mayorga ugarte, f.-enlargement of democracy and changes in the bolilvian
TRANSCRIPT
Revision received jan 09 11,500 words
ENLARGEMENT OF DEMOCRACY AND CHANGES IN THE BOLIVIAN
PARTY SYSTEM
BY FERNANDO MAYORGA UGARTEi
In 1952, a nationalist revolution started important transformations in Bolivia:
agrarian reform, mine nationalization and universal voting. This last measure gave political
rights to peasants, indigenous people and women. However, representative democracy was
weak because the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) dominated the party
system and politics was limited to disputes among the party’s leaders. This dispute
concluded with a coup d’etat held in 1964 which initiated a cycle of military governments.
.After fifteen years a very conflictive period of transition to democracy began in 1978s later
it was possible to install the first civilian government. Thus, in October 1982, the longest
democratic period in Bolivia’s history began. Since then, democracy has functioned under
a hybrid kind of presidential regimen, a mixed electoral system and a moderate multi-
partyism. However, in December 2007, the Constitutional Assembly approved a
constitutional reform that, although it must still be approved or rejected by a national
referendum, already announces a different political arena.
The hybrid nature of this presidentialist system of government is a corollary of the
constitutional norm that allows the president’s election by a parliamentary final decision, if
no electoral candidate has obtained the absolute majority of votes in the general elections.
Between 1982 and 2002, five general elections took place, and none had a winner with an
absolute majority in the electoral boxes. Thus, the constitution and election results forced
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the political parties to build up parliamentary or presidential coalitions, first, in order to
elect a president, and, second, to establish links of mutual cooperation between the
executive and legislative powers, and, thus, to secure political stability to the government
and its future administration. This kind of political interaction between parties has been
called “Pact Democracy,” and the resultant type of government is known as a “hybrid” or
“parliamentary” presidency (Gamarra 1992, Mayorga René 1992). In 2005, for the first
time, a candidate obtained an absolute number of votes in the general elections, and,
therefore, the government was assumed directly by the leading party, which, in this case,
did not need seek or establish parliamentary alliances.
The electoral system supposes a model that combines representation by territory, in
the High Chamber (Senators’ Chamber), and by population, in the Low Chamber
(Deputies’ Chamber). In the first case, each of the nine departments ii is represented by three
senators, two for the majority and one for the first minority. As for the deputies, until 1997,
they were elected by departments, in a single list for each party, by proportional
representation according to each department’s population. Later, since 1994, a new system
was adopted. This is a mixed system that combines proportional representation by
departments with simple majority rule for the uninominal districts (provinces’ sectors). In
2005, the electoral system was politically enlarged, eliminating the parties’ exclusive right
to propose candidates by admitting two new possible contenders: the “citizen clusters” and
“indigenous peoples,” which can also participate in the general and local elections. Also in
2005, after a political agreement and for the first time in Bolivia’s history, the departmental
authorities (prefects) were directly elected by the citizens —although, according to the
Constitution, their nomination is still a presidential prerogative.
Finally, the system of political parties presents itself as a moderately plural system,
with an average of five relevant parties, that is, parties with enough capacity to be part of
the parliamentary and governmental coalitions, or to perform as an efficient opposition.
Along the years, the system of political parties has gone through some significant changes
in its composition, notably, with the surge of political forces representing new social
demands and identities. Likewise, the possible relationships between the parties went from
a dominant —since 1985 until de late nineties— centripetal tendency towards a situation
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marked by acute ideological polarization; a polarization that became quite problematic,
especially since 2003, due to the surge of several social movements with political demands,
whose active participation caused a growing weakening of the previous system of political
parties.
In this chapter we will evaluate the role played by the political parties in Bolivian
democratization in a national context constantly subjected to critical situations and political
changes. In order to analyze the mutations suffered by the system of political parties, we
will consider the influence exerted by the lines of conflict or cleavages that, on one hand,
divided the society, and, on the other, found institutional channels which motivated the
surge, dissolution or renewal of political parties (Ramos 1995). In order to analyze the role
played by the political parties, we will evaluate the institutional reforms adopted in order to
solve deficiencies in the political system’s functioning, especially as answers to the social
demands for larger representation and participation. We must note that this social factor is
very important in Bolivia. Since 1952, the country’s political history has been marked by a
constant and significant presence of labor unions and social movements in the political
processes, frequently questioning the supposed leading role of the political parties.
Emphasizing these factors, we begin by reviewing the historical development of
Bolivia’s political parties from 1982 to 2005 and then, in a final section, focus more
directly on the relationship between the parties and democracy today.
Historical Phases: Bolivian Parties and Elections from 1982 to 2008
To understand the recent history of Bolivian parties it is necessary first to recognize
that during the period 1982 to 2005 several cleavages -- among which the economic,
territorial, and ethno-cultural conflicts were the most salient -- shaped and partially
reformed the Bolivian party system. . The cleavage state vs. market manifested itself in
the contradiction between policies emphasizing the state’s intervention in the economy, on
the one hand, and, on the other, those that promote the private investments. Since 1985, a
transition from state capitalism to neoliberalism was implemented, by a series of measures
destined to adjust the economic structure, but, lately (since 2005), the state has again taken
a leading role. On other hand, centralism has been —and still is— a dominant trait in the
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organization of the Bolivian state. The territorial cleavage (central vs. regional) has
manifested itself in the regions’ struggle for political decentralization, a struggle that has
been present throughout Bolivia’s history, so much so that a historian once affirmed that
“the history of Bolivia is the history of the regions’ struggle” (Roca 1999). Finally, the
ethnic cleavage is a manifestation of the cultural diversity that resulted from the Spanish
conquest —and colonization— of the indigenous territory and people, a cleavage that
began in 1825 (year of the national independence). Policies of cultural homogenization,
promoted during the nineteenth century and later, did not succeed as in other parts of Latin
America.
