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CDS

165 CDS 15 E rev. 1 finOriginal: English

NATO Parliamentary Assembly

COMMITTEE ON THE CIVIL DIMENSION OF SECURITY

TRANSITION IN AFGHANISTAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR CENTRAL ASIA

SPECIAL REPORT

Ulla SCHMIDT (Germany)Special Rapporteur

www.nato-pa.int 11 October 2015

165 CDS 15 E rev. 1 fin

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................1

II. UPDATE ON THE POLITICAL TRANSITION IN AFGHANISTAN..........................................1A. GENERAL REMARKS...................................................................................................1B. 2014 ELECTIONS AND THE NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT...............................2C. AFGHANISTAN’S REFORM AGENDA.........................................................................3

III. STABILITY IN CENTRAL ASIA: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DRIVERS.............................7A. GENERAL REMARKS...................................................................................................7B. UNDERSTANDING CENTRAL ASIA.............................................................................7C. DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE............................................................................8D. INTRA-REGIONAL STRAINS......................................................................................12E. THE RISK OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN CENTRAL ASIA........................................14F. DRUG TRAFFICKING.................................................................................................15G. MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION IN CENTRAL ASIA.............................................16

IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS...................................................................................................18

BIBLIOGRAPHY...................................................................................................................20

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The political and security transition in Afghanistan took place at the end of 2014, but the question of whether or not it has been successful has not yet been answered. Thanks to the statesmanship of President Ashraf Ghani and his electoral rival, now Chief ExecutiveAbdullah Abdullah, Afghanistan has completed its first democratic transfer of power to new leadership – an extraordinary achievement given the circumstances as well as the historical and regional contexts. The people of Afghanistan associate their renewed hopes and aspirations with the new leadership, which is expected to resolutely address the country's ample socio-economic ills. With a 350,000-strong national security force, the country is now completely in charge of its security situation and is doing its best to keep the insurgency at bay. 2. However, the nascent National Unity government has accomplished less than expected in terms of reforms, and the cohabitation of President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah – whose functions have yet to be constitutionalised – is not without problems. The parliamentary and district elections were postponed due to the fact that the fundamental electoral system overhaul has yet to be implemented. Afghanistan's economic prospects for this year are not optimistic as revenue collection continues to decline. With regard to the security situation, the “fighting season” is seriously testing the ability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to counter the insurgency without direct assistance from NATO combat forces.

3. Because the global political agenda is shifting towards new hotspots, such as eastern Ukraine and the Middle East, Afghanistan has almost disappeared from the front pages of newspapers. The adjacent region of five Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan) receives even less media attention. The aim of this report is to get the attention of the policy-making community and make them aware that the relative stability in Afghanistan and the Central Asia Five should not be taken for granted. This region constitutes the eastern end of the so-called Arc of Instability that spans from the western shores of Africa through the Sahel, North Africa, Somalia, and the Middle East, to the Arabian Peninsula in the east.

4. While the correlation between security in Afghanistan and stability in the Central Asian republics is not straightforward, failure of the transition in Afghanistan could be the tipping point in the accumulation of internal strains and cleavages in Central Asia. Sustained international commitment in the region is necessary to prevent it from turning into yet another global hotspot.

II. UPDATE ON THE POLITICAL TRANSITION IN AFGHANISTAN

A. GENERAL REMARKS

5. When assessing Afghanistan’s democratic progress, one should bear in mind the fact that its statehood is based on different underlying premises than that of most of nation-states in theEuro-Atlantic area. From a Western perspective, Afghanistan lacks homogeneity in almost every aspect: it is divided ethnically (Pashtuns constitute a plurality but not a majority), religiously (the vast majority is Sunni Muslim, but there is also a sizeable Shia minority) and linguistically (Pashto and Dari are the two official languages, but a sizeable minority speaks Turkic languages). Moreover, Afghanistan’s largest ethnic communities are part of much larger ethnic groups that extend far beyond Afghanistan’s borders: there are more than twice as many Pashtuns living in Pakistan than in Afghanistan, the Tajik population in Afghanistan is comparable in size to that of Tajikistan, and Afghanistan’s Uzbeks are just a small fraction of the populous Uzbek ethnic group living in the heart of Central Asia. Moreover, many of these ethnic groups are divided into tribes and further into smaller entities. In sum, Afghan society is characterised by a complicated web of identities – in addition to the emerging modern national discourse. This heterogeneity partly explains the virtual absence of political parties on the national level. Yet

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somehow this heterogeneity has not resulted in blatant separatism; there is little evidence of ethnic clashes.

6. Other important factors to consider include the historical legacy of the Soviet invasion, the civil war and the Taliban era, which left Afghanistan’s central government severely weakened and its human resources considerably depleted. Furthermore, governance in Afghanistan is characterised by the cohabitation between the constitutional structures and traditional structures. The traditional structures being the shuras, tribal assemblies of elders, and jirgas, informalquasi-courts. The all-Afghanistan gathering of elders and other respected figures called Loya Jirga has been involved in some of the country's most important political decisions since the beginning of the 20th century. The role of tribal warlords and local strongmen – who do not necessarily hold official positions – is an important aspect of Afghanistan’s political scene.

7. Against this backdrop, the consolidation of democratic governance in Afghanistan might seem like a gargantuan task. The challenges are indeed formidable and the modern state-building process is likely to take decades. However, it would be a mistake to ignore the progress made so far; while all elections in Afghanistan were far from perfect, the country is already in some aspects more democratic than many of its neighbours. With every election, Afghanistan’s political system is becoming increasingly more mature. The parliament is now more independent and competent, Afghan institutions have taken over a growing number of functions from international stakeholders and the number of voters, including women voters, continues to increase. In particular, the electoral transfer of the presidential office in 2014 elevated the Afghan democracy to a new level.

B. 2014 ELECTIONS AND THE NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT

8. It is important to recognise that there was a real risk of Afghanistan sinking into internal political turmoil in the wake of the 2014 presidential elections. Mr Abdullah had a comfortable lead against Mr Ghani after the first round of elections (45% vs. 31%) and his supporters felt that the presidency was within reach. Moreover, these supporters believed that their candidate had already been robbed of victory in the 2009 elections. Therefore, when the Independent Election Commission (IEC) issued a winner’s certificate stating that the former World Bank official Ghani won 55.27% of the total votes (3.93 million out of 7.12 million votes), Abdullah contested these results. 9. To their credit, Abdullah and Ghani were able to reach a power-sharing agreement on21 September 2014, brokered by US Secretary of State John Kerry and other international leaders, thus preventing a potential political catastrophe. The agreement specifies that both leaders will have "parity" in appointing senior officials; the President will preside over the Cabinet of Ministers when strategic decisions are taken, but day-to-day activities of the Cabinet will be supervised by the Chief Executive. On 11 December 2014, President Ghani signed a decree aimed at better defining the competences of the Chief Executive. The decree underlines that the Chief Executive is “accountable” to the President and identifies 20 specific tasks delegated to the Chief Executive. The position of Chief Executive is considered temporary and it is expected that a Loya Jirga will be held to decide whether or not this position of quasi-Prime Minister should be made permanent. Since the 21 September agreement is not part of Afghanistan’s Constitution, its application rests essentially on the good will of both leaders.

10. Ghani and Abdullah are indeed widely regarded as pragmatic and sensible politicians: they are both modernisers and their political visions largely coincide. The representatives of the international coalition already noticed definite improvement in the attitudes of the new leadership towards international partners, especially in comparison with the erratic and anti-Western leadership of former President Karzai. As soon as President Ghani was inaugurated, on29 September 2014, he signed the Bilateral Security Agreement with the United States on behalf of Afghanistan as well as the Status of Forces Agreement with NATO.

