent and incompatible conceptions of the good, that is, a plurality of opposing but reasonable comprehensive doctrines, which require the existence of capitalist firms, or the existence of worker­managed firms, or the existence of completely different forms of ownership rights according to some unique communitarian conceptions of the good. A 'property-owning' democracy that permits the existence of a wider variety of ownership rights, including socialist forms of ownership, should be favoured in modern democratic conditions. From our perspective, the conception of Rawls and similar ones by other authors, such as Ringen, can fairly readily be empirically translated into the set of civil, political, and social rights that cover both freedoms and equalities.

Definitional Gonundrums 41

Rule oflaw and freedom are the key empirical elements of good governance. To better clarify this point, it should immediately be added that, within a very lively and rich debate, the notion of governance has usually been grounded on empirical analyses ( see e.g. Pierre 2000). It refers to a complex set of structures and processes, both public and private, which are not synonymous with 'government' (see Weiss 2000) and can be effectively C<?nceptualized as the 'capacity of public sector of steering, alone or in cooperation with other actors, economy and society' (Peters, 2008: 445).22 An excellent reconstruc­tion is offered by Rhodes (1996), who stresses how with this notion there is not a 'crisis' or the 'disappearance' of government and the state, but a redefinition and repositioning of its role and function in a pluralized context of actors taking part in public decision-making processes. If anything, it does mark the end of the paradigm of government as a centralized, coercive, and hierarchical form of power through a redefinition of the form of political regulation in the interaction with social and economic regulations. Hooghe and Marks (2001) classify forms of governance on the basis of the prevalent definitions found in studies of the EU, international relations, federalism, ' local government, and public policies. From our perspective, the key feature they draw attention to is the need to analyse different levels of government even when considering normative conceptions of democracy. The discussion could continue and doubts rlmain about what is the most effective definition of this notion and the level niost appropriate for close analysis. But we are still within an empirical debate.

The normative element intervenes when the adjective 'good' is added. In this perspective one of the mostoriginal definitions (and analyses) of 'good governance' is the one by Rothstein and Teorell (2008: 165-90), who consider this notion as synonymous with 'quality of government' and strongly argue that a key aspect of good governance is the 'impartiality in the exercise of public authority' (p. 166) as a 'moral principle' for civil servants (p. 176) with democracy as a necessary condition and impartiality implying rule of law as well as enhancing efficiency/effectiveness (pp. 178-83). The World Bank prefers a broader definition where 'good governance' is 'an efficient public service, and independent judicial system and legal framework to enforce contracts; the accountable administration of public funds; an independent public auditor, responsible to a representative legislature; respect for the law and human rights at all levels of government; a pluralistic institutional structure; and a free press' (World Bank 1992). Or, in other words, once again those of the World Baclc, there is a 'predictable, open and enlightened policymaking (that is, transparent pro~sses); a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all

42 The Basics

behaving under the rule oflaw' (World Bank 1994: vii). The notion has also been adopted by other international organizations, and the most recurrent empirical dimensions mentioned in different documents have been: rule of law, government effectiveness, legitimacy and voice, political stability and absence of violence, transparency, accountability, participation, responsive­ness, and so on. 23 This means that ultimately we are not far away from other normative notions when the empirical translation has been made.

A different normative path is to examine the main values that a contempo­rary democracy is supposed to implement with its policies. As already men­tioned above, for several authors these are mainly freedom and equality/ solidarity. This can lead to a definition of a 'good' democracy as 'the set of institutions that create the best opportunities to carry out freedom and equality' or, in a more developed way, 'a stable institutional structure that realizes the liberty and equality of citizens through the legitimate and correct functioning of its institutions and mechanisms'. Thus, a good democracy is a broadly legitimated regime that satisfies its citizens. 24 When institutions have the full backing of civil society, they can pursue democratic values. If, by contrast, institutions have to postpone their objectives and expend energy and resources on consolidating and maintaining their legitimacy, crossing even the minimum threshold for democracy becomes a remarkable feat. Second, in a good democracy the citizens themselves have the power to check and evaluate whether the government is pursuing the objectives of liberty and equality according to the rule of law. They can monitor the efficiency of the application of the laws in force, the efficacy of the decisions made by govern­ment, and the political responsibility and accountability of elected officials in relation to the demands expressed by civil society. All this implies that the different levels of government-local, regional, national, supranational ( espe­cially for European countries)-cannot be overlooked (see also Morlino 2004). The affirmation of the two principles of freedom and equality must occur at the local (municipal or regional), national, and supranationallevels, with all the implications and especially the limitations that this inevitably entails (see Dahl 1994). It must also take into consideration the various spheres of everyday life, from the workplace to the educational system and associational activities. Consequently, any attempt to come up with an ideal definition must adopt a perspective that starts with the individual and society rather than with government institutions. To ensure a greater degree of democracy, one cannot avoid looking first of all at the establishment and extension of the rights of individuals or communities of varying sizes. If this is the case, the next step is that the realization of freedom and equality, even though these may be differently conceived, must necessarily be based on an increasingly rich and extensive set of individual rights.

Definitional Conundrums 43

Dahl (1998), Beetharn (1999), and other authors help to explain the further step required to arrive at a clarification and formulation of rights. In fact, they suggest a ·number of more specific principles that are also means of affering the best jnstitutional opportunities for ensuring freedom and equality. Above all, these principles do not just include aspects such as recognition of the political inclusion of all adult individuals, equal voting rights, the promotion of the effective participation of all citizens, and the availability of clear and correct information for all. Drawing once again on Dahl and Sartori, they also encompass the promotion of the accountability of government and of its capacity to respond to the demands of citizens and communities, and control . of the decisional agenda and of the outcomes of such decisions on the part of citizens themselves or in various other ways that may be devised.

If these aspects, which are essential for the achievement of freedom and equality, are to be effectively pursued, contemporary democracies will also have to attend to issues such as environmental conservation, the right to healthcare, assistance for the elderly and disabled, the right to a job, provi­sions for the unemployed, the need to ensure everyone has a reasonable staridard of living, the right to educational opportunities, and also the promotion of equity in private disputes or between public and private inter­ests. Not to include in an analysis of the ideal democracy the safeguarding of the substantive elements outliped above would paradoxically mean ignoring the steps already taken by many real democracies to promote equality. It would also involve a failure to recognize that in today's world the protection and promotion of those social rights have become just as indispensable for democracy as the principles of inclusion, participation, equal voting rights, accountability, and so on, and indeed are closely related to them. In short, it would result in a definition of the ideal democracy that in some ways falls short of what real ones have already achieved.

A concrete understanding of the affirmation and protection of the values and rights mentioned above requires a third step, namely the pinpointing of the institutional tools that best realize them. Once again, Dahl (1971: 3 and 1982, 10-ll) is useful here, with his emphasis on the need to have the following eight institutional guarantees: (a) freedom of association and orga­nization; (b) freedom ofthought (and expression); (c) the right to vote; (d) the right of politicalleaders to compete for ( electoral) support; ( e) alternative sources of information; (f) the possibility of being elected to public office (passive electorate); (g) free and fair elections; and (h) the existence of institutions that make government policies dependent on the vote ruid on other expressions of preference.

The centrality of rights assumes the possibility that they may be extended and deepened, and may be concretely exercised with greater satisfaction. One

44 The Basics

• procedural • genetic • minimalist

• normative - liberal, representative democracy - responsive democracy - participatory democracy - deliberative democracy - associative democracy - egalitarian or social democracy - good governance - good democracy

Figure 2.1. Most salient definitions of dernocracy

example of this in relation to the right to vote might be the granting of the right-which, indeed, has already become concrete reality in many countries-to express a preference not only for a candidate or party but also for a government. In this way, citizens would feel that they have more scope for expressing their political will. Likewise, a more profound affirmation of the principle of inclusion, and once again of voting rights, would involve the granting of political citizenship to immigrant residents. Such a proposed definition of good democracy is inevitably complex. It starts with the individ­ual and develops in at least three steps: identification of the two most general principles; preliminary delineation of more specific, intermediate principles; and specification of the set of rights that stem from the first two steps. However, the empirical translation should be simpler with the concrete emphasis on the rights, the related content, and the ways of guaranteeing them.

To conclude this section and the chapter, it is worth stressing that empirical notions of democracy, especially the minimalist one, are essential compasses in the empirical research and the normative notions of democracy may be empirically translated to assess their actual presence in the different countries or political situations. But when we switch from the ideal discourse to empirical analysis the enormous richness of different conceptualizations of democracy can only be translated into a few recurrent, empirical features we can explore. These include rule of law, electoral accountability, institutional accountability, participation (the most common of the normative notions), competition, freedom, equality/solidarity, and responsiveness. Chapters 7 and 8 will show such a translation and its consequences for the analysis of democratic deepening. As a way of summing up the entire chapter, Figure 2.1 lists the most recurrent definitions of democracy that are useful for the chapters that follow.

Definitional Gonundrums 45

Notes

1. Gallie appropriately cites democracy as an example of a contested concept: 'Politics being the art of the possible, democratic targets will be raised or lowered as circumstances alter, and democratic achievements are always judged in the light of such alterations' (Gallie 1956: 186).