As democratization began, with its consequent enlargement of the active
citizenship, ethnic demands began to acquire a growing importance.New parties, closely
articulated with the peasant syndicates and the indigenous organizations, were structured,
and in January 2006, Evo Morales, a peasant leader of indigenous origin, democratically
assumed the presidency of the Republic. His party promotes constitutional reform that
emphasizes the collective rights of the indigenous and peasant communities, disregarding
regional demands for greater departmental autonomy. A new cleavage has thus emerged
between the social groups and political actors promoting regional demands, on one hand,
and those fighting for ethno-cultural policies, on the other. This new cleavage is clearly
manifested in the intense struggle carried out regarding the reform of the state, especially in
relation to the territorial distribution of power.
With this summary of shifting cleavages in mind, we may now distinguish three
phases in the recent history of the Bolivian political parties. In each phase we begin with
an overview and then discuss the parties and specific developments in the Bolivian party
system
The first phase, inaugural and foundational, lasted three years, from 1982 to 1985,
and, in general, it was marked by the fragility of the new democratic and political
institutions. The popular expectations in the democratic transition manifested themselves
by a boom in social demands coming from the labor unions and peasant syndicates, which
had been the main actors during the resistance and fight against the military dictatorships.
These demands were not positively solved, due to the aggravated inflationary crisis; in
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consequence, the social sectors, which previously supported the government, began to
radicalize their protests. Moreover, the government —an electoral alliance of national
parties and leftist groups— did not have a parliamentary majority, and the permanent
struggle between the executive and legislative powers ended up in an unmanageable
political crisis. This acute lack of governability was solved thanks to a political accord that
decided to shorten the current presidential period and anticipate the next general elections.
Thus, the political parties entered into a new phase with two main challenges: to solve the
economic crisis and, at the same time, to establish some procedures in order to guarantee
political stability.
Political change began in October 1982, when the first civil government was finally
installed with Hernán Siles Suazo as president, at the head of an alliance of political forces
(the Unidad Democrática y Popular, UDP), composed of the Movimiento Nacionalista
Revolucionario de Izquierda (MNRI), the Partido Comunista Boliviano (PCB), and the
Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario (MIR). In 1980, this same alliance had won the
general elections, but it did not take control of the government because a military coup
d’état interrupted the process. In 1982, the UDP won again, this time with 34.1% of the
total votes. The general results showed a clear voting tendency in favor of the Left, with
almost half of the total votes. Nevertheless, despite the ideological affinity, the UDP was
not able to articulate this tendency and transform it into a parliamentary majority, and thus
had to govern with feeble legislative support. The political parties considered Centrist
obtained almost a third of the total votes, with the leader being the Movimiento
Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) with 17% of the votes. As a tendency, the Right
obtained nearly a fifth of the votes, with a leading 14.8 % obtained by the Acción
Democrática Nacionalista (ADN). (see Table 1). These voting tendencies mask the real
dispersion of the political forces. Not only did 13 candidates run for office, but 11 parties
obtained parliamentary representation. Obviously, the political representation was
extremely fragmented. The initial consensus between the parties, about the need to end
military rule and a willingness to grant tolerant support to the UDP, in order to favor the
democratic process, was promptly displaced by the political polarization. Eventually, the
struggle between officialism and opposition paralyzed the public administration, and the
economic crisis, inherited from the military regimes, became almost unbearable.
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The outcome was a dismembering of the ruling front which found itself pressed by
two extremes: the permanent mobilization of the labor unions, by means of strikes and
street marches, on one hand, and, on the other, the systematic parliamentary boycott carried
out by the opposition against the executive initiatives. Meanwhile, the Left divided itself
into the governmental officialism and the labor unions; the main forces of Center and Right
(MNR and ADN) deployed their opposition by means of a concerted control of the
legislative chambers.
The brand-new system of political parties was now forced to act under an
antagonistic logic of friend and foe. That struggle was quite evident in Congress, where,
systematically, the opposition blocked all initiatives proposed by the executive power.
Furthermore, due to the UDP’s legislative minority, the opposition parties found no real
resistance when they exerted pressure. That legislative situation also weakened the
government’s capacities to negotiate with the labor movement.
The economic crisis, quite acute due to the galloping hyperinflation, motivated a
multiplication of labor strikes and sectoral protests, which, along with the political
instability caused by the mutual blockade between the executive and legislative powers, led
to a situation of “democracy at drift” (Mayorga René 1987). At the end of 1984, the
political crisis was solved by an agreement among the parties to move forward the national
elections, initially foreseen for 1986.