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11. However, domestically, the Ghani-Abdullah cohabitation has already encountered problems. The process of forming the National Unity government has been progressing very slowly: President Ghani was unable to fulfil his campaign promise of forming the government within 45 days. The delays reportedly were due to pressures from various tribal leaders and regional strongmen seeking rewards for their support during the presidential election campaign. The list of ministerial candidates that Ghani and Abdullah were finally able to come up with in January 2015 was characterised by observers as innovative: it included a number of relatively young professionals, representing a new generation of Afghans, and replaced the old guard of tribal heavyweights and political veterans who had dominated previous governments.

12. The parliament and the media have vigorously embarked upon scrutinising the nominees, criticising the competence of several of the candidates and revealing potentially damaging facts about them such as the possession of dual citizenship, attempts to fake their real age or their names appearing on Interpol's wanted list. Criticism from some legislators can also be explained by their ties with the disaffected old guard of Karzai, now largely eliminated from power. The list of candidates has been criticised by some ethnic groups or tribes for allegedly being imbalanced-some non-Pashtun leaders, for instance, complained that the ministries or agencies in charge of security, defence and law enforcement are to be headed exclusively by Pashtuns.

13. After prolonged deliberations, the process of forming the government was almost completed by late April 2015. Of 24 confirmed ministers, four are women. Among notable ministers is the new Foreign Minister Salahuddin Rabbani, son of former President Burhanuddin Rabbani, who replaced his father as the head of the Afghan High Peace Council following his father's assassination in 2011. A notable exception is the absence of a Minister of Defence. The parliament rejected two out of three candidates submitted by the parliament, while the third withdrew his candidacy himself after videos of him making ethnically charged comments appeared in the social media sphere. Other vacancies include the Attorney-General and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. For the appointment of the latter, on 8 July 2015, Afghan lawmakers rejected Anisa Rasouli, the nation's first-ever female nominee for the Supreme Court (UN Secretary General, 2015).

C. AFGHANISTAN’S REFORM AGENDA

14. The near completion of the government finally allows the new leadership to embark upon the implementation of their ambitious electoral promises. Living up to his reputation as a reformer, President Ghani early on presented a 19-page reform programme entitled “Realizing Self Reliance: Commitments to Reform and Renewed Partnership” at the London Conference on Afghanistan on 4 December 2014. This ambitious plan reaffirmed Afghanistan’s resolve to, among other things, create a stable political and security environment in the country, stabilise the country's economy and finances, augment administrative capacities, impose the rule of law, fight corruption and protect human rights, including the rights of women.

15. Some analysts noted, however, that the programme is largely declaratory and lacks clarity on specific delivery mechanisms. In response, the Cabinet approved the Ministry of Finance's proposed plan to implement of the “Realizing Self Reliance” programme on 3 April 2015. The plan consists of 52 measures, 26 of which were identified as priorities for action within the nextsix months. The Ministry of Finance engaged with line ministries to advance the plan. All ministers were also tasked by the President to prepare, during their first 100 days in office, detailed reform plans in their respective areas.

16. Security remains the top concern for the new government. According to UN officials, there was a 45% increase in recorded armed clashes the week following the Taliban's announcement of the start of the spring offensive on 22 April 2015. Civilian casualties from ground engagements

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rose by 16% in the first four months of 2015 compared to the same period in 2014. Actions by Pakistani authorities in the northern areas against militant groups following an attack against a school in Peshawar in December 2014 resulted in the relocation of some of the militant groups to Afghanistan. The most notable security incident in recent months was a suicide car bomber attack on the Afghan Parliament on 22 June 2015. Even the security situation in previously calm parts of northern Afghanistan has worsened markedly, particularly in Kunduz. Fighting has continued in 2015. According to early assessments, Afghan security forces so far have been able to perform their functions and withstand pressure from the insurgency, despite high casualty and attrition rates. However, worrisome reports have been issued by Afghanistan’s Ministry of Interior stating that there are over 7,000 foreign fighters in the country, most of who are associated with Pakistan’s Taliban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (UN Secretary General, 2015). Although some insurgent groups have pledged allegiance to ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), the actual operational presence of this group in Afghanistan has not been confirmed.

17. NATO supports Afghanistan with non-combat training, advice and assistance through the Resolute Support mission, which currently consists of about 12,000 personnel from both NATO and NATO-partner nations. During a visit to the United States in March 2015, Ghani and Abdullah reached an agreement with President Obama, wherein the United States committed to maintain its posture of 9,800 troops until the end of 2015. The security situation is discussed more thoroughly in the 2015 report by the NATO PA's Defence and Security Committee [169 DSC 15 E].

18. In terms of a political solution to the conflict, the Ghani-Abdullah government is visibly more pragmatic vis-à-vis Pakistan than the preceding government. President Ghani took proactive steps to reach out to Pakistani leaders with the intention of warming relations. This change in tone is occurring at an opportune time as Islamabad is revisiting its own policies towards the Taliban following the Peshawar school massacre in December 2014. A historic breakthrough was achieved on 7 July 2015 when the government of Afghanistan met for the first time with representatives from the Taliban in the direct talks held in Muree, Pakistan. The Afghan leadership seeks to clearly differentiate between the Taliban and other local insurgents and foreign fighters. While direct talks with the Taliban are a welcome step towards peace and reconciliation, it is imperative to ensure that Afghan women are part of this process from the beginning to the end.

19. As far as political stability is concerned, Afghanistan faces the important test of holding parliamentary and, possibly, district council elections. According to the law, parliamentary elections should have been held in May 2015 with the current mandate of the lower house of the National Assembly expiring on 22 June 2015. On 1 April 2015, the Second Vice-President,Mohammad Sarwar Danish, announced that the Parliamentary elections would be delayed until 2016, citing the need to allow time for the implementation of electoral reforms. The reform was one of the key promises of the new government, but so far no progress has been made. On 21 March 2015, President Ghani issued a presidential decree establishing a 15-member Special Commission on Electoral Reform. A member of the lower house of the National Assembly was selected to lead the Commission. The process for fully institutionalising the Commission remained unclear due to ongoing disputes between the offices of the President and the Chief Executive about the chairmanship and confirmation of its operational modalities. Reportedly, Abdullah has demanded a drastic overhaul of the electoral structures and the replacement of most electoral officials in order to avoid the problems of past elections. However, President Ghani's approach seems to be more cautious. From an international community perspective, internationalelection-support institutions are strongly urging Kabul to decisively pursue meaningful electoral reforms.

20. District council elections are another important issue. These elections are stipulated by the Constitution, but they have not yet been held due to various problems, including issues regarding

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voter registration, a lack of census, as well as difficulty determining district boundaries that are acceptable to all respective tribes. The absence of these councils leaves a serious administrative gap. These elections are also important because they are constitutionally responsible for nominating one third of the members of the parliament’s upper chamber, the Meshrano Jirga.

21. The new administration is expected to be more serious about fighting corruption than the previous administration. Afghanistan is ranked 172 out of 175 countries by Transparency International on its 2014 Corruption Index. Ghani promised to end corruption in his first speech after signing the power-sharing agreement. As President, he instructed the Supreme Court and the Attorney General’s Office to reinvigorate the investigation of the Kabul Bank scandal – the largest corruption scandal in the country’s history – and to prosecute the culprits. Once the deadline announced by the President to those who owed money to the Kabul Bank expired, the country’s authorities issued travel bans for 150 debtors, froze their assets and began preparations for the auction of their properties. The President also launched discussions on improving coordination between various institutions dealing with corruption. Furthermore, the President has ordered an investigation into why a UN-funded report on corruption in the police force was ignored: allegedly, the Law and Order Trust Fund of Afghanistan (LOTFA), who pays the salaries of the Afghan police force, lost track of millions of dollars in payments that were issued to "ghost employees" (RFE/RL, 2015, 24 April). While these efforts to stop corrupt practices are commendable, further steps are urgently needed, including overhauling the lethargic Attorney General’s Office and improving the capacity and integrity of the judicial system.

