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The future of Canadian airpower and

the F-35Rob Huebert

a

aDepartment of Political Science, University of Calgary, Calgary,

CanadaAvailable online: 02 Feb 2012

To cite this article: Rob Huebert (2011): The future of Canadian airpower and the F-35, CanadianForeign Policy Journal, 17:3, 228-238

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The future of Canadian airpower and the F-35

Rob Huebert

Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada

Keywords: Canadian Airpower; F-35; Military Strategy; Canadian Defence Policy

IntroductionThe Harper governments announcement in July 2010 that it would be purchasing 65 F-35 air-craft unleashed a storm of controversy (CBC, 16 July 2010). Much of it focused on the anticipated

cost of purchasing the aircraft. As the aircraft is still in development the final cost is uncertain.

The real debate is whether in the future Canada needs the airpower that is provided by the F-35s. As a medium power, does Canada need the capability provided by fighter aircraft as it

moves into the twenty-first century? Will Canada require the ability to engage in future hostile

aerospace environments? Will Canada need to have airpower to defend its borders and todefend future foreign deployments? These are the real questions that need to be asked. Once

these questions have been addressed, then the issue of costs may be examined.

In assessing Canadas future airpower requirements, the literature on the subject is quitelimited. Apart from Joseph Jockel, Andrew Godefroy, Scott Robertson and James Fergusson,

academics have made little effort to understand Canadian airpower. Canadas allies have powerfulair forces. Since the Americans have tended to do most of the thinking on the subject,1 few

Canadians have given seriousthought to whatairpower means forCanada.MostCanadians are prob-

ably unaware that Canadian airpower has played a vital role in Canadian security in terms of war

fighting, deterrence, and other overseas deployments for peace-keeping, peace-making and so forth.In order to address whether Canada needs its own airpower, this analysis will look at two key

issues: will Canada need to have fighter-based airpower for the next 30 to 40 years? If yes, what

type of aircraft is necessary and what is available?Canada will operate the replacement for the CF-18s (also labeled as CF-188s) for 30 to 40

years. Every aircraft has its own shelf-life, that is, how long it can be operated. Both theRussian and American Air Forces still maintain and operate bombers that were built in thelate 1950s and early 1960s (Tu-95 and B-52) (FAS 2000, 2010a). Likewise Canada still operates

the CC-138 Twin-Otters that were built in the early 1970s in its northern region (Canadian

Army, 10 March 2011). However, due to high speeds and other demands placed on them, the

ISSN 1192-6422 print/ISSN 2157-0817 online

# 2011 NPSIA

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2011.638196

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Rob Huebert is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science and the associate director of theCentre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary. He was a senior research fellow of theCanadian International Council; a fellow with Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute and inNovember 2010 was appointed as a commissioner to the Canadian Polar Commission. Department ofPolitical Science, University of Calgary, Calgary Alberta, T2N 1N4. Email: [email protected]

Canadian Foreign Policy JournalVol. 17, No. 3, September 2011, 228238


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life expectancy of fighter aircraft tends to be shorter than that of bombers or other slower aircraft.

Nevertheless, the Canadian Air Force has been successful in extending the life of most of its air-craft, particularly its current fleet of CF-18s. The fleet first entered service in 1982 and the final

aircraft was procured in 1988 (Canada, 3 March 2007). It continues to deliver front line service

(as illustrated by its current deployment in the Libyan conflict in 2011), with 79 operational air-

craft currently (CBC, 21 March 2011). Already in service from 23 to 29 years, the modernizationprogram could extend the CF-18s service for another six years until 2017 (Roberds 2006). The

aircraft could be operating for over 30 years. Although Canada is expected to take delivery of

the F-35s in 2017, Canada has seldom taken possession of a major weapon system on time,due to delays in the procurement program. It is likely that the CF-18s will need to be maintained

past 2017.Nevertheless, the Canadian Air Force hopes to commence procurement on schedule in 2016

and then continue for several years. If these new aircraft prove to be as durable as the current CF-

18s, it stands to reason that the F-35 aircraft will be in use for the next 25 to 30 years. Assuming

that Canada takes possession of these new aircraft from 2016 to 2020, they will be in use until

approximately 2050. This is the time period that must be considered for the purpose of answeringthe question about Canadian airpower.