2. See Part III. 3. A good, up-to-date review of notions of democracy is in Bernhagen (2009: 24-40). 4. The very first edition of Vom Wesen und Wert Demokratie (Tübingen: ]. C. B.

Mohr) appeared in 1920, and the 'Foundations ofDemocracy' (Ethics, 56(1)) was published in 1955.

5. By responsiveness, Sartori and other authors mean the capacity of governors to respond to the demands of the governed. More will be said about this in Chapter 8.

6. For more on this term, see 5.1. 7. Responsiveness and related problems of definitions and measures are discussed in

Part III. S: On these definitions of democracy see also Diamond (esp. 1999: 7-17). A

minimalist empirical definition, such as the one discussed in the text and those suggested by Diamond are different from the 'minimalist' theoretical conception 'defended' by Przeworski (see 1999: 23-55).

9. As the assessment of elect~ns is a key element in this minimalist definition, the proposal by Munck (see 2009: esp. chapter 5) should taken into account and followed.

10. Among the normative notions of democracy I have not included 'self-definition', that is, the democratic conception proposed and in some instances developed by specific political or social movements, groups, and leaders in a given moment in a country. There are two obvious reasons for this. Firstly, it would involve an enormous amount of empirical research in several countries, where the specifics of every situation would emerge as being important, if not predominant features, and that is not the purpose of this study. Secondly, the non-specific aspects would in alllikelihood overlap with the notions mentioned and discussed in the text. For more on self-definitions of democracy see, for example, Koelble and Lipuma ( 2008). A common characteristic of all the definitions mentioned in the text is the implicit, but strong reference to the nationallevel. However, not only can we imagine a supranational democracy, but a kind of experiment in one is actually underway, despite hesitations, stops, and steps backwards, and that is the one represented by the EU. This cannot be ignored, and some reference is made to it in the third part of the boqk. r

11. A dassie work outlining the principal normative notions of democracy is Held (1987 and 2006).

12. For definitions, indicators and measures of accountabilities, see Part III.

46 The Basics

13. The term is used to refer to the 'practice or policy of making no more than a minimal effort to offer minorities equal opportunities to those enjoyed by the majority' (Webster Dictionary). According to Arnstein, the demands of mino­rities and weaker sections of society are managed through powerfully mediated forms of listening designed to put a damper on conflicts in the interest of social order, but which are not foilowed by any real measures to solve problems or significant changes in the way decisions are made.

14. I would like to thank Francesca Gelli for calling my attention to this author. 15. The theoretical hypothesis in question had already been formulated by Bachrach

and ~aratz in two articles published many years earlier in the American Political Science Review, entitled respectively 'Two Faces of Power' (1962) and 'Decisions and Non Decisions: An Analytical Framework' (1963). '

16. Pateman examines the institution of marriage in relation to the subordination of women and in the ambit of work and employment, which creates bonds and relations of Subordination particularly for women and the young. These institu­tions are viewed not so much in terms of relations between individuals, but as social institutions--codes and conventions that take root in society and become cognitive structures as weil as mechanisms of power.

17. The universalistic and normative tendencies are emphasized hereinordernot to create misunderstanding, given that critics are prone to describe deliberative democracy and its theoretical prernises as 'soft'.

18. The importance of dialogue lies in the comparing of views by the various parties involved through discussion backed up by rational argumentation. This means not merely asserting one's point of view, but publicly explaining the motivations, in a situation where everyone enjoys equality and freedom of opinion.

19. On deliberative democracy especially there is a blossoming of mixed conceptions. Among them those on 'liberal deliberative democracy' and 'participatory delib­erative democracy', which Della Porta (2011: esp. sect. 3) singled out in her analysis of the connections between these notions and social movements, can be noted.

20. In the 'associative network' of civil society, people make decisions that may be minor, but are capable nonetheless of reducing the distance that otherwise forms between citizens and the state, and even the iniquitous outcomes of the market can be lirnited in this way (Walzer 1992: 99). The conclusion reached by Walzer is that the state cannot last long if it is alienated from civil society, which at the same time cannot be viewed as an alternative to the state (governance does not exclude government). There are at least two fundamental reasons for this. Firstly, because the organizations belonging to 'civil society' rely on the help of the state in various ways (specific prograrnmes and services, financial resources, tax reductions and exemptions, protection, and, above all, the perforrning of a regulatory function on the part of the state, which acts as a guarantoi:) in order to realize their projects. Secondly, because mechanical procedures and rigid bureaucratic appa­ratuses can take over in 'civil society' as weil, leading to radically unequal power relations and reproducing conditions of injustice (Walzer 1992: 104).

Definitional Gonundrums 47

21. In the scheme proposed by Hirst (1997), associative democracy is a system for organizing political and sociallife that encourages self-govemance through vol­untary associations. This helps, in his view, to tackle three fundamental issues: (1) to guarantee the responsibility ef representative democracies; (2) to deal with increasingly pluralist societies with diverging values; (3) to enable those who are successful to make use of services that have all the advantages of being collective without, however, losing their flexibility, and maintaining attention for disadvan-taged individuals. ·

22. Other definitions of governance are: minimal state (Rhodes 1996); corporate govemance (Rhodes 1996; World Bank); new public management (see Mathiasen 1996; Terry 1998; Peters and Pierre 1998; Pierre 2000; Lynn 2006); socio-cybernetic system (see Kooirnan 1993; Rhodes 1996); networks (Rhodes 1996; Peters 2008); multi-level governance (Hooghe and Marks 2001); democratic governance (Franck 1992); and global govemance (Carin et al. 2007). Some ofthem (minimal state, corporate govemance, new public management, good governance, socio­cybernetic system, self-organizing networks) arealso discussed by Rhodes (1996).

23. In addition to the World Bank the other international organizations that have adopted the notion of 'good governance' include: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); United Nations Economic and Social Corninission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP); International Govemance Office (IGO); Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA); and Austrian Development Cooper­ation and Cooperation with Eastem Europe (ADC). I am not going to discuss why these organizations adop~ed the notion. I just wish to mention briefly that it has been considered a way ofnot appearing to interfere in the domestic affairs of the countries where they intervene in different ways. A similar notion has been adopted by the EU, which defines 'good governance' in terms of five principles: ' [ ... J openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence [ ... ] Each principle is important for establishing more democratic governance. They

· unde;:pin democracy and the rule oflaw in the Member States, but they apply to alllevels of government-global, European, national, regional and local' (Euro­pean Commission 2001: 10). Later the notion of'democratic govemance' was also proposed more explicitly: it 'spans a broad range of issues, such as respect and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, democratisation and citizens' involvement in the political process, the rule oflaw and access to justice, gender equality, human security, access to information, management of migra­tion flows, access to basic public services, effective, transparent, responsive and accountable State institutions, sustainable management of resources and promo­tion of sustainable economic growth and social cohesion' (European Commission and Council General Secretariat 2009: 3-4).

24. Of course, such a definition overlooks a few dassie issues related to individual satisfaction such as when individuals have incompatible desires. I thank Uaniela Piana who called my attention to this, although I cannot develop the point here.

3

Are There Hybrid Regimes?

Finer (1970: 441-531) was one ofthe first authors to singleout the existence of farade democracies or semi-democracies to indicate regimes that are no Ionger authoritarian, but not yet minimally democratic and have institutions that are recurrent in a democracy, such as a constitutional charter and elections, but where the former is not actually implemented and the latter are largely constrained. Other authors such as Rouquie (1975) and O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), who had a Spanish background and were working on Latin American countries, Iabelied the phenomenon of ambiguous cases dictablandas and democraduras. Thus, the notion of hybrid regimes has been present in the dassie political science Iiterature for years. The basic change in recent years is the sheer size and variety of the phenomenon.