The procedure was a novelty because it made possible a “dialogue for democracy,”
mediated by the Catholic Church, in which not only the political parties took part but also
several social actors, in particular the entrepreneurs. The labor unions and the peasantry did
not participated in this dialogue, because such accords diminished the effect of their
demands. With the labor unions relatively defeated, the parties began to play a leading role
in the political representation.
During this phase, the dangers of a possible regression to the previous authoritarian
militarism were eliminated, as the accord between the social actors and the political parties
solved the crisis by means of an electoral solution. Nevertheless, it also became quite
evident that the government was extremely fragile when the ruling party lacked a
parliamentary majority. If the political instability introduced into the political agenda the
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theme of “governability,” the growing economic crisis stimulated the debate about the
state’s role in a market economy. Also, the low degree of democratic institutionalism
became quite evident when the general elections were moved forward without respect for
the existing constitutional rules, and a social actor foreign, in principle, to the political
institutions —the Catholic Church— had to be brought in to mediate between the political
and social contenders.
The second phase, from 1985 through the early 2000s, was a period of adaptation
and stability for the parties. The prevailing economic model was designed to reduce the
state’s intervention in the economy. Neoliberalism was the answer to the existing cleavage
between state and market, and its implementation was carried out by adopting measures of
structural adjustment, aimed at stopping hyperinflation (20,000 %!) and capitalizing the
public enterprises with foreign capital. The political scheme that went with this economic
orientation was the formation of coalition governments, negotiated among the traditional
parties, which alternated in the government’s management during eighteen years. During
this phase, some new political parties —which expressed nationalist and ethno-cultural
social demands— appeared on the scene, but they did not alter the scheme, because they
adapted themselves to the rules of the representative democracy. Governmental stability
was guaranteed by means of political pacts which allowed a concerted majority in
Congress to support the executive power’s initiatives. However, popular protests against
neoliberalism and “Pact Democracy” began to shake the existing panorama in 2000. The
results of the general election in 2002 confirmed that tendency, notably due to the presence
of leftist opposition forces, linked with the peasant and indigenous movements. This new
presence changed the previous composition of the system of political parties. In 2003, the
last governmental coalition between traditional parties was formed but the political
polarization and the social protests induced crises that, eventually, lead to the president’s
resignation.
Specific changes in the parties and the party systems for this period began
with the elections in 1985, which produced a re-composition of the parties’ spectrum.
There were eighteen candidates, but, in Congress, only ten parties obtained representation;
furthermore, the parliamentary representation was concentrated in three major parties:
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ADN, MNR and MIR.iii In contrast with the previous elections, the Right and Center
tendencies obtained more than half the votes (ADN 28.6% and MNR 26.4%), while the
Left seemed to be losing its previous leading presence —the MNRI disappeared, on one
hand, and, on the other, the political forces akin to the peasant and labor movements began
to disaggregate— with the exception of the MIR (8.9%), transformed into the third
parliamentary force (see Table 2).
During this period, the logic of political pacts between the parties was inaugurated
and, eventually, established; on this occasion, by means of a parliamentary accord between
the MNR and the AND. They both agreed to support Víctor Paz Estenssoro, the MNR’s
candidate, at the head of the government, who then could count on the support of AND, the
main force in the parliamentary. Despite their initial differences between 1985 and 1989
these two parties worked together, first, in order to readjust the economic structure, and,
also, to secure the political stability by means of a direct collaboration between the
executive and legislative powers.
A new economic policy was implemented. It stopped the hyperinflation and laid the
foundations for an economic model aimed to dismantle the interventionist state. The
structural adjustment and its measures were —following the recommendation from the
“Washington Consensus”iv— the answer to the problematic cleavage state/market. In order
to implement those measures a pact was subscribed between the MNR —the party that in
the 1950s had led the national revolution— with the ADN —until then, the lonely critic to
the state’s omnipresent economic role. Besides its economic effects, this new economic
policy practically dismantled the once very powerful miners’ labor union, whose
weakening, in a certain way, helped to consolidate the growing protagonism of the political
parties. Political stability was based on a parliamentary pact between the ruling party and
the main force of the opposition, and the system of political parties became the space in
which the national policies were decided. Thus, a new model of governability, the so called
“Pact Democracy,” was forged.
This tendency became almost systematic in 1989, when the three traditional parties
(MNR, 23.1%; ADN, 22.6%; and MIR, 19.6%) concentrated almost two thirds of the total
votes. On the other hand, the opposition, aggregated in the alliance Izquierda Unida (IU)
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obtained only 7.2% of the votes. A novelty in this election were the results (11.0%)
obtained by Conciencia de Patria (Condepa) (see Table 3). This new party was the first
expression in Bolivia of neopopulism, a political current that appeared in several Latin
American countries during the 1980s, around leaders who criticized the traditional parties
and their economic programs. Besides Condepa, this current was strengthened by the
creation of the Unidad Cívica Solidaridad (UCS).v Their presence was very important
because they represented the impoverished sectors of the population (notably, urban
migrants, feminine domestic labor force, and petty merchants); in a certain way, inside the
system of political parties, they took the spaces previously occupied by the Left. Moreover,
they incorporated new social identities into political representation. For example, they
were the first to put an indigenous woman into the parliament. They also advanced
demands for a better and fairer economic redistribution, questioning the new economic
policy. They insisted on this issue because their electoral supports were the poor and the
needy, and because their programs offered governmental assistance to benefit them.