Canadian airpower

As mentioned earlier, discussions about Canadian airpower have been limited to a small numberof academics and members of the Canadian Forces. As such, there is considerable ambiguity

regarding the term. An examination of recent Canadian Air Force documents such as Vectors

2020: An air force strategic assessment or Canadian Forces aerospace doctrine does not directlydefine Canadian airpower. Even many of the best academic writings on the term sidestep the

issue (Ferguson 2009). Most of these make reference to the classical theorists of the field suchas Douhet, Mitchell, Trenchard, Seversky, and Slessor, as well as those that are considered tobe more modern theorists such as Boyd and Warden (Meilinger 2003). But there is a frustrating

lack of precision as to what is actually meant by the term Canadian airpower.

Perhaps the best explanation of Canadian airpower has been provided by the former Chiefof Air Staff (i.e., head of the Air Force) Ken Pennie. He wrote that the mission of the Canadian

Air Force is: To control and exploit the aerospace environment for military purposes that con-

tribute to Canadians security and national objectives (2004 2005). Thus the aerospace

environment anything that starts at the ground and continues into space is the unique

element in which the assets of the Canadian Air Force are utilized to provide for Canadian

security.The difference of airpower from other types of power has been summarized by Mueller

(2010). In an excellent review of airpower he identifies four main attributes of modern airpower

that makes it a unique form of coercive force. First, given the speed, range and flexibility ofmodern aircraft, modern air forces can bypass both the land and naval forces of an enemy. Sec-

ondly, these same forces can be massed very quickly. Unlike naval or land forces, an air force can

be concentrated in a matter of hours, giving it the ability to act almost immediately. Third, thesefirst two attributes mean that from a political perspective, leaders of countries who have strong air

forces tend to use the air force as their first deployed military response. The net effect is that a state

with airpower supremacy is in a position to dominate any location of its choosing by suppressingthe naval and land forces of the opposing side.

Mueller also points out that there had been a growing belief in the 1990s that airpower alone

could also achieve military and political victory. This was based on the increasing precision of

weapons systems combined with the accuracy provided by space-based communication and

Canadian Foreign Policy Journal/La politique etrange`re du Canada 229


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command systems. However, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have resulted in a rethinking of

these assessments. Nonetheless, airpower is still essential for Western forces to achieve both mili-tary and political victory in conflicts in the current period.

There has been no specific Canadian airpower theory developed per se. As mentioned pre-

viously, part of the problem is that the academic community has always very small. But a

more significant challenge has been the types of roles that the Canadian Air Force has played.It has continually worked with allies and friends in almost all of its deployments both abroad

and at home. As a result it is virtually impossible to isolate Canadas use of airpower from that

of its allies. Thus there has not been a uniquely Canadian use of airpower, but rather one thatis normally used to support a larger allied need. How then has Canada used airpower?

Canadian use of airpower

Canada has used airpower almost since the time that aircraft were first invented. The Silver Dart,

which was one of the first aircraft built in the world, gave four demonstration flights for the

Canadian forces in Petawawa, Ontario in 1909. The first Canadian Aviation Corp was createdin October 1914, and marked the first step of the Canadian use of airpower (Department of

National Defence, 3 April 2009). Throughout the period from World War I to the end of

World War II, the Canadian Air Force eventually evolved into the fourth largest air force in

the world. As the Cold War developed, the Canadian Air Force emerged as one of the most

important elements in NATOs response to the Soviet Union. In the 1950s the Canadian contri-bution of fighter aircraft for deterrence against Soviet aggression was one of the largest in the

entire alliance. Only as the Cold War progressed and the European nations rebuilt their armed

forces including their air forces, did the Canadian contribution recede both in relative andabsolute terms

Overall Canadian contribution to the training of its own and Allied personnel has been verysignificant, as has the establishment of its own squadrons of aircraft deployed to Europe. Evenmore importantly, Canadian airpower was almost always conducted in cooperation with its

allies. In particular, the Canadian Air Force has always operated closely with the British Air

Force and the American Air Force. In many ways close cooperation has been very importantin achieving military and political victory. Germany was defeated in World War I and was

defeated again alongside the Japanese and Italians in World War II. The Soviet Union was

deterred during the Cold War and ultimately eliminated as a security threat by 1989.