As a consequence, the view of Croissant and Merkel (2004: 1) that 'the conceptual issue of diminished sub-type of democracy ... has begun the new predominant trend in democratic theory and democratization studies' comes as no surprise. Nor does the assertion by Epstein et al. (2006: 556, 564-5) that 'partial democracies' 'account for an increasing portion of current regimes and the lion's share of regime transitions', adding, however, that there is little available information about 'what prevents full democracies from sliding back to partial democracies or autocracies, and what prevents partial democracies from sliding back to autocracy' and that 'the determinants of the behaviour of the partial democracies elude our understanding'. Nor, finally, is it surprising that a variety of Iabels have been coined for these regimes in addition to those mentioned above: 'ex:clusionary democracy' (Remmer 1985--6), 'serni-democracies' (Diamond et al. 1989), 'electoral democracies' (Diamond 1999; Freedom House), 'illiberal democracies' (Zakaria 1997), 'competitive authoritarianisms' (Letvitsky and Way 2002), 'serni-authoritarianisms' (Ottaway 2003), 'defective democracies' (Merkel 2004), 'partial democracies' (Epstein et al. 2006), 'mi:x:ed regimes' (Bunce and Wolchik 2008), to mention just some of the expressions and some of the scholars who have investigated what is denoted here by the broader term of hybrid regimes (see, in particular, Karl1995; Diamond 2002; Wigell2008).1

In trying to gain a better understanding of the reasons for such attention it is worth bearing in mind that complex phenomena such as democratization

Are There Hybrid Regimes? 49

are never linear, and cases of a return to more ambiguous situations have by no means been exceptions to the rule in recent years. Moreover, cases of democracies, even if minimal, going 'all' the way back to stable authoritarian regimes have been much less frequent:2 it is more difficult, though not impossible, to recreate conditions of stable coercion once the majority of a given society has been involved and become politically active in the course of transition. If nothing else, as Dahl noted many years ago (1971), greater coercive resources would be required. Furthermore, in periods of democrati­zation, even if only as a result of an imitation effect, authoritarian crises and the resulting initial phases of change should be more frequent. Consequently, there are several reasons for the greater frequency of regimes characterized by uncertainty and transition. Moreover, if the ultimate goal is to examine and explain how regimes move towards democracy, it is fully justified, indeed opportune, to focus on those phases of uncertainty and change. But here we have a relevant aspect that-this time surprisingly-the Iiterature has failed to address and solve: when considering those phases of uncertainty and ambi­guity, are we dealing with an institutional arrangement with some, perhaps minimal, degree of stabilization, namely a regime in a proper sense; or are we actually analysing transitional phases from some kind of authoritarianism ( or traditional regime) to democracy, or vice versa?

Thus, starting with definitions of the terms 'regime', 'authoritarianism', and t

'democracy' we have to discuss and clarify the reasons for the proposed definition of hybrid regime; try to answer the key question posed in the chapter title, which, as will become clear, is closely bound up with the prospects for change in the nations that have such ambiguous forms of political organization and, more generally, with the spread of democratiza­tion; propose a typology of hybrid regimes; and, in the last section, reach a number of salient conclusions.

3.1 A WIDESPREAD PHENOMENON?

The simplest and most immediate way of understanding the nature of the phenomenon under scrutiny is to refer to the principal sets of macro-political . data that exist in the literature. Data have been gathered by international bodies like the World Bank, the OECD, and the United Nations; by private foundations, such as the IDEA and Bertelsman Stiftung; by individual scho­lars or research groups, like Polity IV, originally conceived by Ted Gurr, or the project on human rights protection undertaken by Todd Landman (2005),

50 The Basics

who formulated indicators of democracy and good governance, and also produced an effective survey (2003) of various initiatives in this field; and even by prominent magazines like the Economist, whose Intelligence Unit has drawn up a well-designed index of democracy. But it is not necessary to survey these here. Despite all the limitations and problems, which have been widely discussed, 3 for the purposes of this chapter the data provided by Freedom House have the insuperable advantage of enabling a longitudinal analysis. In fact, they have been collected since the beginning of the 1970s and regularly updated on an annual basis. These data can, therefore, be used to gain a better grasp of the phenomenon.4

In 2010 the Freedom House data feature sixty out of 194 formally indepen­dent countries (in 2007 there were fifty-eight), which have 30 per cent of the world's population and are political arrangements that can be defined as par­tially free, the concrete term closest to the notion ofhybrid regimes.5 'Partially :free' regimes have an overall ratingrauging from 3 to 5.6 They are present in every continent: five in Europe (four of which are in the Balkans); twenty-six in Africa; fourteen in Asia (two are in the Middle East), nine in the Americas (five in South America and four in Central America), and four in Oceania. There are also forty-seven non-free regimes, which might be defined as stable authoritar­ianisms and correspond to 23 per cent of the world's population,7 and eighty­seven democracies, amounting to 47 per cent of the world's population. Overall, then, the partially free regimes exceed the non-free ones bothin number andin terms of percentage of population. One further observation is that, with a few exceptions like Turkey, 8 most of the nations that fall within the 'partially free' category are medium-smaU or small. Finally, from a European point of view, despite the intense efforts of the European Union, other international organiza­tions, and specific European governments, almost none of the Balkan nations have embraced democracy: apart from Slovenia and Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro and on the borderline while Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia (which has even applied to join the European Union) are partially free regimes. The other European nation in the same situation is Moldova, which borders Romania and Ukraine. However, before proceeding any further with the empirical analysis, it is necessary to define some terms, which will help to give greater precision to the current rather fuzzy terrninology.

3.2 DEFINITION AND ANALYTIC DIMENSIONS

Before proceeding with our analysis, it is worth stating that we prefer the term 'hybrid regime' to all the others present in the literature ( see above) as this,

Are There Hybrid Regimes? 51

relatively speaking, is the broadest notion, whereas most of the others (e.g. 'exclusionary democracy', 'partial democracies', 'electoral democracies', 'illib­eral democracies', 'defective democracies', 'semi-authoritarianisms') seem to refer to more specific models, mainly ilirninished forms of democracy. And it seems appropriate to come up with a precise definition of the broadest notion before going ahead and mapping out the diversified realities inside it.9 In short, we are looking here for the genus that comes before' the species.

Moreover, an adequate conceptualization of the 'hybrid regime' must start with a definition ofboth the noun and the adjective 'trapped' between a non­democratic (above all, traditional, authoritarian and post-totalitarian) and a democratic set-up. As regards the term 'regime', consideration will be given here to 'the set of government institutions and of norms that are either formalized or are informally recognized as existing in a given territory and with respect to a given population'.10 Emphasis will be placed on the institu­tions, even if they are not formal, that exist in a given moment in a given nation. While they no Ionger configure some form of non-democracy and do not yet configure a complete democracy, such institutions still bear traces of the previous political reality. In addition, in order to have so methingthat may be labelled as a regime we need an at least minimal stabilization. Fishman (1990: 428) recalls that regimes 'are more permanent forms of political organization'.n Otherwise, we 'pick up fireflies for lanterns' by confusing a temporary changing situatio~ with a more stabilized one, whatever the reasons might be. Obviously, the consequences of making such a distinction are very significant. In any case, we will totally misunderstand the entire situation if we fail to assess whether there is or has been stabilization or not. This will be a key element of our definition, one that differentiates it from those existing in the literature, even the mostprominent ones (see above).

The second point that can be stressed, then, is that a regime may not fulfil the minimalist requirements of a democracy, in other words it does not meet all the more immediately controllable and empirically essential conditions that make it possible to establish a threshold below which a regime cannot be considered democratic. As recalled in the previous chapter, for a minimalist definition of democracy, we need at the same time: (a) universal suffrage, both male and female; (b) free, competitive, recurrent, and fair elections; (c) more than one party; (d) different and alternative media sources. Tobetter understand this definition, it is worth stressing that a regime of this kind must provide real guarantees of civil and political rights that enable the actual implementation of those four aspects. That is, such rights are assumed to exist if there is authentic universal suffrage, the supreme expression of political rights, that is the whole adult demos has the right to vote; if there are free, fair, and recurrent elections as an expression of the effective existence of freedom

J

52 The Basics

of speech and thought as weil; if there is more than one effectively competing party, demonstrating the existence of genuine and practised rights of assem­bly and association; and if there are different media sources belanging to different proprietors, proof of the existence of the liberties of expression and thought. One important aspect of this definition is that in the absence of just one of these requirements, or if at some point one of them is no Ionger met, there is no Ionger a democratic regime, but some other political and institu­tional set-up, possibly an intermediate one marked by varying degrees of uncertainty and ambiguity.

Finaily, it is worth stressing that this minimalist definition focuses on the institutions that characterize democracy: elections, competing parties ( at least potentially so), and media pluralism and it can be added that it is also important that these institutions and rights should not be subject to, or conditioned by, 'non-elected actors' or exponents of other ex:temal regimes (see previous chapter and Schmitter and Karl1993: 45-6). The former refers to the armed forces, religious hierarchies, econornic oligarchies, a hegemonic party, or even a monarch with pretensions to infl.uencing decision-making processes or at any rate the overall functioning of a democracy; in the second case, a regime might be conditioned by an ex:temal power that deprives the democracy in question of its independence and sovereignty by pursuing non­democratic policies.

To avoid terminological confusion it should be pointed out that the 'electoral democracies' defined by Diamond (1999: 10) solely with regard to 'constitutional systems in which parliament and executive are the result of regular, competitive, multi-party elections with universal suffrage' are not minimal liberal democracies, in which additionally there is no room for 'reserved domains' of actors who are not eleetorally responsible, directly or indirectly, there is inter-institutional accountability, that is the responsibility of one organ towards another as laid down by the constitution, and finally, there are e:ffectively applied norms to sustain and preserve pluralism and individual and group freedoms (Diamond 1999: 10-11) .12 The term 'electoral democracies' is also used by Freedom House with a similar meaning: an electoral democracy is understood as a multi-party, competitive system with universal suffrage, fair and competitive elections with the guarantee of a secret ballot and voter safety, access to the media on the part of the principal parties, and open electoral campaigns. In the application of the term by Freedom House, all democracies are 'electoral democracies' but not all are liberal. Therefore, even those regimes that do not have a maximum score in the indicators for elections continue to be considered electoral democracies. More specifically, a score equal to or above 7, out of a maximum of 12, is sufficient for partially free nations to be classified as electoral democracies. 13

Are There Hybrid Regimes? 53

Thus, in both uses of the term, an 'electoral democracy' could only be a specific model of a hybrid regime, but not a minimal democracy.