Nevertheless, the existence of two parties with the same characteristics limited the chances
that a neo-populist candidate could successfully dispute the presidency, as happened in
other countries of the region.
The surge of neo-populism had already been quite manifest in the municipal
elections. Since 1987, in order to strengthen the democratization process, local
governments were elected —in those years, the practice was limited to the main cities and
certain provincial capitals. In 1989 and 1991, Condepa and UCS, taken together,
represented one third of the electorate, alternating for third place. In both elections, the
traditional parties obtained more than half of the total votes, and the winner was the
Acuerdo Patriótico (AP), an alliance between ADN and MIR; the Left did not go beyond
10% of the votes. In 1991, neo-populism reached the zenith of its possible electoral
presence. This result put into evidence two facts. First, both neo-populist parties had to face
the fact that their incapacity to address effectively the medium and upper classes hindered
their electoral growth; moreover, as was the case with Condepa, the high concentration of
its bases in a single department (La Paz) made it almost impossible to transform itself into a
national party. Second, there was no real connection between the neo-populist municipal
forces and its possible weight at the national level: UCS did not possess parliamentary
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representation, and Condepa, although it supported Jaime Paz Zamora’s nomination, was
not a functional part of the governmental alliance that ruled Bolivia during 1989-1993. That
is, the neo-populist articulation with the current political system was partial and marginal,
and, thus, the fear that these parties could become real adversary forces was dissipated,
especially, when, at the municipal levels, they began to subscribe to pacts of alliance with
the traditional parties.
Nevertheless, the neo-populist presence modified the traditional ideological
spectrum —usually divided between Right and Left— and strengthened “Pact
Democracy.” Thus, the political parties could converge toward an ideological center, where
the representative democracy and economic neoliberalism might coexist with no real
problems or frictions.
This centripetal tendency became practically institutionalized in 1989, with the
election of Paz Zamora as president of the Republic, by means of a parliamentary accord
subscribed between the ADN and MIR, which had finished second and third, respectively,
in the general elections —the MNR was first- but this time it was not able to negotiate
successfully the necessary parliamentary majority. The new ruling alliance implied several
interesting facts. Since the MIR was a political force related to the Left and the ADN was
representative of the Right, this pact diluted the ideological polarization in the system of
political parties, and a new discourse —which we define as “democratic neoliberalism”—
became not only dominant, but, also, gave a new shape to the political scene. Democratic
neoliberalism can be represented as a horseshoe, with representative democracy on one end,
and economic neoliberalism on the other; in this image, there is narrow space between the
extremes, a space where the parties with parliamentary representation, although
ideologically opposed, may interact.vi
The MIR was akin to the pole “representative democracy” —due to its resistance
and fight against the military dictatorship— but it was alien to the “economic
neoliberalism” —due its leftist perspective. On the other hand, the ADN openly subscribed
to the neoliberal policies —a mark of its rightist perspective— but its real commitment with
the democracy was still unknown —since its leader had been a dictator. Thus, ruling the
country, the MIR started to manage the structural adjustment, and began to privatize the
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state’s enterprises, that is, found itself fully compromised with the neoliberal reform. For its
part, ADN’s support to Paz Zamora for the presidency, despite the MIR’s third place,
indicated its willingness to obey the democratic rules. Thus, the risks of an authoritarian
return or a change in the economic adjustment disappeared from the political scene.
Moreover, the MNR, first force of the opposition, was the party that most clearly combined
the poles articulated by the democratic neoliberalism.
Besides this convergence between political forces from Right and Left (for the new
government’s management), another decisive event took place. The current surge of the
neo-populist parties (Condepa and UCS) did not alter the hegemonic tendency of the forces
of democratic liberalism; on the contrary, this tendency was strengthened because both
parties entered into the logic of political pacts. In 1989, Condepa backed up, in Congress,
the election of Paz Zamora as president, and, as part of their agreement, this party was to
manage a regional office of development; moreover, between 1991 and 1995, with the
support of the MIR and ADN, Condepa took control of the municipality of La Paz, seat of
the national government. For its part, in 1989 and 1991, the UCS signed a post-electoral
pact with the MNR in order to govern the municipalities of several important cities across
the country. Later on, the neo-populist parties were to become direct partners in the national
governmental coalitions, thus putting into evidence, if necessary, the strength of the
centripetal tendency, which characterized the system of political parties at that time and
defined the trend of the political and economic reforms.
During the 1989-1993 presidential period, the ruling administration deepened the
economic liberalization, when several minor national enterprises were privatizated and, in
some cases, contracts of shared risks with foreign capitals were created. Efforts at
political reform focused on the need to perfect the electoral system, and to answer the
criticisms by those who wanted the system to give representation to political institution
other than the now traditional parties. Setting up new electoral rules and procedures,
decentralizing political power, and securing the independence of the judiciary power
received greater attention as the problems of governability diminished and social demands
focused on subjects such as social participation, representation, and the quality of the
nation’s democratic institutions.