It is important to note that during the Cold War there were several debates over airpower that

did emerge. The most significant developed in the 1960s when Canadian leaders were required to

make several key decisions in regards to the re-equipping the Canadian Air Force. There werethree specific issues that arose. One was over the nature of the weapons carried by Canadian fight-

ers should they be nuclear or conventionally armed? Second, should Canada retain fighter

aircraft? And third, if fighters were to be retained should these aircraft be built and designedin Canada or should they be bought from the Americans? It is of course beyond the scope of

this article to be able to offer a detailed assessment of these questions. But ultimately they

forced Canadian political leaders and defence planners to address three larger issu.The first was the question pertaining to the core security of Canada. In responding to the

Soviet Union, how could Canada best stop that country from launching a nuclear strike on

Canadian soil? In the 1950s the Canadian answer was to work closely with the United States toprovide a robust surveillance and interceptor system against a possible Soviet bomber threat.

As the USSR moved from bombers to Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Canadian

leaders were required to work with the Americans from a posture of defence to one of deterrence.

The role of the Canadian Air Force remained central but less focused at this point (Jockel 2007).

230 R. Huebert


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The need to defend and then deter the USSR also cemented the CanadianAmerican defence

relationship that emerged from the Second World War. Canadian officials realized very early in theCold War that any defence against the USSR needed the power of the United States. At the same

time, it was also realized that Canada needed to be seen by the United States as pulling its own

weight. Any move to take a free ride was seen as having economic impacts as well pushing

the Americans to take a more active role defending North America within the sovereign territoryof Canada (Barry and Bratt 2008). Thus Canada airpower was needed not only to defend against

the Soviet threat; it was also needed to ensure good economic and political relations with the

United States. Thus Canadian airpower became not only strategic but also political and economic.However, the fact that Canadian security was ultimately achieved in the context of the Allied

cooperation has made it difficult to isolate the precise contribution of Canadian airpower.Furthermore, Canadian political and military leaders were not involved in the strategic use of air-

power since the creation of the Canadian Air Force. Although Canadians were consulted and their

opinions valued, they were expected to follow the decisions made by British and American

leaders.

Canada focused on maintaining an ability to defend the homeland and to deploy aircraft over-seas in all three of these conflicts. Canada has a long tradition of operating its airpower both for

the home game and the away game. However, for a midsize country like Canada, this has

placed tremendous pressure on its resource capabilities. And yet Canada has consistently

chosen to develop airpower capabilities that have met both of these requirements.The end of the Cold War created new demands and opportunities for the employment of

Canadian airpower. On the one hand, many expected that the need for and requirements of

Canadian airpower could be substantially reduced and even eliminated. This so-called peace divi-dend was based on the assumption that the end of the Soviet Union threat meant that Canadian

airpower was no longer required. The desire to reduce the size of the Canadian Air Force was

further enforced by successive Canadian governments in order to reduce the debt and deficit.The Canadian Forces budget was one of the most politically expedient areas that could be

targeted in the 1990s. By 1995, the Canadian Air Force was being substantially reduced.

However, as the Canadian Forces in general were being reduced in the 1990s, Canada began to

deploy its air force at an increasing rate. The 1990s began with the deployment of a number of itsCF-18s to support the war against Iraq in the liberation of Kuwait. This was followed by the use of

the CF-18s in the war against Serbian forces in Kosovo in 1999. In 2001, Canadian assets were

mobilized following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. As an aside, a Canadian

general was in charge at NORAD headquarters when the attack occurred. Canadian air assets

were also utilized in the campaigns against the Indonesians in East Timor, and throughout the

conflict in the former Yugoslavia as that state collapsed into anarchy. Canadian air transportsplayed a critical role in the Afghanistan campaign. While Canadian CF-18s were not deployed,

the Canadian Forces involved in the conflict operated under the umbrella of its allied partners.Most recently, Canada has deployed its CF-18s in the Libyan campaign.

Several major themes emerge after looking at the Canadian record of utilizing airpower. First,

Canada has shown an interest in the development and utilization of airpower almost from thetime the airplane was invented. While it is impossible to determine with precision Canadas

role in the victories of WWI, WWII and the Cold War, there is no doubt that Canadian officials

understood the importance of airpower and were willing to utilize it. Second, Canadian airpowerhas been used both for the protection of Canadian territory and for utilization in overseas deploy-

ment. Third, Canadian airpower has almost continually made use of fighter capabilities. While

this point may not be widely appreciated, it is clear that Canadian political and military

leaders have seen a high utility for the development of Canadian fighter capabilities.



