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Bitonio vs. COAPost under case digests, Political Law at Friday, March 09, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the Department of Labor and Employment. As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA Board, he was receiving a per diem for every board meeting he attended during the years 1995 to 1997. 

After a post audit of the PEZA’s disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the payment of per diems to Mr. Bitonio pursuant to the Supreme Court ruling declaring unconstitutional the holding of other offices by the cabinet members, their deputies and assistants in addition to their primary office and the receipt of compensation therefore, and, to COA Memorandum No. 97-038 dated September 19, 1997, implementing Senate Committee Reports No. 509. 

In his motion for reconsideration to the COA, he contended that the Supreme Court modified its earlier ruling in the Civil Liberties Union case which limits the prohibition to Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries and their Assistants. Officials given the rank equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary and other appointive officials below the rank of Assistant Secretary are not covered by the prohibition. 

He further stated that the PEZA Charter (RA 7916), enacted four years after the Civil Liberties Union case became final, authorized the payment of per diems; in expressly authorizing per diems, Congress should be conclusively presumed to have been aware of the parameters of the constitutional prohibition as interpreted in the Civil Liberties Union case. 

COA rendered the assailed decision denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. 

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Issue: Whether COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors’ meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor. 

Held: The assailed decision of the COA is affirmed. 

The petitioner is, indeed, not entitled to receive per diem for his board meetings sitting as representative of the Secretary of Labor in the Board of Directors of the PEZA. 

The petitioner’s presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity as representative of the Secretary of Labor. Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from receiving compensation for his additional office or employment, such prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf of the Secretary of Labor. The Supreme Court

cannot allow the petitioner who sat as representative of the Secretary of Labor in the PEZA Board to have a better right than his principal. 

Moreover, it is a basic tenet that any legislative enactment must not be repugnant to the Constitution. No law can render it nugatory because the Constitution is more superior to a statute. The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must have realized the flaw in the law which is the reason why the law was later amended by R.A. No. 8748 to cure such defect. The option of designating representative to the Board by the different Cabinet Secretaries was deleted. Likewise, the paragraph as to payment of per diems to the members of the Board of Directors was also deleted, considering that such stipulation was clearly in conflict with the proscription set by the Constitution.

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Dennis B. Funa vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, Office of the President,G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010.Post under Political Law, villarama doctrines at Monday, November 28, 2011 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Judicial review; requisites. The courts’ power of judicial review, like almost all other powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Respondents assert that the second requisite is absent in this case. 

Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. The question on standing is whether such parties have “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely

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depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” 

In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, summarizing the rules culled from jurisprudence, the Supreme Court held that taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met: 

(1) cases involve constitutional issues; 

(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of

public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; 

(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; 

(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. 

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Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional prohibition against Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants holding two (2) or more positions in government, the fact that he filed this suit as a concerned citizen sufficiently confers him with standing to sue for redress of such illegal act by public officials. 

Public officials; multiple office.   The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution was held inapplicable to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein, without additional compensation in

an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise “any other office” within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. Apart from their bare assertion that respondent Bautista did not receive any compensation when she was OIC of MARINA, respondents failed to demonstrate clearly that her designation as such OIC was in an ex-officio capacity as required by the primary functions of her office as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. 

Given the vast responsibilities and scope of administration of the MARINA, we are hardly persuaded by respondents’ submission that respondent Bautista’s designation as OIC of

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MARINA was merely an imposition of additional duties related to her primary position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. It appears that the DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport is not even a member of the Maritime Industry Board, which includes the DOTC Secretary as Chairman, the MARINA Administrator as Vice-Chairman, and the following as members: Executive Secretary (Office of the President), Philippine Ports Authority General Manager, Department of National Defense Secretary, Development Bank of the Philippines General Manager,

and the Department of Trade and Industry Secretary. 

It must be stressed though that while the designation was in the nature of an acting and temporary capacity, the words “hold the office” were employed. Such holding of office pertains to both appointment and designation because the appointee or designate performs the duties and functions of the office. The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of the appointment or designation,

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words which were not even found in Section 13, Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To “hold” an office means to “possess or occupy” the same, or “to be in possession and administration,” which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office. 

The disqualification laid down in Section 13, Article VII is aimed at preventing the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants.Civil

Liberties Union traced the history of

the times and the conditions under which the Constitution was framed, and construed the Constitution consistent with the object sought to be accomplished by adoption of such provision, and the evils sought to be avoided or remedied. We recalled the practice, during the Marcos regime, of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as members of the governing bodies or boards of various government agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations. This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government

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led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials, who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes of discontent with the Marcos regime. It was therefore quite inevitable and in consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986 Constitutional Commission would draft into the proposed Constitution the provisions under consideration, which were envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the evils that flow from the holding of multiple

governmental offices and employment.Dennis B. Funa vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, Office of the President,G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010.

G. R. No. 85468, September 07, 1989

 DOROMA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor

FACTS:

Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his shareholdings and position as president and director of the Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of electronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and airconditioning equipment to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (or DECS) and the National Manpower and Youth Council (or NMYC).

An information was then filed by the “Tanodbayan” against Doromal for the said violation and a preliminary investigation was conducted.

The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning the jurisdiction of the “Tanodbayan” to file the information without the approval of the Ombudsman.

The Supreme Court held that the incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the

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Ombudsman. Subsequently annulling the information filed by the “Tanodbayan”.

A new information, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the Sandiganbayan, alleging that the Doromal, a public officer, being then a Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully, participate in a business through the Doromal International Trading Corporation, a family corporation of which he is the President, and which company participated in the biddings conducted by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the National Manpower & Youth Council, which act or participation is prohibited by law and the constitution.

The petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it was invalid since there had been no preliminary investigation for the new information that was filed against him.

The motion was denied by Sandiganbayan claiming that another preliminary investigation is unnecessary because both old and new informations involve the same subject matter.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the Constitution.

Whether or not preliminary investigation is necessary even if both informations involve the same subject matter.

Whether or not the information shall be effected as invalid due to the absence of preliminary investigation.

HELD:

Yes, as to the first and second issuses. No, as to the third issue. Petition was granted by the Supreme Court.

RATIO:

(1) The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of Doromal as part of the application to bid shows that he can rightfully be charged with having participated in a business which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution" because "the DITC remained a family corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect interest."

Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the President, Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants

shall not... during (their) tenure, ...directly or indirectly... participate in any business.

(2) The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation is "a substantial one." Its denial over his opposition is a "prejudicial error, in that it subjects the accused to the loss of life, liberty, or property without due process of law" provided by the Constitution.

Since the first information was annulled, the preliminary investigation conducted at that time shall also be considered as void. Due to that fact, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted.

(3) The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective; but, if there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The Sandiganbayan shall immediately remand Criminal Case No. 12893 to the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation and shall hold in abeyance the proceedings before it pending the result of such investigation.

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) 

G. R. No. 191002. March 17, 2010.

FACTS: 

This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the

controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory

requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days

after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009,

Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the

JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process

for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced

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immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC

passed a resolution which stated that they have unanimously

agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief

Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the

incumbent Chief Justice. As a result, the JBC opened the position

of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and published

for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer

and the Philippine Star. In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the

JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the

names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their

sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than

February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the process for

the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with

its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the

President its list of nominees for the position due to the

controversy in this case being unresolved. The compiled cases

which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for

either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus

for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the

next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment. A precedent

frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated

March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B.

Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of

Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here

as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15,

Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to

appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed. 

ISSUES: 

1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.

2. Whether or not there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for

judicial determination.

3. Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next

Chief Justice.