22. Reforming the country’s judiciary and, in particular, improving access to judicial mechanisms for Afghan citizens are key concerns. Afghanistan needs a clear strategy as to how to gradually reconcile the informal justice system with the formal one. Expert guidance and financial assistance from the international community in this area is invaluable. The Western non-governmental sector possesses the potential and experience to offer very tangible assistance: for instance, the Max Planck Foundation for International Peace and the Rule of Law has conducted a number of projects to support capacity building for the Afghan justice institutions. Among these projects, legal analysts and researchers of the Foundation offer innovative approaches towards bridging the gap between the state justice system and tribal councils by promoting the concept of restorative justice to relevant Afghan stakeholders. While European criminal justice practices predominantly aim to punish offenders, restorative justice approaches, which originate within the indigenous societies, focus on issues such as addressing reparation, identifying the needs of the injured and instaurating positive social relations. Victim, offender and often other members of the community are actively involved in the mediation process that is conducted in the presence of a facilitator. They collectively decide on the resolution of matters arising from the crime. The project team intends to encourage Afghan stakeholders to use UN Principles as a starting point for the development of a legal framework for the tribal councils in Afghanistan (MPF, 2015).

23. The President Ghani inherited a country in a very bad economic condition. Economic growth has been sluggish in recent years as the country has been unable to replace declining foreign donor contributions with indigenous resources. In 2014, national budget revenues were 25% smaller than planned. According to the World Bank at this time, a dramatic improved in revenue performance was required in order to avoid similar problems in 2015. The disappearance of jobs and contracts associated with the presence of international personnel as well as dwindling business confidence due to delays in forming the government may lead to negligible or no growth at in 2015, even though the GDP has been growing at a rate of about 9% a year since 2001. The Central Bank has been forced to intervene regularly to prevent the national currency from collapsing. Judging from his reform plan “Realizing Self Reliance,” President Ghani intends to apply neo-liberal methods to reverse the economic downturn. This means emphasising fiscal sustainability and discipline, bolstering private sector confidence and improving the investment climate. The government also plans to speed up projects that intend to utilise the country’s mineral resources, but the implementation of such projects will take years.

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24. Nevertheless, Afghanistan will continue to depend on foreign economic assistance for the foreseeable future. The United States recently signed an agreement with Afghanistan earmarking up to USD 800 million in bilateral economic assistance for Afghan development and reform priorities. In 2014, the EU agreed on a new strategy for Afghanistan that extends to the end of 2016. The EU emphasises that Afghanistan receives more development aid from the EU and its member states than from any other country. The EU is committed to providing up to €1.4 billion in development assistance over the next seven years – the largest EU programme in any country. The EU funds will mostly support improvements in health, agriculture, policing, and the democratic oversight of government. At the same time, UN officials note that Afghanistan is one of the world’s most challenging countries for development workers and intensified conflict in 2015 has severely constrained the ability of development works to conduct such development assistance projects (EEAS, 2015).

25. Ghani’s reform plan also prioritises the protection of human rights, civil liberties and the rights of women. The new President has made some important symbolic gestures in this area; he paid emotional tribute to his wife Rula Ghani in his inauguration speech and has supported her civic activities, thus encouraging Afghan women to be more assertive and more politically involved. The President also visited a prison and detention centre in Kabul, calling attention to prisoners’ rights and detention conditions. However as important as these symbolic gestures are, they need to be supported by concrete state policy. In terms of women’s rights in particular, additional efforts are necessary to tackle the issue of violence against women, by, inter alia, enhancing their access to the justice system, especially in rural areas. This access remains limited and most cases tend to be handled through traditional, non-official mechanisms. Human rights activists suggest establishing a special court to deal with cases of violence against women, especially cases of domestic violence. Due to the economic dependency of many women on their husbands, financial support mechanisms should be envisaged for women who are victims of domestic violence (UNAMA, 2015).

26. UN representatives also believe that the harassment and intimidation of civil society activists, journalists and women by religious fanatics remains a serious problem. The pervasiveness of a paternalistic mentality in the society was demonstrated in the lynching of a 27-year-old Afghan woman named Farkhunda, who was falsely accused of having burned the Quran. This despicable incident shook the civilised world and showed that much remains to be done to entrench universal human rights in Afghanistan. It is encouraging, however, that this act of fanaticism has sparked numerous protests in the Afghan society, galvanising women's' rights activists across the country and prompting the authorities to take action against the perpetrators of this crime. On 6 May 2015, the court sentenced four men for participating in the mob killing of Farkhunda.

27. President Ghani has also made some welcome steps in addressing one of Afghanistan’s most acute problems: ineffective and feeble subnational level governance. The President announced a plan to appoint new provincial governors based on clear, standardised criteria and to delegate more authority and spending to subnational administrations. Public-private partnership mechanisms are envisaged to improve service delivery. A welcome initiative in this area includes UNAMA-backed projects that promote closer partnerships between provincial councils and civil society through a series of meetings. Such meetings include the participation of provincial officials along with representatives of civil society organisations, tribal elders, line department directors and journalists. These gatherings provide an opportunity to promote participatory and accountable local governance (UNAMA, 2015). The President has also begun reforming his own administration to make it more economically efficient.

28. These reforms are crucial in creating a new, modern culture of governance. Currently, to ensure that things get done, the President is often forced to intervene personally and micromanage the lower echelons of state administration.

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III. STABILITY IN CENTRAL ASIA: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DRIVERS

A. GENERAL REMARKS

29. Central Asia plays a crucial role in ensuring the integration of Afghanistan into a neighbourhood of stability, cooperation and development. As NATO’s ISAF mission winded down in Afghanistan, apprehension about “post-2014” regional security began to grow in the Central Asian states. Key concerns include the risks of drug and weapon trafficking, socio-economic disparities, refugee flows and the potential increase of activity from militant extremist groups, all of which could undermine the already fragile stability of the Central Asia region.

30. At the same time, while Central Asian countries may be rightly concerned about the spill over of threats from Afghanistan, their governments tend to exaggerate the external risks stemming from Afghanistan and neglect important internal factors that could be the cause instability in their own countries. Moreover, these republics tend to point out the lack of coordination of Central Asian policies among various global stakeholders such as NATO, the EU, China and Russia, as a means of disguising the fact that regional integration and cooperation among the five Central Asian states is unjustifiably low. That said, the international community would be wrong to ignore signals coming from the region that indicate that the region is more fragile than is widely perceived.

B. UNDERSTANDING CENTRAL ASIA

31. The nations of Central Asia have a long and rich history. For instance, cities like Samarkand and Bukhara, Uzbekistan, located on the Silk Road, have been renowned centres of trade, scholarship and Islamic culture for centuries, but due to their remote geographic location, their culture and way of life has largely remained an enigma to the Western world. The delineation of inter-ethnic borders in some regions – such as the populous Fergana Valley – is cause for tension to this day.

32. Central Asian nations were consolidated within present borders during the Soviet period.1 In the 20th century, these nations developed their intelligentsia and basic social infrastructure. As a result, illiteracy decreased from being extremely high to virtually non-existent. While Soviet authorities actively propagated secularism and the emancipation of women, the debate on the contemporary status of women and the role of religion in Central Asian societies is ongoing. The region has also undergone partial industrialisation and agricultural expansion. However, at the same time, Soviet economic policies caused some major environmental catastrophes such as the dramatic shrinking of the Aral Sea. In addition, parts of Kazakhstan have been exposed to nuclear weapon testing.