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Ultimately Canada has come to accept that a modern fighter aircraft provides the best protec-

tion against foreign threats to its own territory, and also plays a critical role in overseas deploy-ments. Both Liberal and Conservative governments in Canada have accepted the necessity of

spending significant amounts of resources to maintain this capability. Furthermore, no Canadian

government has been willing to rely on other nations, in particular the United Kingdom and the

United States, to provide for this need.Canada remains committed to defending Canadian and North American territory. Airpower

is the critical element for protection of the territory. While the end of the Cold War eliminated

the most serious threat to Canadian security, the events of 9/11 demonstrated that it is nave tothink that future threats will not continue to exist. Fighter aircraft are the most efficient means of

countering any threat to North America due to their speed and endurance.Canadian decision makers also see an important utility in the deployment of fighter capabili-

ties overseas. During World War II and the first part of the Cold War, only Canada, the United

Kingdom and the United States had the capability to deploy fighter aircraft to Europe to fight

Germany and to deter the USSR. In the post-Cold War era Canada has deployed its fighters in

at least three conflicts Iraq, Kosovo and Libya. There is obviously an acceptance of both themilitary and political value of the security provided by fighters. In short, it is obvious that

airpower has been a central element of Canadian security both at home and abroad.

Future trends

But what of the future? This article established that the F-35s will likely operate until 2050. Are

there any trends in this time period that will affect the Canadian need for fighter capabilities?

Predicting the future is indeed perilous. It is very difficult to predict the security environmentthat will be facing Canada in the next 30 to 40 years. The shock of the terrorist attack on Septem-

ber 11, 2001 has resulted in a growing effort by both Western governments and researchers todevelop means of better understanding the future. As stated by Martin Van Creveld, while noone can see the future, it is at least possible to indicate a few of the directions that change is

likely to take (1991, p. 198). Thus the focus of most analysis has been on the identifications

of the core trends that are most likely to influence future Canadian defence needs (DND 2008;CSIS 2009; Gizewki 2007). As such, several trends that are now developing will impact future

Canadian needs.

First, it is becoming clear that in the immediate future many of the most powerful Western

nations will increasingly face economic threats to their long-term prosperity and ability to main-

tain their current levels of national security (Miller 2009). For example, the United States is

increasingly facing a debt load that many consider too heavy to be maintained without substantialeconomic changes (Quinn 2010). Whether this comes in the form of drastic cuts to the American

governments spending or significant tax increases, it is increasingly apparent that the United

States will face dramatic challenges to its economic security and, hence, its national security.At the same time, the United Kingdom has already been forced to slash government spending,

including dramatic cuts to its defense expenditures (Chalmers 2010). Japan has also increasingly

been facing issues regarding its aging population and its long-term prosperity. These concernshave been heightened following the disastrous earthquake and tsunami. The resulting death

toll and destruction including the nuclear crisis have raised even more concerns about

the long-term viability of the Japanese economy (OECD 2011).These countries may be able to resolve their economic difficulties, but it is becoming evident

that it will require a substantial reduction in their military capabilities. The Americans have

already slashed the number of F-22 fighters that they had originally intended to build from

750 to 187 due to their very high cost and the growing economic difficulties they face

232 R. Huebert


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(ORourke 2009). The F-22 represents Americas most modern fighter. It incorporates such

advanced technologies that an act of Congress forbids it from being sold to any ally or friendlynation for the fear that its technology could be compromised. The British have also been

making substantial cuts to their fighter fleets. In particular, they have recently announced that

they will be eliminating their existing maritime fighter capabilities until they are able to

purchase the American built F-35s. But even this future procurement will be reduced.This means that Canada can expect to see its main allies substantially reducing their fighter

capabilities in terms of numbers. The technological capabilities of the remaining fighters will

remain high, but the overall quantity will be reduced. Canada cannot assume that the predomi-nance of allied airpower will remain as it has been for the last 20 years. Canada will need to

assume more of the burden for the protection of Canadian and North American territory aswell as for the protection of the airspace over any of its future overseas deployment. It is reason-

able to assume that the Americans will expect Canada to provide more protection of the North

American continent. Thus for the home game, there will likely be continued American pressure

on Canada to contribute to the protection of North America.