As regards the definition of non-democratic regimes, reference must be made at least to traditional and authotitarian regimes. The former are 'based on the personal power of the sovereign, who binds his underlings in a relationship of fear and reward; they are typically legibus soluti ·regimes, where the sovereign's arbitrary decisions are not liniited by norms and do not need to be justi:fied ideologically. Power is thus used in particularistic forms and for essentially private ends. In these regimes, the armed forces and police play a central role, while there is an evident lack of any form of developed ideology and any structure of mass mobilization, as a single party usually is. Basically, then, the political set-up is dominated by tradi­tional elites and institutions' (Morlino 2003: 80).

As for the authoritarian regimes, the definition advanced by Linz (1964: 255) is still the most useful one: a 'political system with limited, non-respon­sible political pluralism; without an elaborated and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities; without either extensive or intense political mobiliza­tion, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader, or, occasionally, a small group, exercises power from within formally ill-defined, but actually quite predictable, limits'. However, with respect to such a definition, which identifies five significant dimensions, i.e. lirnited pluralism, distinctive values, 14 low poli~al mobilization, a small leading group, and ill-defined, but predictable, lirnits to citizens' rights, for our purpose we need to stress the constraints imposed on political pluralism within a society that has no recognized autonomy or independence as weil as no effective political participation of the people, with the consequent exercise of various forms of state suppression. A further, neglected, but nonetheless important, dimension should also be added-the institutions that characterize authoritarian regimes, which are invariably of marked importance in many transitional cases. Once created and having become stabilized over a certain nurober of years, institu­tionsoften leave a significant legacy for a new regime, even when it has become firmly democratic.

In addition to Morlino (2003), other authors stress this aspect. For exam­ple, it is worth recalling the whole debate on 'electoral authoritarianisms' (Schedler 2006). In fact, with this term Schedler (2006: 5) refers to specific models of authoritarianism-not to a hybrid regime-specifically character­ized by electoral institutions and practices; in this instance, hybrid regimes are the result of changes that b~gin within these types of authoritariariism. Moreover, the attention given to authoritarian institutions is relevant for other important reasons. Firstly, the existence of efficient repressive appara­tuses capable of implementing the above~mentioned demobilization policies,

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54 The Basics

for instance security services, which may be autonomaus or part of the military structure. Secondly, the partial weakness or the absence of mobiliza­tion structures, such as the single party or unions which may be vertical ones admitting both workers and employers, or other sirnilar state institutions, that is, structures capable of simultaneously generating and Controlling par­ticipation. There could be distinct forms of parliamentary assembly, possibly based on the functional and corporative representation of interests (see below); distinctive electoral systems; military juntas; ad hoc constitutional organs; or other specific organs different from those that e:xisted in the previous regime. 15 Obviously, there is also another implicit aspect that it is worth stressing: the absence of real guarantees regarding the various political and civil rights.

Limited, non-responsible pluralism, which may range from monism to a certain number of important and active actors in the regime, is a key aspect to recall. For every non-democratic regime, then, it is important above all to pinpoint the significant actors, for whom a distinction can be made between institutional actors and politically active social actors. Examples of the form er are the army, the bureaucratic system or a part thereof and, where applicable, a single party; the latter include the Church, industrial or financial groups, landowners, and in some cases even unions or transnational econornic struc­tures with major interests in the nation concemed. Such actors are not politically responsible according to the typical mechanism of liberal democ­racies, that is, through free, competitive, and fair elections. If there is 'respon­sibility', it is exercised at the level of 'invisible politics' in the real relations between, for instance, military leaders and economic groups or landowners. Furthermore, elections or the other forms of electoral participation that may e:xist, for instance direct consultations through plebiscites, have no demo­cratic significance and, above all, are not the expression of rights, freedom, and genuine competition to be found in democratic regimes. They have a mainly symbolic, legitimating significance, an expression of consensus and support for the regime on the part of a controlled, non-autonomaus civil society.

Having proposed definitions for minimalist democracy, traditional regime, and authoritarianism, it is now possible to start delineating hybrid regimes. They are more than just 'mixed regimes', which, as defined by Bunce and Wolchik (2008: 6), 'fall in the sprawling middle of a political continuum anchored by democracy on one end ... and dictatorship on the other end'. As suggested by Karl (1995: 80) in relation to some Latin American countries, they may be characterized by 'uneven acquisition of procedural requisites of democracf, without a 'civilian control over the military', with sectors of the population that 'remain politically and economically disenfranchised', and

Are There Hybrid Regimes? 55

with a 'weak judiciary'. But again this definition only refers to authoritarian­isms that partially lose some of their key characteristics, retain some authori­tarian or traditional features, and at the same time acquire some of the characteristic institutions and procedures of democracy, but not others. A hybrid regime, on the other hand, may also have a set of institutions where, going down the inverse path, some key elements of democracy have been lost and authoritarian characteristics acquired. Thus, it has to be adequately completed, for example, by induding some of the aspects mentioned by Levitsky and Way (2002: 52-8) in their analysis of a specific model ofhybrid regime (competitive authoritarianism), such as the e:xistence of 'incumbents ( who) routinely abuse state resources, deny the opposition adequate media coverage, harass opposition candidates and their supporters, and in some case manipulate electoral results'.

This discussion, however, prompts reflection about two elements. First, a hybrid regime is always a set of ambiguous institutions that maintain aspects of the past. In other words, and this is the second point, it is a 'corruption' of the preceding regime, lacking as it does one or more essential characteristics ofthat regime but also failing to acquire other characteristics that would make it fully democratic or authoritarian (see definitions above). Consequently, to define hybrid regimes more precisely it seems appropriate to take a different line from the one suggested in the literatme and to explicitly include the past of such regimes in the definillon itself. The term 'hybrid' can thus be applied to all those regimes preceded by a period of authoritarian or traditional rule, followed by the beginnings of greater tolerance, liberalization, and a partial relaxation of the restrictions on pluralism; or, all those regimes which, following a period of minimal democracy in the sense indicated above, are subject to the intervention of non-elected bodies-the military, above all­that place restrictions on competitive pluralism without, however, creating a more or less stable authoritarian regime. There are, then, three possible hypotheses behind a definition taking account of the context of origin, which can be better explicated as follows: the regime arises out of one of the different types of authoritarianism that have existed in recent decades, or even earlier; the regime arises out of a traditional regime, a monarchy or sultanism; or the regime arises out of the crisis of a previous democracy. To these must be added a fourth, which is an important specification of the second: the regime is the result of decolonialization that has never been followed by either authoritarian or democratic stabilization.

If, to gain a closer empirical understanding of a hybrid regime, onerdevel­ops at least the first and second of these hypotheses a little further-though the majority of cases in recent decades would seem to fall into the first category-it can be seen that alongside the old actors of the previous

56 The Basics

authoritarian or traditional regime, a nurober of opposition groups have clearly taken root, thanks also to some partial, relative respect of civil rights. These groups are allowed to participate in the political process, but have little substantial possibility of governing. There are, then, a nurober of parties, of which one may remain hegemonie-dominant in semi-competitive elections; at the same time there is already some form of real competition amongst the candidates of that party. The other parties are fairly unorganized, of recent creation or recreation, and have only a small following. There is some degree of real participation, but it is minimal and usually limited to the election period: Often, a powerfully distorting electoral system allows the hegemonie­dominant party to maintain an enormous advantage in the distribution of seats; in many cases the party in question is a bureaucratic structure rife with patronage favours and intent on surviving the ongoing transformation. This means that there is no Ionger any justification for the regime, not even merely on the basis of all-encompassing and ambiguous values. Other forms of participation during the authoritarian period, if there have ever been any, are just a memory of the past. Evident forms of police repression are also absent, and so the role of the relative apparatuses is not prominent, while the position of the armed forces is even more low-key. Overall, there is little institutionalization and, above all, organization of the 'state', if not a full­blown process of deinstitutionalization. The armed forces may, however, maintain an evident political role, though it is stillless explicit and direct. 16

Moreover, hybrid regimes often stem from the attempt, at least temporarily successful, by moderate governmental actors in the previous authoritarian or traditional regime to resist intemal or extemal pressures on the dominant regime, to continue to maintain order and the previous distributive set-up, and to partially satisfy-or at least appear to do so-the demand for greater democratization on the part of other actors, the participation of whom is also contained within limits. Consequently, there are potentially as many different variants of transitional regimes as there are types of authoritarian and tradi­tional models. Many cases could be fitted into this model, which says a good deal about their potential significance.17

In disentangling empirical realities that fit the previously formulated defi­nition of the hybrid regime from different transitional situations, we should add that there has been some sort of stabilization or duration, at least-we submit-for a decade, of those ambiguous uncertain institutional set-ups. Consequently, to avoid a misleading analysis of democratization processes we can define a hybrid regime as a set of institutions that have been persistent, be they stable or unstable, for at least a decade, have been preceded by authoritari­anism, a traditional regime (possibly with colonial characteristics), or even a minimal democracy, and are characterized by the break-up of limited pluralism

Are There Hybrid Regimes? 57

and forms of independent; autonomaus participation, but the absence of at least

one of the Jour aspects of a minimal democracy. As a way of stressing the differences with the existing literature (see above)

and of making sense of the definition above, . it is useful to emphasize the reasons that justify it: to better understand what hybrid regimes are, it is necessary to disentangle cases of transitional phases from hybrid regimes stricto sensu, where the extent of achieved stabilization has to be taken into account. At the same time it is important to grasp the ambiguities and the fuzziness of regimes in which features ofboth democracy and authoritarian­ism coexist, and in this vein, to consider the institutional past that is so important to them. But if this is the case, two key questions need to be addressed: ( 1) Are there actually cases of hybrid regimes, or does reality just throw up transitional cases, as might sound more reasonable? (2) If there actually are hybrid regimes and transitional phases as well, what characterizes one and the other? In other words, is it possible to elaborate a good typology of hybrid regimes and single out the recurrent characteristics of transitional phases? The remairring sections of the chapter will be devoted to answering

these questions.