4. Whether or not mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the

submission of the shortlist of nominees by the JBC. 

HELD:

1.Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for

this case was waived by the Court. Legal standing is a peculiar

concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not

brought by parties who have been personally injured by the

operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned

citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public

interest.” But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners “are not

covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the

Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to

its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions

raised.” 

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2. There is a justiciable issue. The court holds that the petitions

set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial

determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the

proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a

short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of

which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief

Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the

JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and

practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list

of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next

President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination,

because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates,

the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the “interview of

constitutional experts, as may be needed.” The resolution of the

controversy will surely settle – with finality – the nagging questions

that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that

it already began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist

from the rest of the process. 

3.Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to

appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other

appointments to the judiciary. The records of the deliberations of

the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted

time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the

Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization

and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not

arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made

to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the

Constitution should contain. As can be seen, Article VII is devoted

to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the

powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The

presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15

and 16 of the Article. Had the framers intended to extend the

prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment

of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done

so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the

provisions. They would have easily and surely written the

prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally

applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court

in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. 

4.Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC. Mandamus

shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person

unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law

specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or

station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one

addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is

not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a

particular way.  For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must

be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act

demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the

act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully

neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act

to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no

appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the

ordinary course of law.

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Bermudez vs Torres 2 Comments

GR No. 131429, August 4, 1999

FACTS:

The vacancy in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac

impelled the main contestants in this case, petitioner Oscar

Bermudez and respondent Conrado Quiaoit, to take contrasting

views on the proper interpretation of a provision in the 1987

Revised Administrative Code. Bermudez was a recommendee of

then Justice Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., for the position of

Provincial Prosecutor. Quiaoit, on the other hand, had the

support of then Representative Jose Yap. On 30 June 1997,

President Ramos appointed Quiaoit to the coveted office. Quiaoit

received a certified xerox copy of his appointment and, on 21

July 1997, took his oath of office before Executive Judge Angel

Parazo of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 65) of Tarlac, Tarlac.

On 23 July 1997, Quiaoit assumed office and immediately

informed the President, as well as the Secretary of Justice and

the Civil Service Commission, of that assumption.

On 10 October 1997, Bermudez filed with the Regional Trial

Court of Tarlac, a petition for prohibition and/or injunction, and

mandamus, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of

injunction/temporary restraining order, against herein

respondents, challenging the appointment of Quiaoit primarily

on the ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation

of the Secretary of Justice prescribed under the Revised

Administrative Code of 1987. After hearing, the trial court

considered the petition submitted for resolution and, in due

time, issued its now assailed order dismissing the petition. The

subsequent move by petitioners to have the order reconsidered

met with a denial.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the

Secretary of Justice to the President can be held fatal to the

appointment of respondent Conrado Quiaoit.

HELD:

The petition is denied. An “appointment” to a public office is the

unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one having the

authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the

duties and functions of an office or trust. The appointment is

deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing

authority has been complied with and its acceptance thereafter

by the appointee in order to render it effective.

Indeed, it may rightly be said that the right of choice is the heart

of the power to appoint. In the exercise of the power of

appointment, discretion is an integral part thereof.

When the Constitution or the law clothes the President with the

power to appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must

be understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample

discretion of whom to appoint. It should be here pertinent to

state that the President is the head of government whose

authority includes the power of control over all “executive

departments, bureaus and offices.”

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It is the considered view of the Court that the phrase “upon

recommendation of the Secretary,” found in Section 9, Chapter

II, Title III, Book IV, of the Revised Administrative Code, should

be interpreted to be a mere advise, exhortation or indorsement,

which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or

obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The President,

being the head of the Executive Department, could very well

disregard or do away with the action of the departments,

bureaus or offices even in the exercise of discretionary

authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted

beyond the scope of his authority.

Pimentel vs. ErmitaPost under case digests, Political Law at Friday, March 09, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: This is a petition to declare unconstitutional the appointments issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (“President Arroyo”) through Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita (“Secretary Ermita”) to Florencio B. Abad, Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Michael T. Defensor, Joseph H. Durano, Raul M. Gonzalez, Alberto G. Romulo, Rene C. Villa, and Arthur C. Yap (“respondents”) as acting secretaries of their respective departments. 

On August 2004, Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments. 

Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004. On 23 September 2004, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity. 

Issue: Is President Arroyo’s appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session, constitutional? 

Held: Yes. The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on

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the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature. The scope of the legislature’s interference in the executive’s power to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office. 

However, even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its powers is executive and not legislative. The Commission on Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its power to give or withhold consent to presidential appointments. 

Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not have appointed respondents as acting secretaries because “in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only

an Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary.” 

The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. 

Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an

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office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be. 

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee. 

The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that “[t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent

person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch.” Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent. 

Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to abuse. Petitioners fail to consider that acting appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. 

Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress,

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whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. 

However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo’s issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.

Flores v Drilon (223 SCRA 568)Posted by Evelyn

FACTS:

The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227,  otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Said provision provides the President the power to appoint an administrator of the SBMA provided that in the first year of its operation, the Olongapo mayor shall be appointed as chairman and chief of executive of the Subic Authority. Petitioners maintain that such infringes to the constitutional provision of Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure," The petitioners also contend that Congress encroaches upon the discretionary power of the President to appoint. 

 

ISSUE:

Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates the constitutional prescription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.

RULING:

The court held the Constitution seeks to prevent a public officer to hold multiple functions since they are accorded with a public office that is a full time job to let them function without the distraction of other governmental duties.

The Congress gives the President the appointing authority which it cannot limit by providing the condition that in the first year of the operation the Mayor of Olongapo City shall assume the Chairmanship. The court points out that the appointing authority the congress gives to the President is no power at all as it curtails the right of the President to exercise discretion of whom to appoint by limiting his choice.

DENR VS DENR EMPLOYEES

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Posted by kaye lee on 12:43 PM

G.R. No. 149724 [Alter ego of the President, Qualified Political Agency

Doctrine]

FACTS:

DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum

order issued by the Regional Exec. Director of DENR, directing the

immediate transfer of the DENR 12 Regional Offices from Cotabato to

Koronadal City.  The memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR

Executive Order issued by the DENR Secretary.

Issue:

Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the

DENR Region 12 Office.

RULING: The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and

administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department,

and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and

promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved

or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the

Chief Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the President as

provided for under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The

President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,

and offices.  He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."

In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR

by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato

City to Koronadal, South Cotabato.  The exercise of this authority by

the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the

President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.