The question arises as to what air threats will continue into the future. There are two possibleresponses. First, the Russians resumed their long-range bomber patrols near North American air-

space in 2007 (CNN 2007), and have continued to maintain them since. While they have not ven-

tured into Canadian or American airspace, they have not been willing to provide prior

notification of their patrols. Furthermore, Prime Minister Putin recently announced that the Rus-sians will be building a new long-range stealth bomber by 2025 (Isachenkov 2010). Given the

uncertain relationship that has developed between the Russians and the Western powers, their

patrols will remain a concern into the future.Terrorism remains a threat to North America (NIC 2008). Few, if any, had suspected that

domestic commercial aircraft could be turned into cruise missiles and bring down two of the

tallest buildings in North America and attack the Pentagon. What new terrorist threats willemerge in the next 30 years? Fighter aircraft may not be able to respond to all of the new

threats but they will be the best platform for defence for the foreseeable future.

Another issue that Canada may face in the near future goes beyond these possible threats to

North America. Canada has an abundance of natural resources that will increasingly be the envyof other nations. To a very large degree, Canadas connection to the United States, both in terms

of geography and economics, has provided a level of military and economic security that does not

exist elsewhere. Canadian supplies of oil, natural gas, uranium, and freshwater will increasingly be

in demand from an international perspective. What this means in terms of future security is very

difficult to determine. It may be that the CanadianAmerican relationship, in which Canada

ships most of its resources to the United States in return for an American security umbrella,will remain intact into the future. But it is also possible that the United States could become

more aggressive in regards to Canadian resources and less willing to provide for Canadian secur-ity. And while it is unlikely that Canadian natural resources would create a national security threat

to Canada, the possibility still exists. If Saudi Arabia was to implode due to the Arab Spring, the

natural resources of Canada would attract more international attention. This could be a problemin the future.

At the same time it is highly unlikely that Canada will turn inward and abandon the policy of

overseas deployments that developed at the time of the Boer war. Since World War II there hasbeen a bipartisan consensus that Canadian security is best provided for by meeting threats as far

away as possible from Canadian shores. In the most recent Parliamentary debate on the extension

of the Canadian commitment to the Libyan mission (and the continued utilization of Canadian

CF-18s), the NDP supported the extension. In all probability the Canadian commitment to



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overseas deployments, either in the name of alliances, peace-making, peace-keeping or any other

term, will continue into the future. Canada will continue to deploy its military forces.The complete air superiority that has been guaranteed by Canadas allies and friends will

change. In the last 20 years, Canada has deployed its forces knowing that it will be operating

with allies and friends, which guarantees that the skies will be controlled by Western powers.

As Canada moves into the future, this guarantee will become increasingly questionable. It is prob-able that Canada will increasingly need to deploy its own fighter capabilities to ensure the protec-

tion of both its land and naval assets. Furthermore, it may find itself engaged in conflicts in which

the opposing side will have increasingly sophisticated air assets. As difficult as the deployment inAfghanistan was for the Canadian Forces, it is easy to understand just how much more difficult it

would have been had the Taliban had its own airpower capabilities. This would have meant a verydifferent type of conflict for Canada. Thus, Canada will either have to reduce or eliminate its

overseas deployments and risk higher casualties, or take on an increasing ability to provide for

its own protection.

In Canada, the debate over the F-35s has also raised the issue of its stealth capabilities. Critics

have suggested that Canada does not need stealth capabilities for their next fighter aircraft (Staples2010). Their argument hinges on the suggestion that stealth is primarily utilized for offensive pur-

poses. Stealth does give the ability to launch a strike without an enemy detecting the strike until it

is too late to respond. But more importantly, stealth will be necessary as two technologies become

increasingly available to all states and even non-state actors. The proliferation of missile technol-ogy and, specifically, surface-to-air missiles (SAM) has grave ramifications for Western air forces.

As this technology proliferates and becomes more accessible it will be easier to use it against

Western air forces. The power of these weapons systems was first demonstrated even beforethe Cold War ended. The Americans transferred stinger missiles to the irregular forces fighting

against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan in the 1970s. While these missiles had a limited range,

they proved very effective against the Soviet helicopters and played a role in the Russian decisionto withdraw (Kuperman 1999).

At that time, missiles such as the stinger seldom found their way onto the open market.