3.3 EMPIRICA~ CASES OF HYBRID REGIMES, OR SHEER FANTASY?

A key element that runs against the effective existence of hybrid regime, that is, institutional set-ups that are not democracy, nor authoritarianism, nor traditionalism, is the expected low probability of duration. In fact, once some degree of freedom and competition exists and is implemented in various ways, it seems inevitable that the process will continue, even though the direction it will actually take is unknown. lt might lead to the establishment of a democracy, but it could also move backwards, with the restoration of the previous authoritarian or other type of regime, or the establishment of a different authoritarian or non-democratic regime. Is this constitutive short duration or high instability confirmed by the Freedom House data?

If we assuroe that we are facing a transitional period when the 'partially free' assessment is assigned for more than two years but less than a decade and there is a regime in the pro~er sense when the same/similar political set-up has lasted for ten years or more, and we consider all countries that were 'partially free' between 1989 and 2010, we can immediately detect and differ­entiate the forty-six cases of transition from the hybrid regimes. Among the

58 The Basics

Table 3.1. Transitional cases: towards democracy, authoritarianism, or uncertainty (1989-2010)

Transition to democracy

Brazil (9) Croatia (9) Domin. Rep. (5) EI Salvador (8) Ghana (8) Guyana (4 +1) India (7) Indonesia (7) Romania (5) South Africa (5) Taiwan (7)

Transition to authoritarianism

Afghanistan (3) Algeria (3) Azerbaijan (6) Bahrain ( 4+ 7) Belarus (5) Bhutan (3 +2) Egypt (4) Eritrea (4) Kazakhstan (3) Swaziland (4) Thailand (7+ 1) Togo (3) +3 Tunisia (4) +1

Uncertainty in a democratic context

Bolivia (7) Ecuador (10) East Tirnor (11) Honduras (11) Malawi (11) Papua N. Guinea (5+7) Philippines ( 6+5) Solomon Islands (10) Venezuela (4+11)

Uncertainty in an authoritarian context

Burundi (7) Congo (Brazzav.) (6+6) Cöte d'Ivoire (3+3) Djibouti ( 11) Gambia (9) Haiti (6+4) Kenya (8) Kyrgyzstan (9+4) Lebanon (4+5) Liberia (5+6) Mauritania (3) Niger (5+11) Yemen (4+6)

Note: The number in parenthesis refers to the years the country was assessed as partially free (PF). When there is a plus ( + ), it means an interruption in the continuity of assessment. Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World. Country Ratings 1972-2007 (www.freedomhouse.org) .

transitional cases (see Table 3.1), we can find four different situations. There are: ( 1) countries that after years of uncertainty became democracies, such as Brazil, Croatia, and El Salvador, which had long transitional periods, and countries with shorter transitions, such as Guyana, Romania, and South Africa; (2) countries where transition led to authoritarian regimes, such as Algeria, Belarus, and Thailand; (3) countries where there is great uncertainty because a decade has not yet elapsed, but which have a democratic legacy, such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela; ( 4) countries where there was also non-stabilization, but which have an authoritarian past.

Table 3.2 surprisingly confirms that not only can hybrid regimes stabilize as such, but they are half ( 45) of the entire group (91). Here, if we distinguish between more stabilized hybrid regimes, that is regimes that have been 'par­tially free' for fifteen years or more, we have twenty-six cases where at least there has been a continual stand-offbetween veto players and democratic elites resulting in a stalemate, where all the main actors, especially the elites, might even find satisfactory solutions for their concerns, perhaps not ideal but nonetheless viewed pragmatically as the best ones currently available; or because a dominant power or even a coalition keeps the regime in an interme­diate limbo; or, finally, due to the lack of any central, governing institution.

Are There Hybrid Regimes?

Table 3.2. Hybridregimes (1989-2010)

More persisting hybrid

regimes

Albania (19)

Armenia (19) Bangladesh ( 17) Burkina Faso (18) Cent. Afr. Rep (12+5) Colombia (21) Cornores (20) Ethiopia (2+ 15) Fiji (10+10) Gabon (19) Georgia ( 18) Guatemala (21) Guinea-Bissau (19) Jordan (20) Kuwait (18) Macedonia (18) Madagascar (21) Malaysia (21) Meldova (19) Morocco (21) Mozambique (16) Nepal (12+4) Nicaragua (21) Nigeria ( 4+ 12) Paraguay (21) Seychelles ( 18) Singapore ( 21) Sri Lanka (21) Tonga (21) Turkey (21) Uganda (16) Zambia (2+ 17)

Less persisting hybrid regirnes

Bosnia-Herzegovina (14)

Senegal (13+2) Sierra Leone ( 12) Tanzania (15)

.t ,

Hybrid regirne + transition to democracy

Antigua & Barbuda (13) Lesotho (11) Mexico (ll) Peru (12) Suriname (11) Ukraine (14)

59

Hybrid regirne + transition to authoritarianism

Pakistan (10)

Russia (13) Zirnbabwe (12)

Note: See Table 3.1. Soura?: Freedom House, Freedom in the World. Country Ratings 1972-2010 (www.freedomhouse.org).

Moreover, we can immediately distinguish a second category of four slightly less stabilized countries, at least in terms of duration until2010. But we also have two smaller categories ofhybrid regimesOll the grounds of OUT assump­tions: regimes that aft:er a long period became democracies, such as Mexico or Peru, and regimes that became authoritarianisms, like Russia or Zimbabwe.

60 The Basics

Let's consider the possibility, however, that our assurnptions (less than ten years is to be considered a transitional phase; a decade or more to be regarded as a hybrid regime, and more than fifteen years as a more stabilized hybrid), as reasonable or practical as they rnight sound, are not accepted: is one year's difference (from 9 to 10) enough to call the first one a case oftransition and the second one a hybrid regime?18 But, even ifwe do not make those assumptions, two basic findings have to be accepted and are worth singling out and emphasizing strongly: ( 1) hybrid regimes do exist, as the first colurnn of Table 3.2 shows beyond any doubt; (2) the cases ofhybrid regimes (according to our definition) that turn into democracies or authoritarianisms are very few vis-a-vis the other ones: ten out of forty-five. In other words, at least the traditional, recurrent hypothesis that once some seed of competition is in­stalled then it is difficult to stop it and some sort of democratic arrangement will emerge is heavily underrnined. On the contrary, uncertainty and con­straints on competition ( and rights) can last for decades: in the first column of Table 3.2 there are fourteen cases out of twenty-six where the hybrid regime has been in place for almost two decades. At this point, to try to understand the reasons that might explain all this, we need to look more closely at those regimes. The first important step in this direction is to develop a classification of the thirty-five regimes present in the first two columns of Table 3.2.

3.4 WHAT KIND OF CLASSIFICATION?

On the basis of the previous definition, then, a crucial aspect of hybrid regimes is the break-up of the limited pluralism or the introduction of lirnitations on an open, competitive pluralism where previously there had been at least a minimal democracy; or the proionging of a situation of uncertainty when the country in question gairis independence but does not have, or is unable to establish, its own autonomaus institutions (authoritar­ian or democratic), and cannot revert to traditional institutions, which have either disappeared or have been completely delegitimized. In all these hy­potheses there may be (or there may emerge) veto players, that is, individual or collective actors who are influential or decisive in maintainirig the regime in its characteristic state of ambiguity and uncertainty. These actors may be: an external, foreign power that interferes in the politics of the nation; a monarch or authoritarian ruler who has come to power with more or less violent means; the armed forces; a hegemonic party run by a small group or a single leader; religious hierarchies; econornic oligarchies; other powerful groups, or a mixture of such actors, who, however, are either unable or

Are There Hybrid Regimes? 61

unwilling to elimiriate other pro-democratic actors, assumirig that in the majority of current hybrid regimes the alternative is between democracy

d d- 19 an non- emocracy. In the face of this variety in the origin and ambiguity of internal structures,

four possible directions can be taken to understand what effectively distin­guishes these regimes: the drawing up of a classification based on the legacy of the previous regime; scrutiny of the processes of change .undergone by the nations in question and the consequences for the institutional set-up that emerges; a third line which, rather more 'sirnply', considers the result, that is, the distinguishing characteristics at a given point in time-for example, in 2007-of those nations that fall withiri the genus of hybrid regimes; and a fourth possibility, where the key classificatory criterion is given by the con­straints that prevented a country from becoming at least a minimal democ­racy. The objectives of the first possible classification would be more explicitly explanatory, focusing on the resistance of institutions to change; the second, though this too would have explicative ends, would be more attentive to how modes of change themselves help to define what kind of hybrid regime one is up against; the third would be chiefly descriptive, and would start from the results, that is, from the characteristic traits of the regime; the fourth, which has explicative goals, would focus on the reasons that prevent the transfor­mation towards a democracy. But before going any further, it is essential to consider how the issue has b~n tackled by other authors in the past.