33. The collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent transition into independence took many by surprise in Central Asia. There were no large pro-independence movements in these republics,

1 Prior to the Soviet period, borders of states and administrative units in Central Asia – such as the Kokand Khanate, the Khiva Khanate, and the Bukhara Emirate – were not based on ethnic lines. The majority of the region’s population (except modern Tajikistan) was made up of various Turkic peoples, but Persian/Tajik languages were widespread among urban and administrative circles. Adding to the region’s complexity, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Turkmen – unlike Uzbeks and Tajiks – have long been predominantly nomadic.

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and, as a result, the former Communist leaders retained their power and re-branded themselves as presidents. The only exception was Kyrgyzstan, who elected the scientist Askar Akayev as President (1990-2005). Tajikistan’s first president and the republic’s former Communist leader Rahmon Nabyev resigned in 1992 as the country was on the verge of a civil war. He was replaced by the Kulyab province's leader Emomalii Rahmon.

34. Although the subsequent evolution varies considerably from country to country, in general, the years since independence are characterised by an emphasis on stability as the highest priority. Kyrgyzstan is the only country that went through both a revolutionary and electoral transfer of power. The state structures and economies of the other Central Asian countries remain largely unreformed due to both the lack of a clear strategic development vector and also, in part, to the large retention of power by the old Soviet nomenclature.

35. However, it would be a mistake to underestimate the almost visceral transformation that the Central Asian countries have undergone in the years since their independence. First, their status as independent is now significantly established; any attempts to retract this independence would result in a high level of popular resistance, much more resistance than there would have been25 years ago. Central Asian populations are young (the majority is under 30) and the younger generation has fewer memories of the Soviet era. They are also increasingly using the Latin alphabet and familiarising themselves with the world beyond the former Soviet Union via the Internet and social media. A clear mental shift is taking place in Central Asian societies as they reclaim their Eurasian identity. Central Asia has not become the backyard of one global or regional power; they chose not to strike any exclusive pacts and reject firmly any external patronage, preferring to pursue a multi-vectored foreign policy that may be both more promising and more difficult to handle at times. It is also important to acknowledge the efforts Kazakhstan is making in modernising its economy and state institutions. While visiting Astana in June 2015, members of the Committee were told that since Kazakhstan's independence, poverty levels have dropped from 60% to 3%, while GDP per capita has reached the level of a medium-income Central or Eastern European country.

36. Additionally, Central Asia has not become a source of security risks for the neighbouring regions. On the contrary, Central Asia has been instrumental in facilitating the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan. They all have contributed to fighting violent extremism and terrorism. Nevertheless, Central Asia currently finds itself at a critical juncture.

C. DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE

37. The development of democratic institutions is an important factor in regional stability as broader political participation mitigates discontent by channelling it through legitimate political mechanisms. Democratisation also facilitates inevitable leadership transitions. However, Central Asian countries can at best be described as transitioning towards democracy; and, some of them are unquestionably authoritarian. In particular, the dictatorship of Saparmurat Niyazov (1990-2006), who renamed himself Turkmenbashi (“The Leader of Turkmen”), has assumed Orwellian forms of rule. Kyrgyzstan, at the other end of the spectrum, is undertaking commendable efforts to strengthen their parliamentary democracy, which is notable considering that president-centric systems are predominant in the region.

38. The leaders of these presidential republics have enjoyed remarkable longevity in their reigns: the current President of Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon, has been in power since 1992; Turkmenistan has only had two presidents – Niyazov “Turkmenbashi,” who passed away in 2006, and his successor Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov; Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have had the same leaders in power, Nursulatan Nazarbayev (74 years old) and Islam Karimov (77 years old) respectively, since even before independence (both were First Secretaries of Communist parties of these republics). These leaders are routinely re-elected or, in some cases, their mandate

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renewed by referendum, always by a landslide majority of more than 90%.2 The parliaments are also completely dominated by pro-government deputies. According to assessments by the OSCE and other international bodies, none of these elections have met all established democratic principles and standards. In many cases elections were clearly fraudulent and the playing field was deliberately tilted in favour of the incumbent. In addition, many real or perceived opposition figures are often marginalised, prosecuted or forced to flee. After the recent parliamentary elections in Tajikistan, the two legitimate opposition parties – the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) and the Socialists – are no longer represented in the Parliament. Given the country’s painful experience with civil war between the secular government and the Islamist opposition in the 1990s, the complete exclusion of the IRP might result in further radicalisation of its supporters.

39. On the other hand, while suppression of the opposition and lack of a level playing field are regrettable, it appears that the majority of the population is politically passive and indisposed to a change in leadership. This complacency could be explained by a combination factors including: the lack of democratic tradition in these countries, a paternalistic tradition of obedience to authority, the absence of a middle class and, above all, the fear that any change might push the country into chaos and violence. This fear is, to some degree, encouraged by the authorities in order to bolster their legitimacy. Indeed, in Kazakhstan, the most economically successful Central Asian country, the growing well-being of the country is an important factor in bolstering public supporting for the government; even among Kazakhstan’s youth, only one person in five is unsatisfied with the current situation, and only one in four want a change, according to recent surveys (Central Asia Program, 2014).

40. Any changes in leadership are not expected to be made in a transparent manner and contestation among contenders to succession will most likely take place outside of any formal constitutional framework. The current leadership is unlikely to allow viable alternative independent leaders to emerge. Western countries and international organisations have sought to promote the institutionalisation of the political process, but to very limited effect. Conversely, any kind of Western involvement is seen as the application of double standards and could potentially spur greater involvement by other influential actors in the region such as Russia or China.

41. As noted, Kyrgyzstan remains an exception: political transitions in the country can and have been mediated through constitutional mechanisms. Following uprisings against the unpopular the authoritarian presidents, Askar Akayev (2005) and Kurmanbek Bakiyev (2010), Kyrgyzstan, under the leadership of female interim president Roza Otunbayeva, adopted a new constitution that rebalanced the political system towards a parliamentary republic. The draft was prepared in cooperation with the Venice Commission. The new constitution forbids the incumbent president from running for re-election at the end of his/her six-year term. Elsewhere in Central Asia, presidents have changed constitutions to allow themselves to be re-elected an unlimited number of times. The Constitution of Kyrgyzstan also forbids one party to control more than 65 seats out of 120 in parliament. Moreover, Ms Otunbayeva did not try to hold on to power and did not run for president herself. Elected president Almazbek Atambayev also publicly declared that he would not change the constitution in order to stay in power once his term expires in 2017. In regards to the Parliament, the October 2010 parliamentary elections resulted in pluralistic representation where a three-party ruling coalition was formed. The Parliament’s growing independence and power is testified by the intensive parliamentary debates that took place over the future of the country’s largest gold mine, Kumtor. These debates led to the resignation of the Prime MinisterJoomart Otorbaev in April 2015 (RFE/RL, 2015).

42. Of course, the democratic transition process is far from complete in Kyrgyzstan; for instance, the president remains far more influential than the constitution would suggest. According to the Kyrgyz Republic’s business community, the country’s business climate has significantly improved 2 Both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan held presidential elections in early 2015: 29 March 2015 in

Uzbekistan and 26 April in Kazakhstan. Both Karimov and Nazarbayev won by a landslide.