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During this phase, the leading parties accommodated themselves to democratic
neoliberalism and its codes, working to overcome the cleavages state/market and
authoritarianism/democracy. At the same time, however, other demands grew stronger,
especially, those related to the ethnic questions, with demands such as the official
recognition of the multicultural nature of the country, and the political incorporation of the
indigenous peoples as such. These demands by peasant and indigenous organizations
became more forceful impulse starting from 1992, when the discovery of America was
being “celebrated.” As a sequel to the neoliberal policies, another conflict also became
manifest: the tension between privatization and social redistribution. The negative impact
of the state’s withdrawal from social policies was indirectly palliated by the assistances
practiced by the neo-populist leaders. Both issues —ethnic demands and social policies—
influenced the later electoral campaigns and their programs.
i Translated to English by Luis H. Antezana
ii The country’s political and administrative division establishes the territorial existence of departments, provinces, municipalities (provinces’ sections) and cantons. Since 1897, the municipalities are autonomous, and, in 1995, this autonomy was enlarged to all provinces’ sections. The departmental level is nowadays subject to debate, with possible autonomous governments as a form of political decentralization.
iii The MNR was founded in 1941, the MIR appears in 1971, and ADN was organized in 1979. The MNR played the leading role in the 1950s nationalist revolution; the MIR surged with a socialist trend and played an important role during the transition towards democracy; and, the ADN was a conservative party, organized around the former dictator Hugo Bánzer Suárez who governed between 1971-1978.
iv A compound of macroeconomic reforms for structural adjustments designed by the international financial organisms seated in Washington D.C. These measures were meant to promote economic growth in Latin America, favoring market’s forces. Its economic and ideological orientations influenced the region’s governments, and became a long range program with great incidence during the 1990s (Williamson 1989).
v Max Fernández, another neopopulist leader, head of the UCS, was excluded from the elections in 1989 —when the polls showed a good panorama for him and his party. UCS will suffer several ups and downs before it could participate in that year’s municipal election (see Mayorga Fernando 1991).
vi This analogy was proposed by Jean-Pierre Faye (1972), and was used by Luis H. Antezana (1983) to study the Bolivian “revolutionary nationalism,” the dominant ideology during the 1950s, with its extreme poles Nation and Revolution.
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In 1993, the general elections brought the MNR back into the government. Sánchez
de Lozada’s victory was the clearest during this phase, with 33.8% of the total votes. The
former governmental coalition (ADN and MIR) obtained 20%. The neo-populist vote added
up to almost a third of the electorate (Condepa with 13.6% and UCS with 13.1%), a sign,
by the way, of relative stagnation (see Table 4). In other words, in 1993, the system of
political parties remained stable, with five relevant forces, all of which were committed to
the codes of democratic liberalism. This convergence made possible several agreements
between the ruling party and the opposition, in order to carry out further reforms.
Nevertheless, the parties’ strategies and discourses did nor remain the same. The
MNR, for example, invited an indigenous intellectualvii to run for the vice-presidency, in
order to dispute strategically Condepa’s constituency, on one hand, and, on the other,
perhaps more important, to address the peasant and indigenous movements, whose
demands and social presence were increasing. The MNR’s candidate had recognized that
“In Bolivia, it is not enough to use your head, you must also have a heart,” talking about the
need to include assistance to the needy in the electoral strategies and incorporating the
ethnic and political social demands into the government’s plans for further actions.
The logic of political pacts continued and this time the new government was build
around the MNR supported by the UCS, MBL (Movimiento Bolivia Libre, a moderate left
wing party) and MRTKL (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Katari de Liberación, an
indigenous party). For its part, the opposition was leaded by the ADN and MIR, which, in
general, concurred in the current economic and political model. During 1993-1997, the new
economic policy acquired an integral dimension, notably with the “capitalization” of the
monopolistic state’s enterprises in electricity, railways, telecommunications, air
transportation, and hydrocarbon, that is, with investments provided by transnational
capitals. However, education and health care public services were not privatized. The
regional cleavage was answered with a law that privileged local developments, recognizing
democratic governments in all municipal districts. The municipal governments were
vii Víctor Hugo Cárdenas, the first indigenous to become vice-president, was the leader of the MRTKL, one of the katarismo’s branches —the katarismo was an intellectual and syndicated tendency anchored in the aymara peasants’ communities; this movement installed within the Bolivian political discourse the ethic cleavage, denouncing the internal colonialism.
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strengthened with fiscal resources, according to their population number. The departments,
however, benefited only from administrative decentralization. These measures, together
with an “equity bonus”viii, were answers to the redistribution demands, as well as initiatives
to palliate the negative effects caused by the privatization of the national enterprises.
In 1994, a partial constitutional reform was approved. The articles related to the
economic regime were not altered, as most of the changes affected the political system,
and were intended to correct the existing deficiencies in quality and efficiency of the
democratic institutions. In order to face the ethnic cleavage, several constitutional
provisions were adopted, among which the most salient were the open recognition of the
nation’s ethnic and cultural diversity, the formalization of the peasant and indigenous
authorities and organizations, the official delivery of communal lands to the indigenous
peoples, and the recognition of their traditional forms of law. Also, a new educative policy
was launched, which included intercultural elements and bilinguism. Especially at the
municipal level, economic neoliberalism was thus now combined with a form of
participatory democracy, anchored in multicultural policies.