Without makirig any daim to beirig exhaustive, one might start by citing the simplest solution, proposed by Freedom Hause, which took the third approach mentioned above. Using its own data, it broke down the ensemble of nations defined as 'partially free' into serni-consolidated democracies, transitional or hybrid regimes in the strict sense, and semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes. The firsttype comprises regimes with an average rating between 3.00 and 3.99, the second has an averagetotal between 4.00 and 4.99 while the third is between 5.00 and 5.99 (see Table 3.1). Merkel (2004) also proposes an interesting classification of'defective democracies'. This category can be divided irito 'exclusive democracies', which offer only limited guaran­tees with regard to political rights; 'domain democracies', iri which powerful groups condition and limit the autonomy of elected leaders; and 'illiberal democracies', which only provide partial civil rights guarantees. Finally, Diamond (2002), who starts from the more general notion of the hybrid regime as has been. clone here, 20 proposes four categories on the basis of the degree of existing competition: hegemonic electoral authoritarian, competi­tive authoritarian, electoral democracy (see above), and a residual category of ambiguous regimes. The regimes in three out of these four categories fail to provide the rninimurn guarantee of civil rights that would qualify them to be

62 The Basics

dassified as an electoral democracy.21 Starting from the elementary fact that hybrid regimes no Ionger have some of the essential as~ec_ts of th~ non­democratic genus, but still do not have all the charactenstlcs reqmred to meet the minimum definition of democracy, Morlino (2003: 45) formulated another dassification of hybrid regimes. First and foremost, if limits are placed by specific actors on people's effective freedom to vote or even on the admission of dissent and opposition, and on the correct handling of the elections themselves, one can talk of a protected democracy. By this term it is understood that inside the regime being analysed-defined by Merkel (2004: 49) as a 'domain democracy'-there are powerful veto players, such as the army, strong economic oligarchies, traditional powers like the monarch, or even forces ex:ternal to the country, which heavily condition the regime. Moreover, there is a limited democracy when there is universal suffrage, a formally correct electoral procedure, elective posts occupied on the basis of elections, and a multi-party system, but civil rights are constrained by the police or other effective forms of suppression. Consequently, there is no effective political opposition and, above all, the media are compromised by a situation of monopoly to the point that part of the population is effectively prevented from exercising their rights. The notion of the 'illiberal democracy' advanced by Merkel (2004) coincides with that of the limited democracy as presented here. The notion of 'limited democracy' is also weil developed by Wigell (2008) within a typologywhich still includes the 'electoral democracy' and the 'constitutional democracy' as sub-types of democracy, complemented by the 'liberal democracy' as the type of fully fledged democratic set -up. 22 The main di:fference between the different proposals lies in the fact that, while also having explanatory objectives, the authors point to different factors as the crucial elements for explaining the real nature of these regimes.

Without going on to review the literature in detail, it is better to stop here and to take stock of the more convincing solutions. From this perspective a combination of the first direction, i.e. focusing on the legacy of the previous regime, and the fourth one, i.e. constraints that restrained a country from becoming or being a minimal democracy, seems to provide a more effective typology. Thus, if the criterion of classification concerns the reasons that prevent the transformation towards a democracy and the first hypothesis of institutional inertia is assumed in its entirety, what was proposed above can be reformulated more clearly: the types of hybrid regimes that might come into being depend directly on the typologies of authoritarian regimes and democracies that have already been established by focusing on the factors that prevent democratic change. As evidenced in Figure 3.1, the core assumption of this possible typology is that traditional and democratic regimes can, by virtue of their characteristics, give rise to different results, while it is more

Are There Hybrid Regimes? 63

traditionallpersonal regime

roilitary authoritarianisrn

protected dernocracy

civil-roilitary authoritarianisrn

limited dernocracy

dernocracy without state

Figure 3.1. What kind ofhybrid regime?

likely that the survival of authoritarian veto players points towards a single solution, that of protected democracies. In any case, the elaboration of this classification or typology leads us to propose three possible classes: the protected democracy and the limited democracy, which have already been described above; and a third, logically necessary one in which it is hypothe­sized that there are no relevantlegacies or powerful veto players, nor are there any forms of state suppression or non-guarantee of rights, but simply a situation of widespread illegality in which the state is incapable of performing properly due to poorly functioning institutions. This third dass can be defined as 'democracy without law' or rather, democracy without state, as the state can be conceived as a government based on the primacy of the law and organized as a hierarchic system of roles defined by laws.

The second perspective, i.e. the focus on processes of change undergone by a country and the consequences for the institutional set-up that emerges, may be complementary to the first one. If the contex:t is one of regime change and there is a hybrid resulting from a process of transition during which the characteristics of the previous regime have disappeared ( as mentioned above ), starting with the break-up oflimited pluralism (the hypothesis here is obvi­ously that of a transition from authoritarianism), it is necessary to see what process of change has started and how, in order to assess and predict its future course. The advantage of this classificatory perspective is that, given that the regimes in question are undergoing transformation, the direction and possi­ble outcomes of such change can be seen more clearly. So, if there is liberal­ization, without or with little resort to violence, that is, a process of granting more political and civil rights from above, never very extensive or complete,

64 The Basics

but so as to enable the controlled organization of society at both the elite and mass level, what one has is an institutional hybrid that should permit an 'opening up' of the authoritarian regime, extending the social support base and at the same time saving the goveming groups or leaders already in power. The most probable result, then, would be a hybrid that can be defined as a protected democracy, capable, moreover, of lasting for a considerable or very long time. In order to have some probability of persistence, such a political hybrid must be able to rely not only on the support of the institutional elites, both political and social, but also on the maintenance of a limited mass parti~ipation (in other words, on the goveming elite's capacity to repress or dissuade participation) and on the limited attraction of the democratic model in the political culture of the country, especially amongst the elites. Another possibility is the occurrence of a rupture of authoritarianism as a result of a grassroots mobilization of groups in society or of the armed forces, or due to foreign intervention. If it proves impossible to move towards a democratic situation, even if only slowly, due to the presence of anti-democratic veto players, then a more or less enduring situation characterized by a lack of the guarantees regarding order and basic rights to be found in a limited democ­racy becomes a concrete outcome. In this dynamic perspective, the third solution, that of the democracy without state, does not even entail liberal­ization or the break-up of limited pluralism as such, in that there is no previously existing stable regime or working state institutions.

However, these modes of classification are a priori and do not include an empirical survey of the countries defined as hybrid regimes. In this respect they still fail to carry out one of the principal tasks of any good classification, which is to examine all the empirical phenomena associated with hybrid regimes and then arrive at some form of simplification that makes it possible to grasp the phenomenon as a whole as weil as its intemal differences. So do the three classificatory types outlined above hold up when empirical cases are considered? Looking at the Freedom House data and assuming that the regimes regarded as 'partially free' coincide with the notion of the hybrid regime developed here, there seems to be a need for some revision and integration. Above all, it is worth -examining in greater detail the ratings of the countries belonging to the category of hybrid regimes (Table 3.2) on the set of indicators relating to seven ambits that are important when analysing any political regime, democratic or otherwise: rule of law, electoral process, functioning of government, political pluralism and participation, freedom of expression and beliefs, freedom of association and organization, personal autonomy and individual freedom.23 If those ambits are matched with the elements that appear in the definition of the hybrid regime suggested above, the connections can be immediately grasped: all aspects of minimal

Are There Hybrid Regimes? 65

democracy as weil as the elements that are present in the definition of authoritarianism, such as limited pluralism and participation (to mention just the most salient ones), areprima facie closely related to all seven ambits. In his discussion ofhow to map political regimes, Wigell (2008: 237-41) also refers to the same or similar aspects.24 Levitsky and Way (2002: 54-8) prefer to group the aspects around four arenas of contestation ( electoral arena, legislative arena, judicial arena, media). This, in fact, is correct, as research on democratic transition has shown that these four arenas frequently prove to be the most important ones.25 However, a more detailed and precise set of indicator:;, those suggested by Freedom House, seems in this case to be more appropriate for analysing the various key aspects ofhybrid regimes, where the opposite process (from democracy towards authoritarianism) has to be included, whether or not there is the stabilization stressed above.