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since 2008, but political instability was ranked as the most severe obstacle in business in 2013, followed by corruption and tax rates. According to the World Bank, the least improved areas in the country, in absolute terms, are the areas of: skills and education of workers, transport, and customs and trade regulations (World Bank, 2014). The OSCE has launched a project that focusses on “improving good governance through efficient service delivery in Kyrgyzstan” (OSCE, 2013). The basic aims of the project will be to enhance the government’s anti-corruption efforts and implementation of public administration reform through transparent, accountable and responsible service delivery mechanisms. People living in mining areas also have legitimate concerns about social responsibility and corruption in the sector. As political analysts point out, growing protests against mining have led investors to suspend or shut down operations. The government should, therefore, seek to mediate between stakeholders to find better ways of sharing the benefits (Gullette & Kalybekova, 2014). With regard to human trafficking, many governmental bodies and organisations, as well as NGOs have recently stressed the need to step up prevention efforts. The OSCE has also provided support to promote cooperation between Kyrgyz agencies to help prevent human trafficking. In addition, Aygul Boobekova, a representative of the Kyrgyz Ministry of Health and a gender policy expert, has raised concerns over the phenomenon of the trafficking of newborns (OSCE, 2015).

43. Kyrgyzstan’s process of transition could still have a positive effect across the region and prove to be a promising example to other Central Asian nations. Replicating this experiment in other Central Asian countries, however, would not be easy as there are many existing variables. For instance, unlike other countries in the region, Kyrgyzstan’s elite was not powerful enough to exert authoritarian control over the population for historical and economic reasons. In countries with rich mineral and natural resources, such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, strong and elaborate power pyramids have developed with a president as the supreme referee, capable of navigating among and reconciling the interests of various clans. Replacing these pyramids with competitive pluralistic systems would be difficult to establish in the foreseeable future. The 2005 Andijan events in Uzbekistan and the crackdown on riots in Zhanaozen, Kazakhstan in 2011 have shown that those that defend such strong hierarchical structures are determined to use force to prevent what is referred to as a potential “colour” revolution. Both Karimov and Nazarbayev have made statements suggesting that political systems might be rebalanced in favour of a more powerful parliament and cabinets of ministers, but no serious constitutional overhaul has been attempted so far in these two countries.

44. Defence and security sector reforms have yet to be fully implemented in the region. This sector has traditionally been highly secretive in Central Asia; mandates have been poorly defined and civilian accountability has been very limited. Independent watchdogs are essentially absent. An unaccountable defence and security sector creates the strong potential for corrupt political systems in the region. Security services in particular are reportedly protecting the interests of the regimes rather than those of its citizens. The main problems in this sector stem from the heritage of the Soviet model as well as the corruption of senior officers. Since the 2010 revolution in Kyrgyzstan, some positive changes have been achieved, mainly as the result of the switch to a more parliament-centric political system.

45. In addition to more parliamentary control of the armed forces and the security sector, the idea of ombudsman institutions as advocates for military personnel might also be considered as a means to promote oversight, protection and welfare.3 The preventing of the proliferation of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) materials through the opening of a regional Centre of Excellence in Tashkent, Uzbekistan was one of the security issues discussed at the 2nd High Level Security Dialogue. These discussions involved the EU and the Central Asian countries and took place on 11 March 2015 in Tajikistan. Afghanistan was invited on this 3 The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) has special expertise in this

field and published a report on “Security Sector Reform in Central Asia” in 2012 (http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Security-Sector-Reform-in-Central-Asia)

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occasion as a special guest and will be an influencing factor in outcomes of the talks. The 2nd High Level Security Dialogue also coincided with the ongoing review of the EU’s Central Asia Strategy (EEAS, 2015, 11 March).

46. Central Asia's human rights track-record is poor. According to Freedom House, Kyrgyzstan is the only “partly free” country in the region. For example, the German Bundestag’s campaign conducted in cooperation with the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) on behalf of threatened and persecuted politicians entitled “Parliamentarians Protect Parliamentarians” currently lists five cases of concern in Kazakhstan, four in Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, three in Turkmenistan, one in Tajikistan and none in Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are considered to be among the most authoritarian countries in the world. Human Rights Watch (HRW) notes that Uzbekistan authorities are widely using security apparatuses to crack down on the opposition. Turkmenistan reportedly continues to restrict basic freedoms and uses incarceration as a tool for political retaliation. The country is also “virtually closed to independent scrutiny” (HRW, 2015). In early January 2015, Dunja Mijatović, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, did acknowledge a new law in Turkmenistan that provides wider public access to the Internet, however, she also raised concerns about certain restrictions that can be found within the measure.

47. The Human Rights Watch reported that the human rights situations in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have also suffered significant setbacks in 2014. In Kazakhstan, several independent newspapers were shut down and legislation was introduced that further tightens control over civil society. In Tajikistan several setbacks were noted including the blocking of various websites by authorities, the introduction of a new law that would oblige NGOs to register all funds from foreign sources, and the prosecution of a leading independent news agency for what was cited as “insult”. Even in Kyrgyzstan, there were some disquieting developments: legislation was proposed that would brand NGOs as “foreign agents” and a blatantly discriminatory draft bill was initiated that would seriously restrict Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) rights. On the positive side, Kazakhstan has pledged a zero-tolerance policy towards torture. When visiting Astana committee members were assured by representatives of the National Security Committee that torture was not practiced by law enforcement agencies in Kazakhstan. They argued that it would be counterproductive as such actions would only encourage further radicalisation among the Muslim community. In Tajikistan, a human rights ombudsman created a monitoring group to investigate conditions in prisons. With technical assistance from the International Labour Organization (ILO), the government of Uzbekistan has also begun monitoring the use of child labour (under age 18) in cotton harvesting. The ILO has since then praised the progress made through this new government monitoring system (AFP, 2014).

48. Central Asian governments frequently point to the threat of a potential spill-over of insecurity from Afghanistan as justification for repressive policies. However, concerns about a repetition of the events on Maidan Square may also be part of the equation and seem to continually jeopardise the human rights situation in all five countries.

49. Corruption and nepotism in Central Asia are pervasive: Kazakhstan was reported as 126 th out of 175 countries surveyed in regards to corruption perception by Transparency International in 2014, followed by Kyrgyzstan (136), Tajikistan (152), Uzbekistan (166) and Turkmenistan (169). Corruption and nepotism thrive due to many reasons including, the lack of independent judiciary, governmental control over the parliament and the media as well as the system of clans and tribal unions that have largely survived Soviet rule by merging with Communist party structures. Affiliation with the ruling clans ensures access to power and wealth. In Uzbekistan for instance, President Karimov’s power reportedly rests on the successful endorsement of three out of the seven major clans, the Samarkand, Tashkent and Fergana clans (Stratfor, 2014). Corruption and favouritism significantly hamper governmental measures undertaken to develop national

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economies. Anti-corruption campaigns are occasionally launched by certain governments. However, they are often perceived by the population as mere means in the intra-elite fight.

D. INTRA-REGIONAL STRAINS

50. Despite the civil war in Tajikistan (1992-1997) and violent clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan’s Osh region 2010, the territorial integrity of the Central Asian republics has ever been seriously questioned and the probability of major armed conflict in the region has remained low.4 That said the sustainability of the status quo should not be taken for granted.

51. The first important area of concern is the strategically important Fergana Valley. Located at the intersection of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the Fergana Valley has been an area of frequent border disputes. About one fifth of Central Asia’s population (about 14 million people) lives in this regional hub of economy and culture. The state borders are drawn in such a way that the Valley’s resources including agricultural, industrial, water and infrastructural resources are awkwardly divided among the three republics, enabling each with the power to block the others' attempts to develop the region. The area is an ethnic patchwork and there are multiple pockets of Uzbek, Tajik and Kyrgyz communities living outside of their respective countries. Moreover, there are several territorial exclaves that could easily be cut off from the mainland.