The American government deliberately sent the missiles through intermediaries in Pakistan as

a deliberate policy to undermine the Soviet position in that conflict. These missiles workedagainst slow flying helicopters but were incapable of hitting a fighter. Now much more advanced

weapons systems are becoming available on the open market. This trend is expected to continue.

Furthermore, just as the United States found it politically expedient to provide stingers to the

Afghans fighting the Soviets, states such as Iran are developing their own missile technologies

and will no doubt be willing to provide these to states and non-state actors that are opposed

to Western interests. Canada will be operating overseas alongside its allies and friends in anenvironment proliferated by surface-to-air missiles. Such an environment will require the use

of stealth aircraft.With fewer American and British aircraft, combined with the proliferation of surface-to-air

missiles, Canada will need to assume a greater role of force protection for any future overseas

deployments. This ultimately means aircraft that can provide protection over the skies will beessential. In the future, Canada will need to increase its airpower if it intends to continue to

deploy military force overseas. It will face an increasingly dangerous environment and it will

not be able to depend on its allies to the degree that it has in the past. Thus the choice will beincreasingly stark: to not deploy, or to increase its indigenous ability to protect any ground or

naval assets that it may wish to deploy.

234 R. Huebert


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Options open to Canada

So what options are open to Canada? Canada faces six choices regarding its future airpower: (1)Canada can choose to not buy a new aircraft replacement for the CF-18; (2) Canada can postpone

the decision and attempt to extend the life span of the CF-18s beyond 2017; (3) Canada can intro-

duce new technologies such as drones and UAVs as a replacement for manned fighters; (4)Canada can buy an older generation fighter that is now available on the market; (5) Canadacan look for an alternative fifth generation fighter rather than the F-35s; and (6) Canada can

stay with the decision to buy the F-35.

If Canada were to select the first option and simply eliminate fighter aircraft from its air

force, this would end a policy of maintaining indigenous fighter capabilities that goes back

to World War II. Successive Canadian governments have always seen a utility in spendingthe necessary resources to ensure that Canada had its own fighter aircraft. If Canada were to

abandon this policy, it would face American displeasure. The United States would undoubtedly

take steps to provide for the protection of all North American airspace. What this would looklike would depend on how seriously the Americans view the threats to North America. At a

minimum, the Americans would probably demand the right to overfly Canadian airspace

on a regular basis. In the long term such action would pose a serious threat to Canadiansovereignty.

A second problem would be that Canada would expose any troops deployed overseas to a

much higher risk than before. As has been argued throughout this article, the international

environment is going to become one in which Western air superiority can no longer be takenfor granted. The future of deployments, whether for peace-keeping, peace-making or any

other types of mission, will become more dangerous. Canadian decision makers will face the

choice of either deploying their troops with a higher risk to their safety, or not deploying

them at all.

Canada can also choose to postpone the decision on the F-35s, but this choice will carrysignificant financial ramifications (Department of National Defence, 2007b). It will become

increasingly expensive to keep the CF-18s airworthy. The stresses on a modern fighter aircraft

are substantial and take a toll on both the engine and airframe. As an aircraft ages the stressesoften require the replacement of wings, tail assemblies and other components of the aircraft

(Caron and Richard 1998). This is expensive. In addition, the older the aircraft becomes, the

more dangerous it will be to its pilots. Canadas experience with older equipment demonstratesa superb mechanical capability, but old equipment still breaks down. When a fighter aircraft

suffers any form of mechanical malfunction the results are often disastrous.

It is also likely that if Canada pulls out of its current contract, any effort to subsequently reen-

gage the Americans will cost more. The Americans want partners now and are more willing to cuta deal on the price of the aircraft than they would be in the future. While it might be that the

Americans would welcome Canada back with a contract that is equal or even better than what

is the current case, it seems unlikely.The third option of looking beyond current manned fighter technology is something that all

modern states will do at one point in time. It is reasonable to assume that in the future the

manned fighter will be replaced by some form of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) (FAS

2010b). The Americans first developed an operational form of such an aircraft when they

placed a missile on one of their predator drones. They successfully used this platform todestroy a car carrying Afghan insurgents/terrorists. Until then, the Americans had used the

drones only for surveillance purposes. However, significant technological challenges must beovercome before all manned fighters can be replaced by some unmanned variant. Whetherthat will occur in the next 30 to 40 years is uncertain. However, Canada still needs to wait