On the basis of the profiles for the thirty-five cases ofhybrid regimes, a great variety of situations emerge. Thus, when a first implementation of a fuzzy set analysis is applied, that is a QCA (Qualitative Comparative Analysis) method as elaborated by Ragin (2000, 2008: esp. eh. 4), the reduction ofthetruth table, built up from the seven different variables, leads to seventeen different possible categories, with some of them including just one case. In other words, there are too many classes containing too few cases for meaningful classification.26 One way of reducing the number of categories is to see if, when applied to the cases

t undemeath the seven groups of indicators, some key conceptual elements emerge from the seven original variables. A factor analysis may help in singling out those elements. In fact, when applied to our thirty-five cases the result is very revealing. As displayed in Table 3.3, three components emerge with great

Table 3.3. The three components of hybrid regimes

Variable

Rule oflaw Electoral process GovernrnentfUnctioning Pluralisrn and participation Freedorn of expression & beliefs Freedorn of association & organization Personal autonorny and individual freedorn

Notes: Percentage of explained variance: 80.623%. Method of extraction: Principal Component Analysis. Method of rotation: Varirnax with Kaiser normalization. Only factor loadings > 0.5 represented.

0.835

0.862 0.713 0.865

Cornponents

2 3

0.856

0.818

0.858

66 The Basics

clarity: a first component where electoral process, political pluralism and participation, freedom of expression and beliefs, freedom of association and organization are grouped together closely; a second component where rule of law and personal autonomy and individual freedoms are also strongly connected; and a third component, conceptually dose to the second one, where state functioning stands alone. When considered in its entirety, the lack or the high weakness of the first component can be considered a key aspect of limited democracies while the lack or weakness of the second component can be regarded as a key element of democracies without law, and the lack or wea.klless of the third component the result of inefficient democracy.27 If we consider that the second and third components are conceptually contiguous (see above), we can group them in just one category that could be labelledas democracies without state. But whether this is a good step to take or not must be decided by the empirical control.

With these fairly precise indications we can go back to the QCA method. In particular, profiting from the strong correlations that emerged from our previous principal component analysis, we can build a truth table where: (a) the lack or high weakness (O) of a new component with the four sets of indicators, that is, absence/weakness of electoral process and/or political pluralism and participation and/or freedom of expression and beliefs and/or freedom of association and organization, shape a limited democracy; (b) the lack or high weakness ( 0) of a new component with the two sets of indicators, that is absence/weakness of rule of law and/or personal autonomy and indi­vidual freedoms, depicts a democracy without law; ( c) the lack or high weakness ( 0) of a component with one set of indicators, that is absence/weakness of state functioning, depicts an inefficient democracy. 28 When the related truth table is applied,29 the results are very meaningful and empirically relevant (see Table 3.4). First of all, there are several cases with at least a weak presence of all three components or characteristics. Evidently, in the light of these new results a new category or dass is required, which can be labelled quasi­democracies. Out of the fifteen cases of quasi-democracies, si:x: are European, five African, and only three Asian, with one additional case in Latin America (Colombia). There is also a sizeable group of limited democracies, as expected, and half of them are African. Third, because of the conceptual contiguity and lirnited presence of real cases ( only Armenia and Morocco ), the dass of inefficient democracies can be merged with the democracy without law into a new more effective democracies without state with ten cases; most of these (seven) are from Africa.

Are There Hybrid Regimes?

Table 3.4. Classification and cases ofhybrid regimes (2010)

Categories · Quasi-democracies

Albania Bosnia-Herzegovilla Colombia Georgia Macedonia Madagascar Malaysia

Countries Moldova Mozambique Seychelles Singapore Sri Lanka Tanzania Turkey Zambia

Limited democracies

Banglac:1esh Cornoras Fiji Guatemala Guinea-Bissau Jordan Nicaragua Paraguay Sierra Leone Tonga

67

Demceraeies without state

Armenia Burkina Faso Central African Rep. Ethiopia Gabon Kuwait Morocco Nepal Nigeria Uganda

3.5 WHERE TOGO FROM HERE

The analysis above ended up PJOving in a different direction to the one considered in recent literature,' a direction that is more consistent with the one followed by an older, traditionalliterature that appeared in the 1950s where the stress was on instability. The debate on democratization led to neglect of this aspect, even though it is highly evident at an empiricallevel: the most significant problern in terms of specific cases is to ensure the existence of institutions more or less capable of performing their functions. Hence, one of the most relevant results of our analysis is that there are countries where a strengthening of the state and an effective guarantee of rights would transform several regimes into democracies. As far as the problern of state functioning and the rule of law are concemed, this theme has already been discussed by other authors, for instance Fukuyama (2004), and is still a central issue that deserves attention.

Moreover, there are a number of more specific conclusions. First, although literatme to date has failed to be precise on this and there are only a few case studies, some comparative analyses and good insights, on the grounds of our analysis we can conclude that hJ;brid regirnes are a substantial reality and can be considered an autonomaus model of regime vis-a-vis democracy, authoritafian­ism, and the traditional regime. Second, in view ofthe absence of a good adequate definition ofthat regirne, we proposed a new definition, which takes account of

68 The Basics

the semantic field, that is, the notions of democracy, authoritarianism, and the traditional regime. Third, once we went from an a priori classification, grounded on the criterion of the constraints to an effective minimal democracy, to an empirical one, a few changes and adaptations proved necessary.

On the whole, even if different trajectories are theoretically relevant (see also Figure 3.1), most ofthe cases that might be considered as hybrid regimes have either an authoritarian past or a traditional one. Moreover, because of the data we had, the dass of protected democracies did not emerge. But, for example, in cases such as Jordan and Morocco, which we would have unques­tio~ably Iahelied as such because of the strong political role of a traditional power like that of the monarchy, our empirical analysis suggests that the inefficiency of the state (Morocco) or the limited guarantee of rights (Jordan) is more relevant. As regards this, the data and a different theoretical emphasis account for an unexpected result. In fact, the data clearly suggest that what counts in hybrid regimes is not so much the existence of a legacy or of veto players, but a lack of state or the effective guarantee of basic rights.

The quasi-democracies are a more relevant dass than expected, with fifteen cases, and this is perhaps grounds for optimism in terms of the future possibility of change towards democracy. In particular, in an international context characterized by cooperation rather than high conflict, a stronger role of international actors or of democratic governments is possible and seems to have some chance of success in a democratic perspective.30

Limited democracies and democracies without state are confirmed as empir­ically relevant classes for which different, contrasting elements need to be stressed: on the one hand, the lack of an effective guarantee of rights despite the presence of state institutions and, on the other hand, the lack of the rule of law and of a functioning state, with laws that are not applied because the judiciary has no effective independence, there is widespread corruption, and the bureaucracy is tlawed and inefficient. In these cases too, governments and international organizations have a potentially strong role to play in helping to strengthen the respect of rights and building state institutions, prior even to establishing democracies, in countriesthat have manifested a strong incapac­ity in this respect over the years.31

There is a final important question that is still unanswered: What is the last step? More explicitly, even if we accept that the threshold from hybrid regime and minimalist democracy can be crossed in both directions, what should we consider the additional change, i.e. the 'last step', for a regime or also for transitional context to be considered a minimalist democracy? The minimal­ist definition of democracy, recalled at the beginning of this chapter-and discussed in the previous one-complemented by the result of the empirical dassification show the existence of three patterns with regards to the last step,

Are There Hybrid Regimes? 69

and a11 of them when not immediately taken, difficult to emerge in a situation of stalemate. The first pattern, development of civil and political rights, is the one requested in case oflimited democracy; the second one, building of rule of law, is what the transition to a minimal democracy would entail in a democ­racy without state; the third mixed pattern, growth of right and rule of law, clearly concerns the possibility of transitions for the quasi-democracies. However, every pattern can be additionally and more ptecisely developed only by following the specific directions the empirical analysis of each case points to. Thus there is no possibility of finding a 'recipe' to be applied in different cases: there is no set of recommendations that 'fits all'. Two final considerations on this may be helpful. Although we are not going to develop the point, it seems evident that this analysis can have policy recommenda­tions. That is, at least in an abstract way the classification of each country in the tables above, the consequent pattern, and the additional specific recom­mendations can show specific strategies of transitions. Second, although this analysis is limited to hybrid regimes, patterns of such a kind can be traced in the transitional processes, that is, also in the cases where a country is not stuck into some dass of hybridism, but follows a path of change.

This last consideration brings us to the second and third parts of the book, where the broader processes of change, i.e. transition and installation of democracy, consolidation and crisis, qualities deepening or worsening, and the related sub-processes will•be considered in terms of actor/structure led change, multi-levellegitimation, domestic and external anchorings, and pro­cedures, contents, and results in democratic deepening.

Notes

1. See also Collier and Levitsky (1997: 440), where there is an exhaustive Iist of 'dirninished sub-types', i.e. hybrid regirnes, that are present in the Iiterature on the topic. I'm not taking into consideration here the issue of fragile and failed states. This would open a largely different set of problems that are not the object of the analysis here.