The Fergana Valley. Source: Stratfor

52. Given these complexities, it is hardly surprising that tensions between the nations in the Fergana Valley sporadically surface in the region. Standoffs between Uzbek and Kyrgyz as well as Kyrgyz and Tajik border guards have been common practice. The two most violentanti-government riots in Central Asia’s recent history – 2005 in Andijan and 2010 in Osh – took place in the Fergana Valley. Both resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths and the latter forced dozens of thousands of ethnic Uzbeks to flee temporarily from Kyrgyzstan. The Fergana Valley is also located directly on the drug trafficking route spanning from Afghanistan to Europe via Russia.

53. On the other hand, the Fergana Valley has the potential to address these challenges and become an area of stability. The uneven distribution of economic and geographic assets should encourage Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to cooperate more closely. The tradition of vibrant economic activity in the Valley should also help to create a middle class and the

4 Reportedly, Tajikistan’s President Rakhmon announced in 2009 that the Uzbek cities of Bukhara and Samarkand would eventually be “returned” to Tajikistan. This statement, however, seems to have been an isolated episode rather than an expression of Dushanbe’s official policy.

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foundation for more sustainable development. Despite political tensions, cross-border economic links and people-to-people contacts are substantial.

54. The second area of concern is over water resources. The region has abundant water resources and its main water arteries are the Syr Darya and Amy Darya rivers, which originate in mountainous Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. On the surface, there appears to be an obvious potential for the trade of resources with mineral-rich Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In reality, however, the Central Asian republics are extremely protective of their own resources and are wary of the intentions of their neighbours. Farmers in Uzbekistan and south Kazakhstan complain that upstream countries release too much water from their dams during winter creating floods, and not enough water during summer, creating water shortages (ENVSEC, 2005). Central Asia’s longest river, the Amy Darya, partially originates in Afghanistan. As soon as Afghanistan is stabilised, the demand for water in Afghanistan is likely to increase as over 80% of its population is dependent on farming as a means of income. This would add additional strain on water consumption in the countries downstream from Afghanistan.

55. Tajikistan's also intentions to build a large, 3,600-megawatt dam in Rogun, which makes its downstream neighbour Uzbekistan extremely nervous. Tajikistan considers the Rogun dam project to be of strategic importance as it will serve multiple goals: 1) it would replace current aging Soviet hydropower infrastructure 2) it would address the nation’s chronic electricity shortages and 3) it would increase electricity exports, thus contributing to the national economy. Tashkent argues that the planned dam is unjustifiably large and will affect significantly the irrigation network in Uzbekistan. The ability of Tajikistan to implement such an ambitious project (USD 5-6 billion) on its own is uncertain. According to the World Bank, whose reports included technological and environmental considerations, the construction and operation of the dam is feasible. The World Bank also reports that the application of proper international standards would further reduce the risk of failure. It recommends that downstream countries have an equity participation in the project. In any case, the deterioration of Tajik-Uzbek relations over the Rogun dam project is a clear indication that water disputes in Central Asia continue to have security implications.

56. Therefore, strengthening the cooperation of cross-border water management is essential. However, the international legal basis for this cooperation is weak: while the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses states that “watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner,” Uzbekistan is the only Central Asian state to have ratified the convention (Dal, 2014).

57. International brokers have an important role to play in this regard. For instance, in 2008 the German Federal Foreign Office launched the Water Initiative for Central Asia, known as the Berlin Process, designed to foster joint water management and thereby encourage political rapprochement among Central Asian republics. In the framework of the Berlin Process, a number of projects have been launched on political, scientific and capacity-building levels. Significantly, Afghanistan is involved in this process as an observer.

58. The problem, however, goes beyond the lack of regional cooperation. As a whole, Central Asia does not suffer from water scarcity. Its water reserves are significant (20,525 m3/year) compared to water-stressed regions such as the Middle East (7,922) (Khasanova, 2014). Therefore, the problem to be addressed is the inefficient management of water. Central Asian countries consume and waste very large quantities of water. Due to degrading irrigation infrastructure, 30-50% of its water is lost through evaporation within the irrigation channels. Environmentally inadequate industry and an intensive approach to agriculture has been polluting soil and ground water for decades (FRIDE, 2014). Therefore, it would be prudent for regional and

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international efforts in this area to place greater emphasis on assisting national efforts to improve the efficiency of water usage.

59. The third major area of concern is the threat of separatism, which occasionally emerges in Central Asian states. There have been reports of alleged pro-independence activity in the autonomous region of Karakalpakstan in the west of Uzbekistan near the Aral Sea. This region-inhabited by Turkic peoples (namely Karakalpaks, Kazakhs and Uzbeks) – has historic ties with Kazakhstan. It is also poorer than the rest of Uzbekistan, a fact that generates discontent among the population.

60. Widening social divide has also fuelled protest in Kazakhstan, especially in oil-rich western Kazakhstan where overt signs of disaffection have emerged. The region witnessed independent Kazakhstan’s worst ever bout of social unrest in 2011 when 15 civilians died in clashes with police in the depressed town of Zhanaozen. The region has also seen several terrorist attacks, which many commentators believe is “also a form of protest" (Lillis, 2013). During this Committee’s recent visit to Kazakhstan, the country’s Foreign Minister Erlan Idrissov firmly rejected the hypothetical possibility of Russia’s intervention in northern Kazakhstan, a region populated mostly by Russian-speaking citizens of Kazakhstan.

61. Some anti-government clashes took place in Tajikistan’s remote autonomous region of Gorno-Badakhshan in June 2012. Whereas the government in Dushanbe blames the violence on local drug dealers, protesters have claimed that it was the result of a demand for “more autonomy.” The region differs from the rest of Tajikistan both ethnically (the majority of the population are Pamirs) and religiously (the majority are Shia while most Tajiks are Sunni Muslims). However, although the region constitutes 45% of Tajikistan’s territory, its population is extremely small (only 3% of Tajikistan’s population) (Najibullah, 2014), which makes the separatist cause appear marginal. The hard winter of 2007-2008, which almost led to a humanitarian crisis for the rural population in Tajikistan, should also be taken into account. The result of which was some of the first public protests since the end of the civil war. The use of force and rigid media censorship quickly ended these protests. The situation was further deescalated in part by the lack of civil society structures and the high number of migrant workers. However, this did not significantly change the growing discontent among the population. A number of other factors have also caused increased tensions in the country: reportedly, there are continuing conflicts within the President’s entourage and a variety of corruption scandals have broken out, one involving the national bank, which is led by the President’s brother-in-law, and another involving an aluminium company in Tursunsoda. In addition, tensions have arisen from the return of military commanders from Afghanistan who were previously involved in the Tajik civil war.

62. The World Bank calculates that Tajikistan was the world's largest recipient of migrant worker remittances in 2014 at 42% of gross domestic product. The share in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan was 32%, demonstrating a similar number of workers suffering the effects of the crisis in Russia. About one million Kyrgyz citizens and over one million Tajiks - about half each country's workforce - work in Russia. The prospect of those workers returning home has raised not just concern about the economic impact but has also spurred worries that high unemployment rates could exert intense pressure on the population and give rise to domestic social discontent (Kozhevnikov & Dzyubenko, 2014).

E. THE RISK OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN CENTRAL ASIA

63. The main factor fuelling the fear of extremism in the region is the belief that Central Asian extremist groups that are currently engaged in fighting in Afghanistan, would return to their Central Asian countries of residence at some point. However, the key problem is not the supply (from Afghanistan) but demand (in Central Asia) for extremist jihadism. However, the current demand in Central Asia is low. Returning fighters would not necessarily pose an existential threat

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to stability because they lack a base of popular support and may not even be capable of standing up to the strong security apparatuses of the Central Asian states. A majority of the population in the region views potential “jihadisation” as a concern. However, Tajik and Uzbek communities in Afghanistan are historically anti-Taliban and therefore, the probability of an insurgency spill-over on the basis of ethnicity is low. Nevertheless, it is not implausible that the failure of economic development and governance in the Central Asia region might create cause for the support of radical movements.