Categories: Constitutional Law 1, G.R. No. 149724

Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited (HPPL) v Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority

Facts•Petition to suspend or hold in abeyance the conduct of SBMA of a rebidding.•SBMA advertised an invitation offering to the private sector the opportunity to develop andoperate a modern marine container terminal within Subic Bay Freeport Zone.•Out of 7 bidders, 3 were declared as qualified: 1) ICTSI 2) RPSI and 3) HPPL•SBMA-PBAC first awarded to HPPL. However, ICTSI filed an appeal with SBMA and alsobefore the Office of the President.•In a memorandum, the President ordered SBMA Chairman Gordon to revaluate thefinancial bids together with the COA.•Again, the SBMA Board issued another reso declaring that HPPL is selected as winner,since it has a realistic business plan offering the greatest financial return to SBMA and themost advantageous to the government.•Nothwithstanding the SBMA’s board recommendations, then Exec Sec Reuben Torressubmitted a memorandum to the Office of President recommending another rebidding.Consequently, the Office of Pres. Issued a memorandum to conduct a rebidding.•

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On July 7, 1997, HPPL filed a complaint against SBMA before the RTC and alleged that abinding and legally enforeceable contract had been established between HPPL and SBMAunder Article 1305 of the civil code, considering that SBMA had repeatedly declared andconfirmed that HPPL was the winning bidder.•During the pre-trial hearing, one of the issues raised and submitted for reso was whetheror not the Office of the President can set aside the award made by SBMA in favor of HPPLand if so, can the Office of the President direct the SBMA to conduct re-bidding of theproposed project.Issue: Can the President set aside the award made by SBMA in favor of HPPL? If so, canthe Office of the President direct SBMA to conduct rebidding of the proposedproject?Held:• Yes•HPPL has not sufficiently shown that it a has a clear and unmistakable right to be declaredthe winning bidder. Though SBMA Board of Directors may have declared them as winner,said award is not final and unassailable.• The SBMA Board of Directors are subject to the control and supervision of the President.All projects undertaken by SBMA require the approval of the President under Letters of Instruction No. 620

 •Letters of Instruction No. 620 mandates that the approval of the President is required in allcontracts of the national government offices, agencies and instrumentalities includingGOCCS involving P2M and above, awarded through public bidding or negotiation.• The President may, within his authority, overturn or reverse any award made by the SBMABoard of Directors for justifiable reasons.•When the President issued the memorandum setting a side the award previously declaredby SBMA in favor of HPPL, the same was within authority of the President and was a validexercise of his prerogative.• The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

KMU vs. NEDA GR no. 167798 April 19, 2006KMU vs. NEDA , GR no. 167798 , April 19, 2006

FACTS:In April 13, 2005, President Gloria Macapagal – Arroyo issued Executive Order 420 requiring all government agencies and government-owned corporations to streamline and harmonize their Identification Systems. The purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability and ensure compatibility and provide convenience to the people served by government entities.Petitioners allege that EO420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the executive branch of the government. Furthermore, they allege that EO420 infringes on the citizen’s rights to privacy.

ISSUE: In issuing EO 420, did the president make, alter or repeal any laws?

RULING:Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In issuing EO 420, the President did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as well as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-friendliness in the implementation of current ID systems of government entities under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive issuance and not an act of legislation.

Angeles vs. GaiteFacts

1. Petitioner was given custody of her grand niece, Maria Mercedes Vistan, to take care and provide for as she grew up. Petitioner became attached to such child and took care of her as her own. Petitioner also gave the same attention to the half-brother of the grand niece. The latter would seek petitioner’s financial support ranging from daily subsistence to hospitalization expenses.

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2. After one incident wherein the half-brother of the grand niece, Michael Vistan, failed to do an important task, the petitioner and the Michael Vistan had a falling out. Since no more support was given to the latter, he took his half-sister away. He brought her to different provinces while asked the help of certain individuals to mislead the petitioner and the police.

3. The police was able to apprehend Michael Vistan through a dragnet operation. 4. The petitioner filed a complaint against Michael Vistan before the Office of the

Provincial Prosecutor in Malolos, Bulacan for five counts of Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act, and for four counts of Violation of Sec. 1 (e) of PD 1829. She likewise filed a complaint for Libel against Maria Cristina Vistan, aunt of Michael and Maria Mercedes.

5. The Investigating prosecutor issued a resolution to continue with the filing of the case. This was however denied by the provincial prosecutor who also issued a decision to dismiss the case. Petitioner filed a petition for review with USEC. Teehankee but was denied. Petitioner then filed a petition for review with SEC Perez and was also denied

6. She tried appealing to the Office of the President but was dismissed by such on the ground of Memorandum Circular No. 58 which bars an appeal or a petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death

7. Petitioner went to the CA which sustained the dismissal8. Petitioner contends that such Memo Circular was unconstitutional since t

diminishes the power of control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate officer, almost unfettered power.

IssueW/N Memorandum Circular No. 58 is unconstitutional since it diminishes the power of the President?

RulingNO, it does not diminish the power of the President

The President's act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of said Memorandum Circular is well within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency, long been established in our jurisdiction.

Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department; the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive."The CA cannot be deemed to have committed any error in upholding the Office of the President's reliance on the Memorandum Circular as it merely interpreted and applied the law as it should be.

Memorandum Circular No. 58, promulgated by the Office of the President on June 30, 1993 reads:

In the interest of the speedy administration of justice, the guidelines enunciated in Memorandum Circular No. 1266 (4 November 1983) on the review by the Office of the President of resolutions/orders/decisions issued by the Secretary of Justice concerning preliminary investigations of criminal cases are reiterated and clarified.

No appeal from or petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be entertained by the Office of the President, except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death x x x.

Henceforth, if an appeal or petition for review does not clearly fall within the jurisdiction of the Office of the President, as set forth in the immediately preceding paragraph, it shall be dismissed outright x x x.

It is quite evident from the foregoing that the President himself set the limits of his power to review decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in order to expedite the disposition of cases. Petitioner's argument that the Memorandum Circular unduly expands the power of the Secretary of Justice to the extent of rendering even the Chief Executive helpless to rectify whatever errors or abuses the former may commit in the exercise of his discretion is purely speculative to say the least. Petitioner cannot second- guess the President's power and the President's own judgment to delegate whatever it is he deems necessary to delegate in order to achieve proper and speedy administration of justice, especially that such delegation is upon a cabinet secretary – his own alter ego.

BUT THERE ARE LIMITATIONS:

Justice Jose P. Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena, makes this clear that

“There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, is his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (par. 3, sec. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem).”

These restrictions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in our fundamental law. There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.

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In the case at bar, the power of the President to review the Decision of the Secretary of Justice dealing with the preliminary investigation of cases cannot be considered as falling within the same exceptional class which cannot be delegated. Besides, the President has not fully abdicated his power of control as Memorandum Circular No. 58 allows an appeal if the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher. Certainly, it would be unreasonable to impose upon the President the task of reviewing all preliminary investigations decided by the Secretary of Justice. To do so will unduly hamper the other important duties of the President by having to scrutinize each and every decision of the Secretary of Justice notwithstanding the latter’s expertise in said matter.

The Constitutional interpretation of the petitioner would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the President’s effectivity in running the government.

Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. Commission on Audit,   G.R. No. 177131. June 7, 2011.Post under Political Law at Sunday, October 16, 2011 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Commission on Audit; jurisdiction over Boy Scouts. (J. Abad)

The issue was whether or not the Boy Scouts of the Philippines (“BSP”) fall under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. The BSP contends that it is not a government-owned or controlled corporation; neither is it an instrumentality, agency, or subdivision of the government. The Supreme Court, however, held that not all corporations, which are not government

owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private corporations as there exists another distinct class of corporations or chartered institutions which are otherwise known as “public corporations.” These corporations are treated by law as agencies or instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the tests of ownership or control and economic viability but to a different criteria relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and objectives and their administrative relationship to the government or any of its departments or offices. As presently constituted, the BSP is a public corporation created by law for a public purpose, attached to the Department of Education Culture and Sports pursuant to its Charter and the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not a private corporation which is required to be owned or controlled by the government and be economically viable to justify its existence under a special law. The economic viability test would only apply if the corporation is engaged in some economic activity or business function for the government, which

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is not the case for BSP. Therefore, being a public corporation, the funds of the BSP fall under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.

Drilon vs Lim Leave a comment

GR No. 112497, August 4, 1994

FACTS:

Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code, the

Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies

and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known

as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance

with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax

ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law

and public policy.

In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional

Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary’s resolution and

sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural

requirements had been observed. More importantly, it declared

Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional

because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of

control over local governments in violation of the policy of local

autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific

provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines

only the power of supervision over local governments. The court

cited the familiar distinction between control and supervision,

the first being “the power of an officer to alter or modify or set

aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of

his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the

latter,” while the second is “the power of a superior officer to

see to it that lower officers perform their functions is accordance

with law.”