2. See below for more on the meaning of the terms as used here. 3. The main criticisms concerned the right-wing liberal bias of the Institute itself and

consequently the compiling of unfair ratings for the assessed countries. Although basically appropriate at the beginning, these criticisms have been overcome and neutralized by subsequent de},'elopments characterized by more reliable emJ?irical results. This relevant conclusion is strongly supported by the high number of quotations and attention that Freedom House data have received in recent years. Even a quick look on the Internet will vividly show all this.

70 The Basics

4. Even some of the most interesting data, such as those of the Index ofFailed States (see www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3865) or of Polity N (see www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm) were discarded in favour ofFreedom House data for the reasons mentioned in the text.

5. See below for a necessary and more specific definition. 6. It should be remernbered that Freedom House adopts a reverse points system: a

score of 1 corresponds to the greatest degree of democracy in terms of political rights and civil liberties, while 7 corresponds to the most repressive forms of authoritarianism as regards rights and freedom. The electoral democracies need

. to be distinguished amongst these. For more on the definition thereof, see below. 7. As is known, about half of this population lives in a single nation, China. 8. The inclusion ofTurkey in this group of countries has already prompted debate,

and other analysts, especially Turkish scholars, place it amongst the minimal democracies, stressing the great and now long-standing fairness of the electoral procedure, for which Freedom House does not award the maximum rating.

9. Other terms, such as 'mixed regimes', arealso very broad, but ultimately 'hybrid' was preferred to 'mixed' as the former term gives more precisely the gist of the phenomenon where new and old aspects change each other, that is, it is not just a problern of'mixing' (see below for the definition and classification).

10. A more complex definition is offered by O'Donnell (2004: 15), who suggests considering the patterns, explicit or otherwise, that determine the channels of access to the main government positions, the characteristics of the actors who are admitted or excluded from such access, and the resources or strategies that they can use to gain access. An empirically simpler line is adopted here, which is based on the old definition by Easton (1965). But seealso Fishman (1990).

11. He also adds that a state is a 'more permanent structure of domination and coordination' than a regime (Fishman 1990: 428). But on this see below.

12. The other specific components ofliberal democracies are delineated by Diamond (1999: 11-12).

13. The three indicators pertaining to the electoral process are: (1) head of govern­ment and principal posts elected with free and fair elections; (2) parliaments elected with free and fair elections; (3) electorallaws and other significant norms, applied correctly (see the website ofFreedom House).

14. These values include notions like homeland, nation, order, hierarchy, authority, and such like, where both traditional and modernizing positions can, and some­times have, found common ground. In any case, the regime is not supported by any complex, articulated ideological elaboration. In other regimes, like the tradi­tional ones, the only effective justification of the regime is personal in nature, that is, to serve a certain leader, who may, in the case of a monarch who has acceded to power on a hereditary basis, be backed by tradition.

15. For another analysis of non-democratic regimes, especially authoritarian ones, see Brooker (2000).

Are There Hybrid Regimes? 71

16. Despite her empirical focus on Centtal America the analysis by Karl (1995) is also useful to betterunderstand the conditions and perspectives ofhybrid regimes in

other ateas.

17. As mentioned above, many years ago Finer (1970: 441-531) seemed to have detected the existence of hybrid regimes when he analysed 'fac;:ade democracies' and 'quasi-democracies'. Looking more closely at these two models, however, it is clear that the former can be tied in with the category of traditional regimes, while the latter falls within the broader authoritarian genus. In fact; typical examples of 'quasi-democracies' are considered to be Mexico, obviously prior to 1976, and certain African nations with a one-party system. A third notion, that of the 'pseudo-democracy', refers not to a hybrid regime, but to instances of authoritar­ian regimes with certain exterior forms of the democratic regime, such as con­stitutions claiming to guarantee rights and free elections but which do not reflect an even partially democratic state of affairs. There is, then, no genuine respect for civil and political rights, and consequently no form of political competition either.

18. On the whole, we stillthinkthat those hypotheses are reasonable and practical for our purposes. Above all, they are obligatory when trying to make better sense of the set of cases with which we are dealing.

19. For a more in-depth discussion of veto players in hybrid regimes and in the democratization process, see Morlino and Magen (2008a, 2008b).

20. Such a regime combines 'democratic and authoritarian elements' (Diamond 2002: 23).

21. It should be noted that Diamond uses the term 'electoral democracy' with a different meaning to that of ~{eedom House, as has already been clarified above. For Diamond 'electoral democracy' and 'liberal democracy' are two different categories, while for Freedom House all liberal democracies are also electoral, but not vice versa. So, for example, according to Freedom House a nation like the United Kingdom is a liberal democracy, but is also electoral, while for Diamond it is not.

22. To build his typology Wigell (2008) develops the two well-known Dahlian criteria (participation and competition/opposition) (Dahl 1971) into the notions of 'electoralism' and 'constitutionalism' seen at limited and at effective stages. If there is a limited development then there are minimal electoral conditions, such as free, fair, competitive, inclusive elections; and/or minimal constitutional con­ditions, such as freedom of organization, expression, alternative information, and freedom from discrimination. If there is more effective development, then there are additional electoral conditions, such as electoral empowerment, electoral integrity, electoral sovereignty, electoral irreversibility, and/or additional consti­tutional conditions, such as executive accountability, legal accountability, bureau­cratic integrity, local government accountability. The result is a four-cell matrix with liberal democracy in the case of effective electoralism and effective copstitu­tionalism; limited democracy in the case of limited, minimal electoralism and limited, minimal constitutionalism; electoral democracy in the case of minimal

72 The Basics

constitutionalism and effective electoralism; and constitutional democracy in the case of limited electoralism and effective constitutionalism.

23. The macro-indicators for each ambit are, for the rule of law: (1) independent judiciary; (2) application of civil and penallaw and civilian control of the police; (3) protection of personal freedom, including that of opponents, and absence of wars and revolts (civil order); ( 4) law equal for everyone, including the applica­tion thereof; for the electoral process: (1) head of government and principal posts elected with free and fair elections; (2) parliaments elected with free and fair elections; (3) existence of electoral laws and other significant norms, applied correctly; for government functioning. (1) government policies decided by the head ofthe government and elected parliamentarians; (2) government free from widespread corruption; (3) responsible government that acts openly; for political pluralism and participation: (1) right to organize different parties and the exis­tence of a competitive party system; (2) existence of an opposition and of the concrete possibility for the opposition to build support and win power through elections; (3) freedom from the influence of the armed forces, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or other powerful groups; ( 4) protection of cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minorities; for freedom of expression and beliefs: (1) free media and freedom of other forms of expression; (2) religious freedom; (3) freedom to teach and an educational system free from widespread indoctrination; ( 4) freedom of speech; for freedom of association and organization: (1) guarantee of the rights of free speech, assembly, and demonstration; (2) freedom for non-governmental organizations; (3) free­dom to form unions, conduct collective bargaining, and form professional bod­ies; for personal autonomy and individual freedoms: (1) absence of state control on travel, residence, occupation, and high er education; ( 2) right to 0\<\>11 property and freedom to establish businesses without improper conditioning by the govern­ment, security forces, parties, criminal organizations; (3) social freedom, such as gender equality, freedom to marry, and freedom regarding family size (govern­ment control ofbirths); (4) freedom of opportunity and absence of economic exploitation (see the website ofFreedom House).lt should be bornein mind that the rating system here is the 'obvious' one, i.e. a higher score corresponds to the higher presence of the aspect in question, up to 4 points per general indicator. The maxirnum score for the rule oflaw is 16, while for electoral process it is 12, and so on.

24. More precisely, Wigell (2008: 237-41) includes in his list the minimal electoral conditions (free, fair, competitive, inclusive elections), minimal constitutional conditions (freedom of organization, expression, right to alternative information, and freedom from discrimination), additional electoral conditions ( electoral empowerment, integrity, sovereignty, irreversibility), and additional constitu­tional conditions (executive, legal, local government accountabilities, bureau­cratic integrity). But here, in the perspective of hybrid regimes only the minimal electoral and constitutional conditions are relevant.

Are There Hybrid Regimes? 73

2s. For example, as regards the salience of the judicial arena, see Morlino and Magen

(2008b).

26. Piease riote that while the main purpose of such a method is explanatory, it is used

here to provide a better classification of my cases. It is worth recalling, however, the existing connection between explanation and a good classification, although

this cannot be discussed here. 27. For details of the indicators see above, n. 23. 28. All the truth tables are available upon request. 29. Please note that because of the strong correlations the specific group of variables

(i.e. (1) electoral process + political pluralism and participation + freedom of expression and beliefs + freedom of association and organization; (2) rule oflaw and personal autonomy and individual freedoms) have been combined on the basis of the rule of sufficiency, that is, the existence of one component is sufficient

to represent the dass. 30. On this point, see also the results of research on the role of international actors

in the democratization processes in a number of Europe's neighbour nations

(Morlino and Magen 2008b). 31. Please note that the role of the lOs can be double-faced, and sometimes vague and

slippery. They can recognize as interlocutor a corrupted government.

;'~

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