64. Violent groups associating themselves with Islamism emerged in the region in the early 1990s, mostly in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Tashkent has resolutely supressed the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and forced its members to seek refuge in Tajikistan. Assisted by IMU fighters, the Tajik Islamist opposition was engaged in an armed conflict with the secular government in Dushanbe. The peace agreement in 1997 in Tajikistan caused disappointment among the IMU towards their more moderate Tajik counterparts and drove the movement further into Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. Subsequently, IMU (which, in addition to Uzbeks, also includes some Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Tajiks) and its pro-Al-Qaeda offshoot, the Union of Islamic Jihad (UIJ), were engaged in anti-government activities on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. While reportedly involved in some minor terrorist acts in the Central Asian republics, IMU and UIJ have essentially evolved into terrorist organisations with a much more global violent jihadist agenda. Many of their new recruits are no longer motivated to return to fight secular regimes in Central Asia. Central Asian violent jihadist organisations in Afghanistan and Pakistan are estimated to have between 2,000-3,000 fighters (Balci & Chaudet, 2014).

65. Perhaps more worrying are the reports about alleged contacts between Central Asian extremists and ISIS terrorist organisation. During the visit to Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, members of this Committee were told that about 200 citizens from both countries, including the former head of Tajikistan's special forces Gulmurod Khalimov, had joined the ranks of the ISIS and similar organisations. The authorities opened criminal cases against all those who travel to fight abroad.

66. Counter-terrorism policies in Central Asia tend to focus on law enforcement measures. However, Kazakhstan also has a specific programme designed to prevent the radicalisation of young people. Special committees are created at the local level to conduct anti-radicalisation work. On the national level, the Counter-Terrorism Centre of the National Security Committee (NSC) drafts national counter-terrorism policies, monitors and analysis threats and coordinates with all involved agencies in order to prevent terrorism and neutralise perpetrators.

67. Recently, the Central Asia republics also raised concerns about the possible invasion of foreign militant groups into their territory. While visiting Tajikistan in June 2015, members of the Committee heard from President Rahmon and Minister of Defence Sherali Mirzo that more than 3,000 militants were amassed on the other side of his country’s 1,400 km border with Afghanistan, and that the situation continues to worsen every day. Tajikistan’s armed forces were increasing their presence on the border with Afghanistan and setting up additional checkpoints. However, the country relies on external assistance, first and foremost from Russia, which keeps between5,000-7,000 troops on Tajik soil. Tajik leaders also received some assistance from NATO member states, particularly the United States, but Tajik leaders also called upon the Euro-Atlantic community to increase its assistance with border protection equipment.

68. The extremist threat in Central Asia has so far been manageable due to the fact that it lacks popular support and state governments have assumed a staunchly secularist stance, state governments, however, also tend to overreact to this challenge and use it as a justification to weaken the opposition and curtail civil liberties. Not all movements referred to as Islamist pose a security threat and it would be a mistake to ostracise them indiscriminately. The governments should focus more on the root causes of radicalisation including the lack of socio-economic

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opportunities, rather than counting exclusively on law enforcement measures. In addition, democratic and civilian oversight mechanisms regarding security structures need to be strengthened or, in some cases, created from scratch.

F. DRUG TRAFFICKING

69. The ability to fight the trafficking of drugs from Afghanistan is one of the most serious challenges Central Asia faces today. In 2013, Afghan opium production accounted for 80% of global opium production. According to the Afghanistan Opium Survey, the total area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan in 2014 was estimated at 224,000 hectares, a 7% increase from 2013. Opium production was estimated at 6,400 tons in 2014, an increase of 17% from its 2013 level (5,500 tons). The Russian Federation remains a major consumer market for illicit opiates, with significant quantities of heroin flowing northwards from Afghanistan via Central Asia.

70. While visiting Tajikistan in June 2015, members of the Committee were told by the Minister of Interior of Tajikistan that the flow of drugs from Afghanistan is holding steady following the winding down of the ISAF. However, he was concerned that with further destabilisation of Afghanistan the flow might increase. He estimated that Tajikistan intercepts about 70% of drugs smuggled through its territory. By contrast, the US State Department 2015 report on narcotics suggests a significantly lower percentage of heroin interdictions. It is expected that policy-makers and law enforcement officials will soon have better and more up-to-date information on trends in Afghan drug production and trafficking with the recent launch of the online Afghanistan Drug Reporting System. This system is a joint project of the Ministry of Counter Narcotics and the UNODC that will involve sharing verified data from all relevant institutions in the field.

71. Drug trafficking causes major problems for Central Asia. Firstly, opiate use in Central Asia accounts for 0.8% of the adult population — twice the global average. Secondly, drug trafficking is fuelling illicit criminal networks and violent extremist organisations, particularly in the Fergana Valley. With the rapid development of transformation laboratories in Central Asia, criminal organisations are able to amass enormous profits locally before shipping products onward to Russia and Europe. And thirdly, drug trafficking creates corruption within local, State and law enforcement institutions, undermining their legitimacy and sacrificing people’s trust in these agencies. Reports suggest that most drug trafficking is possible due to high levels of corruption among Central Asian officials and the fact that drug barons are connected to senior politicians. Consequently, current anti-trafficking policies that focus on physical border control systems are inefficient: most of the drug trafficking takes place not because borders are porous, but because officials at border checkpoints choose to turn a blind eye. Building integrity and rooting out corruption among border guards and other state structures is therefore the key to tackling this problem (FRIDE, 2014). With regard to Afghanistan, Western countries and the Afghan government should continue ongoing efforts to reduce the production of drugs and find alternative crops for farmers, such as saffron. Collectively, the governments of Central Asia must cooperate with international and regional organisations to assist in stemming illicit activities including the cultivation, production, trade, and trafficking of drugs in the region.

G. MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION IN CENTRAL ASIA

72. Relations between NATO and the Central Asian republics originate from the dawn of Central Asian independence. At the 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO leaders designated Central Asia, in the context of the ISAF mission, as an area of "special focus". The Alliance appointed a Special Representative to the Secretary General for the region and a Liaison Officer in Central Asia. In the framework of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, each Central Asian country can tailor its level of cooperation with NATO to in a way that is suitable for the country's needs, ambitions and abilities. Most Central Asian republics view the Alliance as a valuable partner that provides tangible assistance in fields such as defence sector reform, border security, disposal of

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excess munition, “Science for Peace and Security”, and civil emergency planning. Also, the Central Asian states often see their cooperation with NATO as a way of striking a balance between their various security arrangements, and hence of preserving their strategic independence from Russian and Chinese. In return, Central Asian countries have provided critical logistical support to ISAF transit. The depth and extent of cooperation varies by country.

73. The European Union’s relations with Central Asia are based on its 2007 Strategy for Central Asia, which focuses on supporting human rights, education, rule of law and border management projects. The achievements have been modest and the EU is revisiting its strategy. There seems to be a lack of consensus among EU member states on whether or not the EU should be proving more support to the region. On the other hand, the more authoritarian nations among the Central Asian states are repelled by the EU's insistence on democratic principles and human rights.