ISSUES:

The issues in this case are

(1) whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is

unconstitutional; and

(2) whether or not the Secretary of Justice can exercise control,

rather than supervision, over the local government

HELD:

The judgment of the lower court is reversed in so far as its

declaration that Section 187 of the Local Government Code is

unconstitutional but affirmed the said lower court’s finding that

the procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila

Revenue Code have been observed.

Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only

the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if

warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When

he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also

permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of

the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary

Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not

replace it with his own version of what the Code should be.

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. It

they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act

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undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to

do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The

supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are

followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does

he have the discretion to modify or replace them. In the opinion

of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor

less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of

mere supervision.

Regarding the issue on the non-compliance with the prescribed

procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code, the

Court carefully examined every exhibit and agree with the trial

court that the procedural requirements have indeed been

observed. The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance

as approved but this omission does not affect its validity,

considering that its publication in three successive issues of a

newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process.

Aberca vs. Ver Case Digest L-69866 April 15, 1988

FACTS:

This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila," Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants

issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.

Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents postulate the view that as public officers they are covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done in the performance of official duties or function 

ISSUE:whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. If such action for damages may be maintained, who can be held liable for such violations: only the military personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as well.

RATIO DICIDENDI:

SC: We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. The cases invoked by respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the performance of official duties written the ambit of their powers.

It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre- emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.

Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and

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liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to 'acts of alleged physical violence" which constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties enumerated therein, among others —

The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and details, how plaintiffs' constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and impaired by defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others, searches made without search warrants or based on irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures and confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property which were not subversive and illegal nor covered by the search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular, improper and illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of 'safehouses" where they were kept incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture and other inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory statements. The complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of their constitutional rights.

Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violation.

The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the complaint. It is well established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion

to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action must be based on what appears on the face of the complaint. 6 To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be considered. 7 For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. 8

IBP VS ZAMORAPosted by kaye lee on 11:27 PM

G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian supremacy

clause]

FACTS:

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of

the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive,  directed the

AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the

proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP

questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines

to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:

1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling

the armed forces is subject to judicial review.

2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols

violate the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the

military.

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RULING:

1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of

the Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and

in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual

controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and

enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the

part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can

exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are

complied with, namely: (1)  the existence of an actual and appropriate

case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the

constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at

the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question  is the lis

mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the

civilian supremacy clause.  The calling of the Marines in this case

constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law

enforcement.  The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint

visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility

to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise,

their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and

render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it

cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over

civilian authority.  Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist

the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. 

Neither does it amount to an “insidious incursion” of the military in the

task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the

Constitution.

Lacson Vs. Perez Case DigestLacson Vs. Perez 

357 SCRA 756 G.R. No. 147780

May 10, 2001

Facts: President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the “rebellion” were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information against them were filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved. They also contend that they are allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that hold departure orders were issued against them.

Issue: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and hold departure orders allegedly effected by the same. 

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Held: President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents have declared that the Justice Department and the police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioner’s prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at this time because an individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing for the period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such may be penalized for the delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal ground, the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders, nor were they expressing any intention to leave the country in the near future. To declare the hold departure orders null and void ab initio must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners’ prayer for relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no complaints have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not subjected to. 

Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial warrants for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang.

ARTHUR D. LIM vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (G.R. No. 151445) Case Digest

Facts:

 

Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition

attacking the constitutionality of “Balikatan-02-1”. They were subsequently joined

by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-list organizations,

who filed a petition-in-intervention. Lim and Ersando filed suits in their capacities

as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers. SANLAKAS and PARTIDO on the other

hand, claimed that certain members of their organization are residents of

Zamboanga and Sulu, and hence will be directly affected by the operations being

conducted in Mindanao.

The petitioners alleged that “Balikatan-02-1” is not covered by the Mutual

Defense Treaty (MDT) between the Philippines and the United States. Petitioners

posited that the MDT only provides for mutual military assistance in case of

armed attack by an external aggressor against the Philippines or the US.

Petitioners also claim that the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) does not

authorize American Soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine

Territory.

Issue:

Is the “Balikatan-02-1” inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution?

Ruling:

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The MDT is the core of the defense relationship between the Philippines and the

US and it is the VFA which gives continued relevance to it. Moreover, it is the

VFA that gave legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercise. 

The constitution leaves us no doubt that US Forces are prohibited from engaging

war on Philippine territory. This limitation is explicitly provided for in the Terms of

Reference of the Balikatan exercise. The issues that were raised by the

petitioners was only based on fear of future violation of the Terms of Reference. 

Based on the facts obtaining, the Supreme court find that the holding of

“Balikatan-02-1” joint military exercise has not intruded into that penumbra of

error that would otherwise call for the correction on its part.

The petition and the petition-in-intervention is DISMISSED.

SANLAKAS Vs. Executive Secretary Case DigestSANLAKAS Vs. Executive Secretary 

421 SCRA 656 G.R. No. 159085

February 3, 2004

Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the

President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued. 

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion. 

Issue: 

Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional? 

Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit? 

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Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present. 

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

0001003

DAVID V. ARROYO

489 SCRA 160 – Political Law – The Executive Branch – Presidential Proclamation 1017 – Take Care Clause – Take Over Power – Calling Out

PowerBill of Rights - Freedom of Speech – Overbreadth

In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress.  Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care power and take over power.ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the

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SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;Resolution by the SC   on the Factual Basis of its declaration The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records.  Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military.   Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events.  Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.   However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth TheoryFirst and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct.  It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’ and again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine

On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017.  The SC considered the President’s ‘calling-out’ power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated powers.  From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such criterion has been met.Resolution by the SC on the Take Care DoctrinePursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.’ The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081).  The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate ‘decrees.’  Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.  Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’  To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only “take care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power DoctrineThe president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:

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(1) There must be a war or other emergency.(2)   The delegation must be for a limited period only.(3)  The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.(4)  The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law DeclarationThe SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.

AMPATUAN v. PUNOOctober 26, 2012 §   Leave a comment

June 7, 2011 (G.R. No. 190259)

PARTIES:

Petitioners: DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, ANSARUDDIN ADIONG, REGIE SAHALI-

GENERALE

Respondents : HON. RONALDO PUNO, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE

FACTS:

On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and

women, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946,

placing “the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of

Cotabato under a state of emergency.” She directed the AFP and the PNP “to

undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to

prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence” in the named places.

Under AO 273, she also delegated to the DILG the supervision of the ARMM.

The petitioners claimed that the President’s issuances encroached the ARMM’s

autonomy, that it constitutes an invalid exercise of emergency powers, and

that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency,

especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no

critical violent incidents occurred. They want Proc. 1946 and AO 273 be

declared unconstitutional.

The respondents, however, said that its purpose was not to deprive the ARMM

of its autonomy, but to restore peace and order in subject places. It is pursuant

to her “calling out” power as Commander-in-Chief. The determination of the

need to exercise this power rests solely on her wisdom.

The President merely delegated her supervisory powers over the ARMM to the

DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any way. The delegation was necessary

to facilitate the investigation of the mass killings

ISSUE:

WON President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called

out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless

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violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City

HELD: NO. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of

emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any

law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers.

The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in

such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She

did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.

ISSUE (2): WON there is factual basis on the calling out of the Armed Forces.