The 1997 electoral results confirmed the stability of the political party system and
strengthened its moderate multi-partyism, with five parties having significant
parliamentary forces. On this occasion, the ADN won the elections with 22.3% of the
votes; the MNR was second, with 18.2%; Condepa obtained 17.2%; the MIR (16.8%) was
closely followed by the UCS with 16.1% of the votes (see Table 5). Overall, neopopulism
once again gained approximately one third of the citizens’ support, and, together, the three
already traditional parties obtained more than half of the total. The Left barely approached
6%, but the electoral and consequent, parliamentary presence of the cocaleros (peasants,
producers of coca leaves) began, with four representatives in the Low Chamber, giving
birth to their “political instrument”, the Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS). The surge of
new social identities and political actors ratified the system’s capacity to integrate new
viii This bonus meant a yearly amount of money for senior citizens, money that came from the state’s shares in the capitalized enterprises.
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forces, because the opposition was still manageable, and institutional politics was still
capable of dealing with the social demands and conflicts
The governmental coalition reproduced a previous pact between MIR and ADN,
but, this time, the elected president was Hugo Bánzer Suárez, the former dictator. The
coalition included a recently created party, Nueva Fuerza Republicana (NFR), and, also,
Condepa and UCS. This large coalition enjoyed an absolute control in both Congress’
Chambers, so the parliamentary opposition became literally irrelevant, and, in order to
manifest their protests and demands, the anti-governmental sectors had to use other
channels, outside the institutionalized ones.
During 1997-2002, despite the intention to modify some of the laws approved by
the previous government, economic policy retained its original pattern. One novelty was
the plan to eradicate the coca leaves plantations, a measure that, gradually, turned into a
very important political issue, especially due to the pressures exerted by the United States
and its need to fight the narcotraffic. To this, the peasant’s movement answered defending
the coca leaf as a symbol of cultural resistance, thus adding new ingredients to the
opposition, led by MAS, against neoliberalism as a foreign intrusion. Another novelty were
the “national dialogues,” in which civil society’s organizations participated along with the
parties with parliamentary representation, in order to decide the use of the resources
generated by the foreign debt’s reduction.
Despite such participative initiatives, a cycle of social protest against neoliberal
policies began in 2000, combining criticisms against Pact Democracy with demands for a
more participative democracy, all under the banner of constitutional reform. The
questioning of the current —post-1985— model of governability had already begun to
express itself in 1997, with the presence of left wing forces in Congress, such as the MAS,
which combined their opposition in Congress with extra-parliamentary actions —massive
protest marches and road blockades— abetted by their close relationship with the
syndicated movements, especially the peasantry. Thus, an alternative protest against the
neoliberal policies began to take form, proposing a larger role for the state in the economy,
while questioning the representative capacity of the dominant political parties. An urban
protest, against the privatization of the water services, and road blockades, carried out by
15
peasant syndicates and indigenous communities, started a process of popular mobilizations,
with serious political consequences.
The mentioned political consequences became evident in the 2000 general elections.
The traditional parties weakened and new ones appeared in the political arena. The MNR
won the elections with 22.4% of the total votes; the MIR was fourth, with l6.3%; and,
notably, the ADN had a minimum response (3.4%). After sixteen years of hegemony, the
parties of “Pact Democracy” obtained, together, less than half of the votes —nevertheless,
after the parties’ negotiations, the MNR’s candidate, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada was
elected president, with the MIR’s support. As for the other parties, the MAS finished
second, with 20.94%, -with Evo Morales as candidate-, and, since it did not negotiate its
votes, became the head of the opposition; next came a new party, with neo-populist traits,
the Nueva Fuerza Republicana (NFR), with 20.91%. In these elections, the Movimiento
Indígena Pachacuti (MIP), an openly indigenist party also appeared (see Table 6).
The electoral debates and campaigns foretold what was to come; they were marked
by the rebuff to the capitalization project, on one hand, and by the growing demands for a
constituent assembly, on the other. The new government had to rule with feeble
parliamentary support and had to face a powerful opposition from the new forces (MAS
and MIP), which went from criticizing the economic model to an open demand for the
nationalization of all enterprises related to the country’s natural resources, in order, they
proclaimed, to “found the country anew.”
The centripetal tendency, marked by the neoliberal hegemonic capacity and “Pact
Democracy,” came to an end. The system of political parties became more polarized, with
the MAS as the head of the opposition transformed into the second electoral force. The
ruling official majority, not long ago sufficient to insure a stable governability, now could
no longer prevent political instability, nor ensure passage and implementation of the
government’s decisions. Agreements between officialdom and opposition were no longer
possible., due to their programmatic differences. Confrontations replaced accords, and, in
October 2003, the political crisis had to be resolved by the president’s resignation, after a
large and violent popular revolt.
16
Phase Three: Crisis and Polarization, 2003-2008
The third phase began in October 2003, when a popular revolt caused the fall of the
government that had been elected only fifteen months previously. From then on, the path of
this phase remained —and remains— quite uncertain, because the political crisis has
transformed itself into a state crisis. It began with large social protests and was followed by
a growing discrediting of representative democracy, dominated by the leading role played
by the political parties. The popular protests caused two presidential resignations in a space
of twenty months, and the political crisis had to be answered with the call for new national
elections, which took place in December 2005. As noted, these elections resulted in the
first victory by absolute majority of votes ever obtained by a single candidate, and,
therefore, control of the government could be assumed without the need to form a coalition
among several parties.