74. The Latvian Presidency of the Council of the EU announced that cooperation with the countries of Central Asia was one of its priorities in light of the changing geopolitical environment. The High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, Federica Mogherini, remarked earlier this year that the appointment of Peter Burian, the new EU Special Representative to Central Asia, demonstrates continued cooperation from the EU with Central Asia. This appointment also ensures a strong EU presence and continued engagement on key issues of mutual interest in the region. Progress has been achieved in negotiations between the EU and Kazakhstan on an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. That said, the Rapporteur believes that Central Asia still does not occupy its proper place on the EU's political agenda.

75. Most Central Asian republics have been participating in Russia-led efforts to reintegrate former Soviet Republics. There are two notable projects: first, the Collective Security and Treaty Organization (CSTO), designed in some aspects to replicate NATO in the former Soviet space. CSTO has been criticised internally for being ineffective, partly due to a lack of unity among its members, and failure to intervene, for instance, during turmoil in Kyrgyzstan in 2010. However, in recent years the organization has made steps to improve its reputation, advancing its rapid reaction forces and intensifying the programme of joint exercises.

76. Second, Russia’s response to the structure of the EU – the Eurasian Economic Union (EaU) – was officially inaugurated in January 2015. The aim is to gradually remove any remaining barriers for free movement of goods and labour within the EaU. By entering the EaU, two countries of Central Asia – Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan – calculated that the benefit of closer integration with Russia outweighs the risks posed by the current downturn of the Russian economy. Tajikistan is still examining all pros and cons (such as the country’s dependence on remittances from Russia versus the fact that most of the trade to and from Tajikistan comes from Uzbekistan, which is not a member of the EaU) as well as the experience of new Eurasian Union members such as Kyrgyzstan. Given that previous attempts to integrate economies of former Soviet republics have not been effective, the success of this project remains to be seen.

77. Another significant multilateral project in the region – the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – is important first and foremost because it involves a major economic player in the region – China (in addition to Russia). The SCO serves as an important vehicle to promote China’s economic presence in the region. Central Asia is vital in advancing China’s ambitiousUSD 140 billion New Silk Road initiative (also known as “One Belt, One Road”), which is China’s response to the so-called US “pivot to Asia”. The SCO’s security role has so far been limited. However in July 2015, Chinese defense minister Chang Wanquan announced China’s intention to work closely with defence ministries in SCO member states in the hopes of promoting a stronger development of defence and security cooperation within the SCO. China has also pledged to

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increase security cooperation with Afghanistan by providing security equipment, technology and training assistance.

78. A notable project in which Central Asia republics (including Turkmenistan) and Afghanistan are critical players is the “Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process.” Launched in 2011, this project brings together regional countries as well as developed powers and international organisations. It officially aims to promote peace and prosperity in Afghanistan as well as in the broader region. Mostly a coordination framework, the “Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process” is not intended to substitute the existing efforts of regional organisations, but to cooperate with them, and complement their work where necessary, particularly in relation to Afghanistan.

79. As a landlocked region, Central Asia objectively has a vital interest in multinational cooperation and infrastructure development projects in all geographic directions. While at the moment the interconnectivity of the region with global markets remains limited, an impressive number of projects are in various stages of development and implementation. Among these, the most notable are:

The CASA-1000 (USD 1 billion) electricity transmission and trade project is expected, by 2020, to enhance electricity trade Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan on the one hand, and Afghanistan and Pakistan on the other.

The TAPI pipeline (USD 10 billion), once completed in the next several years, will transport natural gas from the Caspian Sea from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan into Pakistan and then to India.

The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan Railway project (USD 1.5-2 billion) is expected to improve trade between the countries of Central Asia. It is expected to be operational by 2018 and it might also be expanded to other countries in the region in the future.

A “mega highway” project supported by Kazakhstan will span through its territory to connect China with Russia and Europe. During the Committee visit to Kazakhstan, members were told that, once finished by 2019-2020, the highway will provide a viable alternative to conducting maritime trade between Western China and Western Europe. China and Kazakhstan also plan to build a new railway line across the territory of Kazakhstan from the border with China to the Caspian sea port of Aktau, as a part of implementing China’s “One Belt, One Road” strategy.

80. That said, Central Asian countries show surprisingly different approaches to multinational cooperation. While Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and, to a lesser degree, Tajikistan are inclined to join as many integration and cooperation frameworks as possible, Uzbekistan and especially Turkmenistan pursue non-aligned, and even isolationist, policies. Turkmenistan refuses to consider joining the EaU, the CSTO or the SCO and has very limited relations with the EU and NATO. Uzbekistan joined the SCO in 2001, five years later than the founding members, and chose to end its membership with the CSTO in 2012. Uzbekistan is not planning to join the EaU in the foreseeable future. Tajikistan seems less reluctant to join EaU, but it has yet to make a decision on the membership issue. It is also notable that there are no integration projects or cooperation frameworks that would exclusively involve the five Central Asian republics.

IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

81. In conclusion, the Special Rapporteur wishes to emphasise that more effective governance is the key to stability in Afghanistan and the broader Central Asian region. In Afghanistan,President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah need support in their efforts to create a functioning National Unity government and to implement ambitious reforms, particularly in the field of anti-corruption. The successful conduct of parliamentary and district council elections would consolidate the Afghan democracy. Resolute steps to reassure the women of Afghanistan that

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their rights will be protected are a necessary pre-condition for ultimate political settlement, including reconciliation with the insurgency. Afghanistan will require international economic, material and expert assistance for years to come, and it is imperative that the international community delivers on the pledges it has made to the country. However, to ensure adequate assistance from developed countries, Afghanistan’s institutions must redouble their efforts in elaborating and implementing profound reforms. The EU’s “more for more” principle should be at the heart of the international assistance policy.

82. The situation in Afghanistan does have an impact on stability in Central Asia. However, most of the problems of each individual state in the region are of domestic origin. The build-up of these problems including: uncertain transitions of leadership; pervasive corruption and nepotism;inter-state tensions over water and border disputes; ethnic minorities; unbalanced economic development with social and environmental concerns resulting especially from the exploitation of natural resources; unreformed defence and security sector without parliamentary control; the challenge of drug trafficking and organised crime could potentially lead to significant political, economic and social tensions. For the Euro-Atlantic community to forge effective strategies towards Central Asia, it is important to realise that the spill-over from Afghanistan is only one –and not the principal – factor affecting Central Asia’s stability. That said, the Euro-Atlantic community should devise more pro-active and ambitious policies for this strategic region. Central Asia is not anyone’s “backyard”; countries in the region seek balanced relations with all major regional and global players, and the Euro-Atlantic community and especially the EU must do more to meet the demand for greater presence in the region. Public efforts, including parliamentary diplomacy efforts, should be reinforced to dispel certain myths about NATO.

83. In addition, a durable solution to the region’s problems cannot be achieved without fostering economic projects of cooperation in Afghanistan and the wider region. There is a lot of potential in the region that could and should be utilised to generate prosperity. This includes the current joint projects that are being pursued, such as cross-border railways, highways and energy infrastructure. All countries in the region should strive to develop standards and oversight as well as secure economic revenue sources while attracting needed foreign investment, for example, in the mining sector.

84. It is also important to respect the fact that the ability of Western countries or multinational institutions to influence the region is limited due to the noticeable presence of Russia and China. With threats such as the trafficking of drugs, organised crime and violent extremism, theEuro-Atlantic community should offer closer cooperation especially to neighbouring Russia in meeting these challenges and further encourage regional integration. It is also important to reassure Central Asian countries that their contribution to regional and global security is noticed and appreciated.

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http://www.mpfpr.de/projects/country-based-projects/afghanistan/current-projects/informal-justice-as-restorative-justice/

http://www.mpfpr.de/projects/country-based-projects/afghanistan/current-projects/informal-justice-as-restorative-justice/

http://www.eurasianet.org/print/66575

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