HELD: Yes. The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress

lawless violence springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article

VII of the Constitution. While it is true that the Court may inquire into the

factual bases for the President’s exercise of the above power, unless it is

shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the

Court will accord respect to the President’s judgment.

LLAMAS v. EXEC. SEC. ORBOS, OCAMPO IIIOctober 26, 2012 §   Leave a comment

October 15, 1991 (G.R. No. 99031)

PARTIES:

Petitioner: RODOLFO D. LLAMAS

Respondent: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR ORBOS and MARIANO UN OCAMPO

III

FACTS:

Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some

other complainants filed an administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged

acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found guilty. He was

suspended for office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed

office. In not less than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO

showing that he was pardoned hence he can resume office without completing

the 90 day suspension imposed upon him.

The petitioner argues that President may grant executive clemency only in

criminal cases. They say that the qualifying phrase “after conviction by final

judgment” applies solely to criminal cases, and no other law allows the grant of

executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has been “convicted in an

administrative case, allegedly because the word “conviction” refers only to

criminal cases.

ISSUE: WON the President of the Philippines has the power to grant executive

clemency in administrative cases.

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HELD:

Yes. It is not specified in the constitution whether it may be considered under

criminal or administrative cases. , if the law does not distinguish, so we must

not distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases

executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion

of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be

exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for

the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section

19 of the Constitution. Cases of impeachment are automatically excluded

inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.

The do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President

cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is the court’s

considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and

pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more

reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are

clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant

executive clemency in administrative cases, we refer only to all administrative

cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the

government.

In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is

proof beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, in administrative cases,

the quantum of evidence required is mere substantial evidence to support a

decision.

People vs. SallePost under Pardon   , Political Law Case Digests

Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not yet

therefore attained finality, as in the instant case, executive clemency may

not yet be granted to the appellant.

The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as anabandonment or

waiver of the appeal.

Facts: 

On November 1991, Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were

convicted of the compound crime of murder and destructive arson

before the RTC of Quezon City. Salle and Mengote filed their Notice of

Appeal which was accepted by the Supreme Court on March 24, 1993.

In 1994, Salle filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. The Court

required Salle's counsel, Atty. Ida May La'o of the Free Legal Assistance

Group (FLAG) to verify the voluntariness of the motion.

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Atty. La'o manifested that Salle signed the motion without the

assistance of counsel on his misimpression that the motion was

necessary for hisearly release from the New Bilibid Prison following the

grant of a conditional pardon by the President on December 9, 1993.

She also stated that Mengote was also granted conditional pardon and

that he immediately left for his province without consulting her. She

prayed that the Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal.

On March 23, 1994, the Court granted Salle's motion.

After taking into consideration Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution

which provides that the President may, except in cases

of impeachment or as otherwise provided in the Constitution, grant

pardon after conviction by final judgment, the Court required (1)

the Solicitor General and the counsel for accused-appellants to submit

their memoranda on the issue of the enforceability of the conditional

pardon and (2) the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail,

Release or Pardon to inform the Court why it recommended to the

President the grant of the conditional pardon despite the pendency of

the appeal.

In its Memorandum, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that

the conditional pardon granted to appellant Mengote is unenforceable

because the judgment of conviction is not yet final in view of the

pendency in this Court of his appeal.

On the other hand, the FLAG, through Atty. La'o, submits that the

conditional pardon extended to Mengote is valid and enforceable.

Citing Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., it argues that although Mengote did

not file a motion to withdraw the appeal, he was deemed to have

abandoned the appeal by his acceptance of the conditional pardon

which resulted in the finality of his conviction.

Issue: 

Whether or not a pardon granted to an accused during the pendency of

his appeal from a judgment of conviction by the trial court is

enforceable.

Held: 

Section 19, Article VII thereof reads as follows:

“Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this

Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and

pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final

judgment.

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He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of

a majority of all the Members of the Congress.” 

Where the pardoning power is subject to the limitation of conviction, it

may be exercised at any time after conviction even if the judgment is

on appeal. It is, of course, entirely different where the requirement is

" final conviction, " as was mandated in the original provision of

Section 14, Article IX of the 1973 Constitution, or "conviction by final

judgment," as presently prescribed in Section 19, Article VII of

the 1987 Constitution. In such a case, no pardon may be extended

before a judgment of conviction becomes final.

A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is

seasonably perfected, (b) when the accused commences to serve the

sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is expressly waived in writing,

except where the death penalty was imposed by the trial court, and (d)

when the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his right to

appeal. Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and

has not yet therefore attained finality, as in the instant case, executive

clemency may not yet be granted to the appellant.

The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section 19, Article

VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether

full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal

from his conviction by the trial court. Any application therefor, if one is

made, should not be acted upon or the process toward its grant should

not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the

agencies or instrumentalities of the Government concerned must

require proof from the accused that he has not appealed from his

conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in

the form of a certificationissued by the trial court or the appellate

court, as the case may be. 

The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an   abandonment   or

waiver of the appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of a

pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of

an appeal shall render those responsible therefor administratively

liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must not solely rely

on the pardon as a basis for the release of the accused

from confinement.

WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengote y Cuntado

is hereby given thirty (30) days from notice hereof within which to

secure from the latter the withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to

this Court. The conditional pardon granted the said appellant shall be

deemed to take effect only upon the grant of such withdrawal. In case

of non-compliance with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau of

Corrections must exert every possible effort to take back into his

custody the said appellant, for which purpose he may seek the

assistance of the Philippine National Police or the National Bureau of

Investigation. (People vs. Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote,

G.R. No. 103567, December 4, 1995)

People vs. BacangPost under case digests, Political Law at Tuesday, March 27, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: RTC of Negros Orietal ruled on a Criminal case finding accused Casido, Alcorin and Francisco Palacios guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder

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and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua and to pay 200k and 25k as actual damages and funeral expenses respectively. Accused Casido and Alcorin appealed to the courts. But the accused later filed motion to withdraw appeal without stating the reason for their actions. The SC later received an endorsement form Superintendent Tesoro informing the court that both Casido and Alcorin were released on Conditional pardon. Thus, following the necessary procedures of submitting certified true copies of the conditional pardons and their certificates of discharge signed by the president, Alcorin and Casido were released for confinement. It was evident that the pardon was issued during the pendency of their instant appeal, which is the controversy of this case 

Issue: Whether or not the pardon is valid given that it was granted during the pendency of the instant appeal 

Held: No it is not valid. This is because Article VII of the present constitution prohibits the grants of pardon whether full or conditional to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by TC. (Note: Endorsement of pardon was given earlier than the motion to withdraw the appeal was made hence, it was still appeal was still pending during the pardon grant). Thus, pardon can only be granted or process for pardon shouldn’t have begun when the appeal has yet to be withdrawn. The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as anabandonment or waiver of the appeal and the release of an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible administratively liable. 

The conditional pardons granted in this case of Casido and Alcorin are void hor having been extended during the pendency of their instant appeal.

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TORRES v. GONZALESOctober 26, 2012 §   Leave a comment

July 23, 1987 (G.R. No. 76872)

PARTIES:

Petitioner: WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG

Respondents: HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF

PARDONS AND PAROLE, and THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF PRISONS

FACTS:

1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the

president w/ the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again.

Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner

prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was

consequently released from confinement. In 1982, Torres was charged with

multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of

Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed

the issue before the SC averring that the Exec Dep’t erred in convicting him for

violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against him

were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal.

ISSUE: whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is

necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for

violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the

balance of his original sentence.

HELD: In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned

and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the

Executive Department has two options: (1) Section 64 (i) of the Revised

Administrative Code, a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny, or

(2) Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, a judicial act consisting of trial for

and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon.

Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised

Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime

is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in

order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional

pardon.

Under art. 159 of the RPC, parolee or convict who is regarded as having

violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by

final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed.

In the case at bar, President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner

under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an

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exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial

scrutiny.

*Who determines if violated? The PRESIDENT. When the person was

conditionally pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief Executive of his

constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner

carrie[d] with it the authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a

condition or conditions of the pardon has or have been violated. To no other

department of the Government [has] such power been intrusted.

People vs. Casido G.R. No. 116512, March 7, 1997Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes 

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: In an effort to seek their release at the soonest

possible time, accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin

Alcorin applied for pardon before the Presidential Committee on

the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon (PCGBRP), as well as for

amnesty before the National Amnesty Commission (NAC). The

PCGBRP was constituted in line with the confidence-building

measures of the government. Thereafter, accused-appellants

were granted conditional pardon. But the Court ruled in

resolution that the conditional pardon granted to accused-

appellants is void for having been extended during the

pendency of their appeal. Prior to the resolution, the NAC

favorably acted on the applications for amnesty of accused-

appellants.

Issue: Whether or not the release of accused-appellants is

valid

Held: The release of accused-appellants was valid solely

on the ground of the amnesty granted them and not by the

pardon.

Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a

private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person

pardoned because the courts take no notice thereof; while

amnesty by theProclamation of the Chief Executive with the

concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the

courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after

conviction; while amnesty is to classes of persons or

communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally

before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and

sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves

the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he

has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the

punishment, and for that reason it does not work the restoration

of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless

such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,

and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the

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civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence. While

amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion

the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates theoffense with

which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands

before the law precisely as though he had committed

no offense.

While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended

during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final

judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of

Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution, the grant of amnesty, for

which accused-appellants voluntarily applied

under Proclamation No. 347 was valid. This Proclamation was

concurred in by both Houses of Congress. 

GONZALES V. HECHANOVA

9 SCRA 230 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Treaty vs Executive Agreements – Statutes Can Repeal Executive Agreements

During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the National Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals or rice. Hence, the then Executive Secretary, Rufino Hechanova, authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Ramon Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction”, because Republic Act 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by “the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal.

HELD: Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up.As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in “All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question”. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress. 

USAFFE v. Treasurer of the Philippines (1959)USAFFE VETERANS ASSOCIATION, INC. v TREASURER OF THE

PHILIPPINES, ET. AL. (June 30, 1959) Appeal from a judgment of

the CFI of Manila

FACTS:

• Romulo-Snyder Agreement (1950): RP Govt undertook to

return to the US Govt in 10 annual installments, a total of about

$35M advanced by the US to, but unexpended by, the Nat’l

Defense Forces of the RP.

• Oct 1954: The Usaffe Veterans Associations Inc prayed in its

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complaint before the CFI that said Agreement be annulled; that

payments thereunder be declared illegal; & that defendants as

officers of RP be restrained from disbursing any funds in the

Nat’l Treasury in pursuance of said Agreement.

• Usaffe Veterans further asked that the moneys available,

instead of being remitted to the US, should be turned over to the

Finance Service of the AFP for the payment of all pending claims

of the veterans represented by plaintiff.

• 3 PROPOSITIONS OF PLAINTIFF IN COMPLAINT: 1) that the

funds to be “returned” under the Agreement were funds

appropriated by the US Congress for the RP Army, actually

delivered to the RP Govt & actually owned by the said

Government; 2) that U.S Secretary Snyder of the Treasury, had

no authority to retake such funds from the RP Govt; 3) The RP

Foreign Secretary Carlos P. Romulo had no authority to return or

promise to return the aforesaid sums of money through the

Agreement.

• The court eventually upheld the validity of the Agreement.

Plaintiff appealed.

• July 26, 1941: Foreseeing the War in the Pacific, Pres

Roosevelt, called into the service of the US Armed Forces, for

the duration of the emergency, all organized mil forces of the

Commonwealth. (His order was published here by Proc No 740 of

Pres Quezon on Aug 10, 1941)

• October 1941: By 2 special orders, MacArthur, Commanding

Gen of USAFFE, placed under his command all the RP Army units

including Phil Constabulary.

• Thus, US Congress provided in its Appropriation Act of Dec 17,

1941 (Public Law No. 353): “For all expenses necessary for the

mobilization, operation & maintenance of the RP Army, including

expenses connected w/ calling into the service RP mil forces…

$269,000.00; to remain available ‘til June 30, 1943, w/c shall be

available for payment to the Commonwealth upon its written

request, either in advance of or in reimbursement for all or any

part of the estimated or actual costs, as authorized by the

USAFFE Commanding Gen, of the necessary expenses for the

purposes aforesaid.”

• Pursuant to the power reserved to him under Public Law 353,

Roosevelt issued EO 9011: “2(a) Necessary expenditures from

funds in the Phil Treasury for the purposes authorized by Public

Law 353, will be made by disbursing officers of the RP Army on

the approval of authority of the Commandign General, USAFFE,

& such purposes as he may deem proper…”

• P570,863,000.00 was transferred directly to the AFP by means

of vouchers w/c stated “Advance of Funds under Public Law 353

& EO 9011” This was used mostly to discharge in RP the

monetary obligations assumed by the US as a result of the

induction of the AFP into the US Army, & its operations

beginning in 1941.

• There remained unexpended & uncommitted $35M in the

possession of the AFP as of Dec 31, 1949. Bec the RP Govt then

badly needed funds, Pres Quirino, through CB Gov Cuaderno,

proposed to US officials the retention of the $35M as a loan, &

for its repayment in 10 annual installments. This was the

Romulo-Snyder Agreement, signed in Washington on Nov 6,

1950 by RP Foreign Affairs Sec Romulo, & US Sec of Treasury,

39

John Snyder.

• PRESENT ACTION: Usaffe’s arguments – 1) the money

delivered by the US to the AFP were straight payments for mil

services; ownership thus vested in RP Govt upon delivery, &

consequently, there was nothing to return, nothing to consider

as a loan; 2) the Agreement was void bec there was no loan to

be repaid & bec it was not binding on the RP Govt for lack of

authority of the officers who concluded it.

ISSUES

• Basic issue: Validity of the Romulo-Snyder Agreement – Court

can’t pass judgment

1. WON there is obligation to repay - YES

2. WON the officers who promised to repay had authority to bind

this Govt – YES

RATIO:

1. YES

• Note that the $269M appropriated in Public Law 353 (see 8th

bullet) expressly said that the money is to be handed to the RP

Govt either in advance of or in reimbursement thereof.

• In any system of accounting, advances of funds for

expenditures contemplate disbursements to be reported, &

credited if approved, against such advances, the unexpended

sums to be returned later. Congressional law itself required

accounting “in the manner prescribed by US Pres - & said Pres in

EO 9011, outlined the procedure whereby advanced funds shall

be accounted for.

• It also requires as a condition sine qua non that all

expenditures shall first be approved by the USAFFE

Commanding Gen.

• These ideas of “funds advanced” to meet expenditures of the

Phil Army as may be approved by the USAFFE Comm-Gen, in

connection w/ the accounting requirement, evidently contradict

appellant’s thesis that the moneys represented straight

payments to RP Govt for its armed services, & passed into the

absolute control of such Govt

• Instead of returning such amount into one lump sum, our Exec

Dept arranged for its repayment in 10 annual installments.

Prima facie such arrangement should raise no valid objection,

given the obligation to return.

2. YES (They have authority to bind Govt even w/o Senate

concurrence)

• There is no doubt Pres Quirino approved the negotiations. And

he had the power to contract budgetary loans under RA 213,

amending RA 16.