The new government put forward a program emphasizing indigenous rights and
demands, and aimed at strengthening the state’s role. The system of political parties
suffered a profound reformulation because several traditional parties disappeared from the
electoral scene and, at the same time, political organizations, strongly articulated with the
peasant and indigenous movements, consolidated themselves.
In order to recover the state’s leading role in the national economy, the new
government began to replace the previous neoliberal measures with policies aimed at
nationalizing the public enterprises. Likewise, representative democracy was broadened
with the use of participative democracy’s mechanisms, such as referenda. The state’s
reform began with a Constituent Assembly which approved a new Constitution project,
clearly favoring the peasants and indigenous’ demands. Some regional movements, with
urban support, rejected this result, however, demanding larger departmental autonomy, that
is, a decentralized form of State.
The existing contradiction between the ethnic and the regional demands regarding the
territorial distribution of the political power was the central theme of the Constituent
Assembly (August 2006 – December 2007) and was partially solved with the constitutional
17
recognition, at the same level, of departmental and indigenous autonomies. The new
constitution will be voted on January 2009 to conclude the state transition
This phase started with the crisis unleashed by President Sanchez de Lozada’s
resignation in October 2003 that dismembered the governmental coalition. For the moment,
the crisis was solved constitutionally, when the contenders agreed to let the vice-president,
Carlos Mesa, assume the presidency. Despite the agreements, Mesa had to face the situation
without real parliamentary support. His ruling period lasted only twenty months, because
the crisis followed its course and, besides the parties’ polarization, it gave place to an open
struggle between social movements, which proposed mutually exclusive projects. On one
hand, the MAS, and the peasant and indigenous movements, insisted on the immediate call
of a Constitutional Assembly —in order to reformulate the state—, and, also, on their
demands to nationalize the natural resources, notably, the hydrocarbons’ industry. On the
other hand, the traditional parties and several regional civic committees demanded
departmental autonomies and direct election of prefects. These social actors deployed
massive mobilizations —open cabildos (town councils), marches, blockades—, all of which
increased the parties’ polarization. Finally, the crisis ended up with another presidential
resignation, and the call for general elections in 2005, a resolution finally accorded by the
parties, due, in large measure, to the social pressures.
Previously, in February 2004, a partial constitutional reform was approved. This
reform had important consequences in the further behavior inside the political system.
Mechanisms of participatory democracy, such as referenda and the constituent assembly,
were incorporated with the goal of transforming the existing process of making decisions,
and changing the existing procedures for reforming the Constitution (usually, Congress
was in charge of that kind of reform, now, an assembly elected by the popular vote would
decide it) . The participatory spectrum of the political system was also changed,
incorporating new organizations into the political arena —“citizens’ clusters” and
“indigenous peoples”— thereby eliminating the parties’ monopoly as agencies of political
representation. The inclusion of the citizens’ clusters was a response to strong resentment
against the parties, and recognition of the indigenous peoples’ rights to political
participation was a sign of the growing strength of the ethnic cleavage, as peasant and
18
indigenous movements took on leading social roles and MAS was transformed into the
leading political force.
The new structures of participatory and representative democracy did not close the
possible political reforms. In December 2005, the prefect’s election by citizens’ choice took
place, thus limiting the customary presidential right to nominate departmental authorities.
The demand for nationalization of the hydrocarbon industry was solved by means of a
national referendum; also, an agreement was reached to consult the citizenship about
departmental autonomy, and, to call elections for a constituent assembly.
The final results of the 2005 general election deeply affected the system of political
parties. The Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS) won the elections with almost 53% of the
citizens’ votes, the civil organization Poder Democrático y Social (PODEMOS) was
second, with 29%, Unidad Nacional (UN) obtained about 8%, and the Movimiento
Nacionalista Revolucionario, the only survivor of the traditional parties, came close to 7%
of the votes (see Table 7)ix. The victory of the MAS candidate, Evo Morales, was
unprecedented: for the first time in this democratic period, a candidate could assume the
presidency directly, without the need of parliamentary pacts. Two decades of governments
formed by means of pacts between the traditional parties committed to combining
neoliberalism with representative democracy, were left behind.
After twenty years, the MAS’ victory also meant the return of the Left into the
political power. This kind of Left is, nevertheless, very different from the one that came
into power during the early 80s, anchored in the labor unions and the universities. The
MAS is a political movement that represents ethno-cultural and peasant demands; it is
supported by a conglomerate of syndicated organizations, social movements and
indigenous peoples; it proposes a nationalist and statist project, and deploys an international
policy akin to Venezuela and Cuba. Finally, it is articulated around the figure of Evo
Morales, the first Bolivian president with an indigenous origin, leader of the peasant
syndicates of coca producers, and an iconic figure in the anti-globalization movement.
ix PODEMOS and UN were created by former ADN and MIR leaders, in order to participate in the 2005 elections. The MAS was founded in 1999. That is, all of them are quite recent political forces, and they surged due to the traditional parties’ collapse.