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until someone else such as the Americans develops the necessary technology. Canada will

need to explore this option, but that will be in the future.Many critics of the F-35 have suggested adopting the fourth option. Some are concerned that

the technology associated with the F-35 is simply too untested. Therefore they suggest that it will

both be cheaper and more effective to buy an existing aircraft such as the Super Hornet (Webb

and Byers 2010). If Canada were to pursue this option, it could realistically consider four aircraft.Canada will not buy advanced fighter aircraft from the Russians (e.g., Sukhoi SU-30MKI or

Mikoyan MiG 29M/35) or from the Chinese. The existing choices would be the EuroFighterTyphoon, the French Dassault Rafale, the Swedish Saab JAS 39 Gripen NG, and the Boeing F/A 18E/F Super Hornet. The Swedish jet may be problematic in that its parent company,Saab, is experiencing significant economic difficulties and an expected sale to the Norwegiansdid not transpire. Both the EuroFighter and the Rafale are receiving their first exposure to

combat in the Libyan campaign. Initial reports suggest that they have been performing well

(Keaten 2010), but these reports are very preliminary. The price of the EuroFighter was substan-

tially over the original budget (Evans 2003), but there is no way to know how much cheaper it

would be than the F-35. The other issue is that it probably is not as technologically advancedas the F-35. But even in this context how the two aircraft would compare in unknown. This

can only be understood once the F-35 is operational.

The French Rafle and the American Super Hornet are both very good aircraft but their core

design was established in the 1970s. Both aircraft have modernized avionics and communicationequipment; both also have updated engines, but their radar signature still renders them less

stealthy than the F-35 and therefore more exposed to the new SAM technologies.

The fifth choice open to Canada is to withdraw from the existing F-35 contract and to hold acompetition. If Canada wants to purchase a fifth generation fighter aircraft, it is difficult to know

who would be invited to the competition and, more importantly, who would come. The

Americans have enacted a law that forbids the sale of the F-22 to foreign nations. This includesCanada. As mentioned earlier, Canada has a longstanding policy of not buying military equip-

ment from Russia or China. This means that the two fifth generation fighters currently being

developed by both nations, PAX-FA T-50 and J-XX respectively, would not be eligible and

both aircraft are not as advanced in their development as is the F-35. Japan may be developinga fifth generation fighter, but it is only in the planning stages.

For the competition option, Canada would consider both the sole fifth generation possibility,

i.e., the F-35, and the three older aircraft discussed previously. Such a competition could indeed

be held but whether the various companies would be willing to enter it is questionable.

The final choice open to Canada is to keep its decision to buy the F-35s. It should be clear

from the problems associated with the five alternative choices that this decision is the mostlogical for Canadas future airpower needs. There is no alternative to the F-35. This is not to

suggest that the aircraft may prove to be very expensive and have technological issues, but ifCanada decides to retain a fighter capability to 2050, the F-35 is really the only choice.

Conclusion

In conclusion it should be apparent that Canada will continue to require fighter capabilities to

ensure the continuation of Canadian airpower. Canada will need to protect its aerospace territoryin North America. It is unlikely that any future government will reverse the Canadian orientation

to deploy military force abroad. Given that Canadas allies will probably be cutting back on their

fighter capabilities there will be increasing pressure on Canada to ensure it has its own fighter

capability.

236 R. Huebert


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Not only is Canada going to face a future where there will be increased demands on it

to provide its own fighter capabilities, but it is likely to engage in environments where surface-to-air missile technology will advance and become much more widely available. Aircraft with

stealth capabilities will be necessary.

Canadas options are limited. In a perfect world Canada would not need to worry about the

security of its borders, nor would it have to worry about deploying its forces overseas and placingits men and women in the Canadian Forces at risk. But Canadian history demonstrates the

naivete of hoping for such a world. In a perfect world Canada would also have the ability to

compare and contrast various fighter aircraft options and make a long-term decision based onthat comparison. Once again, that world does not exist. The available options point only to

the F-35 as Canadas next fighter.

Note

1. Of the many Americans who examine the modern concept of air power, RAND is one of the foremostthink tanks examining issues relating to the subject (http://www.rand.org/topics/national-security.html). Within Canada there is now the Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre. But amongnon-military research institutes only the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University ofManitoba has a focus on Canadian air power.

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