• The most impt argument, however, rests on the lack of

ratification of the Agreement by RP Senate to make it binding on

the Govt.

• The ff explanation of the defendant was considered persuasive

by the Court…

The agreement is not a ‘treaty’ as that term is used in CONSTI.

However, a treaty is not the only form that an int’l agreement

may assume. For the grant of treatymaking power to the

40

Executive & the Senate does not exhaust the power of the govt

over int’l relations.

Executive agreements may be entered into w/ other states &

are effective even w/o concurrence of Senate.

In int’l law, there’s no difference bet’n treaties & executive

agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned as

long as the negotiating functionaries have remained w/n their

powers.

The distinction bet’n executive agreements & treaties is purely

a const’l one & has not int’l legal significance.

Altman v. US: An int’l compact negotiated bet’n the reps of 2

sovereign nations & made in the name or behalf of the

contracting parties & dealing w/ impt commercial rel’ns bet’n

the 2 countries, is a treaty both internationally although as an

executive agreement it is not technically a treaty requiring the

advice & consent of the Senate

2 classes of Executive Agreements: 1) agreements made

purely as executive acts affecting external relations &

independent of or w/o legislative authorization, w/c may be

termed as pres’l agreements; 2) agreements entered into in

pursuance of acts of Cong, w/c have been designated as

Congressional-Executive Agreements

The Romulo-Snyder Agreement may fall under any of these 2

classes for on Sept 18, 1946, RP Congress authorized the RP

Pres to obtain such loans or incur such indebtedness w/ the US.

Even granting there’s no leg authorization, the Agreement was

legally & validly entered into to conform to the 2nd category,

namely, as agreements entered into purely as executive acts

w/o leg authorization’, w/c usu includes money agreements.

• The Agreement was not submitted to the US Senate either. But

the Phil Senate’s Resolution No. 15 practically admits the

validity & binding force of such Agreement.

• Further, the acts of Congress appropriating funds for the

yearly installments necessary to comply w/ such Agreement

constitute a ratification thereof, W/C PLACES THE QUESTION OF

VALIDITY OUT OF THE COURT’S REACH, NO CONST’L PRINCIPLE

HAVING BEEN INVOKED TO RESTRICT CONGRESS’ PLENARY

POEWR TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS – LOAN OR NO LOAN.

HELD: Plaintiff failed to make a clear case for the relief

demanded. Petition DENIED.

Tanada vs Angara272 SCRA 18 May 2, 1997

Facts:

On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by the Secretary of

the Department of Trade and Industry signed the final act binding the

Philippine Government to submit to its respective competent authorities the

WTO (World Trade Organization) Agreements to seek approval for such. On

December 14, 1994, Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine Senate

ratifying such WTO Agreement.The present petition was filed assailing the

constitutionality of the WTO agreement as it violates Section 19, Article II of

the Constitution, providing for the development of a self reliant and

independent national economy, and Sections 10 and 12 of Article XII thereof,

providing for the “Filipino first” policy.

Issue:

41

Whether or not Resolution No. 97 ratifying the WTO Agreement is

unconstitutional.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that Resolution No. 97 is not unconstitutional. While

the constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and

enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange

with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity, and limits

protection of Filipino interests only against foreign competition and trade

practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to

pursue an isolationalist policy. Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a “self-

reliant and independent national economy” does not necessarily rule out the

entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither

“economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.”The

Senate, after deliberation and voting, gave its consent to the WTO Agreement,

thereby making it “a part of the law of the land”. The Supreme Court must give

due respect to an equal department in government. It presumes its actions as

regular and done in good faith unless there is convincing proof and persuasive

agreements to the contrary. As a result, the ratification of the WTO Agreement

limits or restricts the absoluteness of sovereignty. A treaty engagement is not

a mere obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. A

state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in

its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the

fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.

BAYAN v. ZAMORAOctober 26, 2012 §   Leave a comment

BAYAN v. ZAMORA

G. R. No. 138570

October 10, 2000

Facts:

The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among

others, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This

resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which culminated on

January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA,

which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States

Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.

Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999,

the senate approved it by (2/3) votes.

Cause of Action:

Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987

constitution is applicable and not Section 21, Article VII.

Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the

“foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” may be allowed in the Philippines

unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:

42

a) it must be a treaty,

b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the

votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by

congress, and

c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable

so that, what is requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the

concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the senate.

ISSUE: Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section

25, Article XVIII of the Constitution?

HELD:

Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign

military bases, troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain

extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII

will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of

determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of

the senate.

The Constitution, makes no distinction between “transient” and “permanent.”

We find nothing in section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or

facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.

It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an

executive agreement because, under international law, an executive

agreement is as binding as a treaty.

Plaridel M. Abaya vs. Hon. Secretary Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr.

FACTS:

On May 7, 2004 Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of the Department

of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) issued a Resolution No. PJHL-

A-04-012. It was approved by DPWH Acting Secretary Florante

Soriquez. This resolution recommended the award to China Road &

Bridge Corporation of the contract for the implementation of civil

works for Contract Package No. I (CP I), which consists of the

improvement/rehabilitation of the San Andres-Virac-Jct. Bago-Viga

road, with the lengt of 79.818 kilometers, in the island province of

Catanduanes.

This Loan Agreement No. PH-204 was executed by and between the

JBIC and the Philippine Government pursuant to the exchange of

Notes executed by and between Mr. Yoshihisa Ara, Ambassador

Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the Philippines, and

then Foreign Affairs Secretary Siazon, in behalf of their respective

governments.

ISSUE:

43

Whether or not the Loan Agreement No. PH-204 between the JBIC

and the Philippine Government is a kind of a treaty.

HELD:

The Loan Agreement No. PH-204 taken in conjunction with the

Exchange of Notes dated December 27, 1999 between the Japanese

Government and the Philippine Government is an executive

agreement.

An “exchange of notes” is a record of a routine agreement that has

many similarities with the private law contract. The agreement

consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being

in the possession of the one signed by the representative of the other.

…treaties, agreements, conventions, charters, protocols, declarations,

memoranda of understanding, modus vivendi and exchange of notes

all are refer to international instruments binding at international law.

Although these instruments differ from each other by title, they all

have common features and international law has applied basically the

same rules to all these instruments. These rules are the result of long

practice among the States, which have accepted them as binding

norms in their mutual relations. Therefore, they are regarded as

international customary law.

That case was dismissed by the SCORP last Feb. 14 2007.

What the petitioners wanted was that Foreign funded projects also

undergo the procurement process.

The dismissal of the case somehow gave justification for the delay of

the implementing rules for foreign funded projects (IRR-B) of the

procurement law

If we recall the decision of the Abaya vs Ebdane was used by the DOJ

when the

DOTC Secretary was asking for an opinion from the former, during

the ZTE controversy.

as ruled by the Supreme Court in Abaya v. Ebdane, an

exchange of notes is considered a form of an executive agreement,

which

becomes binding through executive action without need of a vote by

the

Senate and that (like treaties and conventions, it is an international

instrument binding at international law,

The second issue involves an examination of the coverage of

Republic Act No. 9184, otherwise known as the “Government

Procurement Reform Act”. Section 4 of the said Act provides that it

shall

apply to:

… the Procurement of infrastructure Projects, Goods and

Consulting Services, regardless of source of funds, whether local

or foreign, by all branches and instrumentalities of government, its

departments, offices and agencies, including government-owned

and/or -controlled corporations and local government units,

subject to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 138. Any

treaty or international or executive agreement affecting the

subject matter of this Act to which the Philippine government is a

signatory shall be observed.