19
The system of political parties found itself now reduced to four forces with
parliamentary representation. The previous polarization became more acute, with a
“divided government,” in which the executive and the legislative powers were in permanent
struggle, mainly, because the opposition found no other way but to use its majority in the
Senate as a last resort to confront the executive’s decisions. At the same time, an unheard
of “vertical division of powers” appeared on the political scene, when most of the prefects
elected by popular vote were opposition candidates (5, then 6, out of 9), and entered into
conflict with the central government. The existing distances between the ruling party and
the opposition were aggravated during the Constitutional Assembly (August 2006 to
September 2007). This possible place for national consensus did not fulfill its purpose
when, in the middle of several legal questions, the MAS used its large majority to approve a
new constitutional text with a marked indigenist tendency. Although the new Constitution
must still be approved in a national referendum, its current text is frequently treated by the
ruling party as if it had been ratified. As an answer, the regional —and parliamentary—
opposition approved autonomic statutes for several departments by means of local
referenda, which also were contaminated by illegality. Thus representative democracy
found itself surpassed by a plebiscitary logic that reached its peak in August 2008, with the
call for a national referendum to revoke (or not) the president and prefects’ mandates,
although such a procedure is in no way provided for by the current Constitution.
In short, the system of political parties’ functionality presents some new traits,
especially due to the active presence of institutional and political scenes that run parallel to
the Congress and, therefore, weaken its capacity to deal in an orderly fashion with the
political process. Moreover, the system of political parties finds itself subjected to the
pressures exerted by the social movements, which clearly reveal the existing territorial and
ethno-cultural fractures; fractures that, for the first time, have caused confrontations
between civilians who support the government and the oppositions. Political crisis,
ideological polarization and severe social conflicts are the main characteristics of this
phase whose outcome is still uncertain.
Nevertheless, the transition toward a (possible) new kind of state did not happen ed
Party Votes Percentage
20
UDP 507.173 34.1
MNRA 263.706 17.0
ADN 220.309 14.8
PS-1 113.959 7.7
FDR 39.401 2.6
PRA-A 36.443 2.4
MNRU 24.542 1.6
FSB 21.372 1.4
AFIN 17.150 1.2
MITKA-1 17.023 1.1
PUB 10.308 1.1
MITKA 15.852 1.1
PRIN-A 15.724 1.1
Votos emitidos: 1´489.484
Data Source: Corte Nacional Electoral
Table 2
National Elections, 1985
Party Votes Percentage
ADN 493.737 28.6
MNR 456.704 26.4
21
MIR 153.143 8.9
MNRI 82.418 4.8
MNRV 72.197 4.2
PS-1 38.786 2.2
FPU 38.124 2.2
MRTKL 31.678 1.8
PDC 24.079 1.4
FSB 19.958 1.2
MRTKL 16.269 0.9
POR 13.712 0.8
ACP 12.918 0.8
MNRI-1 11.696 0.7
IU 10.892 0.6
FNP 9.635 0.6
AUR 9.420 0.5
ARENA 8.665 0.5
Total Votes: 1´504.060
Data Source: Corte Nacional Electoral.
Table 3
National Elections, 1989
22
Party Votes Percentage
MNR 363.113 23.1
ADN 357.298 22.6
MIR 309.033 19.6
CONDEPA 173.459 11.0
IU 113.509 7.2
PS-1 39.763 2.5
MRTKL 22.983 1.5
FULKA 16.416 1.0
FSB 10.608 0.7
MIN 9.687 0.6
Total Votes: 1,415,870
Data Source: Corte Nacional Electoral.
Table 4
National Elections, 1993
Party Votes Percentage
MNR 585.837 33.8
Acuerdo Patriótico 346.813 20.0
CONDEPA 235.428 13.6
23
UCS 226.820 13.1
MBL 88.260 5.1
ARBOL 30.864 1.8
ASD 30.286 1.7
VR9 21.100 1.2
FSB 20.947 1.2
EJE 18.176 1.0
IU 16.137 0.9
MKN 12.627 0.7
Independent 8.0960 0.5
Total Votes: 1,731,309
Data Source: Corte Nacional Electoral.
Table 5
National Elections, 1997
Party Votes Percentage
ADN 485.209 22.3
MNR 396.216 18.2
CONDEPA 373.516 17.2
MIR 365.113 16.8
UCS 350.742 16.1
24
IU 80.599 3.7
MBL 67.152 3.1
VSB 30.214 1.4
EJE 18.32 0.8
PDB 10.378 0.5
Total Votes: 2,177,558
Data Source: Corte Nacional Electoral
Table 6
National Elections, 2002
Party Votes Percentage
MNR 624.126 22.46
MAS 581.884 20.94
NFR 581.163 20.91
MIR 453.375 16.32
MIP 169.239 6.09
UCS 153.210 5.51
ADN 94.386 3.40
MCC 17.405 0.63
PS 18.162 0.65
25
Condepa 10.336 0.37
Total Votes: 2,994,065
Data Source: Corte Nacional Electoral.
Table 7
National Elections, 2005
Party Votes Percentage
MAS 1’544.374 53.74%
PODEMOS 821.745 28.59%
UN 224.090 7.79%
MNR 185.859 6.47%
MIP 61.948 2.16%
NFR 19.667 0.68%
FREPAB 8.737 0.30%
USTB 7.381 0.26%
Total Votes: 3,102,417
Data Source: Corte Nacional Electoral.
26