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines   vs. Duque

Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein

44

petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive agency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.

Issue: . Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;

Held: YES

under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members,in the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads:Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organizationfor an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either

By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional

mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

 Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature

VINUYA VS. SEC. ROMULO   Leave a commentISABELITA C. VINUYA, VICTORIA C. DELA PEÑA, HERMINIHILDA,

MANIMBO, LEONOR H. SUMAWANG, CANDELARIA L. SOLIMAN, MARIA

L. QUILANTANG, MARIA L. MAGISA, NATALIA M. ALONZO, LOURDES M.

NAVARO, FRANCISCA M. ATENCIO, ERLINDA MANALASTAS, TARCILA M.

SAMPANG, ESTER M. PALACIO MAXIMA R. DELA CRUZ, BELEN A.

SAGUM, FELICIDAD TURLA, FLORENCIA M. DELA PEÑA, FRANCIA A.

BUCO, PASTORA C. GUEVARRA, VICTORIA M. DELA CRUZ, PETRONILA

O. DELA CRUZ, ZENAIDA P. DELA CRUZ, CORAZON M. SUBA,

EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA, LYDIA A. SANCHEZ, ROSALINA M.BUCO,

PATRICIA A. ERNARDO, LUCILA H. PAYAWAL, MAGDALENA LIWAG,

ESTER C. BALINGIT, JOVITA A. DAVID, EMILIA C. MANGILIT, VERGINIA

M. BANGIT, GUILLERMA S. BALINGIT, TERECITA PANGILINAN,

MAMERTA C. PUNO, CRISENCIANA C. GULAPA, SEFERINA S. TURLA,

MAXIMA B. TURLA, LEONICIA G. GUEVARRA, ROSALINA M. CULALA,

CATALINA Y. MANIO, MAMERTA T. SAGUM, CARIDAD L. TURLA, et al.

In their capacity and as members of the “Malaya Lolas Organization”,

– versus -

THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, THE

HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGNAFFAIRS DELIA DOMINGO-

ALBERT, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MERCEDITAS N.

GUTIERREZ, and THE HONORABLE SOLICITOR GENERAL ALFREDO L.

BENIPAYO

G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010

FACTS:

This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory

45

injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the

DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.

Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit

organization registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing

aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during

the Second World War.

Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive

Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a

claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the

establishment of the “comfort women” stations in the Philippines. But officials

of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the

position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had

already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty

between the Philippines and Japan.

Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that

respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess

of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against

humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the

respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of

reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and

other international tribunals.

Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals

relative to the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951

and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.

On January 15, 1997, the Asian Women’s Fund and the Philippine government

signed a Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support

programs for former comfort women. Over the next five years, these were

implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

ISSUE:

WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not

espousing petitioners’ claims for official apology and other forms of reparations

against Japan.

RULING:

Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive

Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse

petitioners’ claims against Japan.

Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are

to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which

full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive

branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the

wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”

One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It

is well-established that “the conduct of the foreign relations of our government

is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative–‘the

political’–departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be

done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or

decision.” are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They

are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people

whose welfare they advance or imperil.

But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and

courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and

executive agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine

government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign

government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is

demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the

political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided

that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals

for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of

such decision is not for the courts to question.

The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the

conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time

of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the

form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.

The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause

would be inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt

our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in

this region. For the to overturn the Executive Department’s determination

would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate

46

political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been

constitutionally committed.

From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle,

where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treaty’s

conclusion and our consideration – the Executive must be given ample

discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim

against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and

those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and

whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.

In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for

individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has been

when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the

individual’s behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting

to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State

is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects,

respect for the rules of international law.

Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise

diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit,

for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal

person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not

adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can

do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering

their cause or obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the province

of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.

Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not

alter this analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by

the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of

Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international

crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.

The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has

been used as a legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the

community of states as a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between

the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and

those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By

their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of the

importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal

interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.

The term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers to norms that

command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom.

Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are

mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general

international norms of equivalent authority

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

CRISTOBAL V. LABRADOR

Pardon – Restoration of Civil & Political RightsSantos was convicted of the crime of estafa. He was given pardon by the president but even prior to his pardon he was already holding the position as the municipality president of Malabon notwithstanding his conviction. Cristobal, on the other hand, averred that Santos should be excluded from the list of electors in Malabon because he was already convicted of final judgment “for any crime against property”. This is pursuant to CA 357 of the New Election Code. The lower court presided by Labrador ruled that Santos is exempt from the provision of the law by virtue of the pardon restoring the respondent to his “full civil and political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property responsibility.”ISSUE: Whether or not Santos should not be excluded as an elector.HELD: It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised after conviction; and (b) that such power does not extend cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest authority to whom it is entrusted. An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all

47

disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the present case, the disability is the result of conviction without which there would be no basis for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate its command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences Of conviction. In the present case, while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that “he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which a e clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility,” it is absolute insofar as it “restores the respondent to full civil and political rights. Upon other hand, the suggestion that the disqualification imposed in par (b) of sec 94 of CA 357, does not fall within the purview of the pardoning power of the president, would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power of the president, not contemplated in the Constitution, and would lead furthermore to the result that there would be no way of restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature except through legislative action.

MONSANTO V. FACTORAN

Pardon Does not Extinguish Civil Liabilities & It is Prospective

Monsanto was the Asst Treasurer of Calbayug City. She was charged for the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents. She was found guilty and was sentenced to jail. She was however granted pardon by Marcos. She then wrote a letter to the Minister of Finance for her to be reinstated to her former position since it was still vacant. She was also requesting for back pays. The Minister of Finance referred the issue to the Office of the President and Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position. Also, Monsanto avers that by reason of the pardon, she should no longer be compelled to answer for the civil liabilities brought about by her acts.

ISSUE: Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to her former post.

HELD: A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.” This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits. On the other hand, civil liability arising from crime is governed by the RPC. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner’s civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.

GARCIA v. COAOctober 26, 2012 §   Leave a comment

September 14, 1993 (G.R. No. 75025)

PARTIES:

Petitioner: VICENTE GARCIA

Respondents: THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE

HONORABLE MINISTER, LAND TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, THE

REGIONAL DIRECTOR, TELECOM REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IV

48

FACTS:

Petitioner was a supervising lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of

Telecommunications in Lucena City. A criminal case of qualified theft was filed

against him. The president grated him an executive clemency. The petitioner

filed a claim for back payment of salaries. The petitioner was later recalled to

the service on 12 March 1984 but the records do not show whether petitioner’s

reinstatement was to the same position of Supervising Lineman.

ISSUE: Whether Garcia is entitled to the payment of back wages after having

been reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.

HELD:

The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office

which was forfeited by reason of the conviction of the offense. But since

pardon does not generally result in automatic reinstatement because the

offender has to apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to back wages.

If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this

innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent; as if he had not been

found guilty of the offense charged. 7 When a person is given pardon because

he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party from all

punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean

name, good reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.

In the case at bar, the acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not

on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not

commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from finding him innocent of the

charge, the trial court commended petitioner for his concern and dedication as

a public servant. Verily, petitioner’s innocence is the primary reason behind

the grant of executive clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable

recommendations for his reinstatement. This signifies that petitioner need no

longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to his

office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.

Petitioner’s automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to

back wages. This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the

start and to make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust

dismissal from the service. The right to back wages is afforded to those with

have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those

otherwise acquitted of the charges against them.

Therefore, the court ordered the full back wages from April 1 1975 (date when

he was illegally dismissed) to March 12 1984 (reinstated) to the petitioner.